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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

L-45839 June 1, 1988 RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, HON. GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW FAMILIA TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET AL., respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment and inhibition of the grant or award of provisional permits or special authority by the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) to respondent taxicab operators, for the operation and legalization of "excess taxicab units" under certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 101 "despite the lapse of the power to do so thereunder," and "in violation of other provisions of the Decree, Letter of Instructions No. 379 and other relevant rules of the BOT." The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present petition. Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents. Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101) Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides: SEC. 4. Transitory Provision. Six months after the promulgation of this Decree, the Board of Transportation, the Bureau of Transportation, The Philippine Constabulary, the city and municipal forces, and the provincial and city fiscals shall wage a concerted and relentless drive towards the total elimination and punishment of all clandestine and unlawful operators of public utility motor vehicles." the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus officio. To reinforce their stand, the petitioners refer to certain provisions of the Rules and Regulations implementing PD 101 issued by respondent Board, Letter of Instructions No. 379, and BOT Memorandum Circular No. 76-25 (a). In summary, these rules provide inter alia that (1) only applications for special permits for "colorum" or "kabit" operators filed before July 17, 1973 shall be accepted and processed (Secs. 3 and 16 (c), BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations Implementing PD 101, pp. 33 and 47, Rollo); (2) Every provisional authority given to any taxi operator shall be cancelled immediately and no provisional authority shall thereafter be issued (par. 6, Letter of Instructions No. 379, issued March 10, 1976, p. 58, Rollo); (3) Effective immediately, no provisional authorities on applications for certificates of public convenience shall be granted or existing provisional authorities on new applications extended to, among others, taxi denominations in Metro Manila (BOT Memorandum Circular No. 75-25 (a), August 30, 1976, p. 64, Rollo); (4) All taxis authorized to operate within Metro Manila shall obtain new special permits from the BOT, which permits shall be the only ones recognized within the area (par. 8, LOI No. 379, supra); and (5) No bonafide applicant may apply for special permit to operate, among others, new taxicab services, and, no application for such new service shall be accepted for filing or processed by any LTC agency or granted under these regulations by any LTC Regional Office until after it shall have announced its program of development for these types of public motor vehicles (Sec. 16d, BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations, p. 47, Rollo). The petitioners raise the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO GRANT PROVISIONAL PERMITS TO OPERATE DESPITE THE BAN THEREON UNDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 379; II. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND UNLAWFUL TAXICAB OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101; AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEDURE BEING FOLLOWED BY THE BOARD IN THE CASES IN QUESTION SATISFIES THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS. (p. 119, Rollo) We need not pass upon the first issue raised anent the grant of provisional authority to respondents. Considering that the effectivity of the provisional permits issued to the respondents was expressly limited to June 30, 1977, as evidenced by the BOT orders granting the same (Annexes G, H, I and J among others) and Memorandum Circular No. 77-4 dated January 20, 1977 (p. 151, Rollo), implementing paragraph 6 of LOI 379 (ordering immediate cancellation of all provisional authorities issued to taxicab operators, supra), which provides: 5. After June 30, 1977, all provisional authorities are deemed cancelled, even if hearings on the main application have not been terminated. the issue is MOOT and ACADEMIC. Only the issue on legalization remains under consideration. Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent Board emphasizes public need as the overriding concern. It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view thereof, it is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the benefits of legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so, without taking punitive measures against the said operators. Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936). It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the appropriate means are deemed given (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46). Thus, as averred by the respondents: ... [A]ll things considered, the question is what is the best for the interest of the public. Whether PD 101 has lost its effectiveness or not, will in no way prevent this Board from resolving the question in the same candor and spirit that P.D. 101 and LOI 379 were issued to cope with the multifarious ills that plague our transport system. ... (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 91-92, Rollo) This, the private respondents appreciate, as they make reference to PD 101, merely to cite the compassion with which colorum operators were dealt with under the law. They state that it is "in the same vein and spirit that this Honorable Board has extended the Decree of legalization to the operatives of the various PUJ and PUB services along legislative methods," that respondents pray for authorization of their colorum units in actual operation in Metro Manila (Petitions for Legalization, Annexes E & F, par. 7, pp. 65-79, Rollo). Anent the petitioners' reliance on the BOT Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 101 as well as its Memorandum Circular No. 76-25(a), the BOT itself has declared: In line with its duty to rationalize the transport industry, the Board shall. from time to time, re- study the public need for public utilities in any area in the Philippines for the purpose of re- evaluating the policies. (p. 64, Rollo) Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates with the trends of modern life, so must the Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the dynamic and flexible standards of public needs. ... Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie its hands' on its issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise" (Answer of private respondents, p. 121, Rollo). The fate of the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the records of the case, acceptance of the respondent's applications appears to be a question correctly within the discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with administrative action prior to its completion or finality . It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the administrative findings are not in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial support from the evidence. Finally, with respect to the last issue raised by the petitioners alleging the denial of due process by respondent Board in granting the provisional permits to the private respondents and in taking cognizance of their applications for legalization without notice and hearing, suffice it to say that PD 101 does not require such notice or hearing for the grant of temporary authority . The provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse. As to the applications for legalization themselves, the Public Service Act does enjoin the Board to give notice and hearing before exercising any of its powers under Sec. 16 thereof. However, the allegations that due process has been denied are negated by the hearings set by the Board on the applications as expressed in its orders resolving the petitions for special permits (Annexes G, H, I, pp. 80-102, Rollo). The Board stated: The grounds involved in the petition are of first impression. It cannot resolve the issue ex-parte. It needs to hear the views of other parties who may have an interest, or whose interest may be affected by any decision that this Board may take.

The Board therefore, decides to set the petition for hearing. xxx xxx xxx As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent Board to give personal notice to all parties who may be interested in the matter, which parties are unknown to it. Its aforementioned order substantially complies with the requirement. The petitioners having been able to timely oppose the petitions in question, any lack of notice is deemed cured. WHEREFORE. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders of the then Board of Transportation are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION August 27, 1929 G.R. No. L-30783 JUAN B. ALEGRE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondents-appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant. Camus & Delgado and Jose M. Casal for appellee. , J.: 1. That on November 8, 1927, the petitioner addressed to the respondent a letter of the following tenor: The COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMSManila SIR: I desire to export to England one hundred (100) bales of abaca which are not supported by any certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board recently created by law. I do not desire to submit to the decision of the inspectors of said Board, and want to ship the abaca referred to without any certificate of inspection. I would request you to inform me if I can obtain the permission of that office for the exportation of the aforementioned one hundred (100) bales of abaca. Very truly yours,(Sgd.) JUAN B. ALEGRE 2. That on the same day the respondent, through the Insular Deputy Collector of Customs, answered the above letter of the petitioner informing him that he would not be permitted to export the said one hundred bales of abaca unless the export entry covering the exportation is accompanied by a certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board, or a notation is written on the face of the triplicate of the export entry signed by the fiber inspector who made the inspection indicating that the abaca covered thereby has complied with the provisions of the law relative to the shipment of such product. Copies of the said letter and its enclosure are attached to, and made a part of, this answer marked as Exhibits A, B, and C. 3. That the provisions of the law relating to the classification, grading, and inspection of fibers were designed to remedy, and did remedy the dangerously unsatisfactory conditions of the Philippine fiber industry obtaining at the time of their enactment. 4. That the petitioner has secured fiber grading permits from the Fiber Standardization Board has otherwise enjoyed the benefits of the law providing for the grading and inspection of fibers as amended. Wherefore, the respondent prays that the amended petition for the writ of mandamus be denied with costs against the petitioner. As the result of a trial on such issues judgment was rendered as prayed for in the petition, form which the defendant appeals and assigns the following errors: 1. The lower court erred in not holding that the petitioner was estopped from questioning the constitution of Act No. 3263 amending section 1772 et seq. of the Administrative Code.

2. The lower court erred in holding that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as amended, are unconstitutional and void. 3. The lower court erred in ordering the respondent to permit the exportation of petitioners hemp without the certificate of the Fiber Standardization Board. JOHNS, J.: Act No. 2380 is entitled An Act providing for the inspection, grading, and baling of abaca (Manila hemp), maguey (cantala), sisal, and other fibers, and was enacted by the Philippine Legislature, February 28, 1914. Section 1 specifically defies the meaning of the words fiber, abaca, maguey, sisal, strand, string, tow, waste, grading station, and grading establishment. Section 2 is as follows: (a) The Director of Agriculture is hereby enjoined and directed to establish, define, and designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey, and sisal, which shall become the official standards of classification throughout the Philippine Islands, calling to his assistance the agencies of his Bureau, those of any other Bureau or branch of this Government, or such other agencies as he may deem necessary. (b) The Director of Agriculture shall prepare in suitable form the official standard of each grade of the fibers covered by this Act and furnish the same upon request to all authorized grading establishments, provincial governments, chambers of commerce, planters associations, and other instit utions directly interested in the trade, the actual cost of such specimen to be paid in advance by the party requesting the same. (c) The designation and mark of each grade of the official standard, together with the basis upon which each grade is determined, shall be defined and published by the Director of Agriculture in a Bureau of Agriculture General Order not less than six months prior to the date when this Act goes into effect; the Director of Agriculture shall furnish a sufficient number of copies of this order and of any other or others hereafter issue on this subject to the foreign markets, municipal presidents, provincial governors, and to such other persons and corporations as he may deem advisable, for general information and guidance. (d) To preserve the official standards as originally prepared, the Director of Agriculture shall stipulate the manner in which they shall be kept and shall define the period at the expiration of which they shall be renewed. (e) Any grading establishment shall have the right to prepare or renew the set of official standards of grades for its use, providing that such a set shall be an exact copy of the official set of standards and that it shall have been approved and certified to by the Director of Agriculture or his authorized agent. (f) The Director of Agriculture shall establish one or several standards for abaca which may have been partially cleaned or prepared in the form of tow, waste, or strings, at the request of a party concerned, if such standards are required by the market. He shall also likewise establish a standard or standards for the fiber of any species of Musa other than abaca for which there shall be a demand in the market. Such standards, if established, shall be designated and defined in the general order deferred to in section two (c) of this Act. Subsection (b), of section 3, provides: No person, association, or corporation shall engage in grading abaca, maguey, or sisal, unless a permit shall have previously been obtained, which shall be signed by the Director of Agriculture, such permits to be known as grading permits. Subsection (e) says: In grading fiber for export, each grade prepared shall correspond to one of the official standards, and it shall also bear the same designation and mark as the latter. The set of official standards shall be placed in a prominent position in the grading shed for reference. Section 5 provides: (a) All fibers included in this Act which are intended for export shall be pressed in bales approximately of the following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters; and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net. In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure, the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be determined in a general order by the Director of Agriculture. (b) The limit of size of diameter of each hank contained in the bale of abaca, the manner in which these hanks shall be arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and tying of each entire bale shall be designated by the Director of Agriculture not later than six months prior to the date on which this Act goes into effect. (c) Each and all hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank shall also be securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes the bale. (d) Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry. Subsection (g), of section 6, provides:

All fiber of which the official standard shall have been established as provided in section two hereof shall be graded, baled, inspected and approved as provided in this Act. And the last paragraph of subsection (i) says: The object of such inspection shall be to determine whether or not the grade inspected conforms with the official standard for the same, whether or not the private mark (if any) used is correct, and whether the bailing and labeling is in conformity with the provisions of this Act and the authorized instructions of the Director of Agriculture. Subsection (k) provides: Every shipment of graded and baled abaca, maguey, or sisal, which has been inspected and approved, shall be accompanied by a certificate or certificates of inspection attached to the bill of lading and duly signed by the fiber inspector who made the inspection. All certificates of grading shall be prepared in quadruplicate, the original and one copy to be given the owner, one copy to be forwarded to the Director of Agriculture, and one copy to be filed in the inspectors office. Section 7 says: (a) No person shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly or in part, or cause to be changed, obliterated, or counterfeited, the official or private mark or brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this Act, nor shall any person use any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the authorized orders of the Director of Agriculture; nor shall any person tamper with or alter the quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this Act. (b) Any person, associations, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction, be defined not more than two hundred and fifty pesos. (c) Upon conviction of any person, association, or corporation of a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the Director of Agriculture may withdraw and cancel the grading permit theretofore issued to such person, association, or corporation. It will thus be noted that the purpose and intent of the original law was to provide in detail for the inspection grading and baling of abaca, maguey, sisal and other fibers, and for a uniform scale for grading, and to issue official certificates as to the kind and quality of the hemp, so that an intending purchaser from an examination of the certificates might be assured and know the grade and quality of the hemp offered for sale. The original law, as enacted, was later amended and carried into, and made a part of, the Administrative Code, section 1244 of which is as follows: A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal or other fibrous products for which standard grades have been established by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law relative to the shipment of such fibers. Section 1783 of the Administrative Code, which corresponds to section 5 of the original act, now reads as follows: All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in bales approximately of the following dimensions and weight: Length, one meter; width, fifty centimeters; height, fifty-five centimeters; and weight, one hundred and twenty-five kilos, net. Every bale of fiber shall be free from strings, waste, tow, damaged fiber, fiber not identical with that which constitutes the bale, or any extraneous matter, and the fiber shall be thoroughly dry. All hanks of fiber contained in a bale shall be uniform in quality, and each hank also be securely tied by a strand to hold the hank together, and which shall be identical with the fiber which constitutes the bale. In any grade of abaca in which the quality of the fiber may be injured by excessive pressure, the approximate dimensions and weight of each bale of such fiber shall be determined in a general order by the Director of Agriculture. He shall in like manner determine the limit of the diameter of hanks contained in bales, the manner in which these hanks shall be arranged in the bale, and the manner of labeling and trying of each entire bale. Section 2 of Act No. 3263, which was approved December 7, 1925, among their things, provides: The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections seventeen hundred and seventy-one and seventeen hundred and seventy-two of the same Act: SEC. 1771-A. Philippine fiber inspection service. ? There is hereby created an office which shall have charge of the classification, baling, and inspection of Philippine fibers and shall be designated and known as Philippines Fiber Inspection Service and he governed by a standardization board. SEC. 1771-B. Standardization Board. ? There is hereby created a board which shall be designated and known as Fiber Standardization Board and shall be vested with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. Said Board shall consist of seven members, with the Director of Agriculture as its permanent chairman and executive officer, and the other members shall be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Senate: Provided, That one member shall represents the fiber exporters; one member shall represent the dealers or middlemen and two members shall represent the fiber producers. Section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, reads as follows:

The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standards shall go into effect. Section 1788 of the Administrative Code was amended to reads as follows: No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. Section 2748 of the Administrative Code now reads: Any person who shall change, obliterate, or counterfeit, wholly, or in part, or cause to be changed, obliterated, or counterfeit, the official of private mark and brand on any bale of fiber which has been inspected, graded, and stamped as provided in this law, or who shall use any tag or mark which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the authorized orders of the Fiber Standardization Board, or who shall tamper with or alter the quantity or quality of any bale of fiber which has been so inspected, graded, and stamped or who shall otherwise violate any of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos; and upon conviction hereunder of any person holding a grading permit, the Fiber Standardization Board may, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, withdraw and cancel such permit. The Legislature having enacted the law which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of fibers and the creation of a board to carry the law into effect, the question is squarely presented as to whether or not the authority vested in the board is a delegation of legislative power. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, a standard authority all over the world, vol. I, 8th ed., pp. 228-232, says: The maxim that power conferred upon Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to any other authority does not preclude the Legislature from delegating any power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. It may confer an authority in relation to the execution of a law which may involve discretion, but such authority must be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative officer or body may be invested with the power to principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. Boards and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and industrial evolution of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and various governmental power for the more efficient administration of the laws. Hence, the question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient administration. It must be conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law could only be carried into effect through a board of commission. The case of Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, is square in point. The law there construed is as follows: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representation of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or corporation to import or bring into the United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to the standards provided in section three of this Act, and the importation of all such merchandise is hereby prohibited. SEC. 2. That immediately after the passage of this Act, and or before February fifteenth of each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a board, to consist of seven members, each of whom shall be an expert in teas, and who shall prepare and submit to him standard samples of tea; . . . SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Treasurer, upon the recommendation of the said board, shall fix and establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States, and shall procure and deposit in the customhouses of the ports of New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and such other ports as he may determine, duplicate samples of such standards; that said Secretary shall procure a sufficient number of other duplicate samples of such standards to supply the importers and dealers in tea at all ports desiring the same, at costs. All teas, or merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness for consumption to such standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the first section hereof . . . . Construing which that court said: We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the legislation considered in Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, that it does not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring that the penalty power vested in Congress to regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted. And

The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what teas may be imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative power, is without merit. We are of opinion that the statute, when properly construed, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but express the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or presumably so because of their inferior quality. This, in effect, was the fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative policy declared in the statute. The St. Louis vs. Taylor (210 U.S. 281), construed the validity of an Act of Congress, which is as follows: Within ninety days from the passage of this Act the American Railway Association is authorized hereby to designate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height of drawbars for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops of the trials to the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several gauges of railroads in use in the United States, and shall fix a maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed between the drawers of empty and located cars. Upon their determination being certified to the Interstate Commerce Commission, said Commission shall at once give notice of the standard fixed upon to all common carriers, owners. . . . And after July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate traffic which do comply with the standard above provided for. And in its opinion said: It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the railway association and to the Interstate Commerce Commission. This is clearly a Federal question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted that after a date named only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be fixed by the association and declared by the Commission. Nothing need be said upon this question except that it was settled adversely o the contention of the plaintiff in error in Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470; 48 Law. ed. 525; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349, a case which, in principle, is completely in point. And see Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U.S. 364; 51 Law. ed. 523; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 367, where the cases were reviewed. (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 617.) It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provides: The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect. That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of official standards for commercial grades of fibers, and that the Fiber Standardiz ation Board shall determine the official standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers, and that: All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for export shall be pressed in uniform bales. The approximate volume and net weight of each bale, together with the manner of binding, marking, wrapping, and stamping of the same, shall be defined in a general order by the Fiber Standardization Board. And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in quality greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. That is to say, the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission. The petitioners contention would leave the law, which provides for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any m eans of its enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality. The appellee has cited authorities of similar laws, which have been enacted by different States of the United States, that have been declared unconstitutional in violation of section 8 of article 1 of the United States Constitution which confers upon Congress the authority to regulate commerce w ith foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. It must be conceded that within the meaning of the Constitution, the Philippine Islands is not a State of the United States, that it is not a Tribe of Indians, and that it is not a foreign nation. We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance deserves, and are clearly of the opinion that the act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed, without costs to either party. So ordered. Avance?a, C.J., Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions JOHNSON, J., concurring:

The reason for my dissent in the case of Walter E. Olsen & Co. vs. Herstein and Rafferty (32 Phil. 520), is the very reason for my concurrence herewith. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents. Jimenea, Dala & Zaragoza Law Office for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondent. Dizon Law Office for respondent Kathleen D. Saco. CRUZ, J.: The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker. Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the case to her prejudice. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2 The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission. We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985. Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6 It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers, which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino overseas workers."

Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee. The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA. The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the first place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11 But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows: ... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA. The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v. Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held: We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14 Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20 It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that Section C. Compensation and Benefits. 1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the amount of: a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators and master electrician c. P 130,000.00 for ratings. 2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled to under Philippine laws. ... 3. ... c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses. The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows: Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits. All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted, in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB. If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such laws. The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working class and the promotion of its interest. One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed. Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less in life should have more in law. When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter must be counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered. Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-32096 October 24, 1970 ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner. Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf. Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf. FERNANDO, J.:. Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law1 in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition, filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea asking that the constitutional and legal questions raised be decided "once and for all." Respondent Teddy C. Galo who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and non-delegation, is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and the reliance by respondent Galo and the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as promulgated, this Court, sees no obstacle to the determination in this proceeding of the constitutional questions raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial. As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other motorist filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on May 27. 1970 where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order. There was the day after, a motion for its reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk of court of respondent Judge issued, on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June 4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this court on June 18, 1970. In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal questions raised namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and therefore violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power be definitely decided. It was on until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during the course of such argumentation that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision. We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the Constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2. 1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed before him before respondent Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any further hearing by respondent Judge would likewise to limited to a discussion of the constitutional issues raised, no allegations of facts having made. This is one case then where the question of validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved moreover, the officials concerned as well as

the public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of questions of validity, could know the definitive answer and could act accordingly. There is a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such crucial issue, petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared having no cause of action with respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit. There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit, Climaco v. Macadaeg, 2 involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We there announced that we "have decided to pass upon the question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters themselves." There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the burden of showing the constitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown too much for respondent Galo. 2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached to its front and back which shall likewise be visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."3 It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came to force, Calalang v. Williams,4 identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso,5 reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."6 In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc7 with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote Justice Malcolm anew "the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers," 8 extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out "to all the great public needs." 9 Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: "Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time." 10 The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity were this Court to sustain respondent Galo. 11 That we are not disposed to do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the due process safeguard is angularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public safety. How can it plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated as it has always been with that is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsymphatetic appraisal. Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been unable to resist the teaching of many American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against an indiscriminate acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American public law, laissez faire. It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Cardozo speaking of that era: "Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do well to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges must obey." 12 For a long time legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption. The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in 1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States. 13 What is undeniable is that by 1943, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: 14 "We must, transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls." While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the laissez-faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then As early as 1919, in the leading case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 15 Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive march." People v. Pomar, 16 a 1924 decision which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to show that such a principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year before, the American Supreme

Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 17 in line with the laissez-faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm. What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there may be a declaration of nullity, but not because the laissez-faire principle was disregarded but because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for vindication. To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissezfaire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies" in other jurisdictions. 18 He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has definite and well defined philosophy not only political but social and economic. ... If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in selfdefense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes. 19 It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel, who likewise sat in the Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he categorically declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains "its virtuality as a living principle." 21 It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and control of public services. 28 So it is likewise under the Republic this Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, 29 nationalization of the retail trade, 30 limitation of the hours of labor, 31 imposition of price control, 32 requirement of separation pay for one month, 33 and social security scheme. 34 Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test. 3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: "No motor vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night." 35 Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to dimensions the following is provided for: "Glass reflectors Not less than 3 inches in diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner." 36 Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be "placed, installed, pasted or painted." 37 There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. 38 The color required of each reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39 Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: "Non-compliance with the requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed. 40 It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions. 41 It is likewise an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a fine of not less than P10 nor not less than P50 could be imposed. 42 It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. That is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads." 43 This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not long after the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments." 44 He continued: "Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 45 Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed. Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from, Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: 46 "It is well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes ... " 47 An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Lastly, the legality of Circular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the, delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will." (Yakus vs. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) ... It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers ... " 48 It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, farfrom-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May 28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity. Without pronouncement as to costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J. and Villamor, J., took no part.