DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN

MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES:
THE CASE OF SURINAME
Jack Menke
Introduction
ulti-ethnic societies in the
Caribbean suffer from ethnic
L-_ _ __ --' tensions or confl ict s in the
prevailing system of political democracy, with
a negative impact on social and economic
development. Some scholars believe that the
cooperation between ethnic elites via an
informal brokerage system in the context of
the so-called consociational democracy might
be an attractive solution for those living in a
multi-ethnic society with a potential for ethni c
conflicts (Deosaran 1996). Others consider
the democratic tradition of Suriname as a
panacea.
A solution to the aforementioned
problems must take the Suriname experience
into account. In the first instance, the degree
of alienati on experienced by the major races
has been notably less because of the presence
of an informal brokerage system which has
ensured that those races are a part of the
government and decision-making process
(Alexander 1993).
One should however be careful not to
exaggerate the assumed positive elements of
consociational democracy since there are
also negative elements in the sphere of policy
decision making. In the era of global
restructuring, there are also changes in the
policy decision cycle on strategic issues that
one should also take into consideration.
Against this background, it is a simplification
to assume that consociational democracy, as
applied in Suriname, ensures that "those races
are part of the government and decision-
making process" as Alexander suggests.
This paper discusses democracy in
multi-ethnic societies in a much wider
framework of social stratification, the
interplay between politi cal and economic
power, state formation and policy decision-
making on strategic issues.
Post World War Stratification and
Ethnicity
In Suriname, the actual transition
towards the post-colonial society begun in
1947 when the law on the ' Welfare Fund' was
passed in the Dutch parliament which laid the
basis for the modern planned development of
Suriname. In 1948, general suffrage was
introduced and in 1949 the first general
elections were held. At that time Suriname
had a typi cal social structure with the
predominantly white colonial oligarchy in the
highest social stratum. This group represented
the Dutch colonial interests, and held key
positions in the state bureaucracy, parliament
and the army. Second in rank was the colonial
middle class, consisting predominantly of
mulattos in the higher and middle
occupational ranks, lawyers, medical doctors,
schoolteachers, journalists and middle-level
civil servants.
The peasants and wageworkers in
agriculture were mainly of Indian and
Javanese descent . Wageworkers in the balatta
and mining sectors, self-employed and
wageworkers in the urban manufacturing
sector were predominantly of African origin.
The mulatto segment of the colonial middle
class initially opposed the introduction of
general suffrage in 1948. This group feared
increasing competition of the Indians as
regards employment opportunities in the stat e
bureaucracy. Against this background, the
electoral system of 1948, designed by the
representatives of the mulattos, was meant
to consolidate their class position. Owing to
this electoral system that was sanctioned by
Holland, this group came to power by winning
the first elections in 1949. They kept state
power until 1958, depending strongly on the
Dutch colonial bourgeoisie. After the
elections of 1958, state power came in the
hands of the leading middle classes ofthe three
major ethnic groups: the Creoles, the Indians
and the Javanese. In the political hi stolJl of
Suriname, the 1958-1969 period of politics
is referred to as the 'Verbroederingspolitiek '
(consociational democracy) .
The period of the 1960s and 1970s is
characterized by ' transitional stratification'
(Benedict 1962): the major ethnic groups
were represented more or less in all strata,
except the highest managerial stratum.
Remarkable is the greater mobility to white
collar jobs, which was due to development
aid, political patronage, and greater access to
education. In the stage of ' integrational
stratification,' the major ethnic groups are
represented more or less in all strata, which
is the case in Sllriname in 2001.
State Formation and the Policy
Decision-Making Cycle
This section focuses on two issues: first,
the political functions of the slale and the
interplay with ethnicity and class: and second,
changes in the decision-making process by the
state and the consequences for class, ethnicity
and governance in multi-ethnic societies.
Two specific political functions of the
state can be distinguished in developing coun-
tries (Menke 1991):
i) The state as an instrument via
which political power is executed
by groups, strata, or classes;
ii) The state as a central source for
class creation and for gaining
economic power, improvement or
mobility of (ethnic) groups or for
individual survival.
The state is conceived as the institutions,
instruments, ideological and repressive
apparatus via which political power is
executed . National interests and national
security are the principal categories in which
strategic goals are conceived {Allison
197133). There are four stages in the policy
decision-making process by the various state
institlltions: determining strategic pol icy
issues: policy formulation; policy preparation
and policy implementation. Traditionally, it
is assumed that the choice of strategic policy
issues is determined by the state. In today's
globalizing world, external factors have a
major influence on the choice of strategic
policy issues.
The extent to which governments have
the room to formulate and take decisions on
strategic policy issues is critical to political
power via the state. The question therefore
is: which are the changes in state formation
and the policy decision making cycle?
Examples of present strategic policy issues in
the Caribbean are, among others, WTO
determined regulations on trade, contracts
with transnationals in key economic sectors,
and policies on narco-traffic (shiprider
agreement) .
State Formation and Ethnicit),
in Pre-Restructuring Period:
1960-1980
This section deals with the formation of
the state as a central source for class creation,
economic improvement or mobility of ethnic
groups in the pre-restructuring period from
the 1960s to 1980, i.e., the period preceding
global restructuring.
Consociationalism in the 1960s
Suriname has a political tradition of a
multi-party system. From 1958-1967
consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977)
was dominant in politics. This was achieved
by the cooperation between elites of the maj or
ethnic groups and their respective political
parties - Indians (YHP), Javanese (KTPI) and
Creoles/ blacks (NPS) - via an informal broke-
rage system. In the context of 'the state as a
source of power' the ' ethnic state' emerged:
in terms of distribution of resources within
the state sector, ministries were divided along
ethnic lines, including minist ers and rank and
file civil servants. The dist ribution of resources
is also reflected in the allocation of
development aid in distinct economic sectors:
Creoles occupying strategic positions in
parastatals and the public sector, while Indians
dominated the development resources (mainly
from Dutch aid) for the agricultural sector.
State Interventionism and the
State Elite of the 1970s
State interventionism, characteristic in
the pre-restructuring 1970s, started in some
developing countries with the launching of the
joint venture strategy. The interventionist role
of the state is reflected in the establ ishment
of a large number of parastatals and public
enterprises. Tn Suriname, this strategy was
applied in particular in the primary sector, in
agriculture and forestry.
The YHP-PNP government (1969-1973)
was the first Indian dominated coalition since
the first general elections in 1949. They
introduced the Joint Venture Strategy with
participation in enterprises by both foreign and
nati o nal capital, the latter generally
participating with at least 51% of the shares.
The change in the ethnic political power
balance is reflected in the state bureaucracy
by the increased proportion of ministries under
control ofVHP affiliated Indians. Unlike the
preceding consocialional democracy period
(1958-1969) , there were an equal number of
ministries led by Creoles and East Indians.
This was different from the period of
'Verbroederingspolitiek ' (consociational
democracy), when the distribution was quite
in favor of the Creoles (Table I)
au
Table 1. Ministers by Ethnicity in Twenty-Three Administrations, 1949-2001
1949- 1958- 1969-
58 69 73
Creoles 46 30 6
East Indians 4 6 6
Javanese 0 I I
Others 0 0 I
Total SO 37 14
The poor results of the Joint Venture
strategy - in terms of per capita economic
growt h, income di stribution and employment
- gave rise to class conflicts especially of the
middle and lower strata of the state
bureaucracy against the state. As the majority
of this bureaucracy was composed of Creoles,
the conflicts had a very strong ethnic element,
a protest of Creoles against the perceived
'domination' oflndians.
In the 1969- 1973 period the evolution
and different iation of the middle classes was
continued, more or less coinciding with ethnic
di visions. Thus, in the rice sector, as a
consequence of the ' Green Revolution' of the
sixties, an agrarian and commercial elite
evolved, composed predominantly oflndians.
The evolution of this class can be expl ai ned
hi stori cally and economically, but must be
related also to the ' Ethnic State' characterized
by the division of the govemment into ethnic
ministries. In the case of the Ministry of
Agriculture, between 1958 and 1973 all 4
ministers were of Indian origin. The st.ate
evolved towards an instrument of 'class
formation' through political patronage by
providing facilities and resources (e.g., land)
to members of political panies or ethnic
Total Ethnicity
1973- 1980- 1988- 1991- 1949-
80 88 90 2001 2001
23 68 7 33 213
2 20 7 19 64
4 5 3
[0 24
0 2 I 6 to
29 95 18 67 3LO
groups. This also occurred in ministries
governed by ministers of Creole or Javanese
origin.
Bureaucratic State Elite
The eve of political independence in
Suriname (around 1970-1975) was
characterized by ethnic tensions both within
and outside the state, labor conflicts involving
in particular the middle strata of the state
bureaucracy against the state, and the mass
emigration of Surinamese to Holland . The
coloni al power exerted pressure to force
political independence of Suriname. This
pressure can be explained in two ways: first,
there were problems with the growing
Surinamese minorit y in Holland as a
consequence of the mass migration of
Surinamese who were Dutch citizens; and
second, the growing labor and political unrest
in Suriname in the 19705.
The political response of the opposition
to the increasing class and etlmic tensions was
the mass mobilization of creoles in one
political organization (NPK) - together with
the largest Javanese party (KTPI). The creole-
dominated NPK advocated political
independence and the 1973 elections resulted
in a creole dominated cabinet that remained
in power until the military coup of 1980. The
strategic policy issue was the political
independence of Suriname which was initially
opposed by the largest Indian party, the YHP.
The proclamation of political
independence of Suriname in 1975 did not
only mean that state functions (such as the
repressive apparatus) were merely transferred
to the former colony. The new development
aid-agreement between the Dutch and
Surinamese state gave rise to a more
economically active role for the state. The
influential Committee on Development Aid
Cooperation between Holland and Suriname
(CONS) was an expression of this changing
role of the state. In fact, this committee
determined the strategic issues and allocation
of development aid, with the exclusion of the
official planning institutions and the
government.
In fact the bureaucratic state elite was
authorized to function as the representative
of Dutch neo-colonialism with respect to its
interest at the level of the state . The
administration of the huge amount of 3.5
billion Dutch guilders of development aid for
the period 1975-198511990 was entrusted to
exponents of this fraction and the
representatives of the Dutch state in the
CONS (Figure I and 3). On the one hand,
this expresses the dependent character of this
c a s s ~ and on the other, this can be considered
an attempt towards the consolidation of its
political and economic power in Suriname.
In Guyana and Trinidad, the state had
greater influence in determining strategic
policy issues involving state interventionism.
Suriname was to a certain extent an anomaly.
In the context of the huge Dutch develop-
ment aid, ajoint development committee with
representatives of the Dutch and Surinamese
state (the CONS) was influential in decision-
making on strategic development issues.
Guyana, Trinidad and Suriname have in
common that political panies supported by
blacks dominated the political scene during
state interventionism. They became the state
elite and were in control of the state enter-
prise sector, the administration/allocation of
development funding, the policy formulation
and strategic policy issues to the extent that
the latter were not determined by the metro-
pole.
Figure I. Policy Decision-Making on Strategic Issues and Ethnicity in
Suriname, 1949-1955, 1970s
1949-1955 Policy Decision-making: 1970s
Strategic issues
ns
Fonnulation
Mulatto's
C n
r d
e a
a
e
Preparation
0 V
V
1
n
c
S
Military State 1980-1988
In February 1980, State power in
Suriname was seized by non- commissioned
officers of the Surinamese army. The deeper
background of the coup as in many
postcolonial societies are attributable to the
' low' political culture, the stagnation in
capi talist devel opment , and the social
problems. The low political culture on the eve
of the military coup reflected stagnation in
capitalist development, in the indecisiveness
of the government, the disintegration of
parliamentary democracy, the depolitization
of the population, politi cal instability, and
corruption. Directly related to the low political
culture was the weakness and discord of the
ruling fraction of the middle class .
a
c n
n
5 e
S
e
The military leaders made several
attempts to transform the social and economic
structures. Various measures were taken: land
r efo rm in the interest of smallholder 's
agricult ure; the development of resource-
based industries, and the launching of a mass
alphabetization program. Generally speaking,
these attempts failed An important reason for
this failure was the unrealistic expectations
of the role of the state within existing
production - and class relations. These
projects did not yield sufficient political
suppo rt , which was due to the weak
organizational and mobilization structures on
the one hand, and the strength of the counter
ideology of the existing middle classes and
the political pressure by foreign powers (USA
and Holland) on the other hand .
Redemocratization and Strategic
Issues in the 1980s
To understand the character of the state
in the 1980s and 1990s, it is necessary to go
back to the very beginning of the
redemocratization process. Redemocra-
tization commenced in 1983 by an informal
dialogue between the Military Authority and
the leaders of the traditional political parties
representing the major ethnic groups (KTPI,
NPS and VHP) The dialogue initiated by the
military leaders should be understood as a
safety measure to prevent their continued
isolation which they feared could lead to loss
of state power. On further observation of the
background and the nature of the 'dialogue,'
two points are of importance: the choice of
the dialogue partners by the Military Authority
and the strategi c issues in the dialogue.
Two key issues probabl y played a role
in the choice of the dialogue partners. First,
they felt that the most effective way to halt
the continuing isolation from the people, was
to go via the emotional-affective ties of the
traditional political leaders with their ethnic
rank and file . Second, the military opted for
dialogue partners who were willing to accept
a balanced phased wit hdrawal of the military,
leading to a sharing of State power. Tn
particular, in the field of defense and in internal
securi ty, the power should remain in the hands
of the military apparatus. This sharing of State
power was laid down formally prior to the
elections of November 25, 1987 in the decree
of ' National Army' which was adopted on
November 19, 1987 by the National Assembly.
As regards the nature of the ' dialogue'
and the dialogue partners, military regimes
normally opt for civilians who prefer juridical-
poli tical changes to social econo mi c changes
(Petras 1986: I) In t he process of redemo-
cratization in Suriname, emphasis was laid on
jurid ical-political matters, such as the
constitut ion, pa rliament and other State
insti tuti ons.
Paradoxically, the emphasis on juridical-
political issues coupled with the neglect of
the dialogue on the social-economic
development policy led to the crisis of the first
elected civilian government after the military
regime. On several political issues (such as
discussions with the Dutch State on the
internationalization of the development aid,
and the problem of the so-called EA import
and transit trade) the civilian government was
confronted with the crucial choice on strategic
issues that would be of influence on its
existence'. on the one hand, the option was to
try and sol ve internal problems (high
unemployment rate, inflation, scarcity of basic
goods and the low standard of living) to
guarantee internal political stability. On the
other hand, the opti on was to t ry and meet
the external political and economic demands
of the former colonial power, in particular the
implement ation of a structural adjustment
program and the ' internationalization' of the
. development relati on between Suriname and
Holland in order to enhance international
creditworthiness. Ultimately, the emphasis
was on meeting the external demands at the
costs of solving internal problems.
Electoral Instability and
Fragmentation, 1988-2001
During the 1980s and 1990s, the
impact of global restructuri ng was felt in many
Caribbean societi es, among others, by the
fa lling terms of trade of primary export
commodities (bauxite) and the austerity
policies of international finan ce agencies and
donor countries. Changes in strategic policy
issues and the traditional decision-making
cycle in Suriname since the 19805 resulted
from both internal and external developments.
Internal developments relate to the military
regime and the resulting changes in class and
state formation, while external developments
were due to the global restructuring.
This section assesses the redistribution
of political power and its relation with political
fragmentation and ethnic representation after
the first post military elections in 1987, won
by a coalition of the major traditional ethnic
parties (NPS, VHP, KTPI) by almost 90% of
the votes cast.
Electoral Instabil ity
Electoral instability refers to the decrease
or increase of the proportion of votes cast,
related to previous elections. Electoral
instability can be determined by the instability
index: the sum of the procentual gains of all
political parties that had an electoral growth
compared to previous election results. This
index ranges from 0 to 100. An index of 0
indicates no change, thus no instability. The
electoral instability is -39.4 for 1987-2000,
which is quite high. The highest electoral
instability in the postwar polit ical history of
Suriname (1949-2000) was calculated for the
1987-1996 period with an index of -45.4, or
a decrease for the traditional party
combination (FRONT) from 87.1 % to 41 .7%
of the national valid votes cast.
Table 2. Electoral Instability, 1987-2000 Based on
Valid Votes by Party/Combination
Year Front" NDP/ Olher Total
Millennium Parties
1987 87. 1% 9.3% 3.7% 100%
1991 54.2% 21.9% 24% 100%
1996 41.7% 26.2% 32.1% 100%
2000 47.5% 15. 1% 37.4% 100%
Loss(-)gains(+)
1987-2000 -39.5% +5.8% +33.7% 0%
* 1.6% of SPA that was not in the FRONT in 1987 is included in the figures of
FRONT.
There are indications that the negative
growth of the traditional parties in the FRONT
combination becomes permanent in some
districts (Nickerie, Saramacca and Coronie)
In these districts the share of its electorate
decreased further since 1987 to approxi-
mately one third of the valid votes cast in the
2000 elections . On the other hand, new
parties show a continued positive growth
since 1987 in five of the ten electoral districts,
including the three largest districts of
Paramaribo, Wanica and Nickerie.
Electoral instability can be explained by
internal and external factors (Menke 1997).
Among the important internal factors are the
political leadership and organization, and the
changing demographic composition of the
electorate. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign
influence came particularly from the colonial
powers or the United States to prevent radical
political or economic experiments, for
instance, in Guyana in the early 1960s and
Jamaica in the 1970s Since the 1980s, there
is a change in foreign influences due to
economic restructuring policies imposed by
multilateral institutions or individual donor
countries. At the same time there is the inabi-
lity of many ruling coalitions to deal with
global restructuring and imposed structural
adjustment programs in a proper way.
Fragmentation and Non-
traditional Coalitions
One of the possible consequences of
electoral instability is fragmentation of
political parties/coalitions and the birth of non-
traditional government coalitions. Examples
in multi-ethnic societies are Trinidad,
Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. Trinidad had
its first non-traditional coalition in 1986, 30
years after the first general elections were
held, and Suriname after 47 years.
In Suriname the 1996 elections marked
a turning point in the history of general
elections . In that year the hegemony of
traditional politics that was based on ethnic
cleavages was terminated. Historically the
traditional parties derived their electoral sup-
port predominantly from one ethnic group :
NPS (blacks/Creoles), VHP (East Indians)
and KTPI (Javanese). Since none of the
participating parties obtained the majority of
seats, a broad coalition was formed, led by
the multi-ethni c National Democratic Party
(I'mp) of Desiree Bouterse, former leader
of the military regime(1980-1987) In additi-
on to the NDP, this coalition comprised three
new parties (PVF, HPP, OPDA) as well as
fragments (BVD, KTPI) of traditional ethnic-
oriented parties or combinations.
The first general elections in 1949, 12
political parties contested . In the 1996
elections, there were 15 political parties. The
largest number of political parties was in the
200 I elections (23 parties). The critical
question is are there changes in the political
representation of ethnic groups since the first
elections? And how is fragmentation of the
ethnic representation related to political and
economic power?
Fragmentation of Ethnic
Representation
Ethnic fragmentation is reflected in two
ways : the split of existing ethnic oriented
political parties or combinations; and the
representation of each ethnic group by more
than one party in the national assembly. In
the 1996 elections, the fragmentation of
existing political combinations or parties
occurred after the elections . All three
combinations of parties - Nieuw FRONT,
Alliantie and DA9 1 - which had elected
members in parliament suffered from splits.
The ruling FRONT-coalition, which had a
minority of seats in parliament, was unable to
engineer a wider coalition with two other
parties/combinations. Two months after the
elections, the fragmentation in the Nieuw
FRONT, the combination with the largest
number of parliamentary seats (24), begun
by the withdrawal of 5 elected Indians who
established a new party. This was followed
shortly by another split in Nieuw FRONT with
the withdrawal of the KTPI , a Javanese party
with 5 elected members. Due to the with-
drawal of elected members, two other party-
combinations, Alliantie and DA91 , also lost
seats (Table 3).
In the meantime, attempts to form a new
coalition were undertaken by the NOP, which
had 16 seats. This party establi shed a new
coalition with all the members who withdrew
from the original political combinations, ensu-
ring the election of the President and vice-
president, and the formation ofa government.
Table 3. Political Parties/Combinations by Seats in
Parliament Prior and After Fragmentation, Suriname 1996
Party/Combination Before Fragmentation After Fragmentation
NOp
16 16
Nieuw Front 24 14
"BVD-VHP 0 5
"KTP! 0 5
DA9I (AF, BEP, OPDA) 4 3
"OPDA 0 I
AJliantie (DP,HPP, PVF, PSV) J 0
DP 0 I
*HPP 0 I
*PVF 0 I
Pendawalima 4 4
Total seats 51 51
. . . .
* Elected members who withdrew and went m a non-traditional COal1l10n with the NOP.
Sources composed of data from Egger 1996.
In Suriname, the processes that resulted in a
non-traditional coalition in 1996 were:
Electoral Instability, Fragmentation, and
Coalition Forming.
In the 2000 elections fragmentation in
terms of splitting of existing political parties,
continued . The difference with the 1996
elections was that the fragmentation in 2000
occurred before the elections, resulting in 5
political parties. Two factors explain the most
drastic fragmentati on that ever occurred in
the history of elections in Suriname: the urge
to unite economic and pol itical power; and
the urge for completion of the emancipation
of the ethnic group concerned .
Economic and Political Power
We deal first with the necessity to
unite economic and political power The
capital accumulation developed in the 1980s
by various ethnic el ites necessi tated political
fragmentation and new alliances in order to
link economic and politi cal power It is
remarkable that two of the fragmented parties,
which became part of the new government,
represent important local capital groups of
Indians. Another fragmented pany (the PVF)
represents non-traditional trade unionism in
agriculture.
As was observed earli er, control of the
state in post-colonial states is the basis for
the creation or further devel o pment of
economic power and consolidation of rul ing
elites. During and after the military regime in
the 1980s, the military leaders, who gradually
transformed this power politically to the civili-
an political part y, the NOP (Menke 199 1),
reserved an important share of state power.
This is one of the pull fact ors for other
economic elites to prefer an alliance with the
NDP. A push factor for the economic elite to
withdraw from the traditional parties is related
to reduced Dutch aid inflows since the I 980s,
which has been a principal source for the
power basis of these parties. In addition, due
to changed and more stringent procedures,
the possibility of using development aid for
political patr o nage has been reduced
significantly. It is no surprise therefore, that
attempts to strengthen the economic power
base of the 1996-2001 non-traditional
coalition in Suriname is directed towards local
capi tal and managerial groups and pri vate
capital sources in Asia, the Arab world, and
Latin America.
A second factor that could explain the
fragmentation of politi cal parties is the urge
for completion of the emancipation of the
ethni c groups . Traditional ethnic voting,
meaning that most persons of a particular
ethni c groups vote for their own ethnic party,
is to some extent over. The consequence of
the fragmentati on process is that in 1996 and
2000, various parties in parliament
(Schalkwijk 1996) represent members of one
particular ethnic group. Fi ve parties have East
Indian representatives, five parties have black
representatives, three have Javanese, and
another three represent Bushnegroes.
There is a certain sequence in this process
of what I ca ll 'ethni c delinking ' and
emancipation. The black and mi xed group was
the first to experience fragmentation, which
started in the early 1950s. Then gradually
the Indians started in the 1960s, with the
hi ghli ght in 1996. As regards the Javanese,
by numbers the third ethni c group, non-
Javanese parties have not yet succeeded in
attracting signifi cant portions of their
electorate . Thi s is a n indi cation that the
emancipation process of this group has not
yet been completed.
-=
Ethnic Representation in Political
Institutions
With regards to the issue of ethnic
representation and political power we com-
pared the 1949-1955 period, the 1991 and
1996-2000 periods on the distributions by
ethnicity in the national assembly and the
council of ministers, respectively (Table 4).
The 1949-1955 interval is the period prior to
the maturing of consociational democracy in
Suriname.
Table 4. Ethnic Representation in Parliament, Council of Ministers and in Suriname
Parliament Council of Ministers
Ethnicity 1949-55 1991 1996 1949-55
Creole/mixed 59% 33 % 29% 83%
East Indian 33% 35% 33% 9%
Javanese 6% 18% 20% 0%
Bushnegroe 2% 14% 14% 0%
Amerindian 0% 0% 4% 0%
Europeans 0% 0% 0% 4%
Others
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(63) (5\) (51) (23)
Bushnegroes are included in Creole/mixed
"based 011 the 1980 census
1991 1996
50% 33%
33% 39%
17% 28%
0% 0%
0% 0%
0% 0%
100
%
, \00%
(18) (18)
Suriname
1980 ..
39. 14%'
37.8%
18.42%

1.48%
0.49%
3. 17%
100%
Table 4 shows that in the 1949- 1955
period, Creole! mixed had a majority both in
parliament and the council of ministers .
Moreover, their representation in the council
of ministers is relatively much larger than the
representation in the parliament. This
contrasts with the I 990s, particularly the non-
traditional coalition of 1996-2000, which
shows that ethnic distributions in parliament
and the council of ministers resemble the
ethnic di stribution of the population as a
whole. Moreover, Indians rank first in
parliament and in the council of ministers.
However, this does not mean that Indians have
most political power. This is true because a
Creole, who is a representative of the multi -
ethnic NDP - the most powerful party in the
coalition dominated by Creoles - held the
strategic portfolio of president. However, in
2000, the president and some of the ministers
founded a new party (DNP) that spliced from
the NDP.
Due to the reduced aid inflows and the
changed development aid procedures, which
are determined much more by the donor, there
is also a change in the sectors and ministries
that are strategic. Consequently, the finance
ministry, traditionally strategic for controlling
development funds, has decl ined in
importance. On the other hand, the growing
importance and high world market pri ces of
minerals in Suriname, such as gold, resulted
in the strategic importance of the Ministry of
Natural Resources.
In addition, it is important to note that in
the three successive governments of t987-
1990, 1990-1991 and 199 1-1996, the presi -
dent of Suriname did not concentrate politi-
cal power in his own hands. However, in the
non-traditional coalition ( 1996-2000) the
President did concentrate much more political
power in his hands.
Strategic Policy Issues
The shift in strategic policy issues from
J975-2001 is evident (Table 5). In the pre-
restructuring 1970s, emphasis was on the ' Big
Push' economic issues (hydroelectricity and
bauxite projects) and on the political issue of
Independence ' forced' by internal social
tensions and the mass emigration to Holland.
The military period (1980-1988), was
characterized by anti-colonial and nationalist
issues, ranging from changing the focus and
operation of the Dutch-Suriname aid
agreement to participatory democracy. Of the
four civilian governments in the 1988 - 2001
period, all had to deal with the impact of
global restructuring and the changed
development relation with Holland. The
difference between the traditional and the non-
traditional government is that the latter opted
for a combination of 'development by own
financial resources' and 'diversification of
foreign financial resources' in the absence of
a clear development strategy and an economic
recovery program that resulted in a huge
internal and external debt. The traditional
governments executed relatively orthodox
structural adjustment programs of a
monetari st type, neglecting the importance of
a coherent and integrated program, including
a social safety net. At the same time, they
focused on j uridical -politi cal issues to cope
with the perceived 't hreat ' of a growing
opposition and potential political power of the
NOP, a multi-ethnic party led by exponents
of the military regime of the 1980s. Despite
differences in political framework and
strategic policy issues, both the traditional and
non-Iraditional coalit ions did not succeed in
solvi ng the major probl em of a low standard
of living of the population, of which the
majority lives below the poverty line.
Policy Cycle
In formal terms, the traditional policy
decision-making cycle is as follows. Once the
priority of strategic policy issues is determined
in parliamentary democracies, the formulation
of policy and policy objectives are determined
de jure by the parliament, de Jacto by the
government. The policy preparation, including
the operationalisation of policy choices and
objectives, is a task of the administration.
Table 6 shows a periodisation of
decision-making on strategic policy issues. In
the ongoing restructuring and the concomitant
internationalization of capital, labor and
development policy, the focus of donors
shifted from project planning to macro-
economic policy programs.
Table 5. Strategic Policy Issues in Suriname, 1975-2001
Period Strategic Issue Coalition Ethnic/Social Composition
1975-1980

Politi cal Independence NPK (NPS. PNR. Creole majority,

Development Aid Agreement KTPI Javancse

Hydroelectricity & bauxite
19RO 1988

4 revolutionary renewals Successive civi l- Major and other

Change focus and operation of Military Govern ethnic groups
Development Aid Agreement ments

Redemocratization &
Constitutional change
198Rl990

Amending Constitution FRONT(NPS. Major eUmic groups

Restore Development aid VHF. KTPI)

Structural Adjustment program

Peace treaty interior war
1990199 1

New electi ons Civil-Military Major ethnic groups
Government
19911996

Executing Structural Adjustment NEW FRONT Major ethnic groups +
NPS, VHF. KTPI. largest trade uni ons
SPA)
1996-2000

Diversification foreign policy Non-traditional Najor and other
(such as Regional cooperati on) coali tion ethnic groups

Change Dutch - Suriname
development rcla.lion

Local government
2001

Strengthening democratic NEW FRONT Major ellmic groups +
nati on state (Trias Politic) (NPS, VHF. SPA, largest trade unions

Good Governance Penjaya Luhur)

Security & territorial integrity

Structural adjustment
At the same time, the preconditions for
providing aid shifted trom project execution
-and evaluation to policy formulation. These
changes are accompanied by reducing tradi-
tional state functions, which is reflected in
three processes:
I. the state is reduced to an execu-
ting unit in decision making on
strategic policy issues; many
administrations or state institutions
are reduced to 'task forces' rather
than institutions which determine
strategic policy issues.
u. the reduction of the state to an
executing unit implies the
underutilization and informalization
of local professionals and techno-
crats;
Ill . the state has lost a large share of
effective political power and gover-
ning capability in the process of
global restructuring.
The electoral instability followed by
the installation of a non-traditional
government coalition (Wijdenbosch adminis-
tration) in 1996, led to changes in choice of
strategic policy issues and the position ofthe
Surinamese State in the policy cycle (Table
6). This is reflected in the fact that the
Surinamese State determined some of the
strategic policy issues, which went at the cost
of the Dutch influence. Consequently the
development cooperation with Holland was
terminated in strategic sectors during the
1996-2000 non-traditional coalition. A clear
example is the technical cooperation for
strengthening the tax system in Suriname with
assistance of Dutch experts, which was not
continued by this coalition.
Table 6. Chanleliln the PoUcy Cycle on wua In 1950-2001
Period O' ... nnlnine Polky PoUcy Policy
Strateclc bsues Formulation Preparation Implementation
50-605
-
Stat<: Parliament Administration Executi ve
-
Colonizer
Foreign Cap.
19708 Hollatld Parliament Administration EXecu1ive
-
Cons eons Cons- Subcommittee Executive
(Joint Suriname
Dutch Commitlee)
80-88
-
Military Military -Adminiru Burocracy
State State -Mil . State
88-96
-
Holland Foreign Foreign Exocutive
-
Multilateral Consultants Consultants Stat<:
Organization Administration Admin.istralion
Task Forces
96-2000 SIal< Foreign Foreign Executive
Consultants
Conrultan" State
Admin;Slralion Adrniruslral;on
Task Forces
2001 Holland Foreign Foreign Executive
Multilateral Consultants Consultants Stat<:
Orga.nlzaJ.ion Holland Administration Administration
Conclusions and Recommendations
From 1980-2000, the role of the
Surinamese State in the policy decision-
making process changed due to political
conflicts, electoral shifts and the impact of
global restructuring. The electoral instability
and the political changes in the post-military
state of Suriname (1988-200 I) influenced the
representation of elected! appointed members
of ethnic groups in the state institutions, which
resembles more or less the ethnic composition
in the society as a whole in the year 2001.
At the electoral level the traditional
parties (NPS, VHP, KTPI) that are affiliated
with the major ethnic groups (Creoles, East
Indians and Javanese) since the first elections
in 1949, experienced a significant decline in
the share of valid votes cast in the 1987-2000
period. Despite the fact that these parties
united in the Nieuw Front (with the KTPI
replaced by Pertjaya Luhur in the 2000
elections) won three ofthe four elections in
this period, there is declining electora'!
support. The total valid votes cast by the New
Front was 87% in the 1987 elections, 54% in
1991,42% in 1996 and 49% in the 2000
elections. On the other hand, the category of
new parties other than the NDP or
Millennium Combinatie (that is related to the
former military leaders of the 1980s) shows
a steady growth of the electoral support since
1987. The 8 new political parties established
in the 1999-2000 period, together obtained
20.8% ofthe total valid votes cast in the 2000
elections, but a disproportionately low
number of seats.
The differences between mobilizing and
challenging parties (in Suriname mostly
fragmented parties) is that "mobilizing parties
develop stronger attachments among the
electorate and enjoy greater longevity in
Parliament than do challenging parties"
(Rochon 1985). The elections of May 2000
in Suriname demonstrated once again the
strength ofthe established (traditional) parties
to develop a sound electoral machine
generally based on defensive campaigning,
and their weakness to formulate new
development policy issues. Apart from the
disadvantage of not being part of a larger
political combination, the mobilizing parties
generally demonstrated weaknesses in
building a sound electoral machine; however,
these parties were relatively strong in
introducing and formulating modem policy
issues on development and governance.
The political decision-making process
shows significant changes. It was observed
earlier that in the process of global restruc-
turing, the focus of donors shifted from pro-
jectplanning to macro-economic policy
programs, while the preconditions for provi-
ding aid shifted from project execution and
evaluation to policy formulation. These
changes are accompanied by reducing tradi-
tional state functions in various ways, among
others reducing the state to an executing unit
in decision-making on strategic policy issues.
However, differences were identified between
the traditional coalitions and the non-
traditional coalition of President Wtjdenbosch
(1996-2000). Some strategic policy issues (on
strengthening the tax system) that were
introduced during the preceding traditional
New Front coalition (1991-1996) were
deleted by the non-traditional coalition, which
went at the cost of the Dutch influence.
Despite differences in political conception and
strategic policy issues, neither the traditional
nor the non-traditional coalitions succeeded
in solving the major problems of the
population, of which the majority lives below
the poverty line.
It is true that both consociationalism and
political changes due to the military entering
parliamentary politics influenced the
representation of elected! appointed members
of ethnic groups in state institutions
resembling more or less the ethnic
composition of the society as a whole. This
is positive for harmony between ethnic groups
and political stability. However, the issue of
cooperation between ethnic elites via an
informal brokerage system in the context of
the so-called consociational democracy
should not be seen solely as an attractive
solution for those living in a multi-ethnic
society with a potential for ethnic conflicts
(Deosaran 1996).
One should consider the price and the
negative elements of consociationalism as
well . First, infonnal brokerage in order tq
achieve consensus between thr elites of the
various ethnic groups often hinoers effective
and efficient policy decision-making. This may
retard planning and the achievement of deve-
lopment objectives, which in its tum might
be detrimental to creating more opportuni-
ties and the maintenance of the democracy.
Second, the multiplication of parties
since the 1990s within the tradition ofa multi-
party system, enforces the elitist character of
consociationalism, and effectively excludes
rather than include actors of important interest
groups (NGOs, Trade Unions, Employers
Associations) in the policy decision-making
process.
Third consociationalism could fulfill the
function of preventing people and the ethnic
segments from being organized politically on
ideological or development oriented issues.
On the extreme, leaders could mislead their
followers by defensive campaigning or
indicating the danger of ethnic conflicts rather
than focusing effectively on critical
development issues.
Finally, I would like to raise two issues
for managing the ethnic diversity in Caribbean
societies: refonn of the political system, and
ethnicity in the context of regional identity.
Reform of the Political System and
Governance
In multi-ethnic societies with a multi-
party system in the tradition of a consociatio-
nal democracy, fragmentation of political
parties could have a positive function in the
emancipation process of ethnic groups.
However, it could also give rise to serious
problems in coalition fonning and decision-
making. Among possible negative effects are
the long time it takes to fonn a coalition. Anot-
her problem is the weakening of and delays
in decision-making due to opposing interests.
This could result in increased corruption and
patronage, which could be detrimental for the
preserving of democracy. One possible solu-
tion to the problems arising from fragmenta-
tion is to change the political system, in order
to reduce the number of political parties and
establish appropriate procedures and fonnal
regulations for coalition fonning.
Multi-ethnic societies with the tradition
ofa two-party system (Guyana) pose another
problem. Here the possibility of political
hegemony by one ethnic group could be an
obstacle to political stability and ethnic
hannony. In the majority system, small and
new parties are discouraged as the chance of
winning a seat are far lower than in an
electoral system with proportionate
representation. As a consequence, a possible
solution for most Anglophone Caribbean
countries is to introduce in lesser or greater
extent the system of proportionate
representation.
Ethnicity and Regional Identity
Caribbean countries need to develop an
integrated approach to the development of a
regional identity, with more emphasis on
political integration, ethnic integration and
democratization. This should be enhanced in
the context of a multi-step and incremental
integration process.
The development ofa political and social
union of Caribbean states can be enhanced
by a step by step approach of sub-regional
unions. For example, Trinidad, Guyana and
Suriname have not only historical
commonalties, but also demographic, ethnic
and political similarities. Together they have
a relatively large population of oyer 2.5
miUion. The favorable geo-strategic location
in the northern cone of South America, could
form an important bridge between the
continent and the Caribbean archipelago. The
common ethnic composition of the
populations of Trinidad, Guyana and
Suriname is a core dimension of the social
reality which could facilitate integration. At
the political level, these countries could share
experiences of the pros and cons of their
political traditions in a multi-ethnic society:
the Surinamese consociationalism versus the
one-party monopoly in government of
Trinidad or Guyana.
References
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ANNEXES
Annex 1. Evolution of Political Parties and Combinations 1996-2000

Pendawalima
I
Nieuw Front
!
V
PertJoyo Lobue
Somohardjo
1
1 L:'y-' 1---- -
......... .. ..........
f;:. ...... , ... .
BVD
Sardjoe
NPS
Venetiaanan
+
ISPAl

Naya
Kedam
Djawala
Coalitie
Regerinq
1996
Alliantie
v
rPvFl

V
HPP
Kisoensingh
.................... >
KTPI F
Soemita
'------'
---l ........ >! L __
DA
MilI.bnium
Comblolltie
==::::::::::::> ; coalition
__ ; alliance
................. >
; faction
= independent
NPLO
Wangsab.
.. " ..
---
D 21
Moestadja
DNP2000
Wijdenbosch

L-J L-J L-J
Annex 2
Typology of Political Parties and Voters
Established Parties
Strong attachment voters along
Traditional cleavages (ethnic/religious)
Strong party affiliation
High % that decides on voting
preference long before elecitons
Relative high age of electorate
New Parties
A. 'Challenging' Party
Most fragmented from established
party
Competes with established party for
already mobilized voters within
traditonaUy ethnic/religious segment
B. Mobilizing Party
Introduces new issues for mobilizing
voters