Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea Author(s): Kamyar Mehdiyoun Source: The American Journal

of International Law, Vol. 94, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 179-189 Published by: American Society of International Law Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555242 . Accessed: 05/04/2014 17:38
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
OWNERSHIP OF OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN THE CASPIAN SEA
INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the birthof new sovereign nationsborderingthe Caspian Sea, the legal statusof the sea has emerged as one of the mostcontentious oflargeoffshore international problems facingtheregion.The discovery oil and gas depositsin the area has added urgency to the need to resolvethe twin issuesof thelegal statusof the sea and the corresponding miningrights.' the size of The Caspian, the largestinland bodyofwaterin theworld,is approximately Japan.2 The southCaspian is thedeepestpartand containsthe mostproductive oil and gas fields.The oil-producing area of the southCaspian thatholds the mostpromiseextends along a narrow structural zone acrossthe sea fromtheApsheronPeninsula in Azerbaijan to the Peri-Balkhan regionofwestern Turkmenistan.3 As a result of thebreakupof the SovietUnion in 1991,fivelittoral statesnowborderthe sea: Russia,Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan.One authorhas calculated each state'sshareofthecoastlineas follows: Russia,18.5 percent;Kazakhstan, 30.8 percent; Turkmenistan, 16.8percent;Iran,18.7percent;and Azerbaijan,15.2 percent.4 Lackingany directoutletto the ocean, the Caspian is linkedto the Black and BalticSeas through the and a seriesofcanals and otherrivers. The water leveloftheCaspian has fluctuVolga River atedin recentdecades butstill lieswellbelowsea level.5 The sea containsapproximately fifty islands.6 An authority on Sovietand Russianlaw of thesea has observedthatin geological terms thereis some doubtwhether theCaspianSea has a physical continental shelf. Instead, the area maybe viewedas being onlya depressionin the continental landmass.7 The characteristics of the Caspian have prevented its ready geological and legal classification. It has alternatively been called a lake,an enclosed sea, a closed sea, an inland sea, a sea, and, finally, a "unique bodyof water."8 The labelingis significant because the
' Proven reservesin the Caspian Basin are 15.31 billion barrelsof oil, or 2.7% of world reserves.It is also estimatedto contain some 230-360 trillioncubic feet of gas, or 7% of world reserves.Estimatesof possible petroleumreserves vary fromas fewas 20 billion to as manyas 200 billion barrelsof oil. See Thechangingface of energy OECD OBSERVER,June 22, 1999,at 48, availableinLEXIS,NewsLibrary, CurnwsFile. geopolitics, 2 The Caspian Sea is approximately 1,204kilometers long and has a surfacearea of436,000 square kilometers. By comparison,the combined area of the fiveGreatLakes in NorthAmerica is approximately 244,000 square kilometers. SeeINTERNATIONAL CASPIANOILAND GAs147 (1998) [hereinafter CASPIAN OIL & GAS]. ENERGYAGENCY, ' SeeRobertB. O'Connor,Jr.,et al., Future Oil and Gas Potential in Southern CaspianBasin,OIL & GAsJ., May3, 1993,at 117, 117. 4 SeeBrice M. Clagett,Ownership ofSeabed and Subsoil Resources in the CaspianSea under the RulesofInternational CROSSROADS MAG., Summer/Fall1995, at 3, 10. Law, CASPIAN 5SeeTHE NEWYoRKTiMEsATLAs OFTHEWORLD, plate 44 (9th rev.ed. 1994) (giving figureof 28 metersbelow sea level). 6 See2 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 924 (15th ed. 1998). 7See WilliamE. Butler,TheSoviet Unionand theContinental 63 AJIL103, 106 (1969). Shelf; 'Some authoritative nonlegalsourceshaveused more thanone oftheabove labels to refer to theCaspian Sea. The Encyclopaedia forexample,uses both "inlandsea" and "lake" to referto the Caspian. 2 THE NEW Britannica, ENCYCLOPAEDIABRITANNICA, supranote 6, at 923-24 (referring to theCaspian as the"world'slargest inlandsea"); 7 id. at 107 (referring to the "Caspian Sea" as a lake in Asia). 179

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categorydetermineswhich body of law applies to delimitationof the waters and the resourcesof the subsoil.9
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CASPIAN PRIOR TO 1991

International Treaties was ofthenineteenth century oftsarist Russiain thebeginning One ofthemainobjectives In the Caucasus thissouthward driveprovoked a seriesof southward. to expand itsterritory in these ofPersia(nowIran). Persia'sdefeat warsbetween Russiaand thedeclining kingdom in theconclusion of twotreaties, in additionto fixing theRusso-Persian warsresulted which, The first theGoleofthesetreaties, shipping rights in theCaspian.10 land borders, regulated in the Caspian."'The TurkstanTreaty of 1813,barredIran from deploying itsnavalforces 12 on Persiannavalshipping. theselimitations menchaiTreaty, concludedin 1828,reiterated The legal regimeregardingthe Caspian remainedunchanged untilafterthe Russian betweenIran and Russia abrogatedall ofFriendship Revolution of 1917. The 1921 Treaty in the Caspian.13 Under the Treatyof and restoredIranian shippingrights priortreaties concluded bythe twostateson August25, 1935, Establishment, Commerceand Navigation up itsownflagthe right to fishin itscoastalwaters each party "reserv[ed]to vesselsflying of zone in theTreaty to a limit often nauticalmiles."14 fishing Theyreaffirmed the 10-mile was Commerce and Navigationof March 25, 1940.1' Beyond the 10-milezone, fishing The Treaty was silenton seabed mining.'7 allowed onlyto Sovietand Iranian nationals.'6 to the the Treatyand the notes attachedto it containedseveralreferences Significantly, conA more recent comprehensive boundarytreaty, sea."18 Caspian as a "Soviet-Iranian
gProfessor is significant, it mustnot dictatewhichof the althoughthe classification Oxman has argued that, and subsoilresources, fishing rights, shippingrights, different legal regimesthatshould applyto Caspian water, CROSSROADSMAG.,Winter so forth. SeeBernardOxman, CaspianSea o0Lake:lWatDifferenceDoesItMake?CAsPIAN 1996,at 1. 10 Treatyof Peace and Perpetual Friendship,Oct. 12, 1813, Persia-Russ., 62 Consol. TS 435 (in French) 78 Consol. TS 105 Feb. 10 (22), 1828,Persia-Russ., Treaty ofPeace and Friendship, [hereinafter GolestanTreaty]; MAJMUEH see MINISTRYOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS, Turkmenchai Treaty]. For thePersiantexts, (in French) [hereinafter IRANBA SAYER-E KESHVARHA[A Compilationof BilateralTreatiesbetweenIran and MOAHEDAT-E DO JANEBEH-E beonvanmabnaii baiay-e daiya-e khzar inMohamad Reza Dabiri,Rezhim-e ForeignCountries] (1971), cited hogugy-e MOTALEATsolh vatose-eh [The Legal RegimeoftheCaspian Sea: A BasisforPeace and Development],MAJALLEH-E Summer ofCentral MAJALLEH], E ASYAY-E MARKAZIVA GAVGAZ Journal Asianand Caucasian Studies] [hereinafter of ForeignAffairs). 1994, at 1, 3 (publishedbythe IranianMinistry in Dabiri, supranote 10, at 3. 'l GolestanTreaty, supranote 10,Art.5, quoted 12Turkmenchai supranote 10,Art.8, quoted Treaty, In Dabiri, supranote 10, at 4. Feb. 26, 1921, Persia-Russ. SFSR, 9 LNTS 383. Article11 stated: 13 TreatyofFriendship, partiesin February signedbythe highcontracting abrogatesthe treaty As Article1 of the presenttreaty a navalforcein the Caspian Sea, 8 ofthattreaty, whichdeprivedIran ofmaintaining 1828,includingArticle both partieswill have equal rightsto free the high contractingparties herebydeclare thathenceforth shippingunder theirown flagsin the Caspian Sea. in Dabiri, supranote 10, at 5 (trans.fromPersianbyauthor). Quoted 14 Treaty withFinal Protocolsand Annex,Aug. 25, 1935, IranCommerce and Navigation, of Establishment, USSR, Art.15, 176 LNTS 301, 317. Article14 stated: in the TreatyofFebruary in conformity withthe principlessetforth Partiesagree that, The Contracting FederalSovietRepublicand Persia,thereshall,throughout thearea 26th,1921,betweentheRussianSocialist of the Caspian Sea, be onlyvesselsbelongingto the Union of SovietSocialistRepublics or to Iran and to Parties, flying theflagof ofone ofthe twoContracting organisations nationalsor commercialand transport the Union of SovietSocialistRepublicsor thatof Iran,respectively. Mar. 25,1940, Iran-USSR,144 BRIT. & FOREIGNST. PAPERS419 (1940ofCommerceand Navigation, Treaty UNIONAND THELAW OF THE SEA 102 (1971). E. BUTLER, THE SOVIET 42); seeWILLIAM 16 SeeBUTLER, supra note 15, at 102. 17 SeeJamshid ofthe Caspian Sea], MAJALLEH, [The Legal Situationi daiyay-eKhazar Momtaz,Vaziyyat-ehoghugi-e Summer1995,at 123, 127. 18 SeeDabiri,supra sea" was also used in the to the Caspian Sea as a "Soviet-Iranian note 10,at 7. The reference supranote 14, 176 LNTS at 329. notes attachedto the 1935 Treaty,

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the delimiting cluded in 1954,determines the land borderbetweenthe twosideswithout sea boundaryacrossthe Caspian." Municipal Law and State Practice The RussoSovietjurists viewedthe legal regimeof the Caspian as thatof a closed sea.20 commercial and controversial and aimsat limiting Sovietdoctrine oftheclosed sea is highly states.2' In additionto the military activities in certainbodies ofwaterto nationalsoflittoral Caspian, the Black and Baltic Seas were also usuallydeclared to be closed seas by the twoseas,wascontested bythe This designation, as itapplied to thelatter Soviets.22 especially barred in thedraft 1958GenevaConvention whichsuccessfully itsinclusion Western powers, on the High Seas.23 In the case of the Caspian,however, Iran's municipallaw also recognizedthe Caspian as a "closed sea." The Iranian Law on the Explorationand Exploitationof the Continental asserted national jurisdiction over the natural Shelf, dated May 19, 1949, effectively in thePersianGulfand theGulf shelf resources oftheseabed and subsoilofthecontinental of Oman. The law, however, was silenton the Caspian Sea.24Six yearslater,a note was added toArticle "Asregardsthe Caspian Sea, the rules 2 ofthelaw thatread in itsentirety: of international law relating to closed seas are applicable."25 the intent of the In lightof the contestednatureof the doctrineofclosed seas, however, 26 It is noteworthy recognizedthat thatthe lawmakers Iranian legislature remainsunclear. of the the termsof the Soviet-Iranian Treatyof 1940 did not apply to the delimitation continentalshelf and subsoil resources of the Caspian. Thus, the legislationneither nor applied the shared-use/ownership mentionedthe 1940 Treaty principle.GivenSoviet in the exploration ofsubsoilresources, one can and exploitation technological superiority neighbor. easilyunderstand Iran's reluctanceto "share"the Caspian withitsnorthern In 1949 the SovietUnion started resourcesoffshore. to exploitthe Caspian hydrocarbon The operations Beforethe werecenteredin whatis now the coastalregionofAzerbaijan.27
19 Agreement concerningthe Settlement of Frontier and Financial Questions,Dec. 2, 1954, Iran-USSR,451 UNTS 250. 20 SeeBUTLER, supranote 15, at 125. 21 Seeid. at 116-33. 22 Seeid.at 125. For a discussionof the closed-seadoctrineas applied to the Black Sea, seeJosephJ.Darby,The SovietDoctrine ofthe Closed Sea, 23 SANDIEGOL. REv. 685 (1986). Since the Caspian,unliketheBlack Sea and the BalticSea, is not directly connectedto the ocean, the Sovietclassification ofthe Caspian as a "closed sea" did not giveriseto oppositionbyoutsidepowers. 23At the 1958 United NationsConferenceon the Law of the Sea, Romania and the UkrainianSovietSocialist that"forcertainseas Republic proposed an additionto Article1 of the Conventionon the High Seas providing a special regimeofnavigation forhistorical reasonsor byvirtue ofinternational maybe established agreements." The United States,the United Kingdom,and othersargued againstthe proposal on the groundsthatitwas an openingwedgefor"closedseas." SeeGARYKNIGHT& HUNGDAH CHIU, THE INTERNATIONAL LAWOFTHE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS325-26 (1991). 24 AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 160 (1980). SeeCHARLES G. MAcDoNALD, IRAN,SAUDI ARABIA, 25 Loi relative et a l'exploitation du "FalatGharreh"(Plateaucontinental de l'Iran),June19, 1955, a l'exploration Art.2 note,LAWSAND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIMEOF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 24, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6,UN Sales No. 1957.V.2(1957). The official Frenchtext ofthelaw,provided to theUnitedNations, bytheIranianMission translates "closedseas"as lesmersfermees. The original Persianreads da?yay-e "closedsea." SeeMohamad basteh, literally Reza Dabiri,Rezhime-e hoghugi-e khazar: ameli tavazon manafeh va tavazon amniyat [The Caspian'sLegal baray-e da?yay-e Regime: Balancing National Interests and National Security], MAJALLEH, Summer 1995, at 141, 144. The only thesource ofthelaw,however, renders therelevant publishedEnglish text phraseas "inlandsea,"without specifying ofthetranslation. See1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THESEA(S. HoustonLay et al. eds., 1973). 26The Iranianlawmakers however, has wereprobablyreferring to thedoctrineof mare clausum. That doctrine, neverfoundinternational acceptance,and duringthe19thand 20thcenturies itreceivedonly passingnoticefrom Western jurists.SeeBUTLER, supranote 15, at 116. Accordingto the thendeputydirectorof the IranianForeign to distinguish theCaspian legal Ministry's Institute ofPoliticaland International Studies,thelegislative intentwas regimefromthose of otherbodies ofwater.Dabiri, supranote 10, at 7. 27SeeMomtaz,supranote 17, at 129. Commercialoil productionin Azerbaijangoes back to the 19thcentury. Russianannual crude oil productionfrom Azerbaijanifieldsrose from600,000barrelsin 1874 to 10.8 millionin 1884. SeeDANIEL YERGIN,THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEYAND POWER 57 (1991).

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SovietUnion switched itsexplorationand exploitation efforts to Siberiain the 1960s,the fields off Azerbaijanwereitsmostproductive.28 There is no evidencethattheSovietUnion everconsultedIran on its Caspian oil operations.29 Iranian commentators point out that Iran acquiesced in theseunilateralSovietactions,whichin the Iranianviewbreached the "commonsea" principleof the 1940 Treaty,out of reluctanceto antagonizeitspowerful northern neighbor bylodginga diplomatic protest.30 As willbe discussed below,post-Soviet Russiaand Islamic Iranhavebothsupported theposition that the"common sea"principle has always governed theCaspian.The practices ofthelittoral states, however, weakenthisclaim.
THE POSITIONS OF THE LITToRAL STATES,1991-1999 Iran

The Iranianarguments maybe summarized as follows. Because ofitsunique geographical whichdistinguish theCaspianfrom similar bodiesofwater, theinternational characteristics, lawofthesea is notapplicableto it.31 Instead,untilthefive littoral statesjointly devisea new 32The legal regimeforthe sea, the Soviet-Iranian Treatiesof 1921 and 1940 mustgovern. silence of these Treaties on miningrights mustbe seen in the lightof the inadequacyof The intent toownand use offshore at thetime.33 oftheparties, mining technology however, the Caspian on a shared basis can readilybe seen fromthe repeated references in the Treatiesto the Caspian as a "Soviet-Iranian sea."34 The Iranianposition maybestbe understood byanalytically separating twodistinct issues. The first in issueis,How shouldthelittoral states approachthe taskof mineralexploitation the Caspian before the legal regime of the sea has been determined?35 Here, Iranians emphasize that the littoralstates must agree upon a temporary mineralsregime by consensus.36 laterdecide not to sharethemineral of the Thus,evenifthesestates resources shouldall agreein themeantime Caspianand insteaddividethesea amongthemselves, they on any plans to explore and exploit those resources.37 The second issue is the Iranian and ecologicalconditions of theCaspian,the argument that, giventheunique geographical mostsensible is one based on theprinciple of"condominium" or rescommunis.38 legalregime the and geographical underlieIran's oppositionto dividing Economic,political, realities Iran is states on a sectoral basis.Economically, Caspian seabed resources amongthelittoral not in a positionto divert its scarce resourcesto oil explorationand productionin the
28

CAUCASLAN REGIONAL STUD., No. 1, 1998 <http://poli.vub.accommodation.be/publi/crs/eng/0301-Ol.htm>

See Michael P. Croissant& CynthiaM. Croissant,The Caspian Sea StatusDispute:Azerbaijani Perspectives,

(visited Mar. 7, 1999). 29 SeeMomtaz,supranote 17, at 129.

30 31

SeeDabiri, suprra note 25, at 142. 32 See Statement oftheForeignMinistry oftheIslamicRepublicofIran on theresults oftheKazakhstan-Russian in the statement UN Doc. consultations reflected dated 13 February1998 of the KazakhstanForeignMinistry, A/52/913, annex (1998). 3 See M. S. Nourian,Negareshhay-e motafavet darbarey-e rezhim-e hogugy-e da?yay-e khazar [Alternative Viewpoints on the Caspian's Legal Regime], MAJALLEH, Summer 1996, at 105, 111 (the author was then the directorof the IranianForeignMinistry's Departmentof Boundaries). 34 Seeid. at 112. " In itsearly positionon thisissuesetout in 1993 in a draft treaty, Iran proposed thattheCaspian Sea be jointly used and managed bythelittoral and thatparticipation statesrequire the priorconsentofall the states, bythird & Patricia littoral ofthesea wasleftto be determined later.SeeSergeiVinogradov states. The legal status Wouters, TheCaspianSea: Questfor a Nezv LegalRegime, 9 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 87, 94 (1996). 36 SeeNourian,supia note 33, at 106. 3 Seeid. 38The first Iranianofficial to applytheconcept ofcondominiumto theCaspian wasMohamad Reza Dabiri. See Dabiri, supranote 10, at 17 (using the Persian termHakemiiat Mosha,which he translates in a footnote as "Condouminiumor Res Communis").

Seeid.

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Caspian.39 Iranianpoliticians whosupport in energy foreign participation projectsnotonly are hamperedbyconservative domestic political forces, butalsomust overcome foreign legal obstaclestosuchventures.40 Moreover, Iranappreciates thegeologicalfactthat whatever oil reserves it mayhave in the southernCaspian would be situatedin some of the deepest, hence mostdifficult tomine,areas ofthesea.4'Finally, thetwin principles ofcondominium and consensusenable Iran to oppose the presenceofWesternpowersin the Caspian.42 Azerbaijan'sadamantrefusal to accept "sharedownership" and Russia'sshifting position theprinciple states.43 In September vis-a-vis ofcondominium isolatedIranamongthelittoral 1998,Iran officially announced itsacceptance of the principleof sectoraldivision, on the conditionthata singledivision schemebe applied to both thewaters and the seabed .4 In state's addition,Iran has argued thatsuch a division mustbe equal (i.e., thateach littoral sharemustbe 20 percentof thewaters and the seabed) ."5
Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan'spositionon theCaspian legal regimemaybe summarized as follows. Division of the sea among the littoralstatesis supportedby international practice and rules of international law.46 The waters,as well as the seabed, must be divided by means of an equidistantline.47 The Soviet-Iranian Treatiesof 1921 and 1940 regulateonlynavigation, fishing, and border-guard practicesand are inapplicableto the miningregime. 48Azerbaitheir janis also arguethatthehistory ofstatepracticepriorto 1991supports positionforthe division of the Caspian into nationalzones. They point out thatby 1970 the SovietUnion a boundary had dividedtheCaspianintoIranianand Sovietzones bydrawing line acrossthe sea betweenAstaraand Husseingholi;it then further divided the Soviet sectoramong claimthatthis Azerbaij an, Russia,Kazakhstan, and Turkmenia.49Azerbaijanis inter-republic
3 This point is readily acknowledgedbyIranian officials. SeeNourian,supranote 33, at 115. 40 The U.S. Iran-Libya SanctionsAct,Pub. L. No. 104-172,110 Stat.1541 (1996), threatens reprisals against sector.The legislation willexpire foreign firms thatinvest more than$20 milliona yearin the country's energy in 2001. 41 in the center,176 meters;and in the In the northern third, the averagedepth of the Caspian is 6.2 meters; south,325 meters. SeeCASPIAN OIL & GAs,supra note 2, at 147. For bothpoliticaland economic reasons,Iran has triedto secure a share in Azerbaijan'soil projects.On Azerbaijan'sconsortium deal, see note 54 infra. 42 See supranote 35. 43 See the discussion below on the Russianand Azerbaijanipositions. 44 See Iran: Rozvhani Callsfor Unanimous Legal Regime for Caspian, Foreign Broadcast InformationService of the [hereinafter FBIS], Doc. FBIS-NES-98-270 (Sept. 27, 1998) (statement of Hassan Rowhani,secretary on SupremeNationalSecurity Council,to RussianAmbassadorKonstantin Shuvalev).For theIranianinsistence Doc. FBIS-EAS-1999-0214 (Feb. 14, a singledivision scheme,see Iran:Malekionpolicy toward US, CaspianIssues, withIranianDeputyForeignMinister the date in theparenthetical 1999) (interview Abbas Maleki) [hereinafter to FBIS documentswill omit the year,which is reflectedin the document number,and subsequent cites to previously referenced FBIS documentswillbe bydocumentnumber]. 41 See Hossein K Ardabili,Rezhim-e hogugy-e khaza7;toseye-e manabeh va khotut-e ene7zhi [The Caspian's Legal Regime:The DevelopmentofEnergy Resourcesand Pipelines],MAJALLEH, Spring1998,at 45, 48 (the authoris an adviserto the IranianForeignAffairs and Oil Ministries). Iran's newpositionregarding equal divisionof the Caspian may,in turn,be changing.In August 1998, Boris Pastukhov, the then deputyforeignminister of the RussianFederation,reportedthatIranian negotiators were insisting on Iran's 20% share. SeeAzerbaijan: Recent Movement in Caspian TalksAssessed, Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-231 (Aug. 19). The latestpronouncementsof Iranian of officials call onlyforan "equitable" and "fair" division.Doc. FBIS-EAS-1999-0214, supranote 44 (statement Iraniandeputyforeignminister). 46 SeeJoint in Baku on statement on Caspian Sea questionsadopted byPresidents ofAzerbaijanand Kazakhstan 16 September1996,Art.4, UN Doc. A/51/529,annex (1996). 47 SeeDoc. FBIS-SOV-98-231, supranote 45 (statement byAzerbaijaniforeign minister). 48 SeeRussia:Joint Azeri-Russian Statement Outlines Talkson CaspianSea,Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-217 (Aug. 5). 49 Both Azerbaijanand Kazakhstan have produced maps and documentsshowingthatsuch a division, in fact, tookplace. Among theseis an internaldocumentof theUSSR Ministry of Oil Industry, dated 1970,thatdivided theSovietpartoftheCaspian amongAzerbaijan,Kazakhstan, Russia,and Turkmenistan "on thecenterline basis accepted in international practice."SeeMikhail Alexandrov, Russian-Kazakh Contradictions on the CaspianSea Legal Status, Russ. & EURASiAN BULL.,Feb. 1998 (Contemporary Europe Research Center,University of Melbourne)

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in 1993, twoyears was approvedbyRussianPrimeMinister Viktor Chernomyrdin division Azerbaijaniofficials point out that Furthermore, after the breakupof the SovietUnion.50 the sovereignty of Azerbaijan over its portion of the Caspian is enshrined in its new moot.5" constitution and thatthe issue of sharingthe sea is therefore over its portion of the Caspian is based on Azerbaijan's insistence on sovereignty To beginwith, iftheCaspian is divided, economic,geographic, and politicalconsiderations. some of its largestoil and gas reservoirs would be situatedin the Azerbaijanizone.52In are in relatively shallowportionsof the Caspian, allowingeasy addition,these reservoirs of theseoil fields In contrast to Iran,Azerbaijanhas placed exploitation offshore drilling.53 at the top of its agenda. Azerbaijanbelievesthatlack of clear titleover these reservoirs in itsenergy makesthetaskofattracting investment Finally, projectsmoredifficult. foreign Iran in decidingwhenand how Azerbaijandoes notwishto involve as a fledgling U.S. ally, supports Azerbaijan'slegal and to develop itsCaspian resources.54 The United Statesfully politicalstanceon the Caspian.55 supporter oftheprinciple In August1998,Azerbaijanannounced thatRussia,a longtime ofsharedownership oftheCaspian,had nowagreed to dividetheseabed on thebasisofan at a had arrived of thatyear, Azerbaijanand Turkmenistan equidistant line.56 In February
(visited Feb. 19,1999). These documentsare at <http://www.arts.unimelb.edu.au/Dept/CERC/bulfeb98.htm> presentthebasisofnegotiations betweenAzerbaijanand Turkmenistan on howto dividetheir portionofthesea. Azerbaijan claims thatthisdivisionmustfollowSoviet practice,while the Turkmenscontend thatthe Soviet internaldocumentswere onlyadministrative decisions and did not have the force of international boundary treaties. SeeAzerbaijan: Azeri, Turkmen Teams Agree "Basic Points" on CaspianSea,Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-040 (Feb. 9). (Turkmenistan'sreported position, however,appears to be at variance withits earlier position calling for observance of Soviet-era divisionsuntil the statusof the sea is finally settled. See Turkmenistan-Background of APS REV.OIL MARKET CurnwsFile.) CaspianDisputes, TRENDS, Sept. 7, 1998, availablein LEXIS,News Library, an advisertoAzerbaijan'svicepresident, has reliedon thesame documentsto claimthat KhushbakhtYusefzadeh, Azerbaijan'sshareoftheCaspian was80,000square kilometers. The sharesoftheotherrepublicswerereportedly as follows: Russia,64,000squarekilometers; Turkmenia, 80,000square kilometers; and Kazakhstan, 113,000square of kilometers. SeeNourian, supranote 33, at 122. Vinogradovand Wouters point out thatthe Soviet Ministry InternalAffairs establisheda delimitation line thatcontinuedthe land border betweenAstaraand unilaterally Husseingholi in 1935, but that it "has never been recognized by Iran as the Soviet-Iranianborder." Sergei Vinogradov& PatriciaWouters, The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems, 55 ZEITSCHRIFT FURAUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHESRECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 604, 609 (1995).
50

be united,inviolable and indivisible. The Azerbaijan Republicterritory shallincludetheAzerbaijanRepublicinner waters,the Caspian Sea (Lake) sector relatingto the Azerbaijan Republic, and space over the Azerbaijan Republic."<http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/XA1 /wwwtc011.txt> (visited Mar.7,1999). Itis notclearwhether insist on totalsovereignty overtheir ofcourse,wouldconflict Azerbaijanis portionoftheCaspian. Such a position, with thelawofthesea, whichprecludesfullsovereignty beyonda 12-mile territorial sea butwould allowsovereign within the exclusiveeconomic zone. miningrights 52 "Azerbaijan's sectorofthe Caspian is estimated to contain25 ofthe 32 knownoil and gas fieldsofthe Sea as wellas 145 of the 386 prospective structures." & Croissant, Croissant supranote 28. 53 Id. foran $8 billiondeal with 54 In 1994,during negotiations mainlyWestern oil companies,Azerbaijanoffered Iran a 5% share in the consortium. The United Statesstrongly objected to Iranian participation and threatenedto persuade the Westernoil companies to abandon the project.Azerbaijan eventuallyrelented and substituted forIran.The movepredictably & Wouters, Turkey provoked strong Iranianoppositionto thedeal. SeeVinogradov supranote 35, at 88. 55 Glen Rase, the State Department's directorof international energy policy, statedthat, no bodyofwater liketheCaspianistreated as condominium as theRussians knowledge, prefer .... The [t]o my more normalcoursewithbodies ofwaterthatfallon international boundafies... would be to have linesof divisions foreconomicpurposeson thesea bed tocreateexclusive economiczones.Thatstrikes us as a perfectly reasonablewayto go forward and thatcertainly seemsto be whattheKazakhs, Azerisand Turkmens desire. with Glen CASPIAN Manzi,Interview Rase, CROSSROADSMAG., Winter 1995<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/ Terry 1I.htm> (visited homepages/usazerb/ Sept. 18, 1999) . Azerbaijaniofficials haverepeatedly statedthattheUnited States supports their position.SeeDoc. FBIS-SOV-98-23 1,supranote 45 (statement ofStateCounselorforForeign PolicyVafa Guluzade). 56 Azerbaijan: on Disagreement Azerbaijan's Aliyev withRussia on Caspian, Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-217 (Aug. 5) ofHeydarAliyev, (statement president ofAzerbaijan, toInterfax newsagency).This understanding wasconfirmed in a Russian-Azerbaijanijoint statement laterthatmonth.SeeDoc. FBIS-SOV-98-231, supranote 45.

51Article 11 oftheAzerbaijanConstitution readsin relevant part:"The territory oftheAzerbaijanRepublicshall

SeeNourian,supranote 33, at 23.

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on the divisionof the seabed according to an equidistantline.57 general understanding on how the equidistantline should be drawn.58 They These twostatesdiffered, however, of twofieldsin the Caspian. have also clashed overthe ownership
Russia

the constant The Russian positionon the miningregimein the Caspian Sea reflects ofFuel and Power, on theone hand,and theMinistry tension betweentheForeignMinistry, oil companies such as Lukoil, on the other.YakovPappe, a Russian allied withpowerful expert,describedthe companies' viewsas follows: The oil people do not support any attemptsby Russia to pressure its Southern in particular declaringtheformer Islamicrepublicsof the USSR a zone of neighbors, Russia's special interest.They do not supportit because theydon't believe in the of effectiveness of such measures. For them it is importantto have the possibility has yetbeen divided.That is whythe oil people expansion now,whilenot everything whileat the of othernewindependentstates, wantto respectthe nationalaspirations same time expectingthat these stateswould decide to make maximumuse of the scientific, technological, human potentialstillpossessedbyRussia.60 emergedin 1994. In Aprilof thatyear, The first signsofa rift in theRussiangovernment while the Azerbaijanigovernment was negotiating an $8 billion deal to develop its oil theRussianMinistry ofForeign Western consortium, resources in theCaspianwith a mainly in Moscow.The letter statedin part: Embassy Affairs reactedbysendinga note to theBritish with regard "Any stepsbywhichever Caspianstateaimed at acquiringanykindofadvantages actionsare to theareas and resources... cannotbe recognised... [and] ... anyunilateral "6' The ForeignMinistry's in a letter tone became more threatening devoidofa legal basis. laterthatyear,whichstatedthatRussiawould take submitted to theUN Secretary-General all necessary measuresto restorethelegal orderof the Caspian,and thattheresponsibility foranyadverseconsequences,including"majormaterialdamage,"restedwiththosewho resorted to unilateral of international agreements.62 actionsin disregard The earlyRussianpositionstatedin the above letterto the United Nationsand in other documents The Caspian Sea wasa landlockedbodyofwater as follows. maybe summarized and thusthe normsof the international law of the sea, includingthe territorial sea, the exclusiveeconomic zone, and the continental were not applicable to it. The legal shelf, Treatiesof 1921 and 1940, regimeof the Caspian was stillgovernedby the Soviet-Iranian All thecoastalstates werebound bytheseagreements, whichprovidedforjointutilization.
57 SeeDoc. FBIS-SOV-98-040, supra note 49 (statement ofElbarsKepbanov,deputy minister ofTurkforeign menistan, to Azerbaijan'sTuran newsagency). 58 Some reports have indicatedthatTurkmenistan an equidistant line delineatedwithout favors inlets taking or islandsintoconsideration, whileAzerbaijanwouldinclude themin itscalculations. SeeAzerbaijan-Turkmenistan, PLATT's OILGRAM NEWS,Apr. 1, 1998, availablein LEXIS, NewsLibrary, CurnwsFile. 59One ofthefields, called Serdar-by theTurkmensand Kyapaz bytheAzerbaijanis, seemsto lie,at leastpartially, in theTurkmensector.In August1997,following strong protests byTurkmenistan and apparendyin recognition ofthevalidity oftheTurkmenclaims, RussianPresident canceled an agreement BorisYeltsin betweenRosneft and Lukoil to develop the field withAzerbaijan. The deal was reportedly worth$1 billion. See Azerbaijan wants clarification on Caspian, J. CoM., Aug. 28, 1997, at 12A. Later thatyear,Turkmenistan appealed to the United Nationsforassistancein setdingthe dispute.SeeAlexandrov, supranote 49. 60Yuri Fedorov,Russia'sPolicies tozvard CaspianRegion Oil:Neo-Imperial orPragmatic? inPERSPECTIVES ONCENTRAL ASIA,Oct. 1996 (Center for Post-SovietStudies, Carnegie Corp. of NY) (quoting Yakov Pappe) <http:// www.cpss.org/casianw/octpers.html> (visited Dec. 28, 1999). 61 Andrew Seek etal.,Azerbaijan: Rediscoveringlts OilPotential?A LegalPerspective, 13J.ENERGY& NAT. RESOURCES L. 147, 157 (1995) (quoting FIN.TIMES(London), May31, 1994, at 2). 62 Letterdated 5 October 1994 fromthe Permanent Representative of the RussianFederationto the United NationsAddressedto the Secretary-General (Positionof RussianFederationregardingthe legal regimeof the

Caspian Sea), UN Doc. A/49/475 (1994), reprinted in 10 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSAND THE LAwOFTHE SEA:

DOCUMENTARYYEARBOOK 1994, at 195, 196 [hereinafter Russian 1994 Letter].

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the treaty of theformer had inherited obligations not onlybecause as successorstatesthey butalso because all five ofthemhad signedthe "AlmaAta Declaration"to the unitary state, states,the Caspian same effect in 1991.63 Byvirtueof the emergenceof threenew littoral however, anyutilization of the Caspian's legal regimemustbe updated. In the meantime, the other parties' interests mustbe subject to waterand subsoil resourcesthataffected agreement byall the coastal states.64 to appease its Azerbaijan,the clear targetof Russia's ire, had already begun trying itsright to develop itsCaspian resources. powerful northern neighbor, whilealso stressing Although the initial round of Azerbaijani negotiationswith the consortiumhad not it was broughtin earlyin 1994. In March of thatyear,Lukoilwas given included Russia,65 In addition, a 10percentsharein theconsortium.66 AzerbaijanawardedLukoilmulti-billionin 1995 and 1996.67 dollarcontracts in an ironicpositionbyearly1994:whileitsForeignMinistry Russiatherefore founditself in theCaspianillegaland threatening them oil operations to disrupt wascallingAzerbaijani its Ministry of Fuel and Power-allied with Lukoil and other powerfuloil forcibly, The oil lobbyscored to assist Azerbaijanin thesame projects.68 companies-was preparing in November1994,when PrimeMinister theformer head a majorvictory Chernomyrdin, his acceptance of the of Gazprom, met PresidentAliyevin Moscow and reaffirmed consortium deal.69 softeneditsstanceby Two yearslater,in November1996, the RussianForeignMinistry in callingfornationalsectors proposinga hybrid plan thatcombinedAzerbaijan'sposition, the Caspian,withIran's and Russia's positionsin supportof shareduse and ownership.70 The compromise, towhichall thecoastalstatesexceptAzerbaijansubscribed, providedfor milesofeach state'scoast, overthemineralresources within forty-five nationalsovereignty 7' The ForeignMinistry, themiddlearea tobe left forjoint once with however, development. of the in to witness the its from within had when, position government again undermining August1997,Russia'sMinistry ofNaturalResourcesawardeda tenderto Lukoil to develop so farbeyondtheforty-five-mile zone The fieldstretched a fieldin thenorthern Caspian.72 73 itencroachedon Kazakhterritory. with that Kazakhstan Moscow, claiming lodgeda protest
63AlmaAta Declaration,Dec. 21, 1991, 31 ILM 148 (1992).

SeeRussian1994 Letter,supranote 62, at 195-96; and Alexandrov, supranote 49. These talkswere conductedin 1993 in London. SeeFedorov,supranote 60. 66 Lukoil's share came out of thatof the Azerbaijani national oil companyand did not reduce the Western consortium's interest. SeeSeek et al., supranote 61, at 157. 67 For details, see Fedorov,supranote 60. 68 The tension betweentheForeignand Fuel and PowerMinistries surfaced in a conferenceon thelegal status oftheCaspian thattookplace in Moscowin October 1995. The director of theLegal DepartmentoftheRussian ForeignMinistry statedthe standardpositionof his ministry, adding veiled criticism of Azerbaijan'sunilateral actionsin theCaspian.The vicepresident ofLukoilrespondedbyemphasizing theeconomic and politicalbenefits ofcooperationbetweenRussianand Azerbaijanioilmen,and wenton to say:" [Lukoil] knowshow to extract oil and howto do itin thebestpossibleway, whiletheForeignMinistry's employeesknowhow to deal with political problems.Therefore, everyone is concernedwithhis ownbusiness."Thus, the claim ofRussia'sdeputyminister offoreign whostatedin thesame conferencethattherewere"no differences ofprinciplein theapproach affairs, to theCaspian problem"betweenthetwoministries, does notseem very credible.For a reporton theconference, see Lev Klepatsky & ValeryPospelov,Manoeuzring RoundtheCaspianSea, 10 INT'L AFF.59 (Moscow 1995). 69 SeeRobertV. Barylski, and the Russia,theWest, CaspianEnergy Hub,49 MIDDLEE.J. 217, 224 (1995). Barylski and therepresentatives describesthebehind-the-scenes betweentheForeignMinistry oftheoil interests struggle in the Russiangovernment, notingChernomyrdin's refusalto adopt a hard-line policy.Id. at 223. 70 SeeAzerbaijan: in Russian-Aze; i Talks, Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-209 (July28). CaspianSea StatustoBe Discussed 71 Id. Russiaalso signaleditswillingness to accept othercoastalstates'"spotjurisdiction" overoil sitesoutside the45-milezone ifcertaincriteria weremet,and ifthesiteswerealreadybeing,or were about to be, developed. This stipulation seemed to recognizethe interests ofLukoil and otherRussianoil companies thatwerepartners in theseprojects.SeeAlexandrov, supranote 49. 72 See Alexandrov, supla note 49. 73See Syed Rashid Ali, Russia/Kazakhstan PETROLEUM TIMES ENERGYREP., Feb. 1998, at 6, Caspian Agreement, available in LEXIS, NewsLibrary, CurnwsFile.
64 65

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in February Finally, 1998, Russia reversed itslong-heldpositionon the Caspian regime and, in whatmaybe consideredthefinalvictory of theoil interests within thegovernment, declared thatitnowsupportedthesectoraldivision oftheentireCaspian seabed.74 OnJuly 6, 1998,Russiaand Kazakhstan dividedthenorthern portionof theseabed betweenthemselvesaccordingto an equidistant line.75 The agreementconcernedonlythe seabed, how76 ever,since Russiainsistedthatthe Caspian waters should be commonproperty. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan Kazakhstanhas argued thatthe legal regimeof the Caspian mustbe determined bythe UnitedNationsConvention on theLaw of the Sea.77 the Accordingly, Kazakhstan supports establishment thereofinternal and territorial waters In and an exclusiveeconomic zone.78 October 1993,Turkmenistan became thefirst Caspian coastalstateto pass a law declaring overa 12-mile itsjurisdiction territorial sea and a "maritime economic zone."79 Turkmenistan has also reached a basic understanding withAzerbaijanand a purportedagreement with on sectoraldivision ofthesea.80 Kazakhstan and AlthoughKazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijannowagreeon theprinciple ofequidistant-line division oftheCaspian,they differ as to howtheline shouldbe drawn. As ofDecember 31, 1999,no definite amongthemselves on thispointhad been reached.8 agreement
SeeAzeibaijan: BakuEncoutaged by Newv RussianP?oposals on Caspian,Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-041 (Feb. 10). SeeRussia arnd Kazakhstan shareCaspianspoils, BBC Online Network, July7, 1998 <http://news.bbc.co.uk> (visited Feb. 29, 1999). 76 See id. In ajoint statement signed byAzerbaijanand Russia in August1998, the twosides agreed thatthe line modifiedon "thebasis of the principlesof seabed should be dividedintosector-zones along an equidistant fairness and the agreementof the parties."Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-231, supranote 45. Russiajustifies itsopposition to division ofwaters ofthe Caspian byarguingthatitwouldviolatethe ecological integrity ofthesea, butRussia's concern is obviously thatsuch a divisionwould depriveit of a veto over the directionof proposed underlying underwater itsterritory pipelines.Russiaclaimsthatthebestpipeline routeis overlandthrough since underwater pipelinesare ecologicallyunsafe.Interestingly, itsoppositionto underwater pipelines does not extend to those undertheBlackSea, whereRussiasupports itsterritory toTurkey. buildinga gas pipelinefrom The deputy foreign minister has explainedthisdiscrepancy bynotingthat, whiletheCaspian is earthquakeprone,theBlackSea is not. See Russia 7war-ns BBC Online Network,Mar. 27, 1998 <http:// of "bandztty" if Caspian statusas unresolved, news.bbc.co.uk> (visited Feb. 19,1999). In responseto Iran's objections, Russiahas statedthattheRussian-Kazakh agreement"does not create a special statusforthe northern partof the Caspian Sea, neitherdoes it contradict theSoviet-Iranian of 1921 and 1940." SeeRussia:Spokesman treaties onRussia,IranDividingBed ofCaspianSea,Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-202 (July 21) (statement ofVladimirRakhmanin, RussianForeignMinistry spokesman,to ITARTASS). The fateof the Russian-Kazakh agreementis stillunclear since the Duma has not ratified it.Andranik Migranyan, a memberof the RussianFederation'sPresidentialCouncil, said in November1998 thatthe Duma wouldprobably thechairmanoftheDuma's Energy rejecttheagreement. GeorgiiTikhonov, Committee, has also said thattheDumawould consultall thelittoral states, especially Iran,beforedebatingon thedeal. SeeIran:Doubts over Doc. FBIS-NES-98-311 (Nov. 7). RussianDuma Approval ofCaspianAg-eement, 77 SeeAlexandrov, supranote 49. 78 See Vinogradov& Wouters,supranote 35, at 95. 79 Law on the StateBorder,Oct. 1, 1993,Art.6, cited in id. at 92-93. 80 On theAzerbaijani-Turkmen on "basicpoints"on the Caspian,see Doc. FBIS-SOV-98-040, understanding supranote 49. The Kazakh-Turkmen agreementof March 1997 statedthat"all countriesborderingthe Caspian Sea muststandbytheprincipleofdividing thewaterarea out to a middleline untilthe Caspian Sea's legal status is determined." ofthe SeeCroissant & Croissant, supra note 28, at 10 (quotingagreement signedbythepresidents twostates). 81 The UnitedStates has attempted to expeditethesenegotiations bysubmitting proposalsto bothsideson how to draw a median line. Richard Morningstar, before leaving his post as special adviserto the presidentand methodto ofstateforCaspian Basin energy, a scientific secretary reportedthatthe U.S. expertshad "submitted theAzerbaijaniand Turkmenpartiesthatwillallowbothpartiesto reach a mutually He acceptable agreement." a fewmonths."LISEnvoy's expressed the hope that the partieswould be able to reach an agreement"within Comments onAzeti-Turkmen Doc. FBIS-SOV-1999-0624 (June 24). Disputte Reported,
74 75

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The dispute over whetherthe Caspian should be divided or shared has been largely settled betweenthelittoral states through multiple bilateral agreements.82 The chancesthat a court would ever rule on the legal statusof the Caspian seabed are therefore slim. However,one mayarriveat a suggestionof whatsuch an opinion mightbe by critically examiningthe concept of condominiumchampionedbyIran and Russiauntilrecently. First, thereare fewexamplesof shared ownership of seabed resourcesin international case law and statepractice.As Professor is thatmostlakes Oxman pointsout: "The reality and semi-enclosed seas borderedbymore thanone statehave been partitioned.... Those bear a substantial burden.... Withrespectto hydrocarbon and arguingforcondominium mineraldeposits, statepractice."83 .... is supportedbyoverwhelming partition Similarly,J. H. W. Verzijlhas noted thatexamplesof commonownership of lakes and inland seas "do not to myknowledgeactually exist."84 The only case in which a court has held in favorof the principleof condominium concernsthe Gulfof Fonseca. Situatedin the PacificOcean, the gulfis surroundedbyEl Salvador,Honduras, and Nicaragua. Prior to 1821, all three countrieswere part of the to the disputeoverthe Caspian,the GulfofFonsecacase involved SpanishEmpire.Similarly statesuccessionand rivalclaimsto a bodyofwaterthatarose onlyafter the breakupof an A chamberof the International Court ofJustice found thatthe threeriparian empire.85 stateswereeach entitledto a three-mile stripofftheircoast,but thatbeyondthislimitthe waters of the gulfappertainedto themall.86 the questionof the GulfofFonseca fromthatof Important factors, however, distinguish the Caspian. For one thing, unlikethe Caspian, the gulfbelonged to a singlestatebefore In addition, thesuccessorstates in the GulfofFonseca itsdissolution. case, unlikethosein the case of the Caspian, had treatedthe bodyof wateras common property foran extended as BriceClagett which wasmainly concernedwith periodoftime.Finally, pointsout,theICJ, the issue of navigation, realized thatdivisionof the Gulfof Fonseca would have created withno deepwateroutletto insurmountable difficulties byleavingat leastone of thestates the sea. No such difficulty, insofar as division of theseabed is concerned,characterizes the 87 Caspian case. 7 In fact,one mayargue thatdivisionof the seabed maybe the bestwayto avoid the complications thatusuallyarisein shared-use/ownership arrangements. The history states'practicein the Caspian further weakensthe argument of the littoral thatitis the commonproperty of thosestates. in 1949 the As mentionedabove,beginning SovietUnion engaged in intensiveoil operationsin the Caspian withoutacquiringthe consentof itssouthernneighbor.Fear of the politicalcomplications of raisingobjections to these operationsdid not preventIran frompubliclyand privately airingits concerns abouttheoil pollutionin theCaspian caused bySovietoffshore An argument drilling.88 may
82 These agreements include the one signed by Russia and KazakhstaninJuly1998, supranote 75, and the Turkmenistan-Kazakh agreementofMarch 1997, supranote 80. See also sup-anote 57 forthe basic AzerbaijaniTurkmenunderstanding on divisionof the seabed. 83 Oxman, supia note 9, at 6, 12. 84 3J. H. W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19 (1970), quoted supra note in Clagett, 4, at 6. 85 SeeRodman R. Bundy,Janbehaye Summer 1996, at az mohit-e zist-e khaza?; Hogugy-e hefazat da?yay-e MAJALLEH, 138, translated from LegalAspects ofP-otecting thle Environment ofthle & INT'L CaspianSea, 5 REV.EUR.COMMUNITY ENVTL. L. 122 (1996). 86 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 ICJREP.351 (Sept. 11), cited note 9, at 6. in Oxman, supf-a 87 Clagett,supranote 4, at 7. 88 It is estimatedthat up to 10% of Soviet offshoredrillingproduction in the Caspian (approximately 300,000-400,000tons of oil) escaped into the sea each year.In 1968 the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a

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therefore be made thatIran's forty-year-long silence regarding Sovietoil operationsnow prevents it fromraisingobjectionsto similar operationsbythe successorstates.
CONCLUSION

The contestoverminingrights in the Caspian is largely over.All the littoral statesnow favorsectoraldivisionof the seabed. The disputehas therefore shifted from whether the seabed should be dividedto howthatdivision mightbe accomplished.89 As thisdiscussion has illustrated, Iran and Russia, whichsupportedtheshared-use/ownership principle in the early1990s,have nowaccepted theprincipleofsectoraldivision of the seabed not because theiropponents' legal arguments provedto be compellingbut,rather, because forcesof domestic and internationalpolitics left them with no other viable options. That is, of condominiumlostthe battlenot in the courtroom supporters but in the boardroomof domesticand international politics. If the past of the Caspian is anyguide to itsfuture, one maypredictthatthe emerging issuesof the technicalities ofseabed division and thefateof thewaters willbe determined not so muchbylegal arguments as bythepoliticaland geostrategic concernsof the littoral states. These concernsrangein generalfrom thefuture shape ofregionaland international alliancesto thelocationand direction ofunderwater (and overland)oil and gas pipelines. Giventheimportance oftheCaspian energy reserves to theworld'seconomy, a replay ofthe nineteenth-century "greatgame"90-with different playersand some new rules-is not a surprising spectacleat the dawn of the thirdmillennium.
KAMYARMEHDIYOUN*

THE FIFTY-FIFTHSESSION OF THE

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

INTRODUCTION

The fifty-fifth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights took place in Geneva fromMarch 22 to April 30, 1999, and was chaired byAmbassador Anne Anderson of Ireland. The Commission reviewed the state of human rightsand fundamental freedoms in the world, adopting eighty-two resolutions,fifty-eight by consensus, and thirteendecisions. 1 More than thirty-two hundred participantsrepresented fifty-three member and ninety-one observer states,over two hundred nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and some fiftyfive specialized agencies and other organizations.2 Secretary-General Kofi Annan underdecree that, interalia, prohibitedtheoperationofnewwellsin the Caspian unlesseffective measuresweretaken to prevent pollution.SeeBUTLER, sup1anote15,at 137-38. The oil pollutionnotonlyendangeredraremarinelife, butalso wascarriedto thesouthand southwestern shoresoftheCaspian,whereitwashedup on beaches thatwere among the favorite holiday resortsof Iranians. Iranian concern was mainlyresponsiblefor a Soviet-Iranian agreementon pollution controlin the Caspian signed in 1971. SeeDavid Housego, Iran-Russia action forcleaner Caspian,TIMES(London), Apr. 29, 1971, at 9. 89 The othercontentious issue is the legal regimeof the Caspian waters.Iran is the onlycoastal statethathas linkeditsagreementon the statusof the seabed to thatof thewaters.Seesupratextat note 44. 90 KARLERNEST MEYER & SHAREEN BLAIR THEGREAT GAME AND THE TOURNAMENT OF SHADOwS: See,e.g., BRYSAC, AsIA(1999). RACE FOREMPIRE INCENTRAL * M.A., M.Phil., Columbia University; J.D. candidate (2000), Boston College Law School <krnehdiyoun@ ofTexas at AustinSchool netscape.net>.The authorwould like to thankProfessor Hans Baade of theUniversity of Law forhis helpfulcommentson the first draft of thispaper. session,UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 'The ReportoftheCommissionon Human Rights[CHR] on itsfifty-fifth and decisionsof the Commission. [hereinafter Report],containsthe resolutions 2 See id. at 394-406; Statistics session of the Commission on Human Rights,UN Doc. relatingto fifty-fifth E/CN.4/2000/8 (1999).

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