FOREIGN DISTRIBUTORS

ENTRY MODE DYNAMICS 11

Chapter Summary & Case Study

Prepared by: Aditya Lukmanjaya 3094815 Eka Darmadi Lim 3094802

FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF SURABAYA EVEN SEMESTER 2011-2012

SIGNIFICANCE
This chapter summary examines David Arnold idea whom studied the role of external actors especially foreign distributors about maintaining relationship with local distributors over the long term even after establishing their own local network. When MNEs want to expand to the new foreign market which full of uncertainty, MNE can use local distributors as a low cost and risk to penetrate the market. Local distributors give benefits such as knowledge about the local market, knowledge of local regulations and business practices, existing major customers at low cost, and the ability to hire appropriate staff and develop relationship with potential customers. In brief, the local distributors complementary capabilities substitute for developing new, location-bound FSAs required to asses the hos country market. However, after having a great result in early market penetration, sales often grow slowly, flatten, and even may start declining. Analyzing this symptom, MNE doubt the effectiveness of the local partner and its ability to make good performance commitments and expectations. Then, MNE tend to take control of local operations by buying out the distributor or by reacquiring the distribution rights in order to build a self-owned, dedicated distribution network.

In his research, Arnold revealed that the difficult, disruptive, and costly problems can be avoided through better strategic planning of distributor selection and governance of the relationships with local distributors. His research included a two-year field study of eight MNEs active in the consumer, industrial, and service sectors as they entered nearly 250 new host country markets. He observed that MNEs often select new countries for market seeking purposes unplanned or reactive way that resulted in failure to gain a great market share in host country.

Typically, MNE invests very little in marketing and business development, as it assumes that the local distributor will take care of these areas critical to foreign market penetration. With purpose to minimize up-front risk and tap existing knowledge about the local market and potential major customers at low cost, companies just let the strategic marketing decision to the local controls. They just wait and see, this strategy called beachhead strategy.

Unfortunately, this strategy make a serious conflicts of interest between companies and local distributors. In companies point of view, local distributors were merely been vehicles for market entry, temporary partner incapable of sustaining growth in the long term. Seeing this relationship as a short term and temporary, they became unwilling to make the significant investments in strategic marketing and business developments that are necessary to grow the business over the longer term. With the result that, company face challenge of distributors expectation of MNE unreliability in turn creates distributors unreliability.

After blaming each other of the market failure, both parties had to share responsibility for the relative failure of the distribution agreement. However, according to Arnold, senior MNE managers usually deserve the main burden of responsibility because they should be implementers of marketing strategy rather than making new marketing department in host country without providing proper direction and resources. In addition, the local markets life cycle stage typically changes after entry, but the MNE often fails to adjust its market strategy or market commitments to reflect the evolution from early penetration to rapid growth. Instead, the MNE sticks with its initial market-entry strategy (i.e., the beachhead strategy) for too long.

Interestingly, Arnold finds that companies usually have success when they evolve from a beachhead strategy to a mix of direct distribution by the MNE itself and long-term relationships with local distributors. His mixed strategy often lets the MNE retain control of distribution where feasible, while relying on the complementary capabilities of distributors where necessary. In other words, MNEs are advised to maintain relationships with independent local partners for distribution activities over the long term even after establishing their own local network to handle major clients. The key for the MNE is to find the correct balance between three competing objectives: strategic control over important customers, benefits from the local partners market knowledge and market access, and risk reduction when faced with high demand uncertainty in the new market. Arnolds research also give recommendation for local distributors who work with the MNE to be successful over the longer term. According to him, these local distributors have some number of characteristics, such as: they did not distribute competing product lines from rivals, they shared market information with the MNE, they initiated new projects and they collaborated with other distributors in adjacent markets. They also invested in areas such as training, ICT and promotion to grow the business. This research concludes by offering a list of seven guidelines for MNEs when dealing with local distributors to avoid the commonly observed pattern of local market underperformance as a result of underinvestment and over-reliance on distributors, followed by an over correction in the form of complete internalization of all distribution activities: 1. Proactively select the location and only then suitable distributors 2. Focus on distributors market development capabilities 3. Manage distributors as long-term partners 4. Provide resources to support distributors for market development purposes 5. Do not delegate marketing strategy to distributors

6. Secure shared access to the distributors critical market and financial intelligence 7. Link national distributors with each other, especially at the regional level

CONTEXT AND COMPLEMTARY PERSPECTIVES

Andrew R. Thomas and Timothy J. Wilkinson provided a first complementary perspective on international distribution, suggesting that MNEs may also face a critical distribution challenge at home, with implications for international strategy. Their SMR piece argues that many US manufacturing MNEs, especially those active in consumer goods industries, have made an important strategic mistake in managing their domestic distribution system, and should try to avoid a similar mistake abroad. They observe that, since the early 1970s, many large manufacturing firms have focused on their core competencies and have adopted total quality control systems in production, thereby largely neglecting the distribution and sales side of their business. The dual outcome has been increased efficiency in production, where allegedly (according to business gurus and consultants) the firms core competencies are located, and outsourcing of distribution. Unfortunately, a problem may then arise when these non-dedicated, downstream partners include mega-distributors such as Wal-Mart that represent a substantial portion of the firms total sales volume. For many US manufacturers this has meant the evolution from having a global network of loyal and faithful dealers and strong brand loyalty to becoming the manufacturer of a commodity that could be purchased at an ever-growing number of outlets for a lower price. Importantly, the market power of the mega-distributors has led to continuous downward pressures on prices, and therefore to almost forced offshoring of production to low- cost locations such as China. Unfortunately, according to the authors, such offshoring mainly serves the profit margins of the mega-distributors, not the manufacturers, as any cost reductions on the input side yield only further price squeezes at the output side.

This problem occurred because the companies too focus in effective and efficiency of production and forgot to distribute and sell their products. Conclusion, large manufacturers should not relegating strategic marketing to distributors in the domestic context, especially to avoid the tyranny of megadistributors. This research complete each others where Arnold emphasizes the advantages of using distributors if managed properly, and Thomas and Wilkinson emphasize the disadvantages of using distributors and the benefits of direct sales. Another perspectives came from Hau L. Lee who provided complementary CMR paper on how manufacturing companies should maintain uncertainty on both the input market and output market sides of the supply chain. Obviously, demand and supply side uncertainties are detrimental to the firms ability to serve customers effectively and efficiently. This could occur it there is poor planning or execution by the foreign distributors. Only if the information on demand is shared with the MNEs supply chain management, this effect can be avoided. Lee notes that one way to manage demand uncertainty is to adopt a postponement strategy, whereby some production activities are performed at the end of the production process, thereby maximizing this process flexibility. In this way, customization of end products is done as late as possible, in line with changing customer demand. On the supply side, the MNE must also attempt to eliminate unnecessary uncertainty. Here, risk hedging is critical, e.g., by setting up inventory pools at the regional level, close to the customer, to mitigate supply interruptions and to stabilize order fulfillment. Lees main point is that much of the uncertainty on the input and output sides can be reduced by effective supply chain management. Lees paper proposes adopting an agile supply chain in cases of high demand and supply uncertainties.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

When penetrating a host country, MNE should develop location-bound FSAs. Arnolds research revealed that in the early stages of an MNEs entrance in new market, FSA development is not the priority of MNEs strategy, nor the local distribution partner. Rather, the MNEs goal is to get the benefits of existing, internationally transferrable FSAs, while minimizing costs and investments risks. While in the other side, local partner which be ceded by MNEs just remained focus on short-term sales growth. As a result, both parties will never invest heavily in proprietary knowledge, such as brand name development to sustain and further strengthen such success. The development of new FSAs suffers because of lack credible and mutual commitments. By contrast, Arnold found some successful distribution partnership, both sides place greater importance on new FSA development. Distributors who have managed to remain successful over the long run have contributed to MNE competitiveness by sharing market intelligence and helping to build new FSAs. According to Arnold, such credible mutual commitments only make sense if there is an overall company fit between MNE and its local distributor. In this case, they have to work together as partners in building new FSAs, rather than focusing solely on the immediate market fit when linking the MNEs products with the distributors existing customer base. Arnolds prescription for the long term is to adopt a mix of the two governance mechanisms: establishing subsidiaries to control the companys international marketing strategy, while also retaining external distributors as partners to service optimally smaller, local customers. The normative conclusion is thus clearly to establish long-term strategic alliances with external partners, in this case local distributors, to benefit from their FSAs.

Following Arnolds advice would allow an MNE to pursue a mix of strategies of FSA development, which can be analyzed using our framework of FSA development patterns. According to him, the subsidiary should play to its strengths (i.e., transferable FSAs) and adhere to a more standardized approach focusing on large international accounts. By contrast, the local distribution partner should play to its strengths (i.e., location-bound FSAs) and should be nationally responsive in providing service coverage that is unique and adapted to each host market. These strategies correspond to Pattern I and Pattern IV of our framework, respectively (see Figure 11.1 below).

Pattern I builds upon standard, internationally transferable FSAs in the realm of distribution that the MNE can deploy in its foreign subsidiaries around the world to manage large global clients. In contrast, Pattern IV here involves external distributors, who are supposed to provide unique, location-bound FSAs to satisfy the requirements of smaller, local customers, but with their exploitation potential largely confined to the specific host country market. The next guideline is that MNE should maintain control over strategic decision making and against domination of international distribution by Pattern IV, with independent local distributors afforded such a high level of autonomy and control that each country operates independently of the others, with market success determined by each national distributors FSAs. This outcome would reduce the MNEs potential to reap economies of scope by sharing valuable knowledge across borders, since the independent distributors will have little incentive to act as entrepreneurs and to generate new FSAs either autonomously If the MNE subsidiary cooperates with the local distributor, FSA development in the broad sense may end up resembling Pattern III, with the MNE introducing internationally transferable FSAs to the market and the local distributor adding unique location-bound FSAs to optimize sales and distribution within the country. Arnold recommended the crafting of linkages between national distributors at the regional level, is a pitch for Pattern IX and Pattern X. Here, subsidiaries and local distributors work together as a network to create new FSA bundles that can then be customized with location-bound additions for each host market, in the case of Pattern IX, or transformed into internationally transferable FSAs and exploited internationally under the guidance of central headquarters, as in Pattern X. In spite of its useful managerial prescriptions, Arnolds work has two major limitations. First, Arnold mistakenly recommends internalizing some customers and outsourcing others based primarily on the customers size.

According to Arnold, larger customers should be served by the MNE itself. In reality, however, parameters other than size may be more strategically important. The key question is whether a customer requires extensive interaction and customization, and expects continuous product adaptation. Figure 11.2 below incorporates this modification of Arnolds work. The figure shows two parameters critical to decide the optimal governance of international distribution.

The vertical axis measures the final customers needs for technical customization/adaptation of the product offering (low or high).In contrast, the horizontal axis measures the level of customer requirements that are locationdetermined. A high level of location-determined customer requirements on the

right-hand side of Figure 11.2 implies that the necessary customization/adaptation cannot be performed simply by recombining and deploying internationally transferable knowledge, but necessitates deep knowledge of the local situation. The right-hand side of the horizontal axis is further subdivided into two segments, which address the need for external sourcing to develop the required locationbound knowledge. In cell 2 of Figure 11.2, exports can occur without major governance complications, perhaps using simple market contracts with distributors if these can operate with low costs, since the customer imposes no requirements to alter the product offering. In cell 1, substantial technical customization/adaptation to customer requirements is necessary, thus providing an incentive for the internalization of distribution to facilitate smooth adaptation. In cells 3A and 4A, there is an additional need to satisfy locationdetermined customization/ adaptation, and this need can be met internally by the MNE, such as by developing new, location-bound FSAs inside the company. In cell 3A, the MNE has exceptional recombination capabilities: it can develop further and recombine both technical knowledge (internationally transferable) and location- bound knowledge. Finally, in cells 3B and 4B, only external parties can satisfy the need for location-determined customization/adaptation. Cell 3B represents perhaps the most intriguing case: MNE can customize/adapt its product offering to purely technical customer requirements, but it must also meet location-determined requirements for

customization/adaptation which cannot be met internally. This is likely to lead to complex distribution arrangements, perhaps in the form of equity joint ventures, since both the MNE and its distributor need to engage in customization/adaptation processes to satisfy customer requirements. Second, Arnolds sole focus on distribution leads to a relative neglect of the remainder of the supply chain, especially the input market side and the need for an integrative approach to the various supply chain components. Figure 11.3

below displays such an integrative approach. As we learn the value chain that consists of three main components the left-hand side describes the input market, whereby external actors provide at least some inputs to the MNE. The middle section describes the upstream and downstream activities performed by the MNE

itself. Finally, the right-hand side describes the output market, where distributors may play a key role, as discussed above. To increase efficiency, the MNE will typically try to adopt similar routines on the input market and output market sides. For example, if JIT (just-in-time) systems are adopted on the input market side, a similar system will probably be used on the output market side. The point is simply that understanding a relationship with a foreign distributor, in terms of why and how it was set up, and how it should be managed in the future, may require an understanding of the MNEs entire supply chain setup, rather than simply an understanding of the distributor and the MNEs distribution needs.

THE DIRECT SALES MODEL OR A DUAL SYSTEM MODEL: DELLS DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY IN CHINA

Case Summary
The largest direct-sale computer vendor in the world, Dell Computer Corporation sells desktop personal computers, notebook computers, network servers, and a variety of computer peripherals and software. The manufacturer sells its equipment directly to consumers, largely businesses and government agencies, through its toll-free number and its web site. Dell also sells workstations, network servers, and high-end storage products. Founder Michael Dell holds 14 percent of the company and continues to run the company as CEO. Many people doubt the Dells ability to replicate its famous direct sales model abroad, so did when they entered China. Finally, in China Dell gradually evolved from an indirect sales model to a dual system model. At first, in the early 1990s, Dell exported PCs to the China used only distributors. Then, in 1998, Dell set up a manufacturing base in Xiamen, China, and applied a dual system model. In August 2004, Dell pulled out of the low-end PC market in China, thereby by reducing the weight of distributors in its dual system model. However, in the other part of the world, United States, Dell has evolved in opposite direction, from a direct sales model to a dual system model: Dell USA started to sell PCs at Wal-Mart in 2007. What future changes should we expect for Dell China?

Company Profile
Dell was founded by Michael Dell, who started selling personal computers out of his dorm room as a freshman at the University of Texas in Austin. Dell bought parts wholesale, assembled them into clones of IBM computers, and sold them by mail order to customers who did not want to pay the higher prices charged by computer stores. The scheme was an instant success. He was soon grossing $80,000 a month, and in 1984 he dropped out of school to found Dell Computer. At the time, the PC industry was dominated by such large firms as IBM, while smaller, lesser known mail order firms sold IBM clones at a steep discount. Dell used low-cost direct marketing to undersell the better known computers being sold through such high-overhead dealer networks. Dell placed ads in computer magazines, gearing his merchandise to buyers who were sophisticated enough to recognize high quality merchandise at low prices. Customers placed orders to Dell by dialing a toll-free number. As a result of these methods, Dell's computers became the top brand name in the direct mail market. By the end of 1986, Dells annual sales has reached $60 million. Today, the company is one of the largest technological corporations in the world, employing more than 103,300 people worldwide. Dell is listed at number 4in the Fortune 500 list, and also as the third largest PC maker in the world after HP and Lenovo. Dell has grown by both increasing its customer base and through acquisitions since its inception; notable mergers and acquisitions including Alienware (2006) and Perot Systems (2009). As of 2009, the company sold personal computers, servers, data storage devices, network switches, software, and computer peripherals. Dell also sells HDTVs, cameras, printers, MP3 players and other electronics built by other manufacturers. The company is well known for its innovations in supply chain management and electronic commerce.

CASE ANALYZIS: QUESTION & ANSWER

1. What are Dell FSAs? a. Never sell indirect Many of Dells strength come as results of the direct model. It could be considered one of the companys greatest assets. However, a firm specific advantage are gained through the direct model relative to the laptop market. First, the direct model allows consumers to fully customize their laptops. The market is becoming more educated, and now more than ever individuals want a product that can target their specific needs. In the case of laptops, this means that customer want more option in term of both performance and profitability. By cutting out the retail seller as a distributor, Dell has made it possible for each buyer to order directly from the factory, thus giving them opportunity to fully customize their product. In addition to this customization, the direct model yields relatively fast delivery. This allows customers to place their order, and receive their customized order within days. Both of these direct model benefits are great assets in targeting the home-user market segment. b. Disdain inventory Dell also has an advantage in their inventory turn around time, and in their well-controlled relationship with suppliers. These business features create large cost savings, which Dell can pass on to its customer. The final result is a customized, low-priced computer delivered to the customers door within days. c. Always listen to the customers One of Dells great advantage is always listen to their loyal customers, especially targeting the business executive category roughly 75% of sales revenue from large business and government organization. In other words, Dell has

already created relationship with large companies, and this provides most of their business. These companies pass the relationship on through their employees, providing the Dell products. Here again, Dell has ability to customize their products to cater or any needs the business or individuals may have. What are the macro-level requirements for the direct sales model to be successful? - Buyers (corporate and individuals) are very sophisticated and experienced technology users. They often know exactly what they wanted and did not need the intense personal selling. - Reliable supplier who can provide fast components and materials to produce and distribute to end users within short term period. A good distribution channel as the tool to distribute the products to the

customers in the right time and right place. What are the major advantages of the direct model, compared with the tradition channel strategy in the computer business? a. Strong Customer Relationship Direct sales gives a small business the ability to build and manage its own personal relationships with its customers. The relationships a business's direct sales force builds are more personal, meaningful and memorable. These relationships can help the business better understand and adapt to the needs of their customers while fostering a sense of loyalty to the business's brand. b. Cost and Price Control A business using the direct sales model has a significant degree of control over its pricing and distribution. As a result, the business has greater capability to verify that its products are competitively priced. The business is also able to ensure the individuals representing its products or

services are knowledgeable and effective. In addition, a business that uses a direct sales model is less reliant on the services of retailers. c. Access to More Consumers A direct selling campaign affords a business access to consumers who otherwise may not reach. Not all customers receive or respond to media advertising campaigns. Similarly, some customers may not shop at the retail stores that stock a business's products. The direct sales model is a way to get to these customers directly and initiate a sale.

2. How did Dell treat its distributors in China during its reentry into China in 1995? Dell imported PCs from other countries and then sold Dell PCs through its distributors. The distribution system included four first-tier distributors located in metropolitan areas including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xian, as well as second and third tier resellers. Dells representative office in China decided on the sales plan, designed promotion strategies such as sales rebates and coordinated the relationships among the distributors. Was there a vicious cycle of bounded reliability involved? Who should be blamed for Dells initial failure? Yes, it was. These unimpressive results were largely due to the countrys relatively small market size and the lack of effort from both Dell and its distributors. Dell was waiting for the right time to apply its direct sales model, with no intention of keeping a long-term relationship with the distributors. At the same time, these distributors did not want to invest much in developing the market, anticipating that Dell would soon switch to its famous direct model.

3. According to Arnolds seven guidelines, discussed in Chapter 11, what mistakes did Dell make? Dell made mistake in terms of relationship between companies and local distributors, Star Advertising Corporation as solo agents. The main mistake was Dell invested very little in marketing and business development with assuming that its partner did it to penetrate the market. As a matter of fact, the local distributors thought him self as only temporary partners, not for long run. However, Dell should be advised to maintain relationships with interdependent local partners for distribution activities over the long term, as a result of bad relationship. In addition, Dell should provide resources needed to support distributors for market development purposes, such as skilled support staff, minority equity participation, and knowledge sharing. Dell also should not delegate all marketing strategy to distributors because Dell as the company know better than them. Distributors should be treated as implementers of marketing, not marketing department of host country. 4. Given Dells FSA and Chinas location advantages in the late 1990s, why was the direct model successful? Because Dell was confident that its direct model would work well in China if focused on the corporate segment, including MNEs and government institutions which they were technologically savvy, and they already knew what they needed. Dell thus divided its customers into three groups: relationship companies (companies with more than 3,000 employees), mid-sized companies (companies with 5003,000 employees) and small-sized companies and family customers (companies with less than 500 employees and individual customers). The first two segments were their major targets. After selecting its target markets in China, Dell modified its direct sales model in two ways to meet Chinas distinctive characteristics. First, to contact corporate customers in China, Dell relied more on door-to-door sales and

telephone sales rather than Internet sales. Normally, a sales team was comprised of an external salesperson and an internal one, with the former responsible for developing and retaining big accounts and the latter answering customers inquiries and handling purchase orders. On average, the salespeople made three to four calls a day and spent one third of the day visiting customers. Second, Dell recognized that most Chinese people were not used to credit card sales, so it did not insist on pre-payment through the Internet. Instead, Dell signed agreements with several banks to facilitate payments; Dells delivery men could also collect cash or transfer money through wireless debit card machines carried by them. Dell worked hard to reduce its costs in China, as a door-to-door sales channel was very costly, given salespeoples salaries and commissions commensurate with those paid in Hong Kong and the US Dell tried to improve efficiency across the whole value chain. For example, in 1999, the time from order to delivery in China was about the same as the 9-day period in the US. In addition, Dell tried to draw on local talent. Although Dell brought in some Dell employees from Southeast Asia, the company soon hired local talent for most positions, even for many managerial ones. Dells direct sales efforts resulted in a much improved market penetration. By 1999, Dell was ranked seventh among the top PC manufacturers in China, with a market share of 2.3 per cent. By 2004, Dell became the top company in sales of servers and commercial computers. This recipe of successful direct sales model is in its ability to adopt to the market in China and good positioning of product.

5. With the changing market situations after 2004, what new location bound FSAs should Dell develop to cater to retail buyers in China? Facing the growth rate of retail market, PC demand in urban centres such as Beijing and Shanghai fell to an annual rate of 2 3 per cent in 2004. In the other hand, the growth rate in mid-sized citied and small towns soared to around 40 percent. This situation happened because comparing with retail buyers in big cities, end users rural areas had less savings to spend, knew less about computers, preferred to receive advice from retailers before they made the important decision to buy a computer, and also required convenient technical service after bringing the PC back home. So, it is clearly that Dell should develop to mid-sized citied and small towns to cater to retail buyers in China. Or, alternatively, what complementary capabilities should Dell expect from its distributors? Commentators noted that businesses were also requiring services that Dell did not traditionally supply: demand is huge and emerging elsewhere in hundreds of smaller cities where even some business customers want to see products before they buy. Therefore, Dell expect their authorized distributors, called system integrators can play an important role filling the hole gap that Dell cant capture. When retail buyers in the form of small-sized business and family customers lacked technological knowledge and wanted advice, Dell could not meet their needs, but system integrators could.

6. Did demand and supply uncertainties affect Dells channel strategies in China? How? Yes, it did. Instead of dominating in direct sales model in its home country, United States,, Dell should build their dual system model to win in PC market. This mean that Dell has to make stocks for their products and put some displays, so that customers can touch and try their products before they bought. In

conclusion, Dell shifted its channel strategies from direct sales model to dual systems for gaining untapped market share.

7. Arnold recommends simultaneously internalizing some distribution activities and outsourcing other activities to external distributors. This is the dual system model already followed by Dell in China. Please use Figure 11.2 to analyze possible channel strategies Dell could use in the future. In Figure 11.2, Dell possible channel strategies will be in cells 3B while there is high requirement for technical customization or adaption, and also high requirements for location-determined customization or adaption with high need for external sourcing. In this cells, Dell need external parties to satisfy the need for location-determined customization or adaption. Cell 3B represents perhaps the most intriguing case: here, the MNE can customize/adapt its product offering to purely technical customer requirements, but it must also meet location-determined requirements for customization/adaptation which cannot be met internally. This is likely to lead to complex distribution arrangements, perhaps in the form of equity joint ventures, since both the MNE and its distributor need to engage in customization/adaptation processes to satisfy customer requirements.

8. Can you provide an update on Dells distribution strategy in China, using materials available on the Web? In a New York Times article on May 25, 2007, the manufacturer announced that it would began offering two PC models through Wal-Mart stores in June. In a subsequent New York Times article, Dell announced that it would sold Inspiron notebook computers through Wal-Marts Sams Club outlets. In addition, most recently the company announced that its computers would be available in major Chinese cities through fifty Gome Electrical Appliances stores, Chinas largest electronics retailer, starting in early October 2007. Although the actual number of Dell products offered through the initial retail channels is smalljust two low-end Dimension PC models were to be

available at Wal-Mart, for example. The symbolic importance of the move is significant, reflecting a rethinking of the direct sales strategy Michael Dell pioneered and rode to great fame and fortune. In an April memo to employees, Dell, who returned in late January 2007 as the firms chief executive, suggested, The direct model has been a revolution, but its not a religion. Another Dell executive was quick to point out that the limited move to retail was not an indication that the direct-sales model was broken. In fact, Dells hesitation to enter the retail channel may have resulted from unsuccessful or inconclusive past experiments. In the early 1990s Dell products were available through Best Buy, Costco, and other retailers, but the company stopped this distribution in 1994 due to low profit margins. In 2006, Dell opened a mall-based store in Dallas where customers could see and use computers or other products, but ultimately had to order these online through the store rather than taking them home with them. Despite clearer motivation for Dell to enter the retail channel today, some industry observers point out the risks of this move. They dont want to get their brand name too closely associated with Wal-Mart, a Forrester Research analyst points out, citing the danger of Dells products being viewed as the markets value-end. Others note that it may take some time for Dell to realize much financial gain from its retail offerings, given their limited nature. Risks aside, Dells move into Wal-Mart, while retaining the centralized direct sales model, is a clear response to the trends of a hybrid channel model. As another industry analyst suggests, Dell is finally listening to its customers. Either that or taking the time to read the occasional Supply Chain Strategy article by a Kellogg professor.