Pre-MA Written Translation Theoretical Part Saturday, November 30, 20 3 Shaimaa Suleiman In every communicative situation, there are

e tons of possible utterances that go unsaid, even though they are essential for communication success. The reason for this is that interlocutors tacitly agree that, in the context of a certain situation, these possible utterances are too self-evident that they can be inferred from the content of the utterances already spoken and/or from the knowledge of the speaker/hearer ( ussmann, Trauth, ! "a##a#i, $%%&, p. '&(). Two ma*or concepts fall under the rubric of this inferential behavior+ namely, implicature and presupposition. The concept of presupposition has long been debated by philosophers, semanticists and pragmatists, and is heavily present in literature from all three fields. This paper focuses on cultural presupposition, a special variety of pragmatic presupposition, and its role in intercultural communication, especially translation. In fact, cultural presuppositions serves to explain the difficulties encountered in translating special textual and cultural features such as allusion. 1. Presupposition ,resupposition is defined as a non-truth-conditional inference that acts as a precondition for the appropriateness of an utterance in a certain context and is usually generated by the use of certain lexical items and linguistic constructions known as presupposition triggers- The king of France is bald presupposes that There is a king of France (.uang, /001, p. &'). These triggers, as listed by 2evinson ($%3(), are definite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative verbs, change of state verbs, iteratives, temporal clauses, cleft sentences, counterfactual conditionals, and possessive case (p. $3$-$34). This definition, which is now fairly established in the recent and semi-recent literature on presupposition, suggests that the concept of presupposition has always been clear-cut and straightforward, which is not truly the case. In fact, the concept of presupposition was born out of long debates in philosophy and linguistics that evolved over time into debates within linguistics itself over whether presupposition belonged in semantics or pragmatics. 1.1. Philosophical Discussions of Presupposition

Interest in presupposition originates within the tradition of the philosophy of language, particularly in the field of reference and referring

expressions. The earliest philosophical discussion of presupposition appears in 5erge ($3%/)If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or compound proper names used have reference. If one therefore asserts 6"epler died in misery,6 there is a presupposition that the name 6"epler6 designates something. (5erge, $3%/ ($%%(, p. (4)) 5erge explains that the presupposition Kepler designates something is not part of the meaning of the assertion Kepler died in misery. To support his viewpoint, 5erge runs a negation test- that Kepler did not die in misery presupposes that Kepler did not die in misery and Kepler has no reference goes against the simplest of our intuitions. .e, therefore, concludes that it is one of the defining characteristics of presuppositions that they survive negation. 5urthermore, he maintains that presupposition is a necessary precondition for reference. .e cites as an illustration the temporal clause in After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Pr ssia and A stria ! arreled- the presupposition that Schleswig-Holstein was once part of Denmark is necessary for this temporal clause to have a reference (p. (&). 5erge6s view of presupposition suggests that sentences have no truth-value+ they remain meaningful even in the lack of referents. 7any years later, 5erge6s view was modified by 8trawson ($%'0). .e agrees with 5erge that sentences carry no truth-value, but he holds this to be the distinction between sentences and statements which do have truth-value. ,resupposition, according to 8trawson (as cited in 2evinson, $%3(, p. $1/), is a precondition for *udging the truth or falsity of a statement- a statement 9 presupposes a statement iff is a precondition of the truth or falsity of 9. 9fter 8trawson, the concept of presupposition attracted the attention of linguists, especially semanticists. 1.2. Semantic Presupposition

8emanticists (e.g. "empson, $%1'+ :ilson, $%1'+ ;h and <inneen, $%1%+ ! 7c=awley, $%3$) tackle presupposition as a logical concept bound up by the rules of truth-conditional semantics. Truth-conditional semantics is concerned with the propositional meaning of sentences and the logical conditions essential for establishing their truth or falsity (5inch, /000, p. $34). 8emanticists see presupposition as a relation between sentences that is generally similar to logical entailment. Therefore, semantic presupposition is defined as- >a sentence or statement 8 presupposes a sentence or statement 86 provided 8 entails 86 and the

negation of 8 entails 86+ 86 is a condition of the truth or falsity of 8> (9udi, $%%', p. $('). 9ccordingly, both ($) and (/) in the examples below entail and subse?uently presuppose ((). ($) The king of 5rance is bald. (/) The king of 5rance is not bald. (() There is a king of 5rance. In this sense, sentence (() remains true regardless of the truth or falsity of ($) and (/). 7oreover, semantic presuppositions are taken to be part of the encoded meaning of specific words and linguistic constructions (i.e. presupposition triggers), thus focusing more on surface structure rather than deep structure. Therefore, (4) and (') below both semantically presuppose (&)(4) 8he cried before she finished her thesis. (') 8he died before she finished her thesis. (&) 8he finished her thesis. 9lthough the above example is technically correct logic-wise, it still strikes speakers/hearers as problematic, if not absurd. 5or this reason, linguists started to ?uestion whether semantics was able to offer a seamless explanation of presupposition. Thus, they turned to pragmatics. 1.3. Pragmatic Presupposition

The pragmatic conception of presupposition steps out of the narrow constrains of truth conditions and surface forms. Instead, pragmatists base their view of presupposition on concepts as common ground, shared assumptions and mutual knowledge (collectively referred to as contextual aspects). ,robably the most significant counterpoint to the semantic approach to presupposition is due to 8talnaker ($%1/+ $%1(+ $%14+ $%%3+ /00/) who suggests that in order to correctly interpret an utterance, with respect to its truth or falsity, a context is needed. 7oreover, 8talnaker ($%1() has introduced the term 6speaker presupposition69 person@s presuppositions are the propositions whose truth he takes for granted A in a conversation A They are the background assumptions that may be used without being spoken. (p. 441) Thus, when a speaker utters The King of France is bald, she presupposes B believes and believes that her audience shares her belief B that There is

a king of France. "arttunen ! ,eters ($%1') attempt to formulate a definition of pragmatic presupposition that will serve as a reconciliation between the contextual and formal aspects of the term. They argue that participants who wish to be appropriate and cooperative >organi#e their contributions in such a way that the conventional implicata of the sentence uttered are already part of the common ground at the time of the utterance> (p. /&%). 2evinson concurs with this view, but like 8talnaker he attaches a special import to contextual aspects. Thus, he argues that discussions of presupposition belong in pragmatics rather than semantics because >CpresuppositionsD are too sensitive to contextual factors> ($%3(, p. $&1). .e further explains that presuppositions are defeasible (i.e. contextually cancellable)- although the presupposition that There is a King of France fails today (because there is no such person), it would have been feasible in the $3th century. 1.3.1. Pragmatic Presupposition and Intercultural Communication The centrality of contextual aspects to pragmatic presupposition has led linguists to further investigate the relation between culture and presupposition, particularly in the field of intercultural communication. =ulture is broadly defined as >a complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits ac?uired by man as a member of society> (Tyler, $31$, p. $). "eenan ($%1$) holds that presuppositions are essentially derived from and defined by culture which acts as a common ground between participants in communication (p. $'0). esides, presuppositions not only comprise mutual cultural knowledge but also >expectations, desires, interests, claims, attitudes towards the world, fears, etc> which are supposed to be shared between the interlocutors (=affi, $%%(, p. 4(). Intercultural communication, in this sense, typically involves individuals who come from different cultural backgrounds and subse?uently bring with them different expectations associated with their own culture. Eormally, when such expectations are not met, presuppositions fail, thus leading to a breakdown in communication. This is why 7ey ($%%() believes that >cultural presuppositions can be ma*or stumbling-blocks on the road to understanding> (p. /%3). 2. Presupposition and Translation ;ne type of intercultural communication where cultural presuppositions are particularly problematic and prone to fail is translation. 2.1. Translation, Context and Culture

2ike the non-pragmatic accounts of presupposition, early attempts at defining the practice of translation largely overlooked its contextual aspects. Translation was, therefore, perceived as a means for replacing linguistic elements in the 82 with their counterparts in the T2. It did not take so long before this flawed perception of translation came under close scrutiny. In the course of his ethnographic work in Fastern Eew Guinea, 7alinowski ($%/() collected a considerable corpus of folkloric narratives that he set out to translate. To his surprise, the difficulties he encountered in translation did not only pertain to lexis and grammar but also to unshared cultural presuppositions. The translation thus needed to convey a great deal of contextual material characteristic of the source culture of the primitive tribes, and which would seem otherwise unintelligible to readers in the target culture. This was a challenge for 7alinowski, and remains to be so for every other translator. 2.2. Functional Theories of Translation and Cultural Presuppositions

To circumvent such a challenge, functional and communicative theories of translation attach special import to cultural presuppositions. 5unctional theories of translation perceive translation in pragmatic terms as human interaction that aims at >guiding the intended cooperation over cultural barriers enabling functionally oriented communication> (.ol#7anttari ($%34), as cited in 7unday, /00$, p. 11). 9 famous functional model is that developed by Eord ($%%$) who advocates thorough pretranslation text analysis. ,rior to a translation, a translator must analy#e such significant factors as the communicative situation, the participants in the communicative act and their function in the 8T situation and then compare them with the corresponding factors in the prospective TT situation (p. $'). ,rominent in Eord6s typology of 8T intratextual factors is the factor of presupposition. 8he submits that the target reader is not expected to be fully aware of the source culture aspects presented in the 8T presuppositions. Therefore, the translator may want to >ad*ust the level of explicitness to the assumed general background knowledge of the intended TT recipient> (p. %3). 2.3. llusions in Translation! Presupposition Special Case of Cultural

9 more detailed explanation of the relevance of cultural presupposition is provided by 5awcett ($%%$). 5igurative and implicit language, according to 5awcett, is one area where cultural

presuppositions prove most fatal in a translation that wishes to be functionally and communicatively successful. ,uns, *okes, metaphors, similes, idioms and proverbs all present themselves as cultural presuppositions that challenge the translator6s as well as the target readers6 level of ac?uaintance with the source culture (p. $$1-$$3). 5awcett, however, singles out allusion as the most elusive of all cultural presuppositions. 5or instance, the 82 cultural presupposition in the allusion to the defeat in the battle of 7ohHcs in >:e need another 7ohHcs> can be easily lost in translation+ the sentence, if translated literally, will only convey the linguistic presupposition There is a place called "oh#cs. 8imilarly, the allusion in >offre#-vou# le luxe d6une *ournIe beautI-calme-voluptI> culturally presupposes familiarity with the work of audelaire, something which target readers are unlikely to have ever experienced (p. $$3-$$%). The translator, in this situation, has a tough choice to make between following the 82 cultural presuppositions and appropriating them to match the T2 cultural presuppositions. 3. "odel for the Translation of llusions

The most remarkable attempt at providing a solution to the problem of allusion is a set of strategies developed by Jitva 2eppihalme ($%%1) in her book, $ lt re % mps. 3.1. Definitions and Functions of llusion

9llusion is defined as >a figure of speech that makes brief, often casual reference to a historical or literary figure, event, or ob*ect A The effectiveness of allusion depends on there being a common body of knowledge shared by writer and reader> (.olman, $%3', p. $/). 5urthermore, allusion usually comes across as a deliberate incorporation of identifiable elements from other sources, preceding or contemporaneous, textual or extratextual. In her study, 2eppihalme defines allusion along the same conventional lines, but she lists a myriad of functions through which allusion literary and culturally enriches a text. 9llusions can add humor to a text when used parodically or ironically to detract from the importance of a situation or character (p. 40). 7ore importantly, allusions can parody and criti?ue other texts. They also serve as >a fast and economical aid to characteri#ation>+ allusions to literary or historical figures to which a character bears a strong affinity cuts long descriptions short and serves as foreshadowing (p.44). 8uch functions make it hard for a translator to overlook or simplify an allusion in the process of translation.

3.2. Strategies =ulture bump is a term used to describe the different, strange, or uncomfortable situation that an individual finds himself or herself in when interacting with persons of a different culture. 2eppihalme borrows this term to describe >raw allusions> that are translated literally without further explanation and the shock they cause for the target reader (p. 4). 9llusions, or culture bumps, come in two categories- proper-name allusions (including names of famous mythical and historical figures, literary characters and names of places or products) and key-phrase allusion (including ?uotations from literature or the ible that are ?uoted verbatim or distorted completely). To dissolve the cultural bumps in each category, 2eppihalme proposes a typology of strategies (p. 1%-34). These strategies are hierarchically ordered, starting with strategies that bind the translation to the 82 cultural presuppositions, then strategies that attempt at striking a balance between 82 and T2 presuppositions, and finally strategies that lean toward conforming to the presuppositions of the T2. The strategies can be visuali#ed as follows!ey-"hrase Allusions $) Kse of a standard translation. /) 7inimum change / literal translation. () 9ddition of extra-allusive guidance (including typographical means). 4) 5ootnotes, endnotes, forewords and other additional explanations outside the text itself ') 8imulated familiarity, internal marking (marked wording or syntax). &) Jeplacement by preformed targetlanguage item. 1) Jeduction to sense (making the connotations overt but dispensing with the alluding words). 3) Je-creation using a variety of techni?ues. %) ;mission. Pro"er-name Allusions # $etention% a) Jetention of the name as such. b) Jetention of the name with some additional guidance. c) Jetention of the name with detailed explanations (e.g. footnotes). 2# $e"lacement% a) Jeplacement of the name with another source-language name. b) Jeplacement of the name with a target-language name. 3# &mission% a) ;mission of the name, but the sense conveyed through a common noun. b) ;mission of the name and allusion completely.

#. Case Stud$

In light of 2eppihalme6s culture bump model, this paper sets out to analy#e the ways in which three 9rab translators of Lames Loyce6s Klysses have appropriated, replaced or overlooked cultural presuppositions as reflected in allusions. In the Fnglish-speaking world, Loyce is regarded with utmost reverence as one of the founders of modernism. .is magnum opus, Klysses, famous for its textual and cultural complexity, is no less revered than its writer. :hen asked to reveal a few clues about Klysses, Loyce amusedly admitted, >I6ve put in CKlyssesD so many enigmas and pu##les that it will keep the professors busy for centuries arguing over what I meant, and that6s the only way of insuring one6s immortality> (Fllman, $%'%). The voluminous novel includes massive and complex allusive nets that native speakers of Fnglish still grabble with to this day. ;bviously, Klysses is not any less complicated in translation, especially 9rabic translation+ 9rabic and Fnglish cultures are far removed and so are their respective cultural presuppositions. 9dditionally, of all Fnglish writers, Loyce is singled out as the most difficult and obscure for 9rab translators. There are three published translations of Klysses (Taha, $%3/+ Eeya#i, /00$+ Goma6a, /001)+ two of them were published unfinished. Therefore, this paper will restrict analysis to the first two episodes which show up e?ually in all three translations.