CH 1

2004 Robert B.
Brandom
Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel:

Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts I. Introduction: The enterprise animating this essay is generically of the sort epitomized in Croces title: to specify !hat is li"ing and !hat is dead in #egels philosophy.$ T!o %&alifications of this characterization are in order' ho!e"er. (irst' the indefinite articles in my title are meant to indicate that ) &nderstand !hat one is doing in dra!ing s&ch a distinction in a !ay that is at once more pl&ralistic and less final than that slogan s&ggests. ) am proposing one !ay of disting&ishing in #egels !or* large' orienting philosophical insights !orth p&rs&ing and de"eloping today+!hat ) see as the core of his achie"ement +from !hat sho! &p against that bac*gro&nd as optional collateral commitments' contingent choices as to ho! to !or* o&t the big ideas' as !ell as !hat as far as ) can see are simply mista*es ,albeit intelligible and forgi"eable ones-. ) do not at all s&ppose that there are not other !ays of car"ing things &p from !hich !e might learn as m&ch.
(&rther' ) address here only one aspect of #egels m&ltidimensional tho&ght: e.ploiting fa&lt/lines that appear !hen one considers the relations bet!een his "ie!s abo&t the contents of ordinary determinate empirical concepts' on the one hand' and his "ie!s abo&t the contents of the specifically logical' philosophical' or spec&lati"e concepts in terms of !hich he elaborates his o!n "ie!s ,concepts s&ch as partic&larity' &ni"ersality' and indi"id&ality' 0nsichsein' and (1rsichsein- on the other.2 Before la&nching into the disc&ssion of this partic&lar perspecti"e on #egels tho&ght' ho!e"er' it is !orth o&r ta*ing note of a methodological !orry that arises at the o&tset concerning the "ery idea of a critical reading of that tho&ght: a reading' that is' that appropriates some of his philosophical concepts and claims' !hile ignoring or re3ecting others. 4pecific' characteristic feat&res of #egels "ie!s present a special obstacle to any s&ch &nderta*ing. (or #egel himself insists' e.plicitly and repeatedly' that his philosophical acco&nt presents a system. 0nd one essential property of a system in this sense is a strong and distincti"e sort of holism concerning the philosophical idiom in !hich it is e.pressed: no piece of it+ no concept and no claim+can ha"e the content that it does e.cept in the conte.t of all the rest.2 The
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)n other essays' ) ha"e considered different s&ch dimensions: #egels &nderstanding of determinateness ,in Chapter 5 of Tales of the Mighty Dead 6#ar"ard 7ni"ersity 8ress' 20029- and his assimilation of concepts to sel"es ,in Chapter : of Tales of the Mighty Dead-. 2 #ere ) tal* abo&t the systematic metaphysics+basically' the logic. (or "ario&s bits of the Realphilosophie #egel presented in terms of those categories might' of co&rse' be contested' !hile 4;5;2024
2004 Robert B. Brandom systematicity #egels philosophy aspires to and p&rports to e.hibit' entails that it is' as !e may say' semantically monolithic. That feat&re !o&ld ma*e it impossible to chip off some bits from the bloc*. 0ttempting to pic* and choose' to select and re3ect' !o&ld ine"itably be to falsify. 4e"ered from the &ni%&e li"ing concept&al organism to !hich they belong' the dead appendages co&ld not perform their e.pressi"e f&nction. The monolithic systematicity claim< is the biggest obstacle to the critical appraisal of #egels concepts and claims' and so their appropriation in o&r "ery different circ&mstances. B&t it has seemed to many to be of the "ery essence of #egels philosophical contrib&tion' so that the !hole scheme stands or falls !ith that claim. Rolf/8eter #orstmann' for instance' has elo%&ently appealed to this feat&re of #egels tho&ght to arg&e that !e m&st s!allo! it !hole or not at all.4 The short form of my response to this ob3ection that the systematic character of #egels tho&ght precl&des the possibility of a critical reading of it is that the first claim of his ) !ant to re3ect+as the "ery first step in the critical enterprise+is 3&st this claim abo&t its semantically monolithic character. =hat if #egel is wrong to thin* that if one can say at all !hat he is saying in the rest of the Logic' then one must say it in terms that are systematic in a sense that entails being semantically monolithic> ?f co&rse' a !hat if>$ pro"es nothing. Entitling oneself to a response of this general shape ,that is' relin%&ishing the commitment to #egels tho&ght ha"ing to ta*e the shape of a semantically monolithic system- re%&ires performing a dissection that disting&ishes !ithin #egels system an a&tonomo&s' "iable concept&al core from a discardable h&s* of optional collateral commitments' and f&rther locates the strong holist aspect of the systematicity of the semantics of its logical and philosophical concepts and claims in that shell. @oing that !o&ld re%&ire specifying what other master/commitments or insights of #egels can be made sense of apart from the systematicity claim' so as to see that they do not in fact re%&ire or entail it. #o! one might go abo&t doing this sho&ld be clearer at the end of my story than it can be made at this point. B&t the short "ersion is: good reasons to endorse a strong holism concerning the senses ,b&t not the referents- of ordinary remaining firmly !ithin the confines of the system. Th&s #egel himself seems to ha"e approached the pro3ect of applying his categories to the empirical/historical matter of the de"elopment of the concepts and practices of religion' art' and nat&ral science in an e.perimental spirit. Th&s "ario&s "ersions of the lect&res on the history of religion deploy his logical apparat&s in different !ays' once setting things &p in terms of a progression from 0nsichsein thro&gh (1rsichsein to 0n/&nd/f1rsichsein' another time in terms of a progression from categories of Being' thro&gh Assence' to the Concept. ,=hile these categories line &p ro&ghly' there are important differences of n&ance bet!een them' !hich come o&t in the applications.< This holism does not e.ha&st #egels notion of systematicity. 0nother essential element is comprehensiveness: that e"ery alternati"e acco&nt can be e.hibited as a partial' inade%&ate "ersion of the system' a stage in its de"elopment ,as rationally reconstr&cted- that m&st be s&perceded on the !ay to' and so !hose insights can be seen to be incorporated in' that system. )ndeed' beca&se of this feat&re of the scheme he presents' #egel thin*s it is inappropriate for &s to call it his system+in the !ay in !hich he does allo! tal* of 4pinozas system$ or Bants system.$ )n "irt&e of its e.pressi"e de"elopmental comprehensiveness' it sho&ld only be tho&ght of as the system$. 8irmin 4te*eler/=eithofer disc&sses this point at pp. <0/<2 in his fascinating and important Hegels Analytische Philosophie 6(erdinand 4chCningh' D1nchen' 2EE29. 4 This claim is the gra"amen of his essay =hat is #egels Fegacy' and =hat 4ho&ld =e @o =ith )t>$ European Journal of Philosophy 7:2 ,2EEE- pp. 2:G/2H:. Th&s' beca&se #egels "ery ambitio&s and complicated "ersion of an ontological monism is an essential part of his philosophical legacy'$ ,2:E#egels philosophical legacy consists in a "ery intricate combination of an impressi"e m&ltit&de of elements !hich in their entirety form one h&ge comple.. To choose only some of these elements and to claim that 3&st these constit&te the philosophically important parts of his legacy means to ha"e a "ery special notion of !hat co&ld be done to a philosophical theory !itho&t changing its content so m&ch that the theory has in fact been abandoned.$ ,2H4- Therefore' #orstmann concl&des' To deal !ith #egels philosophy in a rather selecti"e !ay means not being "ery faithf&l to his !ill' to say the least$ ,2HG-. #orstmanns recommended response to this sit&ation is to re3ect the idea that #egel left &s a "iable philosophical legacy: Io! J4ystem/8hilosophie in #egels sense has been o&t of fashion from his days on' and ) ta*e it that nobody no!adays really !ants to gi"e the J4ystem/"ersion of a holistic approach in philosophy a second chance. )f' ho!e"er' there are good reasons to s&ppose that for #egel the idea of a system !as constit&ti"e of a philosophical theory' then one !onders ho! it is possible to thin* of #egel as a philosopher !hose legacy is of some "al&e for &s.$,2:54;5;2024
2004 Robert B. Brandom determinate concepts do not oblige one to adopt a corresponding thesis concerning the contents e.pressed by the logical and philosophical meta"ocab&lary !e &se to disc&ss and e.plicate those gro&nd/le"el concepts.
II. The irst !o"e: # $istinction The critical perspecti"e on #egels tho&ght that ) !ant to e.plore and e.po&nd here begins by comparing and contrasting #egels "ie!s abo&t the nat&re of the contents of ordinary determinate concepts !ith his "ie!s abo&t the nat&re of the contents of !hat he calls form determinations of the Concept$: logical' philosophical' and spec&lati"e concepts. The first category comprises the contents of the concepts e.pressed by o&r &se of ordinary !ords' s&ch as Jred' Jrigid' and Jrotten' and of the claims e.pressed by o&r &se of ordinary declarati"e sentences containing them. These are the contents that artic&late o&r e"eryday empirical conscio&sness' both cogniti"e and practical' of the !orld aro&nd &s' as !ell as the contents that artic&late o&r e"eryday empirical self/ conscio&sness of o&rsel"es as creat&res in that !orld: those e.pressed by !ords s&ch as Jself' and Job3ect. The second category comprises the logical philosophical concepts and speculative philosophical claims !hose de"elopment is the s&b3ect matter of both the Phenomenology of pirit and the cience of Logic.
The relation bet!een the t!o categories is' ) thin*' an e!pressive one. To be a logical concept' for #egel' is to play the distincti"e e.pressi"e role of ma*ing e.plicit general feat&res of the &se and content of ordinary' nonlogical ,Jdeterminate- concepts.G )t is to be a certain *ind of metaconcept. This is perhaps clearest in the &se #egel ma*es of his logical "ocab&lary in the Realphilosophie' b&t he belie"es %&ite generally that' as he p&ts
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#a"ing appropriated from #egel this conception of the characteristic e.pressi"e role that demarcates logical "ocab&lary as s&ch' ) moti"ate and e.po&nd it in its o!n right in the first chapter of Articulating Reasons 6#ar"ard 7ni"ersity 8ress' 20009' and de"elop and apply it in the rest of that !or*. 4;5;2024
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2004 Robert B. Brandom
the point in the Encyclopedia' the !hole progress of philosophizing in e"ery case' if it be a methodical' that is to say a necessary' progress' merely renders e.plicit !hat is implicit in a notion.$5 The principal point of his logic is to de"elop concept&al tools that are necessary and s&fficient to e.press e.plicitly the essential str&ct&res that are implicit in o&r &se of ordinary concepts ,incl&ding those of the empirical sciences- in 3&dgment and action. (or #egel' as for Bant' 3&dging and acting 3&st is applying concepts' and it is in "irt&e of that capacity that !e are spirit&al' rational' free creat&res+that is' creat&res able to &nderta*e commitments' to ta*e on responsi"ilities !hose content is artic&lated in terms of !hat !o&ld co&nt as reasons 3&stifying them. 4o coming to be able to ma*e e.plicit !hat is implicit in o&r concept &se+to say and thin# !hat it is !e ha"e all along been doing in 3&dging and acting+is achie"ing a distincti"e sort of self/conscio&sness of o&rsel"es as normati"e' rational' geistig beings.
?ne important ancestor of this f&ndamental distinction bet!een *inds of concepts is Bants di"ision of labor bet!een empirical concepts and the p&re concepts of the &nderstanding' that is' the categories. ?f co&rse' Bant &nderstood the relations bet!een these concepts and metaconcepts some!hat differently: the p&re concepts or categories codify in e.plicit concepts ,that is' ones that can themsel"es fig&re in 3&dgments- the forms that are implicitly e.hibited by all empirically contentf&l concepts as they fig&re in ,e.plicit- empirical 3&dgments. That is' in Bants hylomorphic philosophical metametalang&age' the content of the p&re categorial concepts e.presses the form of the determinate empirical ones. B&t for both fig&res )
thin* it is good methodological ad"ice to see* to &nderstand the
acco&nt offered of the metaconcepts to begin !ith in terms of !hat they tell &s abo&t the &se and content of the gro&nd/le"el concepts.
This is not al!ays easy' since both Bant and #egel spend a lot more time tal*ing abo&t the nat&re and contents of the concepts they !ant to &se to e.plicate concept &se than they do abo&t concept &se itself. 4o there is a nat&ral temptation to follo! their e.ample' and !orry more abo&t' say' the ded&ction of the categories in Bant' or the problem of ho! to ma*e a beginning and then cond&ct a progressi"e e.position of the system of logical concepts in #egel' than abo&t the pict&re being presented of ho! ordinary cognition and action sho&ld be concei"ed. B&t ) thin* it is important to resist that temptation+at least sometimes+and so to enter this partic&lar hermene&tic circle at a different place from that !e find in the first $riti%ue' or #egels Phenomenology or Logic.
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Ancyclopedia Fogic 6ref.9' KHH.
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III. T%o Claims a&out Empirical Concepts ) !ant' then' to start !ith t!o connected' original' o"erarching str&ct&ral claims that ) see #egel p&tting for!ard abo&t ordinary empirical concepts+claims !hich seem to me to hold partic&lar promise in addressing iss&es of contemporary philosophical interest. The first concerns his partic&lar !ay of &nderstanding the sense in !hich the content made a"ailable to tho&ght thro&gh the immediate deli"erances of sense o&tr&ns any partic&lar concept&alization of it. The second is his conse%&ent acco&nt of !hat is re%&ired to grasp' e.press' or con"ey the contents of determinate empirical concepts.
Aach of these phenomena ta*es the form of a process. )n the first case' it is the process !hereby immediacy is grad&ally and incompletely incorporated in the thoro&ghly mediated+that is' inferentially artic&lated+form of determinate/b&t/still/determinable concepts. That is the process !hereby determinate concept&al norms are at once instit&ted and applied in 3&dgments and actions.: )n the second case' the process in %&estion is a recapit&lation as rational reconstr&ction of the first sort of process' !hich displays it as e.pressi"ely progressi"e' as the grad&al emerging into e.plicitness of a determinate concept&al content that can then be seen retrospecti"ely as ha"ing been all along implicit in the tradition of applying and assessing applications of it. #egels term for this sort of process is J&iederholung. 0s ) read him' #egel thin*s that it is only by engaging in processes of the first *ind that !e can manage to thin* or mean anything determinate' and it is only by engaging in processes of the second *ind that !e can say !hat !e mean or thin*' ma*ing that content e.plicit to o&rsel"es or others.
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) disc&ss this process in another connection in 4ome 8ragmatist Themes in #egels )dealism: Iegotiation and 0dministration in #egels 0cco&nt of the 4tr&ct&re and Content of Concept&al Iorms'$ !hich is Chapter 4e"en of Tales of the Mighty Dead' Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of (ntentionality 6#ar"ard 7ni"ersity 8ress' 20029. 4;5;2024
This second sort of enterprise depends on the &se of some sort of logical "ocab&lary. The ade%&acy of a system of logical concepts is to be e"al&ated by its e.pressi"e capacity to ma*e e.plicit the essential' content/determining feat&res of both *inds of process or practice. 7nder the headings of J)erstand and J)ernunft' #egel introd&ces t!o meta/ metaconcepts for classifying the most important *inds of logical metaconcepts. #is o!n &nderstanding of his distincti"e philosophical contrib&tion is epitomized in the slogan that the point of his !or* is to teach &s ho! to &nderstand o&r concept&al acti"ity' and therefore o&rsel"es' according to the categories of )ernunft' rather than those of )erstand. The t!o claims abo&t the contents of empirical concept&al contents that !e t&rn to ne.t artic&late central elements of the contrast bet!een the metalogical standpoint of )erstand and that of )ernunft.
I'. The Conceptual Ine(hausti&ilit) of the Empirical: The Tradition The tradition #egel inherited too* it that act&al' concrete' determinate partic&larity co&ld not be f&lly capt&red by the finite concepts deployed by nondi"ine minds. Their theoretical "ersions of the point start !ith the tho&ght that altho&gh m&ch of !hat ) see !hen ) loo* closely at my hand' or hear !hen ) listen to a comple. piece of m&sic' can be e.pressed in 3&dgments' no set of s&ch 3&dgments' certainly no finite set of 3&dgments' can e.press all of it' !itho&t remainder. There !ill al!ays be a resid&e that is as yet &nsaid or &ntho&ght ,sayable or thin*able tho&gh each bit of it may be-. There !ill 5
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al!ays be more material to be concept&alized. =e cannot e!haustively describe any partic&lar as it is sens&o&sly presented. Ampiricists &nderstood concepts as formed by abstraction. The richness and detail that m&st be ignored in order to prod&ce abstract repeatable representations cannot then be f&lly reconstit&ted by finite con3&nctions of s&ch general classifications. Feibniz did thin* that there are f&lly indi"id&ating indi"id&al concepts corresponding to partic&lars+ that partic&lars are &nrepeatable infimae species+b&t also tho&ght that only Lod co&ld grasp s&ch concepts. Created minds m&st do !ith finite' al!ays e.tensible b&t al!ays incomplete' collections of mar*s that remain essentially general in their signification. (or Bant' concept&alizing the manifold of sens&o&s int&ition+rendering its content in the form of 3&dgments+is an infinite' in principle &ncompletable tas*. #egel says of this "ie!: )n the field of the finite' absol&te determinateness remains only a demand' a demand !hich the 7nderstanding has to meet by contin&ally increasing delimitation+a fact of the greatest importance+b&t !hich contin&es ad infinitum and !hich allo!s only of perennially appro.imate satisfaction.H )ndeed' for Bant each empirical 3&dgment is the application of a r&le for synthesizing other representations that has potentially infinite conse%&ences for the co&rse of f&t&re e.perience. The fail&re of any of these !o&ld re%&ire relin%&ishing or amending the 3&dgment. Dy claim that the animal ) am loo*ing at is a dog may s&ccessf&lly synthesize an indefinite stretch of f&t&re presented int&itions' b&t at e"ery point the possibility still remains that f&rther e.pos&re to
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Philosophy of Right* K202 60llen =ood ,ed.-' #. B. Iisbet ,trans.-M Cambridge 7ni"ersity 8ress' 2EE2-' p. 22H9. 4;5;2024
the indi"id&al may force me to !ithdra! the 3&dgment and replace it !ith another' say' that it is in fact a fo.. The res&lt is accordingly a thoro&gh/going fallibilism abo&t empirical 3&dgments.
This !ay of thin*ing abo&t the relation bet!een partic&lar things and the determinate concepts they fall &nder+abo&t the relation bet!een immediacy and mediation+is characteristic of the standpoint of )erstand. ?n this conception' empirical 3&dgments are de facto collecti"ely incomplete. B&t a s&fficiently comprehensi"e set of them+not a"ailable to &s beca&se it !o&ld ha"e to be infiniteE+might not be. 0nd each empirical 3&dgment is indi"id&ally prone to the possibility of error. B&t any indi"id&al 3&dgment might also be !holly tr&e and correct' e"en tho&gh !e can ne"er be sure of any partic&lar one that it is. ?ne of the most interesting' original' and radical' b&t also among the most diffic&lt aspects of the concept&al transformation to the standpoint of )ernunft that #egel &rges on &s concerns the s&ccessor conception he proposes to this traditional combination of epistemological fallibilism and ac*no!ledgement of the de facto concept&al ine.ha&stibility of the empirical.
0s a point of entry into the topic' !e might consider t!o e.treme "ie!s one might ha"e abo&t #egels final position on the nat&re of determinate concepts and the empirical claims they fig&re in' according to !hich there is no interesting s&ccessor conception to the traditional one a"ailable to be in"estigated. 0ccording to the first' or eliminative interpretation' it is only from the defecti"e "ie!point of )erstand that there are any determinate claims or concepts. =e are s&pposed to gi"e &p that del&sion !hen !e pass to the more ade%&ate perspecti"e of )ernunft. 0ccording to the second' or %uietist interpretation' absol&tely nothing changes at the ob3ect le"el !hen !e pass at the metale"el from employing categories of )erstand to employing categories of )ernunft in understanding or e!pressing !hat is going on in gro&nd/le"el application of determinate concepts in empirical 3&dgment. ?n the eliminati"e reading' iss&es abo&t fallibilism and the incompletability of the empirical enterprise lapse' not beca&se a s&ccessor conception is re%&ired b&t beca&se the enterprise itself is re"ealed as ill/concei"ed. ?n the %&ietist reading' the phenomena of empirical ine.ha&stibility and fallibility persist' altho&gh the terms in !hich they are described e"ol"e in concert !ith #egels other metatheoretical inno"ations.
0nd the !hole set is not entailed by any finite s&bset of it: a fail&re of a certain *ind of compactness.
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2004 Robert B. Brandom ) dont thin* either of these approaches is s&stainable. The eliminati"e "ie! cannot be right' beca&se it is clear that e"en after !e ha"e learned the lessons of the Fogic' lang&age remains the e.istence of 4pirit$. 20 =e are still s&pposed to &se declarati"e sentences to e.press o&rsel"es' as #egel does !hen applying the concept&al apparat&s of the Fogic to nonlogical material in the lect&res on aesthetics' religion' and the philosophy of nat&re. 0nd #egel remained acti"ely interested in introd&cing ne! !ords for distincti"e empirical phenomena+for instance the term Jentoptic' !hich he coined in 2H2:' to describe colors ne!ly disco"ered to appear in transparent media !hen they are heated ,an inno"ation for !hich Loethe praised him e.tra"agantly-. 22 The process of forming' applying' and criticizing determinate empirical concepts and claims in nat&ral science' for instance' is clearly s&pposed to contin&e e"en after !e ha"e achie"ed the sort of self/conscio&sness abo&t that process that #egels logic affords+as e"idenced by his dedication to s&pport and prom&lgate s&ch research in the #egelian +ear"oo# of cientific $riticism he edited from 2H25 to 2H<2 ,for instance' in its treatment of the researches of the #&mboldts-. B&t the %&ietist "ie!' according to !hich no gro&nd/le"el change at all is s&pposed to be occasioned by that ne! philosophical self/&nderstanding cannot be right either. (or one aspect of )erstand that !e m&st gi"e &p in order to achie"e the perspecti"e of )ernunft is the semantic atomism that sees the determinate identity of empirical concepts as !holly &naffected by the 3&dgments applying them that !e endorse. 0ccording to #egels holistic s&ccessor conception' !e m&st &nderstand change of beliefs and change of concepts as going hand/in/hand' and thin* abo&t the progressi"e e"ol&tion of the Concept: the holistic constellation of determinate claims/and/concepts comprising both do.astic and inferential commitments. @oing that means gi"ing &p the idea that !e can change the 3&dgments !e ma*e or the claims !e endorse !hile holding onto the "ery same determinate concept&al contents that !ere in play beforehand. )f Loethe had managed to establish that a common mechanism acco&nts both for entoptic and epoptic colors' the res&lt !o&ld not 3&st ha"e been ne! 3&dgments' b&t a re/determination of the contents of those concepts. 22
'. The Conceptual Ine(hausti&ilit) of the Empirical: Hegel #egels o!n alternati"e to the traditional approach is neither eliminati"ist nor %&ietist abo&t the
incompletability of the enterprise of empirical *no!ledge.
0s ) read him' #egel has a big ne! idea+a stri*ing and stri*ingly original s&ccessor conception to that of his prec&rsors. (or him' ) !ant to claim' the richness and fec&ndity of the immediate sens&o&s e.perience of partic&lars+the !ay it is bo&nd to o"erflo! any concept&al classification+is manifested primarily not in its necessary ine!hausti"ility by any finite set of empirical ,udgments' b&t rather in the necessary insta"ility of any set of determinate empirical concepts. There is and can in principle be no set of determinate concepts !hose correct application in empirical 3&dgment !ill not e"ent&ally re%&ire &s
20 22 22
Phenomenology' Diller paragraph 5G2' p. <EG. Hegel' the Letters Clar* B&tler and Christiane 4eiler ,trans.- 6)ndiana 7ni"ersity 8ress' 2EH49. 4ee 4ome 8ragmatist Themes in #egels )dealismN$ op- cit-.
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to re"ise and re3ect some of them. (or that reason' any set of determinate empirical 3&dgments is not only incomplete and falli"le' b&t is g&aranteed to be incorrect. That is' it not only must omit some claims that are tr&e and may contain some claims that are not tr&e' it must contain some claims that are not tr&e. )n short' as ) !ant to p&t the point' #egel is not 3&st an epistemic falli"ilist abo&t the tr&th of empirical ,udgments' b&t a semantic pessimist abo&t the ade%&acy of empirical concepts. )t is not 3&st that !e are necessarily ignorant of some tr&ths and possibly in error abo&t others' the necessary inade%&acy and incorrectness of o&r concepts means !e are necessarily in error.
#egel thin*s that a tr&ly critical philosophy sho&ld in"estigate+as he ta*es it none of his predecessors' incl&ding Bant' had done+the nat&re and conditions of the possibility of determinate contents of tho&ghts and the !orldly states of affairs they present. #is tho&ght is that by doing that !e might be able to find or craft a concept of content that co&ld' at least in fa"ored cases' intelligibly be &nderstood to be shared by a thought' 3&dgment' or commitment that p' on the one hand' and the fact that p' on the other.
@oing that !o&ld' in t&rn' ma*e possible a better pict&re of the possibility of gen&ine *no!ledge of ho! things really are than he ta*es it res&lts if !e start !ith one *ind of thing' s&b3ects or their representings' confronting another *ind of thing' ob3ects represented' across !hat is ine"itably an ontological and epistemological gap. The opening paragraphs of the (ntroduction to the Phenomenology ma*e it clear that #egel tho&ght Bants transcendental idealism sho&ld be &nderstood as ine.orably follo!ing o&t the logic implicit in s&ch a pict&re' rather than as o"ercoming or replacing it.
#egel endorses the 4pinozist principle ?mnis determinatio est negatio.$ (or him' determinateness of content+!hether of 3&dgments and concepts on the s&b3ecti"e side of certainty' or of facts and properties on the ob3ecti"e side of tr&th+is al!ays a matter of e!clusive 6a&sschliessend9 contrast !ith' the r&ling o&t of' other possibilities. These f&ndamental relations of material incompatibility' !hat he calls determinate negation$'
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in t&rn gi"e rise to material inferential relations among the contents they artic&late: !hat he calls mediation$. 4o for instance being a dog entails being a mammal in that e"erything incompatible !ith being a mammal is incompatible !ith being a dog. To be determinate or determinately contentf&l 3&st is to stand in relations of material incompatibility and material inference to other s&ch determinately contentf&l items+ !hether on the side of tho&ghts or of facts. These relations are intrinsically modally rob&st: incompatibilities are impossi"ilities of coinstantiation' and the inferences they generate are counterfactual/s&pporting. )t is as a conse%&ence of this !ay of thin*ing abo&t determinate contentf&lness that #egel sec&res the res&lt that !as so important to Bant' namely that !e can ne"er be in the s&pposed position from !hich #&mes %&estion is as*ed: one in !hich determinate empirical tho&ghts or states of affairs are f&lly in place' b&t the %&estion of ho! lawful or necessary relations among them are to be &nder!ritten is still open.
)t is also an approach that r&les o&t the semantic atomism on !hich Anlightenment epistemology !as predicated. (or that traditional pict&re too* it that a stoc* of determinate concepts co&ld be a"ailable to the in%&irer' o&t of !hich 3&dgments co&ld be constr&cted that then co&ld be sorted+fallibly to be s&re+into tr&e ones and false ones. The grad&al acc&m&lation of tr&ths and !inno!ing of falsehoods then permitted the b&ilding of the edifice of scientific *no!ledge' bric* by bric*. B&t according to a conception of' in 4ellars phrase2<' concepts as in"ol"ing la!s and inconcei"able !itho&t them'$ the identity and indi"id&ation of concepts does not s!ing free of the 3&dgments !e endorse concerning la!f&l connections among them+paradigmatically' for #egel'
2<
6ref. to Concepts as )n"ol"ing Fa!s and )nconcei"able =itho&t Them$' in PPP&9
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their modally rob&st material incompatibilities !ith and entailments of other concepts. Cogniti"e progress cannot then be constr&ed 3&st as the acc&m&lation of tr&e 3&dgments' b&t m&st incl&de also the shaping and impro"ement of the concepts that artic&late those 3&dgments. Besides the possibility of ha"ing incomplete or incorrect ,udgments' !e ha"e to !orry abo&t !hether !e ha"e gotten the concepts right. 4o the old pict&re of *no!ledge is &nderc&t by #egels approach to content. (or him' the soft &nderbelly of Anlightenment epistemology is its implicit semantics.
This is the line of tho&ght that leads #egel to the holistic idea that the &nit of cognition is not indi"id&al 3&dgments or determinate concepts' b&t !hat he called the Concept$: the !hole e"ol"ing constellation of claims/and/concepts' of do.astic' incompatibility' and inferential commitments. That it de"elops and changes+not 3&st in the 3&dgments it incl&des' b&t in the concepts they in"ol"e+is a conse%&ence of its being artic&lated in terms of relations of material incompatibility or determinate negation. Li"ing &p the pict&re of the contents of determinate concepts as settled independently and in ad"ance of their modal connections to one another leads #egel to thin* of them as dynamic' as changing ,not 3&st being selected- in response to other changes in o&r commitments. (or the engine of concept&al e"ol&tion is the possibility that applying determinate empirical concepts in the conte.t of collateral commitments' incl&ding the other 3&dgments that are a"ailable for &se as a&.iliary hypotheses in m&ltipremise inferences' can lead to commitments that are incompati"le' according to the contents of the concepts in"ol"ed. 0nd the practical significance of that incompatibility+!hat it is for a s&b3ect to ta*e or treat s&ch commitments as incompatible+is an obligation to do something' to alter or
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relin%&ish some of the commitments that led to the predicament. This is the process #egel ,in the )ntrod&ction to the Phenomenology- calls Je.perience+JArfahr&ng' not the episodic JArlebnis appealed to by the empiricist tradition.24
)t is also the process of determination of the content of empirical concepts' !hereby immediacy+ho! things really are' !hat is really incompatible !ith !hat' and !hat really follo!s from !hat+gets incorporated into those contents' ma#ing them ,moredeterminate. Th&s if ) ha"e a concept acidO that is determinate in ha"ing as modally rob&st conditions of application that if something tastes so&r then it is an acidO' and as modally rob&st conse%&ences of application that if something is an acidO then it !ill t&rn Fitm&s paper red' ) can be led by the immediate deli"erances of sense ,3&dgments ) find myself !ith responsi"ely' noninferentially- to commitments that are incompatible by my o!n lights if ) r&n across a li%&id that tastes so&r b&t t&rns Fitm&s paper bl&e. )n the conte.t of the hypothesized commitments' the !orld is then telling me that ) cannot ha"e the concept acidO !ith the e.cl&sions and entailments ) started o&t !ith. 0s #egel says: =e learn by e.perience that !e meant something other than !e meant to meanM and this correction of o&r meaning compels o&r *no!ing to go bac* to the proposition' and &nderstand it in some other !ay.$2G )f ) respond by altering the concept+say by restricting the inference in"ol"ed to clear li%&ids' or to ones that also pass a f&rther test+a bit of ho! the !orld really is gets b&ilt into my concept. By &ndergoing s&ch a process' engaging in s&ch a practice' artic&lated by relations of material incompatibility and inference' ) dont 3&st acc&m&late tr&e
24
This is the sense in"o*ed in the original title of the Phenomenology: The 4cience of the A.perience of Conscio&sness.$ 2G 6P. D5<9. 4;5;2024
2<
3&dgments' ) get better concepts+ones !hose constit&ti"e incompatibilities and inferences better trac* the !ay things really are.
The point is that for #egel' first' determinateness of content is artic&lated in terms of his &nderstanding of negation' and second' negation in"ol"es t!o essentially interdependent aspects: relations of modally rob&st e.cl&sion or material incompatibility' and processes of concept re"ision in e.perience' in response to finding oneself !ith incompatible commitments.25 The e.istence of the content/artic&lating relations of e.cl&sion 3&st consists in the liability of the contents so artic&lated to re"ision thro&gh the e.perience of error. This is !hy The distinct content' as determinateNis its o!n restless process of s&perseding itself' or negati"ity'$2: and !hy determinateness' !ith its concrete lifeNis an acti"ity that res&lts in its o!n dissol&tion'$2H and determinatenessNisNthe self/ mo"ing so&l of the realized content.$2E @eterminate content is !hat is ali"e !ithin itselfM$20 it is Becoming.$22 )t is !hat #egel means by tal*ing abo&t specific Iotions and their organic' self/gro&nded mo"ement'$22 the rhythm of the mo"ement of the content'$2< the rational element and rhythm of the organic !hole'$24 and by saying that in spec&lati"e 6begreifenden9 thin*ingNthe negati"e belongs to the content itself' and is the positi"e' both as the immanent mo"ement and determination of the content' and as the !hole of this process'$2G and that the self/mo"ing concrete shape ma*es itself into a
25 2: 2H 2E 20 22 22 2< 24 2G
4ee the e.tended disc&ssion of this point in #olism and )dealism in #egels Phenomenology$' op. cit.. 6P. DH0G9. 6P. DG49. 6P. DG<9. 6P. D4:9. 6EL KHH9. 6P. DH0G9. 6P. DG:9. 6P. DG59. 6P. DGE9.
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simple determinatenessNits concrete e.istence is 3&st this mo"ementNThe form is the innate de"elopment of the concrete content itself.$25 )t is !hy appearance is the arising and passing a!ay that does not itself arise and pass a!ay' b&tNconstit&tes the act&ality and the mo"ement of the life of tr&th'$2: and !hy The e"anescent itself m&stNbe regarded as essential' not as something fi.ed' c&t off from the Tr&e' and left lying !ho *no!s !here o&tside it' any more than the Tr&e is to be regarded as something on the other side' positi"e and dead.$2H 'I. *eak and Strong 'ersions of Hegelian Conceptual $)namism
The dynamic character of determinate concepts' !hich &nder!rites the semantic pessimism that is #egels s&ccessor/conception to the Anlightenment epistemic incompleteness and fallibilism "ersion of empirical ine.ha&stibility can be &nderstood in at least t!o different !ays. (or there are !ea*er and stronger "ersions of the tho&ght that it is in the inade%&acy and instability of e"ery constellation of empirical concepts+the !ay each s&ch system brea*s do!n and point beyond itself to another+that the concept&al ine.ha&stibility of the empirical consists. The less committi"e reading merely e.tracts the conse%&ences of #egels broadly inferentialist holism' according to !hich changing the claims or 3&dgments one endorses alters the inferential significance of those endorsements' and hence the concepts that artic&late their contents. This is a P&inean line of tho&ght.2E )f meanings or concept&al contents m&st be indi"id&ated at least as finely as roles in material inferences' and if those inferential roles depend on !hat else
25 2: 2H 2E
6P. DG59. 6P. D4:9. 6P. D4:9. 4ee 4ome 8ragmatist ThemesN$' op. cit. .
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one ta*es to be true' since that determines !hat a&.iliary hypotheses are a"ailable for e.tracting conse%&ences' then changes of belief can bring !ith them changes of meaning.
(&rther' material inference is non/monotonic: adding more premises can not only ma*e ne! concl&sions a"ailable' it can ma*e old ones &na"ailable. The inference from the premises that this match is dry and !ell/made to the concl&sion that if ) stri*e it' it !ill probably light may be a materially good one' e"en tho&gh if !e add to the premises that it is in a "ery strong magnetic field' that concl&sion !o&ld not follo!.<0 That formal feat&re of material inferences means that ignorance is as corrosi"e to correct inference as is error.<2 0dding ne! bits of *no!ledge is in principle as transformati"e of inferential roles' and hence concept&al contents' as disco"ering the falsehood of some of ones beliefs. )n the conte.t of s&ch a holism abo&t the inferential artic&lation of any system of claims/and/concepts' then' the traditional Anlightenment &nderstanding of the ine.ha&stibility of the empirical+that any empirically accessible set of tr&e 3&dgments is bo&nd to be incomplete' to omit some tr&ths that are not simply conse%&ences of the ones it already contains+has the in/principle instability of any set of empirical concepts as a straightfor!ard conse%&ence.
Aach ne! empirical belief !e ac%&ire may re%&ire &s to alter o&r inferential commitments' and so o&r concepts. ) call this conception of the inner life and self/mo"ement$ of determinate empirical concepts a J!ea* "ersion beca&se of the Jmay in that last form&lation. The addition of any ne! bit of *no!ledge may re%&ire a change of concepts. B&t it need not. )t may be entirely compatible !ith o&r prior beliefs' and bring in its train no alteration in the co&nterfact&al/s&pporting inference potentials of other sentences. 8rod&cing all the tr&e empirical 3&dgments is a (ichtean infinite tas*. 0s s&ch' it is not completable by &s. B&t there is a sense in !hich this is a merely practical diffic&lty. 0t least the notion of the totality of tr&e empirical 3&dgments ma*es sense. Fi*e!ise' on this line of tho&ght' the notion of a complete and correct set of determinate empirical concepts+a scheme that endorsing f&rther 3&dgments by applying those concepts correctly in ne! e.periences !o&ld ne"er lead &s to correct+is perfectly coherent. =e are' to be s&re' not li*ely to achie"e s&ch a concept&al scheme' and in the nat&re of the case co&ld not be in a position
<0 <2
(or a f&ller disc&ssion of this iss&e' see Chapter T!o of Articulating Reasons. ) arg&e for this claim in 7ns&ccessf&l 4emantics$ Analysis Qol. G4 Io. < ,R&ly 2EE4- pp. 2:GSH.
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to #now that !e had achie"ed it' e"en if in fact !e had. B&t this is only semantic falli"ilism' not yet semantic pessimism. )t adds to traditional epistemic fallibilism only the minimal lessons re%&ired by re3ecting the semantic atomism of the Anlightenment.
B&t #egel might be p&tting for!ard a m&ch more radical "ie!. #e might be gi"ing &s more than 3&st a semantically sophisticated holistic "ersion of the standard epistemological obser"ation that nat&re sho!s &s a co&ntless n&mber of indi"id&al forms and phenomena$<2 or nat&reNr&ns on into endless detail in all directions.$<< =hen he says' for instance' that )n this motley play of the !orldNthere is no!here a firm footing to be fo&nd'$<4 he might not mean 3&st that !e cant be sure that !hat seems no! to be firm !ont at a later point slip. 4ome of his form&lations s&ggest that he is p&tting for!ard the m&ch stronger claim that the "ery idea of an ade%&ate' stable system of determinate empirical concepts is deeply incoherent. ?n this line' thin*ing that that idea does ma*e sense is 3&st the root mista*e of metametatheoretical attit&de of )erstand. =hat !e m&st realize to mo"e to the standpoint of )ernunft is that !e !ill always and necessarily be led to contradict o&rsel"es by applying determinate concepts correctly+ no matter ho! the !orld happens to be+and that it is in 3&st this fact that the tr&e nat&re of the immediacy' partic&larity' and act&ality re"ealed to &s in e.perience consists. the 0ntinomies are not confined to the fo&r special ob3ects ta*en from Cosmology: they appear in all ob3ects of e"ery *ind' in all conceptions' notions' )deasN.The principles of the metaphysical philosophy ga"e rise to the belief that' !hen cognition lapsed into contradictions' it !as a mere
<2 <<
<4
6EL K22T9. 6EP/ )ntrod&ction' before K24G9. 6AFK22<9.
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accidental aberration' d&e to some s&b3ecti"e mista*e in arg&ment and inference.$<G The proper concl&sion is rather that tho&ght in its "ery nat&re is dialectical' and' as &nderstanding' it m&st fall into contradiction'$<5 or' more alarmingly' that (or anything to be finite is 3&st to s&ppress itself and p&t itself asideNe"erything finite' instead of being stable and &ltimate' is rather changeable and transientN0ll things+that is' the finite !orld as s&ch+are doomed.$<: ?n s&ch a conception' the ine.ha&stible richness of empirical partic&larity essentially manifests itself in the transformation' alteration' and development of determinate concepts that is the process of e.perience.
?n this reading' !hen #egel says of the concrete that the tr&e' th&s in!ardly determinate' has the &rge to de"elop'$<H and that The 7nderstanding' in its pigeon/holing process' *eeps the necessity and the Iotion of the content to itself+all that constit&tes the concreteness' the act&ality' the li"ing mo"ement of the reality !hich it arranges'$<E he means that no concepts !ith fi.ed' determinate bo&ndaries can capt&re ho! things are in a !ay that !ill not t&rn o&t to re%&ire e"ent&al re"ision. The case of the defecti"e concept of acidO s*etched abo"e is not e.ceptional. =e !ill always learn by e.perience that !e meant something other than !hat !e meant to mean'$ and so be obliged to correct o&r meaning$.40 =e are al!ays' and in principle' not 3&st epistemically' b&t semantically in medias res. Coming to &nderstand this is learning to thin* !ith the concept of the tr&e infinite$ of )ernunft' in place of the sp&rio&s infinite$' !hich is the
<G <5 <: <H <E 40
6AF K4H9. 6AFK229. 6AFKH29. Berlin )ntrod&ction ,2H20- to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy ,p. 20 6<296P. DG<9. 6P. D5<9.
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infinite of the &nderstanding$42' identified !ith the perennial o&ght$ and the progress to infinity$42 of )erstand. The difference is a matter of ho! !e understand finite determinateness' and the infinity that it implicitly contains.
This "ie! sho&ld not' ) thin*' be tho&ght of addressed to empirical concepts indi"id&ally or one by one. There is no reason ) cannot sort ob3ects into those that do or do not %&alify as rigid' or as having a mass greater than that of the un. )t is only !hen those classifications are s&itably related+by material incompatibility and material conse%&ence+to other classifications in a s&fficiently large constellation of them' that their necessary instability' their essentially pro"isional character' sho!s itself. The claim is rather abo&t !hole artic&lated systems of claims/and/concepts' do.astic commitments and inferential commitments relating them. 4o the tho&ght in %&estion cannot e"en come into "ie! as an alternati"e &ntil and &nless one has gi"en &p the semantic atomism of #egels predecessors. The idea is that there co&ld in principle be no autonomous practices of applying concepts+a set of practices one co&ld ha"e tho&gh one had no other concept&ally artic&lated ones+that !ill not sho! itself in need of repair in response to non/ inferential ,in #egels terminology immediate$- applications of them to partic&lars. 0nd that is not beca&se those applications are mista#en' by the lights of the practices to !hich they belong. Rather' applications of them that are correct by those lights !ill lead to incompatible commitments.
The idea is that at every stage in the de"elopment of an a&tonomo&s system of empirical concepts there lie ahead do.astic commitments ,applications of concepts in 3&dgmentthat are correct according to the norms then in play and that are incompati"le !ith "ario&s other correct applications of them. 0ny s&fficiently comprehensi"e set of determinate concepts !ill' if applied in practice' res&lt in e!perience' that is' the disco"ery of error re%&iring the s&bse%&ent ad3&stment not only of pre"io&sly &nderta*en 3&dgments' b&t also of the inferential commitments artic&lating them' and therefore of the concepts themsel"es.
The most precise "ersion of s&ch a claim abo&t a distincti"e form of the o&tr&nning of the mediated ,concept&al- by the immediate ,act&al- that ) can come &p !ith is this. Empirical Ine(hausti&ilit) as Strong Conceptual Insta&ilit) ,A)4C)-:
42 42
6 L p. 2<E9. 6 L p. 2429.
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2E
(or any s&fficiently comprehensi"e' potentially a&tonomo&s' inferentially artic&lated system of determinate claims/and/concepts ' there is a partic&lar p in the !orld to !hich the concepts apply and there are concepts $' $0 in 4 s&ch that mediation and immediacy collide in that either: aiin the conte.t of ,i.e. of the collateral commitments it comprises'
both do.astic and inferential-' the applicability of $ to some partic&lar is materially incompati"le !ith the applicability of $0 to it' and aii$ and $0 both immediately ,according to the non/inferential
reporting practices of - apply to pM or biin the conte.t of ,i.e. of the collateral commitments it comprises'
both do.astic and inferential-' the applicability of $ to some partic&lar materially entails the applicability of $0 to it' bii$ does and $0 does not immediately ,according to the non/ and
inferential reporting practices of - apply to p. )t is' of co&rse' contingent !hether !e !o&ld e"er' in p&rs&ing the practices of that system of claims/and/concepts' r&n across the fatal partic&lar' and !hether if so !e !o&ld in fact confront it !ith the rele"ant concepts. B&t !hat is not contingent' on the line being considered' is that the partic&lars and concepts that !o&ld sho! the inade%&acy of the concept&al scheme are o&t there' a!aiting disco"ery. =hat ma*es the concepts that play roles in the concept&al scheme determinate is that they incorporate feat&res of
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ho! the !orld really is+!hat follo!s from !hat and !hat is incompatible !ith !hat. They come to do that by a process of e!perience' that is' of error' of the sort e.emplified by the story abo&t the defecti"e concept acidO' and characterized by the A)4C) principle 3&st form&lated. The empirical !orld is concept&ally ine.ha&stible in the sense that there is al!ays more e.perience of that sort to be had' more of the !orld to be incorporated into o&r determinate concepts by the e.perience of error. (or the notion does not' as &nderstanding s&pposes' stand still in its o!n immobility. )t is rather an infinite form' of bo&ndless acti"ity.$4<
)n the botanization ) ha"e been s&ggesting' this distincti"e #egelian "ie! is denominated strong semantic pessimism.$ )t is a form of pessimism rather than merely modesty or falli"ilism beca&se it concerns error' rather than ignorance or uncertainty+ incorrectness' not 3&st incompleteness. )t is semantic rather than epistemic' in that it concerns concepts and their contents' rather than ,udgments and their truth. )t is strong rather than wea# beca&se the defect it alleges is necessary and in principle' not 3&st contingent and in practice. ?ne might prefer to call the "ie! strong concept&al dynamism'$ since it is not pessimistic in the sense of denying &s access to something that !e either need or co&ld ha"e. B&t )ll stic* to the other terminology for this manifestation of #egels Romantic e.pressi"ism.
) thin* this strong semantic pessimism is at the "ery core of the reconcept&alization of concept&alization that #egel in"o*es &nder the heading of J)ernunft+and !hich it is' on my "ie!' the tas* of the Fogic' the st&dy of the form determinations of the Concept$'
4<
6AFK2559.
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to ma*e e.plicit. ?ne of the essential' defining feat&res of )erstand' the traditional standpoint that #egel means to lead &s beyond' is its commitment to the possibility in principle of a set of empirical concepts that is ideally ade%&ate in that no co&rse of e.perience !o&ld e"er oblige &s to modify those concepts' as in%&iry !ent abo&t fallibly and re"isably sorting 3&dgments res&lting from the application of those concepts into tr&e ones and false ones. ,=hether !e co&ld e"er be s&re !e had hit &pon s&ch a set of concepts doesnt matter for this tho&ght-. A"en on the !ea*er reading' #egel is &rging+ on the basis of a holist ,beca&se inferentialist/incompatibilist-' recognizably P&inean' rethin*ing of the relation bet!een 3&dgments and concepts' bet!een epistemic assessments of tr&th and the semantic contents of concepts+that cogniti"e progress m&st be tho&ght of not 3&st as ma*ing more tr&e and fe!er false 3&dgments' b&t also as grooming and impro"ing o&r concepts' that epistemic progress m&st also be concept&al progress. ?n the stronger reading he is ma*ing a far more radical and interesting claim: that a proper appreciation of empirical ine.ha&stibility+of the !ay in !hich immediate ,non/inferential- presentations of sens&o&sly a"ailable partic&lars necessarily o&tr&n attempts to capt&re them in tho&ght+m&st ta*e the form not 3&st of the incompletability of the pro3ect of e.pressing them f&lly in 3&dgments' b&t f&rther of the collecti"e instability of any set of concepts !e might employ in an attempt to do so. ) ha"e here said ne.t to nothing abo&t the cr&cial %&estion of !hy one might endorse a "ie! of this sort' and ho! it might be 3&stified.44 Dy concern in the present conte.t has been 3&st to get it on the table.
44
8&rs&ing this point !o&ld re%&ire going more deeply into ho! things stand bet!een the ob3ecti"e relation of incompatibility side of the concept of negati"ity and the s&b3ecti"e mo"ement of e.perience side of it' and their relations to the mo"ement of &nderstanding of relations of incompatibility that #egel calls tra"ersing the moments.$ 4ome of the ra! materials for s&ch an enterprise are presented in #olism and )dealismN$' op. cit.. 4;5;2024
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'II. Truth+ $eterminateness+ and Skepticism
?ne might thin* that strong semantic pessimism in this sense !o&ld straightfor!ardly entail epistemological s#epticism. 8erhaps s&rprisingly' it does not. The point is an important one' beca&se #egel is clear thro&gho&t his !ritings that he not only does not consider himself a s*eptic' b&t that he considers a"oiding s*epticism a principal criterion of ade%&acy of philosophical tho&ght. 0ppreciation of the !ay tho&ght ad"ances by &nco"ering contradictions is not to be a !ay of despair$.4G B&t !hy not> )t seems no help on this point to say that determinate negations lead to positi"e res&lts' if e"ery one of those positi"e res&lts in t&rn leads to f&rther determinate negations: materially incompatible commitments. A"en !hat has been called the fallibilist metaind&ction$+ that since all o&r prior theories ha"e t&rned o&t to be false' !e o&ght to e.pect all o&r f&t&re ones to do the same+has been tho&ght a co&nsel of despair. 0nd #egels semantic pessimism is far stronger and more principled ,it is an a priori claim abo&t &ltimate intelligibility-.
)ndeed' holism raises the s*eptical sta*es s&bstantially' e"en for the !ea*er form of semantic pessimism. (or if getting the right concepts depends on getting the inferences right' and getting the inferences right depends on ha"ing all and only tr&e 3&dgments as a&.iliary hypotheses' then the correctness of o&r inferences is held hostage not only to the correctness of o&r 3&dgments ,bro&ght into %&estion already by epistemic fallibilism-' b&t to their completeness ,bro&ght into %&estion by already by traditional !ays of &nderstanding the concept&al ine.ha&stibility of the empirical-' gi"en the non/monotonicity of m&ltipremise material inferences. 0nd concepts that are incorrect in the sense that their contents incorporate incorrect inferences+concepts li*e the defecti"e acidO+are not literally tr&e of anything' and so not fit for framing any tr&e gro&nd/le"el 3&dgments. Th&s' someone !ho does not accept a great deal of 0ristotles !orld/"ie! cannot accept that there are any things that ha"e all and only the properties he attrib&ted to' say' "rains' as inseparable parts of organisms' and so o&ght to deny that' strictly spea*ing' he !o&ld ha"e been saying something true !hen he said that he had t!o hands ,not beca&se he doesnt ha"e t!o of something' b&t beca&se nobody co&ld' strictly spea*ing' ha"e any of !hat he meant by JUVWX+3&st as there arent any !itches' e"en tho&gh there !ere people !ho !ere called J!itch-. The strong semantic pessimist goes on to claim that all s&fficiently comprehensi"e concept&al schemes contain concepts li*e this' and since the rest are inferentially related to them' the rot can hardly be contained. 45 =hy isnt this not only a s*eptical res&lt+b&t !orse' the endorsement of a partic&larly "ir&lent sort of semantic s*epticism>
4G
6P. D::9.
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2004 Robert B. Brandom Epistemological s*epticism may then appear as only one of the milder and more benign conse%&ences of s&ch a "ie!. (or not only o&r possession of #nowledge b&t the intelligibility of the notion of true 3&dgment seems to be r&led o&t' along !ith e"en the intelligibility of the "ery idea that o&r tho&ghts ha"e determinate contents.
)n fact' #egels affirmation of the necessary instability of empirical concepts is compatible !ith his ma*ing sense both of the determinateness of concepts and of empirical truth and #nowledge. B&t sec&ring that compatibility re%&ires radically reconstr&ing the concepts of determinateness' and tr&th. ?ne cr&cial element of that reconstr&al is that determinateness m&st no longer by tho&ght of as a property an indi"id&al empirical concept can ha"e all on its o!n ,as' for instance' determinateness is on its (regean constr&al as the possession of sharp bo&ndaries of appropriate application or e.tension-' apart from its synchronic inferential relations to other s&ch concepts and apart from its diachronic de"elopmental relations to its predecessors and s&ccessors in a progressi"e tradition bo&nd together by e.periential transformations of a holistic system of claims/and/concepts. 0nd the loc&s and &nit of truth ,and so of *no!ledge- can no longer be identified as the ,udgment.
4o ho! sho&ld !e thin* abo&t tr&th> The pre"io&s disc&ssion has p&t &s in a position to read a famo&s passage from the 8reface of the Phenomenology ,some bits of !hich ha"e already been %&oted-: This tr&th therefore incl&des the negati"e also' !hat !o&ld be called the false' if it co&ld be regarded as something from !hich one might abstract. The e"anescent itself m&st' on the contrary' be regarded as essential' not in
45
) thin* #egel does endorse something li*e this line of tho&ght' b&t only as half the story. )n one sense' all of o&r determinate 3&dgments are false' and all of o&r actions are fail&res. B&t in another sense' all those 3&dgments are tr&e and all those actions s&ccessf&l. To &nderstand #egels concept of determinateness re%&ires &nderstanding the relations bet!een the t!o perspecti"es. B&t thats another story. 4;5;2024
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the determination of something fi.ed'4: c&t off from the Tr&e' and left lying !ho *no!s !here o&tside it' any more than the Tr&e is to be regarded as something on the other side' positi"e and dead. 0ppearance is the arising and passing a!ay that does not itself arise and pass a!ay' b&t is Yin itselfY' and constit&tes the act&ality and the mo"ement of the life of tr&th. The True is thus a "ast ,acchanalian re"el %ith not a soul so&eryet beca&se each member collapses as soon as he drops o&t' the re"el is 3&st as m&ch transparent and simple repose. R&dged in the co&rt of this mo"ement' the single shapes of 4pirit do not persist any more than determinate tho&ghts do' b&t they are as m&ch positi"e and necessary moments' as they are negati"e and e"anescent. )n the !hole of the mo"ement' seen as a state of repose' !hat disting&ishes itself therein' and gi"es itself partic&lar e.istence' is preser"ed as something that recollects itself' !hose e.istence is self/*no!ledge' and !hose self/*no!ledge is 3&st as immediately e.istence.4H This passage directly addresses' not the de"elopment of determinate empirical concepts' b&t of the shapes of 4pirit$' !hich are str&ct&red by metatheoretic idioms for ma*ing sense of !hat is going on at the gro&nd le"el of applying ordinary concepts in 3&dgment and action. B&t ) !ant to s&ggest' as the pen&ltimate sentence perhaps confirms' that !hat is said here abo&t philosophical
4: 4H
nicht in der Bestimm&ng eines (estenN$ 6P. D4:9. ) ha"e ad3&sted the translation some!hat' in part o&t of admiration for Baillies memorable rendering of the *ey passage: @as =ahre ist so der bacchantische Ta&mel' an dem *ein Llied nicht tr&n*en istM &nd !eil 3edes' indem es sich absondert' ebenso &nmittelbar 6sich9 a&flCst' ist er ebenso die d&rchsichtige &nd einfache R&he.$ 4;5;2024
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concepts and the practices they are embedded in applies also at the gro&nd le"el. ,) !ill ha"e something more e.plicit to say abo&t this parallel belo!.-
Tr&th is tho&ght of here not as a special' desirable property of 3&dgments' b&t as a distincti"e sort of process of transforming concepts ,and so' 3&dgments-. )t is the conception that goes along !ith the shift from thin*ing of e.perience as a *ind of self/correcting process ,Arfahr&ng- rather than as a *ind of self/intimating episode ,Arlebnis-. To &nderstand tr&th this !ay' !e m&st &nderstand the mo"ement of the life of tr&th$' !hich is its act&ality' and not loo* for something that is determinate in the sense of being fi.ed or static. Rather' tr&th is to be fo&nd in the !ay in !hich s&ccessor concepts concretely improve &pon their predecessors. )n this sort of e.pressi"ely progressi"e process' the e"anescent 6das Qersch!indende' !hat disappears9' !hat sho!s itself to be cogniti"ely incorrect' not only 3&dgments fo&nd to be false' b&t concepts fo&nd to be inade%&ate' is an essential element. That each indi"id&al commitment' do.astic or inferential' e"ent&ally sho!s itself to be an appearance that m&st &ltimately be re3ected is the e.perience of error' finding oneself !ith commitments that are incompatible by ones o!n lights' that is the motor of the tr&th/process. Tr&th is not a matter of getting things right ,once and for all-' b&t of getting things righter ,at e"ery stage-. #egels strong semantic pessimism' his concept&al dynamism' means that tr&th for him is a *ind of progress' something yo& ma*e' rather than something yo& ha"e+a feat&re first of !hat yo& are doing' and only deri"ati"ely of !hat yo& ha"e done. 0nd the comparati"es in"ol"ed in the assessments of concept&al
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progress do not ta*e absol&tes in 7ngers sense+to &se his homey e.amples' they are not li*e flatter than$' !hich can be paraphrased as more nearly perfectly flat$' b&t li*e b&mpier than$' !hich cannot be paraphrased as more nearly perfectly b&mpy$.4E
The Bacchanalian re"el$ is an image for the li"ely interactions of concepts and claims ,!hich are applications of those concepts-' as each ne! commitment alters its relations to each other. Their dr&n*enness signifies the !ea"ing tra3ectories that res&lt from those interactions' the impossibility of any members e.ec&ting a prior plan for consec&ti"e mo"ements' the restless' &nintentional elbo!ings of one another that contrib&te to the res&lting' &npredictable e"ol&tion of the !hole company. The integrity of the ongoing affair is maintained' ho!e"er' for as soon as one participant has fallen e.ha&sted and immobile beneath the table' beyond f&rther participation+a concept sho!ing itself inade%&ate and &ns&stainable' the commitments it incorporates accordingly dissol"ing+its place is ta*en by another' fresher re"eler bringing rene!ed ,tho&gh still temporary- "igor to the fete. Roining' s&staining' and lea"ing the animated con"ersation is the arising and passing a!ay that does not itself arise and pass a!ay' b&tN constit&tes the act&ality and the mo"ement of the life$ of the party. The Concept' li*e an organism' is not to be identified !ith its constit&ents at some time/slice of its career' b&t !ith the process by !hich those elements fall a!ay and are replaced.
4E
The fact that Jflat and Jb&mpy are complementary contradictory predicates+!ith flat ,to a certain degree- entailing not "umpy ,to a corresponding degree- and vice versa+sho!s ho! delicate the iss&e of the absol&teness of comparati"es is. 4ee 8eter 7nger (gnorance 6ref.9 4;5;2024
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2004 Robert B. Brandom 0nything intelligible as a truth/process' as a cognitive process' or process of #nowing ,not no! to be identified !ith )erstands conception of the settled achie"ement of tr&th or *no!ledge- m&st sho! itself to be responsi"e to ho! things ob3ecti"ely are. The process of e.perience is so responsi"e' since *no!ers engaged in it respond to the ac*no!ledgment of error+finding themsel"es !ith incompatible commitments+by read3&sting and repairing the discordant concepts that led to the contradiction of inferentially deri"ed commitments carrying the a&thority of mediation by non/inferentially ac%&ired commitments carrying the a&thority of immediacy' in s&ch a !ay as to eliminate or a"oid the incompatibility. )ndi"id&al commitments co&nt as being 3&dged in the co&rt of this mo"ement$ of e.perience' as capt&ring or not capt&ring ho! things ob3ecti"ely are. Common &nderstanding' too' is a becoming' and as this becoming' it is reasonableness.$ G0 (&rther'
to %&alify as cogniti"e' as a practice of *no!ing' as tr&th/re"ealing or
tr&th/e.pressing' s&ch a process m&st also sho! itself to be a progress. The responsi"eness to the immediate being of things m&st not be random' des&ltory' or circ&lar' b&t cumulatively re"elatory. #o!e"er meandering the progress might be' some impro"ing grip on ho! things are m&st be "isible as grad&ally emerging. #o! this dimension of normati"e assessment of e.perience is to be &nderstood is a long story' and ) am obliged to be r&thlessly short !ith it here. (or #egel the e!pressive progressiveness of the process of e.perience is something that in principle is only "isible retrospectively. The process m&st be recollected ,by a J=iederhol&ng-' that is rationally reconstr&cted as the progressi"e re"elation+ the ma*ing e.plicit+of concept&al contents that then appear as ha"ing been all along implicitly in play. 0 paradigmatic case is !here some concept/constit&ti"e inference+say' )f ) stri*e this dry' !ell/made match' it !ill probably light'$ !hich might be partially constit&ti"e of !ell/made as applied in this conte.t+ !as modally rob&st &nder a relati"ely restricted range of circ&mstances' and then is &pdated by ha"ing one of the ,!hat then becomes retrospecti"ely "isible asimplicit restrictions made e.plicit in the form of a collateral premise in a s&ccessor inference ,and hence concept-: )f ) stri*e this dry' !ell/made match in
G0
6P. DGG9.
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the absence of a strong magnetic field' it !ill probably light.$ 4ince this inference remains good &nder a !ider range of co&nterfact&al sit&ations ,i.e. !hen con3oined !ith a !ider range of collateral premises' tr&e or false-' it better e.presses !hat ob3ecti"ely follo!s from !hat' and the concepts that it in part artic&lates are more correct than their predecessors.G2
(rom s&ch a retrospecti"e' recollecti"e' rationally reconstr&cti"e point of "ie!' a process of e.perience that sho!s &p as e.pressi"ely progressi"e is at the same time one in !hich the contents of the concepts de"eloping in it are determined' i.e. become more determinate- ?nce again' this comparati"e is not to be &nderstood as admitting an absol&te reading' so not as paraphrasable as more nearly perfectly ,f&lly' &nimpro"ably' &nre"isably- determinate.$ (or that absol&te notion of determinateness is an ill&sion characteristic of the defecti"e metacategories of )erstand. Dore and more of ho! the !orld ob3ecti"ely is ,!hat really follo!s from !hat' !hat properties or claims are really incompatible-' constraining the process of e.perience thro&gh the deli"erances of sens&o&s immediacy ,i.e. non/inferentially ac%&ired 3&dgments-' is incorporated at each stage into the mediated ,that is' artic&lated by inferential and incompatibility relations- contents of empirical concepts. The philosophical standpoint of
G2
#egels most helpf&l disc&ssion of this sort of retrospecti"e constit&tion of an e.pressi"ely progressi"e tra3ectory thro&gh a tradition is in the closing paragraphs of the (ntroduction to the Phenomenology' !here he tal*s abo&t the emergence in e.perience of a second' ne!' tr&e ob3ect$ from a first ob3ect that then sho!s &p as ha"ing been a mere appearance of the second. )t is in terms of this process that !e are to &nderstand ho! a distinction bet!een no&mena and phenomena can arise within a se%&ence of phenomena' and ho! the concept of referents or representeds' !hat !e are tal*ing or thin*ing a"out' can arise from a se%&ence of senses or ,!hat then sho! &p as- representings' !hat !e are saying or thin*ing ,as it t&rns o&t' abo&t them-. Faying o&t a reading of those dar* b&t pregnant passages along these lines is a tas* that m&st a!ait another occasion' ho!e"er. 4;5;2024
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)ernunft see*s to do all of the philosophical !or* for !hich )erstand called on a notion of a once/and/for/all achie"able property of determinateness of empirical concept&al content+at least all of that philosophical !or* that is "al&able and !orth doing+by appealing instead to the concept of a process of empirical determining of concept&al content that is comparati"ely assessable+in a mo"e formally parallel to that !e ha"e already seen enacted for the concept of tr&th. ?n this "ie!' determinateness+li*e tr&th and *no!ledge of ho! things ob3ecti"ely are+is a concept !ith real and important applicationM the *ind of normati"e assessment it codifies is not dissol"ed in a corrosi"e anything/goes s*eptical so&p. ,#egels image is the night in !hich all co!s are blac*.$- B&t it has become a diachronic' f&nctional concept' applicable only in "irt&e of the role a concept plays in an e.pressi"ely progressi"e tradition: the !ay it de"elops' in concert !ith its fello!s' thro&gh e.perience. This is a temporal' or better' historical semantic f&nctionalism ,and therefore' a *ind of holism-' in addition to the inferential semantic f&nctionalism ,and therefore holism-' !e ha"e already considered.G2 'III. Wiederholung: Vernunft.s Epistemolog) of Semantics
That' in "ery broad terms' is ho! ) thin* #egel a"oids ha"ing his strong semantic pessimism collapse into s*epticism. Before lea"ing the disc&ssion of #egels "ie! of the proper !ay to &nderstand the nat&re and f&nctioning of ordinary empirical concepts ,incl&ding those of the nat&ral sciences-' ) !ant to e.tract one more important conse%&ence from his approach. 0s indicated in 4ection )))
G2
0 f&ller disc&ssion of this iss&e can be fo&nd in 4ome 8ragmatist ThemesN$' op. cit..
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abo"e' #egel thin*s that his )ernunft acco&nt of the metaphysics of semantics has important conse%&ences for the epistemology of semantics+that is' for ho! !e thin* abo&t !hat it is to grasp' convey' or communicate concept&al contents. The t!o orthogonal dimensions of #egels semantic holism+the inferential and the historical+together p&t se"ere constraints on ho! !e can thin* abo&t those iss&es.
(or concept&al contents as #egel concei"es them cannot be specified or con"eyed by definitions of the sort Bant deploys thro&gho&t his !or*: "erbal form&lations disting&ishing the concept from all others by a set of necessary and s&fficient mar*s.G<
0s a ro&gh e.ample for a s&bstanti"e concept' he offers a definition of "irt&e: a readiness in la!f&l actions that are done freely' combined !ith moral strength in p&rs&it of these !ith str&ggle against obstacles.G4
The tro&ble !ith these from the point of "ie! of the #egelian semantics is that they p&rport to fi. the content of one concept by appealing to other concepts+ those artic&lating the constit&ent mar*s+that m&st be s&pposed to ha"e achie"ed f&ll and final determinateness' fi.ing their bo&ndaries once and for all. 0nd that pict&re' characteristic of the metaconception of concepts of )erstand' is 3&st !hat the metaconception of )ernunft ass&res &s !e cannot ha"e.
Ior co&ld one insist that at least the relation bet!een' say' "irt&e and the mar* of str&ggle against obstacles might be constant' e"en as the contents of those concepts e"ol"ed thro&gh a co&rse of e.perience. (or s&ch co&nterfact&al/s&pporting inferential relations m&st themsel"es be constantly assessed as candidates for possible re"ision in response to recalcitrant e.perience' along !ith all the rest. ,=o&ld any and e"ery possible gro&nd for relin%&ishing the mar* of str&ggle against obstacles really 3&st be !arranting a change of s&b3ect from that of "irt&e>- This is' once again' a P&inean point: once they ha"e ser"ed their p&rpose of introd&cing a concept' definitions
G<
This definition of definition is offered in each of the "ersions of his Logic that !e ha"e. 4ee for instance the @ohna/=&ndlac*en Fogic' p. 4HE in Bants Lectures on Logic R. Dichael Zo&ng ,ed.' trans.-' 6Cambridge 7. 8ress2EE29. G4 )bid. pp. 454/45G. 4;5;2024
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2004 Robert B. Brandom ta*e their place alongside other 3&dgments in !hich it is applied' !ith at best a pres&mption against re"ision that remains defeasible and ref&table. Ior is it any help for this diffic&lty to retreat from Bantian/Feibnizian definitions to !hat Bant calls Jdescriptions: more s&b3ecti"e' p&rpose/relati"e specifications of a concept that hope to con"ey the content to another by offering mar*s that are neither necessary nor s&fficient' b&t only s&ggesti"ely associated. GG The tro&bles !ith the mar*s themsel"es' and !ith their association !ith the concept being e.plained' remain. (or the root of the diffic&lty is the conception of !hat is con"eyed: something that has complete' precise' disting&ishing mar*s.G5
4o if these sorts of tellings !ont do' ho! are concept&al contents to be &nderstood' specified' and con"eyed> @oes the metaconcept&al perspecti"e of )ernunft condemn &s to some sort of mere showing of !hat cannot be said> Iot at all. )ernunfts distincti"e form of content/delimiting saying is a &iederholung: a rationally reconstr&cted genealogy' !hich e.hibits the c&rrent f&nctional role played by the concept in a larger cogniti"e constellation artic&lated by relations of material incompatibility and material inference as the o&tcome of an e.pressi"ely progressi"e process of de"elopment. Typically' this is a matter of tracing a caref&lly selected tra3ectory thro&gh the act&al history of the concept' by selecting inde. episodes of e.perientially/dri"en re"ision and refinement of the concept' each of !hich re"eals+from the "ie!point of the so/far/finally achie"ed conception' some important aspect of concept&al content being con"eyed. =here the act&al history is too conf&sed' incoherent' or fitf&l' !here too many steps are retraced' lessons lost' or blind alleys o"er/thoro&ghly e.plored' ho!e"er' a cleaner' clearer path may be indicated' !hereby the act&al content could ha"e de"eloped' tho&gh in fact things didnt happen that !ay. #egels o!n acco&nts of the contents of s&bstanti"e concepts' in the Realphilosophie' ta*e the shape of one of these t!o species of rationally reconstr&cted recollection.
GG G5
A.g. at p. 4E2' ibid. Cf. p. 4HE' ibid.
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2004 Robert B. Brandom 0s e.amples' one might thin* of the narrati"e !hose e"ent&ally re"ealed hero is the concept of animal organism in the Encyclopedia 8hilosophy of Iat&re ,or the related disc&ssion of the organic in the 1"serving Reason section of the Phenomenology-' the presentation of memory in the Encyclopedia 8hilosophy of Dind' the treatment of the s&blime in the first "ol&me of the Lectures on Aesthetics' or of the epic in the second "ol&me' or of the religion of bea&ty in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion' or the genealogical e.planation of the concepts of property and contract in the Philosophy of Right.
(or #egel' ) ha"e claimed' the determinate content of ordinary' gro&nd/le"el' empirical concepts' incl&ding those of the nat&ral sciences' consist in the relations of material incompatibility and material conse%&ence they stand in to other s&ch concepts' and to a set of 3&dgments that are endorsed applications of them' on the one hand' and the f&nctional role they play in a progressi"e' e.pressi"e/ de"elopmental se%&ence or tradition of s&ch constellations of claims/and/ concepts' both earlier and later' on the other. )f that acco&nt of the nat&re of determinate concept&al content is correct' then the only !ay to grasp' specify' or comm&nicate s&ch contents is by placing them in s&ch a synchronic and diachronic conte.t. )nsofar as the !hole is only s*etched' the concept&al content of the f&nctional component in %&estion !ill be only appro.imately delimited. I/. Logical Concepts Compared to Empirical 0nes+ !etaph)sicall) and Epistemologicall): a $ifference and a Similarit)
) ha"e gone on at some length abo&t ho! ) see #egel thin*ing abo&t gro&nd/le"el empirical concepts both beca&se this is the semantic iss&e abo&t !hich ) thin* he has the most to teach &s today and beca&se these "ie!s are m&ch less familiar and less disc&ssed' and the attrib&tion of them is accordingly bo&nd to be more contro"ersial' than is the case for his treatments of logical concepts. B&t the larger point !as to moti"ate a partic&lar program for a critical reading of #egel by
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comparing and constrasting his "ie!s abo&t ordinary empirical concepts !ith his "ie!s abo&t his o!n philosophical and logical ones. 0s ) indicated abo"e' ) ta*e it that #egels distincti"ely philosophical' logical' or spec&lati"e ,a translation common in Anglish "ersions of #egel for his begreifende$- concepts+incl&ding the form determinations of the Concept$ !ith !hich the cience of Logic is principally concerned+ha"e a characteristic e.pressi"e role that is %&ite different from that of ordinary' nonphilosophical concepts. Their 3ob is not to ma*e e.plicit ho! the world is ,to s&bser"e a f&nction of conscio&sness- b&t rather to ma*e e.plicit the process of ma*ing e.plicit ho! the !orld is ,to enable and embody a *ind of self/conscio&sness-. )f ) am right in attrib&ting to #egel the constellation of "ie!s abo&t the metaphysics and epistemology of the semantics of determinate concepts ) s*etched in the body of this paper+strong semantic pessimism as the e.pression of a constr&al of empirical ine.ha&stibility as necessary concept&al instability' and recollection as the only ade%&ate form of specification of the contents of determinate concepts' respecti"ely+then perhaps one reason these "ie!s ha"e not been m&ch remar*ed on by #egels readers is that !hat he act&ally tal*s abo&t in his official systematic !or*s' the cience of Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind' is e.cl&si"ely his distincti"e philosophical concepts. (&rthermore' #egels "ie!s abo&t the contents of concepts at one le"el cannot straightfor!ardly be carried o"er to the concepts proper to the other le"el.
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4pecifically' ) thin* that #egel thin*s that logical concepts are different from gro&nd/le"el concepts in one important respect' and li*e them in another. They are unli#e determinate empirical concepts in that #egel thin*s that there can' indeed must be a final' f&lly e.pressi"ely ade%&ate set of logical concepts' !hose application in practice !ill ne"er oblige their &sers to re"ise or relin%&ish them. #e is a strong semantic optimist abo&t logical concepts. )ndeed' he thin*s that in his Logic' he has presented s&ch a system of logical concepts. =hat his logical concepts are ade%&ate for is 3&st ma*ing e.plicit the process by !hich determinate content is conferred on or incorporated in the gro&nd/le"el empirical and practical concepts that artic&late o&r conscio&sness of ho! things are: the process of determining concept&al content thro&gh e.perience. Being able to deploy those logical' so metaconcept&al' e.pressi"e reso&rces #egel has de"eloped o&t of the ra! materials he inherited from the philosophical tradition is achie"ing a certain *ind of semantic self/conscio&sness. )t e.ercising a capacity' engendered by the &se of his logical "ocab&lary' to say and thin# e.plicitly !hat one has all along implicitly been doing in saying and thin*ing anything at all+namely' determining content' incorporating immediacy in the form of mediation' by engaging in a process of concept/re"ision thro&gh e.perience. This is the sort of self/ conscio&sness #egel calls 0bsol&te Bno!ledge.$ 0s ) indicated abo"e' ) thin* there is no reason !hatsoe"er to thin* that #egel e"er belie"ed that the achie"ement of the sort of self/conscio&sness abo&t that process of e.perience made possible by his logical and systematic philosophical
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"ocab&lary+that is' attaining 0bsol&te Bno!ledge+meant that empirical in%&iry' disco"ery' and theorizing !o&ld come to an end.
?n the contrary. 0ltho&gh being able to bring o&t into the self/conscio&s light of day !hat one had pre"io&sly been obliged to do in the dar* may transform empirical in%&iry in "ario&s !ays' it does not bring to an end the enterprise of grooming and transforming o&r claims/and/concepts in the light of the deli"erances of sens&o&s immediacy.
Arfahr&ng+the re"elation of !hat one had ta*en to be tr&e as mere appearance+ is the passing a!ay that does not itself pass a!ay. 0ny impression to the contrary is the res&lt of conf&sing the t!o le"els of concepts. (or the logical enterprise of crafting e.pressi"e reso&rces s&fficient to ma*e e.plicit the cr&cial feat&res of the empirical enterprise can' must' and #egel thin*s' essentially has come to an end !ith a f&lly and finally ade%&ate system of concepts:
!ith !hat for that reason sho&ld not be called Jhis logic or philosophical system' b&t simply Jthe logic or system.
4o #egel thin*s that empirical and logical concepts are as different as they co&ld be !ith respect to the possibility of achie"ing a final' &nre"isable' f&lly ade%&ate system of them. That is not in principle possible for empirical concepts' b&t is possible both in principle and in practice' for logical or philosophical concepts. B&t there is another respect in !hich #egels practice sho!s &s he belie"es logical concepts are li*e empirical ones. )t concerns not the metaphysics of their content' b&t its epistemology. (or #egel clearly ta*es it that the only !ay it is possible' in principle' to &nderstand' specify' or con"ey logical or philosophical concepts is by rational reconstr&ction of an e.pressi"ely progressi"e tradition of !hich they are the prod&ct. Both of the !or*s in !hich he presents his systematic tho&ght+the only t!o boo*s he p&blished d&ring his lifetime+ha"e this form. They are semantic genealogies of spec&lati"e logical concepts.
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Th&s in the Phenomenology he selects from the act&al history of the de"elopment of philosophical concepts a se%&ence of transformations each of !hich can be seen' retrospecti"ely' as concept&ally epoch/ma*ing' and as c&m&lati"ely determining and re"ealing to &s the systematic idiom+the constellation of philosophical claims/and/concepts+!hose &se is the final form of semantic self/ conscio&sness he calls 0bsol&te Bno!ledge.$ )n the Logic' !hat is essentially the same systemG: is presented as the c&lmination of a co&rse of de"elopment that begins !ith the "ery simplest form/determinations of concepts+metaconcepts codifying a semantic self/conscio&sness so r&dimentary that !itho&t it no concept/&se at all is intelligible at the gro&nd le"el+and progresses in a tra3ectory that does not at all pretend to trac* or be dra!n from the empirical/historical tradition of tho&ght by !hich the systematic concepts act&ally de"eloped.
The &iederholung presented in the Logic is s&bstantially more retrospecti"ely reconstr&cted' and hence more rational in the sense of more reason/re"ealing' than is that of the Phenomenology. B&t for both'
#egel clearly belie"es that the only !ay to come to occ&py the cogniti"e position he finally arri"es at is by going thro&gh the concept&al process and progress to !hich the long e.positions of those !or*s are g&ides. )t is no &se 3&mping ahead to pee* at the ending and see ho! the boo*s come o&t.
)t sho&ld be remar*ed also' by !ay of %&alification of the claim to discern a similarity in the treatment of logical and empirical concepts' that e"en along the dimension of the epistemology of their semantics' the similarity cannot be ta*en to be an identity. (or the process recollected in the case of the logical concepts is not ,in either of its "ersions- one of determination "y incorporation of immediacy' as it is in the case of empirical concepts. )n the logical case the transformati"e Arfahr&ng that is rehearsed in the t!o boo*s is rather moti"ated !holly by considerations that sho! &p retrospecti"ely as ha"ing al!ays already been implicit in the contents of the ,meta-concepts already in play.
/. Conclusion: Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel

G:
4o ) claimM of co&rse this is contro"ersial.
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) !ant to concl&de by s*etching my program for a critical reading of these #egelian theses.
) ta*e it that reading a te.t for its concept&al content is e.ploring the inferential roles of its claims: determining !hat one !o&ld be committing oneself to by &nderta*ing s&ch claims' and !hat might entitle one to s&ch commitments' !hat !o&ld be e"idence for and against them' and !hat they !o&ld be e"idence for or against. The inferences in %&estion are typically ,sometimes' massi"ely- m&ltipremise inferences. That means that for each claim one has identified as central or f&ndamental' there is a choice possible as to the so&rce from !hich one dra!s the a&.iliary hypotheses' !ith !hich it is to be con3oined in determining its inferential role. 0 close or de dicto reading ,!hat in 3&rispr&dence is called a blac* letter$ interpretation-' restricts the a"ailable collateral premises to other claims made in the te.t ,or corp&s- in %&estion. 0 critical or de re reading' ho!e"er' finds its a&.iliary hypotheses' not in claims attrib&ted to the a&thor being read' b&t rather in those endorsed by the one doing the reading+not from !hat else the a&thor ta#es to be tr&e' b&t from !hat is tr&e' according to the reader. The res&lt is an assessment of !hat really follo!s from and !o&ld be e"idence for the claims in %&estion' !hate"er the a&thor may ha"e tho&ght. ) dont thin* that one or the other of these !ays of approaching a te.t' for instance' a philosophical one' is better$ than the other. Aach offers a legitimate perspecti"es on the concept&al content' that is' the inferential role' of the claims made in a te.t' and each pro"ides a distincti"e sort of ill&mination of the te.t it addresses. 4o long as it is clear !hich set of r&les one is binding oneself by' neither enterprise sho&ld be tho&ght ob3ectionable in principle. 4&ch' at any rate' is the hermene&tic methodology my inferentialist semantics &nder!rites. GH The program ) am s*etching aims at a critical reading.
) ha"e no! p&t myself in a position to say rather economically !hat ) propose to *eep and !hat ) propose to emend in #egels philosophy. The res&lts of my ,"ery selecti"ely foc&sed- e.ercise in comparing and contrasting #egels "ie!s abo&t empirical and logical concepts can be form&lated in t!o claims: 2. #egel thin*s logical concepts are different from empirical concepts in that beca&se of the difference bet!een their characteristic e.pressi"e tas*s' !hile there can for reasons of deep principle be no final' stable' e.pressi"ely complete set of empirical concepts' there is a final' stable' e.pressi"ely complete set of logical concepts. 2. #egel thin*s that logical concepts are li#e empirical concepts in that in spite of the difference bet!een their characteristic e.pressi"e tas*s' the only !ay in principle
GH
) disc&ss this connection bet!een hermene&tics and inferentialist semantics in greater detail in Chapter Three of Tales of the Mighty Dead. 4;5;2024
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to &nderstand' specify' or con"ey the contents of both sorts of concepts is by a rational reconstr&ction of a history of their development. The &nderlying claims abo&t the nat&re of empirical concepts seem to me to be among the most interesting and promising of #egels concept&al inno"ations in semantics. 0nd ) also endorse !hat ) &nderstand to be his approach to the %&ite different e.pressi"e role distincti"e of logical or philosophical concepts+the one epitomized in the slogan ,my !ords' not his-: Fogic is the organ of semantic self/conscio&sness.$ B&t ) thin* #egel is !rong in "oth of these claims abo&t the differences and similarities bet!een empirical and logical concepts.
) thin* he is !rong to thin* that !e can e"er finish the tas* of prod&cing e.pressi"e tools to ma*e e.plicit !hat is implicit in the process of determining empirical concept&al content. #e is certainly !rong to thin* that he has already gi"en &s a complete set of inference/codifying concepts. The disc&ssion of the forms of the syllogism in terms of his logical concepts of partic&larity' &ni"ersality' and indi"id&ality in the cience of Logic is a tour de force of theoretical craftsmanship and bea&ty. B&t !e no! *no!' as he co&ld not' that it does not and co&ld not capt&re e"en the simplest forms of inference in"ol"ing iterated %&antifiers' !hich are essential for forming the most basic mathematical concepts. B&t ) also thin* he is !rong e"en to thin* that !e could' in principle' e"en if not in practice' finish the e.pressi"e tas* to !hich logical "ocab&lary is addressed. The simplest inference/codifying loc&tions are conditionals' !hich let one say e.plicitly that some inference or inferential pattern is a good one. B&t !e
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assess the goodness of inferences along many semantically rele"ant dimensions' and different conditionals are needed to capt&re each. Th&s asserting the t!o/ "al&ed ,so/called material$- conditional is e.plicitly saying that it is good in the sense that it !ill not lead from a tr&e premise to a false concl&sion. 0sserting an int&itionistic conditional is e.plicitly saying that it is good in the sense that there is a recipe for t&rning a proof of the premises into a proof of the concl&sion. 0nd so on' for the conditionals of strict implication' rele"ant implication' entailment' %&ant&m logic' and so on. ) dont *no! ho! to ma*e sense of the idea of a complete set of semantically rele"ant dimensions of appraisal of inferences' and hence of conditionals codifying them. #ere ) am inclined rather to a sort of metale"el logical ine.ha&stibility claim: there !ill al!ays be f&rther aspects of the process of ,f&rther- determining the contents of empirical concepts by incorporating immediacy in mediated form.GE
0s to the second claim' e"en if the only !ay to grasp' specify' or con"ey empirical concepts is by &iederholung' by an e.ercise in semantic genealogy' it at least does not follow that that is so also for logical concepts. 0nd it seems to me that it is not so. The semantic e.pressi"e role distincti"e of logical "ocab&lary gi"es &s another !ay of &nderstanding and con"eying them. (or !e can start !ith a pragmatic metalang&age' in !hich !e describe the practices that confer and determine concept&al content' and specify in those terms !hat it is that a partic&lar logical loc&tion ma*es e.plicit' introd&cing it as e.pressing those
GE
Iotice that to say this is not to say that there is anything abo&t that process that in principle cannot be made e.plicit' b&t rather that for any partic&lar set of logical e.pressi"e reso&rces' there !ill al!ays be something still left &nsaid: a claim of the form [' not [. 4;5;2024
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feat&res. This is' not by coincidence' the path ) p&rs&e in Ma#ing (t E!plicit. ) thin* it is possible in principle to say ho! !e sho&ld thin* abo&t disc&rsi"e practice according to the concept&al scheme in place at the end of the Phenomenology and the cience of Logic' without ha"ing to rehearse the e.pository paths by !hich #egel de"elops that scheme for &s.
?f co&rse' a lot of !or* !o&ld ha"e to be done to ma*e o&t these last claims of mine. 0fter all' the "ery best !ay to sho! it is possible to ma*e non/genealogical sense of #egels enterprise is to 3&st to do it. )t !ill no do&bt be a relief to *no! that ) dont propose to la&nch into that pro3ect here. B&t it sho&ld at this point be pretty clear ho! ) propose to car"e off some bits of the #egelian enterprise as !orthy of being p&rs&ed in contemporary terms' !hile discarding others as inessential+!hat ) consider li"ing and !hat dead in #egels &nderstanding of concept&al content.
Bob Brandom 7ni"ersity of 8ittsb&rgh
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2004 Robert B.

Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel:

2004 Robert B. Brandom

thin* it is good methodological ad"ice to see* to &nderstand the

Ancyclopedia Fogic 6ref.9' KHH.

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6ref. to Concepts as )n"ol"ing Fa!s and )nconcei"able =itho&t Them$' in PPP&9

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6EL K22T9. 6EP/ )ntrod&ction' before K24G9. 6AFK22<9.

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'II. Truth+ $eterminateness+ and Skepticism

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to %&alify as cogniti"e' as a practice of *no!ing' as tr&th/re"ealing or

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A.g. at p. 4E2' ibid. Cf. p. 4HE' ibid.

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/. Conclusion: Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel

4o ) claimM of co&rse this is contro"ersial.

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Bob Brandom 7ni"ersity of 8ittsb&rgh

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