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author was a student at the Harvard Business School. The original is dated January 16, 1961.
Library Identifiers Item: Call: Class: OCLC: Entry: Location: V 394.B4-M33-REF 101034184M LC: TK 6575 7363499, 11348050 19810424, 19841105, Update 19981215 Box 14, Folder 16, SCL (UTenn)
Layout and Foreword IEEE Radar: A Reluctant Miracle AFCEA Radar: A Case History of an Invention is U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. Copyright.
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Contents
Foreword John B. McKinney, Colonel, United States Army, Retired Radar: A Reluctant Miracle (Reprint) Radar: A Case History of an InventionThe Evolution of an Innovation Preface Chapter I Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI Chapter VII Chapter VIII Chapter IX Epilogue Chronology of the Development of Radar (Phases I thru V above are referenced in Chapter IX and shown on the Chronology.) Introduction The Fathers of Radar What is Radar The Long Prelude (18731922) Phase I of the Invention of Radar The Rise of Radio (19221930) Phase II of the Invention of Radar The Arrival of Radar (19301935) Phase III of the Invention of Radar The Race with Destiny (19351939) Phase IV of the Invention of Radar Radar Becomes Operational (19391942) Phase V of the Invention of Radar Obstacles and Roadblocks A Summary
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Foreword
...to see what happened, why it happened, the sources of resistance, the things that slowed it down, the actions taken to overcome or circumvent obstacles and roadblocks, why it was turned down at first, arguments used...to place it in development, and arguments used against it by its opponents... Radar: A Reluctant Miracle, authored by John B. McKinney in 1961, appeared as a sheaf of yellowed papers on my desk last year with no identifying marks to indicate origin. The Prefacequoted in part aboveintroduces the reader to a chronology of the actions and interactions of individuals central to the development of radar deployment and use in World War II by the U.S. Reluctant has appeared as a reference in several Systems magazine contributions as an Unpublished manuscript. Louis Browns Radar History of World War II references it; while he was writing that history he mentioned that Reluctant was worthy of wider dissemination. I am aware that the IEEE History Center received a copy from the University of Hawaii at Hilo in 1999, and that the Historical Electronics Museum has three copiesall matching the one on my desk. A literature search for a published version turned up a pair of articles in Signal magazine (1966) with the identical title and author that do not reference the originalthey are included to serve as a prcis. With several positive reviews in hand, we decided to proceed to publish the entire manuscript for wide availability and to get it entered in index databases. When we were almost at the end of scanning the copy for conversion, David Nordrum asked: Why are there 26 references for an Epilogue, but no Epilogue? Another anomaly that had been observed was that the Notes pages had been renumbered by hand. These started us on a quest for more comparison copies. Starting with Harvard (who had no copy) we tried the: National Archives, Army War College, Signal Corps Historical Office, and Signal Corps libraries at Ft. Monmouth and Ft. Gordon. Copies were located at Ft. Gordon and the University of Tennesseethey matched. (The author had advised us that he had deposited copies of all of his work with his alma mater.) James Mayfield and Steve Johnston were teamed to conduct a complete search of all accessible library holdings. This resulted in their locating Radar: A Case History of an Invention, also written by McKinney. With more pages than Reluctant and confusion over library identifiers, it was accessible to us at the Naval Research Laboratory Library. A comparison revealed: Eight chapters of identical text, different title and contents pages, Notes placed at the end of each chapter, and two additional chapters: What is Radar and Epilogue. The authors rank on Case History was given as Lieutenant Colonel, whereas Reluctant indicated he was a Colonel.
Detail comparison of several pages convinced us that we had located the original as the author was a Lieutenant Colonel when he graduated from Harvard and was promoted to Colonel the following year. What had transpired? One theory: The author, being on active duty, had to have his writings pass up the line for approval for public release. Somewhere along that path it had been abridged and released after his promotion. Why did the NRL library have an original? Perhaps, as many NRL personnel were interviewed, the author had given them a courtesy copy; being part of the military it would not be considered public release. Why did the Signal Corps not send a copy to NRL upon public release? Guess: Parochialismthis had been written by the Signal Corps, not the Navy. The complete Case History follows the Signal articles in these pages. We have made minor spelling corrections and returned the Notes to the end of each chapter. Seldom are works that contribute to the history of a development rescued from obscurity; this was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate that investigators must work from paper originals, not electronic versions, to ascertain authenticity. On behalf of this Society, this magazine and future historians, I wish to thank the author, John B. McKinney, and those listed below who contributed to our success. To our readers: Your enthusiastic responses to our Tutorials and other out-of-the-ordinary methods used to bring you information were our motivation. David B. Dobson July 2006 Search Contributors Jeffery CroninBusiness Information Analyst, Baker Library, HBS, Cambridge, MA Elizabeth DurhamLibrarian, Hoskins Library Special Collections, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN Susanna JoynerLibrarian, Woodworth Consolidated Library, Fort Gordon, GA Steven JohnstonEditor, International Radar Index, Huntsville, AL Eric MoekleSuperintendant, Radar Division, NRL, Washington, D.C. James MayfieldLibrarian, Redstone Army Development Center, Huntsville, AL David NordrumMinnesota Technical Typography, St. Paul, MN Linda NortonLibrarian, Ruth H. Hooker Library, NRL, Washington, D.C. Kerry ParkeMedia Relations, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA
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John B. McKinney Colonel, United States Army Signal Corps, Retired John B. McKinney, former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of ITT World Communications, Inc., joined ITT in 1969 as Vice President and Director, Plant and Engineering. He retired in 1983. Prior to his tenure with ITT, Colonel McKinney had a distinguished military career, serving in three wars. He began his military service in World War II as an enlisted radio operator in the 82nd Airborne Division, was commissioned a Second Lieutenant on November 30, 1942, and arrived in the Southwest Pacific Area in April 1943 where he held a number of communications operations positions in New Guinea and the Philippines. Promoted to Major on July 1, 1945, he assumed command of the AFPAC Mobile Communications Battalion which established General MacArthurs communications facilities in Japan at the beginning of the occupation. He coordinated the communications from the USS Missouri on V-J Day, including General MacArthurs victory address to the nation. Between World War II and the Korean War, Colonel McKinney practiced law in Memphis, Tennessee. Recalled to active duty in March 1951, he was assigned as Officer in Charge of the 2nd U.S. Army Communication Center, Ft. Meade, Maryland. He next headed the U.S. Armys Pentagon Communication Center. Leaving for Korea in April, 1953, he became the Operations Officer of the 8th Army Signal Battalion, where, among other duties, he coordinated the communications facilities during the Panmunjon truce negotiations. In early 1954 he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and reassigned as Division Signal Officer of the 3rd Infantry Division. Returning stateside in late 1954, he held various assignments until his selection to attend the Harvard Business School. Upon graduation (1961) he was assigned to England as the Liaison Officer with the British Royal Signals and with his promotion to Colonel in 1962 he was reassigned to the Joint U.S. Mission for Military Aid to Turkey. He next attended the U.S. Army War College and, concurrently, George Washington University. Assigned to Vietnam following a tour as a War College faculty member, he was Deputy Commander of the 1st Signal Brigade, the largest Signal Corps combat command in the history of the Army. In early 1968 he served as General Abrams Signal Officer at MACV Forward during the critical battle of Hue. Upon his return Colonel McKinney joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and ended his military career as Chief of the Communications Electronics Department of the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, retiring December 1, 1969. His decorations include: Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Bronze Star with three Oak Leaf Clusters; Air Medal; Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster; and numerous U.S., Foreign Service, and Theater medals. John B. McKinney was born in Jacksonville, Florida, May 16, 1918, and grew up in Memphis, Tennessee. A graduate of the University of Tennessee, he earned his law degree from Memphis State University, a Masters in Business Administration from Harvard, and a Masters in International Affairs from the George Washington University.
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Colonel John B. McKinney, USA Chief, Research and Publication Section Directorate of Instruction and Research U.S. Army War College Part 1 (October 1966) Most technological innovations have been developed openly by civilians to meet the needs of a civilized society, but in the past thirty years a new type of technological development has arisen. This modern military technology, a product of the marriage between science and warfare, is largely developed in secret. It is financed and controlled by the government, and is not intended for civilian needs, but for the needs of armed forces seeking the keys to victory in war. Radar exemplifies this new technology. It is complex, expensive, and extremely important to the security of nations, but it was invented by no one man. It evolved over the years at the hands and from the minds of many men. It sprang from the accumulation of a half century of scientific knowledge. A vitally important race, to develop radar, although not recognized as such by the participants, began in the 1930s. Closely guarded, highly secret programs were undertaken in England, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, and the United States. Furthermore, the United States Army and Navy each established radar projects, and only infrequently exchanged discoveries and technological information. That the victors wreath in this grim race was won by the Allies was a fortunate, but not inevitable, circumstance. The Allies almost lost the contest. Many obstacles and roadblocks delayed the early acceptance of radar as a research and development project in the U.S. Armed Forces.
Reprinted with the permission of the copyright owner, The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), from Signal magazine, October & November 1966. Copyright 1966 AFCEA. IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE
Early U.S. Navy Experiments The story begins with the first official suggestion for radars development for military purposes which came in 1922. On June 20th of that year, Guglielmo Marconi made an historical suggestion for the use of reflected radio waves for radio detection. He was guest of honor at a joint meeting of the Institute of Radio Engineers and the Institute of Electrical Engineers in New York. On this occasion he was presented the I.R.E. Medal of Honor in recognition of his work in wireless telegraphy. At the close of his acceptance speech he made the following comment: As was first shown by Hertz, electric waves can be completely reflected by conducting bodies. In some of my tests I have noticed the effects of reflection and deflection of these waves by metallic objects miles away. It seems to me that it should be possible to design apparatus by means of which a ship could radiate or project a divergent beam of these rays in any desired direction, which rays, if coming across a metallic object, such as another steamer or ship, would be reflected back to a receiver screened from the local transmitter on the sending ship, and thereby immediately reveal the presence and bearing of the other ship in fog or thick weather. Experiments with 5-Meter Waves Three months later, in mid-September 1922, the earliest experimental confirmation of Marconis idea took place at the Naval Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Anacostia, D.C. Dr. Albert Hoyt Taylor and Leo Clifford Young informally began to explore the possibilities of 5-meter waves for communications and to discover their properties and propagation characteristics. From this exploration came the first U.S. military proposal for the use of radio to detect moving objects in space. A receiver was installed in an automobile, and a transmitter was set up near the door of the laboratory only a few feet above the ground. As the car was
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driven away from the transmitter some steel buildings were passed. Interference effects immediately became noticeable. Furthermore, the shielding effects of other objects, such as a screen door, the backstop of a tennis court, and a passing automobile, were also observed. Experiments on the transmission of energy over water, likewise, were tried. The car in which the receiver was located was driven to Haines Point, across the Potomac from Anacostia. This time the same interference effects were noted from a clump of willow trees. Dorchester Prompts A Discovery While these experiments were in progress, the steamer Dorchester, a small wooden vessel, chugged down the Potomac and crossed the path between the transmitter and receiver. Fifty feet before the boats bow reached the radio circuits line of sight path, the receivers incoming signal jumped to nearly twice its previous intensity. When the steamer actually passed through the path, the signal dropped to only half its normal value. The pattern was repeated as the Dorchester continued down stream. On September 27, 1922, the Commanding Officer of the Anacostia Naval Air Station reported the discovery to the Bureau of Engineering in a memorandum prepared by Dr. Taylor. The memorandum, according to Dr. Taylor, was not received enthusiastically by the Navy Department. Dr. Taylor had mentioned several possible uses of his proposed device, including directive communications, landing of aircraft at night or through overcast, and shipboard use to detect other ships. The memorandum also suggested that possibly an arrangement could he worked out whereby destroyers located on a line a number of miles apart could be immediately aware of the passage of an enemy vessel between any two destroyers of the line, irrespective of fog, darkness or smoke screen. But the lure of such a multi-purpose item of equipment was not strong enough at the time to attract support within the Navy Department. In fact, Dr. Taylor never received a reply of any kind to his memorandum. Dr. Taylor apparently made no effort to follow through on the memorandum, nor did he attempt to generate support for it. Although he was a forceful, energetic and enthusiastic administrator, he was primarily a scientist. He had proved the feasibility of his proposal and, as far as he was concerned, it was up to the Navy to do what they pleased with it. U.S. Armys First Radar Proposal Four years after Taylor and Young made their trail blazing proposal to the Navy Department, the
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attention of Major William R. Blair, a soldier-scientist in the U.S. Army Signal Corps, was also attracted to the problem of detecting airplanes in space. In the spring of 1926, Blair was attending the Armys Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was customary at the time, as it is today, for each of the Armys combat arms and technical services to send a high ranking officer to the college to lecture to the students on the latest trends and developments in military equipment and techniques. Two of the lectures that spring struck a discordant note in Major Blairs mind, and prompted what was to become an important interest in aircraft detection. The Coast Artillery Corps representative described with great pride the latest developments in the sound method of locating aircraft. On the other hand, the Army Air Corps representative said that racing planes had already achieved speeds of 300 miles per hour. He predicted that military planes would soon be going that fast too. To Major Blair, an Army scientist who had already achieved prominence because of his development of the Radiosonde, a balloon-borne meteorologic instrument, these two presentations indicated that something was lacking in the Armys plans. It occurred to him that at 300 miles per hour, approximately two fifths the speed of sound, the airplane would be almost overhead before any defensive action, triggered off by the sound detector, could be initiated. Major Blair had the technical competence to make such an observation. While at the University of Chicago in 1906 as a doctoral candidate, he had assisted the renowned German born physicist, Michelson, in early experiments with measurements of the speed of light. When he came to realize, twenty years later, that reliance on the sound detection of aircraft was dangerously impractical, his previous experience with measuring the speed of light came to mind. He reasoned that if the process of measuring lights speed could he reversed, the exact measurement of the time delay of a reflected radio signal, which moves at the same speed as light, would determine the distance to the object from which it has been reflected. Blair Develops Radar Theory From his earlier experiments with microwaves, during which he had discovered the conductivity of wood at high radio frequencies, Blair also knew that the material of which airplanes were constructed in those days would reflect microwaves. By associating this fundamental knowledge with the existence of a clearly perceived need, he developed the theory of radar which resulted in his being granted the basic United States patent for radar on August 20, 1957, over thirty years later.
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Following his graduation from the Command and General Staff College in the summer of 1926, Major Blair was assigned as Chief of Research Engineering in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in Washington. After becoming acquainted with his new duties, his thoughts again turned to aircraft detection, and he discussed his ideas with Major General Charles McK. Saltzman, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army. In early 1928, General Saltzman arranged a joint meeting between the Signal Corps, the Ordnance Technical Committee, and members of the Coast Artillery Corps. General Saltzman wanted Major Blair to present his proposal for the radio detection of approaching aircraft so that General Saltzman could determine if any interest in the idea could be generated. Despite the logic of the Majors arguments, however, the meeting was not successful. Neither the Coast Artillery Corps nor the Ordnance Corps was willing to allocate any funds for a Radio Position Finding project. The Coast Artillery representatives were thinking in terms of the range of antiaircraft weapons. They did not feel that they needed information about enemy aircraft until it was within ten miles of their firing batteries. The Ordnance Corps had just obtained new models of the latest sound detection equipment of which they were quite proud. If the Coast Artillery people did not feel they needed information beyond the distance that could be covered effectively by the sound equipment, the Ordnance people could see no reason why they should spend their scarce funds to provide it. The Coast Artillery had also sponsored infra-red research projects being conducted by the Signal Corps and workable infra-red detection devices were likewise available. Strange as it might seem, the Army Air Corps was not present at the meeting, and apparently, was not invited. The relationship between the Signal Corps, the parent, and the Army Air Corps, its offspring, was not cordial in those days, to say the least. This coolness may account in part for the failure to extend the Air Corps an invitation to hear Major Blairs presentation. At this point in time, the War Department was faced with a paradoxit recognized the need for an effective means of aircraft detection but it was faced with an equally great need to practice economy. There was not enough money to carry on projects in sound, infra-red and radio detection simultaneously. Since radio detection was the newest proposal and was as yet unproved or even tested, it had to wait until additional funds could be obtained. More important than money or recognition of a need was the more specific problem of just what capabilities an effective detection device should have. At what ranges would it be necessary to detect
RADAR: A RELUCTANT MIRACLE (REPRINT)
incoming aircraft? What should be the maximum and minimum altitude capabilities of the set? How accurately should azimuth he determined? These were critical considerations that could only be evaluated properly in consultation with the Air Corps. But the Air Corps had not been apprised of the new technique. The potential value of radar was seen only with Coast Artillery eyes, and from an antiaircraft artillerymans viewpoint, the short ranges of sound and infra-red detection devices did not preclude their use for the Coast Artillerys purposes. Consequently, this antiaircraft myopia was an important, and perhaps overriding, factor in the War Departments refusal to allocate all too scarce funds to support Blairs idea. U.S. Navys Second Radar Discovery In 1930 the Naval Research Laboratory made a second attempt to get the Navy Department to approve a project to investigate the possible use of reflected radio waves to detect and locate airplanes in space. The Naval Research Laboratory revived its interest in radio detection when L. A. Hyland, a young associate engineer, accidentally detected radio waves reflected from an aircraft. Taylor and Young had considered the possibility of airplane detection at the time of their 1922 observations, but were not convinced that the reflected energy from a plane would be great enough to be detected. Therefore, to them the surprising thing about Hylands discovery was not the fact that the plane reflected the waves, but that the effect was large enough to be detected. In the summer of 1930, Hyland was working on direction finding experiments at ultrahigh frequencies. As part of these experiments, he was studying the directional reception that could be obtained with a 15-foot-long, single-wire antenna that was attached fore-and-aft along the fuselage of an experimental 02U land plane. Early one afternoon, after turning the plane so that a perfect minimum signal was obtained, Hyland noticed that an unusual and unexpected phenomenon occasionally was seen. For a time a signal would come in irregularly when only a steady minimum signal should have been observed. After repeated observations it became apparent that these observations occurred only when planes flying in the vicinity of the air station crossed the line between the receiving antenna and the transmitting station at NRL. Hyland was so startled by the discovery, particularly since he immediately recognized its implications, that he dropped his work and rushed to call Dr. Hoyt Taylor, the Laboratory Director, about his discovery. Dr. Taylor vigorously encouraged him to pursue his findings. On November 5, 1930, Dr. Taylor prepared a memorandum to the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering. He invited attention to the earlier
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observations of 1922 and emphasized the potential usefulness of the equipment to detect moving objects and determine their velocity. Captain E. J. Marquart, Director of the Naval Research Laboratory at the time of Hylands discovery, endorsed Taylors memorandum and stated that the matter was of the utmost importance. In his endorsement he pointed out that if the device could be developed it would be of the greatest military and naval value for defense against enemy aircraft. He recommended that a problem be set up for the development of this apparatus, and that it be given a high priority. Shortly thereafter, a radar project was approved by the Navy Department. Project Number W5-2S was assigned to a task for research on the use of very high frequency radio waves to detect the presence of enemy vessels or aircraft. Although the need for radio detection had thus been officially recognized, the approval of Taylors proposal did not carry with it an allocation of funds. NRL merely had permission to work on the project whenever personnel were available, or if the Laboratorys staff were sufficiently interested in its success to work on it after hours. Blair-Taylor Personality Clash At approximately the same time that Hyland made his discovery, Major William R. Blair left the Office of the Chief Signal Officer to become the Commanding Officer of the Signal Corps Laboratories at Fort Monmouth. It is not surprising, therefore, that soon after Blair found himself in charge of the Laboratories, in February 1931, he set up a detection project to inquire into the potentialities of both high frequency radio and heat detection methods. This undertaking, which he designated Project 88, was entitled Position Finding by Means of Light. Its real purpose was to explore electromagnetic radiation in the radio-optic field, that portion of the frequency spectrum which spans both microwaves and infra-red waves. Blair placed first emphasis on heat detection, and assigned the project to the sound and light section of the laboratories. Blair was not particularly impressed with the Navys early radio detection work, although he probably was influenced by it. Nevertheless, in December, 1930 he accepted Dr. Hoyt Taylors invitation to attend an NRL demonstration. At the demonstration, Dr. Taylor explained Hylands discovery and NRLs experiments with the new phenomenon. During the meeting, Blair apparently took offense at an unintended affront by Taylor. This incident adversely affected Blairs subsequent opinion of the Navys radar work. From that time forward, Blair was unwilling to see good in anything that NRL did. According to Blair, ill feelings occurred
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when Hoyt Taylor, after finishing his explanation of NRLs discoveries, invited the other people present to make any comments they might wish to offer. Blair said that no one present seemed to understand what Taylor was saying except him. When it came his turn to speak, therefore, Blair told Taylor that NRL should have expected this phenomenon as no new scientific principles were involved. Blair attempted to explain what he meant by this statement and also to describe his own 1906 experiments with microwaves, but Taylor adjourned the meeting before Blair had finished speaking. Blair considered Taylors action an insult. At the time of an interview with the author almost thirty years after this incident, Blair said that he was never invited to NRL again. Blair objected to the Navys first experimental effort. It seemed to him to offer no precision. NRLs device showed generally that there were airplanes in the vicinity but did not show where each one was. Nevertheless, by the beginning of 1932 NRL had developed a detection system using a directional continuous-wave 30-megacycle transmitter that could locate airplanes 50 miles away. Unfortunately, it proved to be unsuitable for shipboard installation because of the size of the antennas required for its operation. Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy decided to officially inform the Secretary of War on January 9, 1932 of the Navys work with radio detection. He hoped that the Army, because it was not restricted to shipboard size installations, could use the new discovery. His memorandum stated in part: Certain phases of the problem appear to be of more concern to the Army than to the Navy. For example, a system of transmitters and associated receivers might be set up about a defense area to test its effectiveness in detecting the passage of hostile aircraft into the area. Such a development might be carried forward more appropriately and expeditiously by the Army.... Blairs Opinion Unchanged When the Secretary of the Navys memorandum eventually filtered down to Blair, his unfavorable opinion of the Navys radar project had not changed. He made no effort to build on the information supplied by the Navy. Perhaps another factor affecting Blairs unwillingness in 1932 to take over the Navys project was the continuing influence of the Signal Corps only customer for aircraft detection, the Coast Artillery Corps. In terms of antiaircraft fire, the Navys beat method sounded unpromising. The guns would be provided no exact firing information, and the attacking planes would have passed the firing batteries and be out of sight before they could get such information. Despite Blairs objections to the Navys work, however, there is no evidence that he had started any
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radio detection experiments of his own at the Signal Corps Laboratory prior to the arrival of the Secretary of the Navys memorandum. Project 88 still was restricted entirely to infra-red detection. It was not until after the Secretarys communication that Blair set up a radio detection research endeavor. Nevertheless, the Signal Corps project was Blairs own microwave concept, not an extension of the NRLs beat method. Part 2 (November 1966) Blairs radio position finding project got under way in 1932 under the auspices of the sound and light division. Two men were initially assigned to itFloyd Ostenson and W. D. Hershberger. Blair, remembering his personal experiments with microwaves in his 1906 doctoral work, directed the initial research toward microwave experimentation. He thought that only the higher frequencies would permit the use of antennas small enough in size to make mobile radar a feasibility. Blair was convinced that the size limitations which made NRLs first experimental model unsuited for shipboard installation would also make a long wave set unsuitable for field use in the Army. Theoretically, microwave radar should have been an ideal solution to the detection problem, but Blairs preoccupation with microwaves unfortunately led the Signal Corps into a blind alley. The state of the microwave art had simply not advanced far enough by 1932 to make these waves feasible for any use which required large amounts of power. Furthermore, at the Signal Corps Laboratories where Hershberger was pursuing his hopeless quest for a workable microwave radar, radio detection was still not the major undertaking in the detection field. The principal effort was directed toward infra-red research. In addition, despite obvious weaknesses, sound detection projects were also still underway in Army laboratories. Nevertheless, Blair used infra-red to good advantage in his efforts to persuade the Coast Artillery to see advantages in radar. Blair learned that Dr. S. H. Anderson, an infra-red expert with the Army Air Corps, had become available for employment. The project on which he had been working had been cancelled due to a slash in Air Corps funds. Blair assigned Anderson as head of the Signal Corps Laboratories sound and light section, and in addition assigned him a personal job, the study of the penetration of fog in various regions of the infra-red part of the frequency spectrum. Blairs purpose in setting up this special assignment for Anderson was to use the findings of a nationally recognized infra-red scientist to prove to the Coast Artillery that continued reliance on infra-red detection of aircraft was infeasible. In short, Andersons job was to disprove the value
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of infra-red, instead of the more conventional and positive approach of proving its worth. Blair was willing to gamble that his professional judgment was correct and that Andersons findings would, in fact, support Blairs contentions. Anderson may not have been aware of Blairs intentions at first, because he did an outstanding job of infra-red research. Tests performed during the next two years, however, confirmed Blairs professional opinion. With reflected infra-red rays, even such a favorable target as a Navy blimp could only be detected at a maximum distance of 32,000 yards, which is about 18 miles. During 1933, the reflected infra-red project was abandoned, and Hershbergers microwave research was substituted. Nevertheless, the use of the old infra-red method of detecting heat radiation from an airplanes engine was continued for several more years. The Coast Artillery was not willing to gamble on the yet unproved radio detection because infra-red, with all its shortcomings, did provide at least some warning capability. Radar Appropriations at Last Thus during the first half of the 1930s progress was slow. There were no significant technical breakthroughs. Bath the Army and the Navy laboratories limped along on drastically reduced appropriations and the officials of both facilities continually sought additional funds for their radar projects. Without money and personnel, concrete results were exceedingly difficult to achieve, but without some tangible evidence of the feasibility of radar as a military weapon, the project could not compete with other research undertakings for a share of the all too small military appropriations. NRL finally broke the financial log jam as a result of a successful demonstration of radars capability to detect aircraft that Dr. Hoyt Taylor arranged for members of the House Sub-Committee on Naval Appropriations in February 1934. The committee included $100,000 in the fiscal year 1935 appropriation bill for radar development. Several months elapsed before NRL obtained access to the funds, but the radar money drought was ended at last. In the following year Congress again appropriated $100,000 to NRL for long-time radar exploration, and in the next two years they doubled and tripled the amount. One of the scientists at NRL who helped set up the historic demonstration for the Congressional subcommittee was Dr. Robert M. Page, a young man who had been with NRL about eight years and who was later to become one of the greatest contributors to Naval radar. Page brought to the project fresh ideas, and he gave it a shot in the arm at the very time that it seemed to be getting nowhere.
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Pulse Transmission Takes Spotlight Under Pages guidance the focus of the Navys radar research effort switched successfully to pulse transmission, although both beat and pulse methods remained as parallel approaches for awhile. Page makes no claim to having thought up the idea of pulse transmission. He attributes all of the credit to Leo Young, his associate and early boss in the pulse investigations. Nevertheless, Pages contribution to the subsequent success of Navy radar was of great importance. His inventive genius, when paired with that of Leo Young, resulted in an unbeatable research team. Radar had at last come into its own in the Navy. The Signal Corps solution to the financial problem, which began a year after NRL had received its radar appropriation, also involved successful demonstrations and a dynamic new face on the radar scene. On July 29, 1935, a competition was held at Fort Monroe, Virginia, between Signal Corps and Corps of Engineer infra-red equipment. During the contest, the Signal Corps equipment performed with accuracy and certainty. The Engineer equipment also performed well, but the Signal Corps emerged the victor. From this showdown, however, three somewhat unexpected decisions came from the Coast Artillery Boarddecisions which were to have great significance for both radar and the Signal Corps. First, it was decided that the use of infra-red for detection of aircraft did not appear too promising; second, other methods must be given greater emphasis, particularly the use of radio waves which penetrated all atmospheric variations; and third, the General Staff should assign full responsibility for research on detection of aircraft and marine targets to the Signal Corps. Blairs tactics of defeating infra-red by improving it to the point that it reached its maximum capability had finally been successful. The Signal Corps victory was clouded, however, because no additional funds were provided for the new task. Although General Allison, the Chief Signal Officer, asked the War Department for $40,000, less money than a single SCR-268 radar set would cost after Pearl Harbor, the response was negative. The dilemma of the War Department, aware at last of the importance of radio detection but incapable of providing the necessary funds to develop it, could hardly be more evident. Although the Chief of the Coast Artillery joined with the Chief Signal Officer in a rclame the War Department did not waver from its previous position. It refused to provide the Signal Corps any additional funds. Despite a lack of funds, however, the development of pulse radar, as a high priority project, began at the Signal Corps Laboratories on May 15, 1936. Using a design developed by Hershberger, the Laboratories began work on a pulse transmitter that
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would operate in the neighborhood of 100 megacycles per second. This project marked the first time that Hershberger had been able to get Blair to depart from his insistence that microwaves were the only solution to the radio detection problem. By the end of June, Hershberger, with the assistance of Robert H. Noyes who had been transferred from the Aircraft Laboratories at Wright Field, had built a 75-watt pulse transmitter, and had firmed up the complete system design for a 100 Mc/sec radar system. In Washington, in the spring of 1936, General Allison again requested funds from the War Department for the radar project and again he was refused. By this time, Allison had come to realize that further pleas for money would fall on deaf ears until he had something tangible to demonstrate to the War Department General Staff. Accordingly, he took the only step available to him and diverted $75,741 of fiscal year 1937 money to the radar project. The sum became available to Blair in November 1936. It was the first allocation of funds of any significance. Allison enjoined Blair to have something to show by the end of fiscal year 1937. Allison wanted to try again at that time to get funds for the radio detection project from the War Department and thus be able to stop robbing important communications projects of direly needed funds. Blair established his target date for a major demonstration of pulse equipment as June 1, 1937. Colton Plans Demonstration In August 1936, a new face arrived on the Fort Monmouth scene. Lieutenant Colonel Roger B. Colton was transferred from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer to the Signal Corps Laboratories at Fort Monmouth and was assigned as Executive Officer to Blair. Colton was conscious of General Allisons desire to have demonstrable equipment available by the end of the fiscal year. Shortly after his arrival at Fort Monmouth he began to make his influence felt. Primarily as a result of Coltons urging and dynamic leadership, work progressed to the point that a demonstration was possible by the end of 1936. On December 14th the equipment was moved to a point near Princeton Junction, New Jersey, on a busy air lane for operational tests. The equipment worked successfully, and the tests were repeated with equally good results the following day. By the spring of 1937 there was sufficient progress to warrant staging a demonstration, and one was scheduled for the Secretary of War in May. To assure that everything was ready for the showing to the Secretary of War, General Allison scheduled a preliminary demonstration on May 1819, 1937. He invited the Chief of the Coast Artillery, the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, and representatives of the Ordnance Corps and the Corps of Engineers.
VOLUME 21, NUMBER 8, PART II, AUGUST 2006
This demonstration, ten years after Blairs original proposal, apparently marks the first time that the Army Air Corps was brought into the radar picture. The demonstration was moderately successful. Allison felt safe, therefore, in going ahead with the demonstration for the Secretary of War that was scheduled for the following week. An interesting feature of these demonstrations was the reliance still placed on infra-red detection despite Blairs lack of faith in it and the Coast Artillery Boards rejection of it. According to the test plan, the radar apparatus, with its greater range and searching ability, would be used to pick up target planes. When the aircraft came within antiaircraft artillery range, however, the detection work would be turned over to an infra-red detector because of its greater directional accuracy at close range. Colton states that everyone concerned with the test was hedging. They did not want to give up infra-red detection completely until radar had been proved feasible. During the first test the weather was bad and the infra-red equipment worked poorly. Only four of the passes by the target plane were detected, and these by the radar alone. Army Air Corps Shows Interest After the first demonstration, the Army Air Corps became vitally interested in the new radio detection project. Up to this time, the Signal Corps Laboratories had been working entirely to obtain firing data for the Coast Artillerys antiaircraft artillery batteries. They had not concerned themselves with the early warning needs of the Air Corps. At dinner the evening after the first days demonstration, General H. H. Hap Arnold, the Air Corps representative, asked if the Signal Corps could give him at least 50 miles so that he could have time to get his pursuit planes in the air. Allison and Blair assured him that such a development was rather simple and could be accomplished within 3 years after the establishment of the necessary military characteristics. Arnold agreed to see that the MCs were provided immediately. They were received by the Signal Corps within a few weeks. Thus, a new customer entered the picture. The second demonstration, on May 26, 1937, was a historic occasion. It brought to an end the initial phase of the Armys radar program and resulted in an allocation of fundsan accomplishment which
Blair and General Saltzman had attempted 9 years earlier, and which succeeding Chief Signal Officers had been seeking ever since. Present for the occasion were the Secretary of War, the Honorable Harry H. Woodring; the Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig; and other dignitaries, including members of the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives. For the crucial night demonstration of the future SCR-268 radar, a B-10 bomber, with lights turned off, attempted a sneak raid over Fort Monmoutha simulated battle situation of antiaircraft guns against a bomber. About twenty minutes after the test began, radar picked up a target at a height of 10,000 feet and a range of 6 miles. Almost immediately, the radar controlled pilot searchlight pierced the sky, and there at the end of a pencil beam of light, looking somewhat like an iridescent fly, was the target plane. One by one, the other lights moved over to aid in the track, and the plane was escorted over the distinguished guests, a perfect target for antiaircraft fire. The visitors were impressed, and the Signal Corps was delighted. Several more runs were made, and all were successfully detected. The Secretary of War later wrote to the Chief Signal Officer on June 2, 1937 about his pleasure with the results of the tests and stated: It gave tangible evidence of the amazing scientific advances made by the Signal Corps in the development of technical equipment. General Malin Craig, the Army Chief of Staff, was standing beside General Allison during the test. He turned to Allison and said Jimmy, I would never have believed this possible if I hadnt seen it with my own eyes. I want you to get these experiments away from here (The tests were conducted on Route 35 near Red Bank, New Jersey) because they are in too public a place. I also want you to begin production at once. Blair, who was standing with the two generals, immediately interposed an objection. He stated that there were one or two improvements he had to make first, but Craig stopped him to say, Its good enough for me right now. Allison then directed Blair to begin drawing up the necessary plans, including the modifications he wished to make, to get the equipment into production at once. Radar at last had received recognition at the top level of the Army and funds quickly followed. The rest of the story has many interesting features. Many problems had to be solved, but the last major obstacle had been overcome. Radar had arrived.