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THE LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH : THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE REVISITED

Ahmed Abdullah Jamal he question of US role and motives in relation to the liberation war of Bangladesh has been examined from different angles by politicians, scholars and journalists. Most prominent among such authors (whose writings have been referred to in this article) are Henry Kissinger, Christopher Van Hollen and Lawrence Lifschultz. While their writings play a considerable role in explaining US policy toward the Bangladesh crisis, their main focus remains on more general strategies and intricacies of high-profile diplomacy, often leaving out nuances of sub-continental politics, inter-state relations, conflicting views and interests. Besides, a huge number of hitherto undisclosed documents have recently been declassified by the US government, many of which have been published in two valuable volumes, one edited by Roedad Khan1 and the other by Enayetur Rahim and Joyce L. Rahim2 . These recently accessible sources permit fresh insights into the US policy with regard to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation, and make it necessary to revisit a relatively well studied subject. Initial Assessment and Reassessment As the prospect of the emergence of an independent Bangladesh became stronger after the sweeping victory of Awami League in the general elections of December 1970, the US government started studying different dimensions of such a scenario from the US perspective. The general conclusion of these studies was that the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan was unlikely to have any adverse impact on US interests. For instance, a Contingency study on Pakistan East Pakistan Secession dated February 16, 1971 concluded that though US interests were thought to be better served by a unified Pakistan previously, the United States should be able to adjust to the emergence of two separate states and to maintain satisfactory

relations with them without serious damage to the US interests. The US had nothing to lose from such eventuality, because it was unlikely that either Pakistan or Bangladesh would in the foreseeable future change its external orientation. On the contrary, the study continued, both will want to maintain viable ties with the U.S. as an offset to their relations with other major external powers: India, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China3 . Two months later, the Bangladesh crisis was reassessed by the Senior Review Group (SRG) of the US National Security Council. On April 16, 1971, a policy paper named Pakistan-American Relations : a Reassessment presented before the SRG categorically stated that psychologically the concept of a united Pakistan is dead in Bengal. We see no way in which President Yahya can establish a civilian government based on any significant degree of popular support.4 The paper went on to conclude that Pakistan could remain united only through military force 5 . Commenting on the implications of the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan for the U.S.A., it was assumed that a Pakistan divided into two viable and politically stable states would be almost as acceptable from the point of view of U.S. interests6 . Finally, the policy paper suggested that all efforts be made for bringing about an early cessation of hostilities, for restraining India from providing military support to the separatists, and even for urging the Soviets to counsel restraint in New Delhi 7 . The main concern was to avoid a fresh Indo-Pakistan war, which would run contrary to US interests in the region. The reality of emerging Bangladesh was also brought to the attention of the US government by its own representatives on the spot. In a secret telegram to the Secretary of State on April 13, 1971, US Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating observed: Pakistan is probably finished as a unified state; India is clearly the predominant actual and potential power in this area of the world; Bangladesh with limited potential and massive problems is probably emerging. There is much the United States can do to promote its interests in South Asia and beyond by timely accommodation to these new realities8 . It is interesting to note here that Keatings observations and suggestions had no impact on President Nixon, who believed that every Ambassador who goes to India falls in love with India9 .

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These assessments and reassessments were made known to the highest levels of US policy makers including President Nixon, his National Security Advisor Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers. Having been presented with all the facts and analyses pertaining to the problem, it was for them to form appropriate conclusions from available information and consider re-adjustment of US policy in the face of rapidly deteriorating situation in Bangladesh. Massive Inaction However, the response that the Bangladesh crisis induced in Washington was to refrain from any concrete initiative for resolving the problem. In view of Nixons special relationship with Yahya, and Kissingers evident support for the formers position, members of the Senior Review Group decided that massive inaction would be the best policy for the United States.10 The so called massive inaction turned out to be a policy of passive tolerance of atrocities caused by the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh on the one hand, and active attempts to maintain the territorial integrity of Pakistan on the other. Despite Nixons claim that he holds no brief for Yahyas actions11 , his lenient approach to Pakistan went so far as to assert that the US would not measure its relationship with the government of Pakistan in terms of what it has done in East Pakistan12 . Comparing the case of Bangladesh with that of Nigerian civil war in 1969, he hinted that the US should refrain from getting involved in the Bangladesh issue just as it had in connection with Biafra stayed out of the political side of the problem.13 On another occasion, brushing aside suggestions to stop all American aid to Pakistan, Nixon approved Kissingers softer line towards Pakistan by adding a handwritten note: To all hands. Dont squeeze Yahya at this time. RN.14 . Such indulgent treatment of Pakistan by the White House in the name of massive inaction further hardened Pakistans uncompromising attitude toward the Bangladesh issue and created among its military leaders the expectation that US, along with China, would assist Pakistan in its future confrontation with India. Sino-American rapprochement and Pakistans role in it strengthened this expectation. The justification of massive inaction that was offered at the time was the need to protect Pakistans territorial integrity, presuming that

the Bangladesh crisis was an internal affair of Pakistan in which other countries should not interfere. What was important to the White House was that if Pakistan broke up, it should be the result of its internal dynamics, not of American pressures15 . Although the US policy did not preclude the need to move Pakistan toward political accommodation, this had to be done through understanding rather than pressure16 . Curiously, the US policymakers adopted pacifist policy despite their anticipation of a civil war leading to independence fairly quickly as early as March 2617 . The Tilt If massive inaction was a covert form of supporting Pakistan, it soon became an undisguised tilt toward Pakistan18 . It is interesting to note, however, that despite such pronounced bias in favour of Pakistan, the Nixon administration claimed that the US was giving an even handed treatment to both Pakistan and India. Even if the US administrations claim of equal treatment were true, it was unjust, because they did not deserve equal treatment at the time. As recently disclosed confidential American documents reconfirm, the White House was fully aware of the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army, resulting in death and suffering of millions of innocent Bengalis. For instance, Archer Blood, US Consul General in Dhaka at the time, sent dozens of messages to the State Department describing the situation in occupied Bangladesh.19 One of those messages, sent on April 6 contained a strong protest by twenty officers of the US Consulate and AID Mission, supported by Blood himself, against the US policy in relation to the Bangladesh Crisis. Criticising the US government for failing to denounce the suppression of democracy and atrocities by the Pakistanis in Bangladesh, the letter (better known as the dissent cable) went on to emphasise that the US policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined 20 . Supporting these statements, Archer Blood warned about the political danger of ignoring the most likely prospect of a liberated Bangladesh, pointing out the foolishness of pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser21 . Ignoring such appeals from its own people, the Nixon administration tried to conceal its insensitive approach to the massive human suffering in Bangladesh by referring to the large amount of humanitarian

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American aid allocated for Bangladeshi refugees22 . While it is true that the US aid for the refugees did play an important role in supporting the refugees, it was hardly generated by pure humanitarian concerns. As a matter of fact, Nixon believed that the return of refugees from India may deny India the Casus Belli for going into war with Pakistan, and might induce Yahya toward a political settlement23 . Critiques also suggest that the money allocated by the Nixon administration was nothing but conscience money24 meant to compensate for their unjustifiable support to a brutal regime, and also to placate the American public in general and domestic opposition in particular. In any case, the American contribution towards the refugees failed to serve any of the purposes mentioned above, because the refugees would not leave India as long as the political crisis remained unresolved, continued guerilla activities aided by India would make it impossible to conduct humanitarian relief activities in occupied Bangladesh, and the US government would come under increasing criticism from its own people for pursuing a passive and ineffective policy.25 Nevertheless, Nixon and Kissinger continued to use the refugee aid as a proof of their humanitarian concern for the Bangladeshis, without taking any serious step to address the root cause of the problem. Bangladesh Contacts Amidst the prevalence of massive inaction and tilt toward Pakistan in Nixon-Kissinger administration, the only noticeable attempt by the US administration to resolve the crisis was made through a few individuals claiming to represent the Bangladesh governmentin-exile. The most publicised among such contacts was the series of discussions between Kazi Zahirul Qaiyum an Awami League leader and a member of Pakistan National Assembly of 1970 and representatives of the US Consulate in Calcutta. Often referred to as the Calcutta talks26 , communications between Qaiyum and some minor American diplomats were seen by Kissinger and Nixon as an opening to a negotiated settlement between Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the Calcutta Talks failed to produce any significant impact on the chain of events, and the US initiative for a political compromise on the Bangladesh issue came to a fruitless end about a month before the crisis culminated into a regional war. The situation had already aggravated to an extent where none of the disputing parties were willing to retreat from their respective positions, making the prospect of amicable settlement a matter of wishful thinking, although the US administration was yet to realise it.

US objectives and Motives What did the US government expect to achieve from its policy of massive inaction and tilt? The question is quite pertinent, and the answer is not the obvious one. What transpires from facts narrated above is that the US did want Pakistan to survive the crisis and remain strong, but was not prepared to commit itself to defending Pakistans sovereignty over East Pakistan. On the contrary, the prospect of East Pakistans separation from the West was accepted as a matter of fact. Kissinger, for instance, recognised the futility of trying to preserve Pakistan in its pre-1971 form, and suggested that the issue was to determine how to get through the transitional period without a blowup27 . Clearly, transitional period in this context implied a period when East Pakistan would be gradually transformed into Bangladesh without any major upheaval. It was a policy of accepting the independence of Bangladesh through an evolution28 . The US government would not do anything to expedite that process, but neither would it put itself at a point of no return, since America had no interest in writing off 600 million Indians and Bengalis29 . What Nixon and Kissinger felt most concerned about was not the fate of East Pakistan, but the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. According to Kissinger: There was no question of saving East Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had recognised for months that its independence was inevitable; war was not necessary to accomplish it. We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an independent state, since we judged Indias real aim was to encompass its disintegration30 . US concern for West Pakistan grew stronger after the beginning of full-scale war between India and Pakistan in December. So much so that the US actually sought assistance from its arch rival Soviet Union in preventing India from occupying West Pakistan. Anatoly Dobrynin, the legendary Soviet ambassador to USA, recollects: Kissinger made it clear to us that the United States was mostly concerned about the western section of the India-Pakistan front, which Washington feared would collapse after Pakistans defeat in the East ... Moscow sent a particularly important message to Nixon : our contacts with prime Minister Indira Gandhi suggest

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that the Indian government does not intend to take any military action against West Pakistan ... Nixon and Kissinger had to rely on Moscows word that India would not attack West Pakistan.31 In order to demonstrate the determination of protecting West Pakistan with a show of force, part of the US 7th Fleet led by the aircraft carrier Enterprise was ordered to move toward the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans but in reality to give emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan32 . That brings us to the question of US motives for making so much effort to save Pakistan, even though minus its eastern part. As Kissinger explains, US actions were guided by geo-political considerations and in consistence with global strategic interests of the United States. Specifically, USA was in the process of initiating a Dtente with China in order to establish an equilibrium vis-a-vis USSR in the Cold War. In this strategic game, Pakistan occupied an important position as the crucial link to China and as one of Chinas closest allies33 . Kissinger contends that the Bangladesh crisis presented a dilemma to the US policy makers. While they could not condone a brutal military repression in which thousands of civilians were killed ..., they also did not dare take a stand against Pakistan because it was their sole channel to China; once it was closed off it would take months to make alternative arrangements34 . In this context, Dobrynin is perhaps a little too direct, but not far from the truth when he comments that US support for Pakistan was a payoff for helping open up China35 . Kissingers geo-political arguments for supporting Pakistan have been refuted by Van Hollen, who pointed out that by attempting to resolve an essentially regional dispute through global geo-politics, Nixon and Kissinger unnecessarily elevated the local crisis into one of US-Soviet confrontation36 . In the process, the role of Pakistan as a link to China was over-emphasised. Even assuming that Pakistan was indispensable for the purpose, its importance was substantially reduced after Kissingers secret visit to Peking was made public, Nixons China visit announced, and a direct link to Peking through Paris established in mid-July. Regardless of these developments, the Nixon administration continued its biased inaction with regard to the situation in Bangladesh. The argument that by putting pressure on

Pakistan for a political settlement of the Bangladesh issue, the US would have risked Chinas displeasure is dismissed by Van Hollen, who points out: The Chinese had a strong independent interest in forging the US connection as an offset to the Soviet Union, and it seems unlikely that a more distant US-Pakistan relationship would have significantly affected the evolving US-Chinese ties37 . Apart from the issues mentioned above, there were a number of other factors that influenced Nixons and Kissingers attitude towards the Bangladesh crisis. Their preference and even admiration for Pakistans military rulers as opposed to their strong dislike of Indian leaders (Indira Gandhi in particular) was too obvious.38 These likes and dislikes, in turn, must have been shaped by the US cold war perception of global politics. India was perceived as a Soviet client, which made Pakistan a natural US ally. Consequently, Pakistan became the linchpin of U.S. policy, and India was a political problem39 . Conclusion Revisiting the US perspective of Bangladesh liberation war three decades after the eventful occasion, armed with the benefit of hindsight, one can clearly see the follies and weaknesses of the policy pursued by Nixon-Kissinger administration. The most striking feature of this policy appears to be its total obsession with cold war geo-politics. Nixon and Kissinger tended to see the Bangladesh crisis through the prism of the cold war, and allowed their vision to be blurred by the compulsions of super power rivalry. Having concluded that dtente with China as an offset to the Soviet Union was the US priority, they decided to tilt toward Pakistan as a vital link to China. India, by far the superior power in the sub-continent, was treated with mistrust as a Soviet ally. This increased the gap between US and India and pushed the latter further toward the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Pro-Pakistan tilt was not consistent enough to meet the expectations of Pakistan either. Indulgent treatment by the US during the entire period of Bangladesh crisis had created among the Pakistani leaders the illusion of sustained US support in holding on to East Pakistan, and even in a potential show down with India. But when the moment of truth arrived, contrary to Pakistans

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expectations, the US directed its efforts to save the western part of the country, leaving the eastern wing to reach its logical conclusion. A disillusioned Pakistan drifted away from the United States, and USPakistan relations remained at a low ebb for the rest of the decade. Thus the 1971 US policy failed to satisfy either Pakistan or India, and was largely responsible for subsequent weakening of US position in the sub-continent during the 70s. The American perspective also lacked humanitarian and moral concerns. It denied 75 million Bengalis of the then East Pakistan the right to self-determination. Besides, there was no protest against persistent genocide of Bengalis by the Pakistan army, no serious attempt to alleviate human suffering. This made the US policy look insensitive even to its own people. Humanitarian aid to the refugees proved inadequate, as no action was taken to stop the atrocities that generated refugees. Finally, prestige and image of the United States was tarnished as a result of supporting the wrong cause as well as sponsoring the losing side in the Bangladesh conflict. The Nixon-Kissinger administration acted from a perceived geo-political compulsion that proved to be erroneous. In general, miscalculations made by the US leaders in relation to the liberation war of Bangladesh display the danger of formulating policies with a global perspective without due regard to local factors.

References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Khan, Roedad, ed., The American Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1965-1973 , The University Press Ltd., Dhaka, 1999 Rahim, Enayetur and Rahim, Joyce, L., Bangladesh Liberation War and the Nixon White House 1971, Pustaka, Dhaka, 2000 Khan, Roedad, op.cit., p. 506-507 Ibid., p. 541 Ibid., p. 543 Ibid., p. 541 Ibid., p.553 Ibid., p. 527 Proceedings of a meeting of the National Security Council Senior Review Group on August 11, 1971, reproduced in: Rahim, op.cit., p. 52). See: Van Hollen, C., The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia, Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No.4, April, 1980, p. 341. It may be mentioned here that Christopher Van Hollen served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs during 1969-70, and in that capacity was an active participant of US policy making with regard to the Bangladesh crisis. See: Khan, Roedad, op.cit., p.659 Rahim, op.cit., p.53 Ibid., p. 51 Kissinger, H., White House Years, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1979 p. 856 Ibid., p. 852 Ibid., p. 864 Ibid. p.853 The term tilt was first used by Henry Kissinger, who stated in a meeting of Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) that President Nixon wanted to tilt toward Pakistan (Ibid., p.897) See: Blood, Archer, K., The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh : Memoirs of an American Diplomat, The University Press Limited, Dhaka, 2002, pp.213-223, 243-259 Ibid., p.244

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

Ibid., p.246. It may be added that the dissent Cable failed to bring about any change in US policy. On the contrary, Archer Blood was transferred from Dhaka and excluded from any foreign policy related work for as long as Kissinger was in power. See : Rahim, op.cit., p.51 Ibid., p.50 Van Hollen, Op.cit., p.359 Ibid., p. 346 For details of Calcutta talks, see: Ahmed A. Jamal, The Calcutta Talks and the Liberation War of Bangladesh, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (Humanities), Vol.46 (1), June 2001, pp.75-89 Rahim, op.cit., p.175 Kissinger, op.cit., p.863 Rahim, op.cit., p.176 Kissinger, op.cit., p.886 Dobrynin, Anatoly, In Confidence (Times Books, New York, 1995), p.237 Kissinger, op.cit., p.905. Later on, Kissinger added that the other purpose of sending the fleet was to be ready to back up the Chinese if at the last moment they came in after all (ibid., p.912). Ibid., p.853 Ibid., p.854 Dobrynin, op.cit., p.237 Van Hollen, op.cit., p.355 Van Hollen, op.cit., pp. 353-354 See : Kissinger, op.cit., pp.848-849 Kreisberg, P., The United States, South Asia and American Interests, Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 1989, p.83