Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991

Melvyn P. Leffier
e are accustomed to viewing the cold war as a determined had no master plan to spread revolution or conquer the world. He and heroic response of the U.S. to communist aggression was determined to establish a sphere of influence in eastern Europe spearheaded and orchestrated by the Soviet Union. TTiis imwhere his communist minions would rule. But at the same time. Staage was carefully constructed by presidents and their advisers in their lin wanted to get along with his wartime allies in order to control the memoirs (i). This view also was incorporated in some of the first scholrebirth of German and Japanese power, which he assumed was ineviarly works on the cold war, but was then table. Consequently, he frequently caurebutted by a wide variety of revisionist tioned communist followers in France. historians who blamed ofBcials in WashItaly, Greece, and elsewhere to avoid ington as well as those in Moscow for the provocative actions that might frighten origins of the Soviet-American conflict or antagonize his wartime allies. Within (2). Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the his own country and his own sphere, he cold war the traditional interpretation was cruel, evil, almost genocidal. just reemerged. John Gaddis, arguably the as Gaddis and other traditional scholars most eminent historian of the cold war, suggest (4). Yet U.S. and British officials wrote in the mid-1990s that the cold were initially eager to work with him. war was a struggle of good versus evil, of They rarely dwelled upon his domestic wise and democratic leaders in the We.st barbarism. Typically, President Harry S reacting to the crimes and inhumanity of Truman wrote his wife, Bess, after his loseph Stahn, the brutal dictator in the first meeting with StaHn: "1 like Stalin. Kremlin (3). . . . He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise when he This interpretation places the cold can't get it." Typically, W. Averell Harriwar in a traditional framework. It is one man. the U.S. ambassador to Moscow, way to understand American foreign remonstrated that "If it were possible to policy between the end of World War II see him /Stalin/ more frequently, many and the breakup of the Union of Soviet of our difficulties would be overcome" Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) in 1991. But for quite some time now, historians, (5)political scientists, and economists have Yet the difficulties were not overbeen studying the cold war in a much come. American fears grew. To underlarger global context. They do so because stand them, scholars nowadays examine the new documents from the Soviet the global context of postwar American Union and its former empire as well as and Soviet diplomacy. They see the conolder documents from the U.S. and its altest between American freedom and Solies suggest that Stalin conducted a more viet totalitarianism as part of an evolving Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman, and Josef Stalin shake hands complex and inconsistent foreign policy at the Potsdam Conference. July 23, 1945. (Image courtesy of the fabric of international economic and pothan previously imagined and that U.S. Truman Presidential Museum &. Library. Accession number: 63- litical conditions in the twentieth century. officials initially did not regard Stalin, 1457-29.) After World War II, they say. U.S. leaders notwithstanding his crimes and brutalassumed the role of hegemon, or leader, ity, as an unacceptable partner witli whom to collaborate in stabilizing of the international economy and container of Soviet power. To explain and remaking the postwar world. why, scholars examine the operation of the world economy and the disMost scholars looking at Soviet documents now agree that Stalin tribution of power in the international system. They look at transnaOAH Magazine of History * March 2005 65

tional ideological conflict, the disruption of colonial empires, and the rise of revolutionary nationalism in Asia and Africa, They explain the spread ofthe cold war from Europe to Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America by focusing on decolonization, the rise of newly independent states, and the yearnings of peoples everywhere to modernize their countries and enjoy higher standards of living. Yet the capacity ofthe U,S. to assume the roles of hegemon, balancer, and container depended on more than its wealth and strength; the success ofthe U.S. also depended on the appeal of its ideology, the vitality of its institutions, and the attractiveness of its culture of mass consumptionwhat many scholars nowadays call "soft power" (6). At the end of World War 11, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two strongest nations in the world and as exemplars of competing models of political economy. But it was a peculiar bipolarity. The U.S. was incontestahly the most powerful nation on the earth. It alone possessed the atomic bomb. It alone possessed a navy that could project power across the oceans and an air force that could reach across the continents. The U.S. was also the richest nation in the world. It possessed two-thirds ofthe world's gold reserves and three-fourths of its invested capital. Its gross national product was three times that ot the Soviet Union and five times that of the United Kingdom. Its wealth had grown enormously during the war while the Soviet Union had been devastated by the occupation by Nazi Germany. Around 27 million inhabitants ofthe U.S.S.R, died during World War II compared to about 400,000 Americans. The Germans ravished the agricultural economy of Soviet Russia and devastated its mining and transportation infrastructure {7}.

Compared to the U.S, in 1945, the Soviet Union was weak. Yet it loomed very large not only in the imagination of U.S, officials, but also in the minds ofpoiiticai leaders throughout the world. It did not loom large because of fears of Soviet military aggression, Contemporary pohcymakers knew that Stalin did not want war. They did not expect Soviet troops to march across Europe. Yet they feared that Stalin would capitahzeon the manifold opportunities ofthe postwar world: the vacuums of power stemming from the defeat of Germany and japan; the breakup of colonial empires; popular yearnings for postwar social and economic reform; and widespread disillusionment with the functioning of democratic capitalist economies (8). During World War II, the American economy had demonstrated enormous vitality, but many contemporaries wondered whether the world capitalist system could be made to function effectively in peacetime. Its performance during their lifetimes had bred worldwide economic depression, social malaise, political instability, and personal disillusionment. Throughout Europe and Asia, people blamed capitalism for the repetitive cycles of boom and bust and for military conflagrations that brought ruin and despair. Describing conditions at the end of the war, the historian Igor Lukes has written; "Many in Czechoslovakia had come to believe that capitalism . . , had become obsolete. Influential intellectuals saw the world emerging from the ashes of the war in black and white terms: here was Auschwitz and there was Stalingrad. The former was a byproduct of a crisis in capitalist Europe ofthe 1930s; the latter stood for the superiority of socialism" (g). Transnational ideological conflict shaped the cold war. Peoples everywhere yearned for a more secure and better life; they pondered alternative ways of organizing their political and economic affairs. Everywhere, communist parties sought to present themselves as leaders of the resistance against fascism, proponents of socioeconomic reform, and advocates of national self-interest. Their political clout gTew quickly as their membership soared, for example, in Greece, from 17,000 in 1935 to 70,000 in 1945: in Czechoslovakia, from 28,000 in May 1945 to 750,000 in September 1945; in Italy, from 5,000 in 1943 to 1,700.000 at the end of 1945 (10). For Stalin and his comrades in Moscow, these grassroots developments provided unsurpassed opportunities; for Truman and his advisers in Washington, they inspired fear and gloom. "There is complete economic, social and political collapse going on in Central Europe, the extent of which is unparalleled in history," wrote Assistant Secretary of War John McCIoy in April 1945 (ri). The Soviet Union, of course, was not responsible for these conditions. Danger nonetheless inhered in tlie capacity ofthe Kremlin to capitalize on them. "The greatest danger to the security ofthe United States," the CIA concluded in one of its first reports, "is the possibility of economic collapse in Western Europe and the consequent accession to power of Communist elements" (12). Transnational ideological conflict impelled U.S. officials to take action. They knew they had to restore hope that private markets could function effectively to serve the needs of humankind. People had suffered terribly. Assistant Secretary

The cathedral at Legharn, Italy, was one of the casualties of World War II, The war wrought untold devastation; people yearned for 3 better future, (Image donated by Corbis-8ettman, BE048024,)

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sume the responsibility to provide dollars so that other nations had the means to purchase food and fuel and, eventually, to reduce quotas and curtail exchange restrictions. In June 1947, Secretary of State George G. Marshall outlined a new approach, saying the U.S. would provide the funds necessary to promote the reconstruction of Europe. The intent ofthe Marshall Plan was to provide dollars to likeminded governments in Western Europe so they could continue to grow their economies, employ workers, insure political stability, undercut the appeal of communist parties, and avoid being sucked into an economic orbit dominated by the Soviet Union. U.S. officials wanted European governments to cooperate and pool their resources for the benefit of their collective well-being and for the establishment of a large, integrated market where goods and capital could move freely. In order to do this, the U.S. would incur the responsibility to make the capitalist system operate effectively, at least in those parts of the globe not dominated by the Soviet Union. The U.S. would become the hegemon, or overseer, of the global economy: it would make loans, provide credits, reduce tariffs, and insure currency stability (16). The success of the Marshall Plan depended on the resuscitalion ofthe coal mines and industries of western Germany (17). Most Europeans feared Germany's revival. Nonetheless. U.S. officials hoped that Stalin would not interfere with efforts to merge the three western zones "Now,asintheyeari92o," Presiof Germany, institute currency dent Truman declared in early Marcli reform, and create the Federal 1947, "we have reached a turning Republic of Germany. Marshall point in history. National economies Plan aid, in fact, initially was ofhave been dismpted by the war. Tlie fered to Soviet Russia and its alfiiture is uncertain everywhere. Ecolies in eastern Europe. But Stalin nomic policies are in a state of flux." Palmjro Togliatti, the leader ofthe Italian Communist Party, addresses a large crowd would not tolerate the rebuilding Governments abroad, the president gathered in Rome to hear him speak. The communists offered one alternative to a of Germany and its prospective explained, wanted to regulate trade, better future. In countries like Italy, they enjoyed a huge following. (Image courtesy save dollars, and promote recon- of Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBtS, HU008913.) integration into a western bloc. struction. Tliis was understandable; Nor would he allow eastern Euit was also perilous. Freedom flourished where power was dispersed. But regiropean governments to be drawn into an evolving economic federamentation, Truman warned, was on the march, everywhere. If not stopped tion based on the free fiow of information, capital, and trade. Soviet abroad, it would force the U.S. to curtail freedom at home. "In this atmosphere security would be endangered. Stalin's sphere of infiuence in eastern of doubt and hesitation," Truman declared, "the decisive factor will be ttie type Europe would be eroded and his capacity to control the future of Gerof leadership tliat the United States gives the world." If it did not act decisively, man power would be impaired. In late 1947. Stalin cracked down on tlie woi'ld capitalist system would flounder, providing yet greater opportunities eastern Europe, encouraged the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, for Gormmmism to grow and for Soviet strength to accrue. If the U.S. did not and instigated a new round of purges (18). exert leadership, freedom would be compromised abroad and a garrison state German/s economic revival scared the Erench as much as it alarmed might develop at home (15). the Russians. The French feared that Germany would regain power to Open markets and free peoples were inextricably interrelated. To act autonomously. The French also were afraid that initiatives to revive win the transnational ideological conflict, U.S. officials had to make Germany might provoke a Soviet attack and culminate in another occuthe world capitalist system function effectively. By 1947, they realized pation of France. Erench officials remonstrated against American plans the IMF and the World Bank were too new, too inexperienced, and too and demanded military aid and security guarantees (19). poorly funded to accomplish the intended results. The U.S. had to asThe French and other wary Europeans had the capacity to shape OAH Magazine of History March 2005 67

of State Dean G. Acheson told a congressional committee in 1945. They demanded land reform, nationalization, and social welfare. They believed that governments should take action to alleviate their misery. They felt it "so deeply," said Acheson, "that they will demand that the whole business of state control and state interference shall be pushed further and further" (13). Policymakers like Acheson and McCloy, the officials who became known as the "Wise Men" ofthe cold war, understood the causes for the malfunctioning of the capitalist world economy in the interwar years. They were intent on correcting the fundamental weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Long before they envisioned a cold war with the Soviet Union, they labored diligently during 1943 and 1944 to design the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. They urged Congress to reduce U.S. tariffs. They wanted the American people to buy more foreign goods. They knew that foreign nations without sufficient dollars to purchase raw materials and fuel would not be able to recover easily. They realized that governments short of gold and short of dollars would seek to hoard their resources, establish quotas, and regulate the free flow of capital. And they knew that these actions in the years between World War I and World War II had brought about the Great Depression and created the conditions for Nazism, fascism, and totalitarianism to flourish {14).

their future. They exacted strategic commitments from the U.S. The dence movements arose in French Indochina and the Netherlands East North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 as a result of their fears about Indies. Nationalist leaders like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Sukarno Germany as well as their anxieties about Soviet Russia. U.S. stratein Indonesia wanted to gain control over their countries' future (23). gic commitments and U.S. troops were part of a double containment Decolonization was an embedded feature of the postwar international strategy, containing the uncertain trajectory of the Federal Repubhc system, propelled by the defeat of Japan and the weakening of tradiof Germany as well as the anticipated hostility of the Soviet Union. tional European powers. Decolonization fueled the cold war as it proHegemonic responsibilities meant power balancing, strategic commitvided opportunities for the expansion of communist influence. Third ments, and military alliances (20). World nationalists wanted to develop, industrialize, and modernize their countries. They often found Marxist-Leninist ideology attractive as Just as western Germany needed to be integrated into a western sphere lest it be sucked into a it blamed their countries' backSoviet orbit, so did Japan. U.S. wardness on capitalist exploiofficials worried that their octation. At the same time, the cupation of Japan might fail Soviet command economy and that the Japanese might seemed to provide a model for seek to enhance their own inrapid modernization. Stalin's NATO MEMBERS terests by looking to the Soviets successors, therefore, saw endSOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES or the communist Chinese as less opportunities for expandOTHER future economic partners. In ing their influence in the Third 1948, U.S. policymakers turned World; leaders in Washington their attention from reforming perceived dangers (24). Japanese social and political As hegemon of the free institutions to promoting ecoworld economy, U.S. officials nomic reconstruction. Japan's felt a responsibility to contain past economic growth, they revolutionary nationalism and to knew, depended on links to integrate core and periphery. The Manchuria. China, and Korea, Truman administration prodareas increasingly slipping into ded the Dutch and the French to communist hands. Japan needmake concessions to revolutioned alternative sources of raw ary nationalists, but often could materials and outlets for her not shape the outcomes of colomanufactured goods. Studying nial stru^les. When the French, the functioning of the global for example, reflised to acknowlcapitalist economy. America's edge Ho Chi Minh's republic cold warriors concluded that of Vietnam and established a the industrial core of northpuppet government under Bao east Asia. Japan, needed to be Dai in 1949, the U.S. chose to integrated with its underdevelsupport the French. Otherwise. oped periphery in southeast Truman and his advisers feared Asia, much like Western Euthey would alienate their allies in rope needed to have access to France and pennit a key area to petroleum in the Middle East gravitate into a communist orbit (21). It was the obligation of the where it would be amenable to hegemon of the world capitalist Chinese or Soviet iiifiuence. Falleconomy to make sure compoing dominos in Southeast Asia nent units of the system could would sever the future economic benefit from the operation of This 1950 map of Europe demonstrates the split between the Soviet Bloc in Eastern links between this region and Jathe whole. Europe and the members of NATO in the West, (from Dorjs M. Condit, History of the pan, making rehabilitation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Volume II: The Test of War. 7950-1953 [Washington, DC: But, as hegemon, the U.S. Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988].) industrial core of northeast Asia also had to be sensitive to the all the more difficult (25). worries and responsive to the In the late 1950s and 1950s needs of other countries. In Asia, as in Europe, many peoples feared Japan's extraordinary economic recovery, sparked by the Korean War the revival of the power of former Axis nations. Trutnan promised and fueled by subsequent exports to Norih America, defied American them that U.S. troops would remain in Japan, even as Japan regained assumptions. Yet. by then, American officials had locked the U.S. into its autonomy, and that the U.S. would insure peace in the Pacific, even a position opposing nationalist movements led by communists, like if it meant a new round of security guarantees, as it did with the PhilipHo Chi Minh. U.S. officials feared that if they allowed a communist pines and with Australia and New Zealand (22). triumph in Indochina, America's credibility with other allies and clients would be shattered. Hegemons needed to retain their credibility. Yet, much as American officials hoped to integrate Japan with Otherwise, key allies, like Western Germany and Japan, might doubt Southeast Asia, revolutionary nationalist movements in the region America's will and reorient themselves in the cold war (26). made that prospect uncertain. During World War II, popular indepen68 OAH Magazine of History March 2005

Hegemony and credibility required superior militai7 capabilities. disseminating their values and promoting their culture. Yet scholars of Leaders in Washington and Moscow alike believed that perceptions of the cold war increasingly believe that America's success as a hegemon, their relative power position supported risk-taking on behalf of allies its capacity to evoke support for its leadership, also depended on the and clients in Asia and Africa, In the most important U,S. strategy dochabits and institutions oC constitutional governance, the resonance of ument ofthe cold war, NSC 68, Paul Nitze wrote that military power its liberal and humane values, and the appeal of its free market and was an "indispensable backdrop" to containment, which he called a mass consumption economy (30}. "policy of calculated and gradual coercion," To pursue containment in the Third World and erode support for the adversary, the U,S. needed Endnotes 1, For exarTiple. see Harry S Triinian, Memoirs, Voi I: 1945, Year of Decisions, to have superior military force (27). Prior to L949, the U-S- had a morfpriiit (New York: Signet, Kjfjj, 1955): Truman, Memoirs. Vol. 11: Years of nopoly of atomic weapons. But after the Soviets tested and developed Trial and Hopir, 1946-1^52, repritU (New York: Signet, 1965, 1956}: Dwight D. nuclear weapons of their own, U.S. officials believed they needed to Hiserihower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, ig5J-i956 (Garden augment their arsenal of strategic weapons. Their aim was not only to City, N|: DoiiWeday, i96ii}; Di^aii C, Acheson, Prestnl at the Creation: My deter Soviet aggression in the center of Europe, but also to support tlie Years at the State DepaiimenI (Nfw York: Norton. 1969); George F. Kennan, ability ofthe U,S. to intervene in Third World countries without fear of Memoirs, 2 vnl, paperback ed, (New York: Bantam, 1967-1972), Soviet countermoves. 2. See, for example, |oyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World Nuclear weapons, therefore, produced paradoxical results. Their enorand United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); for a discussion of the dirFerent historiographical approaches, see my essay, mous power kept the cold war from turning into a hot war between the 'The Coid War Over the Cold War." in Gordon Martel, ed., American Foreign U.S. and the Soviet Union. Policy Reconsidered. iHgoLeaders on both sides rec199J (London; Routledge, ognized that sucti a war 1994). would be suicidal. But at 3, John Lewis Caddis, We the same time nuclear Now Know: Rethinking Cold weapons encouraged ofWar History (New York: Oxford University Press. ficials in both Washington and Moscow to engage in 1997)4, For some of the best new risk-taking on the "periphscholarship on Stalin, see ery," tliat is, in Asia, Africa, Simon Sebag Montefiore. the Middle East, and the Stalin: The Court of the Caribbean because each Red Tsar, reprint (New side thought (and hoped) York: Knopf, 2004, 2003); that the adversary would Norman M. Naimark, not dare to escalate the The Russians in Germany; A History of the Sowet competition into a nucleZone of Occupation, 1945ar exchange (28). When '949 (Cambridge, MA; Ronald Reagan revived Belknap Press of Harvard the determination of the University Press, 1995); U.S. to regain military Vojtech Mastny, The Cold superiority in the 1980s, War and Soviet Insecurity: 77ie Stalin Years (New York; he sought to use those Oxford U n iversity Press, military capabilities, not 1996): Eduard Maximilian for a preemptive attack Mark, "Revolution by against the Soviet Union, NATO was formed as part of a double conlditimeiiL itidtegy: containing the Soviet Union and GerDegrees; Stalin's National but as a backdrop to sup- many, Here, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman signs the NATO charter on April 4,1949, {Image Front Strategy for Fiirope, port U.S, interventions donated by Corbis-Bettman, U89965MCME,) 1941-1947," Cold War on behalf of anti-comInternational History Project Working Paper No. )i (Washington, D,C.; munist insurgents from Nicaragua and El Salvador to Afghanistan and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2001): Geoffrey Roberts, Angola, In other words, Reagan viewed superior strategic capabilities "StaliTi and the Grand Alliaiice: Public Discourse, Private Dialogues, and the as a key to containing communism, preserving credibility, and supportDirection of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1941-1947," Slovo 13 (2001): 1-15. ing hegemony (29). 5, Robert H, Frrrell, ed,. Dear Bess: The Leltersfrom Harry to Bess Truman, J910For U.S, officials, waging the cold war required the U.S. to win the transnational ideological struggle and to contain Soviet power. To achieve these goals, the U.S, had to be an effective hegemon. This meant that the U.S. had to nurture and lubricate tlie world economy, build and coopt western Cermany and Japan, establish military alliances and preserve allied cohesion, contain revolutionary nationalism, and bind the industrial core of Europe and Asia with (he underdeveloped pcriphei7 in the Third World. To be effective. Cold Warriors believed that superior militaiy capabilities were an incalculable asset. They focused much less attention and allocated infinitely fewer resources to
1959 (New York: Norton, 1983), 522: Harritnan to Truman, June 8, 1945, Department of State, foreign Relations ofthe United States: The Conference of Berlin: Hie Potsdam Conference, 1945 (2 vols,, Washington, D,C,; Government Printing Office, 1960), 1; 61. 6, For soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power. The Means to Succts,s in World Politiis (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): Nyc, The Paradox of American I'ower: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 7, Paul M, Kennedy, The Rise and Fall ofthe Creat Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From i^ooto2000 (New York: Random House, [987), 347-72; R, j . Overy, Russia's War (London; Penguin Books, 1997); Allan M. Winkler.

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19. William I. Hitchcock. Erance Restored: Cold War Diplomac)' and the Quest for Home Front U.S.A.: America During World War II, 2nd ed, (Wheeling, IL: Leadership in Furope. 1944-1954 (Chapel Hi!!: University of North Carolina Harlan Davidson, 2000}. 8. Meivyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance ofPower. Nationd Security, the Truman Administration, Press, 1998). 20. Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins ofthe North andtheCoid War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 1-141. Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1981). 9. Igor Lukes, "The Czech Road to Communism," in Norman M. Naimark 21. Michael Schaller, 77ie American Occupalionofjapan: The Origins ofthe Cold War and L. IA. Gibianskii. eds., The E'itablishment of Communist Regimes in in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Howard B. Schonberger. Fastem Furope. 1944-1949 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 29; William Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of japan. 1945-J952 (Kent, OH: I. Hitchcock, The Struggle for Europe: The TurbuletU History of a Divided Kent State University Press, 19S9); )ohn W. Dower. Embracing Defeat: japan Continent. 1945 Jo the Present (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 1-12^. in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 271-3. 525-46. 10. Adam Westoby, Communism Since World War I! (New York: St. Martins 22. LefRer, Preponderance of Power. 346-7, 393-4. 428-32, 464-5; Roger Dingman, Press, 198)). 14-5. "The Diplomacy of Dependency: Tlie Philippines and Peacemaking with 11. Memo for the President, by |ohn McCloy, April 26,1945, box 178, President's |apan," joumal of Southeast Aman SliJit;s 27 (September 1986). 307-21: Secretary's File, Harry S Truman Presidivilial Henry W. Brands, "From 12. Centra] Intelligence ANZUS to SEATO: United Agency, "Review of the States Strategic Policy toward World Situation As It Australia and New Zealand, Relates to the Security 1952-1954" International History of the United States," Remew 9 (May 1987): 25070. September 26, 1947, box 203, ibid. 23. Por the emerging nationalist stnig^es in Indochina and 13. Testimony by Dean G, Indonesia, see William j. Duiker. Acheson, March 8, 1945, Saavd War. Nationaiism and U.S. Senate, Committee Revdution in a Diinded Vu:tnam on Bankingand Currenq', (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1995); Bretton Woods Agreement George McTtiman Kahiii. Act. 79th Cong., I sess. Nationalism and Revolution in (Washington, D.C: Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Comell Government Printing University Press, 1952). Office, 1945), i: 35. 14. U.S. Department ol Commerce, The United States in the World Fconomy (Washington. D.C: Government Printing Office, 1943); Harley A. Notter. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. '9J9''945 (Washington. D.C: Government Printing Office, 1950), 128; Georg Schild, Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Fconomic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944 (New York: St. Martin's, 1995). 24. Odd Ame Westad. "The New International History of the Cold War Three (Possible) Paradigms." Dif^matic History 24 (Fall 2000): 551-65; David C. Engerman, Nils Gilinan, Mark H. Haefele. and Michael E. Latham, eds.. Staging Growth: Modemizaiion,Dei'ehpment.and the Global Cold War (Amherst; University of Massachusetts Press. 2003). Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (right) is warmly greeted by Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno (second from left) at an Indonesian reception in 1960 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria. U.S. officials feared nationalist leaders of emerging nations would look to Moscow and Beijing. (Image donated by Corbis-Bettman, BE060377.)

25. Mark Atwood ljwrence, "Transnational C^oalitionBuilding and the Making of the Cold War in Indochina, 1947-1949," Diplomatic History 26 (Summer 2002); 453-80; Andrew Jon Rotter, Tlie Path to Vietnam: 15. Harry STnunan, Public Papers of the Presidents ofthe United States, 1947 (Washington, Origins oj the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). D.C: U.S.G.P.O., 1963). 167-72; sec also his Tniinan Doctrine speech whidi 26. For the importance of credibility, see the pathbreaking article by Robert J. followed a few days later. 176-80, and his special message to ihe Congress on the McMahon. "Credibility and World Power." Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): Marshall Plan, 515-29. 16. Michael |. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America. Britain, and the Reconstruction 455-71of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 27. NSC 68. "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April David W. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: Western Furope. America and Postwar 14, T950, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Caddis, eds., Containment: Reconstruction (New York: Longmans, 1992); Thomas W. Zeiler, Free Trade. Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia Free World: The Advent ofGATT (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina University Press, 1978), 401-2: NSC 114/2, "Programs for National Security," Press, 1999). October 12. 1951, Department of State. Foreign Relations ofthe United States. 1951; National Security Affairs: Foreign Fconomic Policy (Washington. D.C: 17. John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford. CA: Stanford Government Printing Office, 1979), i: 187-89, University Press, r976); Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the line: The 28. For Soviet policy, see A. A. Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftah. "Ont; Hell of American Decision to Divide Cennany, 1944-1949 (New York: Cambridge a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy. ig^^-igC-tjf (New York: Norton. University Press. 1996). 1997); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War 18. Geoffrey Robert.s, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and (New York: Norton, 2005). the Onset ofthe Cold War, 1947." Europe-Asia Studies 46 (December 1994): 29. Peter Schweizer, Reagan's War. The Fpic Story of his Forty Year Struggle and 1371-86: V. M. Zubok and Konstantin Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold Final Triumph Over Communism (New York: Doubleday, 2002). War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 30. C, John Ikenberry, Ajier Victory: Institutions. Strategic Restraint, and the 19961.46-53.

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Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars [Princeton, N]: Princeton University* For the Department of State, see <http://www.state.gov/history/>; for Press, 2OO!), 163-214; Robert O. Keoliane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and the Department of Defense. <http://wvinA'.defenselink.mil/>; for the Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Central Intelligence Agency, <http://www.cia.gov/>. The presidential Press, 1984}. especially 135-81; Michael Mandelbaum. The Ideas that libraries have sites containing selected documents, speeches, oral hisConquered the World: Peace. Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First tories, and other infonnation. You can access them through <http;// Century {Uew York: Public Affairs Press, 2002): Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by www.archives.gov/presidentiaLlibraries/index.htmI>. Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (New York: For short books locating the cold war in a global context, see RobOxford University Press, 1998); Gaddis, We Now Know.

ert J. McMahon. TJie Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press. 2003); David S. Painter. The Cold War: An Bibliographical Note International History (New York: Routledge. 2002); Geoffrey Roberts. Most governments publish primary source docutnents regarding The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, the history of their foreign policy. These documents are published 1945-1991; (New York: Routledge, 1999): Geir Lundestad, East, West, many decades after the fact, but we now have many documents for the North, South: Major Developments in International Relations since 1945. 1940s, 1950s. and 1960s. For the evolution of the role of the U.S. in the 4th ed. {Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1999). cold war, see U.S. Department Many scholars are now of State, Foreign Relations of using primary documents the United States (Washington: from the former Soviet Union Government Printing Office); and other communist counfor Britain and the cold war, tries to study the cold war. see Foreign and Commonwealth In addition to the books and Office, Documents on British articles listed in note 3. see Policy Overseas. Since the end David Holloway, Stalin and of the cold war, the Cold War the Bomb: the Soviet Union International History Project and Atomic Energy. J9J9-i9_56 has been publishing (and dis(New Haven. CT: Yale Unitributing free of charge) priversity Press, 1994); William mary source documents from Taubman, Khrushchev: The the Soviet Union and other Man and His Era (New York: formerly communist nations, Norton. 2003); Hope M. Harincluding the People's Repubrison, Driving the Soviets Up lic of China. They are indisthe Wall: Soviet-East German pensable for understanding Relations, 1953-196] (Princthe global context of the cold eton. NJ: Princeton Univerwar. See the Cold War Internasity Press. 2003}. Some of the tional History Project, Bulletin most fascinating books deal (Washington. D.C.: Woodrow with Chinese foreign policy Wilson International Center. and the relations between 1992-2004). The Central InMaoTse-tungand Stalin. See, telligence Agency (C!A) has China's Chairman MaoZe Dong (left) chats with Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh (right) at a for example. S. N. Goncharov, published several volumes of reception given for Ho in Beijing in 1955. (Image donated by Corbis-Bettman .BE045953.} John Wilson Lewis, and Litai documents. See, for example, Xue. Uncertain Partners: StaWoodrow J. Kuhn.s. ed., Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years (Springfield, VA; Center lin. Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, r993); Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill; Univerfor the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency, 1997); Scott A. Koch, ed., Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, J^^o-icj^c} (Washing- sity of North Carolina Press, 2001), ton, D.C.: History Staff. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central For key books on the effort to reconstruct the world economy afIntelligence Agency. 1995); Ben B. Fischer. At Cold War's End: U.S. Inter World War II. see Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in telligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, igSg-iggi (Reston, VA: Current Perspective: The Origins and ihe Prospects of Our International Central Intelligence Agency. 1999}. Economic Order {Uevj York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Herman Van der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy, 1945-19S0 There are several key Web sites for locating primary source materi(Berkeley; University of California Press. 1986); Alfred E. Eckes and als on the cold war. The most important are the Cold War International Thomas W. Zeiler. Globalization and the American Century (New York: History Project. <http://vwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topicJd=i4O9&fusea Cambridge University Press, 2003). ction=library.col]ection>; the National Security Archive. <htt.p://www. For transnational ideological conflict and the cold war, see Joyce gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>; the Parallel History Project for information on and Gabriel Kolko. The Limits of Power The World and United States NATO and the Warsaw Pact, <http://wvvw.isn.ethz.ch/php/>; and the Foreign Policy, lg^yig^^ (New York; Harper & Row. 1972): Walt W. RosDeclassified Documents Reference Service, <http;//www.galegroup. tow. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 3rd. com/psm>. The Federation of American Scientists also has a Web site ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Francois Furet. The with valuable documents on many issues, like the nuclear arms race. Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century See <http://www.fas.org/>. Many U.S. government agencies also have (Chicago; University of Chicago Press. 1999); Odd Arne Westad, Cold Web sites containing documents on current and past foreign policy. OAH Magazine of History March 2005 71

War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalr)' and the Origins ofthe Chinese Civil War. 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Michael E. Latham, Mode^mization as Ideology: American Sodal Science and "Nation-Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2000): David C. Engerman, Modemization from the Other Shore: American Intelkctuals and the Romance of Russian Dei'clopment (Cambridge, MA: Hai-vard University Press, 2003); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)There are some wonderful studies on decolonization, revolutionary nationalism, and the cold war. See, for example, Robert 1, McMahon, Colonialisfn and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. ig4y'ig (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981); Frances Goiida and Tliijs Brocades Zaalberg, American Visions ofthe Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia: US Foreign PoUc)'and Indonesian Nationalism, I92o-i9<f9 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002); Matthew lames Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins ofthe Post-Cold War Era {New York: Oxford University Press, 2002): Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana. Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). The Vietnam War is often examined in this context; see, for example, William [. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994}: George C. Herring. America's Longest War: Tiie United Statesand Vietnam, 'g^o-igy^, 4th ed, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). For power and the cold war, see Mark Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making ofthe European Settlement, 1945-196^ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999): William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, [992). Raymond L, Garthoff has written two lengthy and illuminating books that link power and ideology. See Garthoff Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C: Brookings institution, 1985) and The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D,C,: Brookings Institution, 1994)For discussions ofthe end oi the cold war that tocus on ideas and transnational movements, see Matthew Evangelista. Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 1999); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea ofthe West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End ofthe Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000): Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History ofthe World Nuclear Disarmament Movement. 1971 (0 the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). For discussions of hegemony and soft power, see the citations in notes 5 and 29, Zi Melvyn P. Leffier is the Edward Stettinius Professor of American History at The University of Virginia. Currently, he is a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the United Stafes Institute of Peace and holds the Heniy Kissinger Chair at the Library of Congress. His hook. A Preponderance of Power National ecurity, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford Univevsity Press, 199J/, won the Bancrofi. ferreli and Hoover prizes. He is now writing a book about why the Cold War lasted as long as it did and why it ended when it did.

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72 OAH Magazine of History * March 2005