While the violence in Syria continues to escalate, and many countries trying to make their voice heard at the

UN General Assembly to vote on a resolution to condemn the crackdown, Russia continues to make that sees and hears nothing. So on October 4, 2011 and February 4, 2012, along with China and Russia have veto over exposed a UN draft resolution on repression in Syria, thus preventing its adoption. Russia argues that Syria despite international pressure.

The veto must, however, explained the special relationship he has with Syria Russia. Thus, although officially it is claimed that this veto is due to the desire to prevent the international community from another Libya to achieve and insists on patience and "balancing", in reality political and economic interests are far more important, for Russia, the dictatorship of Syria depicting the last remaining client in the Middle East.

In the early 1990s, international comunitatatea, dominated by the U.S., did not consider Russia as a "normal" country. Numerous factors-the Soviet past, internal problems, and the territorial expanse nuclear arsenal-have made it difficult, almost impossible, to integrate in the Western countries. NATO's expansion in its vicinity has irritated Moscow, and the feeling of vulnerability has increased. After Vladimir Putin's coming to power, and particularly after the war in Iraq, Russian diplomacy vis-vis the Arab countries and the Middle East has become a useful tool allowing Russia's security and that contribution to economic development. Under Putin's leadership, the relationship with Syria and the rest of the Arab world was placed under the sign of pragmatic defense of Russian interests. Even if Dmitry Medvedev became Russian President in May 2008, Putin has kept a great influence on the formulation of foreign policy, and one of the priority vectors was to put a umilinelor in the 1990s and to play a pivotal role for Russia in International Affairs. This policy gives an extra dimension to Russia's commitment in the Middle East, a region that lies at the heart of international records as the most sensitive; in these circumstances, if Russia wants to be regarded as an actor of the first rank, it must bring their contribution to solving these problems. In addition, Russia, which holds the most important Muslim minority in Europe, wants to maintain good relations with key Muslim countries in the world, whose support it needed in its fight against terrorism and separatism Russian antiCaucasian. Islam is an integral part of Russia and is an important element of its future. For this reason, relations with Muslim countries acquire great importance for Moscow.

Russia had such need of an ally in the Arab East historical and religious centre of the Muslim world, today almost entirely dominated by the u.s.. Syria has been and is one of the few countries in the region relatively independent of the United States; It explains that it has been more willing than others to collaborate with Russia. She can provide some strategic advantages to Moscow, as well as: access to Mediterranean. Need to have strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea is a constant concern for Russia. Such access opens the path to the Indian Ocean and lead to a strengthening of its southern flank (Moscow feels surrounded by various members of the pro-Western alliances and seek to avoid encirclement and to find allies among Arab countries that have a friendly and caring attitude to Russia's diplomatic efforts);

relatively safe presence in the Near East, and the opportunity to practice and a certain influence in Arab-Israeli relations, which Moscow hopes for a long time.

In principle, Russia's policy with regard to Syria and the Middle East mainly aimed at promoting political and economic interests in the region and to protect the southern borders of the country, as follows: economic relations between Russia and Syria, though relatively scarce compared to the trade in Russia with other countries in the region, is still growing. In 2004, the Syrian-Russian trade volume amounted to 218 million u.s. dollars, of which 206 million in Russian exports. In 2008, with the return of Syria on the international stage after years of isolation caused by the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the volume of trade has increased considerably, reaching 2 billion dollars. By the way, currently in Syria is home to a large number of Russian businesses. Stroytransgaz's gas sector, a company owned by Gazprom, has undertaken a number of projects in Syria since 2005, in cooperation with Syrian Gas Company, for an amount estimated at $ 600 million.

From a financial standpoint, the Russian-Syrian relations are in good condition. In January 2005, Russia accept a renegotiation of Syrian debt, contracted during the Soviet era. 73% of the 13.4 billion dollars owed by Damascus have been deleted. The remaining 27% were divided into two categories. One half had to be repaid in ten years time, while the other was filed in Russian accounts in Syria to serve the financing of investments and the purchase of Syrian goods.

Russia's diplomatic support for Syria is reflected in the level of deliveries of weapons and modern technology to Damascus. Until 2006, the Russian military Syria sprjinul remained garrisoned on the process of modernization, maintenance of weapons and training of Syrian officers (nearly 2,000 Russian military advisers were in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic). As of 2006, things have picked up, Russia and Syria with agreed on the export of weapons of a defensive guy, especially in air (GM 39-type missiles Igla, Strelets, Buk-M2 Ural). Israeli and u.s. pressure, Russia did not want to deliver the Syrian defense system portable Igla anti-aircraft, which differs from the Strelets system, and about which, Serguei Chemezov (then director general of Russian arms monopoly Rosoboronexport) has denied the rumour in January 2007 that would have been supplied to Syria. In addition, Syria's repeated requests to get Russian surface-to-air missiles S-300 PMU were not satisfied and in September 2009, Rosoboronexport has frozen contracts signed in 2007 regarding the sale to Syria of Russian MIG 29 Fulcrum planes and MIG-31. The reasons cited were "political sensitivity regarding a potential bulversare to balance the forces in the Middle East" and perhaps, as in the case of ant-aircraft systems S-300, and a strong Israeli pressure on Moscow. Moscow plays such a echilibristic game, seeking at the same time to conforteze a redevenit strategic relationship with Syria, without coming into conflict with other regional partners, whose importance is also of economic order.

Syria, however, is satisfied with this balancing test of Russian diplomacy, and to show their commitment in this relationship, the Syrian regime is positioned as can unconditionally as a partner of Moscow. It showed support for another hereditary Council Presidency, that of Kadyrov, in disagreement with the Chechen commitment; and, in 2008, Syria was the second State after Belarus who showed support for the war in Georgia in Moscow. Instead of speaking of his position, Damascus expected reactions of Russian solidarity, be they regional or national, as is the case for today. Syria, however, is aware that it must menajeze this relationship and to the loyal and powerful ally. In this context it is entered and the initiative to lease Russia a military base from Kherson. This

military base had been made available to the Russian naval forces in the late 1960s. But mediocre quality infrastructures has made it a point of revitalization and maintenance than a real military base and logistics. Left in neglect with the breakup of the USSR, in these places was reinvested with 2008, Moscow. These restored structures will be able as of 2012 to allow receipt of the largest ships of the Russian fleet, such as Pyotr Veliky crucitorul.

This will provide a strategic Mediterranean access to Russia, adding to those already arranged at the Black Sea, Novorossiysk (Russia) and Sevastopol (Ukraine). This shows interest to implant in the Mediterranean, which allows Moscow to overcome constraints to passing the Straits controlled by Turkey, a member of NATO. In addition, through his approach to the Suez Canal, Kherson allows uniting the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, where the Russian Navy participating in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Despite Israeli opposition towards Russian deployment in the area defending Russian announced on 5 July 2011, that sees no objective reasons to curb military-technical cooperation with Syria.

But the question remains: where will go unconditional support for Syria, taking into account the statements of President Vladimir Putin, on June 21, 2011, when in a visit to France, he said: "for some reason unknown, it is believed that we have a special relationship with Syria. In the Soviet era was the case. But it is not the case today. Today, Syria has rather special relationship with France. We don't have any military bases here, neither large nor significant investment defensible. Nothing ". And referring to the installation of Hafez al-Assad in November 1970, Putin has concluded: "we are aware that we cannot use the political tools dating back 40 years in the contemporary world. I hope that the Syrian Government is aware of this and will draw the necessary conclusions ".

The Moscow apropouri you do, suggests that it will not support indefinitely the Syrian regime and that support is not unconditional as it seemed. Other pressures, more important than Syria weighing more than in defining Russian foreign policy.

Conchiznd, it can be said that the relationship between Russia and Syria are primarily due to Syria's geostrategic advantages it offers, but also the economic and political. However, this relationship will last as long as you meet the interests of Russia and Russian political will get benefits, especially in terms of strengthening its position in the region of the Middle East and valued international actor.