M.

Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

Madras High Court Madras High Court M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014 DATED: 02.01.2014 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.VENUGOPAL W.P.Nos.17705 & 17706 of 2012 M.Manickam .. Petitioner in both WPs. vs. 1.The Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes & Registration (H) Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009. 2.The Inspector General of Registration, No.100, Santhome High Road, Chennai-600 028. .. Respondents in both WPs. Prayer in W.P.No.17705/2012: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the Second Respondent in his proceedings Memo No.32483/V3/2012 dated 28.06.2012 and quash the same. Prayer in W.P.No.17706/2012: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the First Respondent in his proceedings G.O.(2D) No.129 dated 29.06.2012 and G.O.(2D) No.131 dated 29.06.2012 and quash the same and consequently, direct the respondents herein to permit the petitioner to retire from service with effect from 30.06.2012 and disburse all consequential service and monetary benefits with interest, within a time-frame as fixed by this Court. For Petitioner : Mr.G.Bala and Daisy For Respondents : Mr.S.Navaneetham Additional Government Pleader ------COMMONORDER The Petitioner in W.P.No.17705 of 2012 has preferred the instant Writ of Certiorari, in calling for the records pertaining to the impugned order passed by the Second Respondent in his proceedings Memo No.32483/V3/2012 dated 28.06.2012 and to quash the same.

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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

2.The Petitioner in W.P.No.17706 of 2012 has focussed the instant Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, in calling for the records relating to the impugned order passed by the First Respondent in his proceedings G.O.(2D) No.129 dated 29.06.2012 and G.O.(2D) No.131 dated 29.06.2012 and to quash the same. Further, he has sought for passing an order by this Court directing the Respondents to permit him to retire from service with effect from 30.06.2012 and disburse all consequential service and monetary benefits with interest, within a time-frame fixed by this Court. 3.According to the Petitioner, he joined Government Service as Junior Assistant on 02.01.1973. He was promoted as Assistant on 01.04.1981. He was qualified as per rules to hold the post of Sub-Registrar Grade II. Subsequently, his name was included in the panel of Assistants fit for promotion as Sub-Registrar Grade II for the year 1985-1986. Further, he was promoted on 25.02.1986 and his service was regularised with effect from 03.03.1986. 4.The Petitioner was promoted as District Registrar and further promoted as Assistant Inspector General of Registration on 24.06.2010. He was due for promotion to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Registration in the year 2011 but however the same was denied by the Department without any justification. He was to retire from service on 30.06.2012 on attaining the age of superannuation but on the verge of his retirement, the Second Respondent/ Inspector General of Registration, Chennai issued a charge memo in proceedings No.32483/V3/2012 dated 28.06.2012. The plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner is that the charge memo was framed without application of mind to the facts of available records. As a matter of fact, the charge memo consists of two grounds, which does not constitute any misconduct and any moral turpitude. The allegations levelled against him is to the effect that he caused loss to the Government by taking wrong assessment while registering documents for registration that too when he was working as Sub-Registrar. All the allegations pertain to the period from September 2009 to April 2010 which is barred by limitation. 5.The Learned counsel for the Petitioner urges before this Court that the first count of the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 namely, purported loss caused to the Government would not be a ground for initiating disciplinary proceedings under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, as he was working as a Sub-Registrar at the relevant point of time and discharged his quasi-judicial function as per law. 6.The Learned counsel for the Petitioner projects his arguments that there is no ulterior motive levelled against the Petitioner by the Department and in the absence of said ulterior motive or mala-fide intention, the Respondents cannot initiate Disciplinary proceedings under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 7.Yet another submission of the Learned counsel for the Petitioner is that to deny peaceful retirement to the Petitioner, in the charge memo, it was mentioned describing it as loss to the Government. At this stage, the Learned counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of this Court that the Petitioner earlier filed W.P.No.21513 of 2011 wherein on 02.11.2011, this Court was pleased to grant stay of the operation of the revision of seniority. It is also represented on behalf of the Petitioner that the said interim stay already granted continues till date and due to the interim orders passed by this Court, the Respondents are not in a position to fill up the post of Deputy Inspector General of Registration using the revised seniority list. 8.The Learned counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the G.O.Ms.144 dated 08.06.2007 issued by the State Government in and by which it is clear that "The disciplinary authority should not resort to last minute suspension of the Government servants (i.e.) on the date of their retirement. Further, a decision either to allow Government servant to retirement from service or suspend him from service should be taken well in advance that is three months prior to the date of retirement on superannuation ..." But in the instant case on hand, it is represented on behalf of the Petitioner that the ingredients of the aforesaid G.O. have not been adhered to by the Respondents which has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice to the Petitioner.
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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

9.Lastly, it is the grievance of the Petitioner that there is no legal basis to substantiate the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 issued by the Second Respondent/ Inspector General of Registration, Chennai and therefore, the said charge memo is to be quashed by this Court in furtherance of substantial cause of justice. 10.To lend support to the contention in the present case on hand, the Petitioner has exercised only quasi-judicial function and in regard to the said exercise of judicial function, the same cannot be cementing platform for initiating a disciplinary proceedings by the Second Respondent concerned, the Learned counsel for the Petitioner relies on the decision of this Court in 2010 (7) MLJ [B.K.Gunasekaran .vs. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Secretary to Government, Commercial Tax and Registration Department, Secretariat, Chennai 600 009 and Others] at page 32 wherein it is held as under: "The charges as framed against the petitioner are not maintainable. That apart, the entire disciplinary action has been grossly delayed and the petitioner has been put to irreparable hardship and mental agony." 11.He also seeks in aid of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in 2005 (5) CTC [The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Chepauk, Chennai-5 and another Vs. N.Sivasamy, Commercial Tax Officer (Under suspension) C.6/6, Kendriya Vihar, Velappanchavadi, Chennai-77 and another] at page 451 at special page 458 and 459 wherein at paragraph 14 it is inter-alia observed as follows:"14.As rightly pointed out by the applicant, all the charges relate to the exercise of the powers by the applicant as a quasi-judicial authority. We have already referred to the view of the Supreme Court that action taken by a judicial authority should not form the basis for disciplinary action. It is also brought to our notice that the enquiry officer was appointed after a lapse of 32 months from the date of issue of charge memo. Even after the appointment of the enquiry officer, the department has not taken steps to complete the enquiry. Even though there is no stay order by the Tribunal, the enquiry was not proceeded with. We are satisfied that the applicant had been exercising quasi-judicial power as Commercial Tax Officer and assuming that there was any error, the remedy would be by way of appeal or revision as provided in the C.S.T. Act and TNGST Act and hence they could not be the subject matter of the disciplinary proceedings. Further, there was inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and the same was issued just 7 days before the date of superannuation. Though the alleged lapse occurred in the year 1995 and certain charges related to the period 1993-94, the charge memo was issued on 15.07.1997 and served on 23.07.1997, just 7 days before the date of retirement. The contention of the applicant that only with a view to cause hardship, agony and anguish, the charge memo was issued cannot be ignored. As rightly stated, if every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers and that misconduct is not coming within the purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty. Likewise, wrong interpretation of law cannot be ground for misconduct. He may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction, but that wrong can be corrected in appeal and the same cannot always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings for an officer while he is acting as quasi-judicial authority. We have already pointed out that though the applicant filed Original Application No.6284/97 challenging the charge memo dated 15.07.1997, admittedly, no stay was granted. Despite the above fact that the department had not proceeded with disciplinary proceedings; there is an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the department. According to the applicant, he is 67 years of age as on date and had rendered 38 years of service in the department. He had undergone sufferings from mental worry, agony, anguish and hardship for all these years. We are satisfied that there is no need to pursue the charge memo dated 15.7.1997." 12.Also that the Learned counsel for the Petitioner cites the order of this Court dated 09.12.2010 in W.P.No.21621 of 2010 [M.K.Jayavelu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by the Secretary to Government, Commercial Tax and Registration Department, Fort St. George, Chennai and another] whereby and whereunder in paragraphs 4 to 6 it is observed and held thus:- "4.Admittedly, the charges relate to the period from 1982 to 1987 but the charge memo was issued only on 14.1.2003. Various incidents have been clubbed together and single charge memo was issued. If there was any lapse on the part of time. If there was any deficit in the levy of stamp duty, it should have been found in the quarterly audit conducted by the Registration department. Each year carries four quarterly audits and when that is the position there may not be any action for the alleged levy of deficit stamp duty. There is no explanation in the counter affidavit as to why
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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

the disciplinary proceedings were not initiated from 1982 to 2003 or 1997 to 2003. Absolutely there is silence in this regard in the counter affidavit. Without any explanation. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delay vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. 5.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.V.Mahadevan vs. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board reported in 2005(4) CTC 403 quashed the disciplinary proceedings due to delay of 10 years. In this case also there is a delay of minimum of six years and maximum of 21 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. Secondly, the enquiry officer conducted enquiry and submitted a report only on 31.8.2005. Even after 2005/2006, there is an unexplained delay of 4 years. Even this delay would vitiate disciplinary proceedings. 6.That apart the petitioner was performing Quasi Judicial function and if there was any improper exercise of function that has to be corrected in the manner known to law and it cannot be the basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings. It has been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zunjerrao Bhikaji Nagakar vs. Union of India reported in (1999) 7 SCC 409 and B.K.Gunasekaran vs. State Government of Tamilnadu and another (2010) 7 MLJ 101." 13.Per contra, it is the submission of the Learned Additional Government Pleader that while serving as Sub Registrar the Petitioner has caused revenue loss to the tune of Rs.35,29,852/- to the Government through registration of various documents and also registered two time barred copies of decrees in violation of Section 23 and 25 of the Registration Act, 1908 and therefore, he was issued with a charge memo under Rule 17(b) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, dated 28.06.2012 by the Second Respondent. Furthermore, pending enquiry of the aforesaid charge, he was placed under suspension. 14.Advancing his arguments, the Learned Additional Government Pleader, contends that the Petitioner has projected W.P.No.17705 of 2012 against issuance of charge memo dated 28.06.2012 by the Second Respondent and indeed, the term 'negligence' and the word 'careless' are mentioned as one of the causes to initiate disciplinary proceedings as per Appendix I of the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 15.Expatiating his submission, the Learned Additional Government Pleader submits that even though the Petitioner is a 'Public Officer' under Section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, he caused loss to an extent of Rs.35,29,852/- by registering the documents in a causal manner and without ascertaining the nature of documents and chargability to Stamp Duty. The other charge is that the Petitioner registered the two decrees of the Civil Court which were time barred under Proviso to Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908. 16.The Learned Additional Government Pleader takes a plea that under Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules there is no prescribed time limit for initiating disciplinary action and the question of quasi-judicial function would arise only when an enquiry is conducted by hearing the concerned registrants and orders passed as to the nature of an instruction. 17.It is the submission of the Learned Additional Government Pleader that disciplinary action initiated by the Second Respondent is quite in tune with the Tamil Nadu Civil Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Due to the pending enquiry of the disciplinary action, the Petitioner on 29.06.2012 was placed under suspension and thereafter, on attaining the date of superannuation, he was placed under extension of service. 18.The Learned Additional Government Pleader, while winding up his arguments brings it to the notice of this Court that proviso to Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908 is to the effect that "Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be presented within four months from the day on which decree or order was made, or, where it is appeal able, within four months from the day on which it becomes final" and in the instant case, the Petitioner has not obtained the copy of judgment of further appeal to vindicate his stand.

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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

19.At this juncture, this Court relevantly points out that the ingredients of Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908 envisages that no document other than a Will can be accepted for Registration, unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within a four months from the date of its execution except in cases falling under Secs.23-A, 24, 25 and 26 of the Act. In this connection, this Court worth recalls and recollects the decision of U Aung Din Vs. Maung Aung Myint, [AIR 1933 Rangoon] at page 194 wherein it is observed that "a document was registered by the Sub Registrar more than four months after its execution. As such, it was held that the Sub Registrar has no jurisdiction to register the document and the defect could not be cured by Sec.87 of the Act. Furthermore, the order of the Learned Single Judge was affirmed in the 'Letters Patent Appeal' ". 20.Also this Court aptly points out that in the decision of Kessara Venkatappayya Vs. Nayani Venkataranga Rao [I.L.R.43 Mad] at page 288 at special page 306 to 308, it is observed and held that "the registration of a document, including an authority to adopt, other than a Will, presented beyond the prescribed period by Sections 23 to 26 of the Registration Act is invalid. It is not a mere irregularity in the procedure cured by Section 87 of the Act". 21.That apart, in the decision of P.A.J. Setharama Vs. Lala Gopi Krishna Das, [Air 1963 Mad.] at page 1 and at special page 2 it is observed and held that 'where a document which requires registration is not presented for registration within the time prescribed, it will not be open to the parties to have it registered in an indirect manner by simply adopting the device of referring to it making it a part of a latter (sic) document which could be presented for registration. 22.In the decision of Ram Singh Sant Ram Vs. Jasmer Singh Vardit Singh, [AIR 1963 Punjab] at page 100 and at special page 102 wherein it is observed and held as follows:"According to Sec.23 of the Act, no document other than a Will can be accepted for registration unless presented for that purpose to the proper officer within four months from the date of its execution. Under Section 23 of the Act, a further period of four months is allowed for registration in certain cases of urgent necessity or unavoidable accident i.e., to say, eight months is the outside limit for presenting a document for registration. In the present case, it would be seen that the sale-deed was presented after about a year of its execution. The same could not, therefore, under any circumstances be registered." 23.In computing the four months provided for Registration, the day on which the document was executed is excluded by virtue of the definition of the word "from" in the General Clauses Act. It is to be noted that a decree can be presented within four months of the day it became final. The four months period for registration as per Section 23 of the Registration Act begins to run from the date of execution. Indeed, the date of execution of the decree would be the date on which it is actually signed and it is different from the date of decree. The time under Section 23 of the Act would in any case begins from the date of actual execution and not from the date of decree. Further, in the decision of Gurjeet Singh Vs. Sarabjeet Singh, [AIR 2009 Delhi] at page 29 and at special page 30 it is held that for the purposes of Section 23 of the Registration Act, the time for registration will run only from the date of release of decree. It is to be borne in mind that two charges levelled against the Petitioner is that when he served as Sub-Registrar at Kodambakkam Sub Registrar office (in Central Madras Registration District) he permitted the two written documents dated 15.03.2002 and 13.03.2008 (document Nos.286/2010 and 287/2010 respectively) to be registered on 29.01.2010 and therefore, he has permitted the said documents for filing of the same and getting it registered after 8 years and 2 years from the date of execution of documents beyond the period of eight months. 24.Also this Court cites the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SCC [Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and others] at page 2881 wherein it is observed and held as follows:"To maintain any charge sheet against a quasi-judicial authority something more has to be alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g. in the nature of some extraneous consideration influencing the quasi-judicial order.
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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

If every error of law were to constitute a charge of misconduct, it would impinge upon the independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers like the appellant. The entire system of administrative jurisdiction whereunder quasi-judicial powers are conferred on administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute if officers performing such functions are inhibted in performing their functions without fear or favour because of the constant threat of disciplinary proceedings. When we talk of negligence perceived as carelessness, inadvertence or omission but as culpable negligence. A wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for misconduct. Of course it is a different matter altogether if it is deliberate and actuated by mala fides. Appellant the Collector of Central Excise while adjudicating the case of an assessee held that the assessee had clandestinely manufactured and cleared the excisable goods wilfully and evaded the excise duty the Collector ordered confiscation of the goods. However, penalty under R 173-Q of Excise Rules was not levied on the assessee. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant Collector on allegation that he favoured the assessee by not imposing penalty. It was not the case that the appellant did not impose penalty because of any negligence on his part but he said it was not a case of imposition of penalty. When penalty is not levied, the assessee certainly benefits. But it cannot be said that by not levying the penalty the officer has favoured the assessee or shown undue favour to him. There has to be some basis for the disciplinary authority to reach such a conclusion even prima facie. Record in the present case does not show if the disciplinary authority had any information within its possession from where it would form an opinion that the appellant showed favour to the assessee by not imposing the penalty. He may have wrongly exercised his jurisdiction. But that wrong can be corrected in appeal. That cannot always form basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings for an officer while he is acting as quasi judicial authority. It must be kept in mind that being a quasi judicial authority, he is always subject to judicial supervision in appeal. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty. The charge of misconduct against the appellant was not proper. Disciplinary proceedings initiated against him are liable to be quashed." 25.Moreover, Rule 9 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 speaks of right of Government to withhold or withdraw pension. More specifically Rule 9(1)(b) of the Rules enjoins as follows:b)In case there is any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, to any local body or to any co-operative society comprising of Government servants and registered under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, and if, in any departmental or Judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement, the Government shall also have the right of ordering recovery from the pension [for Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity] of the whole or part of the pecuniary loss caused by such grave misconduct or negligence. Provided that the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders under this clause are passed." 26.It is not in dispute that the Petitioner has been issued with the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 by the Second Respondent in respect of certain allegations levelled against him. In the charge memo, there were two allegations levelled against the Petitioner and in the annexure to the charge memo from Serial No.1 to 21 the loss caused details has been made mentioned of and the said purported loss amount comes to Rs.35,29,852/-. It cannot be gainsaid that as per G.O.Ms.144 dated 08.06.2007 (Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department, issuance of suspension orders on the date of retirement of the Government servant should be avoided by examining of the case well in advance namely viz., three months prior to the date of his superannuation. But in the present case on hand, the ingredients of the said G.O. as stated supra have not been adhered to by the Respondents 1 and 2. However, this Court on going through the contents and tenor of G.O.Ms.144 dated 08.06.2007 (Personnel and Administrative Reforms (N) Department, [issued by the Government] opines that the decision of the Government has a general principle to avoid issuance of suspension orders on the date of retirement by examination of the Government Servants case well in advance, i.e., three months prior to the date of retirement on superannuation is only advisory/directory in nature.
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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

27.In view of the fact that the Petitioner was only issued with the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 and for the said charge memo, explanation was submitted by him on 29.06.2012 (as informed by the Learned counsel for the Petitioner) and the First Respondent/ Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes & Registration (H) Department, Chennai issued G.O.(2D) No.129 dated 29.06.2012 by placing the Petitioner under suspension and also informed him that he will be paid subsistence allowance and dearness allowance as admissible under Rule 53(1) of Fundamental Rules. Further more, the First Respondent on 29.06.2012 issued G.O.(2D) No.131 [Commercial Taxes and Registration (H) Department] has not permitted the Petitioner (under suspension) to retire on his reaching the date of superannuation i.e., on the afternoon of 30.06.2012 but retained him in service until inquiry into charges pending against him is concluded and final orders are passed by the competent authority. 28.It may not be out of place for this Court to make significant to mention the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2006 (12) Supreme Court Cases 28 [Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana] at page 28 and special page 29 wherein at paragraphs 14 to 16 it is held as under: "A writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. Albeit, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal." 29.Also, in yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [2012 (11) Supreme Court Cases] at page 565 and special page at 566 it is held as follows:"The law does not permit quashing of charge sheet in a routine manner. In case the delinquent employee has any grievance in respect of the charge sheet he must raise the issue by filing a representation and wait for the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. Neither the disciplinary proceedings nor the charge sheet be quashed at an initial stage as it would be a premature stage to deal with the issues. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a charge-sheet or show-cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, charge sheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a charge-sheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the court." 30.On a careful consideration of respective contentions and this Court also taking note of the qualitative and quantitative discussions as stated supra comes to an inevitable conclusion that the Petitioner was only issued with the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 for which he had submitted his explanation on 29.06.2012. At the stage of issuance of charge memo and later when the Petitioner was issued with the suspension order dated 29.06.2012 and subsequently, when he was not allowed to retire from service by virtue of the order dated 29.06.2012 passed by the First Respondent has approached this Court through two Writ Petitions seeking necessary remedies therein, which in the considered opinion of this Court is not proper and correct action in the eye of law. Moreover, as against the issuance of charge memo dated 28.06.2012 ordinarily a Writ would not lie. It is always open to the Petitioner to take part in the enquiry and to expatiate his stand both on factual and legal aspects. Moreover, the two charges levelled against the Petitioner require oral and documentary evidence to be adduced on both sides. Only when a full pledged enquiry is conducted by the competent authority/ Enquiry Officer, a true picture would finally emerge as to whether the Petitioner had applied his thinking mind while exercising quasi-judicial function in a proper and real perspective. Added further, when the Respondents conduct an enquiry in the matter in issue, then it is open to the Petitioner to participate in the
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M.Manickam vs The Secretary To Government on 2 January, 2014

enquiry and to raise all factual, legal pleas with regard to issuance of charge memo dated 28.06.2012 and to place all his contentions in a threadbare fashion. Before that, it is otiose for the Petitioner to approach this Court through two writ petitions with regard to the subject matter in issue as opined by this Court. 31.Be that as it may, on an overall assessment of the entire gamut of the facts and circumstances of the case in an attendant fashion, this Court holds that the Writ Petition No.17705 of 2012 filed by the Petitioner in regard to the quashing of charge memo dated 28.06.2012 and the Writ Petition No.17706 of 2012 in regard to quashing of the G.O.(2D) No.129 dated 29.06.2012 and G.O.(2D) No.131 dated 29.06.2012 and resultantly to permit him to retire from service with effect from 30.06.2012 etc., are not maintainable [even though the Respondents have not adhered to the tenor of G.O.Ms.144 dated 08.06.2007 by avoiding the suspension of the Petitioner during the fag end of his service and on the verge of his retirement]. Consequently, the Writ Petitions fails. 32.In the result, the Writ Petitions are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Further, the Respondents are directed to complete the final enquiry (in respect of the charge memo dated 28.06.2012 issued on the Petitioner) within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Liberty is granted to the Petitioner to raise all factual and legal pleas before the Enquiry Officer/Authority and the concerned Enquiry Officer/Authority is directed to provide adequate opportunities to the Petitioner by adhering to the Principles of Natural Justice. The Petitioner is directed to lend his co-operation and assistance in regard to the completion of enquiry within the time determined by this Court. 02.01.2014 Index :Yes Internet:Yes DP To 1.The Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes & Registration (H) Department, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009. 2.The Inspector General of Registration, No.100, Santhome High Road, Chennai-600 028. M.VENUGOPAL.J, DP W.P.Nos.17705 & 17706 of 2012 02.01.2014

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