TOYOTA V NLRC OCT 19, 2007 In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma.

Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE Secretary. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyotas appeal. In relation to Toyotas appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations. Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work. This resulted to another rally within Toyotas premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work. In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets. ISSUE: Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal. HELD: Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227 employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union argues that the strike is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of protest
1

they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their strike as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary work stoppages. The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are illegal for they violated the return-to-work order. The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are: 1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or 2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or 3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or 4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or 5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or 6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189 Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police. After learning about the planned mass demonstration, PhilippineBlooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of
2

the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA. Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed. BILFLEX PHIL. INC. LABOR UNION et al. VS FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND BILFLEX (PHILS.), INC. 511 SCRA 247 (2006) Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Biflex Philippines Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of the sister companies Biflex and
3

Filflex which are engaged in the garment business. They are situated in one big compound and they have a common entrance. On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest against oil price hike; the unions staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting the companies to file a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements. The Labor Arbiter held that the strike is illegal and declared the officers of the union to have lost their employment status. ISSUE: Whether or not the staged strike is illegal and a ground for the lost of employment status of the union officers HELD: Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code states that any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union who knowingly participates inthe commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. Thus, a union officer may be declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike and in this case, the strike is declared illegal by the courtbecause the means employed by the union are illegal. Here, the unions blocked the egress and ingress of the company premises thus, a violation of Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code which would affect the strike as illegal even if assuming arguendo that the unions had complied with legal formalities and thus, the termination of the employees was valid. The court said that the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance with its legal formalities but also by means by which it is carried out. CASE DIGEST: YSS EMPLOYEES UNION- PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION VS. YSS LABORATORIES INC.

FACTS: In order to arrest escalating business losses, YSS Laboratories, a domestic corporation engaged in Pharmaceutical business implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by the company. Of the 11 employees sought to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU, a duly registered labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of YSS. Claiming that YSS Laboratories was guilty
4

of discrimination and union-busting in carrying out the said retrenchment program, YSSEU decided to hold a valid strike. A number of conciliation proceedings were made by the NCMBNCR but still the dispute was not resolved. This prompted the Sectary of Labor to intervene. Finding that the labor dispute was inimical to the national interest, it certifies the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued two orders: first, directing all striking workers to return to work and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike; second, that the nine retrenched employees be included in the return to work order. Aggrieved, YSS Laboratories filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals in which the latter reversed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and granted the petition of YSS Laboratories. The appellate court found that YSS Laboratories validly carried out its retrenchment program, which effectively severed the concerned employees employment with the company. Hence, YSSEU comes to this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from the coverage of the return-to-work- order.

HELD: The Orders of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Said provision reads: Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. xxxx (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
5

It should be noted that the primary reason why the strike was conducted in the first place was to protest the implementation of the retrenchment program, which clearly discriminated against union officers and members. YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same, said the Supreme Court. Hence, the petition is granted. The orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby reinstated 62. Solidbank Corporation v. Gamier, G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010

Facts:

Sometime in October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank Employees Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining two years thereof. Negotiations commenced on November 17, 1999 but seeing that an agreement was unlikely, the Union declared a deadlock on December 22, 1999 and filed a Notice of Strike on December 29, 1999. During the collective bargaining negotiations, some Union members staged a series of mass actions. In view of the impending actual strike, then Secretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. The assumption order dated January 18, 2000 directed the parties "to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might exacerbate the situation.

Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their motion for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Thus, on April 3, 2000, an overwhelming majority of employees, including the individual respondents, joined the "mass leave" and "protest action" at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) office while the banks provincial branches in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga followed suit and "boycotted regular work. The union members
6

also picketed the banks Head Office in Binondo on April 6, 2000, and Paseo de Roxas branch on April 7, 2000. As a result of the employees concerted actions, Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. On the same day, then President of Solidbank, Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum addressed to all employees calling their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in the union-instigated concerted action. The employees work abandonment/boycott lasted for three days, from April 3 to 5, 2000. On the third day of the concerted work boycott (April 5, 2000), Vistan issued another memorandum, this time declaring that the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting April 6, 2000 "provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act." Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199 employees insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included herein respondents Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De Guzman. For their failure to return to work, the said 199 employees were each issued a show-cause memo directing them to submit a written explanation within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the "illegal strike in defiance of the Assumption Order of the Secretary of Labor resulting to grave and irreparable damage to the Bank", and placing them under preventive suspension.

Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De Guzman filed complaints for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Issue:

Whether the respondents were validly terminated?

Ruling:

The Court has consistently ruled that once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike or lockout. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or certification is a prohibited activity and thus illegal.

Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, also considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike "during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike." There is no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration simultaneous with concerted work abandonment/boycott.

However, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. The Court have held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order.

For the respondents who are union members, the rule is that an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Liability for prohibited acts is to be determined on an individual basis.

Petitioners have not adduced evidence on such illegal acts committed by each of the individual respondents who are union members. Instead, petitioners simply point to their admitted participation in the mass actions which they knew to be illegal, being in violation of the Secretarys assumption order.

The dismissal of herein respondent-union members are therefore unjustified in the absence of a clear showing that they committed specific illegal acts during the mass actions and concerted work boycott.

The award of backwages is a legal consequence of a finding of illegal dismissal. Assuming that respondent-union members have indeed reported back to work at the end of the concerted mass actions, but were soon terminated by petitioners who found their explanation unsatisfactory, they are not entitled to backwages in view of the illegality of the said strike.

Under the circumstances, respondents reinstatement without backwages suffices for the appropriate relief. But since reinstatement is no longer possible, given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, not to mention the fact that Solidbank had long ceased its banking operations, the award of separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is in order.

Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., 512 SCRA 437 (07) 312 SCRA 437 CALLEJO, SR; January 24, 2007 NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter FACTS - The union is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular paid workers and the manthly paid non-ccommission earning employees of the comopany. individual petitioners are union officers,directors and shop stewards. - The union and the company entered into a 3 year CBA. upon the expiration, the union told the company that they wanted to negotiate the terms. the union insisted that representatives from Alyansa ng mga Unyon ng Coca Cola be allowed to observe the CBA meetings. the company
10

refused to allow alyansa to observe and an impasse ensued. union officers, directors and stewards filed a notice of strrice with NCMB based on deadlock on CBA and unfair labor practice arising from the company's refusal to bargain. the grounds were ammended to unfair labor practice for the company's refusal to bargain in good faith and interference with the exercise if their right to self-organization. - pending the notice to strike, the union decided to participate in a mass action by alyansa in front of the company's premises. operations would come to complete stops for insufficiency of contractual employees who would take over. after the mass strike (separate and distinct from the mass action), the company filed to declare strike illegal, to declare the officers of union and individual respondents to have lost their employment status, to declare the union, its officers and members guilty of unfair labor practice to violation of the CBA, and to award them damages. - the LA found the strike to be illegal such that the participants lost their employment status. the CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE/S 1. WON the mass action wit Alyansa is actually a strike HELD 1. YES Ratio The factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as long as based on substantial evidence, are conclusive on the SC. Reasoning The term strike1 encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. That there was a labor dispute between the parties is not an issue. Petitioners notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Disposition Petition is denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed. SUKHOTHAI CUISINE v CA (NLRC, PLAC) 495 SCRA 336 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; JULY 17, 2006 NATURE Appeal by certiorari
1 Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

11

FACTS - On December 3, 1998, employees of Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant (duly organized as a union, affiliated with private respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council [PLAC], and designated as PLAC local 460 Sukhothai chapter) filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice (ULP) and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. - In a subsequent conciliation conference, representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. - In a Submission Agreement, the issue of unfair labor practice was later submitted for voluntary arbitration, during the pendency of which, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Another employee, private respondent Jose Lanorias, likewise a union member, was relieved from his post and terminated from employment. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a wildcat strike which was later transformed into an actual strike. - On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, and for a declaration that respondents who participated in the commission of illegal acts have lost their employment status. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and held that the Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote referred to a prior dispute submitted for voluntary arbitration and cannot apply to the strike staged about six months later; that, instead of resorting to a strike, private respondents should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC; and that even if private respondents complied with all the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon nonstriking employees. - Private respondents appealed to the NLRC which decided in their favor and held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; of violating the Submission Agreement that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings; that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote are applicable to the strike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the same issues of ULP were involved and that ULPs are continuing offenses.
12

- After the NLRC denied the MFR, petitioner appealed to the CA, which later denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC hence this case. ISSUES 1. WON the strike was illegal 2. WON private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. 3. WON the requisites for a valid strike may be dispensed with in case of union-busting. HELD 1. YES. The strike was illegal. Ratio Art.264 of the LC provides: No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Pres. or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. - Strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved, for it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes. Reasoning Once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. - The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. These matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. - Private respondents should have first availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense. - Moreover, even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the
13

prohibited activities under Art. 264(e) of the LC, which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or (c) obstruct public thoroughfares. 2. YES. The strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Reasoning Under Art.264(a) of the LC: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. - The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner; waving their arms and shouting at the passersby, Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai! and Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain dyan! as well as numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment; preventing the entry of customers; angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion which affected neighboring establishments within the mall; openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers and using loud and abusive language, such as Putang ina niyong lahat!, toward the rest of the management as well as their co-workers who refused to go on strike; physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises, as well as deliberately blocking their movements inside the restaurant, at times by sharply bumping into them or through indecent physical contact; openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!; and shouting at the security guard Granada! which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to management and the security agency. 3. NO. Reasoning In case of alleged union busting, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report period cannot be dispensed with. Disposition Petition GRANTED. Decisions of the CA and the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Decision of the LA REINSTATED. The strike held ILLEGAL and Union officers who
14

participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts, as well as the union members who participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike, are declared to have lost their employment status. Liwayway Publishing Co., Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, 108 SCRA 161 (81) 108 SCRA 161 GUERRERO; October 23, 1981 NATURE -This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance FACTS -While a labor dispute between defendant-appellant union and Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued in an action for damages filed by the plaintiff-appellee Liwayway Publications, Inc. a writ of preliminary injunction against appellant union which picketed and prevented entrance to the gate leading to the bodega of appellee and threatened its officers and employees despite the fact that the appellee is not in anyway related to the striking union but a mere sublessee of said bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. against whom the strike was staged. Appellant union filed a motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ on the ground that only the Court of Industrial Relations and not the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the labor dispute; that the appellee has no cause of action against the striking union but against the lessor; and that plaintiff-appellee is not the real party in interest but Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. The lower court denied the motion for lack of labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance and rendered a decision declaring the writ permanent and ordering the payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs. ISSUE WON this case involves or has arisen out of a labor dispute. If it does, then with certainty, Section 9 of Republic Act 875, the "Industrial Peace Act," would apply. If it does not, then the Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because it will not partake the nature of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue. HELD NO. The business of the appellee is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag, Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. The appellee is a third party or an "innocent by-stander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular courts. -The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.The right is, however, not an
15

absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or `innocent bystanders' if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found other than their being situated in the same premises. It is to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were located. -On appeal, the Supreme Court in upholding the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, ruled that: (a) there is no connection between the appellee, the appellant union and the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and the fact, that the latter and appellee are situated in the same premises, can hardly be considered as interwoven with the labor dispute pending with the Court of Industrial Relations; and (b) the acts of the striking union are mere acts of trespass for which the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser. Disposition Decision appealed from, affirmed in toto.

MSF Tire and Rubber Inc. v. CA, 311 SCRA 784 (99) 311 SCRA 784 MENDOZA; August 5, 1999 NATURE Petiton for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS -A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union) -Union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
16

-Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtreads plant. -Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. -The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. -During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre) whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company, herein petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. -Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. -As the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. -Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. -The trial court denied petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. -However, on petitioners motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and granted an injunction. -The respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. -CA ruled in favor of respondent Union, hence, petitioner filed this petition asserting that its status as an innocent bystander entitled it to a writ of injunction. ISSUE WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under the innocent bystander rule HELD No. -In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. -The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or
17

localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. -Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. -Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. -In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute. -As correctly observed by the appellate court: we find that the negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondents personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ. Disposition Petition is denied.

Prohibited Activities Peaceful Picketing 264 (b), Arts. 289 and 312 Revised Penal Code

18