Reyes v. CIR In 1993, Maria Tancino died leaving behind an estate worth P32 million.

In 1997, a tax audit was conducted on the estate. Meanwhile, the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 was passed. Eventually in 1998, the estate was issued a final assessment notice (FAN) demanding the estate to pay P14.9 million in taxes inclusive of surcharge and interest; the estates liability was based on Section 229 of the [old] Tax Code. Azucena Reyes, one of the heirs, protested the FAN. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) nevertheless issued a warrant of distraint and/or levy. Reyes again protested the warrant but in March 1999, she offered a compromise and was willing to pay P1 million in taxes. Her offer was denied. She continued to work on another compromise but was eventually denied. The case reached the Court of Tax Appeals where Reyes was also denied. In the Court of Appeals, Reyes received a favorable judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the formal assessment notice is valid. HELD: No. The NIRC of 1997 was already in effect when the FAN was issued. Under Section 228 of the NIRC, taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made: otherwise, the assessment shall be void. In the case at bar, the FAN merely stated the amount of liability to be shouldered by the estate and the law upon which such liability is based. However, the estate was not informed in writing of the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes had been made. The estate was merely informed of the findings of the CIR. Section 228 of the NIRC being remedial in nature can be applied retroactively even though the tax investigation was conducted prior to the laws passage. Consequently, the invalid FAN cannot be a basis of a compromise, any proceeding emanating from the invalid FAN is void including the issuance of the warrant of distraint and/or levy. CIR G.R. No. v. HANTEX 136975. TRADING March CO., 31, INC 2005

Facts: Hantex Trading Co is a company organized under the Philippines. It is engaged in the sale of plastic products, it imports synthetic resin and other chemicals for the manufacture of its products. For this purpose, it is required to file an Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (Consumption Entry) with the Bureau of Customs under Section 1301 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Sometime in October 1989, Lt. Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-Intelligence Division of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received confidential information that the respondent had imported synthetic resin amounting to P115,599,018.00 but only declared P45,538,694.57. Thus, Hentex receive a subpoena to present its books of account which it failed to do. The bureau cannot find any original copies of the products Hentex imported since the originals were eaten by termites. Thus, the Bureau relied on the certified copies of the respondents Profit and Loss Statement for 1987 and 1988 on file with the SEC, the machine copies of the Consumption Entries, Series of 1987, submitted by the informer, as well as excerpts from the entries certified by Tomas and Danganan. The case was submitted to the CTA which ruled that Hentex have tax deficiency and is ordered to pay, per investigation of the Bureau. The CA ruled that the income and sales tax deficiency assessments issued by the petitioner were unlawful and baseless since the copies of the import entries relied upon in computing the deficiency tax of the respondent were not duly authenticated by the public officer charged with their custody, nor verified under oath by the

EIIB and the BIR investigators. Issue: Whether or not the final assessment of the petitioner against the respondent for deficiency income tax and sales tax for the latters 1987 importation of resins and calcium bicarbonate is based on competent evidence and the law. Held: Central to the second issue is Section 16 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended which provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has the power to make assessments and prescribe additional requirements for tax administration and enforcement. Among such powers are those provided in paragraph (b), which provides that Failure to submit required returns, statements, reports and other documents. When a report required by law as a basis for the assessment of any national internal revenue tax shall not be forthcoming within the time fixed by law or regulation or when there is reason to believe that any such report is false, incomplete or erroneous, the Commissioner shall assess the proper tax on the best evidence obtainable. This provision applies when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue undertakes to perform her administrative duty of assessing the proper tax against a taxpayer, to make a return in case of a taxpayers failure to file one, or to amend a return already filed in the BIR. The best evidence envisaged in Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, includes the corporate and accounting records of the taxpayer who is the subject of the assessment process, the accounting records of other taxpayers engaged in the same line of business, including their gross profit and net profit sales. Such evidence also includes data, record, paper, document or any evidence gathered by internal revenue officers from other taxpayers who had personal transactions or from whom the subject taxpayer received any income; and record, data, document and information secured from government offices or agencies, such as the SEC, the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff and Customs Commission. However, the best evidence obtainable under Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended, does not include mere photocopies of records/documents. The petitioner, in making a preliminary and final tax deficiency assessment against a taxpayer, cannot anchor the said assessment on mere machine copies of records/documents. Mere photocopies of the Consumption Entries have no probative weight if offered as proof of the contents thereof. The reason for this is that such copies are mere scraps of paper and are of no probative value as basis for any deficiency income or business taxes against a taxpayer. BASILAN ESTATES, INC. v. CIR G.R. No. L-22492 September 5, 1967 The income tax law does not authorize the depreciation of an asset beyond its acquisition cost. Hence, a deduction over and above such cost cannot be claimed and allowed. The reason is that deductions from gross income are privileges, not matters of right. They are not created by implication but upon clear expression in the law. Facts: Basilan Estates, Inc. claimed deductions for the depreciation of its assets on the basis of their acquisition cost. As of January 1, 1950 it changed the depreciable value of said assets by increasing it to conform with the increase in cost for their replacement. Accordingly, from 1950 to 1953 it deducted from gross income the value of depreciation computed on the reappraised value. CIR disallowed the deductions claimed by petitioner, consequently assessing the latter of deficiency income taxes.

Issue: Whether or not the depreciation shall be determined on the acquisition cost rather than the reappraised value of the assets Held: Yes. The following tax law provision allows a deduction from gross income for depreciation but limits the recovery to the capital invested in the asset being depreciated: (1)In general. A reasonable allowance for deterioration of property arising out of its use or employment in the business or trade, or out of its not being used: Provided, That when the allowance authorized under this subsection shall equal the capital invested by the taxpayer . . . no further allowance shall be made. . . . The income tax law does not authorize the depreciation of an asset beyond its acquisition cost. Hence, a deduction over and above such cost cannot be claimed and allowed. The reason is that deductions from gross income are privileges, not matters of right. They are not created by implication but upon clear expression in the law [Gutierrez v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-19537, May 20, 1965]. Depreciation is the gradual diminution in the useful value of tangible property resulting from wear and tear and normal obsolescense. It commences with the acquisition of the property and its owner is not bound to see his property gradually waste, without making provision out of earnings for its replacement. The recovery, free of income tax, of an amount more than the invested capital in an asset will transgress the underlying purpose of a depreciation allowance. For then what the taxpayer would recover will be, not only the acquisition cost, but also some profit. Recovery in due time thru depreciation of investment made is the philosophy behind depreciation allowance; the idea of profit on the investment made has never been the underlying reason for the allowance of a deduction for depreciation. BPI v CIR G.R No. 139786 October 17, 2005

Facts: The BIR issued an Assessment for a deficiency of Documentary Stamp Tax (DST). The petitioner filed a protest letter, requesting for reconsideration with BIR however the latter did not reply. Instead, BIR issued a warrant for distraint/levy against petitioner BPI. The petitioner did not hear from BIR until September 11, 1997 when then Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chado, denied its request for reconsideration. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA, raising the defense of prescription. The CTA denied the petition and held that the period of prescription had not yet prescribed nonetheless, it held that the petitioner was not liable for the deficiency of DST. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of CTA on the issue of DST tax and held that the petitioner was indeed liable for DST. Issue: Whether or not the right of the respondent to collect from petitioner BPIis barred by prescription? Held : Yes, the Court ruled that the period to collect has already prescribed. The BIR has three years, counted from the date of actual filing of the return or from the last date prescribed by law for the filing of such return, whichever comes later, to assess a national internal revenue tax or to begin a court proceeding or the collection thereof without an assessment. In case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or the failure to file any return at all, the prescriptive period for assessment of the tax due shall be 10 years from discovery by the BIR of the falsity, fraud, or omission. When the BIR validly issues an assessment, within either the three-year or ten-year period,

whichever is appropriate, then the BIR has another three years after the assessment within which to collect the national internal revenue tax due thereon by distraint, levy, and/or court proceeding. The assessment of the tax is deemed made and the three-year period for collection of the assessed tax begins to run on the date the assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent by the BIR to the taxpayer. In their Decisions, both the CTA and the Court of Appeals found that the filing by petitioner BPI of a protest letter suspended the running of the prescriptive period for collecting the assessed DST. This Court, however, takes the opposing view, and, based on the succeeding discussion, concludes that there is no valid ground for suspending the running of the prescriptive period for collection of the deficiency DST assessed against petitioner BPI. The statute of limitations on assessment and collection of taxes is for the protection of the taxpayer and, thus, shall be construed liberally in his favor

ESTATE OF THE LATE JULIANA DIEZ VDA. DE GABRIEL vs. CIR

GR. No. 155541; January 27, 2004

Facts: During the lifetime of the decedent Juliana vda. De Gabriel, her business affairs were managed by the Philippine Trust Company (PhilTrust). The decedent died on April 3, 1979 but two days after her death, PhilTrust filed her income tax return for 1978 not indicating that the decedent had died. The BIR conducted an administrative investigation of the decedents tax liability and found a deficiency income tax for the year 1997 in the amount of P318,233.93. Thus, in November 18, 1982, the BIR sent by registered mail a demand letter and assessment notice addressed to the decedent c/o PhilTrust, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which was the address stated in her 1978 income tax return. On June 18, 1984, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued warrants of distraint and levy to enforce the collection of decedents deficiency income tax liability and serve the same upon her heir, Francisco Gabriel. On November 22, 1984, Commissioner filed a motion to allow his claim with probate court for the deficiency tax. The Court denied BIRs claim against the estate on the ground that no proper notice of the tax assessment was made on the proper party. On appeal, the CA held that BIRs service on PhilTrust of the notice of assessment was binding on the estate as PhilTrust failed in its legal duty to inform the respondent of antecedents death. Consequently, as the estate failed to question the assessment within the statutory period of thirty days, the assessment became final, executory, and incontestable. Issue: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the service of deficiency tax assessment on Juliana through PhilTrust was a valid service as to bind the estate; (2) Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the tax assessment had become final, executory, and incontestable. Held: (1) Since the relationship between PhilTrust and the decedent was automatically severed the moment of the taxpayers death, none of the PhilTrusts acts or omissions could bind the estate of the taxpayer. Although the administrator of the estate may have been remiss in his legal obligation to inform respondent of the decedents death, the consequence thereof merely refer to the imposition of certain penal sanction on the administrator. These do not include the indefinite tolling of the prescriptive period for making deficiency tax assessment or waiver of the notice requirement for such assessment.

(2) The assessment was served not even on an heir or the estate but on a completely disinterested party. This improper service was clearly not binding on the petitioner. The most crucial point to be remembered is that PhilTust had absolutely no legal relationship with the deceased or to her Estate. There was therefore no assessment served on the estate as to the alleged underpayment of tax. Absent this assessment, no proceeding could be initiated in court for collection of said tax; therefore, it could not have become final, executory and incontestable. Respondents claim for collection filed with the court only on November 22, 1984 was barred for having been made beyond the five-year prescriptive period set by law. Philippine Journalist, Inc. v. CIR G.R. No. 162852; December 16, 2004

Facts: In 1995, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Letter of Authority for two Revenue Officers to examine petitioners books of account and other accounting records for internal revenue taxes for the period January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994. In 1997, petitioners Comptroller, executed a "Waiver of the Statute of Limitation Under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)". The document "waive[d] the running of the prescriptive period provided by Sections 223 and 224 and other relevant provisions of the NIRC and consent[ed] to the assessment and collection of taxes which may be found due after the examination at any time after the lapse of the period of limitations fixed by said Sections 223 and 224 and other relevant provisions of the NIRC, until the completion of the investigation. In 1998, Revenue Officer submitted his audit report recommending the issuance of an assessment and finding that petitioner had deficiency taxes. Subsequently, the Assessment Division of the BIR issued Pre-Assessment Notices which informed petitioner of the results of the investigation. Thus, BIR issued Assessment/Demand stating the deficiency taxes, inclusive of interest and compromise penalty On March 16, 1999, a Preliminary Collection Letter was sent by Deputy Commissioner Romeo S. Panganiban to the petitioner to pay the assessment within ten (10) days from receipt of the letter. On November 10, 1999, a Final Notice Before Seizure was issued by the same deputy commissioner giving the petitioner ten (10) days from receipt to pay. Petitioner received a copy of the final notice on November 24, 1999. By letters dated November 26, 1999, petitioner asked to be clarified how the tax liability of P111,291,214.46 was reached and requested an extension of thirty (30) days from receipt of the clarification within which to reply. The BIR received a follow-up letter from the petitioner asserting that its (PJI) records do not show receipt of Tax Assessment/Demand. Petitioner also contested that the assessment had no factual and legal basis. On March 28, 2000, a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy was received by the petitioner. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which was amended on May 12, 2000. Petitioner complains: (a) that no assessment or demand was received from the BIR; (b) that the warrant of distraint and/or levy was without factual and legal bases as its issuance was premature; (c) that the assessment, having been made beyond the 3-year prescriptive period, is null and void; (d) that the issuance of the warrant without being given the opportunity to dispute the

same violates its right to due process; and (e) that the grave prejudice that will be sustained if the warrant is enforced is enough basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. CTA ruled in favor of PJI. It declared that the deficiency income, value-added and expanded withholding tax assessments issued by the respondent against the petitioner on December 9, 1998, in the total amount of P111,291,214.46 for the year 1994 ANCELLED, WITHDRAWN and WITH NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Likewise, it declared that the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No. 33-06-046 NULL and VOID. On appeal CA ruled that Mere assessment notices which have become final after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day reglementary period are not appealable. Thus, the CTA should not have entertained the petition at all. Also, it ruled that there is a valid waiver thus the running of the prescriptive period is tolled. Issues: (1) whether or not CTA has jurisdiction over the issues in this case. (2) Whether or not the Waiver of the Statute of Limitations is valid and binding on the petitioner Held: (1) No. The appellate jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited to cases which involve decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on matters relating to assessments or refunds. The second part of the provision covers other cases that arise out of the NIRC or related laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The wording of the provision is clear and simple. It gives the CTA the jurisdiction to determine if the warrant of distraint and levy issued by the BIR is valid and to rule if the Waiver of Statute of Limitations was validly effected. (2) No. As found by the CTA, the Waiver of Statute of Limitations, signed by petitioners comptroller on September 22, 1997 is not valid and binding because it does not conform with the provisions of RMO No. 20-90. It did not specify a definite agreed date between the BIR and petitioner, within which the former may assess and collect revenue taxes. Thus, petitioners waiver became unlimited in time, violating Section 222(b) of the NIRC.The waiver document is being incomplete and defective, the three-year prescriptive period was not tolled or extended and continued to run until April 17, 1998. Consequently, the Assessment/Demand No. 33-1-000757-94 issued on December 9, 1998 was invalid because it was issued beyond the three (3) year period. In the same manner, Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No. 33-06-046 which petitioner received on March 28, 2000 is also null and void for having been issued pursuant to an invalid assessment. CIR v. Primetown Property Group GR 161155; August 28, 2007

Facts: Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondents paid in 1997. The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. According to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA, even if the

year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. Issue: Whether or not the counting of the 2-year prescriptive period for filing claim of refund is governed by the Civil Code. Held: Counting of 2-year period for filing claim for refund is no longer in accordance with Art 13 of the Civil Code but under Sec 31 of EO 227 - The Administrative Code of 1987. As between the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail being the more recent law, following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. In the case at bar, there are 24 calendar months in 2 years. For a Final Corporate ITR filed on Apr 14, 1998, the counting should start from Apr 15, 1998 and end on Apr 14, 2000. The procedure is 1st month -Apr 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998 . 24th month - Mar 15, 2000 to Apr 14, 2000. National Marketing v. Tecson, 139 Phil 584 (1969) is no longer controlling. The 2-year period should start to run from filing of the final adjusted return. We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period CIR vs. Enron Subic Power Corp GR No. 166387; January 19, 2009

Facts: The BIR assessed Enron which countered by filing a Petition for Review with the CTA stating that the assessment disregarded the provisions of the Tax Code and of RR No. 12-99, when the assessment failed to provide the legal and factual bases of the assessment. The CTA and CA ruled that the assessment notice must not only refer to the supporting revenue laws or regulations for the assessment but must also justify their applicability to the factual milieu of the assessment. Issue: Is the disputed assessment valid? Held: NO. The assessment is not valid. Although the revenue examiners discussed their findings with Respondents representative during the pre-assessment stage, the same, together with the Preliminary Five-Day Letter and Petitioners Annex G, were not sufficient to comply with the procedural requirement of due process. The Tax Code provides that a taxpayer shall be informed (and not merely notified as was the requirement before) in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made; otherwise, the assessment shall be void. The use of the word shall indicates the mandatory nature of the requirement. Commissioner vs. Phoenix Assurance GR L-19727, 20 May 1965 Facts: Phoenix assurance is a foreign insurance corporation organized under the laws of Great Britain, licensed to do business in the Philippines. Through its head office in London, it entered into worldwide reinsurance treaties with various foreign insurance companies. It agreed to cede a portion of premiums received on original insurances underwritten by its head office, subsidiaries,

and branch offices around the world, in consideration for assumption by the foreign insurance companies of n equivalent portion of the liability form such original insurances. Pursuant to such treaties, the company ceded portions of its premiums it earned from its underwriting business in the Philippines, upon which assessed withholding tax. The company thereafter amended its tax returns (1950-1954) excluding reinsurance premium and items of deduction attributable to such premium. The Commissioner assessed deficiency income tax against the company. Issue: Whether the Commissioner is justified in the assessment of deficiency tax. Held: The changes and alteration embodied in the amended tax return consisted of the exclusion of reinsurance premium received from domestic insurance companies by the companys head office, reinsurance premium ceded to foreign insurers not doing business in the Philippines and various items of deductions attributable to such excluded reinsurance premiums, thereby substantially modifying the original return. As amended return is substantially different from the original return, the period of limitation of the right to issue the same should be counted from the filing of the amended income tax return. The right of the Commissioner to assess the deficiency tax on the amended return has not prescribed. To hold otherwise would pave the way for taxpayer to evade the payment of taxes simply reporting in their original return heavy losses and amending the same more than 5 years later when the Commissioner has lost his authority to assess the proper tax there under. The object of the tax code is to impose taxes for the needs of the government, not to enhance tax avoidance to its prejudice. Commissioner vs. Javier GR 78953, 31 July 1991 Facts: In 1977, Victoria Javier (wife of Melchor), received from the Prudential Bank and Trust Co.US$999,973.70 remitted by her sister, Dolores Ventosa, through some banks in the United States, among them Mellon Bank NA. Mellon Bank filed suit to recover the excess amount of US$9999,000 as the remittance of US$ 1 million was a clerical error and should have been US $1,000 only (Compare facts in Mellon Bank vs. Magsino, GR 71479, 18 October 1990). In 1978, Melchor Javier filed his income tax return for 1977showing a gross income of P53,053.38 and a net income of P48,053.38 and stating in the footnote of the return that taxpayer was recipient of some money received from abroad which he presumed to be a gift but turned outto be an error and is now subject of litigation. In 1980, the Commissioner assessed and demanded from Javier deficiency assessment of P9,287,297.51 for 1977. Javier protested such assessment, where the Commissioner in turn imposed a 50% fraud penalty against Javier. Issue: Whether Javier is liable for the 50% fraud penalty. Held: Under the then Section 72 of the Tax Code, a taxpayer who files a false return is liable to pay the fraud penalty of 50% of the tax due from him or of the deficiency tax in case payment has been made on the basis of the return filed before the discovery of the falsity or fraud. The fraud contemplated by law is actual and not constructive. It must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done or resorted to in order to induce another to give up some legal right. Fraud is never imputed and the courts never sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances which, at most created only suspicion. A fraudulent return is always an attempt to evade a tax, but a merely false return may not be. Herein, there was no actual and intentional fraud through willful and deliberate misleading of the government agency concerned (BIR) committed by Javier. Javier did not conceal anything to induce the government to give some legal right and place itself at a disadvantage. Error or mistake of law is not fraud. As ruled by the Court of Tax Appeals, the 50% surcharge imposed as fraud penalty in the deficiency assessment should be deleted Aznar vs. Court of Tax Appeals GR No. 20569, 23 August 1974

Facts: Petitioner, as administrator of the estate of the deceased, Matias H. Aznar, seeks a review and nullification of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals ordering the petitioner to pay the government the sum of P227,691.77 representing deficiency income taxes for the years 1946 to 1951. An investigation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) ascertained the assets and liabilities of the taxpayer and it was discovered that from 1946 to 1951, his net worth had increased every year, which increases in net worth was very much more than the income reported during said years. The findings clearly indicated that the taxpayer did not declare correctly the income reported in his income tax returns for the aforesaid years. Petitioner avers that according to the NIRC, the right of the CIR to assess deficiency income taxes of the late Aznar for the years 1946, 1947, and 1948 had already prescribed at the time the assessment was made on November 28, 1952; there being a five year limitation upon assessment and collection from the filing of the returns. Meanwhile, respondents believe that the prescription period in the case at bar that is applicable is under Sec. 332 of the NIRC which provides that: "(a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission". Petitioner argues said provision does not apply because the taxpayer did not file false and fraudulent returns with intent to evade tax. Issue: Whether or not the deceased Aznar filed false or fraudulent income tax returns and subsequently, whether the action has not prescribed. Held: The petition is without merit. The respondent CTA concluded that the very "substantial under declarations of income for six consecutive years eloquently demonstrate the falsity or fraudulence of the income tax returns with an intent to evade the payment of tax." The ordinary period of prescription of 5 years within which to assess tax liabilities under Sec. 331 of the NIRC should be applicable to normal circumstances, but whenever the government is placed at a disadvantage so as to prevent its lawful agents from proper assessment of tax liabilities due to false returns, fraudulent return intended to evade payment of tax, or failure to file returns, the period of ten years from the time of the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission even seems to be inadequate. There being undoubtedly false tax returns in this case, We affirm the conclusion of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that Sec. 332 (a) of the NIRC should apply and that the period of ten years within which to assess petitioner's tax liability had not expired at the time said assessment was made. CIR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC. Facts: On January 15, 1982, Carnation Phils. Inc. (Carnation), filed its Corporation Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year ending September 30, 1981; and its Manufacturers/Producers Percentage Tax Return for the quarter ending September 30, 1981. On October 13, 1986, March 16, 1987 and May 18, 1987, Carnation, through its Senior Vice President Jaime O. Lardizabal, signed three separate waivers of the Statute of Limitations Under the National Internal Revenue Code wherein it: x x x waives the running of the prescriptive period provided for in sections 318 and 319 and other related provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and consents to the assessment and

collection of the taxes which may be found due after reinvestigation and reconsideration at any time before or after the lapse of the period of limitations fixed by said sections 318 and 319 and other relevant provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, but not after (13 April 1987 for the earlierexecuted waiver, or June 14, 1987 for the later waiver, or July 30, 1987 for the subsequent waiver, as the case may be). However, the taxpayer (petitioner herein) does not waive any prescription already accrued in its favor. The waivers were not signed by the BIR Commissioner or any of his agents. On August 5, 1987, Carnation received BIRs letter of demand dated July 29, 1987 asking the said corporation to pay P1,442,586.56 as deficiency income tax, P14,152,683.85 as deficiency sales tax and P3,939,913.03 as deficiency sales tax on undeclared sales, all for the year 1981. This demand letter was accompanied by assessment Notices Nos. FAS-4-81-87-005824, FAS-4-81-87-005825 and FAS-4-81-87-005826. In a basic protest dated August 17, 1987, Carnation disputed the assessments and requested a reconsideration and reinvestigation thereof. On September 30, 1987, Carnation filed a supplemental protest. These protests were denied by the BIR Commissioner in a letter dated March 15, 1988 Issue: Whether or not the three (3) waivers signed by the private respondent are valid and bindingi[6] as to toll the running of the prescriptive period for assessment and not bar the Government from issuing subject deficiency tax assessments. Held: Section 318 (now Section 203) of the National Internal Revenue Code, the law then applicable reads: SEC 318. Period of Limitations upon assessment and collection. - Except as provided in the succeeding section, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within five years after the return was filed, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period. For the purpose of this section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day: Provided, That This limitation shall not apply to cases already investigated prior to the approval of this Code.ii[7] (underscoring ours) The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming what the Court of Tax Appeals decided, established that subject assessments of July 29, 1987 were issued outside the statutory prescriptive period. Carnation filed its annual income tax and percentage tax returns for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981 on January 15, 1982iii[8] and November 20, 1981,iv[9] respectively. In accordance with the above-quoted provision of law, private respondents 1981 income and sales taxes could have been validly assessed only until January 14, 1987 and November 19, 1986, respectively.v[10] However, Carnations income and sales taxes were assessed only on July 29, 1987, beyond the five year prescriptive period.vi[11] Petitioner BIR Commissioner contends that the waivers signed by Carnation were valid although not signed by the BIR Commissioner because (a) when the BIR agents/examiners extended the period to audit and investigate Carnations tax returns, the BIR gave its implied consent to such waivers; (b) the signature of the Commissioner is a mere formality and the lack of it does not vitiate the binding effect of the waivers; and (c) that a waiver is not a contract but a unilateral act of renouncing ones

right to avail of the defense of prescription and remains binding in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the waiver.vii[12] Petitioners submission is inaccurate. The same tax code is clear on the matter, to wit: SEC. 319. Exceptions as to period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes. -- (a) x x x (b) Where before the expiration of the time prescribed in the preceding section for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer have consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreement in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon. The Court of Appeals itself also passed upon the validity of the waivers executed by Carnation, observing thus: We cannot go along with the petitioners theory. Section 319 of the Tax code earlier quoted is clear and explicit that the waiver of the five-year prescriptive period must be in writing and signed by both the BIR Commissioner and the taxpayer. Here, the three waivers signed by Carnation do not bear the written consent of the BIR Commissioner as required by law. We agree with the CTA in holding these waivers to be invalid and without any binding effect on petitioner (Carnation) for the reason that there was no consent by the respondent (Commissioner of Internal Revenue). The ruling of the Supreme Court in Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Solano,viii[13] is in point, thus: x x x The only agreement that could have suspended the running of the prescriptive period for the collection of the tax in question is, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Tax Appeals, a written agreement between Solano and the Collector, entered into before the expiration of the of the fiveyear prescriptive period, extending the limitation prescribed by law. For sure, no such written agreement concerning the said three waivers exists between the petitioner and private respondent Carnation.ix[14] Verily, we discern no basis for overruling the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by the Court of Appeals. In fact, there is every reason to leave undisturbed the said conclusions, having in mind the precept that all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals.x[15] Besides being a reiteration of the holding of the Court of Tax Appeals, such decision should be accorded respect. Thus, the Court held in Philippine Refining Co. vs. Court of Appeals,xi[16] that the Court of Tax Appeals is a highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. As a matter of principle, this Court will not set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems, and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.xii[17] This point becomes more evident in the case under consideration where the findings and conclusions of both the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals appear untainted by any

abuse of authority, much less grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, we find the decision of the latter affirming that of the former free from any palpable error.xiii[18] What is more, the waivers in question reveal that they are in no wise unequivocal, and therefore necessitates for its binding effect the concurrence of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In fact, in his reply dated April 18, 1995, the Solicitor General, representing the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, admitted that subject waivers executed by Carnation were for and in consideration of the approval by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue of its request for reinvestigation and/or reconsideration of its internal revenue case involving tax assessments for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1981 which were all pending at the time. On this basis neither implied consent can be presumed nor can it be contended that the waiver required under Sec. 319 of the Tax Code is one which is unilateral nor can it be said that concurrence to such an agreement is a mere formality because it is the very signatures of both the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the taxpayer which give birth to such a valid agreement.

Ungab v. Cusi GR. L-41919-24 MAY 30, 1980 FACTS: In July, 1974, BIR examined the income tax returns filed by Ungab, for the calendar year 1973. BIR discovered that Ungab failed to report his income derived from sales of banana saplings. The BIR District Revenue Officer sent a "Notice of Taxpayer" to petitioner informing him that there is a sum due amounting to Php 104,000.00 which covers income, business tax and forest charges for the year 1973 and inviting him to an informal conference where he may present his objections. Ungab wrote the BIR District Revenue Officer protesting the assessment, claiming that he was only a dealer/ agent on commission basis in the banana sapling business and that his income, as reported in his income tax returns for the said year, was accurately stated. However, the examiner was fully convinced that Ungab had filed a fraudulent income tax return, prompting him to submit a "Fraud Referral Report," to the Tax Fraud Unit of the BIR. After examining the records of the case, the Special Investigation Division of the BIR found sufficient proof that Ungab is guilty of tax evasion for the taxable year 1973 and recommended his prosecution, which the Commissioner approved. Thereafter, the State Prosecutor conducted a preliminary investigation of the case, and finding probable cause, filed 6 informations against the petitioner with CFI. As a result, Ungab filed a motion to quash the informations alleging that it is not within the province of the trial court to decide on the tax evasion case in lieu of his pending protest against the assessment made by the BIR Examiner. The trial court denied the motion. Ungab now claims that the filing of the informations was premature since the CIR has not yet resolved his protests against the assessment of the Revenue District Officer and that he was denied recourse to the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this instant case. ISSUE: Whether or not an assessment of the deficiency tax due is necessary before the taxpayer can be prosecuted criminally.

HELD: An assessment of a deficiency is NOT necessary to a criminal prosecution for willful attempt to defeat and evade the income tax. What is involved here is not the collection of taxes where the assessment of the CIR may be reviewed by the CTA, but a criminal prosecution for violations of the NIRC which is within the province of the trial court. While there can be no civil action to enforce collection before the assessment procedures provided in the Code have been followed, there is no requirement for the precise computation and assessment of the tax before there can be a criminal prosecution under the Code. The crime is complete when the violator has, as in this case, knowingly and willfully filed fraudulent returns with intent to evade and defeat a part or all of the tax. The perpetration of the crime is grounded upon knowledge on the part of the taxpayer that he has made an inaccurate return, and the government's failure to discover the error and promptly to assess has no connections with the commission of the crime. A petition for reconsideration of an assessment may affect the suspension of the prescriptive period for the collection of taxes, but NOT the prescriptive period of a criminal action for violation of law. Obviously, the protest of the Ungab against the assessment of the District Revenue Officer cannot stop his prosecution for violation of the NIRC. CIR v. Pascor G.R. No. 128315 June 29, 1999 FACTS: BIR Commissioner Ong authorized Revenue Officers Que, Estorco and Savillano to examine the books of accounts and other accounting records of Pascor Realty, which lead to the recommendation of an issuance of assessments. In 1995, CIR filed a complaint against the president and treasurer of PASCOR alleging evasion of taxes before the DOJ. As a consequence, PASCOR filed an Urgent Request for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation disputing the said tax assessment. PASCOR then received a subpoena from the DOJ with regard to the complaint. CIR denied the motion for reconsideration of the said assessment. PASCOR appealed to CTA on petition for review. CIR countered by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the CTA has no jurisdiction over the subject matter since there was no formal assessment issued against PASCOR. CTA denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the CIR to file its answer within 30 days from receipt of the notice which the CIR did not comply with nor did it move for a reconsideration. Instead, CIR filed a petition in the CA alleging that the CTA acted with grave abuse of discretion. The CIR argued that the criminal action is not an assessment, based on Sections 205 and 223 of the NIRC which provides that remedies for the collection of tax may either be civil or criminal and that in case of failure to file a return, a tax may be assessed OR a proceeding in court may be begun without an assessment. PASCOR on the other hand argues that the joint-affidavit filed by the CIR for criminal action already constitutes an assessment. It further postulates that an assessment is NOT an action

or proceeding for the collection of taxes but a mere notice of and demand for payment of taxes due. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the criminal complaint for tax evasion can be construed as an assessment. 2. Whether or not an assessment is necessary before criminal charges for tax evasion may be instituted. HELD: 1. The criminal complaint for tax evasion is NOT an assessment. An assessment is a notice to the taxpayer containing the amount of taxes due and a demand to pay such taxes within a specific period. It is deemed made only when the CIR releases the mail and sends such notice to the petitioner. In the instant case, the joint-affidavit for the criminal action CANNOT be considered an assessment since: (1) It contained NO DEMAND for payment (2) There was NO specified period of payment (3) It is addressed to the Secretary of Justice and NOT the taxpayer (Pascor) (4) Its purpose is merely to support / substantiate the criminal complaint and NOT notify the payer of the tax due Since there was NO assessment issued yet, no reconsideration / reinvestigation may be asked from the CIR. 2. Section 222 of the NIRC provides that when a false/fraudulent return is filed, an action in court may be commenced WITHOUT an assessment. Section 205 on the other hand further provides that civil and criminal actions may be pursued simultaneously by the CIR. THUS, the Commissioner is given the discretion to either issue an assessment OR file a criminal complaint or do both. A criminal charge may be supported by only prima facie showing of failure to file return. This fact NEED NOT be proven by an assessment. It must be noted that the issuance of an assessment is DIFFERENT from the filing of a complaint. Before an assessment is issued, there is, by practice, a pre-assessment notice sent to the taxpayer, who is given a chance to submit position papers and documents to prove that the assessment is unwarranted. If the commissioner is unsatisfied, an assessment signed by him or her is then sent to the taxpayer informing the latter specifically and clearly that an assessment has been made against him or her. On the other hand, the criminal charge need not go through all these. The criminal charge is filed directly with the DOJ. Thereafter, the taxpayer is notified that a criminal case had been filed against him, not that the commissioner has issued an assessment. It must be

stressed that a criminal complaint is instituted not to demand payment, but to penalize the taxpayer for violation of the Tax Code. CIR vs. Philippine Global Communication Inc. [G.R. No. 167146 October 31, 2006] Facts: Philippine Global (respondent) is a corporation engaged in telecommunications, filed its Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 1990 on 15 April 1991. On 13 April 1992, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued Letter of Authority No. 0002307, authorizing the appropriate Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) officials to examine the books of account and other accounting records of respondent, in connection with the investigation of respondents 1990 income tax liability. BIR sent a letter to respondent requesting the latter to present for examination certain records and documents, but respondent failed to present any document. Respondent received a Preliminary Assessment Notice dated 13 April 1994 for deficiency income tax inclusive of surcharge, interest, and compromise penalty, arising from deductions that were disallowed for failure to pay the withholding tax and interest expenses that were likewise disallowed. On the following day, 22 April 1994, respondent received a Formal Assessment Notice with Assessment Notice No. 000688-80-7333, dated 14 April 1994, for deficiency income tax. Phil Global filed two letters of protests, in both letters, respondent requested for the cancellation of the tax assessment. More than eight years after the assessment was presumably issued, respondent received from the CIR a Final Decision dated 8 October 2002 denying the respondents protest against Assessment Notice No. 000688 -80-7333, and affirming the said assessment in toto. CTA rendered a Decision in favor of respondent on 9 June 2004. It decided that the protest letters filed by the respondent cannot constitute a request for reinvestigation, hence, they cannot toll the running of the prescriptive period to collect the assessed deficiency income tax. Thus, since more than three years had lapsed from the time Assessment Notice No. 000688-80-7333 was issued, the CIRs right to collect the same has prescribed in conformity with Section 269 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Issues: (1) Whether or not CIRs right to collect respondents alleged deficiency income tax is barred by prescription under Section 269(c) of the Tax Code of 1977 (2) Whether or not the prescription on assessment was suspended by virtue of the alleged request of reinvestigation by Phil Global Held: Petition was denied. The law prescribed a period of three years from the date the return was actually filed or from the last date prescribed by law for the filing of such return, whichever came later, within which the BIR may assess a national internal revenue tax. However, the law increased the prescriptive period to assess or to begin a court proceeding for the collection without an assessment to ten years when a false or fraudulent return was filed with the intent of evading the tax or when no return was filed at all. In such

cases, the ten-year period began to run only from the date of discovery by the BIR of the falsity, fraud or omission. If the BIR issued this assessment within the three-year period or the ten-year period, whichever was applicable, the law provided another three years after the assessment for the collection of the tax due thereon through the administrative process of distraint and/or levy or through judicial proceedings. The three-year period for collection of the assessed tax began to run on the date the assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent by the BIR. The assessment, in this case, was presumably issued on 14 April 1994 since the respondent did not dispute the CIRs claim. Therefore, the BIR had until 13 April 1997. However, as there was no Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy served on the respondents nor any judicial proceedings initiated by the BIR, the earliest attempt of the BIR to collect the tax due based on this assessment was when it filed its Answer in CTA Case No. 6568 on 9 January 2003, which was several years beyond the three-year prescriptive period. Thus, the CIR is now prescribed from collecting the assessed tax. Court has also clarified that the statute of limitations on the collection of taxes should benefit both the Government and the taxpayers further illustrated the harmful effects that the delay in the assessment and collection of taxes inflicts upon taxpayers, that is for the purpose of expediting the collection of taxes, so that the agency charged with the assessment and collection may not tarry too long or indefinitely to the prejudice of the interests of the Government, which needs taxes to run it; and for the taxpayer so that within a reasonable time after filing his return, he may know the amount of the assessment he is required to pay, whether or not such assessment is well founded and reasonable so that he may either pay the amount of the assessment or contest its validity in court. The Tax Code of 1977, as amended, provides instances when the running of the statute of limitations on the assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes could be suspended, even in the absence of a waiver, Among the exceptions, and invoked by the CIR as a ground for this petition, is the instance when the taxpayer requests for a reinvestigation which is granted by the Commissioner. However, this exception does not apply to this case since the respondent never requested for a reinvestigation. Revenue Regulations No. 12-85, the Procedure Governing Administrative Protests of Assessment of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, issued on 27 November 1985, defines the two types of protest, the request for reconsideration and the request for reinvestigation. Section 6. Protest. - The taxpayer may protest administratively an assessment by filing a written request for reconsideration or reinvestigation specifying the following particulars: xxxx For the purpose of protest herein

(a) Request for reconsideration-- refers to a plea for a re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of existing records without need of additional evidence. It may involve both a question of fact or of law or both. (b) Request for reinvestigationrefers to a plea for re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of newly-discovered evidence or additional evidence that a taxpayer intends to present in the investigation. It may also involve a question of fact or law or both. The main difference between these two types of protests lies in the records or evidence to be examined by internal revenue officers, whether these are existing records or newly discovered or additional evidence. A re-evaluation of existing records which results from a request for reconsideration does not toll the running of the prescription period for the collection of an assessed tax. Section 271 distinctly limits the suspension of the running of the statute of limitations to instances when reinvestigation is requested by a taxpayer and is granted by the CIR. In the present case, the separate letters of protest dated 6 May 1994 and 23 May 1994 are requests for reconsideration. The CIRs allegation that there was a request for reinvestigation is inconceivable since respondent consistently and categorically refused to submit new evidence and cooperate in any reinvestigation proceedings. The distinction between a request for reconsideration and a request for reinvestigation is significant. It bears repetition that a request for reconsideration, unlike a request for reinvestigation, cannot suspend the statute of limitations on the collection of an assessed tax. If both types of protest can effectively interrupt the running of the statute of limitations, an erroneous assessment may never prescribe. If the taxpayer fails to file a protest, then the erroneous assessment would become final and unappealable. On the other hand, if the taxpayer does file the protest on a patently erroneous assessment, the statute of limitations would automatically be suspended and the tax thereon may be collected long after it was assessed. Meanwhile the interest on the deficiencies and the surcharges continue to accumulate. And for an unrestricted number of years, the taxpayers remain uncertain and are burdened with the costs of preserving their books and records. This is the predicament that the law on the statute of limitations seeks to prevent CIR v. Metrostar Superama Facts: In January 2001, a revenue officer was authorized to examine the books of accounts of Metro Star Superama, Inc. In April 2002, after the audit review, the revenue district officer issued a formal assessment notice against Metro Star advising the latter that it is liable to pay P292,874.16 in deficiency taxes. Metro Star assailed the issuance of the formal assessment notice as it averred that due process was not observed when it was not issued a pre-assessment notice. Nevertheless, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue authorized the issuance of a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against the properties of Metro Star. Metro Star then appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA ruled in favor of Metro Star.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed in the issuance of the formal assessment notice against Metro Star. HELD: No. It is true that there is a presumption that the tax assessment was duly issued. However, this presumption is disregarded if the taxpayer denies ever having received a tax assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In such cases, it is incumbent upon the BIR to prove by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addresseetaxpayer. The onus probandi was shifted to the BIR to prove by contrary evidence that the Metro Star received the assessment in the due course of mail. In the case at bar, the CIR merely alleged that Metro Star received the pre-assessment notice in January 2002. The CIR could have simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed the pre-assessment notice, but failed. Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of service of the pre-assessment notice. The Supreme Court emphasized that the sending of a pre-assessment notice is part of the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax assessment, the absence of which renders nugatory any assessment made by the tax authorities. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. But even so, it is a requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. CIR v. CA 257 SCRA 200

"Before one is prosecuted for willful attempt to evade or defeat any tax, the fact that a tax is due must first be proved." FACTS: The CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco Corp for 7.6 Billion Pesos representing deficiency income, ad valorem and value-added taxes for the year 1992 to which Fortune moved for reconsideration of the assessments. Later, the CIR filed a complaint with the Department of Justice against the respondent Fortune, its corporate officers, nine (9) other corporations and their respective corporate officers for alleged fraudulent tax evasion for supposed nonpayment by Fortune of the correct amount of taxes, alleging among others the fraudulent scheme of making simulated sales to fictitious buyers declaring lower wholesale prices, as allegedly shown by the great disparity on the declared wholesale prices registered in the "Daily Manufacturer's Sworn Statements" submitted by the respondents to the BIR. Such documents when requested by the court were not however presented by the BIR, prompting the trial court to grant the prayer for preliminary injuction sought by the respondent upon the reason that tax liabiliity must be duly proven before any criminal prosecution be had. The petitioner relying on the Ungab Doctrine sought the lifting of the writ of preliminary mandatory injuction issued by the trial court. ISSUE: Whose contention is correct? HELD: In view of the foregoing reasons, misplaced is the petitioners' thesis citing Ungab v. Cusi, that the lack of a final determination of Fortune's exact or correct tax liability is not a

bar to criminal prosecution, and that while a precise computation and assessment is required for a civil action to collect tax deficiencies, the Tax Code does not require such computation and assessment prior to criminal prosecution. Reading Ungab carefully, the pronouncement therein that deficiency assessment is not necessary prior to prosecution is pointedly and deliberately qualified by the Court with following statement quoted from Guzik v. U.S.: "The crime is complete when the violator has knowingly and wilfully filed a fraudulent return with intent to evade and defeat a part or all of the tax." In plain words, for criminal prosecution to proceed before assessment, there must be a prima facie showing of a wilful attempt to evade taxes. There was a wilful attempt to evade tax in Ungab because of the taxpayer's failure to declare in his income tax return "his income derived from banana sapplings." In the mind of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Fortune's situation is quite apart factually since the registered wholesale price of the goods, approved by the BIR, is presumed to be the actual wholesale price, therefore, not fraudulent and unless and until the BIR has made a final determination of what is supposed to be the correct taxes, the taxpayer should not be placed in the crucible of criminal prosecution. Herein lies a whale of difference between Ungab and the case at bar. Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. CIR G.R. 145526 March 16, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner presented to CIR applications for refund or tax credit of excess input taxes attributed from petitioners sales of gold on the theory that these were zero -related transactions under Sec 160 (6) of Tax Code 1986. CTA denied petition on grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence. The CTA and CA both found petitioner failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements for claims for tax refund. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner submitted sufficient evidence to justify grant of refund. RULING: CIR approved petitioners applications for zero-rating of its sales of gold to some companies. It has always been ruled that those seeking tax refunds or credits bear the burden of proving factual bases of their claims and of showing that the legislative entitled them to such claims. A photocopy of the purchase invoice or receipt evidencing the VAT paid shall be submitted together with the application for tax refund. CTA circular 1-95 likewise required submission of invoices or receipts showing the amounts of tax paid. Both Courts correctly observed that petitioner never submitted nay of the invoices or receipts required and held this omission to be fatal to its cause. A judicial claim for refund or tax credit in CTA is by no means in original action but rather an appeal by way of petition for review of a previous unsuccessful administrative claim. Next, cases filed in CTA are litigated de novo. Thu8s, a petitioner should prove every minute aspect of its case by presenting, formally offering and submitting its evidence to the CTA.

While CTA is not governed by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the purchase receipts is no0t a mere procedural technically which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of claims. G.R. No. L-25289 June 28, 1974 SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO., INC., v CTA & CIR Facts: In November 1961 the petitioner Surigao Electric Co., Inc., grantee of a legislative electric franchise, received a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce the collection from "Mainit Electric" of a deficiency franchise tax plus surcharge in the total amount of P718.59. In a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the petitioner contested this warrant, stating that it did not have a franchise in Mainit, Surigao. An exchange of correspondence between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Commissioner and the Auditor General, on the other, ensued, all on the matter of the petitioner's liability for deficiency franchise tax. The controversy culminated in a revised assessment dated April 29, 1963 (received by the petitioner on May 8, 1963) in the amount of P11,533.53, representing the petitioner's deficiency franchise-tax and surcharges thereon for the period from April 1, 1956 to June 30, 1959. The petitioner then requested a recomputation of the revised assessment in a letter to the Commissioner dated June 6, 1963 (sent by registered mail on June 7, 1963). The Commissioner, however, in a letter dated June 28, 1963 (received by the petitioner on July 16, 1963), denied the request for recomputation. On August 1, 1963 the petitioner appealed to the CTA. The tax court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the ot was filed beyond the thirty-day period of appeal provided by section 11 of Republic Act 1125. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner's appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals was time-barred. Held: A close reading of the numerous letters exchanged between the petitioner and the Commissioner clearly discloses that the letter of demand issued by the Commissioner on April 29, 1963 and received by the petitioner on May 8, 1963 constitutes the definite determination of the petitioner's deficiency franchise tax liability or the decision on the disputed assessment and, therefore, the decision appealable to the tax court. This letter of April 29, 1963 was in response to the communications of the petitioner, particularly the letter of August 2, 1962 wherein it assailed the 4th Indorsement's data and findings on its deficiency, franchise tax liability computed at 5% (on the ground that its franchise precludes the imposition of a rate higher than the 2% fixed in its legislative franchise), and the letter of April 24, 1963 wherein it again questioned the assessment and requested for a recomputation (on the ground that the Government could make an assessment only for the

period from May 29, 1956 to June 30, 1959). Thus, as early as August 2, 1962, the petitioner already disputed the assessment made by the Commissioner. Moreover, the letter of demand dated April 29, 1963 unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the Commissioner on the petitioner's several requests for reconsideration and recomputation. In this letter, the Commissioner not only in effect demanded that the petitioner pay the amount of P11,533.53 but also gave warning that in the event it failed to pay, the said Commissioner would be constrained to enforce the collection thereof by means of the remedies provided by law. The tenor of the letter, specifically, the statement regarding the resort to legal remedies, unmistakably indicates the final nature of the determination made by the Commissioner of the petitioner's deficiency franchise tax liability. The foregoing-view accords with settled jurisprudence and this despite the fact that nothing in Republic Act 1125, 1 as amended, even remotely suggests the element truly determinative of the appealability to the Court of Appeals of a ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus, this Court has considered the following communications sent by the Commissioner to taxpayers as embodying rulings appealable to the tax court: (a) a letter which stated the result of the investigation requested by the taxpayer and the consequent modification of the assessment; 2 (b) letter which denied the request of the taxpayer for the reconsideration cancellation, or withdrawal of the original assessment; 3 (c) a letter which contained a demand on the taxpayer for the payment of the revised or reduced assessment; 4 and (d) a letter which notified the taxpayer of a revision of previous assessments. 5 The revised assessment embodied in the Commissioner's letter dated April 29, 1963 being, in legal contemplation, the final ruling reviewable by the tax court, the thirty-day appeal period should be counted from May 8, 1963 (the day the petitioner received a copy of the said letter). From May 8, 1963 to June 7, 1963 (the day the petitioner, by registered mail, sent to the Commissioner its letter of June 6, 1963 requesting for further recomputation of the amount demanded from it) saw the lapse of thirty days. The June 6, 1963 request for further recomputation, partaking of a motion for reconsideration, tolled the running of the thirty-day period from June 7, 1963 (the day the petitioner sent its letter by registered mail) to July 16, 1963 (the day the petitioner received the letter of the Commissioner dated June 28, 1963 turning down its request). The prescriptive period commenced to run again on July 16, 1963. The petitioner filed its petition for review with the tax court on August 1, 1963 after the lapse of an additional sixteen days. The petition for review having been filed beyond the thirty-day period, we rule that the Court of Tax Appeals correctly dismissed the same. The thirty-day period prescribed by section 11 of Republic Act 1125, as amended, within which a taxpayer adversely affected by a decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should file his appeal with the tax court, is a jurisdictional requirement, 7 and the failure of a

taxpayer to lodge his appeal within the prescribed period bars his appeal and renders the questioned decision final and executory. 8 Prescinding from all the foregoing, we deem it appropriate to state that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language whenever his action on an assessment questioned by a taxpayer constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, as contemplated by sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act 1125, as amended. On the basis of this indicium indubitably showing that the Commissioner's communicated action is his final decision on the contested assessment, the aggrieved taxpayer would then be able to take recourse to the tax court at the opportune time. Without needless difficulty, the taxpayer would be able to determine when his right to appeal to the tax court accrues. This rule of conduct would also obviate all desire and opportunity on the part of the taxpayer to continually delay the finality of the assessment and, consequently, the collection of the amount demanded as taxes by repeated requests for recomputation and reconsideration. On the part of the Commissioner, this would encourage his office to conduct a careful and thorough study of every questioned assessment and render a correct and definite decision thereon in the first instance. This would also deter the Commissioner from unfairly making the taxpayer grope in the dark and speculate as to which action constitutes the decision appealable to the tax court. Of greater import, this rule of conduct would meet a pressing need for fair play, regularity, and orderliness in administrative action. CIR v. Union Shipping FACTS: In a letter dated December 27, 1974 petitioner assessed against Yee Fong Hong, Ltd. and/or herein private respondent Union Shipping Corporation for deficiency income taxes due for the years 1971 and 1972. Private respondent protested the assessment. Petitioner, without ruling on the protest, issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. In a letter, private respondent reiterated its request for reinvestigation. Petitioner, again, without acting on the request for reinvestigation and reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, filed a collection suit against private respondent. In 1979, private respondent filed with respondent court a Petition for Review. The CTA ruled in favor of private respondent. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the finality of an assessment and is tantamount to an outright denial of a motion for reconsideration of an assessment. HELD: The Supreme Court had already laid down the dictum that the Commissioner should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment. There appears to be no dispute that petitioner did not rule on private respondent's motion for reconsideration but contrary to the above ruling of this Court, left private respondent in

the dark as to which action of the Commissioner is the decision appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Had he categorically stated that he denies private respondent's motion for reconsideration and that his action constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, private respondent without needless difficulty would have been able to determine when his right to appeal accrues and the resulting confusion would have been avoided. Republic v. Lim Tian Teng & Sons Facts: In January 1957, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) made an assessment against Lim Tian Teng Sons and Co., Inc. (LTTSCI) demanding from the latter payment of P15k in taxes inclusive of surcharge. In the same month, LTTSCI requested for a reinvestigation with a request to produce supporting evidence. The CIR did not reply however he remanded the case to the Solicitor General (SG) who did not grant a reinvestigation but rather reiterated the content of the assessment. In September 1958, the CIR filed a tax collection suit against LTTSCI with the Court of First Instance of Cebu. LTTSCI assailed the collection suit on the ground that the CIR cannot commence collection without a final and executory assessment notice. It alleged that the assessment notice issued in January 1957 has not yet become final and executory because of the failure of the CIR to act on the protest. ISSUE: Whether or not LLTSCI I correct. HELD: No. Nowhere in the Tax Code is the CIR required to rule first on a taxpayers request for reinvestigation before he can go to court for the purpose of collecting the tax assessed. Ruling on the protest is not a condition precedent for the commencement of tax collection. The CIR is authorized to collect delinquent internal revenue taxes either by distraint and levy or by judicial action or both simultaneously. The only requisite before he can collect the tax is that he must first assess the same within the time fixed by law and this was complied with in the case at bar. The Supreme Court notes that in the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade the tax or of a failure to file a return, a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment. Oceanic Wireless v. CIR GR NO. 148380, December 9, 2005

Facts: On March 17, 1988, petitioner received from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) deficiency tax assessments for the taxable year 1984 in the total amount of P8,644,998.71. Petitioner filed its protest against the tax assessments and requested a reconsideration or cancellation of the same in a letter to the BIR Commissioner.

Acting in behalf of the BIR Commissioner, then Chief of the BIR Accounts Receivable and Billing Division, Mr. Severino B. Buot, reiterated the tax assessments while denying petitioners request for reinvestigation. Said letter likewise requested petitioner to pay

within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise the case shall be referred to the Collection Enforcement Division of the BIR National Office for the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy without further notice. Upon petitioners failure to pay the subject tax assessments within the prescribed period, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection, acting for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, issued the corresponding warrants of distraint and/or levy and garnishment. Issue: Whether the demand letter for tax deficiency issued and signed by a subordinate officer who was acting in behalf of the CIR is deemed final and executor and subject to an appeal to the CTA. Held: YES. A demand letter for payment of delinquent taxes may be considered a decision on a disputed or protested assessment. The determination on whether or not a demand letter is final is conditioned upon the language used or the tenor of the letter being sent to the taxpayer. In this case, the letter of demand, unquestionably constitutes the final action taken by the Bureau of Internal Revenue on petitioners request for reconsideration when it reiterated the tax deficiency assessments due from petitioner, and requested its payment. Failure to do so would result in the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy to enforce its collection without further notice. In addition, the letter contained a notation indicating that petitioners request for reconsideration had been denied for lack of supporting documents. The demand letter received by petitioner verily signified a character of finality. Therefore, it was tantamount to a rejection of the request for reconsideration. This now brings us to the crux of the matter as to whether said demand letter indeed attained finality despite the fact that it was issued and signed by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division instead of the BIR Commissioner. The general rule is that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may delegate any power vested upon him by law to Division Chiefs or to officials of higher rank. He cannot, however, delegate the four powers granted to him under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) enumerated in Section . As amended by Republic Act No. 8424, Section 7 of the Code authorizes the BIR Commissioner to delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the Code to any subordinate official with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, except the following: (a) The power to recommend the promulgation of rules and regulations by the Secretary of Finance; (b) The power to issue rulings of first impression or to reverse, revoke or modify any existing ruling of the Bureau;

(c) The power to compromise or abate under Section 204(A) and (B) of this Code, any tax deficiency: Provided, however, that assessments issued by the Regional Offices involving basic deficiency taxes of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or less, and minor criminal violations as may be determined by rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner, discovered by regional and district officials, may be compromised by a regional evaluation board which shall be composed of the Regional Director as Chairman, the Assistant Regional Director, heads of the Legal, Assessment and Collection Divisions and the Revenue District Officer having jurisdiction over the taxpayer, as members; and (d) The power to assign or reassign internal revenue officers to establishments where articles subject to excise tax are produced or kept. It is clear from the above provision that the act of issuance of the demand letter by the Chief of the Accounts Receivable and Billing Division does not fall under any of the exceptions that have been mentioned as non-delegable. Thus, the authority to make tax assessments may be delegated to subordinate officers. Said assessment has the same force and effect. Allied Banking v. CIR Facts: In April 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a preliminary assessment notice (PAN) to Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) demanding payment of P50 million in taxes. ABC then filed a protest in May 2004. In July 2004, the BIR issued a formal assessment notice (FAN). The FAN included a formal demand as well as this phrase: xxxThis is our final decision based on investigation. If you disagree, you may appeal this final decision within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, otherwise said deficiency tax assessment shall become final, executory and demandable. ABC then appealed the FAN with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that ABC did not exhaust all administrative remedies for failing to file a protest against the FAN. ISSUE: Whether or not the CIR is correct. HELD: No. It is true that a FAN is not appealable with the CTA. However, this case holds an exception. The wordings of the FAN issued by the CIR made it appear that the FAN is actually the CIRs final decision. It even advised ABC to file an appeal instead of filing a protest. ABC cannot therefore be faulted for filing an appeal with the CTA instead of filing a protest with the CIR. The CIR as well as his duly authorized representative must indicate clearly and unequivocally to the taxpayer whether an action constitutes a final determination on a disputed assessment. Words must be carefully chosen in order to avoid any confusion that could adversely affect the rights and interest of the taxpayer.

Santos v. People GR No. 173176 Facts: That on or about the 15th day of April, 2003, above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously file a false and fraudulent income tax return for taxable year 2002 by indicating therein a gross income of P8,033,332.70 when in truth and in fact her correct income for taxable year 2002 is P16,396,234.70 or a gross underdeclaration/difference of P8,362,902 resulting to an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24 excluding interest and penalties thereon of P1,319,500.94 or a total income tax deficiency of P2,714,617.18 to the damage and prejudice of the government of the same amount. The CTA First Division then issued on 9 December 2005 a warrant for the arrest of petitioner. The tax court lifted and recalled the warrant of arrest on 21 December 2005 after petitioner voluntarily appeared and submitted herself to its jurisdiction and filed the required bail bond in the amount of P20,000.00. January 2006, petitioner filed with the CTA First Division a Motion to Quash the Information filed in C.T.A. Crim. Case No. 0-012 on the following grounds: 1. 2. The facts alleged in the INFORMATION do not constitute an offense; The officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

3. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; and 4. The information is void ab initio, being violative of due process, and the equal protection of the laws. This was denied by the CTA. Petitioner received a copy of the 11 May 2006 Resolution of the CTA First Division on 17 May 2006. On 1 June 2006, petitioner filed with the CTA en banc a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB. CRIM. No. 001. She filed her Petition for Review with the CTA en banc on 16 June 2006. However, in its Resolutionxiv[21] dated 19 June 2006, the CTA en banc denied petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Issue: WHETHER A RESOLUTION OF A CTA DIVISION DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL TO THE CTA EN BANC UNDER SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9282, AMENDING SECTION 18 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125.xv[24] Held: The petition for review under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, may be new to the CTA, but it is actually a mode of appeal long available in courts of general jurisdiction.

Indeed, the filing of a petition for review with the CTA en banc from a decision, resolution, or order of a CTA Division is a remedy newly made available in proceedings before the CTA, necessarily adopted to conform to and address the changes in the CTA. There was no need for such rule under Republic Act No. 1125, prior to its amendment, since the CTA then was composed only of one Presiding Judge and two Associate Judges. Any two Judges constituted a quorum and the concurrence of two Judges was necessary to promulgate any decision thereof. The amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9282 to Republic Act No. 1125 elevated the rank of the CTA to a collegiate court, with the same rank as the Court of Appeals, and increased the number of its members to one Presiding Justice and five Associate Justices. The CTA is now allowed to sit en banc or in two Divisions with each Division consisting of three Justices. Four Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc, and the affirmative votes of four members of the Court en banc are necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution; while two Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions of a Division and the affirmative votes of two members of the Division shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution. In A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, the Revised CTA Rules, this Court delineated the jurisdiction of the CTA en bancxvi[31] and in Divisions.xvii[32] Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised CTA Rules recognizes the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en banc to review by appeal the following decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division: SEC. 2. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following: (a) Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over: (1) Cases arising from administrative agencies Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture; (2) Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and (3) Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than one million pesos;x x x x (f) Decisions, resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff

and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs. (g) Decisions, resolutions or order on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; x x x. General rule: The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order which is not the proper subject of an appeal or a petition for certiorari. According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing appeals from the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to the Court of Appeals, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared by the Rules to be appealable. Said provision, thus, explicitly states that no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.xviii[33] The Court distinguishes final judgments and orders from interlocutory orders in this wise: Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch thereof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order or decree has been held to be x x x one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside." The central point to consider is, therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."xix[34] In other words, after a final order or judgment, the court should have nothing more to do in respect of the relative rights of the parties to the case. Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties'

contentions in determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory. xx[35] Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.xxi[37] There is no dispute that a court order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory. The denial of the motion to quash means that the criminal information remains pending with the court, which must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged therein. Equally settled is the rule that an order denying a motion to quash, being interlocutory, is not immediately appealable,xxii[38] nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial Hence, the CTA en banc herein did not err in denying petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, when such Petition for Review is the wrong remedy to assail an interlocutory order denying her Motion to Quash. While the general rule proscribes the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to the same. The general rule is not absolute. Where special circumstances clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.xxiii[41] This Court recognizes that under certain situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for certiorari, is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other interlocutory order) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; xxiv[42] or to promote public welfare and public policy;xxv[43] or when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof;xxvi[44] or when the order was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.xxvii[46] Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order is now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court on the subject of appeal, which states:

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. The CTA First Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion in den ying petitioners Motion to Quash. Assuming that the CTA en banc, as an exception to the general rule, allowed and treated petitioners Petition for Review in C.T.A. EB. CRIM. No. 001 as a special civil action for certiorari, xxviii[47] it would still be dismissible for lack of merit. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. In this connection, it is only upon showing that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that an interlocutory order such as that involved in this case may be impugned. Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that this practice is applied only under certain exceptional circumstances to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and so as not to unduly burden the courts. xxix[48] Certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions of law and fact. It is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper. A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court based on scant allegations of grave abuse.xxx[49] A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling: it is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts. And lastly, the Resolutions of the CTA First Division dated 23 February 2006 and 11 May 2006 directly addressed the arguments raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively, and explained the reasons for the denial of both Motions. There is nothing to sustain a finding that these Resolutions were rendered capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily, as to constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In sum, the CTA en banc did not err in denying petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Petitioner cannot file a Petition for Review with the CTA en banc to appeal the Resolution of the CTA First Division denying her Motion to Quash. The Resolution is interlocutory and, thus, unappealable. Even if her Petition for Review is to be treated as a petition for certiorari, it is dismissible for lack of merit.