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O Mito da Cincia Exata The ultimate hope of classical mechanistic physics was to reach a point from which all

causalism could be deduced and explained. The methods of classical physics, in other words, were aimed at the discovery of some universal law. This mechanistic determinism reveals itself most clearly in the theory of La Place, which describes the world as a system of material points having fixed relations to one another. If these relations are known, if the positions and motions of the material points are known for any specific movement, then it is possible, by integrating the differential equations backward or forward, to determine the state of the world at any past or future moment. For example, if we meet the conditions of La Place's theory, we should be able to rediscover the lost works of Praxiteles or of the Greek painters. [...] The problem of the limits within which physical laws can be applied is never mentioned, nor the question whether the laws of nature may not be changing in the course of time. This strict determinism is at present disappearing because the laws of physics, in theory, appear to be no more than the results of statistics. The hypothesis that light consists of quanta, and Heisenberg's presentation of quantum mechanics, can no longer be reconciled with the older concepts. Heisenberg's quantum mechanics, in particular, demonstrates that no measuring methods can obtain absolutely exact data of minute events. [] These hypotheses of theoretical physics reflect an act of resignation in the minds of the physicists, namely, a renunciation of the attempt to pass beyond certain limitations. They restrict the validity of physical laws to a narrower area. [...]The concept of the universe itself becomes more elastic. [] Proposals to that effect, however, demonstrate the growing desire of the various sciences to become philosophically legitimate. This is most evident in physics, a science which is turning again to philosophy, particularly in its occupation with the concept of time. Moreover, physics is unmistakably turning toward theology, and this is not surprising. For an exact scientist who believes that he has freed himself of theological problems, that he is concerned with a truth and a reality that know no dogma, is indulging in self-deception. He may make such assertions and pretend that he is concerned solely with the knowledge of the laws that govern the processes of nature. That much can be conceded. But this knowledge cannot be isolated, and he who tries to do so does not achieve an independent platform whereon to stand; he merely loses sight of the interrelations of all things. The theory of evolution, the problem of factors, the theory of selection all converge upon the idea of creation. Among other things, these theories depend on whether we assume a single act of creation, or a continuous creation. The problem of causality cannot be treated without considering the question of free will or determination, and this question is inextricably tied to the religious doctrines of predestination. The same holds true of the problem of pre-established forms, and of the entire theory of heredity. Connections of this sort can be traced right into the foundations of mechanics. And those who believe that the law of energy in physics, or that wave or quantum mechanics, or the kinetic theory of heat has been "cleansed" of these philosophical connections, simply fail to understand that these connections are integral and are formative to perception itself. To neutralize them does not mean to liquidate them. The exact scientist merely shuts his eyes to them. Moreover, he likes to believe that only mechanics possesses exactitude. The mathematician, too, assumes that mathematics is the sole source of exactitude. What he overlooks is that the concept of exactitude, like that of purpose, is a relative concept that receives meaning

only if the premises are granted. For example, we cannot achieve absolute exactitude of measurement, but we can make our measurement as exact as possible under certain conditions. There is no absolute, universal concept of perfection, only a specific one resulting from the fulfillment of specific conditions. Likewise, there is only a specific concept of exactitude, and only this concept and nothing more is expressed in mathematical and causal exactitude. Kant believed that there was a science only in so far as there was mathematics. The same error can be encountered among many mathematicians and physicists who believe that they alone possess exactness. However, they possess it only within their field. There is exactness also in the movements of animals and in the emotions and passions of man. Homeric hexameter or a Pindaric ode has as much exactness as any causal relation or mathematical formula. But this rhythmic, metrical exactness is of another, higher order. That it cannot be calculated is no reason to call it less exact than the results of this or that quantitative measurement.

Friedrich Georg Junger The Failure of Technology

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