Resolution 242: Israel's Right To Secure Borders

ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO SECURE
BOUNDARIES
Four Decades Since

UN Security Council
Resolution 242
The Proceedings of a Conference held in

Jerusalem, June 4, 2007
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

)‫המרכז הירושלמי לענייני ציבור ומדינה (ע"ר‬
©2009 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
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2
Contents
Preface — Dr. Lars Hansel 4
Introduction: Correcting the Record on

Resolution 242 — Amb. Dore Gold 5
Contextualizing Resolution 242 — Amb. Meir Rosenne 9
Security Council Resolution 242:

An Analysis of its Main Provisions — Prof. Ruth Lapidoth 13
The Territorial Clauses of Security Council

Resolution 242 — Amb. Yehuda Blum 28
The Plight of the Refugees and Resolution 242

— Prof. Ruth Lapidoth 37
The Principles of Peacemaking — Amb. Richard Holbrooke 45
Appendix A — UN Security Council Resolution 242 51
Appendix B — Statements Clarifying the

Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242 53
About the Authors 57
About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 58
About the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 60
3
Preface
Dr. Lars Hansel A recently published book in Germany about Israeli settlements in the West Bank
included an article entitled “Israel lost the Six-Day War on the Seventh Day.”
Director of the Israel Israel may have won the war in 1967, but many problems remain unresolved.
Office of the Konrad Every day the state is confronted by many unanswered questions, to which it
Adenauer Stiftung is struggling to find answers.
Relations with the Palestinians remain one of the main challenges. Sari
Nusseibeh, a Palestinian negotiator and current President of Al Quds University,
in an interview published in a German news magazine, said that without the
Six-Day War Israelis and Palestinians would still not recognize each other.
Only after 1967, he said, did the PLO slowly start to accept Israel, demanding
withdrawal from all the territories. Again, it took a long time for the Palestinians
to understand the need to negotiate with Israel, rather than expecting their
demands to be answered without question.
Israel has also adapted its policies. Ariel Sharon finally questioned the policy
that developed after the Six-Day War of settling the territories. Many see
the settlements today as an obstacle to a peaceful two-state solution — the
only stable solution. A diplomat with whom I spoke recently summed this up
succinctly: “Israel is looking for historic compromise, whereas the Palestinian
side, and today also maybe Syria, is claiming historic rights.”
The situation is very difficult and complicated, especially with a Hamas-led
government in the Gaza Strip. It will be a long journey to find any kind of solution.
Yet it is also clear that compromise is certainly needed on both sides to resolve
the main issues in the final settlement of the conflict, including the refugee
question, the status of Jerusalem, and the future of the Jewish settlements.
The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung stands for Israel’s right to exist in secure borders,
at peace with its neighbors. It supports debates about possible solutions and
provides platforms for discussion. The purpose of this volume is to make
just such a contribution to the current debate, sharing the insights, thoughts,
and experience of experts. Hopefully, these articles will lead to interesting
deliberations and fruitful discussions.
4 Preface
Introduction:
Correcting the Record on Resolution 242
Amb. Dore Gold United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 is the
most important UN resolution for peacemaking in the Arab-Israel conflict.
Former Israeli Though carefully negotiated forty years ago in the aftermath of the 1967 Six-
Ambassador to the Day War, it has remained the foundation for all peacemaking efforts — from
UN; President of the the Israel-Egypt treaty of peace to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, to the
Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Agreements. For any student of the
Jerusalem Center for Middle East it is well known that the resolution never established the extent
Public Affairs of Israel’s required withdrawal from territories captured during the Six-Day
War in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors.
Nevertheless, over the past decade, several press organizations have falsely
characterized UN resolutions as requiring Israel to withdraw entirely from the
West Bank and Gaza. For example, an Associated Press (AP) article asserted
Resolution 242 that “Security council resolutions 242 and 338 call on Israel to withdraw from
says that as part all territory captured in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, which includes
east Jerusalem, the West Bank and Golan Heights.”1 This characterization
of a final peace was completely inaccurate. Resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from
settlement, Israel “territory,” decidedly not “all territory,” and the borders of such a withdrawal
must have “secure were meant to reflect each state’s right to live in “secure and recognized”
boundaries in the region.
and recognized” The New York Times caught this distinction, and it ran a correction for
borders. committing essentially the same error as the AP: William A. Orme had cited
“resolutions” calling on Israel to withdraw to its “pre-1967 borders.”2 As the
correction pointed out, no such resolutions exist. In this vein, New York Times
Executive Editor Joseph Lelyveld addressed his employees in a speech which,
among other complaints, included the following castigation: “Three times
in recent months we’ve had to run corrections on the actual provisions of
UN Resolution 242, providing great cheer and sustenance to those readers
who are convinced we are opinionated and not well informed on Middle East
issues.”3
The New York Times acknowledged its errors with corrections, such as the
one published on September 8, 2000:
An article on Wednesday about the Middle East peace talks referred

incorrectly to United Nations resolutions on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. While Security Council Resolution 242, passed after the
1967 Middle East War, calls for Israel’s armed forces to withdraw
“from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” no resolution calls
for Israeli withdrawal from all territory, including East Jerusalem,
occupied in the war.
Correcting the Record on Resolution 242 5

Lelyveld clearly understood the content and meaning of Resolution 242. He also
understood that by repeatedly getting it wrong the New York Times was harming
its own credibility. Nonetheless, some of its finest columnists fell into this same
trap of misrepresenting Resolution 242. For example, Thomas Friedman, who
covered the Arab-Israeli conflict from Beirut and Jerusalem, wrote a column
in 2002 which again distorted Resolution 242:
Earlier this month, I wrote a column suggesting that the 22

members of the Arab League, at their summit in Beirut on March
27 and 28, make a simple, clear-cut proposal to Israel to break
the Israeli-Palestinian impasse: In return for a total withdrawal
by Israel to the June 4, 1967 lines, and the establishment of a
Resolution 242 Palestinian state, the 22 members of the Arab League would offer
Israel full diplomatic relations, normalized trade and security
does not mandate guarantees. Full withdrawal, in accord with U.N. Resolution 242, for
Israeli withdrawal full peace between Israel and the entire Arab world. Why not?4
[emphasis added]
from all territories
taken in the 1967 The latest contributor to this effort to twist the original meaning of Resolution
242 is former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in his 2006 book, Palestine: Peace
war. Not Apartheid. Carter asserts, for example, that Israel should undertake a
“withdrawal to the 1967 border specified in UN Resolution 242.” In a critique of
the Carter books, his former colleague, Professor Kenneth W. Stein of Emory
University, attacks Carter’s attempt to revise Resolution 242: “Nowhere in
the resolution does it stipulate what or where Israel’s border should be, nor
does the resolution mandate Israeli withdrawal from all territories taken in
the 1967 war.”5
An ancillary problem is the exact status of the pre-1967 boundary, known as
the 1949 Armistice Line, which was only a military line and not a recognized
international boundary. As the main drafter of Resolution 242, Lord Caradon,
the British ambassador to the UN in 1967, stated in 1974:
It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions
of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial.
After all, they were just the places where the soldiers of each side
happened to be on the day the fighting stopped in 1948. They were just
armistice lines. That’s why we didn’t demand that the Israelis return
to them.6
Yet Carter assigns to the 1949 Armistice Line a new legal significance. He writes
that Resolution 242 “confirmed Israel’s existence within its 1949 borders as
promised in the Camp David Accords and Oslo Agreement.” Not only is this
statement inconsistent with Resolution 242, but it is not to be found in either
6 Correcting the Record on Resolution 242

the 1978 Camp David Accords or the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles.
Unfortunately, Carter widely lectures on university campuses and it is difficult
to ascertain the impact of his mistaken rendition of Israel’s international legal
obligations.
Since Carter’s presidency, U.S. officials have been careful to protect Israel’s
rights and the true meaning of Resolution 242. The most recent example of
this was President George W. Bush’s letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on
April 14, 2004, which stated:
As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and

recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between
the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In
President Bush: light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major
“It is unrealistic to Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome
of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the
expect…a full and armistice lines of 1949.
complete return to Undoubtedly Bush’s letter helped rectify the growing misinterpretations
the armistice lines of Resolution 242. Significantly, it was also supported by large bi-partisan
of 1949.” majorities in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives on June
23-24, 2004. Nonetheless, the need to explain the real meaning of Resolution
242 is growing. For that reason, the essays in this book are of extreme
importance for the academic, diplomatic, and journalistic communities that
avidly follow developments in the Middle East.
Notes
1 “Syrian Minister Hails Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon,” Associated Press, April 8,
2000.
2 Many of these examples are to be found in Jeff Helmreich, “Journalistic License:
Professional Standards in the Print Media’s Coverage of Israel,” Jerusalem Viewpoints,
August 2001, www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=2&DBID=1&LNGI
D=1&TMID=111&FID=253&PID=0&IID=1126&TTL=Journalistic_License:_Professional_
Standards_in_the_Print_Media’s_Coverage_of_Israel. See also, William A. Orme,
“Peace Negotiators Meet in Egypt as Israeli Election Nears,” New York Times, January
22, 2001, A6.
3 From an internal New York Times report on a speech by Executive Editor Joseph Lelyveld
at the Fourth Annual Newsroom Retreat held in Tarrytown, New York, September 14,
2000. Cited by SmarterTimes.Com.
Correcting the Record on Resolution 242 7

4 Thomas Friedman, “An Intriguing Signal from the Saudi Crown Prince,” New York Times,
February 17, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9801E3D6133FF
934A25751C0A9649C8B63&scp=1&sq=thomas%20friedman%20february%2017,%20
2002&st=cse.
5 Kenneth W. Stein, “My Problem with Jimmy Carter’s Book,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring
2007, www.meforum.org/article/1633.
6 Cited from the Beirut Daily Star, June 12, 1974, by Andrea Levin, “Correcting Carter’s
Distortion,” Jerusalem Post, January 16, 2007.
8 Correcting the Record on Resolution 242

Contextualizing Resolution 242
Amb. Meir Rosenne It is impossible to discuss UN Resolution 242 in a vacuum: it must be
contextualized from at least two major perspectives in order for its long-
Former Israeli term significance to be understood. Firstly, any discussion of Resolution 242
Ambassador to U.S. and must be based on its true content and intentions, rather than the perception
of these following their distortion by propaganda claims. Resolution 242
France; Legal Advisor, called for negotiations to find solutions. These negotiations are only hindered
Israeli Foreign Ministry by the distortion of the resolution by those who seek to destroy the peace
process. The second perspective from which it is necessary to analyze the
resolution is that of the agreements, or disagreements, signed surrounding
it. These various documents or expressions of intent clearly form an integral
part of any discussion on the subject, since they demonstrate the continued
presence and influence of the resolution on the international stage, as well
Discussion of as its development and evolution. The following aims to expose the original
Resolution 242 has intentions of the resolution and some of the agreements made surrounding
it. This analysis should be a first step in exposing and turning the tables on
been distorted by those who seek to distort Resolution 242.
propaganda claims.
1. Back to the Beginning: The True Intentions and Content
of Resolution 242
Unfortunately, if a claim is made often enough, even if it is a lie, it becomes
an accepted “truth.” This is especially true of today’s perception of Resolution
242. Many world leaders are unwilling to accept the current terms of the
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Rather, they wish to work according to their
distorted guidelines of Resolution 242: Israel’s total withdrawal from what
is known as “the occupied territories.” This is an Arab success — the Arabs
have managed to convince the world that Resolution 242 requires a complete
withdrawal to the borders of June 4, 1967. However, by reading the text of the
resolution, it is not difficult to establish the actual facts, and this has been
done by the author of the resolution, Lord Caradon, and world-known experts
such as Eugene Rostow, Julius Stone, and Ruth Lapidoth. The resolution does
not require unilateral Israeli withdrawal, but offers flexibility on borders. It
refers specifically to “secure and recognized boundaries” — terms which
could in no way be applied to the pre-1967 borders. These borders were
neither secure nor recognized. In the debates in the Security Council in May
1967, the Ambassadors of Egypt, Jordan and Syria emphasized the fact that
these “were no borders” and these were only “armistice lines.” There is an
extremely large number of articles written by former American diplomats,
among them Justice Arthur Goldberg who was the U.S. Ambassador to the
UN, and by Professor Prosper Weil from the Sorbonne, that emphasized the
fact that Resolution 242 constitutes a “framework” that does not establish
borders.
Contextualizing Resolution 242 9

Before Resolution 242 was adopted, there was a Soviet attempt to include
language referring to “withdrawal to the 4 of June lines.” It was never
adopted.
Moreover, although Arab propaganda has succeeded in convincing public opinion
and diplomats alike that Resolution 242 is self-enforcing, this is certainly not
the case. UN law provides for different kinds of Security Council resolutions,
including recommendations for settling conflicts (under Chapter VI) and
resolutions, which are binding and may be enforced by sanctions (under Chapter
VII). There is no doubt that Resolution 242 was adopted under the former,
Chapter VI, and thus it is a recommendation, rather than a self-enforcing or
binding order. The fact of the matter is that this resolution was a basis for
There is no negotiations, which would in turn establish secure and recognized borders.
There is no mention in the resolution of a Palestinian state, or a requirement
mention in to create one, although this of course does not negate the Oslo Agreements or
Resolution 242 of any others which Israel has signed and implemented. It should be emphasized
that the resolution refers exclusively to states and not to other entities.
a Palestinian state Amongst other claims currently made by Arab propaganda are those that
or a requirement there was no justification for the establishment of a Jewish state and that
to create one. the Temple never stood in Jerusalem. Yet such claims find no endorsement
in Resolution 242. Indeed, the resolution makes no reference either to
Jerusalem or to Palestinians. The attempt of the Arab states to incorporate
a reference to “Arab” refugees in the resolution was rejected. There is,
however, a reference in Resolution 242 to “refugees” in general. As Arthur
Goldberg, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, explained in a letter to the
New York Times, at the time of its composition there were not only Arab
refugees but also Jewish refugees — about eight hundred thousand Jews
were expelled from Arab countries, forced to leave behind belongings, bank
accounts, and properties.
2. The Continued Presence of Resolution 242 in International Agreements

Traditionally, in lengthy negotiations with the U.S., Israel has signed Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs). Although Israel at times favored the use of the term
“agreement,” U.S. officials claimed that using this term would imply ratification
by the Senate. Hence, the term MOA (Memorandum of Agreement) was found to
be preferable. An MOU was signed between Israel and the U.S. shortly after the
Yom Kippur War, on the day before the Geneva Conference convened (December
1, 1973). Therein is a clause stating that “the U.S. will oppose and, if necessary,
vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms
of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242
and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purposes.” This
10 Contextualizing Resolution 242

commitment of the U.S. is also included in the Memorandum of Agreement
of September 1, 1975.
At the time, the MOU was confidential, but eventually it was presented to the
leadership of the Congress. In the Congressional Record there is a question
presented to the legal adviser of the Senate concerning this MOU: “Can the
U.S. make a commitment to a foreign sovereign to vote against any initiative
that would change a resolution in a manner seemingly adverse to the intent of
the authors?” The legal adviser’s response was that this is indeed enforceable.
In other words, from the standpoint of international responsibility, the U.S.
committed itself to this clause, unless Israel releases it from the obligation.
Of course, the issue is not always what is written in a legal text, but the extent
In 1973 the to which a country is ready to use its legal ammunition to defend its rights. If
U.S. pledged to Israel, at a certain time and on the basis of a legitimate decision of a legally
elected Israeli government, were to decide to give up part of its “ammunition,”
oppose changing it is absolutely free to do so. If Israel does not want to hold the U.S. to its
Resolution 242 in commitments on Resolution 242, it does not have to do so. Yet why Israel
would take such a step is unclear.
ways incompatible A further example may be found in the implications of a commitment made by
with its original the U.S. president to Israel on the issue of the Golan Heights. In 1975 Israel
purpose. was negotiating a partial withdrawal from the Sinai with the Americans, in the
framework of a cease-fire agreement with Egypt. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
asked the U.S. to commit itself to the acceptance of Israel’s presence in the
Golan and to pledge its support of Israel’s position in any future negotiations
with the Syrians. President Gerald Ford, in a letter dated September 1, 1975,
to Prime Minister Rabin, did not commit the U.S. categorically to supporting
Israel’s position. However, he did state that when negotiations on the Golan
would take place, the U.S. would take into consideration the strategic
importance of this area for Israel. The language is similar to that of President
Bush’s letter of April 2004, in which there is reference, on the one hand, to
the Jewish presence in civilian settlements in Judea and Samaria and, on the
other, to the need for all parties to accept the conditions of any agreement.
No less significant than the involvement of the U.S., although almost
directly opposed to it, is the role of the EU in peace negotiations and the
implementation of Resolution 242. Specifically, the EU’s reaction when Israel
signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, withdrawing from Sinai and returning
to the international border, is of great significance. On June 13, 1980, the EU
adopted the Venice Declaration, which implicitly rejected the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty.
At the time, the author of this article was Ambassador to France. He visited
the French foreign minister, asking how, fifty years later, a French teacher
Contextualizing Resolution 242 11

would be able to explain to his pupils how France, a democratic state, opposed a
peace treaty between two belligerents; how Europe had the legal or moral right
to decide that Israel and Egypt have not seen enough death and destruction,
that they should go on fighting. He responded by making two claims. Firstly,
he stated that the European reaction is unimportant to Israel in any case.
Secondly, this rejection pleased France’s “Arab friends” (such as the Libyans,
Syrians, and all those who opposed the peace process). It should be noted
that the Europeans’ basis for condemnation was that Israel had not solved the
Palestinian problem, despite the fact that at Camp David Egypt became the
first Arab country to achieve the acceptance by Israel of a regime of autonomy
for the Palestinians.
European opposition to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was perhaps
the greatest misfortune possible since, after all, Resolution 242 called for
negotiated solutions to conflict. When European countries voiced their opposition
to this treaty, it reduced even further the chances of other Arab countries
negotiating peace with Israel. The European negative attitude to the Treaty of
Peace discouraged all Arab states to enter into peace negotiations with Israel.
Likewise, the distortions of Resolution 242, which are accepted by diplomats
and the world at large, only push the solutions called for therein further away.
The steps which Israel must take in order to advance towards negotiations
and solutions are a return to the original intent of the resolution together with
awareness of positive commitments from other countries. Resolution 242 is
still the only legal basis for the peace process with the Arab states, and it does
not call for total withdrawal from the territories.
12 Contextualizing Resolution 242

Security Council Resolution 242:
An Analysis of its Main Provisions*
Prof. Ruth Lapidoth Introduction
Professor Emeritus of Hardly any UN resolution is quoted and referred to as much as Resolution
242. It has become the cornerstone for all stages in the settlement of the
International Law, Arab-Israel conflict — amongst these the Peace Treaties between Israel and
Hebrew University of Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), as well as the 1993 and 1995 agreements with
the Palestinians. There are several reasons for the considerable importance
Jerusalem attached to Resolution 242: its unanimous adoption and, perhaps even more
important, its acceptance by the parties to the conflict. However, as is well
known, the resolution has been the object of differing, and in some respects
conflicting, interpretations by the parties; therefore, an analysis of the
resolution and its various interpretations may be helpful. A short survey of
Following the Six- the origins of Resolution 242 will be followed by an examination of its legal
effects. Following this, an analysis of its specific provisions will lead to the
Day War, neither conclusion that it requires the parties to negotiate in good faith in order to
the Security reach agreement on the basis of several guidelines: an Israeli withdrawal to
secure and recognized (i.e., agreed) boundaries; the termination of claims
Council nor the of belligerency by the Arab states and the recognition by all parties of each
General Assembly other’s independence; guarantees of freedom of navigation in international
waterways in the area; a just and agreed solution to the refugee problem; and
called upon Israel the adoption of measures that guarantee the boundaries to be established by
to withdraw to the agreement.
armistice lines
established in 1949. The Origins of the Resolution
The Six-Day War of June 1967 ended with cease-fire resolutions adopted by
the Security Council.1 However, neither the Security Council nor the General
Assembly, which met in an Emergency Special Session, called upon Israel to
withdraw to the armistice lines established in 1949. Most likely, the reason
for this was the conviction that a return to those lines would not guarantee
peace in the area, as the 1957 precedent had proven.
In November 1967 the United Arab Republic (i.e., Egypt) urgently requested
an early meeting of the Security Council “to consider the dangerous situation
prevailing in the Middle East as a result of the persistence of Israel not to
withdraw its armed forces from all the territories which it occupied as a result
of the Israeli aggression committed on 5 June 1967 against the United Arab
Republic, Jordan and Syria.”2 In answer to this request, the Security Council
was duly convened and debated the crisis in its meetings of November 9, 13,
15, 16, 20, and 22.3
In its deliberations, two draft resolutions were presented: one was jointly
submitted by India, Mali, and Nigeria,4 the other by the U.S.5 In the course of
the deliberations, two further draft resolutions were submitted, one by Great
Analysis of Main Provisions 13

Britain (November 16)6 and another by the U.S.S.R. (November 20).7 Only the
British draft was put to a vote and it was carried unanimously. The resolution
as passed reads:
The Security Council

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area
can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance
with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should
include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;8
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment
of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative
to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the
States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve
a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and
principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the
progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
14 Analysis of Main Provisions

The Legal Effect of the Resolution
Although it is also authorized to adopt binding decisions, in particular when
dealing with “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”
(under Chapter VII of the Charter), it is well known that in most cases the
Security Council adopts resolutions in the nature of recommendations. The
effect of this particular resolution was discussed by the Secretary General of
the UN in a press conference given on March 19, 1992.9 Replying to a question,
the Secretary General said that “[a] resolution not based on Chapter VII is
non-binding. For your information, Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) is
not based on Chapter VII of the Charter.” In a statement of clarification it was
said that “the resolution is not enforceable since it was not adopted under
Had the intention Chapter VII.”
been to impose a Thus it would seem that the resolution was a mere recommendation, especially
since in the debate that preceded its adoption the delegates stressed that they
“binding decision,” were acting under Chapter VI of the Charter. They considered themselves to
agreement between be dealing with the settlement of a dispute “the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”10 There is
the parties no doubt that by referring to Chapter VI of the Charter, the speakers conveyed
would not have their intention that the resolution was recommendatory in nature.
been one of the The contents of the resolution also indicate that it was but a recommendation.
The majority of its stipulations constitute a framework, a list of general
resolution’s major principles, to become operative only after detailed and specific measures
preoccupations. would be agreed upon: “It states general principles and envisions ‘agreement’
on specifics; the parties must put flesh on these bare bones,” commented
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. Representative.11 The resolution
explicitly entrusted a “Special Representative” with the task of assisting the
parties concerned to reach agreement and arrive at a settlement in keeping
with its conciliatory spirit.
Had the intention been to impose a “binding decision,” agreement between the
parties would not have been one of its major preoccupations. In particular, the
provision on the establishment of “secure and recognized boundaries” proves
that the implementation of the resolution required a prior agreement between
the parties. In addition, the use of the term “should” in the first paragraph
(“which should include the application of both the following principles”)
underlines the recommendatory character of the resolution.
However, the question arises as to whether the extent of Resolution 242’s
legal effect was affected by later developments. In this context one must
remember that at a certain stage the parties to the conflict expressed their
acceptance of the resolution.12 This acceptance certainly enhanced its legal
weight and constituted a commitment to negotiate in good faith. But due to the

fact that the contents of Resolution 242 were only guidelines for a settlement,
as described above, the acceptance of the document did not commit the parties
to a specific outcome.
It has been claimed that Resolution 338 (1973), which was adopted after the
October 1973 war, added a binding effect to Resolution 242 (1967).13 Indeed, there
is little doubt that Resolution 338 reinforced 242 in various respects. First, it
emphasized that the latter must be implemented “in all of its parts,” thereby
stressing that all of its provisions are of the same validity and effect. Also, while
Resolution 242 spoke of an agreed settlement to be reached with the help of
the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Resolution 338 expressly
called for negotiations between the parties.14 There is no express statement
It is generally in Resolution 338 that it was intended to be of a binding nature, but rather, it
reinforced the call to negotiate in accordance with the general guidelines of
recognized that Resolution 242.
occupation
resulting from The Contents of the Resolution
a lawful use of In the following analysis of the contents of Resolution 242, four of the five
force (i.e., an act major issues addressed by the resolution will be dealt with (the question of the
refugees is dealt with in a separate article in this volume): (1) the “inadmissibility
of self-defense) is of the acquisition of territory by war”; (2) the withdrawal clause; (3) “freedom of
legitimate. navigation through international waterways in the area”; and (4) demilitarized
zones as a means to preserve the peace once it is established.
1. The “Inadmissibility of the Acquisition of Territory by War”

The exact meaning of Resolution 242’s preamble is hotly debated: does the
statement therein on “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” imply
that, in the opinion of the Security Council, Israel’s retention of the territories
occupied in 1967 was, and is, illegal? To answer this question, it is necessary
to draw attention to the fundamental difference between military occupation
and the acquisition of territory. The former does not entail any change in a
territory’s national status, although it does give the occupier certain powers
as well as the responsibilities and the right to stay in the territory until peace
has been concluded. Mere military occupation of the land does not confer any
legal title to sovereignty.
Due to the prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter, the legality of
military occupation has been the subject of differing opinions. It is generally
recognized that occupation resulting from a lawful use of force (i.e., an act of
self-defense) is legitimate. Thus, the 1970 UN General Assembly “Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation

among States,”15 and its 1974 “Definition of Aggression” Resolution,16 upheld
the legality of military occupation provided the force used to establish it was
not in contravention of the UN Charter. These two resolutions are considered
to be based on customary law or on UN Charter principles. In the words of
Prof. Rosalyn Higgins, “[t]here is nothing in either the Charter or general
international law which leads one to suppose that military occupation pending
a peace treaty is illegal.”17
The preamble of this Security Council resolution denounces “the acquisition of
territory by war,” but does not pronounce a verdict on the occupation under the
circumstances of 1967.18 It is revealing to compare the version finally adopted
with the formula used in the draft submitted by India, Mali, and Nigeria: there
the relevant passage read that “[o]ccupation or acquisition of territory by
military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations.”19
It is, therefore, of some significance that the version of the preamble finally
adopted, while reiterating the injunction against the acquisition of territory,
offers no comment on military occupation. Consequently, it cannot be argued
that the Security Council regarded Israel’s presence in these territories as
illegal. As an act of self-defense,20 this military occupation was and continues
to be legitimate, until a peace settlement can be reached and permanent
borders defined and agreed upon.21
Other interpretations of the passage — suggesting, for example, that the
passage was intended to denounce any military occupation — contradict not
only its wording, but also the established rules of customary international law.
Its form, its place in the preamble rather than in the body of the resolution,22
and a comparison with the subsequent passages all clearly indicate its concern
with the implementation of existing norms rather than an attempt to create
new ones.
2. The Withdrawal Clause

There is a serious contradiction between the attitude of the Arab states and
that of Israel regarding the extent of the withdrawal required by Resolution
242. While the Arabs insist on complete Israeli withdrawal from all the
territories occupied by Israel in 1967,23 Israel is of the opinion that the call for
withdrawal is applicable in conjunction with the call for the establishment of
secure and recognized boundaries by agreement.24
The Arab states base their claim on a combination of the above-mentioned
provision in the preamble on “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
by war” and the French version of the sentence which calls for “withdrawal of
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” (paragraph
1.i), namely “retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors

du récent conflit.” On the other hand, Israel’s interpretation is based on the plain
meaning of the English text of the withdrawal clause, which is identical with the
wording presented by the British delegation. It is also supported by the rejection
of proposals to add the words “all” or “the” before “territories.” Moreover, in
interpreting the withdrawal clause, one must take into consideration the other
provisions of the resolution, including that on the establishment of “secure and
recognized boundaries.”
It seems that the resolution does not require total withdrawal for a number of
reasons:
a. As has already been discussed, the phrase in the preamble (“the
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”) merely reiterates
the principle that military occupation, although lawful if it is the result of
an act of self-defense, does not by itself justify annexation and acquisition
of title to territory.
b. The English version of the withdrawal clause requires only “withdrawal
from territories,” not from “all” territories, nor from “the” territories. This
provision is clear and unambiguous. As Lord Caradon, the Representative
of Great Britain, stated in the Security Council on November 22, 1967:
“I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the resolution
that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear.”25 According to Prof.
Eugene Rostow, who was at the time Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs in the U.S. Department of State: “for twenty-four years, the Arabs
have pretended that the two Resolutions are ambiguous….Nothing could
be further from the truth.”26
c. The French version, which allegedly supports the request for full
withdrawal, can perhaps be considered ambiguous, since the word “des”
can be either the plural of “de” (article indéfini) or a contraction of “de
les” (article défini). It seems, however, that the French translation is an
idiomatic rendering of the original English text, and possibly the only
acceptable rendering into French.27 Moreover, even Ambassador Bernard,
the Representative of France in the Security Council at the time, said
that “des territoires occupés” indisputably corresponds to the expression
“occupied territories.”28
If, however, the French version were ambiguous, it should be interpreted
in conformity with the English text. Since the two versions are presumed
to have the same meaning,29 one clear and the other ambiguous, the latter
should be interpreted in conformity with the former.30

Likewise, the English version should be preferred, since it is identical
to the original version of the British draft on which the resolution is
based.31 It is a well-established rule in international law that multilingual
texts of equal authority in various languages should be interpreted by
“accordant la primauté au texte original”32 or the “basic language.”33 Various
authorities deal with this question in the context of treaty interpretation.
By analogy, the relevant rules may also be applied to the interpretation
of other document categories. English was not only officially a “working
language,” but also, in practice, the language of most of the deliberations.
Indeed, English was used by ten members of the Security Council, French
by three, and Russian and Spanish by one each.
The provision on d. In interpreting Resolution 242, and investigating the intentions of the
Security Council, one should also take into account all the antecedent
the establishment discussions in the Security Council (from the beginning of the crisis in May
of “secure and 1967) and in the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly
which convened after the Six-Day War.34 This “legislative history” shows
recognized that draft resolutions calling for the complete withdrawal of Israeli
boundaries” armed forces from all the territories occupied in 1967 were rejected. It
also demonstrates the predominance of the English language in all the
would have been deliberations.
meaningless if e. The preferred status of the English language has been recognized by
there had been implication by Egypt, since the English version was annexed to the 1978
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, agreed at Camp David by Egypt
an obligation to and Israel. Moreover, in this framework, the parties agreed that the
withdraw from all negotiations on the “final status” of the West Bank and Gaza will also
“resolve...the location of the boundaries,” thus indicating that a return
the territories. to the 1949 lines was not envisaged.35
f. The provision on the establishment of “secure and recognized boundaries”
included in paragraph 1.ii of the resolution would have been meaningless
if there had been an obligation to withdraw Israel’s armed forces from
all the territories occupied in 1967.
This interpretation of the resolution, i.e., that it does not call for a full withdrawal
of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in 1967, is also in line with
pronouncements made by various diplomats who were involved in the adoption
of the resolution and its interpretation.36 The gist of the withdrawal clause
is that “[w]hen peace is made, the resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal to
‘secure and recognized’ boundaries.”37
The question of the extent of the withdrawal foreseen by Resolution 242 has been
the main bone of contention in the negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

Many varied opinions have been expressed on the subject. Some consider that
the full withdrawal from the Sinai in pursuance of the 1979 peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel should serve as a precedent that requires full withdrawal from
further regions. Others have reached the opposite conclusion — namely, that by
carrying out the considerable withdrawal from the Sinai, Israel already fulfilled
any withdrawal requirement. Some have claimed that the lack of a requirement
for full withdrawal under the resolution allows Israel to carry out only minor
border rectifications, whilst others have coined the slogan “land for peace.” None
of these attitudes can claim to represent the proper interpretation of Resolution
242. As mentioned, the resolution calls upon the parties to negotiate and reach
agreement on withdrawal and agreed boundaries, without indicating the extent
and the location of the recommended withdrawal.
1.
2.
3. “Freedom of Navigation through International Waterways in the Area”
Since navigation of waterways was the cause of tension and several wars, it is
understandable that Resolution 242 mentions the need to guarantee this right.
It should be emphasized that the resolution foresees “freedom of navigation”
and not merely a “right of passage.”38 To which international waterways this
provision applies is not specified — most probably the drafters had in mind
the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the
Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. The right of passage “through the Suez Canal and its
approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis
of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations,” as well as
“unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight” in
the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, have been promised by Egypt and
Israel in their 1979 treaty of peace, and a similar provision on the Strait of
Tiran was included in the Israel-Jordan peace treaty (1994).39 However, these
arrangements are not binding on the other Arab states. Since Egypt is the sole
coastal state of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Suez, there seems to be no need
to negotiate on passage through these waterways with other states. The Gulf
of Aqaba has four riparian states — Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Saudia Arabia.
The first three have agreed on a liberal regime for the Strait of Tiran and the
Gulf of Aqaba. Future negotiations with Saudi Arabia should ensure its consent
to that regime as a riparian of the Strait.
4. Means such as Demilitarized Zones to Ensure Safe Borders

The means to guarantee peace once it is established include demilitarized
zones with an appropriate monitoring system. A demilitarized zone is an area
in which a territorial state has agreed not to have military units, arms, and
fortifications. An area can also be partially demilitarized, i.e., military units and

arms would not exceed a certain agreed level. Since demilitarization is based
on an agreement, it does not constitute an infringement on the sovereignty
of the state. However, those states that fear any real or perceived danger to
their sovereignty may prefer to use different terminology, such as a defensive
area, buffer zone, or limitation of forces zone. Resolution 242 recommends
the use of means including the establishment of demilitarized zones by
agreement in order to guarantee the peace between the parties. However,
since the demilitarized zones established by the 1949 Armistice Agreements
were a source of friction and conflict between Israel and its neighbors,40 any
provisions on demilitarized zones must take into consideration that experience
and avoid a recurrence of those difficulties. The 1949 Armistice Agreements
also established “areas in which defensive forces only” were permitted.
The 1974 Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement of Forces, in
pursuance of the 1973 Geneva Peace Conference, established “a zone of
disengagement” in which the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was stationed, and
from which forces of the signatories were excluded. The areas east and west
of this zone were to “be limited in armament and forces.” The 1974 Agreement
on Disengagement between Israel and Syria similarly established “an area of
separation” and “areas of limitation of armament and forces” (monitored by
the UN Disengagement Observer Force — UNDOF), as did the agreement made
in the following year between Egypt and Israel using the terminology “buffer
zones” and “areas of limited forces and armaments.” In the northernmost of
these buffer zones no forces of either party were permitted, only UN forces.
Three early warning stations were established (Egyptian, Israeli, and one
manned by U.S. civilians). The 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty established
“limited force zones” in the Sinai and the southern Negev, the degree of
limitation in the Sinai increasing from west to east. The maximum limitation
was to be found along the international boundary and all along the shore of
the Gulf of Aqaba. This regime is monitored by the Multinational Force and
Observers — an international force established in 1981 by Egypt and Israel
with the support of the U.S.
Concluding Remarks
It may be concluded from the above survey that Resolution 242 requires the
parties to negotiate in good faith in order to reach agreement on the basis of
a withdrawal of Israeli forces, the establishment by agreement of secure and
recognized boundaries, the termination of any state of belligerency, and the
recognition by all parties of each other’s independence and sovereignty. The
forces of Israel’s neighbors do not necessarily have the right to advance into
the areas from which Israeli forces withdraw, since the parties may agree

on the demilitarization of certain regions. The resolution also requires the
parties to negotiate on guaranteeing freedom of navigation in international
waterways in the area, on the search for a just settlement of the refugee
problem, and on the adoption of measures to guarantee the boundaries to be
established by agreement. These guidelines appear to be chapter headings for
peace treaties.
Resolution 242 is an indivisible whole, a “package” or “un ensemble de principes
dont la mise en œuvre simultanée est recommandée aux Etats parties au conflit
pour qu’ils mettent fin à celui-ci par voie d’accords internationaux.”41 However, in
their negotiations the parties are not limited or restricted by the guidelines
included in the resolution, which is, after all, forty-one years old, and cannot
be expected to cover all the questions and alternatives current in 2009. Thus,
the parties may also deal with matters not mentioned in the resolution, such
as cooperation in the fight against terrorism and environmental problems.
Moreover, they may also agree on solutions of a functional nature, in line with
recent trends in international relations that tend to be more functionally than
territorially oriented. In the words of Prof. George Shultz,
Today, the meaning of borders is changing, and so is the notion of

sovereignty....In these [i.e., the Middle East] territories a vision is
needed that transcends the boundaries of traditional nation-states and
addresses the clear requirements for the parties’ security, political
voice, economic opportunity and community life on an equal basis.
Constructs based on absolute sovereignty and rigid borders cannot

provide this vision....Thinking must increasingly be on a region-wide
scale. A little creativity about new mixes of sovereignty might help
move the peace process forward right now. The juxtaposition of
territory for peace need not be a matter of where to draw lines, but
how to divide responsibilities.42

Notes
* This article is partly based on a previous paper by the author (“Resolution 242 at Twenty
Five”) published in Israel Law Review (Is.L.R.) 295 (1992). The following essay is published
with the kind permission of the Is.L.R.
** The author has discussed the subject with a great number of experts, and the list is too
long to be fully reproduced. Special thanks are due to Prof. Eugene V. Rostow, Ambassador
Joseph Sisco, Prof. William V. O’Brien, Mr. Herbert Hansell, Dr. Shavit Matias, Brig. Gen.
Ilan Shiff, Ambassador Dr. Robbie Sabel, Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, Messers. Daniel
Taub, David Kornbluth, Benjamin Rubin, and Joseph Ben Aharon. Needless to say, the
responsibility for the contents is the author’s.
1 Resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967), 235 (1967).
2 UN Doc. S/8226 of November 7, 1967.
3 Security Council Official Records, (SCOR), 22nd year, 1373rd, 1375th, 1377th, 1379 th, 1380 th,
1381st and 1382nd meetings. For the legislative history of the resolution see Arthur Lall,
The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York and London: Columbia University,
1968); Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985);
Gideon Rafael, “Resolution 242 is Five Years Old,” Ma’ariv, November 24, 1972 [Hebrew];
Lord Caradon, Arthur J. Goldberg, Mohamed H. El-Zayyat and Abba Eban, UN Security
Council Resolution 242: A Case Study in Diplomatic Ambiguity, Introduction by Joseph J.
Sisko (Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of Democracy, Georgetown University,
1981).
8 The French version reads: “Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés
lors du récent conflit.”
9 UN Press Release SG/SM/4718 of March 19, 1992, 11, and the clarification DPI of March
20, 1992.
10 Lord Caradon, the Representative of Great Britain, SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd meeting,
November 9, 1967, 18, section 164; U.S. Ambassador A. Goldberg, ibid., 1377th meeting,
November 15, 1967, 6, section 54; the Representative of Denmark, Mr. Borch, 1373rd
meeting, November 9/10, 1967, 24, section 235; the Representative of Canada, Mr.
Ignatieff, 1373rd meeting, 22, section 212, and 1377th meeting, 9, section 86; Mr. Adebe,
the Representative of Nigeria, 1373rd meeting, November 9/10, 1967, 12, section 107.
It is true that in 1971 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided that a resolution
taken in accordance with Chapter VI can also be a binding decision (Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia [South West Africa]
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 [1970], ICJ Reports 1971, 16, sections
113 and 114), but this was not the prevalent view in 1967, when the discussions on

Resolution 242 took place in the Council. See John W. Halderman, The United Nations
and the Rule of Law (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceania, 1967), 65–89. See also: Julius Stone, No
Peace — No War in the Middle East (Sydney: Maitland Publications for the International Law
Association, 1969), 23–24; J. Dehaussy, “La crise du Moyen-Orient et l’O.N.U.,” Journal du
Droit International 95 (1968): 853–88 [French]; Shabtai Rosenne, “Directions for a Middle
East Settlement — Some Underlying Legal Problems,” Law and Contemporary Problems
33 (1968): 44–67, at 57; Yehuda Z. Blum, Secure Boundaries and Middle East Peace in the
Light of International Law and Practice (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1971), 63–64, n.127;
Yoram Dinstein, “The Legal Issues of ‘Para-War’ and Peace in the Middle East,” St. John’s
Law Review 44 (1970): 477; Amos Shapira, “The Security Council Resolution of November
1967 — Its Legal Nature and Implications,” Is.L.R. 4 (1969): 229–41; Ph. Manin, “Les efforts
de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et des Grandes Puissances en Vue d’un Règlement
de la Crise au Moyen-Orient,” Annuaire Français de Droit International 15 (1969): 154–82,
at 158–59 [French]; Pierre-Marie Martin, Le Conflit Israélo-Arabe: Recherches sur l’Emploi
de la Force en Droit International Public Positif (Paris: L.G.D.J., 1973), 232–34 [French].
11 Arthur J. Goldberg, “A Basic Mideast Document: Its Meaning Today,” address delivered at
the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee, May 15, 1969.
12 Sydney D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), at 178–179.
13 E.V. Rostow, “The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 1973,“ 6, American Journal
of International Law (Am. J. Int’l L.) 69 (1975): 272–289, at 275. Resolution 338 states:
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military
activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this
decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start
between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a
just and durable peace in the Middle East.
14 The author wishes to express her thanks to Ambassador J. Sisco for having drawn her
attention to this fact.
15 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of October 24, 1970.
16 General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974.
17 Rosalyn Higgins, “The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the
Security Council,” Am. J. Int’l L. 64 (1970): 1–18, at 8.
18 See Stone, at 33; Rosenne, 59; Martin, at 258–65; Higgins, at 7–8; Blum, at 80–91.
20 See Stone, 6ff; Quincy Wright, “Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation,” Law and
Contemporary Problems 33 (1968): 5–31, at 27; William V. O’Brien, “International Law
and the Outbreak of War in the Middle East,” Orbis 11 (1967): 692–723, at 722–23; Nathan

Feinberg, The Arab-Israel Conflict in International Law: A Critical Analysis of the Colloquium
of Arab Jurists in Algiers (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1970), 114–115; Stephen M. Schwebel,
“What Weight to Conquest?” Am. J. Intl L. 64 (1970): 344–347, at 346; E.V. Rostow, “Legal
Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East,” Proceedings of the American Society of
International Law 80 (1970); A.A. Cocatre-Zilgien, “L’Imbroglio Moyen-Oriental et le Droit,”
Revue Génrale de Droit International Public 73 (1969):52–61, at 59 [French]; John Norton
Moore, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement
of International Disputes,” Kansas Law Review (Kansas L.R.) 19 (1971): 403–40, at 425;
S.M. Berman, “Recrudescence of the Bellum justum et pium Controversy and Israel’s
Conquest and Integration of Jerusalem,” Revue de Droit International (1968): 359–74, at
367ff; B. Döll, “Die Rechtslage des Golfes von Akaba,” Jahrbuch fur Internationales Recht
14 (1969): 225–59, at 258 [German]; Martin, at 153–73; Amos Shapira, “The Six-Day War
and the Right of Self Defense,” Is.L.R. 6 (1971): 65–80; Allan Gerson, “Trustee-Occupant:
The Legal Status of Israel’s Presence in the West Bank,” Harvard International Law
Journal 14 (1973): 1–49, at 14–22; Th. M. Franck, “Who Killed Article 2(4),” Am. J. Int’l L.
64 (1970): 809–837, at 821; Dinstein, 466 et seq.; Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and
Self-Defense (Cambridge, 3rd edition, 2007); Barry Feinstein, “Self-Defence and Israel
in International Law: A Reappraisal,” Is.L.R. 11 (1976): 516–562; Edward Miller, “Self-
Defence, International Law and the Six Day War,” Is.L.R. 20 (1985): 49–73. Cf., however,
J.L. Hargrove, “Abating the Middle East Crisis through the United Nations (and Vice
Versa),” Kansas L.R 19 (1971): 365–72, at 367; M. Ch. Bassiouni, “The ‘Middle East’: The
Misunderstood Conflict,” Kansas L.R 19 (1971): 373–402, at 395; J. Quigley, quoted in E.V.
Rostow, “The Perils of Positivism: A Response to Professor Quigley,” Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law 2 (1992): 229–246, at 229.
21 See, for example, John Norton Moore, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation
to Pursue Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes,” Kansas L.R. 19 (1971): 425;
Schwebel, 344; Rostow, “The Illegality of the Arab Attack,” 276. It should be mentioned,
however, that according to various authors, Israel’s rights in part of the occupied
territories exceed those of a military occupant because of the defectiveness of the
title of the authorities who had been in control of those territories prior to the Israel
occupation; the principle has been maintained mainly with regard to the West Bank
(Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza Strip: see Schwebel, 345–46; Stone, at 39–40; Elihu
Lauterpacht, Jerusalem and the Holy Places (London: Anglo-Israel Association, 1968),
46ff; Cocatre-Zilgien, 60; Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the
Status of Judea and Samaria,” Is.L.R. 3 (1968): 270–301; Martin, at 265–79.
22 Irrespective of the rules that apply to international treaties, it is well known that preambles
to Security Council resolutions carry much less weight than the operative part.
23 See, for example, replies by Jordan (March 23, 1969) and by Lebanon (April 21, 1969)
to questions submitted by Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, in the Report by UN Secretary
General U. Thant, UN Doc. S/10070 of January 4, 1971. See also Talcott W. Seelye,
“Meaning of ‘67 Israel Resolution Disputed,” The New York Times, April 1, 1988 (the writer
was U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia and Syria).

24 Statement by Ambassador Abba Eban, UN General Assembly, Official Records, 23rd session,
1686th Plenary Meeting, October 8, 1968, 9–13, at 9 (section 92), 11 (section 110).
25 SCOR, 22nd year, 1382nd meeting, 7, section 61 of November 22, 1967. See also Cyrus R.
Vance and Joseph J. Sisco, “Resolution 242, Crystal Clear,” The New York Times, March 20,
1988. See, however, Yehuda Z. Blum, “Controversial UN Resolution 242, a Quarter-Century
After,” The Jerusalem Post, November 20, 1992.
26 Rostow, “The Perils of Positivism,” 241–242.
27 It seems that there was no other way to translate that provision into French: “When the
French text appeared, the British and American governments raised the matter at once
with the United Nations Secretariat, and with the French government, to be told that the
French language offered no other solution for the problem.…[N]one of the people involved
could think of a more accurate French translation.” See Rostow, “The Illegality of the Arab
Attack,” 285. See also Rosenne, 360–365, at 363.
28 SCOR, 1382nd meeting of November 22, 1967, 12, section 111.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 33.
30 Charles Rousseau, Droit International Public, vol. I (Paris: Pedone, 1970), at 289–290
[French].
32 Rousseau, at 290.
33 Sir Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties (London: Oxford University, 1961), 434:
“Tribunals dealing with a treaty written in two or more languages of equal authority
will sometimes seek to ascertain the ‘basic language,’ that is, the working language in
which the treaty was negotiated and drafted and regard that as the more important.” The
question of the interpretation of international documents of equal authority in two or more
languages in case of a discrepancy between the different texts has been dealt with chiefly
with regard to treaties. Thus the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) has
favored the language in which a treaty had initially been drawn up: “[Since] the Convention
was drawn up in French...regard must be had to the meaning of the disputed term in that
language” (Advisory Opinion on the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925,
P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 10, 18). For other examples, see Rousseau, at 290; McNair, n. 2.
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also implicitly refers to the original
text of the document since it recommends having recourse to the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion (Article 33, section 4). This provision
is based on Article 29, section 3 (formerly Article 73, section 2) of the draft prepared by
the International Law Commission. Actually, Prof. Alfred Verdross had proposed inclusion
of an explicit provision in favor of the text in which the treaty had initially been drawn up
(see Summary Records of the 874th meeting, section 5, and 884th meeting, section 44,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, [1966] vol. I, part 2, 208 and 271). But the
Commission preferred not to adopt a strict rule on the subject in order not to avoid taking
into consideration the circumstances of each case (see “Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its 18 th Session,” Yearbook of the International Law Commission

[1966], vol. II, 169–367, section 9 of the commentaries to Article 29, 226). However, Prof.
Roberto Ago has rightly pointed out that reference to the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion inevitably lead to the language in which the
treaty has initially been drawn up (see Summary Records of the 874th meeting, section
22, vol. I, part 2, 210). See also J. Hardy, “The Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties
by International Courts and Tribunals,” British Year Book of International Law 37 (1961):
72–155, at 98ff; M. Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980), 211; Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Manchester: Manchester University, 2nd edition, 1984), 152; Prosper Weil,
“Le Règlement Territorial dans la Résolution du 22 Novembre 1967,” Nouveaux Cahiers
23 (Winter 1970) [French]. For a different opinion, see the majority decision in the “Young
Loan Arbitration,” International Law Reports 59 (1980): 495.
34 Rosenne, 365.
35 Chapter A, Section C of the Framework. The author wishes to express her thanks to Brig.
Gen. Ilan Shiff for having drawn her attention to this aspect. In the agreements between
Israel and the Palestinians (1993 and 1995) as well negotiations on the future borders
are foreseen.
36 Vance and Sisco; Mr. Michael Stewart, Britain’s Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, Hansard, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Series, Vol.
791, Col. 844–5, and 261; Mr. George Brown, Britain’s Foreign Secretary in 1967, The
Jerusalem Post, January 20, 1970.
37 Rostow, “The Illegality of the Arab Attack,” 242.
38 R. Lapidoth, “The Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between
Egypt and Israel,” Am.J.Intl L. 77 (1983): 100.
39 See M. El-Baradei, “The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Access to the Gulf of Aqaba:
A New Legal Regime,” Am.J.Int’l L. 76 (1982): 532–554; Lapidoth, “The Strait of Tiran,”; R.
Lapidoth, “The Suez Canal, the Gulf of Suez, and the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt
and Israel,” in Festschrift für Rudolf Bindschedler (Bern: Staempfli, 1980), 617–633.
40 Nissim Bar-Yaacov, The Israel-Syrian Armistice: Problems of Implementation (1949–1966)
(Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967); Blum, Secure Boundaries, at 92–101.
41 See J. Dehaussy, “La crise du Moyen-Orient et l’O.N.U.” Journal du Droit International
95 (1968): 884 [French]; Wright, 24; Stone, at 35; E.V. Rostow, “The Middle East Conflict
in Perspective,” Vital Speeches 40/4 (December 1973): 103–107, at 105; John Norton
Moore, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue Peaceful Settlement
of International Disputes,” Kansas L.R. 19 (1971): 433; T. Draper, “The Road to Geneva,”
Commentary (February 1974): 23–39, at 27–28; Report by the Secretary General under
Security Council Resolution 331 (1973) of April 20, 1973, UN Doc. S/10929, May 18, 1973,
Annex 1, 1.
42 George P. Shultz, “A Chance for Some Serious Diplomacy in the Middle East,” The
Washington Post, March 6, 1990.

The Territorial Clauses
of Security Council Resolution 242
Amb. Yehuda Blum The frequent misinterpretation and distortion of UN Security Council
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, over the past four decades have been
Former Israeli an interpretational victory for the Arabs.1 Yet in light of the legal and practical
Ambassador importance of the resolution, a correct understanding of its territorial and other
provisions carries particular importance. Resolution 242 has been constantly
to the UN; referred to in official statements on the Middle East in something akin to a
Professor Emeritus of ritualistic incantation. It was also referred to in the two Camp David Framework
International Law, Accords of 1978,2 in the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979, in the Israel-Jordan
Peace Treaty of 1994 and even in the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles of
Hebrew University 1993, commonly known as the “Oslo Accord.”
of Jerusalem It is important to note at the outset the elements that are not mentioned in
Resolution 242. The resolution does not speak of a Palestinian people or a
Palestinian state.3 Nor does it mention Jerusalem. The resolution does not refer
Resolution 242 to a so-called right of return for the Palestinians. It speaks of a “just settlement
does not refer to of the refugee problem,” without even characterizing it as a specifically
Palestinian refugee problem. 4 It does not refer to direct negotiations; that
a so-called right subject was taboo for the Arabs in 1967. Indeed, the resolution was adopted a
of return for the few months after the three well-known Khartoum “no’s” were enunciated by
the Arab heads of state in the aftermath of the Six-Day War: no recognition
Palestinians, and of Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no peace with Israel.5 As a result of this
nowhere does the rejectionist Arab attitude, the resolution does not even mention the possibility
of peace treaties. It speaks merely of the “termination of all claims and states
phrase “land for of belligerency” and then makes a brief reference to the right of the states in
peace” occur. the region to live in peace — peace de facto, not de jure.6
The central argument of Israel’s adversaries and their supporters has been
that Resolution 242 calls for “land for peace” — for Israel’s total withdrawal
from the territories captured by it in June 1967, in return for peace. This, in the
present view and as will be demonstrated below, is a misconstruction of both
the language and legislative history of the resolution.
To start with, nowhere in the resolution does the phrase “land for peace” occur.
Moreover, nowhere does the resolution stipulate, as has been erroneously
claimed, full Israeli withdrawal from the territories in return for a full
peace.7
To be sure, it is not the merits of legal arguments that will determine the final
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (or, for that matter, of any other major
international conflict), since international law has a rather limited impact on the
course of diplomatic negotiations. Nevertheless, the distorted interpretation
of Resolution 242 must not be allowed to persist.
The resolution has three territorial components: first, the right of every state
in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;8 second,
28 The Territorial Clauses

withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories captured in the 1967 war;9
and third — in the preamble, as distinct from the operative paragraphs — the
inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war.10 It is certainly impermissible,
both from a logical and legal standpoint, to isolate one of these three provisions
and focus on it, while disregarding the other two. Resolution 242 can only be
correctly interpreted if these three components are read together with a view
to reconciling them with one another.11
With regard to the first of these components — namely, the right of every
state in the region to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries
— it is clear that Israel’s pre-1967 armistice demarcation lines met neither
of these specifications; they were neither “secure,” and “recognized,” nor
were they “boundaries.”12 The late Abba Eban, former Israeli foreign minister,
characterized Israel’s armistice demarcation lines with its neighbors of
Abba Eban the 1949–67 period as the country’s “Auschwitz borders that must not be
characterized restored.”13 Indeed, in the area of Netanya, the armistice line with Jordan
(Israel’s “narrow waistline”) left the country with a width of less than ten miles.
Israel’s 1949 The “Jerusalem corridor” (that linked the city with the rest of Israel until 1967)
armistice was no more than three miles wide on the outskirts of Israel’s capital.14 The
Egyptian air fields in the Sinai were only five flight minutes away from Tel Aviv.15
demarcation lines Undoubtedly, when the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
as “Auschwitz 242, security considerations were uppermost in the minds of its drafters.16
borders that must Nor were Israel’s pre-1967 armistice lines “boundaries,” within the accepted
meaning of this term in international law but, as already indicated, merely
not be restored.” armistice demarcation lines, as stipulated in Israel’s armistice agreements
made with its neighbors in 1949. The significance of this distinction is also
shown by a statement made by Jordanian Ambassador El-Farra in the UN
Security Council only a few days before the outbreak of the Six-Day War:
There is an Armistice Agreement. The agreement did not fix

boundaries; […] Thus I know of no boundary; I know of a situation
frozen by an Armistice Agreement.17 [emphasis added]
Although Israel originally desired to convert these lines into recognized

international boundaries, the Arabs opposed the idea. They were willing to sign
the 1949 Armistice Agreements on the assumption that they had solely military
significance; to underline the fact that these were not peace treaties, the heads
of the Arab delegations to the signing ceremonies of those agreements were
all uniformed military officials. The Arabs were adamant about the inclusion
of certain provisions in each of these armistice agreements (among them,
for example, the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement) to the effect that “no
provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims and
positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the
The Territorial Clauses 29

Palestine question, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively
by military considerations.”18 When the armistice regime collapsed with the
outbreak of the Six-Day War, the armistice lines were replaced by cease-fire
lines.19 Yet it is to this former (and long-defunct) armistice regime that Israel’s
opponents, citing Resolution 242, have invited it to return, although under that
regime the country had neither secure nor recognized boundaries.
In the Israeli-Egyptian sector those cease-fire lines have now been converted
by Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt into an international boundary.20 The same
is true of Israel’s boundary with Jordan: under Article 3(a) of the Israel-Jordan
Peace Treaty of 1994, “[t]he international boundary between Israel and Jordan
is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the [Palestine]
Mandate.” Article 3(b) then adds that this boundary “is the permanent, secure
and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without
prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military
government control in 1967.” However, Israel’s borders with Syria, on the Golan,
as well as with Lebanon, are still merely cease-fire lines.21
Regarding the second component, it has been argued by Israel’s opponents, as
already indicated, that Resolution 242 requires the total withdrawal of Israel
from all the territories captured in June 1967. In actual fact, article 1(i) of the
resolution calls for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict.” The article was carefully drafted in English by
its British sponsors, in consultation with the U.S. delegation. It deliberately
omitted the definite article (the term used is “withdrawal from territories”
rather than “withdrawal from the territories”).22 Due to the multilingual nature
of UN documents, the absence of the definite article in the original English
text has raised some questions. These are due primarily to the French version
(“retrait…des territories”) of the resolution.23 Yet all the negotiations that led to the
adoption of Resolution 242 were based on the English draft and were conducted
in English. It is a well-established rule of international law that multilingual
texts of equal authority in the various languages should be interpreted on the
basis of what is said in the “basic language.” In any event, while French was
admittedly a working language of the Security Council in 1967, having regard to
the legislative history of the resolution and to the fact that the French version
is ambiguous on this point, the original English version must be considered as
the “basic language” of the resolution.
Indeed, it was due to this omission of the definite article from the English
draft that the Arabs, the Soviets, and their supporters initially opposed
Resolution 242.24 In the days before the adoption of the resolution, the Arabs
and Soviets constantly remonstrated with the British Ambassador to the UN,
Lord Caradon, demanding that the resolution call upon Israel to withdraw from
all the territories, or, alternatively, that “all sides are required to return to their

initial June 4, 1967 lines.”25 They were rebuffed. The Soviet Union, India, and
other Security Council members tried to interpret the resolution as calling
for Israel’s total withdrawal, but both Lord Caradon and U.S. Ambassador
Arthur Goldberg responded that this was not the purpose of Resolution 242.26
In fact, as late as November 21, 1967, less than twenty-four hours before the
resolution was adopted, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin sent a letter to U.S.
President Lyndon Johnson demanding that the resolution explicitly state that
Israel be called upon to withdraw to its pre-war positions. Johnson replied that
the text was balanced and no changes could be introduced at that stage.27
Two years later, in 1969, an exchange took place in the British House of
Commons which reinforced the plain meaning of the text. British Foreign
The Secretary Michael Stewart was asked if the resolution called upon Israel to
withdraw from all the territories. He replied to the questioner: “No Sir, this
recommendation is not the phrase used in the resolution. The resolution speaks of secure and
for withdrawal recognized boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the
statement on withdrawal.”28
does not stand Indeed, the two provisions discussed above must be read concurrently. The
alone but rather recommendation for withdrawal does not stand alone but rather in conjunction
in conjunction with the “secure and recognized boundaries” clause. The provision calling for
the establishment of secure boundaries in the resolution would have been
with the “secure meaningless had there been an obligation to withdraw Israel’s armed forces
and recognized from all the territories captured by it in 1967.
boundaries” The last territorial component emphasized by some of Israel’s adversaries

is the provision on “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.”
clause. This phrase is found in the preamble, which, from a legal standpoint, is even
less binding than the operative paragraphs of the resolution, given that
Resolution 242 itself, in the view of the vast majority of commentators, is
in the nature of a recommendatory resolution adopted under Chapter VI of
the UN Charter.29 However, more significant than this formal aspect is the
substantive meaning of the phrase. In the first place, the fact that “acquisition
of territory by war” is inadmissible does not mean that the presence of Israeli
forces in Judea and Samaria is by itself presently illegal. The former president
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Dame Rosalyn Higgins, made a point
relevant to this question in an article published in 1970. She mentioned that
there was confusion, particularly disturbing to lawyers, between the notion of
territorial acquisition and that of military occupation. According to Higgins, “even
those nations which most pride themselves on respect for, and knowledge
of, international law can be party to this [misunderstanding].”30 Higgins then
pointed to “the general failure in debate, and in the text of Security Council
resolutions, to distinguish between claiming title to territory and legitimate
military occupation of it…there is nothing either in the UN Charter or general

international law which leads one to suppose that military occupation, pending
a peace treaty, is illegal….The law of military occupation, with its complicated
web of rights and duties, remains entirely relevant, and until such time as the
Arab nations agree to negotiate a peace treaty, Israel is in legal terms entitled
“Until such time to remain in the territories that she now holds.”31
Moreover, regarding the areas that formerly belonged to the Palestine Mandate
as the Arab (for example, Judea and Samaria), Israel’s rights there exceed those of a mere
nations agree military occupant. It will be recalled that the Arab armies in 1948 entered
to negotiate a Palestine — upon the termination of the British Mandate on 15 May of that
year — with the declared purpose of crushing by military force the new State
peace treaty, of Israel, which had been proclaimed on the day before, in pursuance of UN
Israel is in legal General Assembly Resolution 181(II) of November 29, 1947. Their military
intervention with a view to frustrating that resolution — and indeed, their very
terms entitled presence on Palestinian soil — constituted a use of force in violation of Article
to remain in the 2(4) of the UN Charter.32 According to Schwebel (a former judge and president
of the ICJ), in an article published in 1970:
territories that
[T]he facts of the 1948 hostilities between the Arab invaders of Palestine
she now holds.” and the nascent State of Israel…demonstrate that Egypt’s seizure of
— Dame Rosalyn the Gaza Strip, and Jordan’s seizure and subsequent annexation of
the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem, were unlawful….The
Higgins, former Arabs of Palestine and of neighboring Arab states rejected…the [UN
president of the General Assembly partition] resolution. But that rejection was no
warrant for the invasion by those Arab states of Palestine….It follows
International that the Egyptian occupation of Gaza, and the Jordanian annexation
Court of Justice. of the West Bank and [the Old City of] Jerusalem, could not vest in
Egypt and Jordan lawful control, whether as Occupying Power or
sovereign.33
Since the use of force by the Arab states was illegal, it could not give rise to any
valid legal claims. Ex injuria non oritur jus. On the interpretation most favorable
to them — and even this is challenged by Schwebel — their rights could not
exceed those of a belligerent occupant.
By contrast, the legal standing of Israel in these territories is therefore that
of a state which, as a result of measures of self-defense taken against forces
that had unlawfully entered Palestinian territory with a view to crushing it, is
lawfully in control of territories in respect of which no other state can show
better title. To quote again Schwebel:
[H]aving regard to the consideration that, as between Israel, acting

defensively in 1948 and 1967, on the one hand, and its Arab neighbors,

acting aggressively in 1948 and 1967, on the other, Israel has better
title on the territory of what was Palestine, including the whole of
Jerusalem, than do Jordan and Egypt.34 [emphasis added]
Schwebel’s justification of any modification of the former armistice demarcation

With Israel acting lines in favor of Israel, within former Mandate Palestinian territory, on the
defensively and its grounds that Israel can show better title than Jordan and Egypt respectively,
rests on solid legal foundations. Title to territory is normally based not on a
neighbors acting claim of absolute validity (few such claims could be substantiated), but rather
aggressively in on one of relative validity.35
1948 and 1967, It was by virtue of this conception that the law and jurisdiction of Israel were
“Israel has extended beyond the areas originally allocated to the Jewish state under
the UN General Assembly partition resolution of 1947 to all those parts of
better title on the the former Palestine Mandate held by Israel in the course of the 1948–9
territory of what hostilities. 36 It was in this manner that Israeli law and jurisdiction were
extended to Western Galilee (including Nazareth), Jaffa, Ashdod, Ashkelon,
was Palestine, Beer Sheva, the “Jerusalem corridor,” and the western part of Jerusalem
including the whole itself. This conception was articulated in the Knesset in June 1967 by the then
Minister of Justice, Ya’acov Shimshon Shapira, when, in submitting the bill that
of Jerusalem, than was to become the law of June 27, 1967 (commonly known as the “Jerusalem
do Jordan and Law”), he stated:
Egypt.” The legal conception of the State of Israel — an organic conception

adjusted to the practical political realities — has always been based
— Stephen M. on the principle that the law, jurisdiction and administration of the
Schwebel, former state apply to all those parts of Eretz Israel [the Hebrew name of
Mandate Palestine] which are de facto under the state’s control…
president of the in addition to Israel Defense Forces’ control of these territories,
International Court an open act of sovereignty on the part of Israel to make Israel law
applicable to them is also required….It is for this reason that the
of Justice. government has seen fit to introduce the bill which I now submit to
the Knesset.37 [emphasis added]
Over the past four decades many distortions have accumulated with regard to
the interpretation of the territorial provisions of Resolution 242. Only a clear
understanding of the resolution as a unified and integrated text may enable
us to understand its true meaning and intentions. The resolution creates
a blueprint for peace in the Middle East — a peace to be based on a partial
Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967 to secure and recognized
boundaries and on Arab acceptance and recognition of the right of the Jewish
people to re-establish in Israel its historic homeland.

Notes
1 See for example R.A. Falk, “The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation,”
American Journal of International Law (Am. J. Int’l L.) 63 (1969), 415; Q. Wright, “The Middle
East Problem,” Am. J. Int’l L. 64 (1970), 270.
2 Framework for Peace in the Middle East and Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel.
3 The resolution refers several times to the rights of “every State in the area.” See, for
example, articles 1(ii) and 2(c).
4 See article 2(b) of the resolution. See also S.D. Bailey, The Making of Resolution 242 (The Hague;
Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1985), 151. Thus, it conceivably applies equally to the Jewish refugees of
the 1948 hostilities in the territory of the former Palestine Mandate, as well as to the hundreds
of thousands of Jewish refugees from Arab lands who came to Israel after 1949.
5 Ibid., 130.
6 Articles 1 and 2 studiously avoid mentioning a peace treaty. However, the second preambular
paragraph of the resolution does speak of “the need to work for a just and lasting peace.”
Likewise, article 3 entrusts the Secretary General’s Special Representative, inter alia,
with the task of “…assist[ing] efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement” of the
Arab-Israel conflict. It is evident that even there the resolution refrains from mentioning
formal peace treaties.
7 This false interpretation has been espoused for instance by Falk, 415, 435 n. 55 and Wright,
270, 274–5 (note 1 above). It has even been suggested that such a full withdrawal must
precede any peace negotiations.
8 Article 1(i).
9 Article 1(ii).
10 See the second paragraph of the preamble.
11 On the requirement to interpret legal documents in their entirety with a view to reconciling
their various provisions, see L.H. Tribe and M.C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution
(Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1991), Chapter 1.
12 Yehuda Z. Blum, Secure Boundaries and Middle East Peace in the Light of International Law
and Practice (Jerusalem: Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1971),
Chap. 1, 63–70.
13 Interview with Der Spiegel magazine, November 5, 1969.
14 For a detailed account see Blum (note 12 above), 63–70.
15 Ibid., 69. Israel’s security concerns in the Sinai Peninsula were addressed in Article IV of
the treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel of 1979 and its Annex I (Protocol Concerning
Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements), amounting to a virtual demilitarization of
the Sinai. It may be mentioned in this context that Article 2(c) of Security Council resolution
provides “for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every
state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.”

16 Ibid., 77. For instance, when British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was asked in
the House of Commons in 1969 (two years after the adoption of the resolution) whether
Resolution 242 meant that the Israelis should withdraw from all the territories taken
in the 1967 war, he responded that “the resolution speaks of secure and recognized
boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal.”
See Hansard (Commons), 5th Series, vol. 791, cols. 844, 845.
17 UN Doc. S/PV.1345 of May 31, 1967, 47.
18 Article 2(2) of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949; emphasis
added.
19 See Security Council resolutions 233 (June 6, 1967), 234 (June 7, 1967), 235 (June 9, 1967),
and 236 (June 11, 1967).
20 The Israel-Egyptian armistice demarcation line followed the previous boundary between
Egypt and Mandate Palestine. Under Article II of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty of 1979,
“[t]he permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international
boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine…without
prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.”
21 The current cease-fire line with Lebanon essentially follows the former Mandate
boundary between Palestine and Lebanon.
22 Although the official sponsors of Resolution 242 were the British, the U.S. State
Department played a vital role in formulating the drafts of the resolution.
23 French was the only other working language of the Security Council in 1967, aside from
English. See Bailey, 152; Shabtai Rosenne, “On Multilingual Interpretation,” Israel Law
Review (Is.L.R.) 6 (1971), 363. Thus, the Spanish, Russian, and Chinese versions of the
resolution actually only amount to translations, as distinct from official versions of
the resolution (under Article 111 of the UN Charter, the UN has five official languages:
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish). In any event, Russian and Chinese
have no definite article. The Spanish version (“retiro…de los territories”) is clearly an
inaccurate translation of the official English version.
24 Blum, 72.
25 See, for example, A Lall, The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis, 1967 (New York:
Columbia University, 1968), 253–4, noting that on November 17, 1967, several Arab
representatives “discussed matters with Caradon. Could he not use the formulation
‘all the territories’ instead of ‘territories’ in relation to the clause requiring Israeli
withdrawal? Caradon’s response was that his draft represented a delicate balance which
would be upset by any changes.”
26 See, for example, Doc. S/PV.1382, 28: Mr. Parthasarathi of India told the Council on
November 22, 1967, that it was his understanding that “the draft resolution, if approved by
the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli
forces from all the territories — ‘I repeat all the territories’ — occupied by Israel as a
result of the conflict which began on June 5 1967.” Lord Caradon, the British sponsor of

the draft resolution replied: “I am sure that it will be recognized by us all that it is only the
resolution that will bind us.” Similarly, Ambassador Goldberg, on behalf of the U.S., stated
that “the voting of course takes place not on the individual discrete views and policies of
various members but on the draft resolution.” Blum, 75.
27 In his well-known speech of June 19, 1967, President Johnson stated that “[t]he nations
of the [Middle East] region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for twenty years.
What they now need are recognized boundaries that will give them security against terror,
destruction and war.”
28 Hansard (Commons), 5th series, vol. 791, cols. 844, 845.
29 See, for example, E.V. Rostow, “The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6,
1973,” Am. J. Int’l. L. 69 (1975), 272, 276.
30 Rosalyn Higgins, “The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the
Security Council,” Am. J. Int’l L. (1964), 1, 7–8.
31 Ibid., 8. See also J. Stone, No Peace — No War in the Middle East (Sydney: Maitland
Publications for the International Law Association, 1969), 33; Elihu Lauterpacht, Jerusalem
and the Holy Places (London: Anglo-Israel Association, 1968), 52.
32 See Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria,” Is. L. R. 3 (1968), 279, at 283. See also, E. Lauterpacht, 43; Stephen M. Shwebel,
“What Weight to Conquest?” Am. J. Int’l.L. 64 (1970).
33 Schwebel, ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 See, for example, the Minquiers and Ecrehos (United Kingdom v. France) case, International
Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments 1953, 67. Israel’s current legal status within any
territory of the former Palestine Mandate has not been affected by the Oslo Accord of
1993 and its follow-up agreements. That accord (the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles
of September 13, 1993) stated that its aim is to lead “to a permanent settlement based
on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338” (Article I), and that the permanent status
negotiations between the parties shall cover, inter alia, the issue of borders (Article V(3)).
Thus any future border settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will also
be subject to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242, as analyzed in the present
article.
36 Under Section 1 of the Area of Jurisdiction and Powers Ordinance, 5708–1948, passed by
the Provisional Council of State (the forerunner of the Knesset) on September 22, 1948,
“any law applying to the whole of the State of Israel shall be deemed to apply to the whole
of the area including both the area of the State of Israel and any part of Palestine which
the Minister of Defense has defined by proclamation as being held by the Defense Army
of Israel…” (1 Laws of the State of Israel, 64, emphasis added).
37 Divrei Haknesset (Parliamentary Records), vol. 49, col. 2420 [Hebrew, translated by the
author].

The Plight of the Refugees and
Resolution 242
Prof. Ruth Lapidoth The plight of the Palestinian refugees is a grave human problem. During the
1947–48 period many Arabs “left, ran away, or were expelled.”1 At the same
Professor Emeritus of time, Jews escaped from Arab countries. While the Jews were integrated
International Law, into the countries in which they arrived, the Arab refugees were deliberately
denied integration into most Arab countries (except Jordan) in order to prevent
Hebrew University of any possible accommodation with Israel. The refugees have been receiving
Jerusalem support and assistance from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established by the UN General Assembly
in 1949.2
According to various estimates, the number of refugees in 1948 was between
538,000 (Israeli sources), 720,000 (UN estimates), and 850,000 (Palestinian
sources). By 2001 the number of refugees registered with, and supported
by, UNRWA had grown to about 3.8 million, since UNRWA also registered
the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren born to the refugees.
Another reason for this increase is that UNRWA does not systematically delete
all deceased persons from its registry.
According to UNRWA, in 2000 there were about 550,000 refugees in the West
Bank, 800,000 in the Gaza Strip, 1,500,000 in Jordan, 350,000 in Lebanon, and
350,000 in Syria. Not all of these were living or had lived in refugee camps.
The situation of the refugees has been particularly severe in the Gaza Strip
and in Lebanon.3
In this brief paper, three legal questions are examined, with a particular
emphasis on the ramifications of Resolution 242:
1. Who should be considered a refugee?
2. Do the Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Israel?
3. Do they have a right to compensation?
1. Who Should Be Considered a Refugee?

The question which arises is whether all those registered with UNRWA are
to be considered refugees. The 1951–1967 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees has adopted the following definition:
[A]ny person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
The Plight of the Refugees and Resolution 242 37

the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.4
The original There is no mention in this definition of descendants or spouses. Moreover,

the convention ceases to apply to a person who, inter alia, “has acquired a new
Convention nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality.”5
Relating to Under this definition, the number of Palestinians qualifying for refugee status
the Status of would be well below half a million. However, the Arab states managed to exclude
the Palestinians from this definition by introducing the following provision into
Refugees did the 1951–1967 Refugees Convention:
not include This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present
descendants, receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection and
spouses, or those assistance.6
who acquired a In no official document have the Palestinian refugees been defined, and UNRWA
new nationality has adopted varying definitions, such as:
in its definition of A Palestinian refugee is a person whose normal residence was
refugees. Under Palestine for a minimum of two years preceding the conflict in
1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, lost both his home and his
this definition, means of livelihood and took refuge in one of the countries where
the number of UNRWA provides relief. Refugees within this definition and the direct
descendants of such refugees are eligible for Agency assistance
Palestinians if they are: registered with UNRWA; living in the area of UNRWA
qualifying for operations; and in need.7
refugee status This is a very broad definition under which the number of refugees increases
would be well markedly. It may be appropriate for UNRWA purposes in order to decide who
qualifies for assistance, but it is hardly suitable for other purposes. It follows
below half a that the parties should agree on a more suitable definition.
million.
2. Do the Palestinian Refugees Have a Right to Return to Israel?
Another legal controversy concerns the question of whether the refugees,
however they are to be defined, have a right to return to Israel. This subject
will be discussed from three viewpoints: general international law, the most
relevant UN resolutions, in particular Resolution 242, and various agreements
between Israel and its neighbors.
Several international human rights treaties deal with freedom of movement,
including the right of return.8 The most universal provision is to be found in
38 The Plight of the Refugees and Resolution 242

the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that
“[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”9
Of course, this provision in turn raises the question of who has the right of
return, or rather, what kind of relationship must exist between the state and
the person who wishes to return to it. A comparison of the various texts and
an analysis of the discussions which took place before their adoption lead to
the conclusion that the right of return is probably reserved only for nationals
of the relevant state, and perhaps also for “permanent legal residents.”10 Even
the right of nationals is not absolute, but may be limited on condition that the
reasons for the denial or limitation are not arbitrary.
Moreover, according to Stig Jägerskiöld,
the right to return or enter one’s country in the 1966 International

Covenant…is intended to apply to individuals asserting an individual
right. There was no intention here to address the claims of masses of
people who have been displaced as a by-product of war or by political
transfers of territory or population, such as the relocation of ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe during and after the Second World
War, the flight of the Palestinians from what became Israel, or the
movement of Jews from the Arab countries.11
In the context of general international law one must also observe that
humanitarian law conventions (such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the
Protection of Victims of War) have not dealt with a right of return.
The first major UN resolution that refers to the Palestinian refugees was
General Assembly Resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948.12 This resolution
established a Conciliation Commission for Palestine and instructed it to “take
steps to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final
settlement of all outstanding questions.” Paragraph 11 deals specifically with
refugees:
The General Assembly…resolves that the refugees wishing to return to

their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted
to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should
be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law
or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities
responsible.
Though all the Arab states originally rejected this resolution because it assumed
recognition of Israel, later they relied on it heavily and have considered it to
be recognition of a wholesale right to repatriation.

However, this interpretation does not seem warranted. The paragraph does not
recognize a “right,” but recommends that the refugees “should” (not “shall”) be
“permitted” to return. Moreover, that permission is subject to two conditions
— that the refugee wishes to return and that he wishes to live at peace with
his neighbors. The violence and mistrust between Israelis and the Palestinians
forecloses any hope for a peaceful coexistence between Israelis and masses
of returning refugees. Moreover, the Palestinians have linked the request for
return to a claim for self-determination. If returning refugees were to have
a right to external self-determination, this would mean the end of the very
existence of the State of Israel. Under the 1948 resolution, the return should
take place only “at the earliest practicable date.” The use of the term “should” in
regard to the permission to return underlines that this is only a recommendation
UN General — it is “hortatory.”13 One should also remember that under the UN Charter the
Assembly General Assembly is not authorized to adopt binding resolutions, except in
regard to budgetary matters and its own internal rules and regulations.
Resolution
Finally, the reference to principles of international law or equity refers only
194 of 1948 to compensation for property and does not seem to refer to permission to
recommends that return.
refugees should Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the provision concerning the refugees is
but one element of a resolution that foresaw “a final settlement of all questions
be permitted to outstanding between” the parties. The Arab states, on the other hand, have
return subject to always insisted on the implementation of paragraph 11 (in accordance with the
interpretation favorable to them) independently of all other matters.
the condition that
In this context one should remember that the General Assembly has also
they wish to live recommended the “reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the
in peace with their Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement.”14 [emphasis added]
neighbors. About 200,000 Palestinian displaced persons (i.e., persons who had to
leave their homes and move to another place in the same state) resulted
from the Six-Day War in 1967. These were dealt with by Security Council
Resolution 237 of June 14, 1967,15 which called upon the government of Israel
“to facilitate the return of those inhabitants [of the areas where military
operations had taken place] who had fled the areas since the outbreak
of hostilities.” The resolution does not speak of a “right” of return and,
like most Security Council Resolutions, is written as a recommendation.
Nevertheless, Israel has agreed to their return in various agreements, to
be discussed below. Some 30 percent of the displaced persons of 1967 had
already been counted as refugees of 1948.16
Highly significant in this respect is Security Council Resolution 242. In its
second paragraph, the Security Council “affirms further the necessity…(b) for
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.” The Security Council did

not propose a specific solution, nor did it limit the provision to Arab refugees.
There is no basis for the Arab claim that Resolution 242 incorporates the
solution recommended by General Assembly Resolution 194 of 1948, which was
discussed above. The Security Council simply recommended achieving a “just
settlement,” without stating what exactly this would consist of, and without
referring to any other UN resolution. It was deemed a matter to be settled by
negotiation between the parties. Furthermore, since the resolution speaks
in general terms of “the refugee problem,” it is not limited to the Palestinian
problem. The just settlement to be negotiated must also take into account
the right of the Jews who fled Arab states to compensation. Security Council
Resolution 242 has superseded General Assembly Resolution 194(III).
None of the Turning now to agreements between Israel and her neighbors, the refugee
problem has been tackled by Israel and Egypt in the Framework for Peace in
agreements the Middle East agreed upon at Camp David in 1978.17 There it was agreed that
between Israel a “continuing committee,” including representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
and the Palestinians, should “decide, by agreement, on the modalities of
and Egypt, the admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967” (Article
Palestinians, and A, 3). Similarly, it was agreed that “Egypt and Israel will work with each other
and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt,
Jordan has granted just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem”
the refugees a right (Article A, 4).
to return to Israel. In the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

between Israel and the Palestinians it was again agreed that the modalities
of admission of persons displaced in 1967 should be decided by agreement
in a “continuing committee” (Article XII).18 The issue of refugees should be
negotiated in the framework of the permanent status negotiations (Article V,
3). The 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip adopted similar provisions (Articles XXXVII, 2 and XXXI, 5).19
Somewhat more detailed is the relevant provision (Article 8) in the treaty of
peace between Israel and Jordan of 1994.20 While displaced persons are the
object of a text similar to those above, the peace treaty mentions the need to
solve the refugee problem both in the framework of the Multilateral Working
Group on Refugees, established after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference,
and in conjunction with the permanent status negotiations. The treaty also
mentions “United Nations programs and other agreed international economic
programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance
to their settlement.”21
It is clear from this survey of the agreements concluded over the past
four decades that none of the agreements between Israel and Egypt, the
Palestinians, and Jordan respectively has granted the refugees a right to
return to Israel.

Thus neither under the general international conventions, the major UN
resolutions, including Resolution 242, nor the relevant agreements between the
parties, do Palestinian refugees have a right to return to Israel. As was noted
above, in 2000 there were about 3.8 million Palestinian refugees registered
with UNRWA. Allowing all of them to return to Israel would be tantamount to
self-destruction of the State of Israel; and no state can be expected to destroy
itself. On the other hand, at least some of the refugees would object to, and try
to delegitimize, any agreement that did not grant a wholesale right of return.22
Moreover, some of them threaten those who would like to settle for a different
solution, thus creating a vicious circle.
The solution may include a right to return to the new Palestinian state after
Since Israel did its establishment, settlement and integration in various other states (Arab
and non-Arab), and possible return to Israel of a small number if compelling
not initiate the humanitarian reasons are involved, such as family unification.23
1947-48 war, but
was attacked by 3. Do They Have a Right to Compensation?
its neighbors, The third legal problem regarding the refugees is the question of the right to
compensation for lost property and a subsidy for rehabilitation (i.e., integration,
it was not resettlement, or return).24 General international law recognizes the obligation
responsible for to pay compensation in the case of confiscation of property belonging to
foreigners. There is, however, disagreement about the amount that should
the creation of the be paid. Two experts have suggested a standard of “adequate compensation,”
refugee problem. taking into account the value of the property and the needs of the specific
refugee.25 If a definitive solution to the problem is sought, one should consider
paying — either by law or ex gratia — not only compensation for lost property,
as mentioned in General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), but also a reasonable
subsidy for rehabilitation and perhaps compensation to the host country in
which the refugee has lived and may perhaps settle. Since Israel did not initiate
the 1947-48 war, but was attacked by its neighbors, it was not responsible for
the creation of the refugee problem; hence it is under no obligation to recruit
the necessary sums. Preferably an international fund should be established
for this purpose, to which other countries, as well as Israel, would contribute.
The difficulty is the enormous sums involved.26
It would perhaps be advisable to resort to a lump sum arrangement which
would settle all financial claims between the parties and preclude any further
claims. An international commission could be in charge of registering all claims
and distributing appropriate sums. Likewise, it would be essential to bind
not only Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also all the refugees, to the
arrangement. One could envision a provision under which the Palestinian
Authority would replace Israel with regard to any claim which might be
submitted beyond the implementation of the agreement.
In conclusion, it is desirable that the parties involved in the refugee problem
agree on a reasonable definition of the Palestinian refugees, and not
automatically adopt that used by UNRWA. The refugees do not have a right to
return to Israel, neither under general nor special international law. Rather,
the adequate solution seems to be either return to the Palestinian state once
it is established, resettlement and absorption in other countries (preferably
according to the wishes of each refugee), and the return of a small number
to Israel on humanitarian grounds. A prompt and adequate solution will
also involve the payment of compensation for lost property and a subsidy
for rehabilitation. These proposals are in conformity with Resolution 242,
which affirmed the necessity for achieving a just settlement of the refugee
problem.
Notes
1 Eyal Benvenisti and Eyal Zamir, “Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-
Palestinian Settlement,” American Journal of International Law 89 (1995): 295–340, at
297.
2 UN General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, adopted at the 273 rd
plenary meeting.
3 Yitzhak Ravid, The Palestinian Refugees (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan, 2001), 1–12 [Hebrew].
4 UN Treaty Series, vol. 189, no. 2545, (1954), at 152–156, Article 1A (2).
5 Ibid., Article 1C (3).
6 Ibid., Article 1D.
7 Don Peretz, Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 11–12.
8 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13(2); The 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12(4); The 1963 Protocol IV to the European
Convention on Human Rights, Article 3(2); The 1969 American Convention of Human
Rights, Article 22 (5); The 1981 Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples› Rights, Article 12
(2); See Sir Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford, 4th edition, 2002),
20, 186, 443, 678, 730–1; for additional examples, see Paul Sieghart, The International
Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 174–178.
9 Article 12(4).
10 Sieghart, 179; Geoffrey R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 283; Ruth Lapidoth,
“The Right of Return in International Law, With Special Reference to the Palestinian
Refugees,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 16 (1986): 103–125, at 107–108.
Some experts are of the opinion that the right of return applies also to “permanent legal
residents.” See, for example, the discussion that took place in the sub-commission on

Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as reported in the Report by
Chairman-Rapporteur Mr. Asbjorn Eide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/45, of August 29,
1991, 5. The Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights has adopted an interpretation according to which the right of
return belongs also to a person who has “close and enduring connections” to a certain
country — UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 9 of November 2, 1999, 5–6.
11 Stig Jagerskiold, “The Freedom of Movement,” The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, ed. Louis Henkin (New York: Columbia University, 1981), 166–184,
at 180. For a different opinion, see Watson, 283.
12 GAOR, 3rd session, part I, 1948, Resolutions, 21–24.
13 Watson, 281.
14 UN General Assembly Resolution 393 (V) of December 2, 1950, adopted at the 315th plenary
meeting. See also the second paragraph of UN GA resolution 194 (III) of December 1948,
and Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, adopted at the 365th plenary meeting.
15 SCOR, 22nd year, Resolutions and Decisions 1967, 5.
16 Salim Tamari, “The Future of Palestinian Refugees in the Peace Negotiations,” Palestine-
Israel Journal 2 (1995): 8–14, at 12.
17 UN Treaty Series, vol. 1138 (1987), no. 17853, 39–45.
18 International Legal Materials 32 (1993): 1525.
19 International Legal Materials 36 (1997): 551 (excerpts). For the full text see Kitvei amana
(Israel’s official publication of treaties), vol. 33, no. 1071, 1.
20 International Legal Materials 34 (1995): 43–66.
21 Article 8, paragraph 2(c), at 49–50.
22 Tamari, 1–12.
23 For possible solutions, see Watson, 286–290; Donna E. Arzt, Refugees Into Citizens:
Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1997); Joseph Alpher and Khalil Shikaki, The Palestinian Refugee Problem and the
Right of Return (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International
Affairs; Working Paper no. 97–8, 1998). See also the principles proposed by Ami Ayalon
and Sari Nusseibeh, 2002; the Peace Plan of the Arab states, 2002 and 2007; the Roadmap,
2003; the Beilin-Abed Rabbo text (“the Geneva Initiative”), 2003.
24 Watson, 286–290; See also Benvenisti and Zamir.
25 Watson, 331 and 338.
26 Ravid, at 36–40.

The Principles of Peacemaking
Amb. Richard Holbrooke When the Six-Day War broke out, the U.S. was deeply trapped in Vietnam. It
was thrilling to watch Israel’s triumph in those extraordinary days. I was then
Former U.S. Ambassador working on Vietnam in the Johnson White House; Americans looked on with
to the UN, awe and admiration, celebrating the creation of what seemed to be a new era
of hope and opportunity. The significance of Resolution 242 was less clear,
Assistant Secretary of when it was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council five months
State for European later: yet it was soon to became the most important and celebrated Security
and Canadian Affairs Council resolution in the history of the UN. It remains so to this day, despite the
fact that more than 1,500 other Security Council resolutions have been passed
and Assistant Secretary since. Following is a discussion of the content of Resolution 242 as it can be
of State for East Asian applied to peacemaking in four specific aspects: the need for a negotiated
solution, the roles of the parties involved and their responsibilities, the need
and Pacific Affairs for diplomatic flexibility, and the U.S.-Israel relationship.
There is good reason that UN Security Council Resolution 242 is the best
known resolution providing the basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
It has appeared in the preamble of almost every Arab-Israeli peace initiative:
the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace, the 1991 Madrid Invitation, the
Oslo Agreements, and the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Treaty of Peace. What gave
Resolution 242 its strength was the fact that it became the only agreed basis
for reaching a political settlement.
Of course, it is well known that UN Security Council resolutions by themselves
do not automatically lead to the resolution of long, difficult conflicts. What a UN
Security Council resolution can accomplish is to set reasonable expectations
for the parties engaged in disputes, such as the Arab-Israel conflict, and
illustrate how the key players in the international community view the
necessary steps to be taken in order to build a stable peace. In some other
conflict zones repeated principles of peacemaking have been successful in
helping to resolve diplomatic disputes, and these can be applied universally.
The value of Resolution 242 emanates from the fact that these principles are
implicit in a careful reading of its content.
Resolution 242 is so important because it was the first building block in what
is called the “peace process.” Of course, this very phrase has today become
something of an oxymoron: there is no real peace process at this time. There
are occasional contacts, high level trips by the U.S. and the Europeans, and
meetings of the Quartet around the world, providing photo opportunities
and handshakes that are virtually meaningless. In some ways this thing
masquerading as a peace process may be worse than none at all because
it can reduce the potential of real negotiations when they ultimately take
place, and because its emptiness may give the idea of serious negotiations
themselves a bad name.
The Principles of Peacemaking 45

One over-riding reason that the current process cannot be called a “peace
process” is the simple fact that there is no one to negotiate with, since the
Palestinian Authority is at war with itself. Israel’s most dangerous enemies,
Hamas and Hizbullah, seek the destruction of the Jewish state. They are not
party to any of the agreements, or any of the resolutions from Resolution 242 to
the 1978 Camp David Accords and today’s events. Furthermore they are backed
by the single most dangerous nation in the entire region, perhaps even in the
world: Iran, led by the most famous anti-Semite since Adolf Hitler. Hamas and
Hizbullah will not negotiate and their backers in other countries, Iran and Syria,
will not force them to the table.
Under these circumstances it is tempting to conclude that Resolution 242 has
become irrelevant. Yet Resolution 242 constitutes the starting point of common
agreement, written in language which is short, simple, and easy to understand;
every word of it is significant. Likewise, an analysis of the original meaning of
the resolution, as opposed to its inadvertent or intentional misconstructions by
certain people, is essential. This is especially necessary in light of the fact that
numerous publications and media outlets have reiterated the misconception
that the resolution calls for full withdrawal from all territories.
The Need for a Negotiated Solution

Clearly resolutions, peace agreements, and ceasefire agreements are
meaningless without an enforcement mechanism. In cases of pure aggression,
the UN Security Council has repeatedly adopted its most forceful resolutions
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which call on a party to unilaterally
desist in its activity. In 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in a bald case of
international aggression. UN resolutions adopted subsequently under Chapter
VII required him to pull back his forces to the pre-war lines. In 2008 the UN
called on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment activities. Iranian compliance
with the UN Security Council’s demand requires that it halt its illegal activity:
Iran enforces the resolution by itself, there is no negotiation. Chapter VII was
also invoked to justify the coalition efforts in Afghanistan after the attacks of
September 11, 2001. It was famously not invoked in the case of the attack on Iraq,
one of the difficulties facing the U.S. after President Bush proceeded without it.
It is common practice and a widely held belief in the U.S. that Security Council
approval is not necessary in order to take military action if it is in accordance
with the U.S.’ own legal processes and in the national interest. The UN did not
approve the 77-day bombing of Kosovo in 1999 which successfully liberated
Kosovo from the Serbs (UNSCR 1244 in effect legitimated the war after it was
over). Thus, although Chapter VII is an enormously valuable legitimizing tool
for the use of force, it is not essential, at least for America.
46 The Principles of Peacemaking

Forty years ago, the Soviet Union tried to brand Israel as the aggressor in
the Six-Day War, but neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly
accepted this allegation and so Chapter VII was not invoked in the case of
Resolution 242. This is probably the most important element of the resolution: it
suggests a negotiated outcome to the Arab-Israel conflict. The former Secretary
General of the UN, Kofi Annan, made an extremely important comment about
Resolution 242, very much in Israel’s favor, when he said that it is not self-
enforcing. The only part of Resolution 242 enacted by the UN Secretariat is
the designation by the Secretary General of a Special Representative to the
Middle East. Even here the purpose of this representative is not to enforce but
to promote agreement and assist to achieve a peaceful, accepted settlement
in accordance with the resolution.
Israel may have Israel may have to withdraw from territories it captured in the Six-Day War, but
to withdraw from only after it reaches an agreement with its neighbors about borders, security
territories it arrangements, and a termination of the state of belligerency between them.
There is a mistaken notion that for Israel to comply with Resolution 242, it
captured in the Six- must withdraw from these territories unilaterally. Section 1.i is the famous
Day War, but only phrase which calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict. Yet section 2.ii, which does not receive enough
after it reaches an attention, is also of great value for negotiations. It calls for:
agreement with its Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
neighbors about acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace
borders, security within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
arrangements, force.
and a termination The meaning is very simple — it affirms that the fulfillment of charter principles
of the state of requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which
should include the application of both of these principles.
belligerency
Moving forward almost forty years, the Saudi peace proposal adopted at the
between them. Beirut Summit on March 28, 2002, often referred to as a conciliatory proposal
by the Saudis, mentions Resolution 242, mistakenly claiming that it calls for
withdrawal from all occupied territories — it uses the phrase “full withdrawal
from all Arab territories.” More importantly, it sets up a sequence that is in
direct contradiction to Resolution 242, demanding Israeli compliance with
all demands before offering Israel anything, including normal relations. The
press has often reported that Saudi Arabia offered recognition to Israel for
the first time in its proposal. However, the word recognition is not used, but
rather the term “normal relations” — there may be a difference in meaning.
More significant, what this proposal really does is to lay out as a precondition
for the negotiation the very thing being negotiated: this is a fundamental

flaw. Although many, including the Bush administration, regard the Saudi
proposal of 2002 as a very important breakthrough, this is clearly a mistake.
Its fundamental flaw, along with the fact that the Saudis are not willing to
participate in the negotiations themselves, clearly diminishes utility and hopes
of success.
What Resolution 242 calls for is a negotiated solution which includes mutual
recognition between the parties. One of the areas where diplomats rarely
tread is exploring how to create the necessary environment in which bilateral
peacemaking will work. In the Balkans, there was a common myth that the
peoples of the area were victims of “ancient hatreds,” which made diplomacy
appear hopeless. Yet hatred is frequently the product of deliberate incitement.
The Saudi peace This was true in Bosnia, as in Nazi Germany. To make a negotiated settlement
possible, incitement to hatred must be tackled at an early stage of negotiations.
proposal sets It cannot be ignored or swept under the rug.
up a sequence
that is in direct The Key Role of the Parties Themselves
contradiction to One of the repeated negotiating strategies used by warring parties in a conflict
Resolution 242, is to get the U.S. or the EU to impose the terms of a peace settlement on their
adversaries. Such a process is taking place currently regarding Kosovo, where
demanding Israeli the UN Special Envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, has presented
compliance with a very intelligent plan for which he is requesting UN approval. The Russians, on
the other hand, are threatening to veto the plan which would lead, inevitably, to
all demands a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo without UN approval.
before offering The Western powers have vital interests in the Middle East which affect their
Israel anything. positions on a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. As has been said before,
the U.S. and its European allies cannot want peace more than the parties in
the region. If negotiators for one side believe that the U.S. will deliver the other
side, then the chances of any dynamic of mutual compromise emerging is very
unlikely. Indeed, the hardest concessions in negotiations have traditionally
been made by the parties themselves. Recognizing this truth, President Lyndon
Johnson stated on September 10, 1968, that “we are not the ones to say where
other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the
greatest security.” Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher essentially
also adopted this position when he wrote to Israel a letter of assurances on
January 17, 1997, stating that:
The key element in our approach to peace, including the negotiation and
implementation of agreements between Israel and its Arab partners,
has always been recognition of Israel’s security requirements.
Moreover, a hallmark of U.S. policy remains our commitment to

work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel
identifies.
Changing Circumstances: The Need for Diplomatic Flexibility

Anyone looking back at the history of U.S. declaratory statements about
the territorial question in Resolution 242 will find the expression of varied
positions. In 1969, Secretary of State William Rogers spoke about “insubstantial
alterations” in the 1967 lines. This position was later overtaken by Secretary
of State George Shultz’s statement in 1988 that “Israel will never negotiate
from, or return to, the lines of partition or to the 1967 borders.” Secretary of
State Warren Christopher wrote about Israel’s right to “defensible borders.”
This position was repeated in a letter from President George W. Bush to Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon in April 2004, presented to the House of Representatives
on June 23, 2004. The next day the Senate passed a long resolution specifically
referring to this letter, which included a statement strongly endorsing the
principles articulated in the letter, and the strengthening of the security and
well being of the State of Israel. It also expressed support of continued efforts,
along with others in the international community, to build the capacity of
Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations,
and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn posing a threat to the
security of Israel. Although this is not law in the sense of a treaty, it was a
unanimously supported act of resolution on the part of both Houses.
In recent years, one of the factors affecting the specifics of U.S. statements
on borders has been the position of the Israeli government at the time. Given
that the U.S. wants to work with the Israeli government in power, it may seem
that U.S. policy changes on these essential questions. Moreover, the differing
threats that Israel faces undoubtedly affect the assessments, from both
Jerusalem and Washington, about what risks Israel can afford to take. For
example in the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
resulting weakening of former Soviet client states, it seemed that the Middle
East was becoming a more secure region. Today, there are new risk factors in
the Middle East on the horizon; the 2003 war in Iraq eliminated the regime of
Saddam Hussein, but created a new center of al-Qaeda Jihadism in Western
Iraq that seeks to spread to Israel’s neighbors. In the meantime, Iranian
adventurism has increased across the Middle East — and now Israel faces
thousands of Hizbullah rockets from Lebanon.
This in turn points to the need for diplomatic flexibility in dealing with the
issues outlined in Resolution 242. It is for that reason that the U.S. will
probably be reluctant to take a detailed position about these territorial
matters in the future, preferring instead to support whatever is agreed by

the parties. Resolution 242 provides a toolbox of diplomatic instruments for
reaching a permanent diplomatic settlement between Israel and its neighbors;
it mandates the creation of “secure and recognized boundaries,” suggests
the use of “demilitarized zones” and the establishment of a “just and lasting
peace.” Essentially, Resolution 242 provides the flexibility for the negotiators
to decide what proportion of each of these elements should be used to craft a
stable political outcome.
The U.S.-Israel Relationship

A strong U.S.-Israel relationship is a pre-requisite for successful peacemaking.
As Israel takes risks in establishing new boundaries, the U.S. is frequently called
The U.S. will upon to offset them. This is more than a financial matter. Not all agreements
probably be are implemented smoothly or in good faith. Violations of agreements can be
expected. For peacemaking to work, U.S. diplomatic activism is necessary not
reluctant to take only to produce an agreement, but also to see through its ultimate realization
a detailed position on the ground.
about territorial
matters in the Summary
future, preferring Resolution 242 remains relevant to modern-day peacemaking and constitutes
part of the guidelines, or tools, to be used in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli
instead to support conflict. The emphasis on a solution negotiated by the parties themselves, not
whatever is forcibly imposed by external powers, is extremely important — only such a
solution can provide a long-lasting, secure peace. There is, of course, a need
agreed by the for diplomatic flexibility, and for a close relationship between Israel and other
parties. countries, specifically the U.S., in any negotiations. Although at the negotiating
table only Israel itself can decide what positions to take, international support,
as expressed by the U.S. with relative consistency over the past 40 years, is
central to guaranteeing Israel’s position in the negotiations, and any agreement
will require internationally sanctioned enforcement mechanisms. On the basis
of a correct interpretation of Resolution 242 (not the demand, as is to be found
in the Arab League peace initiative, for Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from
all territories), and the four principles discussed here, it is to be hoped that a
lasting peace may eventually be possible.

Appendix A
UN Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967 Following the June ‘67, Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was
discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security
Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security Council resolution
was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22,
1967. It was adopted on the same day.
This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles which,
it was hoped, would lead to a solution of the conflict. Resolution 242 was
to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming
decades.
The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can
live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance
with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment
of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the
application of both the following principles:
• Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
recent conflict;
• Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of every State in the area and their right to live
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats
or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
• For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area;
• For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
• For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence
of ever y State in the area, through measures including the
establishment of demilitarized zones;
UN Security Council Resolution 242 51

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative
to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with
the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts
to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the
provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on
the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as
possible.
52 UN Security Council Resolution 242

Appendix B
Statements Clarifying the Meaning of
UN Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967 Even before the beginning of the Jarring Mission (the Special Representative
as mentioned in the Resolution), the Arab states insisted that Security Council
Resolution 242 called for a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories
occupied in the Six-Day War. Israel held that the withdrawal phrase in the
Resolution was not meant to refer to a total withdrawal. Following are statements
including the interpretations of various delegations to Resolution 242:
A. United Kingdom
• Lord Caradon, sponsor of the draft that was about to be adopted, stated
before the vote in the Security Council on Resolution 242:
The draft Resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract

from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide
measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be
considered as a whole as it stands. I suggest that we have reached
the stage when most, if not all, of us want the draft Resolution,
the whole draft Resolution and nothing but the draft Resolution.
(S/PV 1382, p. 31, of 22 November 1967)
• Lord Caradon, interviewed on Kol Israel in February 1973:
Question: This matter of the (definite) article which is there in French

and is missing in English, is that really significant?
Answer: The purposes are perfectly clear, the principle is stated in

the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is stated in the operative
section. And then the essential phrase which is not sufficiently
recognized is that withdrawal should take place to secure and
recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully
chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized.
They will not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why
one has to work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend
absolutely what we did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where
the border should be. I know the 1967 border very well. It is not a
satisfactory border, it is where troops had to stop in 1947, just where
they happened to be that night, that is not a permanent boundary.
• Mr. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament, 17 November 1969:
Question: What is the British interpretation of the wording of the

1967 Resolution? Does the Right Honourable Gentleman understand
Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242 53

it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territories taken
in the late war?
Mr. Stewart: No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the Resolution. The
Resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. These words
must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal.
• Mr. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs, in a reply to a question in Parliament, 9 December 1969:
As I have explained before, there is reference, in the vital United

Nations Security Council Resolution, both to withdrawal from
territories and to secure and recognized boundaries. As I have told
the House previously, we believe that these two things should be
read concurrently and that the omission of the word ‘all’ before the
word ‘territories’ is deliberate.
• Mr. George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967, on 19 January 1970:
I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve
the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the
Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and
complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council.
I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted
it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said
"Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied," and not
from "the" territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw
from all the territories. (Jerusalem Post, 23 January 1970)
B. United States of America

• Mr. Arthur Goldberg, U.S. representative, in the Security Council in the
course of the discussions which preceded the adoption of Resolution 242:
To seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries...

would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries
without withdrawal. Historically, there have never been secure or
recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949
nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description...
such boundaries have yet to be agreed upon. An agreement on that
point is an absolute essential to a just and lasting peace just as
withdrawal is. (S/PV. 1377, p. 37, of 15 November 1967)
54 Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242

• President Lyndon Johnson, 10 September 1968:
We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines
between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is
clear, however, that a return to the situation of 4 June 1967 will not
bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized
borders. Some such lines must be agreed to by the neighbors
involved.
• Mr. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 July 1970 (NBC “Meet
the Press”):
That Resolution did not say "withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines."

The Resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve
agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders.
In other words, the question of the final borders is a matter of
negotiations between the parties.
• Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University,

who, in 1967, was U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs:
a) Paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli

armed forces "from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and
not "from the territories occupied in the recent conflict." Repeated
attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word "the" failed
in the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to
assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the
territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the
Armistice Demarcation lines. (American Journal of International Law,
Volume 64, September 1970, p. 69)
b) The agreement required by paragraph 3. of the Resolution, the

Security Council said, should establish "secure and recognized
boundaries" between Israel and its neighbors "free from threats
or acts of force," to replace the Armistice Demarcation lines
established in 1949, and the cease-fire lines of June 1967. The
Israeli armed forces should withdraw to such lines as part of a
comprehensive agreement, settling all the issues mentioned in
the Resolution, and in a condition of peace. (American Journal of
International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, p. 68)
Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242 55

C. USSR
• Mr. Vasily Kuznetsov said in discussions that preceded the adoption of
Resolution 242:
Phrases such as "secure and recognized boundaries." What does

that mean? What boundaries are these? Secure, recognized — by
whom, for what? Who is going to judge how secure they are? Who
must recognize them?...There is certainly much leeway for different
interpretations which retain for Israel the right to establish new
boundaries and to withdraw its troops only as far as the lines which
it judges convenient. (S/PV. 1373, p. 112, of 9 November 1967)
D. Brazil
• Mr. Geraldo de Carvalho Silos, Brazilian representative, speaking in the
Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 242:
We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East has necessarily to be based on secure, permanent boundaries
freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighboring States. (S/PV.
1382, p. 66, 22 November 1967)
56 Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242

About the Authors
www.jcpa.org Amb. Yehuda Blum

Former Israeli Ambassador to the UN and Professor Emeritus of International
Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Amb. Dore Gold

Former Israeli Ambassador to the UN and President of the Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs.
Dr. Lars Hansel

Director of the Israel Office of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Amb. Richard Holbrooke

Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs.
Prof. Ruth Lapidoth

Professor Emeritus of International Law at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Amb. Meir Rosenne

Former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and France; former Legal Advisor to
the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
About the Authors 57

About the Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs
The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs is a leading independent research
institute specializing in public diplomacy and foreign policy. Founded in 1976,
the Center has produced hundreds of studies and initiatives by leading experts
on a wide range of strategic topics. Dr. Dore Gold, Israel’s former ambassador
to the UN, has headed the Jerusalem Center since 2000.
Jerusalem Center Programs:

• Defensible Borders Initiative — A major security and public diplomacy
initiative that analyzes current terror threats and Israel’s corresponding
territorial requirements, particularly in the strategically vital West Bank,
that Israel must maintain to fulfill its existential security and defense
needs.
• Iran and the New Threats to the West — Preparation of a legal document
jointly with leading Israeli and international scholars and public personalities
on the initiation of legal proceedings against Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad for incitement to commit genocide and participate in genocide.
This program also features major policy studies by security and academic
experts on Iran’s use of terror proxies and allies in the regime’s war against
the West and its race for regional supremacy and Dr. Dore Gold’s book The
Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Regnery, 2009).
• Institute for Contemporary Affairs (ICA) — A program founded in 2002
jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation that presents Israel’s case on
current issues through high-level briefings by government and military
leaders to the foreign diplomatic corps and foreign press, as well as
production and dissemination of information materials.
• Global Law Forum — This ground-breaking program undertakes studies and
advances policy initiatives to protect Israel’s legal rights in its conflict with
the Palestinians, the Arab world, and radical Islam (www.globallawforum.
org)
• Anti-Semitism After the Holocaust — Initiated and directed by Dr. Manfred
Gerstenfeld, this program includes conferences, seminars, and publications
discussing restitution, the academic boycott, Holocaust denial, and anti-
Semitism in the Arab world, European countries, and the post-Soviet
states.
• Global Terrorism — Using previously unpublished documents, Jerusalem
Center President Dore Gold explored the influence of Saudi Wahhabism on
9/11 in the New York Times bestseller Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia
Supports the New Global Terrorism (Regnery, 2003).
58 About the Jerusalem Center

• Jerusalem in International Diplomacy — Dr. Dore Gold analyzes the
legal and historic rights of Israel in Jerusalem and exposes the dangers
of compromise that will unleash a new jihadist momentum in his book
The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy
City (Regnery, 2007). Justus Reid Weiner looks at Illegal Construction in
Jerusalem: A Variation on an Alarming Global Phenomenon (2003). Prominent
journalist Nadav Shragai assesses the imminent security threats to
Israel’s capital resulting from its potential division, and offers alternative
strategies for managing Jerusalem’s demographic challenges in his
monograph Jerusalem: The Dangers of Division (2008).
• New Models for Economic Growth in Israel — This comprehensive,
10-year project has studied the application of financial innovations in Israel.
Sponsored by the Milken Institute, the project includes nine published
volumes in Hebrew and English.
Jerusalem Center Serial Publications:

• Jerusalem Viewpoints — providing in-depth analysis on changing events
in Israel and the Middle East since 1977.
• Jerusalem Issue Brief — insider briefings by top-level Israeli government
officials, military experts, and academics, as part of the Center’s Institute
for Contemporary Affairs.
• Daily Alert — a daily digest of hyperlinked news and commentary on Israel
and the Middle East from the world and Hebrew press.
• Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism — a monthly publication examining anti-
Semitism after the Holocaust.
• Jewish Political Studies Review — A scholarly journal founded in 1989.
Jerusalem Center Websites:

• www.jcpa.org (English)
• www.jcpa.org.il (Hebrew)
• www.infoelarab.org (Arabic)
• www.jcpa-lecape.org (French)
• www.jer-zentrum.org (German)
• www.mesi.org.uk (United Kingdom)
• www.globallawforum.org (Global Law Forum)
About the Jerusalem Center 59

About the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
More than 40 years ago, Konrad Adenauer and David Ben-Gurion laid the foundation
for reconciliation between Germany and Israel and for the future in partnership of
the two nations. Carrying on the legacy of the late chancellor, the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung (KAS) has been active in Israel for more than 25 years.
Together with local partner organizations we work on three main objectives:
• We preserve and further develop the relationship between Germany and Israel.
This task is increasingly acquiring a European dimension as well.
• We support efforts to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in Israel.
• We strive to facilitate a peaceful coexistence between Israel and its
neighbors.
The future of German-Israeli relations is one of KAS’s most challenging tasks.
We are currently facing a watershed in German-Israeli history: The generation of
survivors and witnesses of the Shoah is slowly passing away. To many members
of the younger generations it is often not obvious why the relations between the
two countries are so important for both sides. KAS sees it as one of its prime
tasks to foster a future-oriented and sustained dialogue between Germans and
Israelis. This trustful dialogue is to be based on the lessons of the past, but also
on common values and shared future challenges in the fields of society, science
and security.
Our efforts in aiding Israeli civil society mainly focus on projects improving the
integration of minorities. One example is our joint program with the Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev, which helps Bedouins achieve higher education and thus
enables them to participate more successfully in Israel’s modern society. For years
we have also undertaken extensive programs advancing in practice equal rights
for women. In further projects we raise awareness for human rights issues and
non-violent conflict management.
In order to help assure Israel’s existence in peace and security by bringing about a
peaceful solution to the conflict with the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbors,
KAS organizes dialogue programs for Israeli and Palestinian politicians, officials,
businessmen, journalists and students. Not even during the worst times of the
“Second Intifada” did these meetings stop. In many cases the participants managed
to solve practical problems while at the same time helping to lay the basis for a
future comprehensive peace. Other outcomes were common Israeli-Palestinian
teaching materials and the strengthening of Israeli-Jordanian relations through
joint business meetings.
All KAS projects are guided by our belief in the benefits of democracy, freedom,
a market economy and peaceful coexistence. We aim at making a lasting and
sustainable contribution to Israel’s thriving in peace, prosperity, and partnership
with Europe.
60 About the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Resolution 242: Israel's Right To Secure Borders

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ISRAEL’S RIGHT TO SECURE

Four Decades Since

The Proceedings of a Conference held in

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

13 Tel Hai Street, Jerusalem, Israel 92107

Academic Editor: Dr. Isaac Herzog

Photo Credit: AP Photo

Introduction: Correcting the Record on

Contextualizing Resolution 242 — Amb. Meir Rosenne 9

Security Council Resolution 242:

The Territorial Clauses of Security Council

The Plight of the Refugees and Resolution 242

The Principles of Peacemaking — Amb. Richard Holbrooke 45

Appendix A — UN Security Council Resolution 242 51

Appendix B — Statements Clarifying the

About the Authors 57

About the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs 58

About the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 60

An article on Wednesday about the Middle East peace talks referred

Correcting the Record on Resolution 242 5

Earlier this month, I wrote a column suggesting that the 22

6 Correcting the Record on Resolution 242

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and

Correcting the Record on Resolution 242 7

8 Correcting the Record on Resolution 242

Contextualizing Resolution 242 9

2. The Continued Presence of Resolution 242 in International Agreements

10 Contextualizing Resolution 242

Contextualizing Resolution 242 11

12 Contextualizing Resolution 242

Analysis of Main Provisions 13

The Security Council

14 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 15

1. The “Inadmissibility of the Acquisition of Territory by War”

16 Analysis of Main Provisions

2. The Withdrawal Clause

Analysis of Main Provisions 17

18 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 19

4. Means such as Demilitarized Zones to Ensure Safe Borders

20 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 21

Today, the meaning of borders is changing, and so is the notion of

Constructs based on absolute sovereignty and rigid borders cannot

22 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 23

24 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 25

26 Analysis of Main Provisions

Analysis of Main Provisions 27

28 The Territorial Clauses

There is an Armistice Agreement. The agreement did not fix

Although Israel originally desired to convert these lines into recognized

The Territorial Clauses 29

30 The Territorial Clauses

boundaries” The last territorial component emphasized by some of Israel’s adversaries

The Territorial Clauses 31

[H]aving regard to the consideration that, as between Israel, acting

32 The Territorial Clauses

Schwebel’s justification of any modification of the former armistice demarcation

Egypt.” The legal conception of the State of Israel — an organic conception

The Territorial Clauses 33