Final Proceedings of Scientific Forum On Tsunami 30mar07

Proceedings
SCIENTIFIC FORUM ON THE TSUNAMI, ITS IMPACT AND RECOVERY

Regional Symposium
6th 7th June 2005 Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand Organized by

Asian Institute of Technology (AIT), Thailand
In partnership with
UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific (UNEP RRCAP) University of Rhode Island/USAID Federal Institute of Hydrology, Germany Ibaraki University, Japan Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Thailand Kenan Institute Asia United Nations University, Japan ASEAN Foundation, Indonesia French Regional Cooperation SOI Asia Project/Keio University
Sponsored by
UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific (UNEP RRCAP) Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand
June 2005
Editor Tawatchai Tingsanchali, D.Eng Professor of Water Resources Engineering School of Civil Engineering Asian Institute of Technology Thailand
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Foreword The 26th of December 2004 will forever be remembered as the day when the face of the world was shattered in the aftermath of a crushing natural catastrophe of unimaginable proportion that occurred in southeastern and southern Asia. The powerful earthquake that had shaken the Island of Sumatra, Indonesia caused tidal waves Tsunami - that were so devastating, never before experienced in recent human history. The earthquake only lasted in a matter of seconds, but the devastation it had caused seemed timeless. The natural cause was local but the effect on mankind was global. But in the midst of the boundless misery that the world was put to bear, the international community had come together in solidarity to rescue, clear, build, and sustain the lives and livelihood of people directly affected by the calamity. The response of the Asian Institute of Technology was befitting of a great and responsible institution - its mission, mandate and character. The Institute immediately dispatched a team of experts to certain parts of the affected area and presented their findings to a large audience from AIT and many partner organizations. The open forum served as a powerful platform for bringing together views and opinions for a common of purpose. AITs response was absolutely firm and sincere. Research teams where formed to brainstorm and identify priority areas of concern. Contents of relevant educational course offerings were revisited to incorporate natural disaster issues and training programs were initiated aimed at raising awareness and reinforcing capacities of people and institutions to tackle natural disasters. As an institution of higher learning and research, AIT is committed to address issues on natural disasters, and aspires to assume a leadership role towards the advancement of knowledge. One such endeavor was to look through the lens of science and technology the Tsunami phenomenon. A regional symposium - Scientific Forum on the Tsunami, Its Impact and Recovery - was held at AIT for the purpose of learning more about the science of Tsunamis cause and effect, and the development rehabilitation and reconstruction needed in its aftermath. The organizers of the regional symposium were indebted to the speakers, sponsors and the partners of AIT that had made contributions, one way or another, for making the event possible. The organizers were thankful to all those who took part in the preparation of the symposium at a time when the world was still mourning the massive deaths and sharing the extreme distress and suffering of the survivors and families of the victims. Above all, the organizers were profoundly grateful to the Asian Institute of Technology. It is earnestly hoped that the proceedings of the regional symposium will contribute towards the advancement of knowledge on Tsunami. Prof. Mario T. Tabucanon Symposium Chairman Prof. Tawatchai Tingsanchali Symposium Editor
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
Background The Asian Tsunami of 26 December 2004, which struck the Indian Ocean basin, affected hundreds of thousands of people in countries including Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and India. Its death toll was over 260,000 victims. Many that survived had their lives disrupted since coastal tourism, fisheries, mariculture and agriculture had been seriously affected. Housing and public infrastructure had been destroyed. There was a need to restore, rehabilitate and repair the damage of the affected people and the area. Full comprehension of this event and its consequences required in-depth studies to analyze and assess the impact measures, preparedness, prevention measures, emergency response and rehabilitation. Among a large number of abstracts received and presentations made during the scientific forum, this proceedings published only the full papers received which had been reviewed and accepted. Objectives The worlds leading scientists and advocates were invited to participate in this scientific forum organized to explore, analyze and take measurable steps to better understand the recent Tsunami phenomenon. The forum was organized by the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) in partnership with UNEP, ADPC, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Royal Thai Government and other partners as listed. The forum took place on 6 and 7 June 2005 at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok. Through this scientific forum, technical knowledge was strengthened so that national and international authorities as well as vulnerable people in the region could increase their capacity to prevent, manage and recover from the impact of a large-scale tsunami disaster.
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ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Chairman: Co Chairmen:
Prof. Mario T. Tabucanon

Acting President, AIT
Prof. Chongrak Polprasert

Dean, School of Environment Resources and Development and Acting Dean, School of Civil Engineering, AIT
Prof. Tawatchai Tingsanchali

Professor, Water Engineering and Management, School of Civil Engineering, AIT
Members:
Dr. Amrit Bart, Associate Professor, Aquaculture and Aquatic Resources Management, School of Environment Resources and Development, AIT Dr. Pennung Warnitchai, Associate Professor, Structural Engineering, School of Civil Engineering, AIT Dr. Vilas Nitivattananon, Assistant Professor, Urban Environmental Management, School of Environment Resources and Development, AIT Dr. Cherdchinda Chotiyaputta, Department Specialist, Department of Marine and Coastal Resources, Thailand Dr. Kitti Kumpeera, Director, Environmental Management Division, Kenan Institute Asia Mr. Earl Kessler, Deputy Executive Director, ADPC Ms. Tunnie Srisakulchairak, Programme Officer, UNEP Mr. Karma Rana, Institute Secretary, AIT Mr. Jean-Philippe Thouard, IT Coordinator, AIT Ms. Nadeera Rangika, Programme Associate, AIT Tsunami Forum Secretariat, Office of the President, Asian Institute of Technology, P. O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand. +66 2 524 5005 +66 2 524 5069 http://tsunami.ait.ac.th/tsunami-forum tsunami-forum-secretariat@ait.ac.th
Contact Address:
Tel: Fax: Forum website: E mail:
Table of Contents
No.
Title
Page
1.Keynote Tsunamis: Their Coastal Effects and Defense Works Lecture Nobuo Shuto 2.
1 12
13 21 After Effects of the Tsunami Disaster on Inhabitants and Functions of the Local Communities in Phuket and Phang Nga Provinces, Thailand: Possibility and Efficacy of Supports for Them. Tetsuji Ito, Hisashi Kobayashi , Hiromune Yokoki, Naoyuki Kamiko, Hisamichi Nobuoka, Mohammed Fazlul Karim, and Yuji Kuwahara Assessment of Damages of Tsunami and Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka Weerakkody, W.A.P., Hemachandra S.K, Nissanka, S.P., Galagedara, L.W., Gunaratna, L.H.P, Soorasena, J.M. and Fernando, S. Improvement of Water-Related Disaster Management in Thailand Tawatchai Tingsanchali and Narong Luengbootnak The ISLAND Project Approach (Information Systems for Local Authorities Needs to Face Disasters) Jean Brunot de Rouvre A Review of Techniques for Tsunami Detection and Evacuation Notification Santosh Tripathi and Suthy Heng The 2004 Sumatra Tsunami: Deaths and Damages to Buildings at the Kamala beach, Phuket, Thailand Mongkonkorn Srivichai, Yupa Chidtong, Seree Supratid and Nobuo Shuto Development of a Kite-Balloon System for Disaster Assessment Michiro Kusanagi, Santosh Tripathi and Rajesh Bahadur 22 32
3.
4.
33 41
5.
42 49
6.
50 59
7.
60 65
8.
66 76
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Thapa 9. Applicability of Electric Imaging in Site Investigation for Reconstruction and Emergency Response in a TsunamiAffected Beach in Phuket P. H. Giao, N. Phien-wej, K. Adisornsupawat and V. Singh Hydrodynamic Modeling of Tsunami Impact for Phi-Phi Island, Thailand Chanon Thaicharoen, Sutat Weesakul and Ashim Das Gupta A Strategy for the Rehabilitation of the Rural Transport System in Tsunami-affected Areas Chris Donnges Logistics Problems In Recovery Assistance Of Indian Ocean Earthquake And Tsunami Disaster Shinya Hanaoka and Fayyaz M. Qadir Sustainable Rehabilitation and Reconstruction in Tsunami Affected Areas in Sri Lanka Bandula Wickramarachchi Delivering Affordable Housing after the Tsunami Bernard G. Lefebvre The Use of the Dass42 Survey Tool in Disasters and as Part of a Shelter Program in Aceh Regan Potangaroa The Development of a Permanent Shelter Program for Aceh, North Sumatra Regan Potangaroa Post-Tsunami Disaster Reconstruction Management: A Case Study of Thailand Narong Leungbootnak, Chotchai Charoenngam, and Riza Yosia Sunindijo Authors Index 77 83
10.
84 92
11.
93 105
12.
106 110
13.
111 116
14.
117 124
15.
125 133
16.
134 143
17.
144 153
154-155
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TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.
TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS

Nobuo Shuto Environmental Sciences, Advanced Research Institute for the Sciences and Humanities, Nihon University, 6F Ichigaya Tokyu Building, 2-1 Kudan-kita 4-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0073, Japan E-mail of Corresponding author: shuto-nobuo@arish.nihon-u.ac.jp
ABSTRACT
The generation and coastal effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami are briefed with two hopeful episodes to reduce casualties. Basic physics from generation to amplification in the shallow sea are described by showing typical formulas governing the phenomena. In the numerical simulation, the powerful means to analyze tsunamis and tsunami effects, there are several problems that need due considerations to obtain reliable results. Kinds of disaster and degree of damage are summarized from data and experience in the past. Defence works are composed of three components; hard-wares, urban planning and soft-wares. Residence on tsunami-free high ground is recommended as well as tsunami-resistant buildings in low land. Forecasting is based upon empirical relationships, numerical simulation and measurement. Once warning is issued, evacuation of coastal people according to this warning is the last means to save human lives. The most difficult but important in the tsunami defence work is how to continue the action principle, i.e. early evacuation to high ground, to the future generation. Public education can solve this problem, if not forgotten and not neglected during a long period before the next giant tsunami.
INTRODUCTION
The whole world was suddenly surprised by the Indian Ocean tsunami in December, 2004. It was really a giant tsunami. Its highest run-up was found as high as 49 meters on the west coast of the Sumatra Island. The most shocking was the number of casualties, nearly 300,000. There are two major reasons of this tragedy; no forecasting system in the coastal areas and no knowledge of tsunamis among coastal people. This paper aims to give a brief explanation of a geophysical phenomenon of tsunamis, mathematical method to understand them, damages caused by them and how to prepare for them. When a giant tsunami is born in the sea, it is hundreds kilometres long and several meters high. It is quite long compared with the sea water depth of kilometres deep. At the start, it can be analyzed with the linear long wave theory. Approaching the shore, it increases its height and shortens its length due to shoaling, focusing and resonance effects. These effects are explained with basic formulas. In the near-shore zone, it may take one of the following three shapes; a rapid tide, breaking bore and undulating bore. The numerical simulation is considered as the best means to understand tsunamis and their effects. It is, however, not an almighty. It should be carefully designed; otherwise the results will not reveal a true faces of a tsunami. The most serious difficulty lies in the initial profile that can not be uniquely determined with the present science. Selection of governing equations is related to the accuracy of reproduction of physical phenomena. On an assumption of the leap-frog method with the up-wind scheme for convection terms, conditions are described to ensure the stability and numerical error control of numerical simulation. There are many kinds of disasters, in addition to casualties, loss of houses and boats. A table is prepared to summarize them. Tsunami phenomena and damage are roughly expressed in terms of tsunami intensity.
Scientific Forum on Tsunami, Its Impact and Recovery, AIT, Thailand, 2005
Taking this information into consideration, the recommendable tsunami defence work may be a combination of three components; (1) hard-wares such as sea walls, (2) urban planning such as residence on high ground and tsunami-resistant building and (3) soft-wares such as forecasting, warning, evacuation and public education. Qualitative and quantitative forecasting used at present is briefly introduced with knowledge that coastal residents should have and heritage. The problem the most difficult to solve in the tsunami defence work comes from the fact that the occurrence interval of giant tsunamis is very long compared with a life span of human beings.
THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI OF 2004

At 7:59 a.m. (local time) on December 26, 2004, earthquake of M=9.2, the fifth biggest in the history of earthquake measurement with seismograph, occurred off North Sumatra Island where the Indo-Australian plates are subsiding in the north-east direction below the Eurasian plate. The event occurred in the Burma micro-plate. It was an inter-plate rupture that corresponded to a reverse dip slip. The fault mechanism analyzed by Yagi [2005] is as follows. The rupture continued for over 400 seconds. He divided it into two stages. In the first stage, the rupture mainly propagated to the northwest from hypocenter during initial 100 seconds. It was a usual rupture corresponding to M=8.2. Then the second rupture that released earthquake moment M=9.2 started. The second rupture generated ultra long period seismic waves of 20 seconds. Yagi thinks that this may imply slow and large dislocations. The conventional method to determine the slip distribution can be applied to the first rupture of usual type, but not to the later stage of the rupture. He recognized that the measured tsunami were important to analyze the later stage of the fault motion. This means, in return, the tsunami initial profile usually determined from seismic information may not be a good estimate in case of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Many simulation results published through inter-net by different researchers should be corrected in the future, because these simulation assumed the tsunami initial profile obtained with the conventional method. The aftershock area was 1,200 km long and 300 km wide. The tsunami source area is similar to the aftershock area. Therefore, the tsunami wave length along the short axis of tsunami source area was of the order of 300 km, within which there was ideally one wave crest on the western side and one trough on the eastern side. On the west coast of Sumatra Island directly facing the tsunami source, the tsunami run-ups higher than 20 m were measured along the coast 10 km long and the maximum run-up there was 49 m. If we follow a numerical simulation [Kosihmura, 2004], the tsunami arrived at the coast around half an hour after the earthquake with an ebb tide, but with a flood on the Nias Island off the west coast. Most of tsunami energy propagates in the direction parallel to the short axis of its source. It is, therefore, of no wonder that Thailand, being located in this direction only 400~500 km far from the source, was hit by the tsunami and suffered a huge damage. The highest run-up of 11 m was measured at Kao Lak. The concentration toward Kao Lak is considered to be a result of convergence due to refraction caused by bathymetry. The numerical simulation tells that the tsunami arrived at Phuket Island around two hours after the earthquake and began with an ebb tide. For this tsunami, it was also easy to arrive at Sri Lanka without losing its energy, because the travel distance of 1,600 km is only five times its wave length. The highest run-up on the eastern coast was measured as high as 15 m. The numerical simulation shows that the tsunami arrived at the eastern coast around two hours after the earthquake and began with a flood. The western coast of Sri Lanka is also exposed to the invasion of the tsunami, because the north-south length, 400 km, of Sri Lanka is not long enough. Diffraction around Sri Lanka made the tsunami strong on the western coast, assisted by the reflection from the Indian Continent. On the south-western coast, run-up of 10 m was found. The numerical simulation shows that at Colombo, the tsunami begins with a flood around two and half hours after the earthquake.
On the contrary, only a few of tsunami energy propagated toward Bangladesh, because it is located in the direction normal to the short axis of the tsunami source. According to a statistics of WHO on February 10, 2005, death toll amounts to 148,873 and missing 142,123. In total, casualties are 290,996; 228,948 in Indonesia, 36,603 in Sri Lanka, 16,423 in India, 8,476 in Thailand and so on, including about 5,000 tourists from Europe. The main reasons of these large casualties are considered to be the lack of warning system and no knowledge of how to act in case of a tsunami. The latter is more important if we learn the exceptional cases experienced in this tsunami event. In case of the Simeulue Island in Indonesia where the tsunami began with an ebb tide, an inherited sad lesson that several thousand residents were killed by a tsunami 97 years ago acted to reduce much casualties, 7 victims among 78,000 residents [Asahi Shinbun, 2005] . Another hopeful example is found in case of an English girl ten years old on the Mai Khao beach, Phuket Island in Thailand. The girl, who had learnt about tsunamis in the school two weeks ago, warned the persons nearby to evacuate and thus saved many lives [Reuter, 2005].
GENERATION, PROPAGATION AND AMPLIFICATION

Birth of a Tsunami Among several causes of tsunami generation, the major one is submarine fault movement. Others are landslide, submarine landslide and volcanic action. A fault movement, while rupturing, shakes the ground and the sea water. The former is an earthquake and the latter is the sea-shock that is not a tsunami. If the sea bottom is vertically displaced as the final result of the rupture and the sea water is also vertically displaced as a consequence, this change in sea water level forms the initial profile of the tsunami. Propagation in The Ocean The initial profile of a tsunami consists of many components of different frequency. When the tsunami hits the nearby shore as a near-field tsunami, all the components arrive without attenuation and with negligible phase lag. In many cases, the dominant tsunami period of a near-field tsunami is 5 to 10 minutes.
During the propagation over the ocean as a far-field tsunami, the phase-dispersion effect makes the longer wave components propagate faster. Whether or not the phase-dispersion effect should be taken into consideration is judged by the Kajiura pa value [1970]. pa=(6h/R)1/3(a/h) (1)
where h is the water depth, a the horizontal dimension of the tsunami source and R the distance from the source. For pa<4, the assumption of the non-dispersive long wave is not applicable. In addition, sea mounts and islands are effective to entrap and scatter the short-period components [Tsuji, 1977]. As a result, a far-field tsunami becomes to have long-period wave components of 40 to 100 minutes.
Major Amplification Mechanisms in The Near-shore A tsunami is a long wave, since its wave length of several hundreds kilometres is very long compared to the water depth of few kilometres. Its wave height in the ocean is a few meters, quite small compared to the water depth. Under these conditions, the linear long wave theory is applied.
The phase velocity that is the same as the energy propagation velocity CG, is determined by the water depth h as follows, C= (gh)1/2 (2)
where g is the gravitational acceleration. The shallower the water depth is, the slower a tsunami propagates. A wave ray, the trace of tsunami propagation, bends toward the shallow region on a shoal. This is refraction. Approaching the land, a tsunami increases its height H. This shoaling effect is obtained as follows, on assuming that the energy transmission rate is kept constant. H2CG=H2(gh)1/2=constant. (3)
After a tsunami enters a bay with a wide and deep entrance, the tsunami increases its height on proceeding to the narrow and shallow bay bottom. This is the focusing effect. Similar effect occurs when the wave rays converge due to refraction caused by sea bottom configuration. The Green formula for the linear long waves is applied to the shoaling and focusing effects, H2(gh)1/2 b=constant or H~b1/2h1/4, where b is the width of bay or the normal distance between adjacent wave rays. The resonance is the third effect. If water in a container is displaced from its equilibrium by an external force and then the force is removed, the water begins to oscillate with a period determined from the size of the container and the water depth in it. This is the natural oscillation. In case of a bay, the natural period of the first-mode, T, is given by T=4l/(gh)1/2 , (5) (4)
where l is the length of the bay. When a tsunami of the period similar to this value enters the bay, at least three waves consecutively, the resonance is completed [Kajiura, 1963].
Non-linear and Dispersive Effects Approaching the shore, the wave height becomes comparable to or larger than the water depth. Then the linear long wave theory is no longer applied. Instead, we have to switch to the shallow-water theory, a non-linear long wave theory.
In simplicity, the water depth, h, of the still water is replaced by the actual water depth d=h+, where is the local water level. The phase velocity is now given by C=[g(h+)]1/2= [g(d)]1/2 (6)
A tsunami has a quite gentle slope and negligibly small curvature at its front in the deep sea where the whole wave moves with the same propagation velocity determined by the still water depth. As it becomes higher in the shallow sea, the crest moves faster than the front and overtakes the latter. Consequently, the local slope and water surface curvature near the front increase. After the front becomes a vertical wall, the water rushes out forward continuously. This is a breaking bore. If the effect of water surface curvature that works to reduce the phase velocity is large enough to suppress the steepening of the front surface, another shape appears. That is an undulating bore, often observed in rivers and shallow seas. A series of short-period waves develops at the front. This is also called as a cnoidal wave train, because its shape is well expressed by the Jacobi elliptic cn function. Or, the waves are called as solitons in an analogy to the quantum mechanics. The period of a soliton is similar to that of wind waves, about 10 seconds. Due to the local centrifugal acceleration caused by large curvature, the effect of gravity is decreased (increased) at the wave crest (trough). This modification in the vertical acceleration acts to develop soliton fission as well as to amplify the wave height of solitons. The highest crest height reaches about twice the height of the original tsunami [for example, Shuto, 1985].
NUMERICAL SIMULATION
The most powerful means to understand tsunamis and their effects is numerical simulation. Since we have to cover wide areas, hydraulic experiment is not recommended because of scale effects, except for some special purposes. A numerical simulation should be designed carefully; otherwise it can not supply useful and meaningful results.
Initial Profile For a tsunamigenic earthquake, the fault parameters are determined from seismic data. Then, with these fault parameters, the vertical displacement of sea bottom is computed with the Mansinha-Smylie method [1971], on assuming a rectangle fault plane in an isotropic homogeneous semi-infinite medium. For a thorough discussion and misprint correction, refer Okada [1985].
A fault motion is not simple. Heterogeneity of a fault motion can be estimated with the method introduced by Fukuyama and Irikura [1985] or with another method by Satake [1989].
Equations When born in the sea several kilometres deep, a tsunami is several tens to 200 kilometres long and several meters high. At its infancy and during the near-field propagation in deep sea, the linear long wave theory in the Cartesian coordinates is applicable. For the transoceanic propagation, the phase dispersion effect and Coriolis force should not be neglected. The linear Boussinesq equation including the Coriolis force expressed in the longitude-latitude coordinates is applied.
Approaching the shore, the shallow-water theory with the bottom friction included should be used. In a river or in a shallow sea on a very gentle slope, a tsunami often shows evolution of undulating bores at its front. The Boussinesq equation is needed for this phenomenon. If one wishes to analyze the runup of undulating bores, he needs such equations of higher approximation as the Goto equation [1984], until bores develop and break. For special topography, the basic assumption of two-dimensional long waves that the vertical acceleration of wave motion is negligible compared to the gravitational acceleration is no longer acceptable. Masamune et al. [2001] introduced a 2-dimension/3-dimension hybrid numerical model. Breaking and after-breaking-growth of undulating bores might be solved with the MAC (mark and cell) method, with verification by hydraulic experiments to formulate the energy loss due to breaking.
Moving Boundary at The Run-up Front With equations in the Eulerian description, it is not possible to handle a runup front in simulation. We have to introduce an approximate moving boundary condition. In the leap-frog scheme, grid points are alternatively located for velocity and water level. Assume that the water level is already computed at a computation cell. Then, compare this water level with the bottom height of the next landward cell. If this water level is higher than the bottom height, the water may flow into the landward cell.
The discharge into the landward cell is evaluated with the water surface slope of the first-order approximation [Iwasaki and Mano, 1979], or with the repeatedly-corrected water surface slope [Hibberd and Peregrine, 1979], or with weir formulas [Aida, 1977; Houston and Butler, 1979].
Deference Scheme and Numerical Error Control The most popular and world-widely used scheme is based upon the leap-frog method with the up-wind scheme applied to the convection term [for example, IOC, 1997].
Simulation by a difference equation introduces numerical errors that are closely related with the original differential equation, difference scheme, grid size, size of tsunamis and characteristic size of the sea bottom configuration.
For a stable computation of a wave equation, the CFL condition should be satisfied first. The more spatial grids are in one wave length of a tsunami, the more smoothly the wave profile is expressed. For this purpose, more than 20 grid points are necessary within one wave length [Shuto et al., 1986]. Use of an approximate moving boundary condition introduces numerical errors. In order to limit the error within 5% and ensure stability of computation for the Iwasaki & Mano condition, the grid size should be smaller than 1/50 of one local wave length at the front. In addition, the grid size should be determined by taking the sea-bottom configuration. Conditions are given for refraction on a uniform slope [Sayama et al., 1988], entrapment around a conical island [Fujima et al., 1998], amplification in V-shaped bay [Inagaki et al., 2001] and inflow into a harbor [Inagaki et al., 2001].
DISASTERS
Kinds of Disasters Several kinds of disasters in the past are summarized in Table 1. A natural disaster is an expression of the interaction of a natural force and the human society. Even if the natural force is the same, the magnitude and type of the disaster is quite variable, because of the change and difference of the coastal society. It is, therefore, strongly recommended to estimate the possible disaster in the future with flexible imagination, on referring Table 1 that is based upon the experience in the past.
Among many disasters, fire can be the biggest secondary disaster. A fire starts from such a source as kitchen fire when houses are destroyed by earthquakes and tsunamis. If this fire is spread by oils transported by the tsunami, the result is devastating. There are five examples that fires were assisted by inflammable materials stored in a large quantity. All occurred in 1964; three in Alaska, USA, one in California, USA and one in Niigata, Japan. The burnt area AB (m2) is roughly estimated by AB = 324V, (7)
where V (kl) is the volume of oil [Shuto, 1991]. Goto [1985] developed a two-layer model to simulate the spread of oil transported by tsunami, by solving simultaneously water-and-oil layers.
Degree of Damage in Terms of Tsunami Intensity Figure 1 provides a rough estimate of degree of damage caused by tsunamis in terms of tsunami intensity, i, defined as (8) i = log2H.
The tsunami height H is the crest height in meter above mean sea water level on the sea and that above ground level on land. Reinforced concrete buildings are tsunami-resistant if they are designed and constructed earthquakeresistant, up to the inundation depth of 6 m even though windows and doors are broken. It is not known from the past experience whether these buildings can withstand or not against deeper depth than 6 m because of lack of data.
TSUNAMI DEFENCE WORKS

A recommended defence plan is a combination of defence structures, urban planning and soft-wares in a harmony with daily activity. Structures provide a direct means to protect human lives and properties against tsunamis not higher than their crown height. However, structures are not always expected to work
perfectly. Urban planning strengthens coastal villages and reduces damages, although perfect protection is not expected. Soft-wares should be introduced in order to save human lives in any case.
Structures A typical structure is a seawall made of concrete. A coastal dike made of soil should be covered by concrete on fore-, top- and rear-faces; otherwise it will be easily eroded if a tsunami overflows. The back toe of these structures should be protected well against scouring due to overflowing.
A tsunami control forest can reduce tsunami-induced currents and stop floating materials if the strength and thickness of trees and undergrowth are sufficient [Shuto, 1984]. A hydrodynamic method to evaluate the effect of forest has been being developed [Harada and Imamura, 2003; Matsutomi et al., 2004].
Urban planning Major item is the land-use regulation. The tsunami resistibility of a coastal village should not be weakened but more and more improved before the next giant tsunami hits.
Movement of residences to the tsunami-free high ground was often used in the past. Important facilities such as town office, police station and fire station as well as facilities for disaster weak such as hospital, home for the aged and nursery school should not be located in the tsunami-prone low land. The tsunami-resistant building zone, i.e. alignment of substantial buildings along the shoreline, is a hopeful countermeasure in the future. This idea has no conflict to daily activity except for its high construction cost. From the experience in the past, all the earthquake-resistant reinforced concrete buildings could withstand tsunamis and protect wooden houses behind, if the inundation height was not larger than 6 m as shown in Fig.1. Only one example of destruction is found in case of the 1946 Aleutian tsunami. A light house 18 m high on the ground 10 m above sea water level was destroyed by the tsunami 30 m high (inundation height was 22 m) [Lander and Lockridge, 1989]. For the inundation height between 6 and 22 m, no data is found in documents. Lifelines such as electricity, water supply, sewage system and telephone system should be well protected against tsunamis, because they are very important not only for daily life but also for surviving after a tsunami. A careful attention should be paid for the storage tanks of inflammable materials, not to trigger a secondary disaster that may become a catastrophic devastation.
Soft-wares Human action to reduce tsunami damage is soft-wares. Among them, forecasting, warning and evacuation are discussed in details in the next section,
Disaster culture that concerns tsunamis and tsunami disasters should be learnt by people and continued to the future generation. Public education is for this purpose, but it is not easy to overcome a wrong optimistic belief that I am exceptionally safe and indifference that other persons experience is not mine. It is important to prepare beforehand for rescue operation. If a rescue operation is put in action within 24 hours (Golden 24) after a disastrous event, many persons will be saved alive. On the second day, the number of the sufferers found dead exceeds the number of them found alive. After 72 hours, there is almost no possibility to relieve any survivors. This law is believed universally true in any natural disasters. In case of a giant tsunami, the first difficulty in rescue operation is to open the coastal roads covered by debris, houses and boats.
FORECASTING AND EVACUATION

Tsunami forecasting and warning Tsunami forecasting is developed and used in many countries and in an international cooperation in the Pacific Ocean.
Most of their method is based upon a general law applicable to tsunamigenic earthquake that the stronger an earthquake is, the larger the tsunami is and the larger its effect on coastal areas is. Since 1952 to 1999, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) used an empirical chart for tsunami forecasting. It is based upon two parameters. One is the magnitude of earthquake determined from the maximum amplitude of seismic waves recorded on the standard seismograph and the other is the distance to the epicentre determined from the time difference in the arrival time of P and S waves. In order not to miss tsunami earthquake, it is recommended to use broad-band seismographs that can record long-period components generated from slow rupture propagation and slow dislocation motion of a fault movement. In French Polynesia, this idea is used in tsunami forecasting [Raymond et al., 1993]. In 1999, JMA introduced a new quantitative forecasting method based upon numerical simulation, for tsunamigenic earthquake. Results of 100,000-case numerical simulations are stored in a computer. Once an earthquake occurs, its fault parameters are determined within 3 minutes and the corresponding tsunami heights along the coast in danger are determined from this data base in one second [Tatehata, 1997]. When a tsunami is forecasted, a warning is issued and is disseminated to local authorities and coastal residents with every communication means as telephone, facsimile, radio, TV, and information transmission systems specially arranged by civil defence or by similar authorities. The best will be the direct transmission via satellites, excluding any possible errors and delays on the line of information flow.
Evacuation Evacuation is the most important and effective method to save human lives. Tourists in Hawaii should have a look at the special pages in telephone books placed in every room in hotels at their checking-in. The pages show the possible tsunami inundation maps and tell, When the ATTENTION/ALERT SIGNAL is sounded, the EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM will direct evacuation of threatened areas, adding another important warning in case of a local tsunami, Any violent earthquake one that caused you to fall or hold onto something to keep from falling is a natural tsunami warning. Immediately evacuate beaches and low-lying coastal areas as soon as the shaking stops. Go to an area that is safe from flooding. This rule is widely adopted in the world. However, this rule can not cover the tsunami generated by a tsunamiearthquake.
The second rule is that an abnormal ebb tide is a signal of the coming tsunami, having also exception that some tsunami can begin with a flood. Another empirical rule that a loud booming noise means an approaching tsunami is analyzed and classified into three major types [Shuto, 1997] and is shown in Fig.1. Drills make coastal residents know evacuation routes and shelters, and keep them aware how to act in an emergency.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A giant tsunami such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 occurs very infrequently, once in 100 years or more. It is difficult to learn the experience in the past and continue the knowledge thus obtained to the future generation. Large casualties caused by this tsunami are a result of this difficulty. However, there is a hope if we remind the case of the Simeulue Island in Indonesia. Memory of another tsunami 97 years ago saved coastal villagers there. The present author believes that the most essential tsunami defence work is to teach how to judge and act in case of an emergency. Continuous public education at every level, at home, in school, in local community and in country is expected for this purpose. The forecasting and warning system comes next. We need maintenance of system and training of staffs for long period. Every time when a coastal village is changed or reformed, residents are recommended to reflect whether their area becomes stronger or weaker against tsunamis with the change. This is the basis of urban planning in the tsunami defence work.
REFERENCES
Aida, I. (1977) Numerical experiments for inundation of tsunami, -Susaki and Usa, in Kochi Prefecture. Bulletin Earthquake Research Institute, 56, 441-460 (in Japanese). Asahi Shinbun (News paper) (2005) An article on January 19, 2005. Fujima, K., K. Masamura, K. Hayashi, T. Shigemura and C. Goto (1998) Criterion for grid size in tsunami simulation around island using a Leap-Frog scheme, Proc. JSCE, 593/II-43, 183-188 (in Japanese) Fukuyama, E. and K. Irikura (1986) Rupture process of the 1983 Japan Sea (Akita-oki) earthquake using a waveform inversion method, Bulletin Seismological Soc. America, 76, 1623-1640. Goto, C. (1984) Equations of nonlinear dispersive long waves for a large Ursell number, Proc. JSCE, 351/II, 193-201 (in Japanese). Goto, C. (1985) A simulation model of oil spread due to tsunamis, Proc. JSCE, 357/II-3, 217-223 (in Japanese). Harada, K. and F. Imamura (2003) Evaluation of tsunamis reduction by control forest and possibility of its use for mitigation, Proceedings of Coastal Engineering, JSCE, 50, 341-345 (in Japanese). Hibberd, S. and D.H. Peregrine (1979) Surf and run-up on a beach: a uniform bore, J. Fluid Mech. 95, 323345. Houston, J.R. and H.L. Butler (1979) A numerical model for tsunami inundation, WES Tech. Rep. HL 79-2. Inagaki, K., M. Kiba, H. Tanaka and M. Takao (2001) Effects of grid length on tsunami numerical simulation for V-shaped bays and harbors, Proc. Coastal Engineering., JSCE, 336-340. IOC (Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission) (1997) IUGG/IOC TIME Project; Numerical Method of Tsunami Simulation with the Leap-Frog Scheme, prepared by C. Goto, Y. Ogawa and F. Imamura, IOC Manuals and Guides, 35, 122 pp. Iwasaki, T. and A. Mano (1979) Two-dimensional numerical simulation of tsunami run-ups in the Eulerian description, Proc. 26th Conf. Coastal Engineering, JSCE, 70-74 (in Japanese). Kajiura, K. (1963) Effects of a breakwater on the oscillations of bay water, Bulletin of the Earthquake Research Institute, 41, 403-418 (in Japanese). Kajiura, K. (1970) Tsunami source, energy and the directivity of wave radiation, Bulletin of the Earthquake Research Institute, 48, 835-869. Koshimura, S. (2004) Modeling a tsunami generated by the December 26, 2004 Earthquake, off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, http://www.dri.ne.jp/koshimuras/sumatra/, DRI Preliminary Tsunami Modeling Report . Lander, F.J. and P.A. Lockridge (1989) United States Tsunamis 1690-1988, National Geophysical Data Center, 265pp Mansinha, L. and D.E. Smylie (1971) The displacement fields of inclined faults, Bulletin Seismological Soc. America, 61, 1433-1440.
Masamune, K., K. Fujima, C. Goto, K. Iida and T. Shigemura (2001) Numerical analysis of tsunami by using 2D/3D hybrid model, Proc. JSCE, 670/II-54, 49-61 (in Japanese). Matsutomi, H., K. Ohnuma and K. Imai (2004) Basic equations for an inundated flow in a vegetated area and a similarity law for a trunk, Proceedings of Coastal Engineering, JSCE, 51, 301-305 (in Japanese). Okada, Y. (1985) Surface deformation due to shear and tensile faults in a half-space, Bulletin Seismological Soc. America, 75, 1135-1154. Raymond, D., O. Hyvernaud and J. Talandier (1993) An integrated system for real time estimation of seismic source parameters and its application to tsunami warning, Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1, 177-196. Reuter, (2005) http://news.kyodo.co.jp/kyodonews/2004/sumatra/serialization/2.html. Satake, K. (1989) Inversion of tsunami waveforms for the estimation of heterogeneous fault motion of large submarine earthquakes; the 1968 Tokachi-oki and 1983 Japan Sea Earthquakes, J. Geophysical Research, 94, 5627-5636. Sayama, J., N. Shuto and C. goto (1988) Errors induced by refraction in tsunami numerical simulation, Proc. 6th Congress, Asian and Pacific Regional Division, IAHR, IV, 257-264. Shuto, N. (1985) The Nihonkai-Chubu earthquake tsunami on the North Akita coast, CEJ, 28, 255-264. Shuto, N. (1987) Effectiveness and limit of tsunami control forests, Coastal Engineering in Japan, 30, 143153. Shuto, N. (1991) Historical changes in characteristics of tsunami disasters, Proc. International Symposium Natural Disaster Reduction and Civil Engineering, JSCE, 77-86 Shuto, N. (1993) Tsunami intensity and disasters, Tsunamis in the World, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 197-216. Shuto, N., T. Suzuki, K. Hasegawa and K. Inagaki (1986) A study of numerical technique on tsunami propagation and run-up, Science of Tsunami Hazards, 4, 111-124. Shuto, N. (1997) A natural warning of tsunami arrival, Advances in Natural and Technological Hazard Research, 9, 157-173. Tatehata, H. (1997) The new tsunami warning system of the Japan Meteorological Agency, Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research, 9, 175-128. Tsuji, Y. (1977) A study on the scattering wave induced by tsunami passing over a sea mount or rise, Kaiyou Kagaku (Ocean Science), 9, 45-53. Yagi, Y. (2005) What occurred at the rupture area of the 2004 giant earthquake off Sumatra, Summary Report of the Off Sumatra Earthquake of December 26, 2004, Seismological Society of Japan, 1-5 (in Japanese).
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Table 1 Kinds Types and Causes of Tsunami Disaster Human Lives Drowned. Injured hit by debris etc. Disease caused by swallowing alien substances during drifting. Houses Washed away. Destroyed. Flooded. Coastal Structures Toe erosion, displacement and overturning of sea walls, sea dikes, breakwaters and quay walls. Scattering and subsidence of concrete blocks. Traffic Railway Erosion of embankments. Train wagons overturned. Displacement of rails and bridges. Rails buried by sands. Highway Displacement and falling down of bridges. Overturning of bridge abutment by erosion. Erosion of embankment. Closure of traffic by debris on roads. Harbour Change in water depth (erosion and accumulation). Lifelines Water supply Destruction of hydrants by collision of debris. Electricity Overturning and washed-away of electric poles. Telephone Damage to telephone lines and poles. Overturning of relay tower for portable telephone. Cut-off of underground telephone line at the junction to the aerial lines. Submergence of telephone receivers. Fishery Damage to fishing boats. Destruction and loss of rafts, fishes and shells in aquaculture. Loss of fishing nets and other fishing gears. Closure of port entrance by fishing gears washed-away. Commerce and Industry Depreciation of goods by submergence. Agriculture Physiological damage to crops due to submergence. Damage to farms buried by sands. Closure of irrigation channels filled by sands and debris. Forest Physical damage (Breaking and overturning of trees. Soil erosion). Physiological damage by sea water and sands. Oil Spill Environmental pollution. Spread of fires. Fire (causes) Kitchen fire. Heating. Engine room of fishing boats. Submerged batteries of fishing boats. Collision to gasoline tanks. Electricity leakage.
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TSUNAMI INTENSITY TSUNAMI HEIGHT (m) On a mild slope WAVE PROFILE On a steep slope SOUND
0 1 Sudden rise near the shore. Rapid tide.
1 2
2 4 Wall of water in the offing. Second wave breaks.
3 8 Wave front often breaks.
4 5 16 32 First wave may show plunging breaker.
Continuous sound caused by spilling breaking at wave front. (Like a sea roar, a storm, a locomotive or big trucks.) Sudden big sound caused by plunging breaking on the beach. (Like a thunderbolt. Only hearable at the beach of breaking.) Big sound caused by impact of tsunamis on cliffs. (Like a distant thunder or an explosion. Hearable at distant places.) Wooden house Partial damage Withstand Withstand Damage begins. Negligible damage. Drifts stopped. Reduction of tsunamis. Damage begins. Demolished (No data) Demolished (No data) Damage>50% Partial damage. Drifts stopped. Damage=100% Damaged. No effect. Demolished
HOUSE Stone house R.C. Building FISHING BOAT TSUNAMI CONTROL FOREST AQUACULTURE RAFT
Fig.1 Phenomena of and damage due to tsunamis in terms of tsunami intensity
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AFTER EFFECTS OF THE TSUNAMI DISASTER ON INHABITANTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN PHUKET AND PHANG NGA PROVINCES, THAILAND: POSSIBILITY AND EFFICACY OF SUPPORTS FOR THEM; Ito,T. et al.
AFTER EFFECTS OF THE TSUNAMI DISASTER ON INHABITANTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN PHUKET AND PHANG NGA PROVINCES, THAILAND: POSSIBILITY AND EFFICACY OF SUPPORTS FOR THEM
Tetsuji Ito1), Hisashi Kobayashi 2), Hiromune Yokoki, Naoyuki Kamiko, Hisamichi Nobuoka, Mohammed Fazlul Karim, and Yuji Kuwahara 3) Faculty of Humanities, Ibaraki University, 2-1-1 Bunkyo, Mito-city, Ibaraki-prefecture 310-8512, Japan 2) Faculty of agriculture, Ibaraki University, 3-21-1 Chuo, Ami-machi, Inashiki-gun, Ibaraki-prefecture 300-0393, Japan 3) Faculty of Engineering, Ibaraki University, 4-12-1 Nakanarusawa-cho Hitachi-city, Ibaraki-prefecture 316-8511, Japan E-mail of Corresponding author: tetsuji64@ybb.ne.jp
1)
ABSTRACT
At two- and five-month intervals following the tsunami disaster, we observed and interviewed some of the inhabitants of Phuket and Phang Nga Provinces, in Thailand, in order to determine the conditions of their present lives as individuals and as members of their communities. We arrived at the following conclusions about their mental and emotional well-being: 1) Contrary to expectations, narratives about the disaster included some humorous remarks. 2) For a more complete understanding, it is necessary to incorporate psychological perspectives other than those specifically related to traumatic events and post-traumatic stress disorders. 3) We assume that the continuation of community relationships after the disaster is important, but more research is needed to predict future changes. 4) Under the circumstances, we predict that support for community-based human relationships is more important than support for individuals. Based on these findings, the possibility and efficacy of future support are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The huge earthquake and tsunami on December 26, 2004 in the Sumatra area caused considerable physical and psychological damage. While it is important to investigate the disaster and attempt to devise countermeasures from an engineering standpoint, it is also important to consider human factors such as what people experienced, what they lost, and how their relationships changed. We discuss the possibility and efficacy of support for the victims of devastation from a social psychological perspective. Many psychologists in Japan and in Western developed countries have adopted the viewpoint that, In a disaster, affected people are damaged, not only physically but also psychologically; for example, they are injured mentally, and sometimes suffer from trauma and from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) for years. In such cases, mental health care provided by accomplished clinical psychological counsellors is needed. It is well known that soldiers exposed to severe conflict conditions often experience such problems, and the term PTSD received considerable attention during the Vietnam War. We consider the possibility that sociocultural factors are as, or more, important than individual psychological conditions. An Ibaraki University (in Japan) research team conducted two field investigations (in March and June, 2005) in Phuket and Phang Nga Provinces, Thailand; these areas were extensively damaged by the tsunami. Although most team members were majoring in coastal engineering or rural planning, the first author (and team member) is a social psychologist, and this determined the focus of the current study.
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AFTER EFFECTS OF THE TSUNAMI DISASTER ON INHABITANTS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN PHUKET AND PHANG NGA PROVINCES, THAILAND: POSSIBILITY AND EFFICACY OF SUPPORTS FOR THEM; Ito, T. et al.
FIELD INTERVIEWS
Locations Our research sites were Phuket and Phang Nga Provinces in the southwestern coastal area of Thailand (see map). The main industries are tourism, agriculture, and fishing. Tourism in the area has developed rapidly in recent years, and many foreign tourists, especially Europeans, were also affected by the tsunami. Dates The research was conducted during the periods March 2-5 (full research team) and June 7-8 (first author only). Interpreter A Japanese woman who has been living and managing a tourist agency in Phuket for many years served as an interpreter. Interviews We did not determine question content in detail before the interviews; however, we always asked the following questions: Where were you at that time? What did you see and how did you act? What is the situation like for you now? Procedure We rented a car and walked around to observe the area, accompanied by the interpreter. Informal interviews of residents were conducted shoreside, in schools, in temporary homes, and so on. Interviewees were selected randomly because of practical constraints.
(Cited from http://www.maps-thailand.com/)
NARRATIVES OF THE RESIDENTS

We interviewed approximately 20 residents, including children. As interviews were not conducted systematically some of them were very short, or it happened that the audio-recordings were insufficient; therefore, we present a number of typical or particularly impressive narratives, and our observations.
a) A fisherman (52 years old) at Bang Tao beach in Phuket on March 3rd, 2005 He was sitting alone on the shore watching the sea that had brought the tsunami two months before. He looked as if he were in a sentimental mood at the time. When I (ITO Tetsuji) talked to him, he responded and was soon at ease.
---- Where were you at the time of the tsunami? I am a fisherman and the driver of a long tail boat. I had moored my boat around here. ---- Tell me about the situation at that time. Well, the sea water backed off. I judged that it was not a normal situation. After six or seven minutes, the first wave came very fast, although its height was normal. Three big waves came. The second time nothing happened. The third time, water wasnt drawn and a huge wave attacked. I thought the situation at
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the time of the second wave was abnormal, so I paddled my boat off shore and stayed in it for a long time. I stayed there, and did not come back, for some time. ---- Therefore, you were safe?. Yes. There was no huge wave offshore. The level of water was elevated a little bit, but there were no special waves. ---- How far from here were you? Beyond that boat (pointing to an offshore boat). I dont know how many meters I was from the shore. ---- You thought that something would happen, didnt you? The (first and second) waves were the kind of waves Id never seen before. They were apparently abnormal. So I went offshore for a time. ---- Did you have any knowledge about tsunamis before that? I had heard the word tsunami in the past three or four years. I had heard it was a huge wave, but I didnt know what caused it, or what effects it would have. ---- Your choice to go offshore was a possible solution, then, wasnt it? All the boats staying at the shore were destroyed. Only the boats that were paddled offshore got out of trouble. ---- How many boats took off from the shore? About 20. ---- Some fishermen stayed inshore?. Yes. They didnt believe the huge wave, the tsunami, would come. There were about 70 boats here; about 50 stayed and were destroyed. ---- How many minutes did you have to take your boat offshore from the moment you noticed the abnormal situation? Four or five minutes. ---- Usually people escape toward land, I guess.. It was a gut feeling as a fisherman. I thought offshore was safer. There had not yet been a huge wave, so I escaped beyond it. (syncopation) ---- While you were sitting there watching the sea a while ago, what were you thinking about? If some tourists come, I will try to talk to them (with laughing). When two foreign tourists, at some distance, waved to him, he went to see them and the interview was terminated abruptly. He is, in fact, a fisherman, but sometimes he gives tourists rides in his boat. Before I interviewed him he seemed to be watching the sea in a musing or sentimental manner, but he was actually a pragmatist. He had lost no family members or friends, although eight people had been killed or were missing from this area. His calm way of talking and his mild facial expression strongly impressed me.
b) A school worker (43 years old) at Kamala beach in Phuket on March 3rd, 2005 There is a primary school near Kamala beach in Phuket. Beside the school there is a big tree; we found a number of people sitting under this tree and chatting. There were plain benches and tables. One particular woman, who had been living in a house near the school, appeared very sociable. Her humorous way of talking made the people around her laugh heartily.
---- What happened at the time of the tsunami? When the first wave backed off, my daughter came to me and shouted, Mom, a big wave will come soon. Run! So I tried to escape to the second floor of the school building. Many things, even cars, were carried away from the shore by the sea. Oh, yes, everything! I drank water, dirty oily water. There was a bike repair garage beside my house and dirty oil was pooled there. I drank the water. I felt sick after drinking that water (said with indignant expression. Persons around laughed). (syncopation)
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Even this large lad escaped by climbing up a tree (pointing to a boy who weighed around 140 kg). Everyone was surprised by the huge wave and tried desperately to protect themselves. People climbed up trees because they were frightened, but then found they could not get down because of their trembling. There were trees full of fruit (laughing). It was a tough job, requiring human assistance, to get them to climb down. The interval between the first wave and the second wave was very short. I tried to bring my daughter to the mountain side, but I couldnt because the second wave came soon. We went up to the second floor of the school building. We were safe. However, she stepped on glass, or something like it, at that time and she has had to have her wound sewn up with 18 stitches. (syncopation) Someone cried, The water is coming! The water is coming! So I replied, Two tanks of water, please, because we always order drinking water by the tank. But the water that was coming, of course, was the tsunami! While we were talking in this manner, the tsunami struck suddenly and carried away everything over there (laughing). (syncopation) There were five monks in the temple; four of them were killedThe flow of the tsunami was very strong, so everything was carried away. My friend climbed a tree with her niece on her back. It was worthy of a gold medal! I couldnt distinguish which parts of her narrative were true. She sometimes seemed to be joking. Her humor made her neighbours laugh; obviously, this kind of banter exemplified her zest for life, even within a miserable situation. I met her again on June 8th. At that time she let me know that she had been working as a masseuse for years and had many foreign tourists as friends. They were worried about her and had sent her a large amount of money. She was angry with the governments lackluster performance, but her house is now under reconstruction as a result of the support she has received from her foreign friends. Her sunny disposition may have been responsible for her many foreign friends.
c) A noodle-bowl seller (49 years old) at Kamala beach in Phuket on March 3rd, 2005 While interviewing the previous woman, I noticed another woman sitting calmly on a bench, some distance away. The translator (a Japanese woman) knew her and said that the woman had been injured and terribly shocked by the disaster. When I talked to her, she did not talk much by way of response, but we did manage a little conversation.
Yesterday there was a false alarm and they said, The tsunami will come again. So I left with my belongings at three or four oclock. ---- From whom did you get the information? I dont know. ---- How did you come to hear of it? Because everyone was running away, so I ran away too. ---- Really. Did a lot of people run away? Yes. (syncopation) I still have an injury (showing the injury to her hands).
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---- Do you know someone else around here who was wounded? Only I was injured. On that day I was at the beach, putting up a noodle-bowl stall. Then, I was carried away by sea water ---- How far were you carried away? To the tree over there (pointing to the tree). ---- How was the sea? At first, as the water backed off, I tried to escape because it seemed dangerous. I couldnt get away; then the second wave carried me over there. I was able to stop here at first, but the next huge wave came and I couldnt avoid it (looking like she was badly shocked by the event). ---- Have you heard the kind of rumor you heard yesterday many times? No, only yesterday. Yesterday another earthquake occurred in Indonesia, and the rumor spread. Approximately 100 people had been killed in this area. This woman never smiled during the interview. She might have been badly shocked by the effects of the tsunami. I could not estimate the extent of her shock. The interpreter told me later that she had gradually come to feel at ease. At the time she had been with some neighbors, including the garrulous woman from b), so she appeared not to have been alone.
d) A school headmaster (51 years old) in Nam Khem village in Pang Nga on March 4th, 2005 I visited a school in Nam Khem village; about half of the inhabitants (approximately 4,000) of this village had been killed or had gone missing after the tsunami. Although I did not have an appointment with the headmaster, he welcomed me and even permitted me to talk with the students. According to him, 27 students from over 400 students in the school (nursery, primary and junior high) had been lost. I was rather surprised by his manner in that he did not exhibit an elevated sense of vigilance, even though it was my first visit.
The students are not in a very good state at the moment. The reason for this is a rumor, suggesting that another tsunami will strike on the 12th of this month. This rumor has spread all over the country. This day is coming up fast, so the students are rather jittery. In my opinion, the government should provide information that is reliable, but it has not yet done so. There are other rumors, for example, that another tsunami will come in April.... This information was offered by a fortune teller. People find it easy to believe that a tsunami will strike after the earthquake in Indonesia. ---- There was a rumor of a tsunami the day before yesterday, wasnt there? How was everything that day? There was no further news on the day, so things carried on as normal. But on the 12th no one may stay around here. The rumor has spread wildly.... It may not matter too much because that day is Saturday, a holiday. ---- What will you do on the day? I will come to school because I have work to do. ---- So, in your opinion, the rumor is not true? That is correct. Communications between government and the people here dont function well. I dont know what to do.... In such a situation, the students are scared and they find it difficult to behave rationally. Their parents have some responsibility for this because they seem to believe the rumors. Scenes from the tsunami are broadcast repeatedly, so students can see it all the time; that doesnt help matters....
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After interviewing him, I talked with several students. One small girl said, I ran to escape with the adults. Everyone was crying, so I was scared too... However all of the students with whom I spoke were bright, childish, and charming, and seemed quite normal. When I revisited this school on June 7th, the headmaster said that students who had lost both their father and mother would receive financial support for their future studies. So they are stable now! he emphasized. I was a little surprised by this comment, although it has been said that parent-child relationships in Thailand are somewhat distant and that independence from parental influence occurs early. Unfortunately I was not able to meet with any students on my second visit to the school; it would be useful to investigate further the situation of children who had lost parents in the tsunami disaster.
e) A woman (62 years old) living in a temporary home in Nam Khem village in Pang Nga on March 4th, 2005 People who had been living near the coast and had been affected by the tsunami were living in temporary row-style homes in Nam Khem village. I met with several sufferers there and tried to interview them. One was a 62-year-old woman, who was sitting in front of her room with her dog.
I was living in a house near the coast, only about 10 meters away. I lost four relatives. Only one body was found; the other three have not been found yet. My elder sister, her son, and two great grandsons That day I stayed in my house and escaped by running towards the road. I took refuge at a hospital and stayed there on a bed of newspapers for several days. After that I came here. At first I stayed in a tent, and then I moved to this temporary home. I lost my house ---- Are you staying here alone? No, with my husband. He was working on a construction site, but he lost all of his tools, so he cannot work now. We lack money and are having a hard time. I have lived in Nam Khem village for about 20 years; my husband has been here for about 40 years. ---- What did the tsunami look like? At first I saw a huge waveand then I fled to the back of my house. ---- Did you escape with your husband? No. He escaped before me. He thought I had died. When the wave came, my body was carried up, and got stuck somewhere (making a desperate gesture). I was holding my dog. My dogs fur became dirty and black because the water was foul. After the water had died down, many people couldnt climb down. ---- Where were you stuck? Most of my neighbors houses were destroyed and carried away. I hung on to the last remaining house.... I want to go back home, but I cant if I have no money. Though she had experienced a huge shock, she spoke firmly. She was stoney-faced during the interview, but she softened her expression when I took her picture. Her loving dog stayed near her all the while. The temporary homes do not provide enough privacy for the residents. They did not seem to mind that too much, appearing to value greatly the retention of their human relations as a community. Isolation death will probably not happen here.
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f) A fisherman (61 years old) at Kamala beach in Phuket on June 8th, 2005 When I revisited Phuket in June, I met several fishermen who were rebuilding their boats by themselves on Kamala beach. One of them, an old fisherman, responded to my questions (not pictured).
---- Where were you at the time of the tsunami? In my boat; I was about one kilometer from shore. ---- How were things there? I didnt notice anything because I stayed offshore. ---- How did you find out about the tsunami? There was a call on my mobile phone. I always have it with me when I go fishing because it is convenient. The radiowave covers three or four kilometres. ---- What did you do after that? I couldnt come back until around 5 oclock because of the big wave. ---- Was the water high? Were you able to operate your boat? Yes, there was a big wave. I could go further offshore, but I couldnt come back in for quite a while. ---- Did it last for several hours? Yes. ---- Was this your first experience of such an event? What did you think it was? I had no idea. Maybe an earthquake but I didnt think it had been such a large one. ---- Have you ever experienced an earthquake before? Never. ---- Where did you come back to? Here? No, not here. I returned to a port, about one kilometer from here. ---- What did you see after that? How was the situation around here? It was terrible ---- Did you see any dead bodies? No, I didnt see any here. ---- What was the most impressive thing that you saw? There was nothing here. Everything had been carried away He was not very talkative and gradually retreated from me during the interview. According to the interpreter, that is a normal reaction in Thai men. He said that he does not go fishing so often now because of his age, but that he was cooperating with his colleagues for their future well-being.
KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Contrary to expectations, narratives about the disaster included a number of humorous comments. No one refused to respond to my questions when I interviewed them. Most spoke calmly, and did not cry, even when they mentioned the deaths of their relatives. Children in school or in temporary homes did not express their distress. The only time I saw tears was when I talked with a middle-aged brother and sister who were selling cloth. When they talked to me about the cloth, the younger sister cried a little bit because of the loss of their parents.
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As the woman interviewed in b) typifies, their narratives included some humorous remarks, contrary to our expectations. We did not anticipate that laughing would occur during our investigations, and we concluded, therefore, that the victims had not lost their zest for living. For a fuller understanding of such situations, it will be necessary to incorporate psychological perspectives other than those specifically related to traumatic events and post-traumatic stress disorders. As mentioned in the introduction, it is normal to assume that, In a disaster, affected people are damaged, not only physically but also psychologically; for example, they are injured mentally and sometimes suffer from trauma and from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder) for years. In such cases mental health care provided by accomplished counsellors of clinical psychology is needed. However, it is difficult to apply this perspective to our subjects in Phuket and Phang Nga, Thailand. Some of the victims may have sustained severe mental or emotional damage, but the fact that these inhabitants could still talk normally, sometimes even brightly and jokingly, about their experiences suggests that another perspective is needed. The effects of trauma and PTSD are affected by human relations after the events (Nuber, 1955), so we need to consider these factors in trying to understand our information from the field. We assumed that the continuation of community relationships after the disaster would be important, but more research is needed to predict future changes. It may be that the human relationships formed in their community protected people from more severe mental and emotional damage. Inhabitants of the temporary homes in Nam Khem village typically supported each other. When I revisited in June, it seemed that the temporary homes had become a real village; that is, in spite of the negative effects of limited individual privacy, children were playing in the alley, and inhabitants were gossiping here and there. Although there must be several aspects to this kind of phenomenon that outsiders cannot easily understand, it may be that these victims do not need the individual psychological counselling that could be beneficial in individualistic societies like America or most other western countries (and possibly even present-day Japan). Human beings are basically social animals. Social supports, like good relationships with ones family, relatives, neighbors, and friends, can function to powerfully encourage people in spite of their losses. Under the circumstances, we predict that support for community-based human relationships is more important than support on an individual basis. We should not apply the usual psychological perspectives to the victims in this area without thoughtful consideration of sociocultural factors. Our most effective contribution should be to support the retention and reconstruction of community-based relationships.
OTHER ISSUES
One of the biggest psychological problems is that of preventing the memory of the events of a disaster from slipping away. Disaster ethnography has been gaining attention recently as a way of learning from and understanding the experiences of disaster victims. Ethnography is the product of fieldwork and has been applied to problems in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and social psychology. Ethnography has features related to both scholarly and creative literature; usually expressed in common and colloquial language, it describes peoples daily lives in detail and is often accompanied by photographs. Disaster ethnography would increase our understanding of what happens to people during and after disastrous events.
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In our investigations, we found that there was a tendency for rumors to spread, which often caused the residents to panic. In fact, on March 12th (there was a rumor of another tsunami that day), we were told that many of the residents had left the area. Disaster ethnography can play a role in disseminating accurate and current knowledge to victims and potential victims. A Living God (Inamura no hi in Japanese) is a famous Japanese folk tale based on a real story at the time of the 1854 Ansei Nankai earthquake. In this story, one man, who knows that a tsunami is coming, saves the inhabitants of a village by warning them with a big fire, similar to a forest fire (see the following website for story details: http://www.tokeikyou.or.jp/bousai/english/inamura-top_e.htm). It might be helpful to use such a folk tale in spreading knowledge about how people react in such situations (A Living God has already been translated into several languages); it would probably be more effective to use this story in cooperation with local residents and with other researchers in this field.
REFERENCES
http://www.tokeikyou.or.jp/bousai/english/inamura-top_e.htm (on a story of A Living God, that is called Inamura no hi in Japanese) Ibaraki University Sumatra Tsunami Survey Team 2005 Report on Damages of the Sumatra Tsunami on the Western Coasts, Thailand. (in Japanese with English abstract) Nuber, U. 1995 Der Mythos Vom Fruhen Trauma: Uber Macht und Einfluss der Kndhei. Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag GmbH.
Notes The English in this document has been checked by at least two professional editors, both native speakers of English. For a certificate, see: http://www.textcheck.com/cgi-bin/certificate.cgi?id=snTiw6
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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES OF TSUNAMI AND POST-TSUNAMI REHABILITATION IN SRI LANKA; Weerakkody, et al.
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES OF TSUNAMI AND POST-TSUNAMI REHABILITATION IN SRI LANKA

Weerakkody, W.A.P.1), Hemachandra S.K1), Nissanka, S.P.1), Galagedara, L.W.1), Gunaratna, L.H.P.1), Soorasena, J.M.2) and Fernando, S.2) Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Peradeniya, 20400, Sri Lanka 2) Movement for National Land and Policy Reforms (MONLAR), 4th Lane, Kotte Road, Colombo. E-mail of Corresponding author: palithaw@pdn.ac.lk
1)
ABSTRACT
Tsunami on December 2004 caused a severe damage to lives, properties, and environment along the coastal belt in Sri Lanka, displacing thousands of people and loosing their life-styles. This study was under taken to assess the impact of the disaster, living standards of the displaced people and the rehabilitation program. A detailed field survey was carried out in Hambantota and Ampara districts during MarchMay, 2005. The firsthand information was gathered using structured questionnaires through interviews with affected families and all actively involved parties while secondary data were gathered from reports and press releases. More deaths and damages have been occurred closer to the seashore. Relatively weak age and sex groups were highly victimized. The majority of displaced families have been depending on government relief aid program, since February. Some of the delays and discrepancies in the relief aids during the early stages were mainly due to deficiencies in the existing regulations and inefficiency in the government sector. The distribution of other sources of relief aids has been highly irregular, leading to wastage and pilferages. The water supply and its quality were fairly good, but sanitary conditions were relatively inadequate in Ampara. The overall medical care was satisfactory. The permanent housing projects and restoration of the fisheries sector have been already begun in Hambantota district whereas it is just limited to plans and projections at Ampara. The proposed buffer zone would be implemented since 62-82% of the affected families are willing to move out.
INTRODUCTION
"Tsunami" is a Japanese word which translates as "harbor wave", now used internationally to refer to a series of waves traveling across the ocean. Oceanographers often refer to tsunamis as seismic sea waves resulting from a sudden rise or fall of a section of the earth's crust under or near the ocean [5]. History of tsunamis in the world was well documented since the 15th century. Since 1850 alone, tsunamis have been responsible for the loss of over 420,000 lives and billions of dollars of damage to coastal structures and habitats [7]. Most of these casualties were caused by local tsunamis that occur about once a year somewhere in the world and have been recorded in all the major oceans of the world. Despite being an island in the ocean, the awareness about tsunami until the moment of tsunami was never had among all Sri Lankans. This was a serious instance of ignorance especially with the coastal communities and the government authorities. The major reason behind the lack of knowledge among any person is the lack of susceptibility and lack of prior experience in such incidents for generations in Sri Lanka. The major known incident in Sri Lankan history was also recorded in Mahawansa as an act of angered god because of the kings malicious punishment to a monk, where there was no real information about a tsunami in that story.
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On December 26, 2004, the deadliest tsunami in the history of the world hit the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka due to the massive earthquake of magnitude at 9.0, the largest earthquake recorded worldwide in 40 years off the coast of Sumatra. The tsunami radiated outward and within 2 hours reached Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India. According to [3], almost 200,000 people in eight countries perished in a few hours, and over 100,000 were identified as missing. Without any warning [8], the deadly waves of tsunami struck the coasts of Sri Lanka a few hours after the daybreak (8.27 am) with a massive destruction to the people, their homes and livelihoods and public properties and infrastructure of coastal areas [6, 7]. Out of the entire islands coastline, only a little portion of the western and northwestern coasts could escape the impact of tsunami waves [4, 10]. The destruction was caused by the waves which reached heights up to (run-up) 11 m while the inundation penetrated about 2.5 km inland and it was relatively higher in the North and East [4, 10]. At the moment of the disaster, losses of lives were immense due to lack of understanding on how to respond in such a situation. Although the most vulnerable communities at the coastline had no option, a significant amount of lives could have been saved specially those who were living some far-off the coast. However, the general public of Sri Lanka had organized themselves to care for, feed, shelter, and nurse the surviving and bury the dead. Despite the WHO warnings that the deaths could be doubled due to epidemics, the situation was well addressed by the government, civil societies and the general public. The collective effort so far prevented another catastrophic human disaster. According to the present estimates, it is presumed that more than 40,000 lives were lost, 15,000 injured and 6000 are missing in 11 administrative districts [4, 10]. Ampara and Hambanthota districts in east and southeast experienced the highest devastation including human lives (Fig. 1). According to the Government Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit, the number of houses that were damaged by the tsunami totals up to 50,783 and similar numbers have been recorded as partially damaged [9, 11]. About 481,540 persons of 141,022 families have been displaced [4, 10]. These displaced are currently living either with relatives and friends or in welfare centers in 162 camps island wide [4, 9, 10]. Damages to the buildings, roads, railroads, power, water supply and communication facilities needs extensive recovery and industries such as fisheries and tourism which were the main income for many coastal inhabitants have to be rebuilt to sustain the lives of those who were affected [9]. With all these destructions, foreign countries, NGOs, INGOs, and people in other countries extended their fullest support and corporation to Sri Lankan people. Sri Lankan government and relative authorities were facing serious problems mainly because of the lack of experience on this type of natural hazards during the history of more than 2500 years. The lack of coordination among the organizations and the government, and planning without consulting the affected parties led to several disputes in overall relief aid and rehabilitation programs. With these circumstances, there was an urgent need to assess the situation to rectify the problems encountered in rehabilitation process. This study was under taken to assess the situation of affected people in terms of the impact of the disaster, receiving aids and other basic needs and the progress made in terms of planning and implementation of the rehabilitation and rebuilding process. The specific objectives of the study were; (i) to assess the present status and identify the main problems and improvement needed in the relief aid and rehabilitation programs of affected and displaced persons. (ii) to make appropriate recommendations to improve the relief aid and rehabilitation programs and disaster management.
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Fig. 1: Fatalities in Sri Lanka as Estimated on 15th January 2005. (Source: the national disaster management center)
METHODOLOGY
A detailed field survey of the tsunami-affected study was carried out during a four-month period starting from March 2005. Two districts, Hambantota and Ampara were selected for the detailed survey considering the geographical location, composition of ethnic groups, and the extent of damage. Rest of the affected area in other districts in south and east provinces was briefly visited to gather necessary information to validate the outcome of the detailed survey. The survey was mainly focused to gather information and understand the current situation of the affected community, the basic facilities available for them and the status of the rehabilitation program.
Target groups of the survey The information required to assess the current situation of the affected community was collected by interviewing five main groups of personals; (i) affected/displaced families, (ii) managers/care takers of the camps for displaced community, (iii) government officials involved in providing or operation of relief aid program, (iv) non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other International Organizations, and (v) key informants which includes priests, social leaders and other local individuals involved. Questionnaires Five questionnaires were prepared initially and questionnaires were pre-tested by the survey coordinators visiting the Hambantota district. Considering the views, opinions and experiences of the people, the questionnaires were modified before the field survey. Four questionnaires were used to collect the information from the five target groups mentioned above and the fifth questionnaire was used to assess the impact on agriculture and environment by evaluators.
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The questionnaire 1 was used to collect information from various levels of government officers from the district level to the village level covering three main areas (extent of damage, the relief aid program and rehabilitation program). The questionnaire 2 was used to collect information from affected/displaced families currently living in camps, public shelters and with relatives. This questionnaire was mainly focused to gather information on progressive events that took place after the tsunami in terms of displacements, damages caused to lives and their properties, and also receipt of relief aids by government or any other sources. In addition, their opinions, views and suggestions were gathered with respect to rehabilitation program. The information on the facilities available in the temporary shelters and living standards in the camps was also collected. The questionnaire 3 was used to gather information from camp managers/caretakers who involved in distributing/coordinating relief aids (government or non-government) among the affected families that covered three key areas as adequacy of basic facilities, government relief aid program and future plans on rehabilitation of the community. The questionnaire 4 was used to gather information on impact of tsunami on Agriculture and Environment, through interviews and also the personal evaluations made by the field assistants after visiting the field sites. Most of the information was gathered by interviewing extension and research personals in the Department of Agriculture. The questionnaire 5 was used to gather information on relief aid program particularly to identify the misconduct in distribution of aids, and on rehabilitation program. Target personals to interview (one to one) involved the personals that have good understanding about the current situation such as priests, monks or social leaders in the area and relief workers of NGOs and other volunteer groups and representatives of the unaffected community.
Data compilation Upon the receipt of the completed questionnaires, the information was tabulated and entered to Microsoft Excel work sheets and transferred to Microsoft Access database. Calculations or estimations were made based on the total number of available information to avoid the potential under or over estimations. Statistical tests were not heavily used due to the nature of the data. However, Chi-square test (P=0.05) was used to check the differences of proportions among AGA division etc. Out come of the survey was analyzed by team leaders and the information collected by other parities were used to discuss the findings. In addition, several expertise in sociology and environmental ecology were consulted as appropriate to get their views on overall out come of the survey. Their views and opinions were included in the discussion of the results.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Damages Caused by Tsunami
From the sample population, 17% in Hambantota and 20% in Ampara districts reported that they have lost at least one family member due to the Tsunami. Among the victims, relatively higher proportion of pre-school children (0-6 years) and elders (>60 years) were found dead in both districts as shown in Figure 2. The Hambantota district shows comparatively higher death percentage of pre-school children (22.8% in Fig. 2A) than the Ampara district (17% in Fig. 2B). As for elders, Ampara has higher percentage (25% in Fig. 2B) when compared with Hambantota (11.4% in Fig. 2A). Meanwhile, more females (10%) than males (6%) were among the diseased in the displaced families in both districts. These results assure that the greater vulnerability of relatively weak groups such as very young kids, the elderly group and women to tsunami disaster. This emphasizes the need of the awareness programs and training of the rescue missions to concern on physically weak groups in similar natural hazards that can be more severe in future with the global climatic change. The life threats due to tsunami have been more than twice when living within the 100 m buffer zone (21%) compared with living out of it or away from the seashore (8%) for Hambantota (Fig. 3A) while it was more than 6 times higher in Ampara (Fig. 3B). Out of all deaths, the deaths within 100 m, and 500 m distances from the shoreline were 76%, and 97%, respectively for Ampara and 57% and 88%, respectively for Hambantota. These results show that more people have been victimized to the Tsunami in the Ampara district than the
25
Hambantota district mainly because of densely populated areas within the shoreline in Ampara when compared to Hambantota. This was confirmed from the secondary data as well [1, 2].
25 Death (%) 20 15 10 5 0
21.8
30 25
11.4 8 5.3
Death (%)
20 15 10 5
<6
6_20
21-60
>60
0 <6 6 20 21-60 >60 Age (years)
Age (Years)
Fig. 2: Distribution of deaths in relation to age group in two districts. A: Hambantota district; B: Ampara district.
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
13 8.3 8
(A)
Death (%)
25 20 15 10 5 6.47 19.2
(B)
Death (%)
4.03
0-50
50-100 Distance (m)
>100
0 <50 51-100 Distance (m) >100
Fig. 3: Distribution of deaths in relation to the distance between dwelling and shoreline. A: Hambantota district; B: Ampara district. Before the tsunami incidence, 26% and 24% of the displaced people had been living within 50 m distance from the shoreline in Hambantota and Ampara districts, respectively. With regard to the proposed 100 m buffer zone, 53% of the displaced families had been living within the 100 m limit in Hambantota (Fig. 4A) while it was just 38% in Ampara (Fig. 4B). These results are contradictory to the results of deaths in two districts as shown above which might be due to the completely lost families where they were not among the displaced community else could be due to some other factors such on population density, distribution pattern of dwellings and availability of land barriers etc. These results provide a ground for discussion on the proposed 100 m buffer zone proposed by the government. Even if we have implemented this rule before the tsunami, only 38% of displacements could have been reduced in the Ampara district. More damages might have been occurred from 100m 400m range with the increased population density. Figure 5 compares the severity of property damages as well as the effect of the proposed buffer zone of 100 m from the shoreline. Complete destructions were relatively high when living within the 100 m buffer zone from the shoreline in both districts. In Hambantota, the complete destructions were 68% and 58% (Fig. 5A) while in Ampara, they were found to be 95% and 82% (Fig. 5B) within 100 m and beyond 100 m, respectively. These are similar to results of deaths as discussed above that the severity in Ampara was significant when compared to Hambantota, because to the population density and proximity to the shoreline. Partly damages were
26
relatively higher (more than 20%) in Hambantota (Fig. 5A) when compared to Ampara which was less than 20% (Fig. 5B). As shown in Figure 5, minor damages such as cracks, flooding, mud deposition etc., were very low in both districts. Since all the affected families were not in the displaced group, for an accurate assessment of the severity of damages, sampling of these groups also can be suggested. According to the statistics at the Divisional Secretariat, damage to dwellings is the most serious problem in both districts under property damages [1, 2]. Among the affected families, 78% of the families have lost their dwellings in Hambantota while it was 47% in Ampara. The low percentage damages to dwellings among the affected again shows that the percentage of completely lost families was higher in Ampara compared to Hambantota. The losses of business premises such as fishing huts, small boutiques etc. are 47% while boats and other vehicles are 51% and 37%, respectively in Hambantota and information were not sufficient for unbiased estimation in Ampara. Comparatively less affect on public properties (such as school buildings and hospitals etc.) and infrastructure has been reported in the Hambantota district while it higher in the Ampara district [1, 2]. However, the total value of the damage to public properties could be much more than the value of damage of private properties in both districts.
Dwellings(%)
Dwellings %
26% 47%
<51m 51-100m >100m

62%
24% <51 m 51-100 m 14% >100 m
27%
(A)
(B)
Fig. 4: Distribution of dwellings of affected families in relation to the distance from the shoreline. A: Hambantota district; B: Ampara district
80 60 40 20 0
Completely destroyed Partially Mud deposited Crack Sunken
100 80
<100 m >100 m
60 40 20 0 Completely destroyed Partially Cracked Mud deposited Sunken
<100m >100m
Sevearity of Damage
(A)
Severity of damage
(B)
Fig. 5: Property damage of tsunami affected people in relation to the distance of dwelling from the shoreline in A: Hambantota district; B: Ampara district
Relief Aids Program In the Hambantota district, around 90% of the displaced community was living in camps that contained either huts or wooden-board temporary shelters. The main source of food (as on mid March) was the food ration received through the government relief-aids program (40%) while the rest of the families were still dependent
27
on the managing organization of the camp or the supplies received from various other sources. On the other hand in the Ampara district, the main food source was the rations given through the government relief-aids program (55%) while the remaining are still dependent on the managing organization (13%) or the supplies received from various other sources (31%). The survey related that supply of foods and other basic needs are fulfilled by now. However, the contribution of the government is relatively high, the other organizations also play a satisfactory role. According to the observations of the evaluators, in general water supply, general hygiene, and care for needy groups were satisfactory in almost all the camps in Hambantota. A high percentage of positive comments (>85%) were reported for quality of water, irrespective of the management of the camp. However, the conditions were comparatively poor in camp managed by private organizations and NGOs particularly the water supply (Table 1). In Ampara district, satisfactions on water quality and water supply (quantity) is lower than Hambantota as shown in Table 1. A comparatively high level of satisfaction was reported for water quality (79%) while it was much lower for the water supply (53%). An exceptionally low water quality was reported in private run camps (61%). Similar to the Hambantota district, the water supply in government managed camps were better than the NGO managed camps. Meanwhile, the water supply was greater in privately camps and it was lower in religious camps. There was a variation in water supply in different DS divisions but it was not significant for water quality. Nearly 75% of the camps are fed with bowser borne water, followed by public water supply (17%) in Ampara resulting a for comparatively low supply of water for most camps. When contacted the camp management in the Hambantota district, they confirmed that almost 100% availability of food, water and cloths and 86-100% availability of sanitary facilities. In the Ampara district, 80% indicated that they have adequate amount of foods, water and cloths. However, they expressed their dissatisfaction on the sanitary condition in the camps. Particularly 75% of un-satisfaction for toilet facilities, 63% un-satisfaction for drainage and sewage facilities have been reported. Meanwhile, a greater share of the garbage disposal was borne by the service organizations including local governments and camp management themselves in both districts. Table 1: Satisfaction of water quality and water quantity under different camp managements. Management Government NGO Private Religious quantity 72% 41% 56% 94% Hambantota quality 93% 86% 87% 85% Ampara quality 88% 87% 61% 98%
quantity 60% 48% 84% 51%
The government aids package as given in Table 2 appeared to be received by all the affected individuals in Hambatota, and except the allowance for the school children in Ampara. There have been delays and deficiencies in providing aids in the early stages (in January). However, the high percentage of reception in February indicates its gradual improvement. The government high officials in the administrative set-up assured the efficient functioning of the relief aids program, and its equitability to all the affected groups in the Hambantota district. In addition, there is a mechanism to receive complaints in order to eliminate injustice in the relief aids program. On the other hand in the Ampara district, the high officials in the administrative set up assured moderate success in regular aids (dry ration) distribution and much higher degree of success in providing other allowances (Rs. 5000/- monthly allowance and 2500/- kitchen allowance (Table 2).
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Table 2: Status of success of the recommended compensations/allowances of the government (percentage reception). Allowance Hambantota (%) January February March Ampara (%) February March 28.5 72.6 73.3 -
January
Monthly allowances Rs.5000 from government per family 26.7 85.3 29.2 69.8 95.6 Rs.200 from government per family 39.2 88.0 38.2 77.7 97.3 Rs.175 from government per family 38.5 89.7 40.2 78.3 97.9 Samurdhi from government per family 9.6 9.8 8.6 One time payment Rs. 2,500 for school children 13.5 0 Rs. 2,500 for kitchen 74.3 93.2 Rs. 15,000 for death compensations 85.5 21.8 Note: for Hambantota, data are given in March for the first two weeks only
Out of the respondents, the satisfaction on relief-aids in Hambantota and Ampara were found to be 78% and 47% quantitatively and 58% and 53% qualitatively. Relatively low level of satisfaction on the quality of the aids was mainly due to issuing of unfamiliar food materials (Western or Chinese food) and low quality dry rations. Only half (50%) of them have stated that the program was bias in Hambantota, but very high in Ampara (83%). According to their comments, the gravity of the biasness was greater for racial and religious factors (66%) when compared to political factor (34%). In contrast to the Ampara district, in Hambantota, about 55% of them believed that it was politically bias while the rest (45%) believed that it was racially or religiously bias. A good proportion of respondents (56%) believed the existence of frauds in the supply line of the relief-aids distribution while 62% of them believed the deceptions by the recipients. They also commented that, the former problem was mainly due to lack of coordination among different relief worker groups, poor institutional structures, corrupted officials at the lower end of the supply line and lack of infrastructure (i.e. storage facilities). The majority of the government officials were highly satisfied (> 65%) about the achievements in providing basic facilities (education, physical health, mental health, moral development etc.) for the displaced communities.
Rehabilitation Program Housing in Hambantota: Stakeholder awareness on the rehabilitation planning was very low as on Mid March in the Hambantota district. Most of the government officials (85%) claimed that temporary shelter requirements have been completed while about half of them (57%) agreed that building of permanent shelters has been started. The scarcity of lands and unavailability of construction materials are found to be major limiting factors in this venture. Meanwhile, the awareness among the affected communities on the rehabilitation planning was very poor. The importance of constructing elevated foundations in the proposed houses has been identified.
Housing in Ampara: Most of the administrative officials commented that the constructions of temporary shelter requirements have been started and 14% of it has been completed. Meanwhile they commented that 57% of the planning of permanent shelters has been completed while not more than 14% has been begun yet. The awareness of the managerial staff of the camps on the current developments in the housing reconstruction was relatively good. According to them, 25% of the housing requirements have been started by the authorities by early June, 2005. The major limitation found to be scarcity of suitable lands followed by bureaucratic inefficiency. Livelihood development in Hambanthota: The government officials stated that most of the livelihood development projects had been started by mid March, 2005. Only one camp out of seven has received boats and the majority of fishermen have received boats through the Ministry of Fisheries by mid March. Very few numbers of boats, fishing gears, carpentry tools and masonry tools have been distributed among the camps
29
mainly by the NGOs and private donors. Some of the problems/limitations as indicated by the camp management in relation to livelihood development and their suggestions to resolve those problems and limitations are given in Table 3. According to these results, the livelihood development seems to be unsatisfactory though affected groups expect high priority in this regard. Livelihood development in Ampara: The administrative officials commented that 43% of the work on development of livelihood requirements has been started (up to May 2005). However, according to the same source, except 75% progresses in planning of fisheries, none other sectors (industries and agriculture) has received any attention. Meanwhile, the awareness on the rehabilitation planning by the managerial staff of the camps was very poor. Only 25% of the key informants responded to the question of satisfaction on rehabilitation planning. All the respondents were positive on the planned rehabilitation in fishing. The suffered people have a serious need of development of livelihood but it reveals that except for fishing there are no concrete plans for the rest. Infrastructure development: The government officials commented that most of the infrastructure developments programs are still at the planning stage (as on April 2005) in both districts. On the other hand, there was a comparatively considerable progress in the development of highways and railways in both districts. Neither displaced communities nor managerial levels the relief aids program has been updated with the rehabilitation programs particularly on the infrastructure development. Table 3: Common problems and suggestions indicated by the managerial staff of camps in Hambantota. Problem Problem related with temporary shelter Remedial Measures Quick supply of permanent houses Before construct houses should discuss with inmates Constructed houses should match with occupation Quick supply of fisheries equipment Should provide sanitary facilities Should supply sewing machine for women Need to have proper market for fishermen
Inadequate supply of fisheries equipment Sanitary condition not enough Required instrument for the self employers Lack of support from pradeshiya saba GN some times do not consult the office No authority to complaining GN and DS
Attitudes, Complaints, Suggestions and Expectations As shown in Fig. 6A, 82% of the displaced people are in favour of moving out of the proposed 100 m buffer zone [10] in Hambantota and it was only 57% in Ampara. This result agrees with the earlier results of high percentage of life losses and property damages within the 100 m zone. Furthermore, most of the people who wish to move away from the buffer zone wanted to continue their authenticity in the former lands and did not tolerate possible uses by any other groups for various purposes. The other factors that influence their support on this ban might be ability to get another land while keeping the right of the previous land, to get the government support (i.e., a newly built house) or ability to change the livelihood over the time.
Only 38% of the affected people responded to the question on complains on the present life in temporary shelters in Hambatota while a relatively high response was found in Ampara (60%). As for Hambantota, nearly 50% were social problems and followed by political favourations (36%). As for Ampara, social problems were the dominant category (72%) similar to Hambantota while the problems regarding political biases were negligible (3%). In Ampara, the most of the other problems (24%) were found to be camp or site specific. Meanwhile, more than 85% of the government officials said that complaints are accepted at all levels of the administrative set up in Hambantota and 75% of them accepted that police and the human right organizations are also accepting complaints. But for Ampara, the responses were inadequate to make a comment.
30
From all families(%)
(B)
(A)
10%
8% Yes No No respoinse 82%
38%
Yes No 57% 5% No response
Fig. 6: Willingness of the affected families to move away from the seashore. A: Hambantota district; B: Ampara district. According to the rating of camp managers, problems in aids distribution, disciplines of the inmates and other frauds/malfunctioning were within the range of 20-33%. The reported cases on disciplinary problems were not significant in most camps. The main problems indicated by the key-informants were poor quality of shelters (in camps), lack of drinking water for inmates, lack of coordination at the ground level (by the other relief work groups), overloading of work on state workers, spoiling of village labourforce with unusually high wages (by other relief workers) and lack of teachers in schools in the affected areas.
Suggestions for Further Improvements The importance of improving water and electricity supplies in the camps and temporary residences of the affected communities and providing compensations for the damages to agricultural activities have been stresses. Also, it was stressed that the importance of improving awareness at the grass-root level with respect to rehabilitation programs and the value of feed back of the affected groups in improving the planning process. Regarding future expectations of the affected community in the Hambantota district, permanent residence appeared to be the top priority with 85% and only 50% wanted a job. The percentage that selected both a house and a job was 48%. In Ampara, expectation for permanent housing and livelihood need found to be 95% and 69%, respectively. It highlights the affected peoples desires on the rehabilitation programs. The importance of improving the relief aids program to minimize misuses and to uphold the justice to the dropouts from the program was revealed. Improving the quality of dry food supplies, increasing storage capacities and taking action against deceptive weighing in cooperative retail outlets and bribery by the officials within the relief aids program are some needed improvements. The importance of revising formalities regarding damage-claims and finally improving health care facilities in the camps had also been identified.
CONCLUSIONS
On average, temporary shelters, other basic needs and government relief-aids are provided to tsunami victims since the first month of the disaster at a fairly satisfactory level. Most of them have received the assistance in the form of basic domestic items from various donors adequately. However, the displaced community is still dependent in terms of requirements of permanent shelters and livelihood aids. The majority is in a positive mind about the governments suggestion on moving out of the proposed buffer zone, but have hardly any awareness and little trust on the on-going rehabilitation projects and proposals. This field survey revealed some main problems related to post tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction; (i) deficiencies in the existing regulations in claiming for lost lives and properties, (ii) ineffectiveness of the available mechanism for making complaints to the higher authorities by the target group, (iii) wastage of valuable resources, which were donated by various local and foreign donors due to improper co-ordination between the local administrative set-up and
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the camp management, (iv) excessive heat in the tents and temporary huts during daytime especially in Ampara (v) inadequate supply of water in some DS divisions in Ampara and low quality water in some DS divisions in Hambantota, (vi) absence of safe and convenient means for garbage disposal in Ampara, (vii) inadequate toilet facilities for displaced families who live in dilapidated houses or with host families, (viii) delays in implementation of housing (permanent) development projects especially in the Ampara district due to problems in identification of suitable lands, (ix) lack of proper action-plans for development of livelihoods, damaged infrastructure and remedial measures against future seawater damages, (x) deficiencies in interactions between the top level rehabilitation planning process and the stakeholder groups at the ground level with respect to the views of the latter group on reconstruction planning and awareness development among them of their future prospects, (xi) massive work-load on the regular administrative structure under disaster situations, (xii) lack of well-coordinated action plan for post-disaster management within state institutions and among various fractions.
REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] Anon1 (2005). Deaths and damages of Tsunami at Hambantota District, Divisional Secretariat, Hambantota. Anon2 (2005). Deaths and damages of Tsunami at Ampara District, Divisional Secretariat, Ampara. Indian Ocean Tsunami, A Dossier; Volume I (2005). SAAPE-ICSF Regional Meeting on A Peoples Process for Post-Tsunami Rebuilding, in Colombo at 24-26 April 2005. National Disaster Management Centre, Press release, June 02, 2005. National Geophysical Data Centre, USA www.ngdc.noaa.gov National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), USA. www.noaa.gov Pacific Tsunami Museum, Hilo, Hawaii, USA. www.tsunami.org Rafiqulalam, M.D.R. (2005). Learning from Disasters, Bangladesh Disaster Prevention Center (BDPC), House # 57, Road # 13C, Block E, Banani, Dhaka 1213. Sri Lanka Government Post-tsunami Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme. Progress Report, May 31, 2005. Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) www.tafren.gov.lk Transitional Accommodations Project, Progress Report, June 07, 2005.
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IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.
IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND

Tawatchai Tingsanchali*, D. Eng, Prof. and Narong Luengbootnak, D.Eng School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand *E-mail of corresponding author: tawatch@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
Water-related natural disasters, such as floods, droughts, and tsunami, can create damages and major destructions, such as loss of lives, destruction of infrastructures, and destruction of agriculture lands. Disaster management in Thailand is still ineffective due to lack of coordination and collaboration between the involved parties. Therefore, the development of master plan, standard policies and procedures is required to improve the current situation and manage this disaster effectively. The plan should consider three stages of disaster cycle: before impact, during impact, and after impact. Thailand should prepare disaster management at national level and river basin/coastal zone level. Then, it is necessary to start considering disaster management at higher levels, such as regional and international level. Public participation is regarded as an important concept in disaster management plan should be take into consideration. This study suggests some necessary improvement for the existing water-related disaster management in Thailand. Key words: Water-related natural disasters, disaster management, public participation, Thailand
INTRODUCTION
Water-related natural disasters, such as flood, drought, and tsunami, can create damages and also generate major destructions, such as loss of lives, destruction of infrastructures, and destruction of agriculture lands. At present, water-related natural disaster management in Thailand is not so effectiveness due to lack of coordination and collaboration between involved parties. This situation especially happened before the government reform in October 2002. There were nine ministries, 20 departments, and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and communities that were involved in disaster management. In order to improve the current situation, the development of a master plan as well as standard policies and regulations are required to manage disaster effectively. Government commitment in disaster management is necessary to support the implementation of the master plan. The purpose of this study is to suggest improvement for Thailand disaster management. Moreover, the study explored the disaster management activities before and after reform of government system. In addition, reconstruction process after disaster was discussed after 2004 Asian tsunami disaster in Thailand.
STAGES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Basically, disaster management can be divided into three apparent stages: before disaster, during disaster, and after disaster.
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Before disaster Proactive approach in tsunami disaster management is important to minimize the impact of the disaster. In this case, effective disaster preparedness is essential. There are several steps that can be considered for creating an effective disaster preparedness program and government should involve seriously for ensuring its successfulness (McEntire and Myers, 2004): - Establishing laws: Laws will give power and authority for the government to carry out preparedness program and recruit responsible personnel in the program.
10.5
Assessing the tsunami hazard: Assessment can be done by recording prior disaster events and searching information for historical data on the disaster. Creating an emergency operation plan (EOP): An EOP indicates the general courses of action to be taken during the disaster, with flexibility. Creating a warning system: Warning provides vital information for the community such as when the disaster will occur, how long the disaster will last, and what people can expect. Identifying and acquiring resources and grants: In emergency, managers should be able to reach people and can authorize the use of personnel, equipments, and supplies. Initiating mutual aid agreement: Mutual aid agreement is a contract between different local governments to assist each other during the disaster. Training and exercising: Both are important to ensure that the personnel understand their responsibility during the disaster and also to test the applicability of the EOP. Public education: Public education will provide information regarding the disaster to the community; therefore they will understand how to take proactive action during the disaster.
During disaster During the critical time of disaster, it is important that people are well informed regarding the disaster. People should remain calm and follow the emergency procedures and proactive actions that have been prepared in advance. If possible, it is important to inform the expected impact of tsunami disaster to other areas. This information can save many lives and help other areas to prepare for the disaster. After disaster An effective relief program is essential to help people to recover from the impact of the disaster. Some aspects that should be considered in relief program are as follow (McEntire, 1999):
Declaration of the disaster: The declaration shows that the government realizes the disaster and that help is needed. Distribution of aid: It is necessary to understand the needs of the people suffered because of the disaster. Moreover, aid should be distributed evenly so every one can gain benefits. Coordination and collaboration: They are important for facilitating the sharing of resources and minimizing the duplication of efforts. Knowledgeable relief workers: Experience in relief works is essential to ensure that people can get appropriate cares. Experience workers will understand the needs of local disaster victims. Integration of relief and development: This will help people to rebuild their areas and bounce back from the effects of the disaster.
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The cycle of disaster management and activities that need to be done in each cycle is shown in Figure 1.
Disaster 3. Emergency response During disaster 2. Readiness Before disaster After disaster
1. Preparedness for prevention and mitigation
4. Recovery and rehabilitation
Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle
COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Coordination and collaboration are important to manage all the parties that involve in the disaster management program and to ensure that victims of the disaster can get maximum benefits from the program. There are four levels of coordination and collaboration in disaster management: international level, regional level, national level, and organizational level.
International Level It is common in practice that there are many countries involved in the disaster management, especially for disaster that affects many areas in different countries. Sometimes, international relief efforts face problems related with socio-cultural and religious aspects that can create mistrust and hostility (Trim, 2004). Moreover, international relief works mostly use military command and control model that can create false assumption and misdirected efforts. It is suggested that this command and control method is shifted to coordination and collaboration method. It is recommended that coordination and collaboration should renegotiate the existing authority, procedures, structures, hierarchies, and formalities (Suparamaniam and Dekker, 2003). Regional Level This is similar to the coordination and collaboration in the international level. Regional level involves countries in one particular region. It is typical for countries in the same region to have regional coordination and collaboration in order to increase the effectiveness among the countries in the region. An example of regional level coordination and collaboration is Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which objectives are to accelerate development and promote regional peace and stability in the region (ASEAN, 2004).
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National Level Water-related disasters usually affect one country greatly and become a national disaster. The role of government in that particular country is important in this case. Government should recognize the importance of the disaster management program and has commitment in the program. It is necessary to make a formal organizational entity for handling the disaster management program (Nateghi-A, 2000). An example for government involvement in disaster management can be examined in Iran. Iran has Natural Disaster Headquarter (NDH) under the ministry of interior which has full authority and responsible for policy, guidance, supervision, coordination of the disaster management. NDH also has responsibility in coordinating rescue and relief operations, temporary settlement and reconstruction with the cooperation of all the respected government agencies (Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999). Organizational Level There are many organizations involved in disaster management, such as Red Cross, fire department, military, humanitarian organizations, social organizations, and churches, etc. Consequently, disaster management is a complex process and requires the involvement of many actors and the coordination of numerous emergency, recovery, and development activities (McEntire, 2002).
DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND

In the past Thailand used reactive approach in disaster management and mainly the activities were rescue relief and recovery during and after disaster impact. At that time, Thailand used the concept of civil defense (2R): readiness and response in disaster management. Table 1 Comparison of Disaster Management between Before and After Government Reform
Factor
Laws
Before Government Reform

34 laws related to disaster management and they had lack of enforcement. Confusing roles for organizations which participate in the disaster management.
After Government Reform

Many laws were established to improve the disaster management. The purpose is to clearly set the roles of different organizations in disaster management.
Organization Structure
Ministries, departments, central and local government and organizations had overlap responsibilities. There are many levels of command. No emphasize on NGOs and public sectors. Use 2R concept.
Department of Public Disaster Prevention and Mitigation lead the disaster management under Civil Defense Act B.E. 2522 and National Civil Defense Plan B.E. 2545. Use combination of 3E and 4R concept.
Operations
Use reactive approach. No specific organization in disaster management. Operation involved many organizations under the direction of Office of Civil Defense Secretary.
Use proactive approach. Management and Operation is under Department of Public Disaster Prevention and Mitigation.
Source: Teeraoranit (2003) After reform of government system on 1 October 2002, Thailand started to change from reactive approach to proactive approach. The goal of this proactive approach is to reduce severity and effect of disaster by using prevention and preparedness. Thailand changed the concept of disaster management to the
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combination of 3E (engineering, education, and enforcement) and 4R (reduction, readiness, response, and recovery) (Teeraoranit, 2003; Tingsanchali, 2005). The comparison of disaster management between before and after government reform is presented in Table 1.
MASTER PLAN FOR WATER-RELATED NATURAL DISASTERS IN THAILAND

It is suggested that a master plan should be developed for disaster management at national level first. At this level, the master plan covers all components of water-related natural disasters in Thailand. The plan also includes river basin or coastal zone planning that gives further detail to the master plan. As shown in Figure 1, the planning for disaster management should consist of four main steps: Preparedness for disaster prevention and mitigation. Readiness. Emergency response. Disaster recovery and rehabilitation.
Key Factors in Disaster Management There are key factors that can drive the mechanism of disaster management. The factors are described as follow: 1. Policy Government must have clear and continue policy in disaster management. The National Economic and Social Development Plan should identify the importance of disaster management program to integrate disaster management program into sustainable development. 2. Laws and enactment Government must have laws and regulations which are clear and updated to follow the present situation. Successful disaster management must be continually supported by the laws. 3. Incident commander Incident commander must be unique and firm. Responsible organizations should provide necessary knowledge in disaster management to incident commander. 4. Participation of people and public sectors This is the important factor in disaster management and will be discussed in detail in the next section. Participation should exist in all stages of disaster management program. 5. Organization management Good organization can utilize existing and allocated resources. Good human resource management is necessary to increase the effectiveness of the organization. Provider and development of equipment or tools in disaster management must be suitable and sufficient. Volunteer rescuers must be continually developed to support the function of organization. 6. Technology Database is an important factor in disaster management and effective warning. Computer technology, hardware, and software in information and communication system must be developed together with human resources. 7. Study, research, and development The study and feasibility analysis of disaster prevention projects are required for engineering, social, economic, art, cultural, and environment. Results of the study should be included in the integrated plan.
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8. Domestic political support Political system must realize the importance of disaster management. The main target is to provide the safety of life and properties of the people. Public Participation Public participation is viewed as a significant aspect in developing master plan for disaster management. Public participation is a process of activities comprising of people involvement in contributing to developmental efforts, equitable sharing of benefits derived therein and decision-making with respect to setting goals, formulating policies and planning, and implementing economic and social development programs. Proposed Institutional Arrangement In the past, activities in disaster management have faced problems in coordination and collaboration between involved parties and there has been a lack of responsible organizations. These problems have created ineffectiveness in disaster management program. It is recommended that disaster management should be done first by an uthorized lead agency, which has direct responsibility and legislation support. The Office of Public Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Committee should be established as well as 12 public disaster prevention and relief centers for unity of command. The proposed institutional arrangements are given in Figure 2. Another role is to support 75 public disaster prevention and relief office in every province except Bangkok Metropolitan.
The advantages of this institutional arrangement are that the command is directly from Prime Minister and other ministries will follow the Prime Minister. The level of command is direct to provincial authorities. Overview disaster management can be done for policy making, planning, and implementation. Systematic coordination is achieved in disaster management. Prime Minister or Designated Personnel Department of Public Disaster Prevention and Relief
Office of Public Disaster Prevention and Relief Committee
Related Ministries, Department, organizations, NGOs, and public foundation
75 Provincial Public Disaster Prevention and Relief Centers
75 provinces
District Offices of Public Disaster Prevention and Relief
Local Administration Organizations
Coordination or support Figure 2 Proposed Institutional Arrangements for Water-related Disaster Management
Proposed Coordination and Collaboration in Water-related Disaster Management This part gives example of coordination and collaboration in disaster management at the international, regional, and national levels.
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International Level Figure 3 shows international coordination and collaboration in developing tsunami warning system. Firstly, it is necessary to develop a tsunami warning system which is in coherence with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission IOC and the Global Earth Observation System of Systems GEOSS. IOC of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization provides Member States of the United Nations with an essential mechanism for global cooperation in the study of the ocean. The IOC assists the governments to address their individual and collective ocean and coastal problems through the sharing of knowledge, information and technology and through the coordination of national programs (IOC, 2004). GEOSS is envisioned as a large national and international cooperative effort to bring together existing and new hardware and software, making it all compatible in order to supply data and information at no cost. Therefore, both should support each other to boost the effectiveness of their systems.For developing tsunami warning system, GEOSS includes NOAA, GSN, and IMS in its system to provide necessary information and data. In addition, collaboration between IMS and IDC is necessary to give further information. NOAA has deployed some buoys to provide accurate and timely tsunami warning information. NOAA also uses tides gauges to measure the tides. GSN is a critical element for tsunami and other disasters warning systems. It studies the earthquakes and seismic waves that move through and around the earth. GSN operates 137 stations and each station is in principle a seismometer that measures the planets vibrations. Because tsunami usually generates by earthquake, GSN is important to provide early information for tsunami warning system.
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC)
Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Global Seismographic Network (GSN)
International Monitoring System (IMS)
International Data Center
Tsunami Warning System Risk assessment Hazard monitoring and detection Prediction and formulation of warning Dissemination and communication of warning messages Knowledge and preparedness to act
Figure 3 International Tsunami Warning System The IMS is a network of 321 stations that is being built to monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT). IMS and IDC provide products and services needed for global monitoring. IMS system monitors the sea, land and air for evidence of nuclear releases. It has four kinds of stations: seismic, hydroacoustic (underwater sound) and infrasound (frequency is too low to be detected by the human ear) stations monitor underground, underwater and atmospheric environments. Radionuclide (radioactive atoms) stations detect radioactive debris from atmospheric, underground or underwater nuclear explosions. The system can contribute to global early warning efforts by making raw data and/or preprocessed data available to disaster-alert organizations (Pellerin, 2005).
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Regional Level An example of regional effort in disaster management is the Asian Institute Technology (AIT) response to the earthquake and tsunami in South and Southeast Asia. In response to the December Asian tsunami, team of experts from AIT joined with local and international agencies visit some affected areas to assess the situation and define ways in which AIT and its partners can contribute in providing assistance to the affected areas. Figure 4 shows tsunami disaster management in regional level.
Regional countries
Damage assessment and risk mapping
Disaster management
Sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction of affected areas Assess disaster impact Reconstruction plan
Information capturing Alert System Information analyzing
Coordination and collaboration Policy and regulation on disaster management Establish a lead agency
Figure 4 Regional Disaster Management
Other Government Departments
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
Engineering Institute
Architect Institute
University and College Research in disaster prevention and management Propose new method for disaster management
Reconstruction Implement disaster prevention plan
Rapid house design Low cost design Sanitation design
Figure 5 National Disaster Management
National Level Coordination and collaboration of disaster management in national level is essential to show the commitment of the country in this matter. In Thailand, there is a Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation to manage this issue. This department should manage and lead other parties in the country to ensure an effective disaster management plan. An example of disaster management coordination and collaboration among parties in Thailand is shown in Figure 5.
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CONCLUSIONS
Thailand has shown improvement in its disaster management program. However, some problems still exist, especially coordination and collaboration problems among involved parties in the disaster management. This study suggested that Thailand should build a master plan for disaster management at national level first. After the plan can be implemented effectively in this level, a higher level planning, such as regional and international level, can be considered. This study proposed institutional arrangements that would be useful to reduce the impact of these problems.
REFERENCES
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2004. Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN Secretariat. from Website: http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm. Ghafory-Ashtiany, M. 1999. Rescue Operation and Reconstruction of Recent Earthquakes in Iran. Disaster Prevention and Management, 8, 1, 5-20. Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 2005. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Retrievedfrom Website:http://www.epa.gov/geoss/index.html. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). 2004. IOC Issues. IOC-UNESCO. Retrieved from Website: http://ioc.unesco.org/iocweb/index.php. McEntire, D. A. 1999. Issues in Disaster Relief: Progress, Perpetual Problems and Prospective Solutions. Disaster Prevention and Management, 8, 5, 351-361. McEntire, D. A. 2002. Coordinating Multi-organizational Responses to Disaster: Lessons from the March 28, 2000, Forth Worth Tornado. Disaster Prevention and Management, 11, 5, 369-379. McEntire, D. A. and Myers, A. 2004. Preparing Communities for Disasters: Issues and Processes for Government Readiness. Disaster Prevention and Management, 13, 2, 140-152. Nateghi-A, F. 2000. Disaster Mitigation Strategies in Tehran, Iran. Disaster Prevention and Management, 9, 3, 205-211. Pellerin, E. 2005. Four Part Series: Tsunami Early Warning System. International Information Programs. US: Department of State. Retrieved from Website: http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2005/Feb/08-289044.html. Suparamaniam, N. and Dekker, S. 2003. Paradoxes of Power: The Separation of Knowledge and Authority in International Disaster Relief Work. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12, 4, 312-318. Teeraoranit, A. 2003. Development of Master Plan for Flood Management, Thailand. Master Thesis. Thailand: Asian Institute of Technology. Tingsanchali, T., Supharatid, S., Mairiang, W. and Rewtrakulpaiboon, L. 2003. Development of Master Plan for Water-related Natural Disaster, Research Report, Volumes 1 and 2, Prepared for Thailand Research Fund, Bangkok, Thailand.
Tingsanchali, T. 2005. Management of Water-related Natural Disasters in Thailand. Hydropower and Dams, 1, 31-35. Trim, P. R. J. 2004. An Integrative Approach to Disaster Management and Planning. Disaster Prevention and Management, 13, 3, 218-225.
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THE ISLAND PROJECT APPROACH (INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES NEEDS TO FAC DISASTERS); Rouvre, J.B.
THE ISLAND PROJECT APPROACH (INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES NEEDS TO FACE DISASTERS)
Jean Brunot de Rouvre1)
1)
Project Manager, ISTED (Institut des Sciences et Techniques de lEquipement et de lEnvironnement pour le Dveloppement, Paris la Grande Arche), ISLAND project (Information Systems for Local Athorities Needs to face Disasters), Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam, EuropeAid AsiaIT&C programme E-mail of Corresponding author: jbderouvre2002@yahoo.fr
ABSTRACT
This presentation comments the experience of two EC-funded disaster mitigation projects managed by the author in the Mekong region: One was funded by DIPECHO in year 2000 in flood-prone villages of the Hue lagoon (Central Vietnam); it had been actually drafted before the historic flood of 2d November 1999 and the 5 selected poor villages of the Phu Vang district were actually those which had most casualties and houses destroyed. These villages were provided safe havens on stilts above the flood water level, Red Cross early response posts, early warning radio link with the provincial Flood and Storm control Committee, lights and sirens alarms, rescue boats, life buoys and preparedness training. The second is the on-going ISLAND project in Vietnam (Tu Ky district, Hai Duong province in the Red River Delta), Lao PDR (Champasak district in the central Mekong floodplain) and Cambodia (2 districts of Prey Veng province in the Mekong delta) funded by the AsiaIT&C programme. This project is aiming at providing improvements of the end-to-end information chain in order to convey reliable and understandable information to the most vulnerable village communities, through a participatory assessment of their needs and a local ownership of appropriate ITC tools. Both projects are also providing relevant suggestions for mitigating the risks of tsunami hazards, which Vietnams and Siam gulf coastal areas may face in case of submarine earthquake along the Philippine faults.
INTRODUCTION
Different programmes of the European Commission have provided the author an opportunity to test efficient approaches to mitigate the impact of natural disasters on vulnerable communities. DIPECHO, the Disaster Preparedness programme of the EC Humanitarian Office, has funded a one year 220 000 Euros project implemented in Thua Thien-Hue province of Vietnam (October 2000 December 2001) by CODEV Viet-Phap French NGO in partnership with the provincial authorities (the Management board of the Huong river projects, the Phu Vang district and 4 communes), the IFRC and the provincial Vietnam Red Cross. This project has been assessed by ADPC and described in the Partnership for Disaster Reduction in S-E Asia first papers and meetings. Unfortunately, DIPECHO and CODEV Viet-Phap shifted priorities away from
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disaster resilience structures and systems and a follow-up in other districts of the Hue lagoon area could not be implemented, leaving the provincial authorities, the communities and NGOs without support to assess the impact and ownership of the project after its one year too short duration.
Map (1) : sites of the DIPECHO safe havens (square: market place with upper floor, triangles: nursery schools on stilts) and early warning pylons (dots) in the vulnerable villages of the Hue lagoon in Central Vietnam, plus obsevation tower (hexagon) at the outlet (Phu Vang district) The AsiaIT&C programme is aiming at fostering links between Europe and Asia for the development of new information and communication technologies. In 2002 the French non-profit organisation ISTED (joining public and private expertise for developing countries) applied for a first get-in-touch component about ITCs for natural disasters modelling, warning and mitigation, which was 50% funded by EuropeAid and implemented (October 2002 November 2003) in partnership with Vietnams Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD: Water Resources Research Center and Disaster Management Center), the Mekong River Commission and the 4 National MRCs, and European partners: SOGREAH French Hydraulics Laboratory (Grenoble), CNR Rhone River Basin Organisation (Lyon), TNO Netherlands Applied Research Organisation (Geoscience Institute, Utrecht) and an expanding network of associates. This first project included a study tour in Europe, workshops and a final seminar in Hanoi. It provided the opportunity to learn about an on-going ITC project coordinated by SOGREAH in Europe for the Loire river (France) and Oder river (Germany and Poland) basins : OSIRIS (Operational solutions for the management of Inundation risks in the Information society), aiming at providing local partakers (communal authorities, public or private facilities, farmers) with the ownership of ITC tools they can tailor to their needs to manage flood crisis locally, bridging the gap between basin-wide forecasts and local flood management. Although the institutional, cultural and socio-economic environment of S-E Asian countries is very different from Europe, it was worth trying to apply the same approach in the Lower Mekong countries, and the ISLAND
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project (Information Systems for Local Athorities Needs to face Disasters) was 80% funded by EuropeAid AsiaIT&C programme in Vietnam (Tu Ky district, Hai Duong province in the Red River Delta), Lao PDR (Champasak district in the central Mekong floodplain) and Cambodia (Peam Ro and Ba Phnom districts of Prey Veng province in the Mekong delta). This 2-year 500 000 Euros project starting in November 2004 is joining ISTED with a wider network of partners: MARD Vietnam, MOWRAM Cambodia (Dept of Hydraulics and River Works), Prime Minister Office Lao PDR (Lao NMC) and the MRC Secretariat in Vientiane, plus MICA International Multimedia Research Center (Hanoi Polytechnic University and French CNRS) and GRET rural development NGO with a long experience of communities and agrosystems in the Mekong and Red River basins; and in Europe Netherlands TNO, French CNR, SOGREAH and CETMEF (Public technical center for marine and river studies). The first steps of this project, including a study tour and workshops with the Asian and European partners in Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Vientiane and visits to the chosen provinces and districts, have been presented to a wide range of partners of the MRC, bilateral donor agencies and multilateral organisations and NGOs at the 3d Mekong Flood Forum. The OSIRIS project presentations and the ISLAND approach have been translated into Vietnamese, Khmer and Lao and provided to the local authorities.
fig (1): ISLAND workshop in MOWRAM, Phnom Penh, chaired by Secretary of State Ngo Pin fig (2): demonstration of OSIRIS tools by Gilles Morel, CETMEF, in DHRW Phnom Penh
figs (3 and 4): workshop in MRC Secretariat, Vientiane, chaired by MRC CEO Dr Olivier Cogels and ISLAND project manager Jean Brunot de Rouvre
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LESSONS FROM THE 26 DECEMBER TSUNAMI

While much attention has been devoted after the tsunami disaster to improve the coordination of the remarkable international solidarity for search and rescue, then for helping relocation and restoration of livelihoods, although too little time has been spent to listen to views of the affected communities and understand their needs, many points remain to analyse and address the failure of the warning systems which could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives if messages had reached the coastal villages. The World Disaster Reduction Conference in Kobe came up with the Hyogo Framework for Action and the UNESCO Conference in Paris came up with the concept of System of Systems to upgrade the monitoring of the Indian Ocean and adjacent coastal zones. But most proposals have been addressing the scientific monitoring system through the improvement of data acquisition by satellite remote sensing and networks of seismographs, deep ocean pressure gauges, data collecting buoys and tide level stations. While it was agreed that the early warning should be an end-to-end system, the other end of the information chain, that is the preparedness of the risk-prone coastal communities and the way to convey understandable and reliable messages to their villages has been given less attention. In this respect the objective of the ISLAND AsiaIT&C project targeting the poor vulnerable communities fits with the priorities of improving the tsunami early warning systems. This needs more than technical improvements of the information chain to convey understandable and reliable messages, it needs a participatory assessment of the risks and vulnerability of the communities, of their needs and access to information, then adapting the information chain accordingly and ensuring a local ownership of the information tools through appropriate training. However in the case of Aceh near the earthquake epicentre, there was too little time for any early warning system to be very efficient. But in this case structures such as the safe havens built on stilts in the center of risk-prone villages in the Hue lagoon area (DIPECHO funded project) would be quite relevant. They are coupled with the warning system (lights and sirens) and host Red Cross early response posts with radio link to the provincial CFSC, ensuring that the village refugees will not be isolated and can convey bottom-up information. The same project included an observation tower for the Coast Guards at the outlet of the lagoon, exactly what Thailand has decided to build after the last tsunami.
fig (5): storm observation tower for the Coast Guards, Thuan An outlet of the Hue lagoon, Central Vietnam. fig (6): example of village safe haven: nursery school on stilts with early response post of the Red Cross and pylon with lights, sirens and radio antenna (DIPECHO project, Phu Vang)
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Another important finding came from ADPC study of the tsunami risks in the whole ASEAN region and the appropriate monitoring and warning system. The map of the earthquakes in the region, especially the tsunamigenic submarine earthquakes, clearly show that the risks are not limited to the Indian Ocean coastlines but that faults in the Philippines could also trigger tsunamis in the South China Sea and the Siam Gulf, hitting Eastern coasts of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Malaysia. However the subduction movement is not as fast as in the Andaman fault along Indonesia, where the Indian plaque is pushing underneath at more than 5 cm per year.
End-to-end Multi-hazard EWS for SEA
Tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Indonesian region (past 150 years)
Source: Puspito, 2005
fig (7) : tsunamigenic earthquakes in the Indonesian region (past 150 years)
THE ISLAND APPROACH

The ISLAND project in the Lower Mekong Countries took inspiration from the European IT&C project OSIRIS which ended up with an international seminar in Berlin in 2003. This project had been coordinated by SOGREAH and involved 13 scientific and institutional partners in 5 countries. It has been implemented in the Loire river basin (France) and the Oder/Odra river basin (Germany and Poland) and has developed a series of ITC tools for the local partakers, such as user-friendly information system on the hydrologic situation, tailoring forecasts for local diagnosis and decision support tools, information and education websites. Since then many mayors of French small communes have been happy with further developments of these tools by CETMEF and the Loire River Basin Organisation which provide a local ownership of the Internet based flood scenarios coupled with local data base of stakes and vunerabilities, available means and response plans, and can be updated in real time during the flood crisis. The data base can even be connected to pagers or
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mobile phones for individual end-users (active or passive way) who can tailor the information to their needs (configuration of messages, choice of gauges and thresholds).
Once the configuration is done : In Case of Active Mode for Mobile Phone users
2
Information processing according to the users configuration
Serveur L1
Periodical updating of the Data base
A customized message is sent on pager according to the configuration
fig (8): OSIRIS end-user access to data base with mobile phone From OSIRIS to ISLAND, that is from Europe to the Mekong countries, there were huge differences to overcome: culture and languages, poverty and vulnerability, literacy and access to information, local institutions and limited budgets, decision making process, scarce sources of hydro-meteorological reliable information. The difficult questions to be addressed are: 1. how to tailor the information to the needs of the vulnerable communities? 2. how to help these communities make their own risk and vulnerability assessment to express their needs? 3. how to give them access to reliable and understandable information from relevant sources? 4. how to ensure their local ownership of the information chain through appropriate ITC tools?
fig (9): meeting the inhabitants and village chief in the Vat of Ban Tha Deua, Champasak district, Lao PDR. fig (10): debriefing with Champasak district vice-governor Sisavay Akhchavongs, with LNMC (Sourasay Phoumavong) and MRCS (Thanongdeth)
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The on-going surveys in villages of the chosen districts in the three countries already tend to shift away from the flood-centered risk management of the OSIRIS project. It comes out that rural communities are not only interested by early warning messages but more often by any information useful for their activities and livelihood, especially meteorological, economic (market prices), etc. Providing a wider range of information, not only about crisis forecasting and management, ensures people are more interested to listen and more trustful and reactive (bottom-up inputs). This ensures a better use of the information chain for preparedness and response in case of disasters. Actually the same information system can convey different sorts of information which the rural communities are concerned with:
Urgent information can be needed about: Fast floods and landslides causing roads to be blocked Pollution outbreak due to industrial leakage or hazard Risk of epidemic outbreak such as bird flu or s.a.r.s. cases Uncontrolled forest fire needing evacuation, etc
More long term information is needed about: How long will the flood stay in the fields ? When will the rain come after the drought ? Could we adapt the crops to better forecasts ? These concerns need connections of the information system to a wider range of sources and providing tools such as multimedia mobile phones or community electronic billboards displaying figures, symbols and maps. Even in very poor communities of Asia, new communication tools (such as mobile phones) are rapidly spreading, which allows to build appropriate ITC tools based on new generations of devices. The local ownership of these tools will allow bottom-up communication and shortening the top-down link between national and international information sources (hydro-meteo, health, etc) and the local communities. Tailoring the messages to the needs of the vulnerable communities, in their own language, needs more than scientific explanations for preparedness training, but good understanding of cultural values, gender issues, local institutional organisation, village socio-economic patterns: this is why we rely upon GRET and other NGOs which have a long experience of rural sustainable development, poverty alleviation and village organisation in the pilot districts.
REFERENCES
ADPC/ECHO: A Case Study of Local Initiatives, Indigenous Technology in Disaster Mitigation, Communitybased initiatives in Thua-Thien-Hue province, Vietnam, PDR-SEA News (Partnerships for Disaster Reduction in S-E Asia) 2/9, July 2001 ADPC 5th Regional Consultative Committee meeting, Hanoi 18-20 May 2005: Establishing End-to-End Multihazard Early Warning System in S-E Asia, presentation by Ms Lolita Bildan, Program manager, Climate risk management team, ADPC CETMEF/Guy Taliercio, Gilles Morel: Dmarche et outils pour lanticipation des inondations ; laide la dcision et la gestion des interventions au niveau des Collectivits Locales, May 2002 CODEV Viet-Phap/ DIPECHO: Disaster Mitigation Project in Thua Thien-Hue province (Phu Vang district, villages along the lagoon) 12p+map (also in Vietnamese and French) 22/10/2001
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DIPECHO Regional consultative meeting, 22 April 2005, Bangkok: 4th DIPECHO Action Plan for S-E Asia, 21 p ISTED/Asia IT&C: Information Technology and Communication for Natural Disasters Warning and Mitigation, Final Seminar, Hanoi 28 November 2003 ISTED/Asia IT&C: ISLAND project (Information Systems for Local Authorities Needs to face Disasters) approved 3 June 2004: application, summary, logical framework, task chart; worshops in Hanoi (8 March 2005), Phnom Penh (11 March) and Vientiane (15 March) ISTED/CNIG: GIS and Sustainable Water Management (French and English) February 2003, 103 p ISTED/CNES/CNIG:GIS and Disaster Management (in French:SIG et gestion des risques) January 2005, 101 p MRC 3d Mekong Flood Forum, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 7-8 April 2005: Jean Brunot de Rouvre, project manager, presentation of the ISLAND project Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat) National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management (RIKZ): the Storm Surge Warning Service (SVSD) Netherlands Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management: A Different Approach to Water, Water Management Policy in the 21st Century, December 2000, 70 p OSIRIS European Research Project (EC/EPALA): Recensement des besoins en matire dinformation, rsultats des enqutes auprs de la population en Loire moyenne; 69 p OSIRIS European Research Project: K-Peter Holz, Marc Erlich (BauNF/SOGREAH): Flood Events Are We Prepared?, Proceedings of the Final Workshop, Berlin, Germany, March 20-21 2003, 163 p UN Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan,18-22 January 2005, 42 p UNISDR, Hyogo Declaration, World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan, 3 p
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A REVIEW OF TECHNIQUES FOR TSUNAMI DETECTION AND EVACUATION NOTIFICATION; Tripathi, S. and Heng, S.
A REVIEW OF TECHNIQUES FOR TSUNAMI DETECTION AND EVACUATION NOTIFICATION

Santosh Tripathi and Suthy Heng Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems, School of Advanced Technologies, Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand E-mail of Corresponding author: Santosh.Tripathi@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
Tsunami that hit the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004 resulted in the death of more than 200,000 people and destruction of billions of dollars of property. The fact that the death toll would have been significantly lower had there been a tsunami warning system in the region has led to a heightened interest in such systems. However, before any such system is implemented all the alternatives available need to be analyzed. In this paper we discuss different techniques for detecting the tsunami: those in use and those under development. Some of the mechanisms discussed are: tide gauges, seismic data, DART system, different types of floating buoy systems, use of microwave satellites, using the changes in the signals form GPS satellites etc. However, detection of tsunami is only the first step in ensuring the safety of human lives. The next step is notifying the people of the danger. Several alternatives are available all of which are not applicable to all places. In the paper, we discuss these alternatives and their applicability. Some of the notification mechanisms discussed include: sirens, telephones, emails, mobile loud speakers, pagers, aircraft, television broadcasts, radio broadcasts, amateur radios, billboards etc.
INTRODUCTION
Tsunamis are sometimes known as tidal waves; however, tsunamis have no relationship with the tides. These waves rather than being induced by the gravitational forces of other celestial bodies are caused by the sudden upward displacement of an enormous quantity of water. This displacement can be caused by earthquakes and/or volcanic eruptions in the sea, submarine landslides, falling meteorites etc [Gedik et. al. 2004, Schnack and Pousa 2005, Shuto 2005, Levia 2005]. Tsunamis have been a constant source of threat in the coastal regions and in some cases have resulted in the complete destruction of civilization [Levin 2005]. Many Countries in the Pacific have evolved comprehensive systems to detect the tsunamis and to notify their citizens of the danger to ensure citizens safety [OEM and DOGAMI 1994]. For these countries tsunamis are certainly not surprises. However, the tsunami caused by the earthquake off the Coast of Sumatra Island of Indonesia on 26 December 2004 hit a different cord: it hit an area that in a long time had not suffered the wrath of tsunamis [NIO 2005]. It killed more than 200000 people and destroyed billions of dollars of property [EERI 2005, Inderfurth et. al. 2005]. The message is clear, if one lives near a ocean, one is potentially subject to the havoc to be perpetrated by the tsunami. This has led to a heightened interest in tsunami and many countries are planning to establish tsunami warning systems [Inderfurth et. al. 2005]. Any tsunami warning system possesses two components: detection component and the notification component. In the first we detect a tsunami and determine the probable threat. Once it has been done, it is necessary to let the vulnerable populace know of the danger. For both of these components there are several alternatives but the alternatives to be chosen by a community depend upon a variety of factors. In this paper we present different techniques that can be used in the detection of tsunamis. Some of the techniques
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covered are in use and some of them are undergoing research. Similarly, for the notification too, different techniques have been covered and again some of them are in use and some can be used in the future. Paper is organized as follows. Next section describes the causes of tsunamis and is followed by the section on the characteristics of tsunamis. Following the brief description of the characteristics of tsunamis is a section on different techniques for tsunami detection. Both, the techniques in use and those under research have been described there. Finally the section on evacuation notification techniques follows that describes the ways in which a vulnerable population can be notified of the threat.
CAUSES OF TSUNAMI
A tsunami is caused by a sudden upward displacement of enormous amount of water. Any phenomenon that is capable of producing such a displacement can be a source of tsunami; these phenomenon include: [Gedik et. al. 2005, Shuto 2005, Levin 2005] 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Submarine earthquake Volcanic eruption in the sea Submarine landslide and landfall Asteroid Atmospheric disturbances Explosion in water Decomposition of gas hydrate
Submarine Earthquakes Tectonic earthquakes i.e. the earthquakes that deform the crust of the earth permanently or temporarily are one of the major sources of tsunamis [Tsunami Laboratory 2005]. The vertical component of the deformation lifts the overlying water up. This water thus gains the potential energy. When the trembling caused by the earthquake stops, the surface elevation induced by seismic energy begins to spread over the surface and the tsunami starts its journey towards the coast. The magnitude of tsunamigenic earthquakes is generally higher than 7.0 in Richter scale and the horizontal size of the zone of strongest bottom oscillations may be as big as 100km [Levin 2005]. Volcanic Eruption in the Sea Volcanic eruption of islands or eruptions of submarine volcanoes too can generate tsunamis. When the submarine volcanoes explode, the gases and the hot lava come out from the interior of the earth. The heat and the gases create gas bubbles in the water which rise up to the surface increasing the height of the water level in the sea [Caraynis 2004] . Like in the earthquake induced volcano this gain in the potential energy is afterwards changes to kinetic energy giving rise to tsunami. Explosion of Krakatau in Indonesia in 1883 caused a tsunami that resulted in a death toll of more than 36000 [Levin 2005, Shuto 2005]. Submarine Landslide and Landfall Submarine landslides and landfalls can also induce the tsunamis. Generally, these tsunamis are local in character. However, in the case of an extensive landslide involving the bottom sediments of the continental shelf or at the fall of a marine glacier into sea, the tsunami source may reach a size of several kilometres. Some tsunamis generated by the landslides are tsunami in Alaska in 1958 that caused trees to be washed up to a height of 525 meters. The failure of coastal constructions may also cause tsunamis as in the case of the tsunami caused by the submarine landslide associated with the dock failure in Kagway Harbor, Alaska in 1994.
In addition to these causes of the tsunamis, tsunamis can be generated by the asteroids falling into the ocean. According to estimates, an asteroid of 100km diameter falling into the sea at a velocity of 20km/s can generate a tsunami of height more than 8m at a distance of 1000 m from the source [Levin 2005]. Gas hydrates are formed when some components of natural gas combine with water. Gas hydrates are stable under high pressure and low temperature. However, under low pressure or high temperature they can decompose creating up to 30 volumes of gas. Gas hydrates are found in many areas underneath the sea. If
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the decomposition is triggered, the decomposition can start and a tsunami may result in response to the release of the gas. Similar to the asteroids, the underwater explosions may be potential source of tsunami.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TSUNAMI
Detection of tsunamis is possible because of their peculiar characteristics. Tsunamis travel in all directions from the source area. As the entire column of water from the bottom to the free surface is in motion, they have very long wavelength compared to the depth of the ocean basin where they propagate. Thus they are long waves and are usually modelled mathematically using shallow-water wave theory [Gedik 2004]. For the local tsunamis, in the ocean deeper than approximately 200m, linear long-wave theory can be used in their analysis. For the first order approximation, its velocity can be calculated as,
v = gd
(1)
This relation does not take into effect the dispersion which is caused by different frequency components of the tsunami travelling at different velocities. Using the average depth of Pacific Ocean to be 4.2km, the propagation speed of the tsunami is found to be about 730km/hr. However, in the analysis of distant tsunami it is necessary to consider of the dispersion effect too. At the shallow areas, the velocity of the wave decreases. As the rate of energy transmission in the wave is constant (neglecting the loss of energy due to friction at the sea-bottom), the wave height increases. This is this shoaling effect that makes the wave height devastatingly high in the coastline [Shuto 2005]. In the deep sea the wave height may be 30 to 60 centimetres whereas in the coast waves height may go upwards of 30 meters. One very important property which is widely used in its detection is its time period. The longest swell waves have their periods in seconds and the time period of tide waves is one where as the time period of the tsunamis can be anywhere between 2 minutes to 90 minutes with the tsunamis having periods of 10-40 minutes occurring most frequently [Meinig et.al. 2005]. The time period remains constant as the tsunami travels from the source to the shore. The spatial period, that is the wavelength, is higher at the deep sea and as the wave approach the coast its spatial period decreases i.e. the crests and troughs become nearer and nearer.
TSUNAMI DETECTION TECHNIQUES

As described in a previous section, a tsunami possesses a number of characteristics that separate it from other types of ocean waves. These characteristics are what detection techniques use to detect the tsunamis. However, no one technique is fool-proof and at present the tsunami warning systems use a number of these techniques, each augmenting the other [Levin 2005, Adams 2005]. However, in this paper we will discuss the detection techniques, rather than practical detection systems. Moreover, predicting tsunamis and detecting tsunamis have a subtle difference; however, here we overlook this difference. Techniques covered are as follows. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Earthquake Data Tide Gauges Deep Ocean Pressure Measurement Floating Buoy Systems High Frequency Coastline RADAR GPS Altimetry Microwave Satellite Imageries Ionospheric Monitoring
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Earthquake Data As described in a previous section, earthquakes of magnitude greater than 7 in the Ritchter scale are potential tsunamigenic earthquakes. Moreover, if the epicentre is near a subduction zone, the probability tsunami occurrence is higher. As soon as an earthquake occurs, its magnitude and epicentre are calculated and based on the empirical relationships between earthquake magnitude and tsunami, potential of having a tsunami is predicted [Shuto 2005, Levin 2005]. This is not a foolproof method of tsunami detection. First, not all large magnitude earthquakes generate tsunami. Second, the tsunamis caused by other mechanisms can go undetected. However, this is routinely used for issuing warnings for local tsunamis. When the source of tsunami is quite near, then there is no time to wait for other data such as tide gauge data to become available; in such cases earthquake data is singly used to issue warning for the tsunami. Tide Gauges Tide gauges are used to collect the sea level data and are located near the shore. These gauges come in different measurement principles and different degrees of sophistication. Regarding the principle, they can be float and stilling type gauges, acoustic gauges and the gauges based upon the principle of measuring the sub-surface pressure [Parez and Estado 2005, Luick 2004]. Similarly, regarding the sophistication, some of them record the data on a paper in graphical format that has to be collected manually whereas there are gauges that can transmit data to the station in the shore or a central location which receives data from many tide gauges [Levin 2005]. Sparse or dense, most countries have tide gauges stations. For example, Malaysia has 39 such stations [Chew 2005]; Japan has upwards of 150 such stations [Levin 2005], NOAA Center for Operational Oceanographic Products and Services maintains 175 such stations spanning over the entire continental United States.
Using the tide gauge in tsunami detection is based upon the difference in the time period of the tsunami, and the swell waves and the tides. Tides have much longer time period and so they indicate a slow change in water level. However, in comparison to tides, tsunami has much smaller time period. This results in a slow changing component of sea level signal over which a fast changing tsunami signal is superimposed when a tsunami comes. By using the signal processing techniques this can be detected. Tsunami detection based on tide gauge data is more reliable than that based solely upon the earthquake data as the former directly detects the tsunami whereas the later assumes it. However, tide gauges are generally located in the shore, so the time between the detection of tsunami and its arrival is small which leaves less time for evacuation. Similarly, a number of tide gauges are required to cover whole coastline. In addition, they give point data only. Despite all this they form an essential element in a practical tsunami detection system and are extensively used for confirming the existence of tsunami following an earthquake, monitoring the tsunamis progress, estimating the severity of the hazard along the coast and providing a basis for declaring the hazard to be over [Chew 2005].
Deep Ocean Pressure Measurement Tide gauges can be used to detect the tsunami but using only those leads a nominal time for evacuation. This can be improved if the tsunamis are detected while deep in the sea. Deep ocean pressure measurement can be done to do this. If a pressure sensor is placed on the bottom of the ocean, a tsunami passing over it will produce a characteristic pattern of change in pressure. A pressure is changed by a tide and a swell wave as well. However, the change in pressure caused by the swell wave lasts for only several seconds whereas that caused by tide lasts for several hours and that changed by tsunami is not like any of them. By detecting this pattern, tsunami can be detected.
Tsunameters used by DART (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis) are practical systems relying on this principle. Each of these systems consists of seabed bottom pressure recorder, and a surface buoy. The seabed pressure recorder records the pressure, and transmits it to the surface buoy via sonar. Data is then transmitted to PTWC via the GEOS satellite system. Detection of tsunami is done by detecting the characteristic pattern in the pressure change caused by tsunami [Milburn et. al. 1996, Titov et.al. 2005].
Floating Buoy Systems Change in height in the deep ocean caused by tsunami is very small; nevertheless, there is a change. This change in ocean level unlike that caused by other waves has a period of anywhere between 2 to 90 minutes.
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So, there is the possibility of using the changes in the ocean height in tsunami frequency to detect the tsunami. Kato et. Al.[2001] built an experimental system to use this concept. They used RTK-GPS and accelerometer, and tiltmeters to measure the change in height of the buoy, which in their case was at a distance of 2 kilometers from the shore line. Similarly, Colombo [2002] used RTK-GPS system to measure the buoy height and showed that using a 5 or 6 minutes running average of the instantantaneous buoy height eliminates the short term variations in height due to ordinary waves and shows the gradual change in the ocean height.
High Frequency Coastline RADAR High frequency coastline RADARS are based on the Braggs principle. They are used for mapping ocean currents. As a tsunami wave approaches the shore, it increases the velocity of the ocean water. This change in velocity may be used to detect the tsunami [Barrick 1979].
SeaSonde is a high frequency RADAR system [Lipa et. al. 2005]. It has a range of 200km A simulation study performed by the manufacturer shows that with shallow water bathymetry in the radar coverage are, the equipment can measure strength and direction of the tsunami wave and provide vital information well before impact. WERA is another such system [Grugel and Antonischki 1997]. It is developed by the University of Hamburg, high-frequency radar group. This system differs from SeaSonde in that it uses the frequency domain approach for range resolution unlike the time domain technique used by the SeaSonde.
GPS Altimetry There have been experiments to use the GPS signals as means of finding height accurately from an airborne system. Treuhaft et. Al. [2001] showed that an accuracy of 2-cm is possible using the GPS altimetry. Li et. al. [2002] developed a multi-static SAR system for terrain imaging using the reflected GPS signal. As the change in the height of ocean due to tsunami is in this range it is possible that such a system can be used for tsunami detection [Neira et.al.2005]. Satellite borne such systems might be very useful in detecting the tsunami. This concept is much better suited to detection of tsunami than others described so far in that this directly views the tsunami thereby reducing any chance of false alarm to negligible. Moreover, the strength and direction can be known in advance. However, this concept requires that a set of satellites be available to view the entire globe at all times [Neira et.a.l. 2005]. Microwave Satellite Satellites such as TOPEX/Posedien, Jason etc measure the sea level. They transmit the radar signals which bounce back from the sea. By observing the time taken by the radar signal in the round trip they measure the sea level. Smith et.al. [2005] and Artru et. al. [2003] report that it is possible to detect the tsunami by comparing the sea level anomaly profiles by comparing those of previous days. The comparison allows the removal of permanent and slowly varying features of sea level, revealing transient signals [Colombo 2000].
Extended darker strips on the ocean surface along the front of a weak tsunami have been observed. This strip is known as tsunami shadow. This suggests that tsunami can be detected by detecting the changes in ocean surface roughness. Change in surface roughness is caused by the tsunami is the result of air-sea interaction. In the lower tens of centimetres of the atmosphere, tsunami-induced perturbations of the mean wind velocity are much greater than current velocities in the water. The tsunami shadows for destructive tsunamis can be viewed from the microwave satellites [Smith et. al. 2005]. The spatial structure of these waves: their length of thousands of meters and their width of a few tens of meters and their specific speed make them a better mechanism to detect the tsunami.
Ionospheric Monitoring Tsunami triggers atmospheric gravity waves hear the sea surface, which then travels into the ionosphere and significantly disturbs the electron density within it. Iononamics, the ionospheric tsunami signatures of the total electron content (TEC) are detected by ground based receivers of the GPS. The data show that giant iononamics which have maximum heights of about 60km, periods of 10-20 minutes and horizontal wavelengths of about 200km travel away from the epicentre with an average horizontal speed of about
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700km/hr. Based upon these results many researchers are working on the development of techniques to monitor tsunamis by using GPS networks. [Liu et.al. 2005, Lognonne et.al. 2005].
EVACUATION NOTIFICATION TECHNIQUES

Tsunami detection techniques help us know that a tsunami has occurred. However, this information by itself is not useful; the vulnerable population has to be warned of the dangers. Almost all means of communications ranging from burning fires to issuing warning in the Internet are useful in notifying the danger; however, for a given place, based upon the available infrastructure, budget, level of consciousness among the population etc. some methods are more suitable than the other. Paper touches upon the different techniques that are being used and that can be used and their advantages and the shortcomings. It should be noted that a successful notification system will be an integration of more than one of these techniques. A description of the different methods in use in USA and Japan can be found in [OEM and DOGAMI 2001]. Treatment of the subject in the OES [2004] is also useful. Paper covers following techniques: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Dedicated Radio Systems Television and Radios Telephone Networks Sirens and Bells Mobile Announcer Systems Aircrafts and Helicopters Pagers and Mobile Phones Internet Technology Amateur Radio Aerial Flares and Explosive Reports
Dedicated Radio Systems Dedicated radio systems such as Simultaneous Announcement Wireless System (SAWS) used in Japan by local authorities for many different types of messages. The authorities that are responsible for issuing the warnings can install transmitters and the receivers can be installed in the government offices, hospitals, fire stations etc and the receivers can be bought by the people interested in getting the warning too. Once the disaster hits, the message can be transmitted over this system so that the population under the threat can receive the warning. Moreover, loudspeakers can be put in the public places so that once the warning is received, they become activated.
However, there are a few shortcomings of the system. First, the receivers have to be turned on all the time consuming the electricity. By putting the receivers in the standby mode, one can reduce the power consumption to some degree though. Second, tsunamis are not day-to-day events for most parts of the world. So, the receivers and transmitters have to be maintained without coming in use for years. This may lead the users to be lax in maintaining the receivers so that the system fails to work when the disaster hits at the last.
Television and Radio Televisions and radios can also serve as a means of issuing the notification. Once the threat has been perceived, an appropriate message can be broadcasted over the television and radio channels. With many people having such sets and many people using them, this can be an effective method of issuing the notification. In Japan, broadcasting stations receive the tsunami bulletins from local and regional observatories. Once received, the message is broadcasted. In case of the television, the map for which the warning applies is also shown.
However, there are many television channel, having all of them transmit the warning requires a great deal of coordination. Moreover, each station may serve a wide area. Channels using the satellite for broadcasting can cover many countries and all the areas covered are rarely under threat. It may case panic to population which is not under threat too. Similarly, though many people have these systems, these
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systems are not in use all the time. For example, a notification issued in the late night may go unheard by the targeted population.
Telephone Networks Telephone networks can also be used for notification. An authority need to be set up that can trigger the issuance of the warning. Once the warning has been issued the phone numbers can be automatically dialled to notify the users. Pre-recorded message in a clear and concise manner can be played to the user. This can allow a large audience to be reached within a short period of time. Such systems are in use in USA.
However, it presupposes that the telephone network is working, but this cannot be guaranteed especially in case of a local tsunami. A local earthquake causing the tsunami may easily damage the telephone network as well. Similarly, the prospective recipients should be near the phone to receive the message. In a busy working day, the telephone lines may as well be busy. Moreover, it takes a finite amount of time to call all of the households. Similarly, the cost of issuing a warning increases as the number of telephones to be called increases. Moreover, there is the cost associated with testing the system regularly and updating the list of the numbers to be called.
Sirens and Bells Sirens are used as means of notifying the threat in Japan and USA as well. Some villages use bells for the purpose in Japan. Sirens can sound distinct tone as the means of notifying the threat. It has the advantage of reaching all population. People in a beach may not be reached via a telephone, mobile phone, email, television or a radio message; however, a siren placed in the beach is sure to convey its message to the populace.
However, there are many issues in the establishment of siren based notification systems. First, the tone to be used for expressing the threat has to be decided and people have to be taught to decode what the different tones mean. For the tourists, it may be a problem to learn the meaning of the tones as they move from one place to the other where the tones may mean different things. Similarly, the number of sirens to be used has to be decided. In addition, how are the sirens to be activated has to be worked on. Establishing a siren system and making the people conscious of it may entail a lot of effort and resources.
Mobile Announcer Systems Trucks, cars etc. can be used to convey the message of danger. Once an area is under the threat of being damaged by tsunami, these vehicles can be sent with the loudspeakers. However, this method is useful only if all the portions of the area are accessible with the trucks, cars etc. Moreover, the warning issuing vehicle is on the move so not all people in the area may properly get the message. Similarly, in an area with very high buildings the loudspeaker may not be heard on the upper floors or inner portions of the area. In a metropolis with a heavy traffic and big buildings this method is certainly not useful. Aircrafts and Helicopters Aircrafts and helicopters can also be used to notify the affected population. Once a threat is perceived, the crafts can be flown. The message can be given through the voice or text delivery. For voice, the aircraft or the helicopter has to be equipped with the public address system. For the text delivery, the leaflets containing the message have to be designed and stored in advance. For the flying vehicles, it has to be planned that which agency will provide the crafts who will fly it and similar things. Similarly, the speed, the height to be flown and the tracks to be followed has to be planned in advance. This system can cover isolated areas and can cover a large area.
However, once again, as it is in move, it might not be possible that all people get the message. The sound of the engine itself may make the voice low. Similarly, in throwing the text messages on presupposes that the people will pick up them and read them but it many not be effective as in night. Moreover, the text messages once dropped, have to be recovered quickly otherwise a false alarm may be perceived by the public. Collection of the text messages also poses some problem.
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Pagers/ Mobile Phones The notification of the threat can also be broadcasted over the pager or mobile phones. People, under normal condition, move with these equipments so wherever they are and whatever they are doing they are bound to get the warning. In developed countries where mobile phones have become one of the basic necessities, this method is quite feasible. However, in the developing countries or in poor communities near the coastline for which the mobile phones are still luxury, it may not be quite feasible. Internet Technology With more and more people using the email facility, emails and Internet can be used to let the people know of the threats too. However, this method cannot be used by its own because it is never clear that when the people will read their emails or check the internet. Thus, both for the local and distant tsunami, it cannot work by itself. However, it can be used to augment the other methods. For example, local authorities can keep a watch on the email or the Internet and once a warning is received they can use other methods to disseminate it to the users. Amaterur Radio Amateur radios can also be used for letting the people know of the tsunami. However, this method can only warn people who are operators themselves and the people in the close vicinity to them. Aerial Flares or Explosive Reports These techniques were used in distant past for communication. These too can be used for tsunami notification. They are useful for the people in the areas where the conventional means of information. They are useful for both the distant tsunami and the local tsunami. However, there are a few issues with this system. First, the aerial flares and explosive reports rather than driving the people away from the source may attract towards the source. Moreover, these signals may have other meanings too and their use with the tsunami may result in conflict and hence the problem.
CONCLUSION
Tsunamis most of the times are caused by the sources over which we have no control whatsoever. To ensure human well being we have to think of the ways that allow us to detect their arrival in advance and let the people know of the danger so that they can move to safer places. There are many methods that can be used to do this. For the detection earthquake data, tide gauge readings, readings of the sea-bottom pressure sensors are routinely used to detect the tsunami. However, there are many techniques such as floating buoy systems, high frequency radars, microwave satellite imageries, GPS signal monitoring or ionosphere monitoring under investigation that seem to be promising for the tsunami detection and may well be incorporated in the future tsunami warning systems. For notification, radio broadcasts, television broadcasts, dedicated radio systems, sirens, bells, mobile announcer systems, amateur radios, telephone networks, mobile phones, pagers, email, the Internet etc. are being used. With the advent of information and communication technologies, some innovative and more effective techniques may well become part of the new tsunami warning systems.
REFERENCES
Adams, W. M., Jordaan, J. M. Tsunamis and Tsunami Warning Systems. In Hydraulic Structures, Equipment and Water Data Aquisition Systems, from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers, Oxford ,UK, (http://www.eolss.net) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Artru, J., Ducic, V., Lognonne, P., Murakami, M., and Kanamori, H. (2003) Tsunami in the open ocean detected from space. Geophysical Research Abstracts, l 5, 07195. Barrick, D. E. (1979) A coastal radar system for tsunami warning. Remote Sensing of Environment, 8, 353358. Carayanis, G. P. (2004) Volcanic tsunami generating source mechanisms in the Eastern Caribbean region George. Science of Tsunami Hazard, 22(2), 74-114.
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Chiew, L.K. (2005). Malaysian National Tsunami Early Warning System. National report of Malaysia in the First Session of the Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (ICG/IOTWS-I), Perth, Australia, 3-5 August 2005, 11pp. Colombo, O.L. (200) Detecting Tsunami in the High Seas: How GPS Might Contribute to an Early Warning System. Proceedings of National Technical Meeting of the Institute of Navigation (ION) California, USA, January 2000, 6pp. Curtis, G. D., and Pelinovsky, E. N. (1999) Evaluation of tsunami risk for mitigation and warning. Science of Tsunami Hazard, 17(3), 187-192. Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (2005) EERI Special Earthquake Report May 2005. (http://www.eeri.org/lfe/pdf/india_srilanka_tsunami_eeri_socsci_report.pdf ) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Gedik, N., Irtem, I., and Kabdasli, S. (2004) Laboratory investigation on tsunami run-up. Ocean Engineering, 32, 513-528. Godin, O. A. (2005) Air-sea interaction and feasibility of tsunami detection in the open ocean. Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences. (http://cires.colorado.edu/science/projects/aomsgodinO01.html ) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Governors Office of Emergency Services (OES), California, USA (2004) Local Planning Guidance on Tsunami Respones. Ed. 2, Governors Office of Emergency Services (OES), California, USA, 198pp. Gurgel, K. W., and Antonischki, G. (1997) Remote Sensing of Surface Currents and Waves by the HF Radar WERA. In the proceedings of Seventh IEE Conference on Electronic Engineering in Oceanography, 211-217. Inderfurth, K. F., Fabrycky, D., Cohen, S. (2005) The 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami: Six Month Report June 2005. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, New York, USA, 27pp. Kato, T., Torada, Y., Kinoshita, M., Kakimoto, H., Isshiki, H., Moriguchi, T., Takada, M., Tanno, T., Kanzaki, M., and Johnson, J. (2001) A new tsunami monitoring system using RTK-GPS. In the proceedings of International Tsunami Symposium 2001, Washington, USA, 645-651. Levin, B. W. Tsunamis: causes, consequences, prediction, and response. In Natural Disasters, from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers, Oxford ,UK, (http://www.eolss.net) (Retrieved August 14, 2005) Lipa, B., Bourg, J., Issacson, J., Barrick, D., and Pederson, L. (2005). Seasonde detection of tsunami waves. CODAR Report 25 January 2005, 10 pp. Li, Y., Rizos, C., Donskoi, E., Homer, J., Mojarrabi, B. (2002) 3D multi-static SAR system for terrain imaging based on indirect GPS signals. Journal of Global Positioning System, 1(1), 34-39. Liu, J. K., Tsai, Y. B., Ma, K. F., Chen, Y., Tsai, H., Lin, C., Kamogawa, M., (2005). Iononami-Ionospheric Tsunami Signature. In the proceedings of AOGS 2005, the Asia Oceania Geosciences Societys 2nd Annual Meeting, Singapore, 20-24 June 2005. Lognonne, P., Jeansou, E., Garcial, R., Artru, J., Occhipinti, G., Crespon, F., Achache, J., Helbert, J., and Moreaux, G. (2005) Detection of the Ionospheric perturbation associated to the tsunami of December 26th, 2004 with Topex and Jason-1 TEC data. Geophysical Research Abstracts, 7, 09028. Luick, J. L. (2004) Australian Tides Manual. Permanent Committee for Tides and Mean Sea Level, Wollongong, Australia (Available at: http://www.icsm.gov.au/icsm/tides/SP9/index.htm) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Milburn, H.B., Nakamura, A.I., and Gonzalez , F.I. (1996) Real-time tsunami reporting from the deep ocean. Proceedings of the Oceans 96 MTS/IEEE Conference, 23-26 September 1996, FL, USA, 390-394. National Institute of Oceanography (NIO), India (n.d.) 26 December 2004 Tsunami . (http://www.nio.org/jsp/tsunami.jsp) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Neira, M. M., Buck, C., Gleason, S., Unwin, M., Caparrini, M., Farres, E., Germain, O., Ruffini, G., and Soulat, F. (2005) Tsunami detection using the PARIS concept. In the proceedings of Progress in Electromagnetics Research Symposium 2005, Hangzhou Chaina, 22-26 Augus 2005, 4pp. Oregon Emergency Management (OEM) and Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) (2001). Tsunami Warning Systems and Guidance for Local Officials. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, Oregon, USA, 41pp. Perez, B., and Estado, P. d. (2005) Sea level monitoring in Spain. National report of Spain for GLOSS in the Ninth Session, Paris, France, 24-25 February 2005, 10pp. Shuto N., Tsunamis. In Natural Resources Policy and Management, from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers, Oxford ,UK,
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(http://www.eolss.net) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Smith, W. H. F., Scharroo, R., Titov, V.V., Arcas, D., and Arbic, B. K. (2005) Satellite altimeters measure tsunami, early model estimates confirmed. Oceanography, 18(2), 11-13. Titov, V.V., Gonzlez, F.I., Bernard, E.N., Eble, M.C., Mofjeld, H.O., Newman, J.C. and Venturato , A.J. (2005) Real-time tsunami forecasting: Challenges and solutions. Nat. Hazards, 35(1), Special Issue, U.S. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, 4158. Trenhaft, R. N., Lowe, S. T., Zuffada, C., and Chao, Y. (2001). 2-cm GPS altimetry over Crater Lake. Geophysical Research Letters, 22(23), 4343-4346. Tsunami Laboratory (n.d.) Causes of Tsunami . (http://tsun.sscc.ru/tsulab/tgi_4.htm) (Retrieved September 1, 2005) Zahibo, N., and Pelinovsky, E.N. (2005) Evaluation of tsunami risk in the Lesser Antilles. Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences, 1, 221-231.
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THE 2004 SUMATRA TSUNAMI : DEATHS AND DAMAGES TO BUILDINGS AT THE KAMALA BEACH, PHUKET, THAILAND; Srivichai, M. at el.
THE 2004 SUMATRA TSUNAMI : DEATHS AND DAMAGES TO BUILDINGS AT THE KAMALA BEACH, PHUKET, THAILAND1
Mongkonkorn Srivichai2, Yupa Chidtong3, Seree Supratid4 and Nobuo Shuto5
2,3,4 5
Civil Engineering Department, Rangsit University, Thailand Disaster Control Research Center, Tohoku University, Japan
e-mail : e-mail : seree@rangsit.rsu.ac.th, shuto@tsunami2.civil.tohoku.ac.jp ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the tsunami intensity scale for the 2004 Sumatra tsunami at the Kamala beach, Phuket, Thailand. This area was the hardest hit by tsunami in Phuket Island. Sixty seven local people and 7 tourists were killed in the event. Field investigation reveals that the maximum tsunami height and run-up distance are 6 m and 650 m, respectively. More than 760 houses were damaged, 210 houses were totally collapsed and washed away. Forty fishing boats and 173 cars were destroyed. In total, the damaged cost is preliminary estimated to be more than 1,500 million Baths. Main reasons of many deaths and damage characteristics to buildings were obtained by field survey and several distributed questionnaires to affected families.
INTRODUCTION
Massive earthquake of 9 magnitude that occurred at 07.58 local time on 26th December 2004 at the interface between the India and Burma plates off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia caused tsunami disaster to several countries in the Indian Ocean. Hardest hit were the countries of Indonesia, Srilanka, India, and Thailand. The death toll up to the present exceeds 300,000 people and is a major disaster of monumental geographic and human proportions. This time earthquake is the worlds largest for 40 years. It has been also estimated that the Burma plate was raised by 10-20 meters along a 1,000 km fault between Sumatra and the Andaman Island. Several aftershocks of magnitude ranging from 4 to 8 were triggered on the same day (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 Geologic characterization and aftershocks of the region (USGS)
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This paper is one part of an original paper (Supratid and Shuto, 2005) The 2004 Sumatra tsunami : Tsunami intensity scale, Damage assessment at the Kamala beach, Phuket, Thailand, to be presented in 22nd Tsunami Symposium, 27th-29th July, 2005, Chania, Greece For Thailand, the death toll including missing people are more than 9,000. Report from the field indicated that the Khoa Lak area (Pang Nga province) was hardest hit and suffered the highest loss of life due to its long and narrow stretch of the exposed coastline. The Thai-Japan survey teams reported these areas recorded tsunami wave heights of more than 10 meters (maximum of nearly 20 meters). Most of resorts surveyed sustained heavy to complete damages. Phi Phi Island hotels and resorts were among the worst affectted with most resorts were washed away by the huge wave (5-6 m wave height). Damages to commercial buildings and residential area in Phuket were mixed ranging from the most extensive (at the Kamala and Patong beachs) to minor (at the Karon and Kata beachs) or no damage. Surveyed results of wave heights are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 Wave heights distribution along the Khao Lak, Phuket, and Phi Phi Island (Thai-Japan survey team) This paper reviews the tsunami intensity scale at the Kamala beach. Several questionnaires were also distributed to affected families in order to investigate reasons of many deaths and damage characteristics to houses and buildings.
REVIEW OF TSUNAMI INTENSITY SCALE

Sieberg (1927) is the first to introduce a six-grade tsunami intensity scale which is analogy to earthquake intensity scale. It was based on the description of tsunami macroscopic effects, like damage, etc, not on the measurement or estimation of a physical parameter, e.g. wave height. Ambraseys (1962) published a modified version of Siebergs effort toward tsunami quantification which was later known as the SiebergAmbraseys tsunami intensity scale. However, this scale is considered by many researchers today to be too crude.
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Imamura (1942, 1949) introduced and Iida (1956, 1970) and Iida et al. (1967) developed further concept of tsunami magnitude, m, defined by
m = log 2 H max
where Hmax is the maximum tsunami wave height (in m) observed in the coastline or measured by tide gages. The so-called Imamura-Iida scale is, practically, a six-grade scale ranging from -1 to 4. Soloviev (1970) proposed the tsunami intensity, is by
(1)
i s = log 2 2 H
(2)
where H (in m) is the mean tsunami height. It can be seen that both Hmax and H are physical quantity. Therefore, Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001) called this is a magnitude scale, not an intensity scale. Later, Abe (1979, 1981, 1985, 1989) and Hatori (1986) proposed the tsunami magnitude, Mt defined by
Mt = a log H + b log + D
(3)
where H (in m) is the maximum amplitude of tsunami waves measured by tide gages, is distance (in km) from the epicenter to the tidal station along the shortest oceanic part, and a, b, and D are constants. Murty and Loomis (1980) introduced a different approach for the calculation of tsunami magnitude, ML, defined by
ML = 2 (log E-19)
where E is tsunami potential energy (in ergs). Shuto (1993) introduced tsunami intensity scale in the form
(4)
i = log2 H
(5)
where H is local tsunami height (in m). It can be the tsunami crest height above the ground level or it can be inundation height. Even though Shutos (1993) tsunami scale based on Eq. (5) by definition a magnitude scale, its description of tsunami impact is finally classified into a six-grade tsunami scale, ranging from 0 to 5 depending on H. Recently, Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001) proposed a new tsunami intensity scale based on following basic principles: a) independence from any physical parameter such as wave height; b) sensitivity, that is, incorporation of an adequate number of grades in order to describe even small difference in tsunami impacts; and c) a detailed description of each intensity grade by taking into account all possible tsunami impacts. Finally, they obtained a 12-point scale of tsunami intensity in analogy to earthquake intensity scale like the EMS or Mercalli scales.
METHODOLOGY
Kamala beach, located in the east coast of Phuket Island, was is 2.5 km long and was the hardest hit by tsunami. Detailed field survey of damages to houses and buildings were made during the mid of January. Several questionnaires (UNESCO, 1998) were also distributed to the affected families. Inundation map was obtained for the whole area of Kamala beach. Some particular destroyed buildings were investigated closely together with tsunami intensity scale.
RESULTS
Location of damaged houses (or buildings) and also inundation depth are shown in Fig. 3. More than 760 houses were damaged, 210 houses were totally collapsed and flushed away. Forty fishing boats and 173
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cars were damaged. In total, the damaged cost is preliminary estimated to be more than 1,500 million Baths. Many of one-storage houses located not more than 50 m away from the beach were completely destroyed. These houses served as the 1st row barrier of the beach. In total there are 40%, 17%, and 43% for houses of completely destroyed, wall and roof destroyed, and windows and doors destroyed, respectively. Design code for these houses is not included lateral wave force to wall and principal structures such as column, beam, etc. The popular wall is 10 cm thick brick wall. The column size is 15 x 15 cm reinforced concrete with 4-12 mm round bars. It was estimated that with a flow velocity of 4 m/s results in more than 10 tons per meter of water column. Therefore, building code in the affected area should be reconsidered. It was found that 30% of the houses were affected.
Fig. 3 Inundation map and photograph of incoming tsunami at the Kamala beach Results from questionnaire indicated that most of the local people did not have before knowledge of tsunami and were saved because they ran away immediately to the 2nd and 3rd floors of the nearby reinforced concrete building after hearing of a loud wave sound. They also noticed that many of killed people were caused by the high flow velocity with impact to buildings. Some people were dragged by the flowing water, but could safely climb up the three. The 2nd wave was the highest among series of waves attacking their houses. The tsunami intensity scale according to Shuto (1993) and Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001) is shown in Fig. 4. Contour lines of inundation (0-3 m) are also attached. The detailed survey indicates different tsunami scale categories. Near the beach, Shutos scale (1993) and Papadopoulos and Imamuras scale (2001) are 3 and IX, respectively. In this zone, many people were washed away. In addition, all wooden structures and many masonry buildings were completely destroyed. Extensive erosion was observed. However, some houses of higher standard of construction could withstand and were group as scale 2/VII. In this zone, most wooden houses were washed away, most vessels and cars were moved ashore and crashed each other. The other areas of inundation were classified as tsunami intensity scale 1/VI where slightly damage to buildings was observed.
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Fig. 4 Tsunami intensity scale according to Shuto (1993) and Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001)
CONCLUSIONS
This study reviews the tsunami intensity scale for the 2004 Sumatra tsunami at the Kamala beach, Phuket, Thailand. This area was the hardest hit by tsunami in Phuket Island. Sixty seven local people and 7 tourists were killed in the event. Field investigation reveals that the maximum tsunami height and run-up distance are 6 m and 650 m, respectively. More than 760 houses were damaged, 210 houses were totally collapsed and washed away. Forty fishing boats and 173 cars were destroyed. In total, the damaged cost is preliminary estimated to be more than 1,500 million Baths. Results from questionnaire indicated that most of the local people did not have before knowledge of tsunami and were saved because they ran away immediately to the 2nd and 3rd floors of the nearby reinforced concrete building after hearing of a loud wave sound. They also noticed that many of killed people were caused by the high flow velocity with impact to buildings.
Acknowledgement We would like to thank local staffs of the Kamala Municipality for providing useful pictures and data.
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REFERENCES
Abe, K. (1979) : Size of great earthquake of 1837-1974 inferred from tsunami data, J. Geophys. Res., 84, 1561-1568. Abe, K. (1981) : Physical size of tsunamigenic earthquakes of the northwestern Pacific. Phys. Earth Planet. Int., 27, 194-205. Abe, K. (1985) : Quantification of major earthquake tsunamis of the Japan sea, Phys. Earth Planet. Int., 38, 214-223. Abe, K. (1989) : Quantification of tsunamigenic earthquakes by Mt scale, Technophysics, 166, 27-34. Ambraseys, N.N. (1962) : Data for the investigation of the seismic sea-waves in the eastern Mediterranean, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am., 52, 895-913. Hatori, T. (1986) : Classification of tsunami magnitude scale, Bull. Earthquake Res. Inst., Univ. Tokyo, 61, 503-515 (in Japanese). Iida, K. (1956) : Earthquakes accompanied by tsunamis occurring under the sea off the islands of Japan, J. Earth Sciences Nagoya Univ., 4, 1-43. Iida, K. (1970) : The generation of tsunamis and the local mechanism of earthquakes, In tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean, edited by W.M. Adams, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 3-18. Iida, K., D.C. Cox, and G. Pararas-Carayannis (1956): Preliminary catalog of tsunamis occurring in the Pacific Ocean, Data Report 5, HIG-67-10, Hawaii Institute of Geophysics, University of Hawaii, Honolulu. Murty, T.S., and H.G. Loomis (1980) : A new objective tsunami magnitude scale, Mar. Geod., 4, 267-282. Papadopoulos, G.A.., Imamura, F. (2001) : A Proposal for a New tsunami Intensity Scale, ITS 2001 Proceedings, No. 5-1, 569-577. Shuto, N. (1993) : Tsunami intensity and disasters, In Tsunamis in the World, edited by S. Tinti, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 197-216. Sieberg, A. (1927) : Geologische, physikalische und angewandte Erdbebenkunde, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, Jena. UNESCO (1988) : Post-tsunami Survey Field Guide, Intergovermental Oceanographic Commission, Intergovermental Manuals and Guides.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A FLYING BALLOON SYSTEM FOR DISASTER ASSESSMENT; Kusanagi M. et al.
DEVELOPMENT OF A KITE-BALLOON SYSTEM FOR DISASTER ASSESSMENT

Michiro Kusanagi , Santosh Tripathi and Rajesh Bahadur Thapa Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems FoS, School of Advanced Technologies Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang Pathumthani, 12120, Thailand
* *
E-mail of Corresponding author: kusanagi@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
It is always better to prevent the disasters as far as possible. However, sometimes the best thought over prevention plans fail and sometimes there is no such plan whatsoever. Once a disaster strikes it is necessary to assess the damage so that relief activities can be properly managed and future prevention methodologies thought over. Although there are many mapping and imaging systems that can be used to help in damage assessment, all the systems have their own shortcomings: cost, time required for deployment, technical expertise required for operation etc. At RS&GIS FoS we have an ongoing development of a comprehensive, cheap and dependable flying balloon platform for mapping, which can be used to help in damage assessment too. Presently the system consists of three cameras and a GPS located on the flying platform and a laptop acting as the base station. The images from one camera can be viewed on the laptop in real time so that the height of the flying platform can be changed to ensure good visibility. Using the time-synchronized images from two cameras it is possible to make rough digital surface models too. Images can be used for qualitative damage assessment through visual interpretation. Similarly, using the DSMs generated some quantitative analyses can be done.
INTRODUCTION
Disasters are the occurrences that cause widespread destruction and distress. Though the disasters are always no welcome; they do occur and once hit by the disaster it becomes imperative to assess it to minimize the losses and to plan for the future. The process of disaster assessment consists of a number of tasks: determining the impact of the hazard on the society, setting the needs and priorities for immediate emergency measures to save and sustain the lives of the survivors, finding the resources available, and exploring the possibilities for facilitating and expediting longer term recovery [Stephenson 1994]. All of the above mentioned activities require data. Type of data to be collected and appropriate source depends upon the particular problem. For the disasters caused by flood, earthquake, fire, landslide etc., however, images are extremely helpful. Satellite imageries were used for disaster assessment when Indonesia was hit by forest fire in 1997 [United Nations 1997]. Similarly, El Salvador benefited from the satellite imageries when it was hard hit by earthquake and subsequent landslides in 2001 [International Charter Space and Major Disaster, 2005]. At the aftermath of Asian Tsunami of 2004, the satellite imageries and derived products were extensively used [International Charter Space and Major Disaster 2005]. Aerial surveys of the affected areas are normally done to assess the situation and plan for the relief activities. Honda and Nagai [2002] have devised a method for rapid mapping of volcano-affected areas using commercial grade CCD camera. The maps can be used for guiding evacuation or disaster notification. Though all the sources of imageries mentioned are useful, each of the sources have their own shortcomings. For the satellite imageries, images are available only if the satellite happens to be over the affected area. Moreover, the images with cloud are not suitable for analysis. Similarly, images are costly and need considerable time to be obtained unless the disaster is noted nationally and internationally. For the aerial
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surveys, the crafts cannot be flown in cloudy conditions and they are costly too. For the ground based imageries, though they are cheap to take, their spatial coverage is small. All this points to a need of some cheap imaging systems that can be easily taken from one point to other. Moreover, the system needs to have large spatial coverage and limited technical requirements. In this paper we present such a system under development at Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems Field of Study, Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). We are using a tethered kite balloon as the flying platform and the system presently uses three cameras for the collection of imageries. Images from one of the cameras can be downloaded to the base station in real time. This image helps to gauge whether the area of interest has been covered or not and if the height need to be adjusted to avoid haze or to get suitable resolution. By doing or undoing the tether the height can be adjusted. The images are suitable for visual interpretation. Moreover, the images can be used to make rough digital surface models too. This paper also presents the basis of these uses and the relations developed or to be used for these purposes. The paper is organized as follows. Present section gave the background information. Next section discusses the guiding principles in the development and provides an overview of the system. The ensuing three sections describe the system in detail. Fourth section is on the sensor calibration. Potential uses and the procedural requirements are described on the section named Uses of the Imageries. Future developments are touched in the following section. Paper finally ends with a brief conclusion. Derivation of the relationship for DSM generation is given in the appendix.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Following block diagram shows the overall system as it will be after the implementation is complete. As any other air borne system for remote sensing, our system too consists of observation platform, communication system, ground station and the flight control system.
Observation Platform Communication System Data Recorder Wireless LAN Ground Station
Video & Camera Servo Actuator Power System Battery
Telemetry - Command Transmitter & Receiver
Camera Pointing Control
Main OBC
Flight Control & Navigation

Elastic Layer & Piezo Electronic Actuator
DGPS Receiver & Antenna
Gyro & IMU
Flight Control System
Vibration Control
Figure 1 Block diagram of the kite-balloon system
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Observation platform is responsible for holding the payload which is constituted by different sensors such as cameras. Flight control system is responsible for controlling the flight of the platform and the communication system links the ground station and the platform itself. Next four sections describe these sub-systems in detail.
OBSERVATION PLATFORM AND FLIGHT CONTROL

For a low cost flying platform there are a number of alternatives. Radio controlled Unmanned Vehicles (RC-UAV) form a group. They are light weight and easily transportable. They can provide real time and continuous detailed analysis of local area and data can be obtained for several hours. However, they are not for layman; they need specially trained operators. Moreover, they are difficult to operate in bad weather and if they malfunction, they pose severe problem to the people and structures in the ground. Moreover, during landing there is a high probability of crashing and subsequent damage to the on-board equipments. In addition, they are, by most developing countries standard not cheap. Another set of low cost flying platforms are sky-sport airplanes. This class includes the ultralight, parasail and paragliders etc. However, they also have many problems as low cost flying platform for image collection. First, they can take images for only a short duration. Secondly, they need specially trained licensed pilot. Moreover, they can not be used in bad weather. Similarly, the concept of micro air vehicles (MAV) is also under development and they are not yet matured and are costly too. Balloons are cheap to buy and operate. Their light weight makes them easy to transport and they require only a nominal maintenance. They can hover at one place for long time, so they are suitable to collect continuous data from the area under consideration. However, not all balloon shapes are equally suited for taking imageries. Altan et.al (2004) used a spherical balloon for mapping a historical area. However, the tethered spherical balloons tend to move towards the ground if the wind hits them from the side. In this regard, kite balloon, commonly known as kitoon, do not have this problem. Fig. 2 shows the different forces working on a flying kitoon. Unlike a spherical balloon for which the lift component produce by a side blowing wind is negligible in comparison to the drag component trying to drown it, kitoon experiences considerable lift by the side blowing wind [Kusanagi et. al. 2003]..
Buoyancy Force Lift C.P. Drag C.G.
Wind
Weight
Pitch angle control tether
Payload Tether tension Tether weight
Fig. 2 Dynamics of a tethered kite-balloon
Fig. 3 Kite balloon used in RS&GIS FoS observation platform
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The kitoon used in our system is made of polythene material and helium gas is used to inflate it. When inflated its length is five meter and the diameter at the widest point is two meters. The kitoon can cruise at the altitude of fifty to five hundred meters. Weathercock stability is provided by its tail fins. As shown in fig 3, kitoon carries the platform for the payload beneath it. The platform is made of synthetic board and its location ensures near nadir viewing at all times. With the tethered balloon systems the flight control is manual. The height of the system is controlled by doing and undoing the tether. To take the imageries of a particular location, the required paraphernalia are transported to the location and the balloon is filled with the lighter than air gas. Once filled it is alighted. If one is flying from a moving vehicle like a jeep, one can achieve change in the mapping location by moving the vehicle itself. For the height of the platform, a rough estimation can be done by keeping track of the tether out.
PAYLOAD
In terms of payload, the system presently consists of a GPS receiver, two standalone digital cameras and a personal digital assistant. As stated earlier, one of the guiding principles in the development has been the cost and the ease of development so that other interested communities can easily implement the system and use it. The sensors and equipments have been selected based on this principle.
GPS Receiver GPS is a GlobalSat Bluetooth GPS. Readings can be taken manually or it can be set to take the readings at regular intervals of time. It can transmit the readings to the Bluetooth enabled computer using the wireless which obviates the need for cabling. Standalone Digital Cameras Two Ricoh Capilo PR1 standalone cameras are used in the system. As other commercial digital cameras these cameras can take still photos under varied combinations of focal length and resolution and can take short video clips. The images or videos can be stored on system flash memory or can be stored in removable memory chip. Similarly, they can be set to take images at preset intervals of time. Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) Personal digital assistants are one step ahead of laptops in miniaturization. They are light and come in different functionalities. In our system we have used HP iPAQ 3417. This comes with a 4.3 mega-pixel camera, and Wi-Fi and Bluetooth wireless connections. It serves double purpose for us: its camera makes it payload equipment and its Wi-Fi capability makes it easy to communicate with the ground station.
Fig. 4: Sensor equipmetns on board the flying platform. From left to right, a GlobalSat GPS receiver, a Ricoh Capilo PR1 digital camera and a HP iPAQ 3417 PDA respectively
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Payload Integration The payload is mounted on the payload platform which in turn is suspended from the balloon. Two standalone digital cameras are mounted so that one is nadir looking and the other is backward looking. These cameras are set to take the images at preset interval of time before the system is flown. The imageries are recovered after the campaign is over and the balloon has been grounded. The camera on the PDA looks at nadir. The images are again taken at regular intervals of time; however, these images are downloaded to the base station in near real-time. The GPS is also set to take the readings at preset interval of time. These reading are stored in the PDA which receives them from the GPS receiver through Bluetooth connection.
COMMUNICATION SUBSYSTEM AND BASE STATION

A laptop is used as the base station. It and the PDA run simple software written specifically for the system. The Wi-Fi capability of the laptop and the PDA and the custom software constitute the communication subsystem. As the flight control in a balloon system is not sophisticated and cannot make use of the commands given from the ground, the communication between the base station and the flying payload is only for the download of the images from PDA in near real-time. These images are useful in checking whether a particular area has been captured or not. In the absence of this mechanism, at times, one or the other part of area of interest is found to be missing necessitating flying the balloon again. Moreover, the availability of the image in real time lets the user decide whether the image is clear or not. If the image is not clear, user can decide to take the images from slightly lower altitudes so as to circumvent the The download mechanism is quite simple. The image is taken periodically by the PDA. These images are transferred to the shared folder on the PDA by the custom software. This folder is accessible from the laptop in the ground. As soon as a new image is added to the folder, software running on the laptop opens it and shows to the user. User can delete the images or can copy the images to the laptop freeing the space on the PDA which are anyway constrained by memory.
SENSOR CALIBRATION
Though commercial grade cameras are not suitable for mapping and photogrammetric purposes due to the defects in the lenses, for cases where the accuracy requirement is not stringent, they are quite acceptable. One example of mapping using commercial digital camera is given by Honda and Nagai [2002] where they used digital camera to map the volcano activities. Because using a photogrammetric camera would have made the system more expensive and that our accuracy requirements are not very stringent, we opted for consumer grade digital camera. However, these cameras if available can be used to supplant the consumer grade digital camera being used now. With a high angle of view more area is covered. So, we have calibrated the standalone cameras for their pixel size with the focal length fixed to the minimum which is 7.3mm in our case. Moreover, higher resolution means richer details and so calibration was done for the highest resolution for the cameras which is 2272*1704. Though calibration has been carried out for only one setting, based upon the requirement, it can be done for other settings or other cameras and used in the system.
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Fig. 5 Square grid pattern for camera calibration A pattern consisting of square cells of 7.5cm*7.5cm was drawn on the ground and the images were taken from different heights. Later the images were transferred to Adobe Photoshop and the distance covered by the images in both the width and length direction were calculated by counting the number of cells and their fractions there off covered by the image. The angle of view in each direction was calculated by using the Eq 1. In this relation, i is the angle of view. i takes the value of 1 and 2, with 1 referring to the width direction and 2 referring to length. h is the height of camera with respect to the pattern. li is the distance covered by the image in either the width or the length direction.
i = 2 tan 1
li 2 h
(1)
Following table shows the readings taken. Table 1 Calibration of the camera on board the flying platform Sl. No. 1 2 3 4 Width Covered (cm) 32.6 32.6 65.3 65.3 Length Covered (cm) 43.7 43.7 87.5 87.5 Height (cm) 100 100 200 200 Averaged Values Width () 36.112 36.112 36.163 36.163 36.138 Length () 47.211 47.211 47.259 47.259 47.235
To calculate the spatial coverage when the platform is flying at height H, following relation, which is a variation of the Eq. 1, can be used: L = 2 H tan (2) 2 L needs to be calculated in both directions. For example, an image taken with the above settings of the camera from a height of five hundred meters will give a spatial coverage of single image to be 437 m* 326m. To calculate the resolution of each pixel following approximation formula can be used:
LPixel =
(3)
As the imagery from the PDA is being used only for visual interpretation only it has not been calibrated. Moreover the accuracy of the GPS receiver was obtained from the manufacturers specification and is 15m within 2 rms.
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USES OF THE IMAGERIES

Imageries thus collected can be used for visual interpretation, mapping and DSM generation.
Visual Interpretation As seen from the previous section, the resolution of the captured imageries is high and so high quality imageries can be obtained from the system. Imageries thus obtained can be used to visually interpret the damage: one can count the number of houses that have been damaged, or the severity of the damage. Moreover, the condition of roads and streets can also be assessed. High resolution of the images obtained combined with the height at which the balloon can be flown can be leveraged in locating and subsequently rescuing the stranded people during flooding or after the earthquakes. Mosaicing and Mapping Each image taken comes with a corresponding GPS location. For the image taken from the PDA and nadirlooking camera, GPS reading is the location of its central pixel. As the resolution of the pixel is known, and if the user can orient the image with respect to the map, the image can be georeferenced using the software like ENVI. Different georeferenced images can be mosaiced so that the final image covers the area of interest. As the image is georeferenced it can be easily overlaid with the existing high scale maps of the locality. With the mapping facility in place, users do not only know what but also can know where. It will certainly be useful for emergency phase following the disaster and afterwards.
Fig. 6 Sample image taken from the kitoon (Authhaya 2003)
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Fig. 7 Sample image taken from kitoon (Kochan 2002)
Digital Surface Model Generation Two standalone digital cameras are so placed in the payload platform that both of them look at the same place from slightly different angles: one takes the nadir view of the location and the other takes the offnadir view. The angle between the cameras is fixed and the height of the flying platform can be measured.. If we take a particular point on the ground at zero height, we know beforehand the shift in x and y direction that will take place. As such, the image from the off-nadir camera can be shifted by a and b so as to have the same points on both images lying above each other.
Fig. 8 Nadir and off-nadir images have a shift a and b between them However, if the point is elevated, after shifting by a and b in x and y direction respectively, the representative pixels of the point on two images will not overlap. Following figure shows the geometry after shifting by a and b has been done.
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1 2
p h
k
pi1
pi2
Fig. 9 The geometry of the image after the shifting due to the different looking angle of the two cameras is nullified In the figure, p is a point at height h and pi1 and pi2 location of the same point on the image taken by nadir looking and off-nadir looking cameras respectively. x is the shift in both the images once a and b correction has already been applied to the imageries. Following relation can be used to find the height h which has been derived in appendix. Using the relation derived in the appendix it is possible to find the height of the point p which make it possible to generate DSM from the images collected.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
There are a number of aspects that are under development, both in the improvement of the physical system and the improvement of the procedures that generate the useful product from the raw imageries collected. For the physical system, there are a few components shown in the block diagram that are yet to be integrated to the system. This includes the servomotor for payload steering, gyro for attitude control and DGPS for precision position determination. Servomotor will allow the images of very wide area to be taken from one location. Similarly, gyro and resulting accuracy in attitude determination will allow accurate mosaicing and mapping. It will also overcome the effect of the wind that at present degrades the quality of the imageries. Similarly, addition of other sensors such as infrared and thermal cameras will make the system not only suitable for disaster assessment but also monitoring the health of crops etc. The flying height can be increased by using multistage kitoon systems and the lift can be controlled by using lift control wing mechanism with variable area will allow better control over the balloon. On the algorithmic side, quantitative limits and the accuracy of the system has to be established which will require extensive field testing and refinement.
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CONCLUSION
The paper presented a flying balloon system for disaster assessment. It is apparent that this cheap and easily transportable system can be used, in conjunction with other forms of data, in disaster assessment. The imageries collected using the system can be used for visual interpretation or the mapping and similarly they can also be used for rough DSM generation of the affected area. The system is not only useful for disaster assessment but with the addition of near infrared sensor can be used for monitoring the health of crops too. Thus, it can be used both during the disaster and during the peace too. Once the proposed developments are completed, it is believed that the system will become more useful.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We want to express our gratitude to GIS Lab, Kieo University for providing us with a kite balloon which has been used in this development.
REFERENCES
Altan, M. O., Celikoyan, T. M., Kemper, G., Toz, G. (2004) Balloon photogrammetry for cultural heritage. In the proceedings of XXth ISPRS Congress, Istanbul, Turkey , pp 964-969. Kusanagi, M., Nogami, J., Choomnoommanee, T., Laoswan, T., Penaflor, E., Shulian, E., and Zuyan, Y. (2003) Digital Koh Chang Island Eco-Tourism Mapping by Balloon-born Remote Sensing Imagery System. In the proceedings of 24th Asian Conference on Remote Sensing, Bussan, Korea, 5, November 2003. Honda, K., Nagai, M. (2002). Real-time volcano activity mapping using ground-based digital imageries. ISPRS Journal of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 57(1-2), 199-168. International Charter Space and Major Disaster [http://www.disasterscharter.org/] [Retrieved on September 2005]. Stephenson, R. S. (1994) Disaster Assessment, Ed. 2, Disaster Management Training Programme, UNDP, USA, 54pp. United Nations (1997) Report of the UNDAC Mission on Forest Fires, Indonesia, Septermber-November 1997. Geneva, Switzerland.
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APPENDIX: HEIGHT CALCULATION FOR DSM

Let N be the number of pixels and be the viewing angle in x direction. Then, the angle represented by each pixel in x direction will be,
Pixel , x =
(4)
Let be the angle that the lines passing through centre of the cameras and focal point make. For a given platform it is constant. be the x components of the angle that a light ray joining the camera to a point on the ground makes with a line passing through the camera centre and the focal point. If the x coordinate of the pixel is n, then it is given by,
= Pixel , x n
(5)
Let us assume that the sensors are at the height of H meters above the ground level. Let us apply shifting by a and b to the off-nadir image. Consider a point p with height h. Let x be the relative displacement this point in x direction in the overlaid nadir and off-nadir image, in pixel units. (Fig. 9) Invoking the sine law in the triangle pi1p pi2,
k PixelUnit =
sin ppi1 pi 2 x sin p i1ppi 2
(6)
Similarly, invoking the properties of right angled triangle in the triangle bppi2, hPixelUnit = However, the required angles are,
pi1 ppi 2 = 1 2
(8)
k sin ppi 2 pi1
(7)
ppi1 pi 2 = ppi 2 pi1 = From Eqs 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, we get
+ 1
( 9)
(10)
hMeters
sin + 1 2 x x H = N sin 2 sin (1 2 ) 2
(11)
Here, x is the camera viewing angle in x direction. x direction can be taken either in the direction of width or in the direction of length in the image.
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APPLICABILITY OF ELECTRIC IMAGING IN SITE INVESTIGATION FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN A TSUNAMI-AFFECTED BEACH IN PHUKET; Giao, P.H. et al.
APPLICABILITY OF ELECTRIC IMAGING IN SITE INVESTIGATION FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN A TSUNAMI-AFFECTED BEACH IN PHUKET
P. H. Giao*, N. Phien-wej, K. Adisornsupawat and V. Singh Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand * Email of the corresponding author: hgiao@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
Phuket is the largest island in Southern Thailand. It has an area of 930 km2 or the size of Singapore. About 70 percent of Phuket is forested hills, a number of which can be found next to famous beaches of Phuket. After the 26 December 2004 tsunami, those ground spots with high elevation should be considered of high priority in reconstruction and preparation of emergency responses. In this paper, experiences from a pretsunami site investigation using a relatively new geophysical technique, i.e., electric imaging, for construction of a new hotel on a hill at the Katanoi beach will be presented. As the hill is covered by weathered granites, the geotechnical engineer would like to know the thickness of the weathered layer in the upper part of the subsurface profile and if there is any corestone left in it due to an incomplete weathering, as this information would affect on the design of hotel foundation type. A common geotechnical site investigation was not suitable in this case because it was difficult to bring a drilling rig to make the boreholes on the hillside and get samples for testing for design parameters. Electric imaging survey was jointly carried out by researchers from the Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering (GTE) program of AIT and staffs of Pyramid Development International Co. Ltd. (Thailand). The survey could successfully map the weathered layer by using a Wenner electrode array as well as by an inverse analysis taking into account topographic conditions. As a result, applicability of electric imaging in site investigation for hilly terrains nearby Phuket beaches is highly recommended in reconstruction and emergency response efforts.
INTRODUCTION
Phuket is Thailand's largest island in Southern Thailand (930 km2 about the size of Singapore), known as the jewel of the Andaman Sea (see Fig. 1). About 70 percent of Phuket is forested hills. Tin mining has been a major source of income for the island since the 16th century. With falling tin prices, the mining has now all but ceased. Nowadays, Phuket's economy rests on rubber tree plantations (making Thailand the biggest producer of rubber in the world) and tourism. Since the 1980s Phuket has become one of the major tourist attractions of Thailand, and most of the sandy beaches on the western coast of the island have been developed into tourist centers. Phuket has many popular tropical resorts, among which Kata Noi is a small and beautiful beach with only a few hotels and little other development, located on the southwestern side of the island. A view of Katanoi beach is shown in Fig. 2. It prolongs the popular Kata Beach to the south, and most of the beach front is occupied by the Kata Thani resort. Construction of a new hotel on the hill at Kata Noi beach was considered in the early 2004. The hill is made of granite rocks, whose upper part has been weathered. Electric imaging can be an useful tool for geotechnical engineering [Giao et al., 2003] and it was applied in this case. Some of the problems in imaging the weathered granites at Kata Noi hill at the beginning of the survey were as follows: (i) no prior
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geological information or any borehole data are known; (ii) it was not known which is the most suitable electrode array and spacing to map the weathered layer and to detect the core stones; (iii) how is effect of topography on quality of EI measurements and their inverse analysis.
Fig. 1 Phuket Island and Kata Noi location
Fig. 2 View of Kata Noi beach, Phuket
GEOLOGY OF PHUKET
The Phuket Island mainly comprises of the Cretaceous granitic rocks and Carboniferous to Lower Permian sedimentary rocks. The sedimentary rocks cover less than one third of the area and outcrop in narrow strips along the east coast and on a number of adjacent small islands. They are clastic and include pebbly mudstone, laminated mudstones, siltstones, shale and greywacke. The granitic rocks, which cover more than two thirds of the island, outcrop mostly in the western and eastern central parts. They are felsic types with compositions ranging from granite to adamellite; quartz monzodiorite is present in small amounts along the margins of some plutons. The granites form elongate bodies aligned in a north-south direction parallel to regional structural features. In general, they form two separate mountain ranges, the western range and the relatively shorter eastern range. However, a number of granites bodies are found as low hills in the eastern part and as small islands to the south of Phuket. Some rocks of the Phuket group show evidence that they have undergone very low grade regional metamorphism. These low grade metamorphic rocks are related to granite emplacement. They exhibit parallelism of relic bedding and schistosity at a few places near the granite contact. Based one the detailed field, petrographic, geochemical and Rb/Sr isotope investigation, the granites are subdivided into four suites; namely Khao Prathiu suite (G-1), Kata Beach Suite (G-2), Nai Thon Beach Suite (G-3) and Khao Tosae Suite (G-4). The distributions of these suites are shown in Fig. 3a. Structural Geology The major structural features are folds and faults which are mostly oriented north-south. The deformation in the region is the result of folding and vertical and lateral movements along high angle faults [Garson et al., 1975]. Most of the sedimentary rocks found on the east coast dip gently eastward at about 200-300. Beds with a westerly dip are confined to fault zones and small open folds. The axes of these folds trends northsouth and north-northeast with plunge angles of 150 [Hummel & Phawandon, 1967]. In the granitic rocks, one of the common structure features is well developed joint system with a moderate to steep dip (~500800) which have similar orientations to the major fault system. The horizontal joints are less common. There are two dominant joint systems, one trending northeast, and the other trending northwest. Joint analyses indicate similarities between the joint pattern of the eastern and western granite bodies, but in the eastern granites, the northeast joints are more prominent.
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Fig. 3a Geology of Phuket (DMR, 1989)
Kata Noi Area The Kata Noi area consists of granitic rocks from Kata Beach Suite (G-2). The Kata Suite occurs as elongated body along the western part and the southern tip of Phuket Island. It forms the hilly terrain in the south and a moderate high mountain range (~ 500 m msl) in the west. Good outcrop occurs along the shoreline, in steep creeks, road cuttings and in two quarries, but the outcrops in the other areas are poor because of the deep weathering and the thick overburden. The rocks show a moderate to strong magmatic feldspar foliation varying in strike from northeast to northwest and having a moderate dip of 400 to 800 .the foliation is more pronounced in the weathered or slightly weathered outcrops. At the Kata beach the strike of the foliation is very variable suggesting that the foliation results from magmatic flow rather than flattening. Mafic xenoliths are common and many are elongated parallel to the foliation. The rocks of the Kata beach suite are gray in color with a coarse to very coarse grained, porphyritic texture in which large K-feldspar phenocrysts (average size about 3 cm, but reaching 7 cm) are dominant. The petrographic analysis shows that the essential minerals are quartz (21.4 to 29.6%), K-feldspar (31.0 to 37.6%), Plagioclase (25.0-30.6%) and Biotite (9.7-15.4%). Other accessory minerals are Hornblende, Sphene, Allanite, Zircon and some opaque minerals. The chemical analysis shows that the silica (SiO2) ranges from 68.4 to 74.5 %, Alumina (Al2O3) ranges from 12.5 to 14.3%, Potassium Oxide (K2O) ranges from 4.6 to 6.4 %, Iron Oxide (FeO) ranges from 1.9 to 3.6% and Ferric Oxide (Fe2O3) ranges from 0 to 0.5% (Putthapiban, 1984). The Kata beach suite is free from tin-tungsten mineralization. Around the Kata Noi area, granite rocks are very coarse grained and most of them are moderately to highly weathered. At top part, the rocks are highly weathered to residual soil up to 5 m thick. The weathering of granite rocks are
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well observed along the road cut section where, the granitic core-stones of 50 cm to 2 m diameter are observed at the depth of 2 to 5 meter from ground surface (Fig. 3b).
Fig. 3b View of the weathered granitic rocks along the road cut section at Kata Noi hill
REVIEW ON THE WEATHERING PROCESS OF GRANITES

For engineering purposes, as Goodman [1993] indicated, description and analysis of the effects of weathering prove essential for the investigation of sites in granitic rocks. Engineers need to choose the elevations and locations of structures, selecting the types of foundations, and locating the materials with which to build them. Granitic rocks usually weather to a mixture of clay, silt, and sand, with sand properties predominating. The range of material within the zone of weathered rock is highly variable and, for that reason, complex to deal with. Therefore we need to consider the properties and classification of weathering products in some detail. Ruxton and Berry [1957] had made a study on development of weathering profile for granites in Hong Kong, in which corestones are quite abundant. They distinguished four zones above the fresh (unweathered) bedrock that are labeled A to D, proceeding downward. The upper zone A is residual debris without relict texture and structure and lacking corestones. Zone B is completely weathered, containing isolated corestones that make up less than half of the total volume. Zone C is residual material in various decomposition grades, containing 50% to 90% rectangular blocks of fresh rock, contacting along altered joints. In zone D, rock constitutes more than 90% of the volume and residual debris is found only along joints. Significant is the effect of the degree of the surface slope on development of the profile as shown in Fig. 4. The profile developed on a slope steeper than 150 suffers erosion of the finer constituents as they are formed. On very steep slopes, the corestones are eroded as well, and the profile consists of zone D or nothing. Conversely, at the base of a steep slope, corestones rolled down from above litter the surface and, father below on the slope, zone B is thickened by addition of material washed from above as shown in Fig. 4, where profile (f) can be developed from profile (e) by movement of corestones from slopes above or from profile (d) by a renewed intensity of weathering and the abandonment of the upper horizons
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(a)
(c)
(e)
B C D
Fresh bedrock
A B
C C D D
(b)
(d)
(f)
B C D
Fresh bedrock
C D
A B C D
Fig. 4 Effect of slope on the development of profiles of weathering in Hong Kong. Parts a and b for 300, c and d for 22.50, e and f for 150 slopes [after Ruxton and Berry, 1957]
ELECTRIC IMAGING SURVEY

The only information provided by the geotechnical engineer is that he saw boulders of granites at some places, mostly in the part of low elevation of the hilly terrain. As no geological or borehole data are available, one did not know how thick the weathered layer is and if it contains any corestone. The equipment used was an automatic SYSCAL R1+ with a cable of 120 m long. Five survey lines (Fig. 5) were done using Wenner and dipole-dipole configurations. It was found out that the Wenner array worked better than the dipole-dipole array in mapping the weathered granites. The procedure of electric imaging with the Wenner array is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 5 Location of Survey Lines

spacing "a"
Line 1 Line 2
A A
N B spacing "2a"
Syscal R1+
M M N B spacing "3a" N B
Line 3
A
2
1
3
2
4
3
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Fig. 6 Procedure of electric imaging with Wenner configuration
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Results of EI survey at Kata Noi beach The field data obtained by both Wenner and dipole-dipole arrays were analyzed by RES2DINV software [Loke, 2002] for two cases without and with taking into account topographic data.
Fig. 7a Results of analysis without topographic data for Wenner configuration
Fig. 7b Results of analysis with topographic data for Wenner configuration
Results discussion and interpretation No sample of both weathered and unweathered granites was collected as no borehole could be done. The only criteria used are the values of resistivity found in literature as shown in Table 1. Consequently, a value around 1000 m was chosen to primarily separate between the weathered layer (predominantly blue) to the underlying fresh granite layer (predominantly red). The depth to the fresh bedrock was estimated about 10 to 12 m. The resistivity pseudosection indicated we were dealing with a weathering profile similar to that in Fig. 3b.
Table 1 Some values of weathered and unweathered granites Rock type Heiland (1963) Telford et al. (1976) Reynolds (1998) Fresh granite 3x102 to 106 m 300 to 106 m Weathered granite 3x10 to 5x102 m Granites in Washington 5x103 m DC Granitic Porphyry 4.5x103 (wet) to (wet to dry) 1.3x106 (dry) m
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For Katanoi hill investigation, the Wenner array could delineate the weathered layer very well. Inverse analyses by RES2DINV [Loke, 2002] with taking into account topographic data provided a much better results than an analysis without topographic data (one can compare Fig. 7b with Fig. 7a). In the event that you do find yourself near the coast when an earthquake hits, be aware of the following guidelines: (i) Move to higher ground immediately; (ii) A tsunami may be coming within minutes; (iii) Go on foot; (iv) If there is no high ground, move inland away from the coastline; (iv) Stay away from the coast; (v) Later waves are often higher than the first; (vi) Waves may continue to arrive for hours; and (vii) Listen to your radio for the "all clear" signal [after Imamura, 2005]. According to this guideline, construction works on the high grounds of hilly terrains next to the beaches in Phuket are highly recommended.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The electric imaging survey was jointly carried out by researchers from the Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering (GTE) program of AIT and staffs of Pyramid Development International Co. Ltd. (Thailand). Contribution from Mr. P. Inkoom, manager of the geotechnical division, Pyramid, is much appreciated.
REFERENCES
DMR (1989), Geology of Phuket Island, Geological Survey Division, Department of Mineral Resources, Bangkok, 14p. Garson, M.S., Young, B., Mitchell, A.H.G. and B.A.R. Tait (1975). The geology of the tin belt in peninsular Thailand around Phuket, Pangnga and Takua Pa. Overseas Mem. No. 1. I.G.S., London, 112p. Giao P. H., Chung, S. G. Kim, D. Y. and Tanaka, H. (2003). Electric imaging and laboratory resistivity testing for geotechnical investigation of Pusan clays, International Journal of Applied Geophysics, 52 (4), 157-175. Goodman, R. E. (1993), Engineering geology rock in engineering construction, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Singapore. Heiland, C. A. (1963). Geophysical Exploration, Hafner Publishing Company. Hummel, C.L. and Phawandon, P. (1967). Geology and mineral deposits of the Phuket mining district, South Thailand. Rep. Invest. Royal Thai Dept. Miner. Resour., no. 5, 74p. Imamura, F. (2005), Tsunami simulation for the warning and risk evaluation, Invited Lecture on Tsunami given at the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand. Loke, M. H. (2002). Tutorial on 2D and 3D e;lectrical imaging surveys, www.geometrics.com. Putthapiban, P. (1984). Geochemistry, geochronology and tin mineralization of Phuket granites, Phuket, Thailand; Ph.D. Thesis, La Trobe University, Victoria, Australia. Reynolds, J. M. (1997). An Introduction to Applied and Environmental Geophysics, John Wiley & Sons, 796p. Ruxton, B. P. and Berry, L. (1957), Weathering of granite and associated erosional features in Hong Kong, Bull. Geol. Soc. Amer. 58: 1263-1292. Telford, W. M., Geldart, L.P., Sheriff, R.E., and Keys, D. A. (1976), Applied geophysics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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HYDRODYNAMIC MODELING OF TSUNAMI IMPACT FOR PHI PHI ISLAND, THAILAND; Thaicharoen, C. et al.
HYDRODYNAMIC MODELING OF TSUNAMI IMPACT FOR PHI PHI ISLAND, THAILAND

Chanon Thaicharoen, Sutat Weesakul, and Ashim Das Gupta Water Engineering and Management, School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand E-mail of corresponding author: chanon.thaicharoen@ait.ac.th and sutat@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
Indian Ocean Tsunami struck on December 26, 2004 caused huge damage along 300 km of shoreline length in the southern part of Thailand. A numbers of recreational islands were enormously impacted including Phi Phi Island. Due to its special coastal morphology with tombolo shape, tsunami can propagate across the beach. The large wave height caused rapid coastal flooding and washed most of infrastructure from one to another side of the tombolo. A mathematical model of long wave has been used to study the detail of tsunami propagation to Phi Phi Island. The result shows the large amplification ration as 3 to 4 at the tombolo. The computed tsunami inundation height which is approximately 4.8 m above mean sea level is compared with the measured value with satisfactory agreement. The computed velocity shows strong current during over-washing on the beach, which is up to 4 to 6 m/s. The numerical model can successfully simulate the overflow process at the tombolo during tsunami attack.
INTRODUCTION
Phi Phi Island is located in Andaman Sea and is about 35 km off the main land, as shown in Figures 1. It is one of the most famous islands in Thailand. The island, stretched approximately to a length of 7 km and a width of 3.5 km resembles to a T-shape when observed from above, with a tombolo between two bays namely, Loh Da Lum Bay and Ton Sai Bay. The tombolo width is about 200 m. During tsunami attack, the eyewitnesses have reported the waves propagated from both bays. The first wave was from Loh Da Lum Bay which is in the north direction and followed by that from Ton Sai Bay. This phenomenon provides initially two waves in a very short time and consequently less time to escape from waves of both sides. There are a very high human loss especially foreigners. A number of mathematical models have been applied to study Indian Ocean Tsunami in a large scale. The model covers the extent of the ocean. Satake [1] firstly introduced the results of Indian Ocean Tsunami modeling and presented the arrival time of tsunami in both global and regional coverage. A research team at Disaster Control Research Center (DCRC) [2], Tohoku University, has developed three cases of regional tsunami model of the event. A tsunami code developed by DCRC was also employed by Koshimura [3] with six cases of different fault parameters. Another research team at Research Center for Disaster Reduction Systems (DRS) [4], Kyoto University, had also presented the results of simulated time series of waves at a number of locations in affected countries. All mentioned tsunami models are based on linear shallow water theory of spherical co-ordinate system. The result of tsunami simulation from the MOST (Method of Splitting Tsunami) model [5] was rather accurate when compared to several detected satellite data for example TOPEX/Poseidon. In addition, the tsunami simulation was done by Pedersen et al [6] using MIKE21 with different grid sizes on global, regional and local coverage. Far field tsunami propagation model can provide magnitude of tsunami height along the west coast of Thailand. Most of models have grid size of which is approximately 200 km therefore, these models could not have enough high resolution for a small island. The nearshore tsunami model is the necessary to be developed for the present study.
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Several studies of tsunami propagation to island and cape have been conducted. Gonzalez et al [7] studied tsunami propagation to Cape Mendocino and found that the largest wave amplitude is due to localized edge wave nearshore. It is slow moving but in a very energetic mode. Tinti et al [8] studied tsunami propagation to island and found that tsunami wavefronts can produce local systems of waves rotating around the island coasts as the effect of the strong wave refraction caused by considerable depth changes. The rotating edge wave depends on bathymetry, topography and other features which control its amplitude, period and duration of occurrence. All of literatures showed local effect of geophysical condition of tsunami. Therefore, the objectives of the study are to apply a two dimensional numerical model to study near-field tsunami propagation to Phi Phi Island, and to determine the tsunami characteristics at the tombolo the island.
Figure 1 Location map of Phi Phi Island
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
A two dimensional shallow water equation is applied to compute tsunami propagation to Phi Phi Island. Mathematical model MIKE 21 is used for numerical computation with finite different scheme, so called ADI scheme. The bathymetric data are taken from a hydrographic map with 1:60,000 scale as illustrated in Figure 2. A computational domain covers an area of 55 x 55 km2 with square grid size of 100 m, illustrated in Figure 2. The domain was aligned at 45 degree from the north. A sub-domain covering the area of Phi Phi Island with smaller grid size of 20 m is also established to study the detail of tsunami propagation to the island. In addition, a topographic map of Phi Phi Island, shown in Figure 3, is also included. There are a total of eight tidal gauging stations along the west coast in the southern part of Thailand. From the measured tidal gauge data, it shows that the measurement at Ko Taphao Noi and Pak Nam Krabi are the nearest stations to Phi Phi Island so that the former can be used as a boundary condition for the study and the latter for model calibration considering the direction of tsunami propagation. Figure 4 shows tidal record at both stations. Data of water level for whole two days, which is one day before the event and the day of 26 December 2004, is prepared to have proper background of tidal water level before tsunami occurred. The tsunami magnitude at model boundary condition is adjusted including time adjustment so that result of calibration is satisfied. The topographic details of the island are illustrated in Figure 3. The island comprises of four highlands interconnected to each other by sandy beaches. The most famous place is the tombolo which is located at
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the central part of the island connecting Loh Da Lum Bay at the north and Ton Sai Bay at the south. The elevation of this area is approximately 2 m MSL. The other low lying area is between Lo Lana Bay and Lo Bakao Bay with the elevation of about 1 m MSL. The northernmost tip of Phi Phi Island, called Laem Tong, has a narrow channel between two highlands with a width of 25 m spreading to the east and west side of the island.
Figure 2 Bathymetric map and computational model domain of the study area
Figure 3 Topographical map of Phi Phi Island
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Ko Taphao Noi
2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 -2.00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 25/12/04 25/12/04 26/12/04 26/12/04 27/12/04 27/12/04 28/12/04 Water Level (m MSL) Water Level (m MSL)
Pak Nam Krabi

2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 -2.00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 25/12/04 25/12/04 26/12/04 26/12/04 27/12/04 27/12/04 28/12/04
a) Tidal records on 25-27 December 2004

Ko Taphao Noi
2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 -2.00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 Water Level (m MSL)
Pak Nam Krabi

Water Level (m MSL)
26/12/2004
2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50 -2.00 08:00 09:00 10:00 11:00 12:00
26/12/2004
13:00
14:00
15:00
13:00
14:00
b) Tidal records on 26 December 2004
Figure 4 Tidal records at Ko Taphao Noi and Pak Nam Krabi
MODEL RESULTS
By adjustment of the magnitude and time of tsunami at the open boundary, the calibration result shows a satisfactory comparison of observed and simulated water level at Pak Nam Krabi station, as illustrated in Figure 5. The results of timing of tsunami and peak of the earlier wave show good agreement with the observed data. However, the simulated water level after the peak is higher than the observed one. It may be due to the fluctuation of water level at boundary condition (Ko Taphao Noi station) and the damping effect of river flow at Pak Nam Krabi station. Based on the eyewitnesses on the island, it was found that three locations from which the tsunami overflow can occur to the island are: i) from Loh Da Lum Bay to Ton Sai Bay, ii) From Lo Lana Bay to Lo Bakao Bay, and iii) from the west side of Laem Tong to the east side. From the model simulation, tsunami can cross at the first two locations mentioned above. The model can not simulate the crossover at Laem Tong because of too narrowness of the channel compared to the grid size. The tsunami propagation to the tombolo can be investigated by comparison of water level at different location from deep to shallow area at Loh Da Lum Bay (LDL 1, LDL2 and LDL 3) and Ton Sai Bay (TS 1, TS2 and TS 3), locations of which are indicated in Figure 6. On the land area, four locations namely, A, B, C, and D, are marked to evaluate the tsunami inundation depth on the island. Tsunami wave becomes larger when it moves to the shallow area which can clearly be seen in Figure 7. The peak of the wave in Loh Da Lum Bay increases from 2.5 to 4.5 m MSL while it increases twice the magnitude, from 2 to 4 m MSL, at Ton Sai Bay. The wave at Loh Da Lum Bay is slightly larger than that at Ton Sai Bay causing the crossover of seawater from north-south direction during the tsunami propagation to the island. The result of tsunami propagation reflects that the tsunami inundation depth at Point A is always higher than Point B, illustrated in Figure 8. At point C and D, the tsunami inundation depth is reduced about half from the tombolo which helps to explain the less damage occurred at this area than that at tombolo area. The maximum tsunami inundation depth is found at about 4.8 m MSL at the tombolo area. The magnitude
15:00
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of tsunami inundation height at this location is slightly less than the survey result of Harada [9] on 2 Jan 2005 of 5.84 m MSL. However, the present simulated result of tsunami inundation depth is rather satisfactory. Another tsunami inundation height at Lo Lana Bay is about 2.5 m MSL which is less than half which occurred at the tombolo. The speed of the crossover wave is very high, with the value of 4-6 m/s, at the tombolo which creates very energetic power that can damage a number of land properties and buildings. Velocities at the tombolo point A and B are computed and illustrated in Figure 9. The maximum values are 5.3 and 4.5 m/s at point A and B, respectively. At the other bays, the velocities of tsunami wave are calculated as 2-3 m/s at points C and D. By multiplying the depth square (H2) and speed (v) with seawater density (), the instantaneous force due to the tsunami acting over the tombolo is calculated. The contour line of maximum force due to the tsunami is illustrated in Figure 10. It is found that the maximum force is approximately 20,000 N/m2. It is to be noted that the calculated force is not including the force due to debris flow. From the survey result, it is found that the only strong building can withstand the tsunami wave in which most of its wall were broken from one side to other. A tsunami amplification ratio is the ratio of tsunami inundation depth over the incident wave at the boundary. An analysis of tsunami amplification is demonstrated in Figure 11. The highest amplification ratio is 3 to 4 at the tombolo. The view of Phi Phi Island before and during the tsunami attack is shown in Figure 12. It shows the crossover wave at two locations as mentioned above. It can be seen that the inundation height at tombolo is much amplified due to the physical characteristics of the island. This type of area should be paid much attention for tsunami preparedness and evacuation.
Figure 5 Comparison of observed and simulated water levels at Pak Nam Krabi station
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Figure 6 Locations of plotting of tsunami propagation to Phi Phi Island and tsunami inundation height
Figure 7 Tsunami propagation to Phi Phi Island
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a) at Loh Da Lum Bay (A) and Ton Sai Bay (B)
b) at Lo Lana Bay (C) and Lo Bakao Bay (D)
Figure 8 Tsunami inundation depths at different attacked beaches
a) at Loh Da Lum Bay (A) and Ton Sai Bay (B)
b) at Lo Lana Bay (C) and Lo Bakao Bay (D)
Figure 9 Tsunami velocities at different attacked beaches
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Loh Da Lum Bay
Ton Sai Bay
Figure 10 Contour line of maximum force due to tsunami over the tombolo (Unit: N/m2)
Figure 11 Amplification ratio of tsunami inundation depth over the maximum wave height at the boundary
CONCLUSIONS
Numerical computation of tsunami attack at Phi Phi Island was conducted. The overflow at tombolo joining Loh Da Lum and Ton Sai Bay was successfully simulated. The computed inundation height is 4.8 m which agrees well with the observed value satisfactorily. The computed amplification ratio around the island has the values between 1 to 4. The maximum value is at the tombolo with the ratio of 3 to 4. Maximum velocity during overwash is 4-6 m/s. This available information can be useful for tsunami preparedness and evacuation planning.
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a) before tsunami
b) during tsunami
Figure 12 View of simulation result before (a) and during tsunami attack (b) to the island
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge Marine Department and Hydrographic Department, Thailand for providing water level data.
REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3] Satake K. (2004), http://staff.aist.go.jp/kenji.satake/Sumatra-E.html DCRC. (2005), Modeling a Tsunami Generated by Northern Sumatra Earthquake [12/26/2004], http://www.tsunami.civil.tohoku.ac.jp/hokusai2/topics/04sumatra /index.html Koshimura S. (2005), DRI Preliminary Tsunami Modeling Report: Modeling a Tsunami Generated by the December 26, 2004 Earthquake, Off the West Coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, http://www.dri.ne.jp/koshimuras/sumatra/ DRS. (2005), Tsunami Numerical Modeling Report: December 24, 2004 Earthquake Tsunami Disaster of Indian Ocean, http://www.drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/sumatra/drs/ NOAA. (2005), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2005/s2365.htm Pedersen N. H. et al (2005), Modelling of the Asian Tsunami off the Coast of Northern Sumatra [electronic version], the 3rd Asia-Pacific DHI Software Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, http://www.dhisoftware.com/mike21/Download/Papers_Docs/index.htm Gonzales F.I., Satake K., Boss E.F. and Mofjeld H.O. (1995), Edge wave and non-trapped modes of the 25 April 1992 Cape Mendocino tsunami, http://www/pmel.noaa/tsunami/ gonzalez1995.html Tinti S. and Vanini C. (1995), Tsunami Trapping near Circular Islands, Pure and Applied Geophysics (PAGEOPH) Tsunamis: 1992-1994 Their Generation, Dynamics and Hazard, Vol. 144, No.3/4, pp 595-619. Harada K. (2005), The December 26, 2004 Sumatra Earthquake Tsunami, Tsunami Field Survey around Phuket, Thailand, http://www.drs.dpri.kyoto-u.ac.jp/sumatra/thailand/ phuket_survey_e.html
[4] [5] [6]
[7] [8]
[9]
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A STRATEGY FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE RURAL TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN TSUNAMI-AFFECTED AREAS; Donnges, C.
A STRATEGY FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE RURAL TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN TSUNAMI-AFFECTED AREAS
Chris Donnges ILO ASIST-AP E-mail of Corresponding author: Donnges@ilo.org
SUMMARY
The rural transport sector has been badly affected by the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami. A large part of the rural road network in Indonesia and Sri Lanka needs to be rehabilitated or reconstructed. A recovery of the affected areas however requires far more than rebuilding roads and bridges. Large job losses occurred in productive sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing. The local economy needs to be revived to restore the livelihoods of the people. Local governments have collapsed and need to be strengthened to perform their functions. An integrated strategy for improving rural transport is proposed that creates assets and improves livelihoods simultaneously. Rural transport cuts across different sectors. Improving rural transport improves access people have to basic needs and social and economic goods, services and facilities including health care, education and incomeearning opportunities. A successful rural transport recovery strategy contributes at the same time to the restoration of the local economy and livelihoods of the people. Rural transport infrastructure is primarily made up of rural roads. This strategy will offer a set of principles for planning, designing, implementing and managing the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the rural road sector in the aftermath of a natural crisis. Firstly, it advocates the use of labour-based methods which will provide immediate, but temporary, employment opportunities to unskilled people. The strategy differentiates between labour-intensive and labour-based methods as developing good quality infrastructure is the principal objective. Secondly, the strategy aims at rebuilding local governance. Due to the collapse of local governments in the most severely affected areas, it is difficult for them to fully contribute to the recovery effort. Restoring local governance is important for the future management of the sector. Thirdly, the strategy advocates the development of local entrepreneurship and use of local small-scale contractors in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. This will have a positive impact on the local economy. Lastly, the strategy promotes horizontal and vertical participation. This will ensure that interventions to improve the rural transport system will address the immediate and real needs of the rural people affected by the disaster.
RURAL TRANSPORT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The widespread destruction caused by the Tsunami brought a heavy toll on the livelihoods in the affected areas. Job losses are particular acute in the large informal sector in the affected areas due to the loss of productive assets and markets especially in agriculture, fisheries and small retail businesses. In Sri Lanka alone, an estimated 275,000 people have lost their livelihoods. The catastrophe also resulted in the destruction of the infrastructure assets in the areas affected. Communities and local governments have an immense task before them in the repair and rebuilding of infrastructure. This strategy concentrates on activities in the rural road sector. The road sector has been selected because a well functioning local transport system providing access to key services is a pre-requisite for most other development activities. Transport cuts across most sectors. The sector was also one of the largest impacted by the disaster, in value terms, after housing. Lastly, it is one for which there is extensive international experience with labour-based methods. Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India have already adapted employment
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intensive approaches to local conditions. Transport patterns between countries, within a country and between rural and urban areas differ considerably. Rural transport for the purpose of this article is defined as the movement of people and goods in rural areas by any conceivable means, for any conceivable purpose along any conceivable route. Research work has revealed that rural transport in developing countries has its own very distinct features. It is characterized by people moving themselves and their goods around in rural areas for a variety of subsistence, social and economic purposes. Some of this transport takes place in motorized vehicles along well maintained roads. Much of this transport takes place in and around the community often with intermediate modes of transport such as bicycles and motorcycles. Rural roads play a dominating role in the rural transport system. Rural roads enable motorized transport and link villages to each other and to markets and other important locations. Rural roads allow transport services to operate which increases mobility of people who do not own any means of transport. The social and economic impacts of rural roads are well established. Communities and local governments often attach a high priority to rural road improvements. Rural roads improve rural access, which facilitates marketing, schooling and health services. Better access increases income and employment opportunities and also helps alleviate poverty in different ways. Investments in rural roads are often justified from a social and economic point of view. Although the link between rural roads and poverty alleviation seems to be more indirect, it can generally be concluded that areas with poor accessibility are generally worse off compared to areas with better road access. The destruction of the rural road network has worsened accessibility. The flow of goods and people has been interrupted. Restoring local access will have immediate beneficial effect and facilitates recovery in the social and productive sectors. Large investments are now under preparation for rehabilitating the major infrastructure in the countries affected by the crisis. In particular the main road network will be improved. There are substantial potential gains to be realized if resources are also dedicated to improving the connectivity between the communities and the improved main road network. Rural roads are often forgotten but form an important part of the local transport system. Improving the local road network will contribute to the recovery of the areas affected. It is important however to underline that improving the local transportation situation is just one condition for local economic development and poverty reduction. Complementary actions in the social and productive sectors are equally necessary.
DAMAGE TO THE RURAL ROAD NETWORK EXAMPLE OF ACEH

The broad dimensions of the natural disaster are now clear in the countries affected. For example, in Indonesia the Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment Report (BAPPENAS/Donor Community January 2005) assesses the largest public sector damages to be in the infrastructure sectors. The total damage of the road network has been assessed at 1.7 trillion Rp. About 10 percent of the road network in Aceh Province has been damaged or about 316 kilometres of national and provincial roads, over 1900 kilometres of local roads and over 400 bridges. The following table shows an overview of the assessment of rural road damage at the district (Kabupaten) level. Table 1: Overview damage to rural road network in Aceh, Indonesia Districts Roads(km) Bridges(unit) Existing Damaged Percentages Existing Damaged Percentages ACEHBARAT 322 264 82% 76 43 57% ACEHBARATDAYA 75,5 18 23% 39 12 31% ACEHBESAR 379,5 105 28% 73 16 22% ACEHJAYA 176 124 70% 43 27 63% ACEHSELATAN 186,4 114 61% 144 40 28% ACEHSINGKIL 591 92 16% 47 6 13% NAGANRAYA 195 125 64% 30 7 23% 1.925 841 44% 452 151 33% Map 1 shows the extent of the damage in different sectors for one district in Aceh, Indonesia.
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The infrastructure sector in general is seen as a major facilitator in the reconstruction process. Without major investments in roads, water supplies, schools and health stations and housing the economic and social revival will not take place. The Government of Indonesia for example has defined three phases of this reconstruction process. The initial emergency phase in which basic necessities are provided such food, shelter and medical supplies and some input of funds in the form of emergency employment programmes lasted until May. In the second phase of rehabilitation some of the basic infrastructure will be restored. This will ensure that the basic needs of the Acehnese people will be met in terms of access to clean water, to decent shelter and to schools and health centers. This is expected to cover a period of 6-12 months. The final phase of reconstruction is intended not only to return the affected areas to a pre Tsunami situation but to provide the basis for the further development of the Province in economic, social and administrative terms. The reconstruction of the rural road network is part of this third phase although immediate activities are necessary to restore basic access as good as possible. These activities would fall under the emergency and rehabilitation phases. Map 1: Example Damage Assessment at Kabupaten level: Aceh Barat
The rehabilitation and reconstruction of the entire damaged road network would require a large number of skilled engineers, technicians and small-scale contractors. Currently, this skilled manpower is in short supply and a fast track training programme is needed to establish this capacity. The strategy suggests to quickly building up local capacity for implementing the required works. If labour-based technology would be used for example across Aceh Province, assuming a daily wage of USD 3.5 per day, it could generate an estimated 4 to 5 million work days.
OVERVIEW OF THE STRATEGY FOR THE REHABILITATION OF THE RURAL TRANSPORT SYSTEM
This paper outlines a strategy for restoring the rural road network. The main objective of the strategy is to rehabilitate the rural transport system and contribute towards the restoration of rural livelihoods and communities through labour-based infrastructure investments in the repair and rehabilitation of drainage structures, local roads, and small bridges. The main reason to emphasize on the adoption of labour-based technologies in rural road works is its huge employment potential. Employment creation is of critical importance in a situation wherein people have lost almost everything but their ability to work. Paramount to the intention of local income generation and enhanced work skills among the participating population however is the overall aim to restore the local road network to facilitate sustainable socioeconomic
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recovery in the affected areas. The strategy also aims at strengthening community institutions through participatory decision making processes in all aspects of the work. The strategy proposes to work through local governments and small-scale contractors and strengthen their capacity to partake in the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The latter will enhance the performance of the local construction industry through training, on-the-job and in a more formal setting, of small-scale contractors and technical guidance during implementation of physical works. The strategy responds to the main issues identified through recently completed assessments of the rural infrastructure and construction sector in Aceh and Sri Lanka and meets some of the intermediate and long term needs of the local people in terms of provision of infrastructure and production facilities which will enable them to recover their social and economic activities. Restoring rural access is a critical factor in the socio-economic recovery of the areas affected. Without adequate access to social and economic goods, facilities and services, communities will find it difficult to return to normal. Rural transport services may have ceased to exist due to the destruction of the rural road network, people will have lost their transport vehicles and accessibility has generally deteriorated. Improving the rural road network will restore the rural transport system, with traffic picking up again, transport and consumer prices falling and access to markets and income earning opportunities improving. Improving rural access will bring immediate and long-term social and economic benefits to the areas affected. Unemployment is another key concern. Efforts to address the vast needs of employment in the immediate and longer term is a central issue, which should be integrated in all reconstruction programs, in particular those related to the provision of infrastructure. Rebuilding and repairing the destroyed and damaged infrastructure involves a massive investment but also implies a huge employment potential. The promotion of employment-intensive practices will contribute to the restoration of livelihoods; greater capacity of the population to participate in the restoration works and improved accessibility to goods, facilities and services. The strategy encourages labour-based technology to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of rural infrastructure in the disaster area. It concentrates on the local rural road system. The same approach however could be extended to other forms of local infrastructure (small-scale irrigation, land development and rehabilitation of fish-ponds). Labour-based methods are most appropriate for reconstruction of secondary and tertiary roads rather than the main roads. From a more general local economic recovery point of view, the infrastructure reconstruction works will also help generate business opportunities for local enterprises. The mobilization of small scale contractors will contribute to the revival of the local economy. A great number of job seekers, in particular those who lost their livelihood during the disaster, can be absorbed during the reconstruction period, and when infrastructure has been reconstructed, there will be increased capacity in the construction sector to more effectively participate in the regions future development programs. As a result of the Tsunami, some government structures at the local level have suffered and their capacity to participate effectively in rural road reconstruction programmes has been greatly reduced. Improving the local government capacity to partake in the reconstruction process is an integral component of the strategy. The key to this proposed strategy is a well planned capacity building process, integrated within the reconstruction programs, where all actors and stakeholders are adequately involved and benefit from the program in such a way that they can better implement programs with improved planning and implementation management, and a better use of local resources, while fulfilling the local community needs. In short, the strategy will simultaneously contribute to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of rural roads, strengthen the capacity of local governments, small-scale contractors and communities and generate employment and income.
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The strategy is fully in line with Government policies and strategies in the areas affected. The Indonesian Governments strategy for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and North Sumatra for example is to recover the economy by creating job opportunities and productive assets. This has been expressed in the Master Plan recently prepared by its national planning agency BAPPENAS. The plan spells out the principles and approaches for rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Master Plan was officially launched on March 26. The Master Plan and an earlier report BAPPENAS/World Bank Notes for Reconstruction clearly show that the strategy would be fully in line with Government objectives. The documents state that: the infrastructure should therefore be both asset-creating and employment-creating. Fortunately, the basic guidelines and training materials already exist in Bahasa for this purpose and in the reconstruction phase, infrastructure can only be developed if institutional arrangements and capacity are in place and the concepts of participation, employment creation, development of local skills and local entrepreneurs, developed in the rehabilitation phase, would be strengthened in the reconstruction phase. Implementing the strategy would require international Technical Assistance (TA). The main type of TA intervention will be institutional development through training and on-site supervision of demonstration works. It may also be necessary to raise the awareness of local decision makers and communities about new techniques and technologies introduced.
IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

The strategy can be implemented through 3 different steps.
Step 1: Making Assessments The immediate needs in the disaster area are food, sanitation, shelter and medicines. It is critical however to address the recovery process as early as possible to mitigate the direct and indirect impacts of the disaster on rural livelihoods and the local economy. Planning the recovery process requires some basic data on the extent and impact of the disaster. A first step is to generate this information to effectively plan for the reconstruction of the areas affected.
During the assessment stage it is necessary to, as quickly as possible: Assess the damage to the rural road network Survey and calculate quantities of work Estimate the potential for employment creation Prepare documentation on the work mentioned above, which will form the basis for (i) the bill of quantities, (ii) an estimate of tools and equipment requirements, (iii) labour inputs and (iv) a cost estimate for the total works Make recommendations on how to recruit labour and secure the necessary tools and equipment, with an emphasis of securing most items locally Identify needs for site supervisory staff and make recommendations for initial training Identify local government institutions with which collaboration will be established (see step 3) Identify local contractors for project implementation (see step 3) Collection and compilation of information on the road network at the district level is not always an easy task. Usually road network inventories are not available or not updated. Little information is available on the extent of the destruction and impact on livelihoods. Initial assessments however should come up with quick results which will direct specific project interventions. The initial assessments will have to look into more detail into the rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks that will be required in the areas affected to restore the transport system. Road maps and road inventories need to be prepared to assess the extent of the road network, classification, damage inflicted, rehabilitation and reconstruction needs and priorities. Inventories need to be made on the ground of the technical characteristics of the rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks required for roads and bridges. These can then
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be used to identify the suitable techniques and any complementary light equipment that might be necessary. For example, while most of the international experience with labour-based road works has been with earth and gravel surfaced roads, there have been significant recent advances with more durable bitumen. Similar design innovations can be found with low cost bridges, especially those suitable for community level structures. This is important as most district roads in Aceh are or were black-top roads, while village roads are often gravel roads. Different roads need different technologies. The strategy seeks to optimize the use of labour during reconstruction works. It is therefore necessary to estimate the potential for employment creation through labour-based works based on the road network assessment. In Aceh, for example, it is estimated that, at a wage level of about USD 3 per day, a total of about 5 million work-days or 25,000 work-years could be created (defined as 200 workdays of 8 hours). A key problem in the areas affected by the disaster is the mobilisation of the necessary local support to rebuild the rural road network. Communities, contractors and local governments have all lost skilled people, capital and assets during the disaster. It is necessary to first assess the scale of this loss before planning a programme to strengthen capacity of local governments, small-scale contractors and community groups to implement the needed rural road works and contribute to the reconstruction process.
Step 2: Planning and Participation The reconstruction of the rural transport system must meet the immediate access and transport needs of the rural people. A planning process is needed whereby these needs can be swiftly identified. The process must be inclusive of the general needs of the community, and importantly reflect the needs of the poorest and most affected members. Access to essential social and economic services, and opportunities, are generally affected by the Tsunami. Improving access to health services, education, information, markets, water, employment and income earning opportunities are key factors in mitigating the effects of the crisis.
There has been an influx of goodwill and resources to the tsunami recovery programmes in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia. At this time there is not yet a planning or coordinating mechanism in place to assist the responsible authorities or the communities to guide this support to where it can achieve the greatest impact both in the short and medium term. Rural roads are part of this picture. It is necessary to have an integrated planning tool to quickly establish investment priorities. This tool should be able to set priorities across sectors and within sectors. The process of identification and prioritization of investment priorities should be participatory. Communities need to participate to express their concerns and perceived priorities. Local governments and technical line agencies should participate to discuss these priorities, coordinate activities and prepare action plans. Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning (IRAP) is a tool that produces comprehensive plans to improve the access situation for a community, an area, and/or a region. The planning process culminates in the creation of an Accessibility Action Plan (AAP) for a given administrative level. The AAP is based on a systematic consultative process with community informants, including leaders, vulnerable groups, responsible government authorities, and other stakeholders such as NGOs. It takes stock of the existing assets so that the repair and maintenance of these assets will be the first priority for investment. This is by far the best investment possible, especially when resources are constrained. It also avoids the production of wish lists for new assets while repair and maintenance of existing assets is neglected. It looks at the poverty levels among villages in the target areas. It estimates travel time, travel frequency and travel costs to social and economic activities. The AAP then prioritizes the needs for the different sectors, such as roads, water supply, health, education, markets. A detailed investment program is drawn up. Extensive use is made of special information tools and mapping for the presentation of the AAP. Experience has shown that the AAP is a useful tool for guiding investments that will increase accessibility, which in turn will have a beneficial effect on the potential for people to move out of poverty. There is usually considerable buy in by the stakeholders and investors. Critically the AAPs are a tool to link the governments development program with those that are being carried out from other sources and by other actors.
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IRAP is usually used in a normal development context. A reduced version of the process can be used in crisis situation to quickly identify priorities in a participatory manner. The strategy adopts this sanitized version of the IRAP process to develop AAPs for tsunami affected communities. The AAPs will be formulated at the district level. These AAPs will be the central tools to guide immediate investments in infrastructure and will be also useful for the longer-term reconstruction programmes. The investments identified will include rural roads. Rural roads however will not be planned in isolation of the other infrastructure needed. The outcome of the planning exercise is a list of rural road priorities.
Step 3: Implementation Implementing the strategy starts with the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the rural road network. Special consideration will be given to the technology and involvement of small-scale contractors and local governments. Labour-based technology Tragically, the huge loss of life, number of displaced persons, and physical damage are the most obvious indicators, but crucially these translate into lost or severely impacted livelihoods. The rehabilitation and reconstruction processes that have been instituted by the different governments with support of the donor community are thus equally about replacing physical assets and the rebuilding of livelihoods and communities. It is possible to combine these aspects by using an employment intensive investment or labour-based approach to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of physical infrastructure wherever this is economically and technically feasible. Such an approach provides local people with the vital benefit of income and, because it uses participatory methods of decision making, assists in the process of community re-generation. The implementation of physical labour-based works can be done by small-scale local contractors supervised by local government units. Investment in infrastructure thus becomes both asset and employment creating, and assists the process of strengthening the local construction industry, capacity building of local governments and community development. Above all, it creates the much needed local short-term employment and injects cash in the local communities.
It should be noted that in the districts affected most severely by the Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were generally those with poverty levels above the national average even before the Tsunami. Both, affected people and poor people who were not directly affected by the tsunami will have an opportunity to participate in the labour-based works. This will expand the inclusiveness of the reconstruction program for those directly affected as well as the poor people in the area. The rural roads works needs to be based on existing specifications and standards available from the relevant line ministries and government authorities. In case the existing specifications and standards do not allow for labour-based works, then approval needs to be sought from government for the use of more appropriate designs and standards that favour the use of labour-based technology. Cash-for-work projects are widely used to provide immediate income for the population affected. The main objective here is to distribute cash. In the immediate recovery phase following a crisis this could focus on the removal of debris blocking the roads and, to the extent possible, improve the transport system to distribute aid and kick-start the local economy again. It is important here to differentiate community and public works and labour-intensive and labour-based technology. Community works are works that create assets or reconstruct assets that serve a particular community and address their priorities exclusively. Community works could include such activities as improving the local environment through tree planting and soil conservation measures. The ownership of the outputs is held by the community rather than a line Ministry or some other Government Organization.
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Community contracting is a preferred modality for implementation of infrastructure works in Sri Lanka. In Aceh, community contracting is not preferred as an implementation modality for rural roads as it undermines the construction markets for local contractors. Communities often lack the necessary technical skills which could compromise the quality of works. Community contracting however is used in Indonesia on a large scale for building community infrastructure. Public Works are carried out on district infrastructure and will frequently benefit more than one community. A common example of public works is a road improvement project. The asset belongs to the government and thus to the public, not to the village or community. Labour-Intensive technology relies primarily on labour and hand-tools only. In this context, their use addresses immediate social protection needs by means of short term employment through which essential infrastructure works can be implemented, albeit restricted to a narrow range of works. The main objective is to create employment while the construction of infrastructure is often of secondary importance Labour-Based technology offers an optimal use of labour accompanied by equipment in a cost-effective manner, and to the required quality, thus creating a shift in balance between labour and equipment in the way the work is specified and executed. The use of labour-based methods will assist in addressing immediate job creation needs, but also in the longer-term be applied to recurrent works under regular budgets of the infrastructure Ministries. By shifting wisely and carefully from the current conventional equipment-based work methods to more labour-based approaches for selected works components, it will be possible to create significant numbers of jobs and reduce poverty in a sustainable manner without compromising on the quality of the works and without affecting the timeliness and cost of the works. This strategy recommends the use of labour-based technology on public works (rural roads). In support of the employment goals of the reconstruction strategies in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, a high level of labour-intensity in the works to be carried out is desirable, but as the cleaning-up operations reduce and reconstruction increases, the labour-intensity of the activities will automatically reduce.
Small-scale Contractors Works on roads and associated structures (bridges, culverts, drainage channels) can be implemented by the use of small-scale contractors. Using the private sector to carry out this work will be a stimulus for strengthening and expanding the local small-scale contracting industry. Small-contractors can be equally instrumental in securing the short and long term employment gains from labour-based rural road works.
There is often reluctance to include small contractors on the part of the local authorities due to a concern regarding their performance and potential deviation from standards. Local contractors however can be very cost effective, as they are most likely to practice labour-based techniques combined with local resources, thereby generating a multiplier effect for the local economy. The strategy suggests working with and through small-scale contractors and developing their skills to administer and implement labour-based works. This will contribute to the strengthening of the local construction industry. Small-scale contracting is an effective mechanism for works implementation and will be a focus of training activities to raise their skill levels and improve working conditions for labour. Although there is a clear need and potential for capacity building of small scale contractors, it should be realized that an isolated attempt to create capacity through training only, without paying attention to the long term framework that sustains the efforts, is most likely not effective. Training materials need to be developed that can be inserted into a larger scale programme or used by other donors and reconstruction programmes. In Aceh, before the Tsunami, many local contractors depended solely on government work, which resulted in a tight, and eventually unhealthy, competition between local contractors. The number of registered contractors (before the Tsunami struck) was around 3,500, of which about 93% represent small-scale contractors. The Tsunami impacted on the industry as follows:
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many contractors lost their lives, lost family members or close relatives which causes moral and psychological problems loss of assets as contractors lost their homes, offices, construction plants, equipment, data loss of skilled human resources such as managerial, technical, skilled trades. loss of financial networks and reduction in capacity and competitiveness
There will be insufficient private sector capacity to implement the rehabilitation and reconstruction works. It is necessary to consider measures to strengthen the private sector capacity. Early investigation of the availability of local small scale contractors in Aceh confirmed that there are only a limited number of local experienced entrepreneurs who could be involved in labour-based reconstruction projects. Because of the massive havoc created by the Tsunami, a large construction market has opened up. Increased contracting opportunities now exist for a small-scale contracting industry that has reduced in size. Appropriate action should be undertaken to help existing contractors to recover and new contractors to enter and utilize the opportunities created by the enlarged market. This would help to re-establish a strong and healthy local construction industry. It is important to identify the immediate training needs of small-scale contractors to involve them as soon as possible. In Aceh, a workshop was organized to assess the immediate training needs of small-scale contractors. ILO has some standard crash courses to train small-scale contractors in technical issues related to labourbased technology and in simple small business management. These training modules have been translated in local languages and can be used immediately.
Local Governments Local governments in the disaster affected areas have been severely affected and needs to be strengthened. Support to the local government to manage the tsunami response is amongst the priorities to be addressed. The support will have two dimensions in relation to improving the rural road network. One is to strengthen the local planning and coordination capacity of the local government. The second is to strengthen the technical capacity of the relevant local government staff to ensure that the implementation is carried out to the appropriate standards.
It is necessary to implement a quick training needs assessment to identify training and capacity building needs for rural road development at local government level. This is an important issue. Local government capacity in the affected areas was already poor before the disaster hit. The Tsunami has made matters worse and has reduced the capacity further. There is a need for simple tender documents to accommodate labour-based technology and small-scale contractors. Usually the tender documents used by national government agencies are too complex. Local governments could be assisted to simplify the bidding documents and tender process to facilitate the use of labour-based technology in rural road rehabilitation and reconstruction. The rural road demonstration projects should equally be implemented in collaboration with local governments to re-establish local capacity to improve, rehabilitate and maintain rural roads using labourbased approaches. Local government staff most likely would need immediate training in: - project management - procurement process - bid evaluation - contract administration, monitoring, evaluation and reporting
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In Indonesia, the ILO has been supporting the Government in developing courses on rural infrastructure development covering the fields of planning, implementation and contracting. These courses are now being modified for use in a crisis situation.
Maintenance and Sustainability In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka there was already a great backlog of investments in several infrastructure sectors, particularly in the road sector. This has arisen due to the lack of investment in upgrading the infrastructure, and the accumulated affects of neglected maintenance.
As stated earlier, it is important that the infrastructure is rehabilitated or reconstructed based on certain standards. A potential problem that will emerge if the infrastructure is not carried out to adequate standards is that the local governments are left with a stock of assets that they are unable to maintain. This would mean that the current investments would again deteriorate to a poor condition. Several quick assessments of the road network in Banda Aceh, Sigli and Meulaboh districts in Indonesia showed large differences in the quality of the road network. Although some of the damage to these road networks was inflicted by the Tsunami, other damage was the result of the poor quality of the initial construction and a lack of maintenance. For the reconstruction in the affected areas to be successful it is important the quality of the assets created is of an acceptable level. This will require capacity building activities to improve quality control at local government level. It will also however require improved budget control. Equally, it is necessary to develop a maintenance culture and a capacity to maintain the assets in the future. Although the issues identified here are not directly related to the Tsunami response, paying the necessary attention is required for the reconstruction efforts to be successful. If a maintenance culture is absent, it is likely that rural roads will not be maintained after they have been rehabilitated or reconstructed. This will again result in a gradual loss of assets.
CAPACITY BUILDING
The subject of capacity building has been addressed in this paper. It is however important at this point to reiterate the importance of capacity building in a crisis situation. Particularly in the aftermath of a devastating event like the Tsunami there are inadequate capacities at all levels to plan, coordinate, implement, supervise, monitor quality standards and evaluate rural infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. The key to the strategy described in this paper is a well planned capacity building process, integrated if possible within existing reconstruction programs. In the short-term, training should become one of the most important elements in the recovery efforts. Although unskilled labour makes up most of the labour component in labour-based works, there is a need for skilled labour as well. Due to the lives lost and the sudden increase in construction activities, there is a shortage of manpower in skilled construction works. Demonstration projects can be useful not only to demonstrate the impact of the approach but also to gradually build up this capacity and strengthen the local construction industry. In Aceh Besar, Indonesia, it was decided to initially reconstruct 5 kilometres of rural road per municipality, with 5 different local contractors, each having responsibility for a stretch of 1 kilometre only. Works are closely supervised by local government officials who are trained on the job. These labour-based works will provide skills and experience which will continue to be of use in the longer-term programmes of labour-based works. In terms of training and capacity building it is important that these are tailored to the specific and immediate needs. In the aftermath of the crisis all available technical staff is occupied with a variety of task
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and no time and resources should be wasted on training which is not directly related to the rebuilding efforts. Usually it is effective to link training activities directly to the implementation of works. Equally important is to keep the courses short and limit training to fast-track courses. In Aceh, it is estimated that a fast-track training programme is required for an estimated 50 engineers and 250 technicians on the higher technical aspects of rural road construction for overall quality insurance through improved design as well as direct engineering support and improved monitoring and evaluation. Training should preferably be conducted in close collaboration with the training institutes of the Ministries and existing educational institutions. Other organisations and projects will benefit from the capacity building efforts. The ILO is not a large scale implementer of rural road projects. It will limit itself to demonstration and training projects. The capacity established can be transferred to other larger scale programmes implemented with large scale grants or loans disbursed under the different Trust Funds set up in the affected areas. Training should be provided in Basic Engineering Skills, Project Management and Project Supervision.
Basic Engineering Skills: During rural infrastructure construction many specific tasks need to be performed. Skills related to clearing, earthworks, embankment construction, ditching, sloping and camber formation, off-road drainage, pavement, compaction, culvert construction, drift construction, gravelling, erosion protection and soil stabilization will in varying degree be needed. Many of these tasks will allow the use of labour-based work methods in order to maximize the employment impact. Although not all skills are of equal importance, it is nevertheless deemed important that contractors, technicians and local government staff are trained in the various tasks. Project Management Besides the above mentioned technical skills, to ensure a timely, cost effective construction in line with the quality specified, proper works organization is needed. This typically involves the proper setting up of a camp, the timely and efficient supply, maintenance and storage of tools and materials, maintenance of equipment, and site support activities. It also involves the proper accounting of a project, timely payments and other administrative tasks to be fulfilled. Again, contractors, technicians and local government staff need to be trained in these various tasks. Project Supervision Work programming is needed to arrange and distribute the construction works between the gangs of workers in such a way that the best use is made of the available labour, material, tools and equipment. Labour needs to be recruited and employed for which various incentive schemes exist. This relates to issues like Daily Paid Work, Task Work, Group Tasks, Piece Work, Payment in Kind and Task Rates. Finally, Inspection and Supervision of the works need to be done. Contractors, technicians and local government staff need training in these various tasks.
TARGET GROUPS AND PARTNERS

The key stakeholders are the affected people, local government institutions, small-scale local contractors and the Public Works Ministries in the disaster area. The strategy is to rehabilitate and reconstruct rural roads, drainage structures and small bridges through labour-based public works. The approach will work through local contractors and local governments and strengthen their capacity for planning, implementing and supervising labour-based rural road rehabilitation and reconstruction. The approach is participatory approach and will train individual community members in specific construction-related skills. These members could, if successful, emerge as petty contractors.
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The ultimate target group of course are the people whose livelihoods have been destroyed or seriously impaired by the disaster. For many of the affected population the main, and often only, resource they currently possess is their labour. Unless they are able to exploit this for monetary gain then the process of recovery will necessarily be very slow. Some of the affected population also seem determined to seek new occupations because of the perceived danger of that they use to pursue (e.g. fishermen), or due to the irreplaceable loss of their agricultural land. Others wish to relocate away from the immediate area of the coast because of the trauma experienced. Thus, the opportunity to acquire new work skills as well as financial capital will enhance their future livelihood prospects. As described above, the main means of ensuring that the benefits resulting from rehabilitation and reconstruction reach the intended beneficiaries is by participatory prioritisation of investments using community institutions, and the adoption of technologies that maximise the use of local labour and other local resources and generation of income without compromising the quality of the resulting infrastructure.
THE ILO AND CRISIS RESPONSE

The ILO has established an international reputation for its work on local resource-based including labourbased investment approaches to the sustainable rehabilitation and reconstruction of physical infrastructure, including in crisis response situations. Through its Advisory Support, Information Services and Training Asia-Pacific Programme (ILO ASIST-AP), it has been assisting various governments in the region in developing and implementing approaches, strategies and programmes for sustainable rural infrastructure development. This work concentrates on the development of guidelines, manuals and training materials on participatory rural infrastructure planning, labour-based technology, small-scale contracting and sustainable rural road maintenance systems. After the tsunami struck, ILO was quick in re-allocating its own funds to initiate some of this work in Sri Lanka and Indonesia1. The available resources were used to establish small local teams on the ground and to identify immediate needs and develop proposals on how to respond to these needs both in terms of the planning and implementation of rural infrastructure (and in particular rural roads) and the mechanisms through which the real needs of the people can be integrated in future infrastructure works. The strategy described in this short paper forms the basis for current and future work of the ILO in rural infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction in the crisis-affected areas in the region. Training and capacity building are an integral and essential component of the strategy. Whatever mode of implementation and supervision is used, training in the required skills and management procedures is necessary to guarantee the security of benefits and improve the quality of the roads to be rehabilitated or rebuilt. The ILO has extensive international experience in the relevant fields and has developed training manuals for: (i) participatory planning and identification of infrastructure priorities; (ii) labour-based work technologies; (iii) small scale contracting; and (iv) maintenance. For (iii) and (iv) separate training manuals are available for government administrators and contractors. The existing guidelines and training materials are currently being adopted for use in Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The ILO will also see to it that the principles of decent work are applied in all construction activities. These relate to issues such as the payment of minimum wages, equal pay and opportunities for men and women, health and safety issues, elimination of child labour.
REFERENCES
The work is partly supported by a small grant from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida).
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Proposal for Scaling-up Labour-based Rural Road Rehabilitation and Construction in Aceh, Indonesia ILO ASIST AP 2005. The Creation of 50,000 Job Opportunities through Labour-based Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Works Dr. Akhmad Suraji ILO ASIST AP 2005. Concept Paper ILO Sri Lanka 2005. Rapid Income Recovery Program Cash for Work Component ILO/UNOPS Colombo 2005. First Quarterly Report of the Labour-based Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project Paul Munters ILO ASIST 2005. ILO Contribution to the Aceh Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery Programme (ERTR) of the United Nations Development Programme ILO 2005. Stage 1 Report on Assessment of Small Scale Contracting Scheme for Rural Road Construction in NAD Province, Krishna S. Pribadi, ILO 2005. Aceh Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation: Empowering Local Communities and Government through Rebuilding of Infrastructure ILO 2005.
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LOGISTICS PROBLEMS IN RECOVERY ASSISTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE & TSUNAMI DISASTER; Hanaoka, S. and Qadir, F.M.
LOGISTICS PROBLEMS IN RECOVERY ASSISTANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI DISASTER
Shinya Hanaoka1) and Fayyaz M. Qadir1)
1)
Transportation Engineering, School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand. E-mail of Corresponding author: hanaoka@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
The challenges faced by professionals due to Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami ranges from evacuation of people to the sustainable rehabilitation of the tsunami affected areas. As this huge disaster affected twelve countries, an effective logistics system for recovery of tsunami affected area is required. This paper will show the logistics problems that occurred during recovery and relief phase of Tsunami Disaster. Beyond the transport bottlenecks, greatest barrier remained a lack of the sort of coordination for the relief works. This will also lead to different techniques and methods to solve logistics problems in an efficient manner by identifying and filling bottlenecks (e.g., with bilateral military assets) through organizations coordination. Systematic review of key elements of national transport infrastructure (port, road, rail and air) such as capacities and constraints on strategic routes, key bottlenecks due to hazard impact at a regular time interval; can be done by making use of Geographic Information System and Remote Sensing tools. This real time information enhances capabilities of relief emergency logistics.
INTRODUCTION
On 26th of December, 2004 an undersea earthquake occurred in Indian Ocean caused for generation of the deadliest tsunami in the history affecting twelve countries along Indian Ocean; required an effective logistics system from the evacuation of people to the sustainable rehabilitation. The Emergency or Relief Logistics is the basic task of a logistics system: to deliver the appropriate supplies, in good condition, in the quantities required, and at the places and the time they are needed. Relief Logistics encompass the relocation of disaster affected people, transfer of casualties, and the movement of relief workers [Stephenson, 1993]. The logistics tasks involve integrated and coordinated performance from widely scattered groups of skilled specialists, because 1) Tsunami disaster generates a limited need for very rapid and very specific deliveries from outside the area, 2) Management challenges to find ways to limited prioritize relief inputs (barrier to move important deliveries) and 3) Tsunami and Earthquake disasters demand for logistics services related to rehabilitation of services, debris clearances, and the movement of material and resources for reconstruction. The objectives of this study are 1) to focus world attention that logistics is the largest and the most complex element of relief operations and 2) to realize that overall effectiveness of disaster logistics depends on the level of prior investment in both the transport and communications infrastructure.
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LOGISTICS PROBLEMS IN RECOVERY ASSISTANCE

Capacity There are very few transport companies in the east of Sri Lanka. Those which can offer one to five trucks are usually engaged in other businesses for which the use of these trucks is necessary [UNJLC, 2005b]. In response of survey 94% of respondents replied that they encountered problems due to poor infrastructure. The tsunami destroyed most coastal roads in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Many locations were only accessible via helicopters. In survey, 76% of respondents said their organizations used air transport exclusively to access the area [Fritz Institute, 2005]. Tsunami affected areas have faced capacity lack in physical and economic infrastructure due to which formation of transport bottlenecks at sea ports and airports have been seen. Lack of secure warehouses in the affected areas produced piling of commodities at airports due to which difficulties arose in handling of commodities. The shortage of fuel occurred right in the start of recovery due to which recovery process was delayed. Damage Caused by Disaster In Aceh 2,000 km of roads and more than 4 km of bridge need to be made passable again. The tsunami destroyed 230 km of road, and 2,788 m of bridges require reconstruction, with about 130 km of roads almost completely washed out. In addition to that, rehabilitation will need to cover 1,930 km of roads and 4,348 m of bridges. Total nine seaports and ferry ports required reconstruction and rehabilitation. The air transport system sustained most damage in Sabang, Banda Aceh, and Meulaboh [World Bank, 2005]. The delay in execution of recovery process in the affected areas was contributed by flooding and destruction of telecommunication. Coordination Frequent duplication and lack of coordination within and among the supply chains of organizations was obvious due to which most of the severe affected areas have been neglected for two to three weeks. In survey, only 58% of organizations used logisticians in their assessment teams, a reason why some of the logistics bottlenecks were not anticipated and planned for accordingly. While 77% of organizations worked with local authorities, 69% worked with the military, and 77% worked with the private sector, only 56% reported working with other agencies in setting up their supply chains [Fritz Institute, 2005]. Politics Control of large amount of food confers political influence. Institutions and groups tend for access to commodity distribution chain (divert foods and delay shipment for weeks). At local level the highly influenced bodies have created a lot of problems in commodities distribution. In conducted survey, 71% of respondents encountered some delays due to customs and it was seen as a bottleneck in both Indonesia and at a later point in Sri Lanka. In Indonesia, the problem stemmed from the customs procedures that were inconsistent and constantly changing [Fritz Institute, 2005]. Security A foreign aid worker from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was shot by unknown assailants near Lam No, about 80 km south of Banda Aceh. Seismic activities continue in Aceh and Nias regions [UNJLC, 2005a]. Most of the affected areas were neglected by respective governments that created inferiority due to which relief vehicles, relief workers and supply centers may be attacked. Similarly the closure of routes and damage to bridges may discourage local contractors to participate in recovery.
LOGISTICAL DECISIONS FOR RECOVERY

Strategic Level Decisions having long lasting effect like social and economic impacts [Simchi-Levi et. al., 2003]. Development programs in the transport sector can aid both immediate relief and long term economic recovery after disaster. Strategic redundancy should be built into the transport system so as to provide for alternative means of access when some links or modes are disrupted by either natural or security related hazards. Specific considerations
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include: retention of both eastern and western arterial road links and the pace for reconstruction of the west coast road, upgrading of inland alternative road routes, the standard and capacity of the ports and airports, etc. According to USAID/DART (USAID, 2005), the key to ensuring continued progress is to establish sustainable sea- and land-based logistical networks. Emergency repairs to road and sea infrastructure will ensure continuous access to relief supply routes during the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases. Logistics training programs should be promoted at governmental and regional level who can be deployed on short notice and must be able to create common processes, standardization and vocabulary across organizations.
Operational Level Refers to day to day decisions [Simchi-Levi et. al., 2003] like scheduling, routing and loading trucks, sea based assets, and cargo planes. Effective daily operations can be possible through daily data regarding commodities supply, demand in field, routes conditions, transport availability, etc.
Fig. 1: Mode Choice and Routing Operations for Indonesia
KEY ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

UN Peace Keeping Military Involvement The involvement of UN peace keeping military is effective to identify and fill bottlenecks and gaps in supply chain because military campaign have the advantage of a time table and target. Use of military transport aircrafts to move bulk relief supplies for inaccessible areas by any other mode can save many lives.
As of January 24, more than 11,400 U.S. military personnel are involved in providing relief support in the affected region (USAID, 2005). Of the 2,787 military personnel currently on the ground, 1,724 are in Thailand, 698 in Sri Lanka, 197 in Indonesia, 56 in Malaysia, and 12 in Maldives. With 15 ships and 63 aircraft, the US military has delivered a total of 6,283,445 lbs of relief supplies to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
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Thailand, and other affected nations, including 37,438 gallons of water; 133,708 lbs of food; and 47,890 lbs of relief supplies in the last 24 hours.
Mathematical Models, Simulations and Algorithms Develop a planning model to be integrated into a natural disaster logistics Decision Support System. It addresses the dynamic time-dependent transport problem that needs to be solved repetitively at given time intervals during ongoing aid delivery. It regenerates plans incorporating new requests for aid materials, new supplies and transport means that become available during the current planning time horizon. The plan indicates the optimal mixed pick up and delivery schedules for vehicles within the considered planning time horizon as well as the optimal quantities and types of loads picked up and delivered on these routes.
In conducted survey, only 26% of the respondents had access to software that provided track and trace capabilities to anticipate the receipt of procured goods in the field. The majority of organizations relied on homegrown technologies, solutions using Excel spreadsheets or manual processes for tracking goods in the field [Fritz Institute, 2005].
GIS and Communication Network Humanitarian organizations have a common need for integrated information technology solutions that support procurement, distribution through a pipeline, tracking and tracing of goods and funds, flexible and robust reporting and connectivity in the field. Developing flexible technology solutions can improve responsiveness by creating visibility of the materials pipeline as well as enable organizations to retain and transfer knowledge in a systematic way. Furthermore, technology can assist organizations to standardize internal processes which will increase the effectiveness of people and facilitate coordination. In survey conducted, 83% of organizations communicated via cellular or satellite phone for the first days of the relief operation and within a week 50% of organizations communicated via email. During the collaboration theater however, 81% of organizations experienced communication issues. Based on input from the field this was in large part due to cellular systems not being able to handle the increased volume of usage on their networks [Fritz Institute, 2005].
National Remote Sensing Agency Maps, based on Satellite remote sensing evaluation by GIS is one of an important real time response to crisis situations for effective recovery operations and as a decision support tool for disaster management. Communication Networks involving radio, radio-telex, and satellite links like satellite phones should be adopted to update real time information for recovery operations in disaster affected areas
Coordination Logistic bottlenecks clear with better coordination within and among organizations at central and local level both. Transparent and easy access to real time information for every participating organization should be assessable. The challenge will be to translate these resources into results on the ground and to coordinate this multitude of actors around a common vision for the recovery of the people in Aceh and North Sumatra [UNDP, 2005].
Disaster logistics requires certain tasks that should be grouped together in organizational units like director management, central support function, calling forwarding supplies, port clearance, operation of warehouses, feasible transport and transport operation support, scheduling and operation planning and management, commodity control and control of terminal distribution to beneficiaries; most important is that all these tasks must be controlled by a single individual management unit. The responsibilities of different actors in a coordinated disaster system should contain the followings: Relief Organization: should be liable for demand forecast, report of deliveries and plan of deliveries for current period, all by region and by product category Host Government: should provide infrastructure information, access by water, district level organization, availability of local warehouse, etc.
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The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency has also played a key role in resolving bottlenecks facing NGOs and other implementing agencies in the field, for example setting up a one-stop shop for visas and obtaining clearance papers for approximately 1,300 containers that were held up at Belawan port [World Bank, 2005]. Vendor: should serve for price and shipping information in existing conditions Logistics Service: should be responsible for delivery fleet, location, mode type and pricing data Application Service: should maintain data base, information transparency and work flow engine
CONCLUSION
The unpredictability of global emergencies (e.g., Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami) and the stakes of adequate and timely delivery dominate the uniqueness and challenge of managing material flow in the humanitarian relief chain, which can be successfully possible through coordination among various involved agencies, by hiring logistics professionals and by using the advanced communication technologies. GIS gives better real time response for effective recovery operations and performs well as a decision support tool for disaster management.
REFERENCE
Fritz Institute (2005) Logistics and the effective delivery of humanitarian relief 2005. San Francisco, US. Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky, P., Simchi-Levi, E., (2003) Designing & Managing the Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies & Case Studies, 2nd ed. McgrawHill, New York. Stephenson, R.S. (1993) Logistics; Disaster Management Training Programme (1st ed.). UN Development Programme (UNDP) & UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). pp.9. United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) (2005) Indonesia: Notes on Reconstruction 2005, The Consultative Group on Indonesia. United Nation Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) (2005a) Indonesia: UNJLC Bulletin No. 45 Indian Ocean Tsunami Operation. Retrieved May 2005, from http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6E9C86?OpenDocument United Nation Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) (2005b) United Nation Joint Logistics Centre field assessment Jan 2005, Sri Lanka. United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005) Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis, Fact Sheet #25. World Bank (2005) Rebuilding a better Aceh and Nias, News Release No:535/EAP. Retrieved May 2005, from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/INDONESI AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20559150~menuPK:224605~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:22630 9,00.html
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SUSTAINABLE REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN TSUNAMI AFFECTED AREAS IN SRI LANKA; Wickramarachchi, B.
SUSTAINABLE REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN TSUNAMI AFFECTED AREAS IN SRI LANKA

Bandula Wickramarachchi Research & Design Division, Department of Coast Conservation, 4th Floor, New Secretariat, Maligawatta, Colombo 10, Sri Lanka E-mail of Corresponding author: bwickramarachchi@fisheries.gov.lk, engwicky@sltnet.lk
ABSTRACT
Since the countrys development has been closely related to maritime activities with the growth of human settlements in the coastal zone, Cost Conservation Department was established as the prime government agency for Coastal Issues and the Coastal Zone Management Plan has been developed to address the coastal problems. Coastal setbacks and regulation for the development activities were introduced as a management tool. But no scientist was realized about any threat to the country by Tsunami. Along shore massive development and dense population raised the Tsunami damages to very high figures. The lack of knowledge about Tsunami and the poor building construction practices were other key factors. Just after the Tsunami, the government fixed the 100m setback along the coastal belt. It has become a controversial issue and the Opposition has taken the leadership for opposing the 100m and the tourism, and fishing sectors followed. The government were able to manage and develop the plans for each sector which are operating in the costal zone. The government realises the necessity of comprehensive coastal vulnerability assessment and risk analysis for the sustainable development of the coastal zone. Housing and resettlements have become a great task. Evacuation supported Type Plans and other development criteria have been developed. The coastal community loves the natural environment than before. They felt the importance of natural environment against natural disaster.
INTRODUCTION
The last Tsunami hits the Sri Lankan coast, creating vast damage than never before. Nearly 75% of the coastal zone was washed away. Sri Lankan had no experience for this type of coastal hazard and they never expected. The Tsunami hits not only the coastal sector but also the whole Sri Lankan economy. Sri Lankan have great task to rebuild the coastal sector and the nation to the better than before. Since the Tsunami washed all the ad-hock development, the government could consider the disaster as an opportunity for developing the coastal zone in sustainable manner. Though the Sri Lanka was in well advanced in the region, in the sense of coastal zone management, the Tsunami shows that there were big gaps in the previous plans. Identification of the reasons, for the high figured damage, on the scientific platform, are very useful in developing the sector in secure and sustainable manner. Evaluation of the coastal resource profile in socially, economically and environmentally, with the modern technologies, shall direct to create best values for the coastal zone. Element of natural environment and there features are the best applications in natural disaster management and risk mitigation.
PRE-TSUNAMI SITUATION
Coastal Zone Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean, which is having nearly 1620 km long shoreline. The countrys history was begun with the civilization centralized in the interior. In the last five centuries, following the
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foreign occupation, the countrys development has been closely related to maritime activities with the growth of human settlements in the coastal zone. The coastal region presently covers 74 Divisional Secretaries Divisions, and it contains about 25% of the total Population 23% of the islands Land area 285 km2 Municipal and Urban lands 70% of Tourist Hotels Major Highways and Railways 88% of the Fish production 62% of Industrial Units Very productive Habitat
Coast Conservation Coastal problems were realized far back in 1920 with related to the coastal erosion, and to counter act with the coastal erosion, coast protection division was started in the Ports Authority. In 1981 Cost Conservation Department (CCD) was established by the parliament act No. 57 of 1981 as the prime government agency in Sri Lanka for Coastal Issues. Though there are enough central and local agencies/institutions for the planning and management of the coastal zone and the resources, still the CCD is the unique agency, either government or non-government, responsible for the shoreline Management.
The Coast Conservation act is an act to make provision for survey of the coastal zone and the preparation of a coastal zone management plan; to regulate and control development activities within the coastal zone; to make provision for the formulation and execution of schemes of work for coast conservation within the coastal zone; to make consequential amendments to certain written lows; and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. By the act, Coastal Zone means that the area lying within a limit of 300m landwards of Mean High Water line and a limit of 2km seawards of the Mean Low Water line and in the case of rivers , streams, lagoons, or any other body of water connected to the sea either permanently or periodically, the landward boundary shall extend to 2km measured perpendicular to the straight base line drawn between the natural entrance points thereof and shall include the waters of such rivers, streams and lagoons or any other body of water so connected to the sea.
Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) First Coastal Zone Management Plan was developed in 1990, addressing most critical coastal problems such as coastal erosion, coastal pollution, degradation of coastal resources and environment etc., and it was revised in 1997. The next revision was in 2004, and it is still on the discussion table. Coastal setbacks and regulation for the development activities were introduced by the plan as a management tool. But unfortunately no scientist was realized about any threat to the coastal zone of country by Tsunami.
HIGH FIGURES OF TSUNAMI DAMAGE

Physical Features and Hydrodynamics The near shore wave characteristics of the Tsunami wave depends on the sea bathymetry and shore profiles. The maximum height will achieve with the shoaling of the wave. Just after the shoaling, it will act as a flood and therefore the ground elevations will be a key factor. North and East lands of the country are less in elevation and then the more than one km area were inundated. But some areas in the south, the near shore profiles are very steep, and hence the sea bottom is somewhat deep. This has formed high water depths at the shoaling, resulting vast damages. Magnitude of the Coastal Zone At the last Tsunami, along shore massive developments, including major infrastructure and the dense population, raised the damage to very high figures. Fishing and Tourism are the two major economical activities in the coastal region and both are operated mainly with onshore activities and /or in the hider
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lands. Though the setbacks were introduced through the CZMP, there were some developments against the low and most of them were very close to the shore. Structures, constructed before the lows enforced, were also kept unchanged.
Awareness The lack of knowledge about Tsunami wave was another key factor. Though there were many awareness programs conducted annually, no Tsunami matters were discussed. Coastal erosion, and other coastal environmental matters were introduced to the School Curriculum and no Tsunami was considered. Those, who followed the Geology in the schools, were aware of the Tsunami, but no risk to the island. Day after Christmas Since the day 26th December is a well known holiday, and is in the school vacation, most of the people are on their recreation at coastal areas. Thousands odd people are on pilgrims to Katharagama on coastal highways. But if it was not in the school vacation, most of school childrens lives would have to be taken by the Tsunami at their schools along the coastal belt. Building Standards There were no specialized building standards developed for the coastal zone. Since most of the coastal lands in the country are accreted lands with coastal sands. The waves over the sandy lands generate eddies with the presence of structures. At the last Tsunami those eddies washed the sand beneath the foundations and it was the major reason for the building failures. Majority of the houses were not constructed to the general standards, mostly due to the negligence and high costs. Even some of the buildings constructed to the basic standard were not able to withstand to the forces induced by the Tsunami wave.
POST-TSUNAMI REHABILITATION
100/200 m Setbacks Just after the Tsunami, the government of Sri Lanka have introduced the 100/200m setbacks along the coastal belt. The town planners, who were taken the leading role, assessed the damages and introduced two setbacks. The inundated areas were higher in East and North coastline due to flatness and low elevations of coastal lands, and hence the setback is 200m. (But also the direct wave hit on the East and North Coasts). The west and south coasts are somewhat higher in elevation and the inundated areas were lower, and hence the setback is 100m.
Since the government and other agencies are releasing loans/aids for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged properties and socio-economic activities, only on the conformation of the developments which are laying out side the setback, the setback clearances are been able to maintain up to some extent. However the 100/200m setback has become a controversial issue and many discussions were held on it. Opposition has taken the leadership for opposing the 100/200m setback and the tourism, and fishing sectors followed. The Department of Survey has demarcated the setback boundaries all over the island with the consultation of Department of Coast Conservation (CCD) and Urban Development Authority (UDA). The CCD was in practice of multiple setbacks for different coastal sectors, which were categorized on physical, social, economical and environmental reasons and for most sectors the setback were less than 100m. With the directions of several consultation committees and series of discussions and meetings the 2004 revision of CZMP has been proposed to amend with the government decision, providing the possibility of future amendments on following the studies. Socio-economic study to justify the suitability of multiple setbacks or uniform setback Preparation of Building criteria for the Coastal Zone etc. Preparation of Coastal Zone Risk Maps through Coastal Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis The socio-economic study has already been started.
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Buildings and Human Settlements The proposals of building criteria for the coastal zone have already been prepared with the collaboration of many Engineering Institutions. CCD shall justify the adoptability of the same and can be implemented through the permit procedure, which is already implemented for the developments within the coastal zone. Housing for the lost houses and relocation become a great task. However the town planners are running for identification of suitable lands for them. In the resettlement programs ethnic, cultural and religious matters are the most concerned areas. Evacuation Supported Type Plans for both in the land parcelling and in construction of buildings, mainly for the housing sector, have been developed. Coastal Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis The project proposals have already been prepared and submitted for the funds, for the comprehensive Coastal Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis. The project will take six years in two stages. The probable waves around Sri Lankan seas will be modelled on the physical shoreline characteristics (bathymetry, land elevations, shoreline parameters etc.) for determining the coastal risk and their magnitudes. Long term study will be deployed for the assessment of the influence of sea level rise on the coastal sector. The scientific setbacks could be determined with the results of above study. Coastal zone development plans could be detailed on the coastal vulnerability and risk platforms and the coastal risk mitigatory measures could be introduced. Coastal Economy Tourism, Fishing, Ports and Harbours are the hub of the coastal economy of the island. Since the tourism and fishing contribute lot to the national economy, special plans have been prepared with Tsunami rehabilitation.
While the new setbacks are strictly applied for the human settlements, government has flexible on tourism and fishing industry. Hotels, with the damaged are less than 40% of the total, allowed to repair as it was. But the others have been proposed to taken in to the Tourism Zones, where to be declared and developed with the infrastructure required for the industry. Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka is also within the coastal belt and the 100m buffer within the city is inapplicable. Engineering structural intervention through pushing the shoreline towards the sea with /without heavy water absorbents and/or multi disciplinary structure (elevated highway with the action of dyke) along the shoreline may be the solutions. Similarly preparation of town plans for the major cities on the coastal belt has been commenced. Possibilities of shifting the majority of major activities of the cities in to the high lands are the great concern.
Shoreline Stability Due to the south-west monsoon, the south, south-west and west coasts are the critical areas for sea erosion. For the last 25 years several km of coast protection structures and shoreline stabilization schemes were constructed along these coastlines. But most of the areas have now reached to their natural stability. Coastal cells have been formed with natural headlands and forming their wave incident angles as appropriate for the stability.
With the last Tsunami disaster, heavy sediment load were crossed over the shore in and off. This would affect the near shore wave dynamics and the sediment budget in the area, resulting increase the heavy erosion and/or overtopping and sea water flooding possibilities. Such several cases were reported from the south-west coast in the last monsoon and controlled them by applying soft solutions. Due to the Tsunami nearly one km long coast protection structures in two locations were completely destroyed. Both were in low lying areas and hence the pore pressure and the capillary action would have washed the sand profiles beneath the structure. The new designs, with counter actions for the failures, have been prepared and constructions started.
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At present, the CCD is in the practice of post-actions i.e. applying coast protections in the eroded areas after the erosion. But now the CCD has commenced to work on Shoreline Management Concepts i.e. preactions for the shoreline developments. In this practice the shoreline will be developed so as to creating the best values for the coastal resources therein. For the optimised results the concepts will be developed with the integration of Social, Economical and Environmental sectors in the region. The Post-Tsunami rehabilitation and development concepts in each sector in the coastal region shall be justified and adopted in to the Shoreline Management Plans. In this exercise, the coastal sediment cells shall be identified and plans shall be prepared and implemented to achieve the highest shoreline stability. The most economical, social and environmental activities shall be identified and introduced for each sediment cell or part thereof, for creating optimum value for the shoreline. Since the world trend in the coastal sector in the next decades will be the coastal tourism, the Sri Lanka has great opportunity of having 1620km long coastline. Therefore the CCD aim is to develop the coastline improving their recreational values to meet the future demand. Coastal landscape plays major role in this process and special effort has gone to improve the qualities of coastal landscape.
Technology Transfer In the process of Post-Tsunami rehabilitation and development with the aid of foreign grants, there is a great advantage of transferring new technologies and tools to the local organizations and the community. Mainly the local planners and other officials realises the power of new supporting tools for decision making such as Geographic Information System, Remote Sensing, Satellite Images, Laser born technologies etc. There were many workshops and seminars for technology transfer. Most of the local organisations, involved in the process, have received tools and equipments, high accuracy data, foreign expert for consultation etc. Those have extensively been used for the planning of rapid rehabilitation and development in the various sectors. Coastal Green Belt The coastal community love the natural environment and vegetation than before. They felt the importance of natural environmental elements like vegetation, sand dunes, coral reefs, sand barriers, lagoons etc. against natural disaster. Now the environmental rehabilitation programs are eventually formulating by the society.
The CCD has launched a program of Coastal Green Belt to rehabilitate, conserve and develop the coastal vegetation with the local NGOs and the community. The guidelines for the vegetation have already been prepared. Vegetation patterns shall be varying along shore according to the land use patterns. For the townships and dense settlements, vegetation mixed with landscape structures shall improve the scenic and recreation value. Selection of economical verities for the rural areas shall improve their economy while providing natural shelter. Forest and mangrove areas shall have no selection other than existing. For selection of cross shore verities, matters such as providing shelter for the in land vegetation by breaking the sea breeze, stem density for the breaking in flow energy, reducing damage due to the back flow and surface cover to reduce the top sediment movement etc shall be considered. But considering the coastal erosion the high root density with low overturning movements are important. The selected verities shall be distributed over the erosion prone areas.
Sand Dunes At the last Tsunami, fewer damages were proved with the existence of sand dunes. Hundreds of km long sand dunes are available in different areas of the country. The value of the sand dunes shall be obtained in different ways. Considering the dune as a protection barrier only, the value of one km will be more than 0.5 million US$.
The sand dunes could be dead or alive and the restoration methods will be differed on their state. Dead sand dunes shall be protected reducing the lost of sand from the dunes. Live dunes shall be rehabilitated so as to increase the natural retreat. Sand dune studies have already been commenced to assessing their present state, rehabilitation needs and the possibility of making artificial dunes.
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Hambantota, in the south coast, is the potential site for the next commercial port development and series of natural sand dunes are providing natural shelter. But for the safer township development the gaps in between shall be identified and covered for continuation. The study has already begun to locate the risk areas and then to formulate the safer developments. Recently the sand dune study has partially completed in Komari, in the east coast, and found that the natural wind direction will not support for the natural formation of the sand dunes alongshore.
REFERENCES
Coast conservation Department, Draft Coastal Zone Management Plan, Sri Lanka (2004 revision)
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DELIVERING AFFORDABLE HOUSING AFTER THE TSUNAMI; Lefebvre, B.G.
DELIVERING AFFORDABLE HOUSING AFTER THE TSUNAMI

Bernard G. Lefebvre Habitech Center, School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4 Klong Luang, Pathum Thani 12120, Thailand. E-mail of Corresponding author: bernard@ait.ac.th
ABSTRACT
Building materials in developing countries are the single largest input in construction activities followed by labour. So far, a large proportion of building components used in developing countries has been produced in small and medium scale units. Building components produced in a manner that relates to traditional processes can make a significant contribution to national development as evidenced by employment and skill generation, as well as have a multiplier effects achieved through backward and forward linkages to other sectors of the economy. Habitech's research is focused on developing building materials production and construction methods especially suited for construction by unskilled labour. Lightweight modularly compatible building materials can be produced by machines and moulds assembled in different industrial configurations delivering inexpensive, solid and durable, quickly and easily erected houses and social infrastructure buildings. The generally low level of skills required for the production of building components as well as the low level of capital required to start production means that producing building components is relatively easy and presents no insuperable barriers. Keywords: Building system, industry, housing, SMEs.
Typical house Khao Kho Project Petchabun Province - Thailand
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Low Cost Housing Low-cost housing or affordable housing represent a major and urgent problem in most developing countries of the world. The only alternative poor families have is to live in slums that are developing at a much higher rate than local government housing programs can address the demand for housing. Low cost housing is a very large market that is just starting to be looked at globally.
Now this problem is being exacerbated and has become crucial in countries affected by the 26th of December tsunami. Technical activities and cooperation that support and promote the reconstruction of human settlements should look at the construction industry, promote human resource development and capacity building to strengthening local capacity using appropriate construction technologies. The activities of the construction sector are vital to the development goals of providing shelter, infrastructure and employment. In accordance with countries national plans, objectives and priorities to establish and strengthen building material industry based on inputs of locally available natural resources should be to: Promote labour-intensive construction technologies that generate employment in the construction sector and at the same time allow for the development of skills in the construction sector. Use practices that reach the informal sector and self-help housing builders by adopting measures to increase the affordability of building materials on the part of the urban and rural poor through, credit schemes and bulk procurement of building materials for sale to small-scale builders and communities. Adopt standards and other regulatory measures which promote the increased use of technologies and the sustainable utilization of natural resources in an economically and environmentally appropriate way. Low-cost housing reconstruction projects and programs should look to light industrialization in the production of building materials and in the house construction process itself, promote information and technology transfer for better sustainable development. Industrialization doesnt necessarily mean high technology transfer but suppose corresponding market segments so that the technology transferred can be amortized. Low-cost housing projects can be successful if they are rooted in the community, present innovative solutions to real problems, enable others to imitate it and build partnerships between the private and public sector. But mostly they need to address livelihood by making it possible for some people to earn a living and generate income from these projects. Local populations should be involved in the production of building materials they will use and in the construction process itself. After all it is their houses that will be rebuilt. These projects should contribute locally to social and economic growth and not only serve as foreign markets as often criticized by opponents of globalization. Those offering solutions must be aware that they are only facilitators, filling a gap that must legitimate expectations and incubate new micro and small-scale enterprises giving access to technology, building capacity and propagating it through the raising of funds. At Habitech, we have been addressing the problem of delivering low-cost housing by developing building material and construction techniques produced and used by unskilled labour which while lowering the cost of housing procure solid and durable houses by setting up production facility, creating employment and generating income for local populations.
Habitech Center Habitech Center was established in 1989 at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, Thailand. The name Habitech is derived from two words; habitat, a dwelling or settlement and technology. The goal of Habitech is to research and develop housing technologies that can provide affordable houses.
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For Habitech, the answer to the problem of delivering housing to low-income groups lies in a strategy employing systematized construction systems as an integral part of the construction industry sector. These systems should allow for the use of local labor in construction activities as well as the use of raw and processed materials that can be found and transformed locally. Small and medium size building material production facilities have by definition few employees, small capital investment and a limited volume of output. They are also likely to show other characteristics such as production with locally available raw materials, production for local markets or specific projects and intermittent levels of production.. Although originally targeted at low-income groups, the building system developed at Habitech has since drawn of lot of interest from building contractors as one of its principal characteristics while reducing construction costs is to shorten construction time. Projects built by private sector contractors range from one to two storey housing and social infrastructure buildings such as schools, health clinics, district hospitals; to three and four storey public schools and more recently, medium rise (eight to nine floors) low cost rental apartment buildings. Ultimately, the success and the appropriateness of the research and development carried out can be measured by the extent to which the technology has been adopted and integrated by the private sector in the construction industry. Table 1 shows the effects that design decisions taken in the development of the Habitech Building System have in the construction environment. Table 1 - Habitech Building System DESIGN EFFECTS DECISIONS No material wasted No cutting or adjusting Fits in place Quickly erected Controlled production Precise dimensions Rapid and exact products Controlled production Controlled quality Configured to demand Production unit mobility
SIDE EFFECTS
GLOBAL EFFECTS
Modular
Labour saving Less supervision necessary Material Cost saving saving Shortens construction time Labour saving Creates local jobs Generates income Cost saving Stimulate local economy
Prefabrication Light industrialization Production on/near site
Eliminates transport costs Cost saving
Cost reduction Reduces transportation Use of local materials Easily available Cost saving costs Eliminates imports Resist fire, wind, flood, Cement based Strong & durable materials High value houses earthquake Optimal use of materials Optimize strength Cost reduction Cost saving Reduce materials quantity Minimum training Self aligning Use of unskilled labour Interlocking (no Cost saving Reduce reinforcement Less supervision mortar) Simplify construction Reduces wages costs Permits self-help Lightweight Less capital Easy to put in place No equipment needed components investment
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Alternative to wood Minimize the use of wood Cost reduction Eliminates beams & columns Eliminates form work Reduce reinforcement Electric when needed No pollution
Cost saving Reduced deforestation
Load bearing walls Energy Environment
Optimal use of materials Shortens construction Cost saving time Cost reduction Labour intensive Cost saving Environment No effect friendly
Building System The building system proposed for building houses is innovative. All its elements are modular eliminating wastage as there is no need to cut or adjust them to fit in place. The components can be quickly erected as they interlock and are self-aligning; shortening construction time. The system uses load-bearing walls eliminating the need for beams, columns, and formwork reducing reinforcement and simplifying the construction process. The technology has been repeatedly transferred to many housing projects in the region through training for the establishment of micro, small and medium size building material producing enterprises based on light industrialization. Moulds and simple machines are used to prefabricate components of precise dimensions assuring quality control. Small and Medium Enterprises - SMEs In developing countries there has been a lack of interest from the private sector to implement social housing or low-cost housing projects unless these projects generate an acceptable return on their investment.
Three basic parameters enable any business to grow and create new jobs: the business must create value management, must be able to execute its business plan consistently over time cost advantages and must be sustainable over time. In new development approaches, economic growth should focus on fulfilling human needs in an equitable manner, that is gender sensitive and that also protects the environment. The delivery of low-cost housing can be approached through the set-up of small and medium scale building material and construction enterprises, creating employment and generating income for local population. Production facilities have economic multiplier effects through backward and forward linkages to other areas of the construction sector and the economy in general. Furthermore, SMEs ensure a more equitable distribution of income, disperse economic activities to the countryside and are a potent force in the war against poverty. Many emerging -economy countries have adapted successful SMEs promotion programs and established institutions with a mandate to finance such enterprises initiating a process that is leading to a substantial increase in local production capacities. Most development banks offer packages focusing on the promotion of SMEs development. SMEs create jobs for 10 per cent of the cost of jobs created by larger enterprises. Furthermore, SMEs can be more widespread, more resilient, and make better use of local resources. In many countries the SME sector is the backbone of their economy. In the Indonesia SMEs comprise about 99% of all registered firms nationwide, employ 99% of the labour force and contribute 63% to the economy. In Thailand, it represents 98% of firms, employs 58% and contributes 35%. Recent Thai government policies with regards to SMEs promotion would like to increase SMEs contribution to the GDP to 50% by 2006.
Out-venture SMEs Just the same as Out-sourcing to SMEs has become increasingly common for many larger businesses over the last decade and has usually resulted in more streamlined, flexible and competitive companies we are proposing Out-venturing through SMEs in affiliation with companies. Potential building material producers should be identified and established in networks of production facilities.
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It is generally accepted that good practice in SMEs requires that interventions should, wherever possible, develop and enhance existing commercial markets. Donor interventions should complement or build on private initiatives rather than compete with them. To effectively carry out this task, donors and development practitioners must understand the breadth, scope and operation of SMEs. A greater understanding of the building sector environment, and of the existing and potential markets, is imperative as a preliminary step in the design of sustainable and effective interventions. New and innovative approaches to enhance existing commercial activities should be adopted in the construction sector and as such should take a new and objective view of all support provided for SMEs in most countries. Typical production facilities offered by Habitech are based on a proven model that has been set-up repeatedly in many countries to supply construction projects of various types and sizes. Network of SMEs can be strategically dispersed throughout regions to manufacture in close proximity to the local building demand. A strong case can be made for both micro and small-scale enterprise financing that credit is best linked in some way to business training. Training materials should focus on registering new businesses under government regulation, negotiating with financial institutions for financial aid and loan support, administration and management, and sales and marketing. All issues relating to the establishment of the SMEs and the transfer of technology can be addressed through incubators with business packages including technical, business and financial assistance.
Out-venture model A typical production facility is based on the following a model that has been set-up repeatedly in many countries to supply construction projects of various types and sizes.
The facilities produce soil-cement or concrete interlocking blocks (no mortar), an innovative product for building walls. Load bearing walls built with these blocks are quickly and easily erected by unskilled labour providing solid and durable construction at a much lower cost than with conventional construction techniques. Table 2, outlines the investment costs, the typical financial analysis and the employment that would be generated by the establishment of a typical production facility.
Table 2 - Typical Production Facility FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Reference data Cost of cement Cost of stone dust Production cycle Production days Initial Investment Cash Loan Working Capital Cash flow analysis Net Present Value Internal Rate of Return Total Net Cash flow Break-Even Point Security Margin Human Resources Direct Employment Indirect Employment
$70.00 Per ton $6.50 Per ton 8 Hours 254 Days $127,484 $40,000 $87,484 $23,431 8 years $538,355 89% $851,297 27% 33% 25 Persons 50 Persons
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Table 3, forecast what a network of typical SMES strategically dispersed throughout a region would generate in demand for raw materials, the equivalent number of houses built over a period of 10 years illustrating the contributions to the local economy. Table 3 - Forecast of a Network of Production Facilities Basic Items Cement Unit Value Stone dust - tons per year Unit Value Two bedroom house Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Qty 1,016 70.00 8,128 12.00 150
Tons/year US$ Tons/year US$ House/year
No. Of Cement Stone Dust Stone Dust Houses Cement US$ Facilities Tons Tons US$ per year 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 4,064 8,128 12,192 16,256 20,320 24,384 28,448 32,512 36,576 40,640 284,480 568,960 853,440 1,137,920 1,422,400 1,706,880 1,991,360 2,275,840 2,560,320 2,844,800 32,512 65,024 97,536 130,048 162,560 195,072 227,584 260,096 292,608 325,120 243,840 487,680 731,520 975,360 1,219,200 1,463,040 1,706,880 1,950,720 2,194,560 2,438,400 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,000 3,600 4,200 4,800 5,400 6,000 Houses
Cumulative 10 years
Cement Stone Dust Stone Dust Cement US$ Tons Tons US$ 223,520 $15,646,400 1,788,160
$13,411,200 33,000
Non-Governmental Organisations NGOs have declared a common vision of global development that is equitable within and among countries, which satisfies the economic, social and cultural needs of all human beings, and that is in harmony with the environment.
The participation of civil society in development is one of the aspects most publicized by cooperation agencies. The institutions displaying the most achievements in this field are NGOs. They exhibit an institutional capacity and have a proven record in implementing development activities in many fields jointly with grassroots organisations. Within the tsunami context, of particular interest are NGOs activities related to human settlements reconstruction: low-cost housing, micro - small scale and medium size enterprises and employment generation.
NGO model As Habitech has been continuously cooperating with NGOs assisting them in the delivery of houses to lowincome groups, a model facility for promoting micro-enterprises is also presented in Table 4. This typical facility can produce all of the components of the Habitech Building System and serve as an incubator for training micro-entrepreneurs. A typical micro-enterprise is presented in Table 5.
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Table 4 - Small-scale Production Unit Micro-Enterprise Incubator Establishment Costs Equipment Delivery and installation Total Fixed Investment Cost Production costs Materials Labour Yearly production costs Yearly income estimate Working Capital Loan (10 % interest) Yearly Net Cash Flow Total Net Cash Flow (5 years) Net Present Value (10% interest) Capacity Break Even Point Direct Employment Indirect Employment
$ US 4,000 17,000 3,500 24,500 57,300 12,200 76,100 136,000 20,000 30,000 15,100 92,820 65,000 90 Houses/year 14 Houses 25 Persons 50 Persons
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Table 5 - Micro-Enterprise Soil-cement interlocking bricks Initial Fixed Investment Costs Establishment Costs Equipment Delivery and installation Total Fixed Investment Costs Yearly Production Costs Materials Labour Total Production Costs Yearly Income Estimate Working Capital Loan (10%) Yearly Net Cash Flow Total Net Cash Flow (7 years) Net Present Value (10% interest) Break Even Point Capacity
US $ 300 3,900 500 4,200 19,300 5,050 24,350 30,000 2,000 6,000 3,700 35,000 27,150 20% 200,000 Bricks / Year 6,000 M2 of Walls 23 Houses/year 5 Persons 10 Persons
Direct Employment Indirect Employment
Awards and recognitions Habitech Center was awarded the Matsushita Memorial Prize by the Japan Housing Association for 1994 in recognition of excellent achievements in improving human settlements in Asian countries by promoting research and development related to technologies for low cost housing as well as providing educational programs and facilities to disseminate the results of their research efforts .
In 1995, one of Habitech's project: The Khao Kho Housing Resettlement Project in Petchabun, Thailand was selected as one of the finalist for the World Habitat Awards by the Building and Social Housing Foundation in the category for developing countries. The Habitech Building System has been recognized by the United Nations Human Settlements Program and the international community as contributing to housing and economic development through the transfer of technology and has been compiled on the Habitat Best Practices database for others to learn from and incorporate in their own work.
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THE USE OF THE DASS42 SURVEY TOOL IN DISASTERS AND AS PART OF A SHELTER PROGRAM IN ACEH: Potangaroa R.
THE USE OF THE DASS42 SURVEY TOOL IN DISASTERS AND AS PART OF A SHELTER PROGRAM IN ACEH Dr. Regan Potangaroa Associate Professor, School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture ScALA, Unitec, Private Bag 92025 Auckland, New Zealand E-mail of Corresponding author: rpotangaroa@unitec.ac.nz
ABSTRACT
The recovery and reconstruction stages of development occur well after the initial disaster emergency. In Aceh following the disaster of the December 26 2004 tsunami, a recovery phase was anticipated as being from 6 months to 2 years after the impact of the tsunami. This was to be followed by a reconstruction phase which was expected to carry on for up to 15 years beyond that recovery phase. And consequently victims of the tsunami would have to live in either temporary housing or tents (usually on their original plot of land), in adhoc camps usually in tents, in transitional housing or TLCs or with relatives or host families for at least 2 years and potentially a lot longer until there was aid available for the construction of any permanent housing options. For those humanitarian workers on the ground such a timeline was unpleasant because they were directly witnessing through the people they worked for, the people they worked with and the people they worked through (such as Government departments) the cost of this natural disaster. Planning takes time and presumably good planning takes longer. But in this planning, the cost to people is not seemingly accounted for? And while one would not want to negate the importance of planning the need for better accounting of such costs and the need to implement an appropriate response by shortening timeframes for critical aid aspects (such as housing and roads) could be planned and implemented earlier than suggested by the above time frame. In response, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set out to design a permanent shelter program during the emergency phase that could be implemented during the subsequent recovery phase rather than waiting for the reconstruction/rehabilitation phase 2 years later. As it turned out the program was heading to be implemented even earlier in the emergency phase. And a central element of that permanent shelter program was the need to demonstrate its effectiveness given that it was apparently breaking the rules. This and the lack of base line data resulted in the setting up of a survey of the potential beneficiaries for UNHCRs permanent shelter program. This survey used the World Health Organisation Quality of Life Tool (WHO QLT) and the DASS42 survey tool. And the paper looks specifically at the advantages and robustness of the DASS42 tool for such a job. In particular, the severity table of the DASS42 allowed workable conclusions to be drawn from one survey while most (including the WHO QLT tool) required a before and after survey. Moreover, when combined with the Disaster Life Continuum model the DASS42 was able to produce valuable quantifiable insights into the condition of victims of the tsunami. The inclusion of such insights early in the shelter program was part of the key to implementing aid earlier.
INTRODUCTION The scene that welcomed aid workers arriving in Banda Aceh (the capital of Aceh province) for up to 1 month after the tsunami disaster of December 26 2004 was one of complete devastation. The death toll had exceeded 100,000 people and authorities had effectively stopped counting. The centre of town was essentially flattened for some 3 kilometres from where the shore line used to be. The most affected area was along the west coast of Aceh (from Meulaboh north to Banda Aceh a distance of approximately
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250 kilometres). Here, the scenes were particularly grim. This area was where the tsunami first touched down and there had been no effective warning for the villagers. Much of the area experienced a 10-13 metre high (3 to 4 storeys high) tsunami that swept away 147 bridges and 80% of the coast highway. Typically, only ground floor slabs of buildings were left and in many places the slabs had been sucked off their foundations by the force of the tsunami. . Interestingly, the tsunami had a relatively minor impact south of Meulaboh due to the proximity and orientation of the fault movement that generated the tsunami (Wilkinson, 2005). UNHCR took on the role of working along this coast as the focus for its planned aid package of 35,000 permanent houses. The design rationale and the development of the strategy for that permanent housing package is described in detail in another paper at this conference (Potangaroa, 2005). But it was clear from the outset that there was a lack of hard base line data from which to work and moreover, there would be a need later to quantitatively demonstrate that UNHCRs shelter package was successful. The package needed to incorporate community participation and to strategically direct aid and assistance. Hence, a significant survey of the West Coast of Aceh was undertaken.
SURVEY TOOLS Two survey tools were finally selected for the project. The first survey tool was the well known World Health Organisation Quality of Life Tool (WHO QLT) and the second survey tool referred to as the DASS42 (Depression Anxiety Stress Survey consisting of 42 questions). Other tools such as the Harvard Post traumatic Syndrome test were discounted because several questions were inappropriate.
The most widely known and readily available survey tool is the World Health Organisation (WHO) Quality of Life tool (QLT). It has had extensive use in examining the QOL aspects of health related interventions and while it is suitable for architectural and physical engineering and planning interventions its predominant use remains in the health sector (Hawthorne et al, 2002). It consists of 100 questions in the standard version (25 questions in a brief version) and is a comprehensive self assessment of the individuals QOL. This is defined as "an individual's perception of his/her position in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which he/she lives, and in relation to his/her goals, expectations, standards and concerns. It is a broad-ranging concept, incorporating in a complex way the person's physical health, psychological state, level of independence, social relationships, and their relationship to salient features of their environment" (WHOQoL, 1994). The DASS42 on the other hand, is relatively new survey tool and was developed at the University of New South Wales, in Sydney Australia (Lovibond, 1995). It is a set of three self-report scales designed to measure the negative emotional states of depression, anxiety and stress and was constructed not merely as another set of scales to measure conventionally defined emotional states, but to further the process of defining, understanding, and measuring the ubiquitous and clinically significant emotional states usually described as depression, anxiety and stress (DASS, 2006). The characteristics of high scorers on each DASS scale are as follows: Depression scale: self-disparaging, dispirited, gloomy, blue, convinced that life has no meaning or value, pessimistic about the future, unable to experience enjoyment or satisfaction, unable to become interested or involved, slow, lacking in initiative. Anxiety scale: apprehensive, panicky, trembly, shaky, aware of dryness of the mouth, breathing difficulties, pounding of the heart, sweatiness of the palms, worried about performance and possible loss of control. Stress scale: over-aroused, tense, unable to relax, touchy, easily upset, irritable, easily startled, nervy, jumpy, fidgety, intolerant of interruption or delay.
These two approaches are compared below in table 1. SURVEY FRAMEWORK Surveys at each of UNHCRs field offices along the west coast were undertaken with 100 people interviewed in the towns of Lamno, Calang, Krueng Sabe and Tenoum. In Meulaboh 200 people were
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surveyed because it was a larger city. In all for both survey instruments 1,200 tsunami victims of adult age were surveyed in the first 2 weeks of March 2005. WHO Quality of Life DASS42 Field tested set of 26 questions. Set of 42 questions It quantifies the Quantity of Life and can be used in Measures the levels of depression, stress and different interventions. anxiety in a population. Bahasa version obtained from WHO in Banda Aceh. Fairly new but robust survey tool developed at Has been around for some time and is well known (an the University of New South Wales, Australia. oldie but a goodie). http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/Groups/Dass/ http://www.acpmh.unimelb.edu.au/whoqol/default.html Table 1: Brief Comparison of the WHO QLT and the DASS42 Survey Tools. The surveys were completed by a local NGO called Mapala using teams of 5 people that included at least two women team members (refer to figure 1 below). This gender balance was felt to be important because of the concern that women may not talk as candidly with a male as opposed to a female interviewer. A pilot of the survey was trialled in Banda Aceh and this brought out that many of those completing the survey would not be able to read and that most would converse in Acehnesse instead of the national language of Bahasa Indonesia. This meant that the survey had to be translated into Acehnesse and that we would have to rely on survey team members reading the questions out and writing down responses. The pilot also raised issues with question 2 of the DASS42 survey (refer to appendix A of this paper which contains the DASS42 questions) where the respondent is asked if they were aware of dryness of their mouth. This question sought physiological confirmation of anxiety but in the 35+OC temperatures (common along the west coast) dryness of mouth was common place and not understood as the question sought. Nonetheless, this question was retained for so as to be true to the original as possible and survey staff were asked to explain the background to the question to respondents. It is difficult to ascertain what impact if any there was in this decision and in the verbal delivery of the survey but it seemed to be a practical solution to the problem at hand.
Figure 1: Survey Teams at Work. Training of the team members involved was undertaken so that there was a level of uniformity of survey process, inquiry and data taking between the 3 teams involved. Due to the logistics and the lack of a telephone network at that time communication both between and with separate teams would be minimal once they were air lifted into the field. Hence, it was essential that any issues be resolved before being sent into the field. In addition, field living conditions were basic and interviewers while committed to assisting had to appreciate the traumatised nature of the people they were working with. The work was also physically demanding (not forgetting emotionally draining) with each team having to carry in all their equipment together with food and water for 5 days. Facilities were also basic in the field offices and there was limited electrical supply from on site generators. Hence, the training was also used to prepare the team members who were essentially from Jakarta for survival whilst completing the survey.
DISASTER LIFE CONTINUUM (and the DASS42)
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The most commonly used disaster model is the 4R model (MCDEM, 2004). The Rs stand for Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery and rather crudely represent the phases of the disaster cycle. However, aid workers find such a model limiting in terms of what is seen in the field and other models such as the Disaster Life Continuum are more widely used (EMA, 2003) (refer to figure 2 below).
Figure 2: The Disaster Life Continuum Model. In such a model there is a relative calm period before the disaster. When the disaster occurs (and in this case it was a tsunami) the community and social context together with the family context is shattered. Disaster victims experience two general forms of reaction namely a depression (related to a preoccupation and fixation of how things were before the disaster) and anxiety (and despair) about their future. And both of these are experienced in the context of shattered family relationships and a scattered community and social fabric. This Disaster Life Continuum model would therefore appear to have parallels with the measures of depression, anxiety and stress (as outlined earlier) from the DASS survey. The third DASS42 factor of stress relates to this daily living and measures the tense situation that exist post disaster. Consequently, these links between the DASS42 and the Disaster Life Continuum Model provides a useful tool in firstly gauging the position (and changes of position over time and due to programmed aid intervention) of target populations in disasters.
THE SEVERITY TABLE.

One further useful aspect of the DASS42 survey was the severity table (refer to table 2 below). This table allowed scoring of responses immediately without the need for a before and after survey as it commonly required. This meant that practical results could be obtained from this initial survey with the further possibility of comparing scores with later surveys. This feature makes the DASS42 a useful survey tool for disaster/emergency related work. The severity table also allowed for comparisons between categories within the survey and the value of this can be particularly seen below with the DASS42 measurements related to gender and age. Depression 09 10 13 14 20 21 27 28+ Anxiety 0-7 89 10 14 15 19 20+ Stress 0 14 15 18 19 25 26 33 34 +
Normal Mild Moderate Severe Extremely Severe
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Table 2: The DASS42 Severity Index Table. Down loaded from:

http://www.swin.edu.au/victims/resources/assessment/affect/dass42.html
HOW RESILIENT ARE THE ACEH PEOPLE?

The Aceh people appeared to aid workers coming into Aceh to have responded and reorganised communities quickly following the tsunami. There was a stoical sense that they had accepted what they appeared to believe was their fate. On the other hand aid workers also noted that public shows of emotion appeared to be contained within the family and that this stoical sense may have been the public face. Such issues were discussed informally amongst the aid community as they sought to find the best type of aid for survivors and the question for the permanent shelter cluster members was, is it too early for permanent shelter? This was especially the case given that the disaster was still in its emergency phase and the emphasis (quite rightly) was on emergency shelter such as tents. Everyone had an opinion on this issue of timing and there was no tool that quantitatively measured what in effect was immeasurable. Given that background it was extremely relevant to review the overall figures provided by the DASS42 and these are summarised below in table 2. Lamno Depression Anxiety Stress
9.2 Mild 15.0 Severe 14.8 Mild
Calang
8.2 Normal 14.8 Severe 10.7 Normal
Krueng Sabe
9.0 Normal 15.2 Severe 11.4 Normal
Tenoum
12.0 Mild 17.0 Severe 16.1 Mild
Meulaboh 1
8.8 Normal 13.8 Moderate 11.1 Normal
Meulaboh 2
10.4 Mild 15.6 Severe 13.5 Normal
Overall Normal Severe Normal
Table 3: DASS42 Overall Results The overall numbers suggested that people were managing the stress of day to day living with both depression and stress DASS42 factors being normal (the basis for these categories are explained in more detail on the DASS42 web page). And their issue, as suggested by the severe rating for anxiety was what was going to happen rather than what had happened. It is interesting to compare this finding against the planning timetable associated with the 4R model. This suggested that the response phase would be of the order of 3-6 months, the recovery period a further 15 months to 2 years and the rehabilitation (where permanent housing could be expected to start) being 2-2years out extending out for 15 years from the date of the disaster. But what these results from the DASS42 suggest is that people were not only ready for permanent shelter (housing) but that it should start immediately because the crisis for people was their future and resolution of shelter was central to that anxiety. This appeared to be the first time that the concerns of any beneficiary group had been quantitatively factored into what had been accepted as a de facto planning standard (UNDP, 2004). There is more that can be developed from this result but the need to accelerate the implementation of permanent shelter was now critical for the welfare of beneficiaries.
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF AGE?

The UNHCR Handbook list vulnerable people as those that are sick, mentally incapacitated, the elderly, children and women head of households (UNHCR, 1998). And no real differences were expected from that list for the situation in Aceh. However, table 4 below suggests that the impact of the disaster was felt more by the young than the old. In all areas and for all the DASS42 indicators (except for Tenoum) the young (those under 30 years of age) were more dis-advantaged than the old (those over 50 years of age). Moreover, the severity was highest for those under 30 and reduced steady through the 30 to 39, the 40 to 49 to those over 50 years of age. Thus, there was a consistent pattern. Consequently, those under 30 years of age were the vulnerable people in this context. This tied in with the earlier finding that the Aceh people were anxious about the future and those that had the most to loose were those under 30. Age
(in years)
Lamno
9.8 Mild
Calang
10.4 Mild
Krueng Sabe
11.3 Mild
Tenoum
11.3 Mild
Meulaboh 1
11.4 Mild
Meulaboh 2
10.5 Mild
Overall Mild
Depression
Less than 30
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30 to 39 40 to 49 50+ Years
Anxiety
Less than 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50+ Years
Stress
Less than 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50+ Years
9.3 Mild 9.6 Mild 10.7 Mild 15.7 Severe 16.2 Severe 13.8 Moderate 20.8 X Severe 16.0 Mild 16.3 Mild 14.2 Normal 13.0 Normal
8.6 Normal 7.4 Normal 7.1 Normal 17.2 Severe 15.5 Severe 13.7 Moderate 13.4 Moderate 12.4 Normal 10.9 Normal 9.8 Normal 10.3 Normal
8.8 Normal 8.5 Normal 8.1 Normal 18.7 Severe 15.4 Severe 13.8 Moderate 13.9 Moderate 13.9 Normal 11.1 Normal 10.5 Normal 11.4 Normal
12.4 Mild 12.5 Mild 8.8 Normal 20.3 X severe 17.3 Severe 16.4 Severe 12.4 Moderate 18.4 Moderate 16.0 Mild 16.4 Mild 10.9 Normal
10.5 Mild 8.0 Normal 8.4 Normal 18.4 Severe 14.3 Severe 16.0 Severe 12.6 Moderate 14.4 Normal 11.9 Normal 11.7 Normal 10.7 Normal
11.2 Mild 11.3 Mild 9.1 Mild 17.9 Severe 15.7 Severe 14.6 Severe 16.4 Severe 14.9 Normal 13.9 Normal 14.3 Normal 12.6 Normal
Mild Normal Normal Severe Severe Moderate Moderate Normal Normal Normal Normal
Table 4: DASS42 Results for Age.
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF GENDER?

There had been discussion amongst the UNHCR team as to whether the tsunami impacted more on females rather than males? This was based on observation and feeling but the DASS42 figures quantify this difference between the sexes (refer to table 5 below). The DASS42 survey supports this notion with females being typical one level higher that for males for all three DASS42 indicators. This pattern was the same at all the locations surveyed along the West Coast. Lamno Female Depression Anxiety Stress Male Depression Anxiety Stress
9.2 Mild 16.1 Severe 16.5 Mild 9.1 Mild 12.9 Moderate 12.2 Normal
Calang
10.8 Mild 17.9 Severe 13.2 Normal 5.7 Normal 12.0 Moderate 8.2 Normal
Krueng Sabe
10.3 Mild 18.2 Severe 13.6 Normal 7.8 Normal 12.4 Moderate 9.4 Normal
Tenoum
14.1 Moderate 21.7 X Severe 19.3 Moderate 9.3 Mild 11.1 Moderate 12.1 Normal
Meulab. 1
12.3 Mild 18.8 Severe 15.3 Mild 7.0 Normal 11.2 Moderate 8.8 Normal
Meulab. 2
12.8 Mild 17.7 Severe 15.4 Mild 6.6 Normal 12.8 Moderate 10.9 Normal
Overall
Mild Severe Mild Normal Moderate Normal
Table 5: DASS42 Results for Gender.
WHAT DID THIS MEAN FOR THE SHELTER PROGRAM?

The DASS survey painted a more conclusive picture than what would have been assumed from the UNHCR Emergency handbook. The DASS42 survey indicated the following: The need for shelter was critical and moreover the need was for permanent shelter options so that people started to address the anxiety presented by an unknown future. This need was immediate and should not be held over. The shelter program should target traditional vulnerable groups and in particular women and those under 30 years of age. While these results are not shattering the ability to fine tune such programs is invaluable.
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CONCLUSION
The DASS42 survey is a particularly useful tool for targeting shelter programs in disasters and emergency situations involving large populations. The use of the severity table, the Disaster Life Continuum Model and its ability to provide practical results based on one survey without the need for a before and after study make it a functional tool. In addition, the survey tool is freely available from the Internet thus increasing is serviceability. Architects and engineers accustomed to the quantitative aspects of building must begin to measure the qualitative aspects of the same buildings that they design and build. The difference between the quantitative and qualitative is the difference between a house and a home. And while building codes work to produce the first it is actually the second that people desire. This is perhaps more so following a disaster when everyone simply wants to go home. The recognition that there are tools available that can quantify such qualities is the first step in realising the above paradigm shift. REFERENCES DASS (2006) Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) Psychology Foundation of Australia http://www.psy.unsw.edu.au/Groups/Dass Emergency Management Australia (EMA) (2003). Recovery Management: Context of Recovery; EMA Institute, Mt Macedon August 2003 pp51 Hawthorne G, Richardson J, Day N (2002). Using the Assessment of Quality of Life (AQoL) Instrument Version 1.Centre for Health Program Evaluation Monash University in collaboration with Melbourne University pp80 Lovibond S. Lovibond, P (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. (2nd. Ed.) Sydney: Psychology Foundation. Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) (2004). National CDEM Strategy 20032006 pub. by the NZ Govt pp14-16 Potangaroa R. (2005) The Development Of A Permanent Shelter Program For Aceh, North Sumatra. Scientific Forum on Tsunami, Its Impact and Recovery, AIT, Thailand, 2005 UNHCR (1998) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR (1998) Handbook for Emergencies pub UNDP (2004). Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) chapter 1 pp13-15 UNHCR Geneva pp11-23 Wilkinson T (2005) Report On Coastal Design And Tsunami Mitigation For Shelter /House Reconstruction Along West Coast Aceh Province pub. UNHCR WHOQoL Group (1994). The Development of the World Health Organization Quality of Life Assessment Instrument (the WHOQoL). In J. Orley and W. Kuyken (Eds). Quality of Life Assessment: Inter. Perspectives Heidleberg: Springer-Verlag pp43.
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APPENDIX 1
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT SHELTER PROGRAM FOR ACEH, NORTH SUMATRA. : Potangaroa R.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT SHELTER PROGRAM FOR ACEH, NORTH SUMATRA.

Dr. Regan Potangaroa Associate Professor, School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture ScALA, Unitec, Private Bag 92025 Auckland, New Zealand
E-mail of Corresponding author: rpotangaroa@unitec.ac.nz
ABSTRACT
The resulting housing solutions developed for permanent shelter as part of aid packages often belie the complexity of their resolution. This paper outlines the often hidden subtleties in such designs that need to incorporate social/cultural and economic aspects together with the usual areas of structural design and construction. Further issues such as procurement, capacity building and logistics must also be factored into such solutions. Left unmanaged, the design of permanent shelter can quickly become unwieldy, cumbersome and out of control. The development of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permanent shelter program is documented in this paper. It outlines how provisional numbers for destroyed and damaged houses were determined. And how spatial surveys of low cost houses in Banda Aceh were used to ascertain an appropriate house design. The resulting strategy was to provide a core house so called because the house could be readily expanded in many ways as required by beneficiaries and as such was the core for the eventual house. The paper also sets out the matrix for selection of the wall material of the house, an issue that highlights the difficulty of what essentially looks to be straightforward. The area most affected by the December tsunami was along the west coast of Aceh (from Meulaboh north to Banda Aceh a distance of approximately 250 kilometres). The West Coast was where the tsunami first touched down and there had been no effective warning for the villagers. Much of the area experienced a 10-13 metre high (3 to 4 storeys high) tsunami that swept away 147 bridges and 80% of the coast highway. Typically, only ground floor slabs of buildings were left and in many places the slabs had been sucked off their foundations by the force of the tsunami. Interestingly, the tsunami had a relatively minor impact south of Meulaboh due to the proximity and orientation of the fault movement that generated the tsunami (Wilkinson, 2005). UNHCR took on the role of working along this coast as the focus for its planned housing program.
DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT SHELTER STRATEGY

The development of any shelter program requires answers to three main questions: What do we build? Where do we build? Whom do we build for? This paper primarily focuses on the what. Later, the issue of How was also required given the scale of the program (initially 35,000 permanent houses). The balance between community participation/ own construction (the usual humanitarian aid model) and engaging contractor/s (the commercial model) to build the houses was problematic. On the one hand was the desire to spend as much of the aid money within the affected community, to build capacity within the community and to get beneficiaries involved in the construction of their own houses so that their
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT SHELTER PROGRAM FOR ACEH, NORTH SUMATRA: Potangaroa R.
was a sense of ownership. On the other hand was the need to have specialist construction skills (such as bending and placing reinforcing steel, mixing and placing concrete and constructing and installing windows and doors), maintenance of quality and standards and finally time frames. Not forgetting the issue of speed of construction. For example to construct 35,000 houses in 3 years requires constructing 30+ houses per day for every day of that 3 year period. And given that it takes a building team of 10 people two weeks to construct a timber house and 4 weeks to construct a house from concrete blocks equates to a work force of between 4,200 and 9,000 people working on some 420 to 900 different house sites simultaneously. This suggested that 35,000 houses in 3 years may not be feasible? But the goal of 35,000 houses was maintained as an ideal and also as a sign of commitment to Aceh. Hope was in short supply in those early months. The final resolution was that a main contractor would supervise other sub contractors in each of the field office regions. Those contractors had to be based or have their head office in Aceh and had to have sufficient depth to be able to manage other contractors. The companies were also required to employ and use local skills where they were available and bring in those skills where they were not. In addition, skill programs were to be initiated by other implementing NGOs to give these required new skills to locals. Finally, a paid representative was selected from the beneficiarys family to work for the contractor on their house. This last initiative was meant to provide additional quality checking on the contractor and also initiate the ownership mentioned earlier. This approach was developed from discussions that included local contractors and suppliers. Often these groups are incorrectly not considered as stake holders.
EARLY SHELTER NUMBERS

Observations from walk throughs of the devastated areas in Banda Aceh suggested the following: Those houses in the tsunami hit area (where the tsunami passed by) were essentially destroyed Those houses at the wave front (where the tsunami stopped) were only partly destroyed and were often being repaired. Consequently, it was possible to estimate the number of houses that would require repairs and the number of new houses required for construction by using what was observed in the field. This was achieved by using existing topographical maps and enlarged aerial imagery of the devastated areas that were available through contacts with the Public Works Department. From these the length of the wave front and the area of land affected by the tsunami were measured. Using typical urban and rural density figures of: For the Wave Front: Urban Density of 1 house every 50 metres; Rural density of 1 house every 100 metres For the tsunami affected area: Urban Density of 250 m2 per house; Rural density 2,500 m2 per house.
produced the normalised results tabulated in table 1 below for an affected population of 400,000 people and a family size of 5 persons/family (note the areas in table 1 are listed in geographical sequence from Banda Aceh south to Meulaboh). Shelter kits New Houses Banda Aceh 957 7,460 Lhoong area 242 4,711 Lamno area 893 9,177 Scamperi Neir area 446 4,141 Calang area 550 6,288 Teunom North area 644 2,572 Teunom South area 248 4,693 Sama Tiga area 557 26,010 Meulaboh area 715 14,948 Table 1: Early Shelter Numbers for New Houses and Houses Requiring Repairs.
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It was clear that these figures were estimated values only but they did show up the following: 1) Shelter kits would be a small percentage of the overall housing aid package. This was topical at that time as many NGOs were planning to supply shelter kit options rather than permanent housing. There were many reasons for this such as the supply of the kits being faster and easier than developing new houses. Funding for most NGOs was time dependent with a time horizon of 9-12 months thus excluding the option of mew houses. 2) The areas to the south around Meulaboh were the most affected. These areas were flat low lying rice growing areas and the impact of the tsunami was therefore more extensive. This was valuable information that assisted both UNHCR as well as other NGOs operating in the area.
A SPATIAL SURVEY OF LOW COST HOUSING IN BANDA ACEH.

The need to recognise local standards and norms and to include the intent of humanitarian charters such as SPHERE and the UNHCR Handbook into any proposed house design was understood by all the NGOs and UN Agencies involved in permanent shelter in Aceh (SPHERE, 2004) (UNHCR, 2000). However, details such as floor area and what determined dignity, health safety and well being (as outlined in the SPHERE manual) were not understood. SPHERE and other Handbooks do not (understandably) address such details but perhaps unfortunately they do not outline acceptable and practical methods to determine dignity, health safety and well being (SPHERE, pg 221). The approach adopted was to initiate a spatial survey of low cost housing complexes in Banda Aceh. The aim was to ensure that whatever the house design the size and scale of the house was comparable (and preferably slightly less) than existing low cost houses. Otherwise, provision of better housing to tsunami victims could generate long term jealousies within the community. On the other hand it is debatable that the provision of a mortgage free house (when those living in Government low cost houses were often paying it off over 20 years) would not generate such jealousies nonetheless? This dilemma could never be resolved short of not helping those in need. And consequently, the integrated programs (housing together with schools, roads, water sources, mosques, health clinics etc) had to be managed so that existing communities also felt that they were benefiting. This was never going to be simple and interestingly is also not addressed by SPHERE. Over 30 such housing complexes were reviewed and it was noted that an Acehnese house had the following four main areas and that these areas had the follow areas: Porch area 4.00m2 and average dimensions of 2.61m by 1.43m. Living/ lounge area 14.26m2 and average dimensions of 4.68m by 3.03m. Kitchen 10.09m2 with average dimensions of 3.78 by 2.54 metres Toilet/bathing area 4.31m2 with average dimensions of 2.28 by 1.84 metres. Thus, suggesting a total house size of the order of 33 m2. (The average family size not including host members due to the tsunami was 6.4 people per household)
Figure 1: Low Cost Houses for Hospital, Police and Government Workers. Low cost houses typically had two bedrooms. But the inclusion of separate bedrooms into the UNHCR proposed house was abandoned in favour of one common living area that could be partitioned with bamboo screens. The reasoning for this is discussed in the next section under social and community sustainability and is central to the design intent, house development and housing strategy of the core house.Various house
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sizes were possible by varying the length of the core while holding the width of the house to allow different family sizes as shown below: Family size up to 4 people 3.2 metres length of lounge area 5-7 people 4.8 metres length of lounge area 8-9 people 6.4 metres length of lounge area 10+ people Special design. The above dimensions were based on the results of the spatial survey but the final exact dimension was based on logistical requirements for the corrugated iron roofing. In Indonesia the thickest corrugated iron sheet is 0.4 mm thick (compared to the thinnest section of 0.55 mm used in New Zealand). When stacked, sheet lengths longer than 1.8 metres can not be lifted with a fork truck without buckling and consequently this became the maximum sheet length (based on work by John Weir of RedR (Australia)). Allowing for roof angle and sheet over lap gave the final dimensions above Change to these dimensions or failure to recognise this important logistical aspect would result in unnecessary wastage of one of the more expensive house building items, extra construction work meaning slower construction and increased logistics. This critical dimensional aspect is not reflected in any literature.
Figure 2: The UNHCR Permanent Shelter House or Core House

An Acehnese house (much like many South East Asian communities) actually has two kitchens. One is a dry kitchen and the other is a wet kitchen. Unlike many western households where food such as chicken arrives frozen ready for storage and later cooking. In an Acehnese household the food arrives alive and for example chickens would need to be killed, plucked and cooked. All this would be completed in the wet kitchen with the cooking of rice and eating meals being done in the dry kitchen. The core house only provided the wet kitchen which was also the case in many modern low cost housing complexes reviewed. From this work evolved the UNHCR core house drawn and photographed in figure 2 above.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER PERMANENT SHELTER PROGRAMS

Many alternative options (usually prefabricated with most opting for concrete) were being developed and offered by both aid agencies and commercial developers. And it was salient (and interesting) to compare these options against the core house strategy described above. Comparisons fell into 6 different categories as discussed below: 1) Constructional Sustainability: Many alternatives used materials or construction techniques that were not readily available in Aceh making maintenance or alteration problematic. For example, the precision of these prefabricated houses was outside that commonly achievable in Sumatra. And with the departure of either the aid agency or the commercial supplier would difficult to source and expensive to supply. Such houses were not sustainable. This would particularly show up in the wet areas of the house such as the kitchen and bath room and home owners would probably resort back to local materials for patching up.
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This would not be good practice. The core house on the other hand used locally produced concrete blocks, sand, aggregate and cement. Materials that people could easily source and skills were readily available. 2) Social Sustainability: The alternative houses came as a completed 2 bedroom house that on the face it appeared to be up to standard. However, if a family were not an exact "2 bedroom family" (such as mother and father and 1 child or 2 children of the same gender or one set of parents and no children) then the house wouldnt be able to accommodate them. For example, if a family consisted of a mother and father, 1 teenage son and 1 teenage daughter someone would presumably have to sleep in the lounge? Therefore, it is debatable whether such a two bedroom approach is actually up to standard as intended by SPHEREs benchmarks of dignity, health safety and well being... This 2 bedroom approach was also repeated in non prefabricated houses. Altering such houses is discussed below under architectural sustainability. The core house on the other hand was intended to be adapted by the family, over time to fit their requirements. The core area could be used as the common area with extra rooms and extensions of the house either through the windows on the sides or by closing in either end of the house. Thus, the core house could be fitted to the family (and not the other way around as happens with the 2 bedroom approach). Thus, the core house had a social sustainability component that was not evident in other house designs. 3) Architectural Sustainability: Following on from the above was the issue of extend-ability of a 2 bedroom house (prefabricated or otherwise). Firstly, any alteration to a prefabricated house would require professional engineering advice related to tie beams, bracing walls and structural support of roofs. The structural system while addressing issues usually of quality control and construction speed means a level of sophistication not usually employed for housing in Aceh. Hence, there would be the likely hood that such alterations would be done without the required professional advice. Figure 3 (left) below shows an example of such a prefabricated design available in Aceh. Alteration of this 2 bedroom house would require complete removal of a prefabricated section of wall located between the columns and then infilling to get the required opening. It is not clear what would be the impact of any wall removal on the remaining house structural integrity? But such advice would not be available to the house owner after the departure of the aid agency that built or supplied the house. Secondly, locating the bathroom/toilet inside and between bedrooms meant that the back wall of the house (where the bathroom/ toilet was located) could not be extended without significant renovation of the bathroom/toilet area together with its associated septic tank (and potentially any water tank). Leaving the bathroom/ toilet where it was and extending around the bathroom/ toilet would be unwise. It would produce an internal toilet with issues of smell, lack ventilation, compromise health and again not in line with the benchmarks of dignity, health safety and well being... Finally, extending out through either side walls would be hampered by the installation of the bedrooms on either side of the house. An example of such a design is shown in figure 3 (centre and right) which is taken from one of the best low cost housing complex surveyed earlier and taken from a report by Fardanesh. (Fardanesh, 2005).
FLOOR PLAN
Veranda
Bed Room
3.00
Hall / Living Room Bed Room Veranda 3.00 3.00
1.50
3.00
Figure 3: Comparison with other House Designs
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The core house on the other hand was designed to have the areas below windows removed allowing extensions on both sides and extensions front and rear as required by the family without compromising the original structure. In addition, the location of the bathroom/toilet on the corner of the outer wall thus allowing extension on that side of the house without the need for such extensive renovations. It is interesting to note that by increasing the floor area of the house many agencies avoided these issues but however increased the cost and construction time for the house. 4) Community Sustainability: The uniformity of prefabricated houses will produce a one size fits all solution. And while houses could be expected to be customise over time such customisation will be limited as discussed above. However, the core design will facilitate and invite their owners to extent out beyond the core so that with relative ease and much sooner than with other options. Thus, families and thereby communities can quickly take on their own particular character. 5) Logistics. Prefabricated houses are heavier because they include the weight of the sand, aggregate and the water which is added on site with the core house. Prefabricated houses are around 10 tonnes for a 36m2 house whereas the equivalent core house is approximately 5 tonnes or less depending on resources available on site. 6) Economic Sustainability: Perhaps the most importantly issue is the economic multiplier effect of spending locally rather then outside the tsunami affected area. The core house design means that as much as possible is spent within the affected community and Aceh generally. The trickle down or multiplier effect of such spending is between 3 and 5 and hence for every dollar spent the economy sees between 3 to 5 times that expenditure as that dollar successively triggers other spending (CARE, 2004). The building industry is often used by many Governments to stimulate economic growth (usually prior to elections) because this multiplier effect occurs more rapidly than in other sectors. And in the Aceh situation agencies and NGO's should be seeking ways to "buy Aceh" as a way not only of completing their programs but also as a way of jump starting the local economy. The prefabricated houses are largely constructed out of town and hence this effect is minimal. This analysis suggested that the core design should be followed through into construction.
HARMONISED PERMANENT HOUSE DESIGN FOR UN AGENCIES AND NGOs

An agreement was also reached between the UN Agencies and NGOs in Aceh involved in permanent shelter regarding house specifications. This agreement was intended to eliminate (or at least minimise) any significant differences between the housing aid programs offered by the different agencies. The following was agreed: Houses would have concrete floor Houses would have a corrugated iron roof The house cladding material was left up to each Agency.
The final decision of the cladding material was left to each Agency in developing their permanent shelter program. At the time it was felt that specification of the cladding would result in a monotone housing landscape. Moreover, there were several competing values associated with the selection of the cladding material and together with a lack of site resource information made any such selection premature. These competing values made any selection complex and the selection of the cladding material for the UNHCR house is discussed in more detail later in this paper. That aside, this agreement was a major achievement and one that was particularly appreciated by those NGOs with large budgets.
ZONING AND LAND TENURE.

Zoning and land tenure were two thorny issues.
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Government initiatives to create a Green Zone (which at one time consisted of the first 3 kilometres of land from the sea shore) were soundly rejected by the Acehnese people (BAPPENAS, 2005). Instead local people spontaneously started to return to their original land plots and building temporary houses. It was clear that such zoning given that it contained much of the affected areas fertile rice fields and fish ponds was probably never going to be accepted. This Green Zone was later replaced by Village Planning Guidelines with the establishment of the Government Department in charge of the tsunami reconstruction Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NADNias or BRR (BRR, 2005). The guidelines stressed that Finally, it is important to note that the benefits of community-driven participatory planning are real and significant. Proper village planning can help achieve sustainable development, minimize long-term social conflict, and mitigate the potential danger of natural hazards. Villages were subsequently required to submit a master plan for approval to BRR before any house construction could start. And central to this master plan was the land tenure within the village. Again early Government initiatives to register land were ignored. The process of registration is both expensive and time consuming resulting in only 22% of land in Java and 11% outside of Java being registered (Stevens, 2002). This situation was created in 1960 with the passing of the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) that aimed to bring land ownership into line with western approaches (and presumably encourage western investment) and it was to replace the informal adat system of land ownership. According to Stevens adat law is very diverse. Up to 300 separate identifiable adat systems have been identified. Adat is tied up with societal relations, religion and traditional customs and beliefs. It is dynamic, largely unwritten and fluid. Some efforts have been made to codify or document adat laws, but little research has been undertaken since the 1940 He concludes that not surprisingly, implementation (of the BAL) has proven disastrous. While recognising that adat law still applies, government implementation of the system has been hostile towards it. Statutory restrictions on adat title have been exploited heavily by the state. Article 5 of BAL states that adat must not be contrary to the national interest. This has given the government carte blanche to expropriate adat land for development projects. Consequently, the rejection of land registration and the continuation of adapt (informal) land ownership was not surprising.
Thus, villages were required (and assisted by agencies involved with them) to complete the adat process at a community and lodge these record with BRR as the first step in the development of a permanent shelter program.
THE SELECTION OF THE HOUSE CLADDING MATERIAL

Three locally used cladding materials were identified namely: Timber Concrete Block with grouted infill Brick with a concrete frame.
Examples of these (taken from the Spatial Survey) are shown in figure 4 below. Other options such as styrene foam boards, rice board, bamboo and rammed earth were not considered as it was felt that the use of non local materials could be easily rejected by beneficiaries despite any technical advantages.
Timber Concrete Block Brick with a Concrete Frame. Figure 4: Local Cladding Options for Low Cost Permanent Housing in Aceh
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However, such options were not discarded completely but because of the complexity of the issues involved it was felt that further complication with a new material would not be advisable. Consequently, only these three options were studied. The complexity of what is apparently a straight forward issue can be gauged from table 2 below. Many do not understand the balancing process involved in selecting cladding nor the process and design of shelter let alone permanent shelter. Nonetheless, this has to be done and initially because of cost it was felt that the cladding selection tended towards timber but with the proviso that availability be confirmed at each location. This was countered by the need to complete a sustainability evaluation and the need to ensure that a sustainable harvesting scheme was adopted. There was a concern with the perceived quality of timber over the other two hard surface materials. This was confirmed both by UNHCRs spatial survey of low cost housing in Banda Aceh and by national construction figures obtained from BPS (Indonesian Government Statistics Department) that 95% and 94% of houses had hard surfaces. This was countered by the traditional wooden house (more common in rural areas) and the feeling amongst UNHCR national staff in Banda Aceh that if you did not have a house than any house was a better option. Thus, in the initial stages timber appeared to have potential advantages over the other two options. This was followed by intense concerns based in part around the East Timor Shelter program experience that the selection of the cladding (and the complete permanent shelter solution) was largely a question of logistics and procurement. The impact of at least the logistic issue can be seen in the number of 40 kg bags of cement that are required for each of the housing types. A timber house requires 25 bags while a concrete block house requires 100 bags (4 times that of the timber house) and a brick house requires 150 bags (6 times that of the timber house option). Given that corrugated iron and cement would be the two bulky and heavy items to be potentially transported to site underlines the impact of the above figures. On the face of it this would appear to also favour timber but the difficulty of grading, quality control and procurement meant that timber also had a down side. Those with experience from earlier shelter programs both in Indonesia and Sri Lanka were strongly suggesting the use of light gauge steel sections and the use of hard surface materials. Issue Cost1 Cement Usage2 Timber 19,000,000 Rph 25 bags each 40 kg Concrete Block 22,000,000 Rph 100 bags each 40 kg (not including cement in concrete blocks). high Higher quality material. 94% of buildings have solid walls. 30+ years Medium. Skilled trades people required for concrete and block laying Brick with a Concrete Frame 26,000,000 Rph. 150 bags each 40 kg
Building Expertise Quality Perception Material Life Specification Issues
low Lower quality material
High Higher quality material. 94% of buildings have solid walls. 30+ years Medium. Skilled trades people required for concrete and brick laying
Capacity Building Seismic Design
2-5 years Highest. Previous experience suggests issues of grading, source, durability and problems with Good Light seismic loads and better seismic performance
Better Heavy seismic loads and the need for specific seismic design and detailing to achieve acceptable seismic performance. 4 weeks
Better Heavy seismic loads and the need for specific seismic design and detailing to achieve acceptable seismic performance. 4 weeks
Construction
1.-2 weeks
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time Sustainability Issues Thermal Properties Material resources at site
Deforestation and potential erosion Fast to heat and cool Timber is anticipated as being available in Lhoong and Lamno areas. Confirmed availability in Calang/Krueng Sabe but is not expected to be readily available further south in Teunom
Tsunami debris high generation. Table 2: Competing Issues for Different House Cladding Options
Embodied energy and source of materials Slow to heat but slow to cool Sand, aggregates and stone are available in Calang/Krueng Sabe and are anticipated to be available in Lhoong and Lamno but is not expected to be readily available further south in Teunom low
Embodied energy and source of materials Slow to heat but slow to cool Suitable clay materials for bricks could be expected between Lhoong and Calang/Krueng Sabe but is not expected to be readily available further south in Teunom.
Low
Notes 1: Based on Banda Aceh prices with no ceiling or painting and no plastering of the concrete block and brick options. 2. This does not include the cement required for the concrete block production.
Work by UNHCRs Tsunami/Coastal Protection expert Frank Wilkinson pointed to the need for the reduction of debri and that timber houses within any potential tsunami zone (within 3.5 kilometres of the shore line) should be restricted or preferably eliminated. The presence of timber not only doubles the tsunami loads on other buildings (by increasing the density of the water flow) but also creates projectiles within the tsunami itself that increases any death toll. From this apparent melting pot developed the view that the paramount issues for the cladding selection were the following: The quality of the material The durability of the material The perception of timber being an inferior material.
And despite logistical and cost disadvantages the house cladding material should be concrete block. The selection of concrete block over brick was made not only because of cost (though this appears to be significant itself) but because of concerns relating to structural integrity, thermal comfort, weathering and constructability. In all these areas concrete block has advantages (though at times marginally so) over brick but taken overall these constitute a definitive preference.
CONCLUSION
The provision of shelter appears innocent and apparently straightforward. The reality is quite the opposite as can be hopefully seen from the above analysis. It is not simply a matter of procuring a ready made solution. The need to more than simple understand critical terms such dignity, health safety and well being.., the need for technical expertise, the impact of land and zoning issues, differ models of construction are all indications of the complexity of shelter provision. The concept of a core house has many advantages and this paper has strongly argued for such an approach in part to address this complexity but also issues of community participation and sustainability. However, this shelter program, despite the intensive research, the tight program and design strategy did not eventuate. The Indonesian Government closed off the emergency period 3 months after the tsunami and UNHCR was one of the agencies that had to leave. And consequently there is no conclusion to what was planned. The program was reinstated some 5 months later but by then the Aceh context had shifted.
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Nonetheless, the development and design process used for this shelter program does offer opportunities for other shelter programs. And hence, this paper.
REFERENCES
BAPPENAS (2005) Master Plan For The Rehabilitation And Reconstruction Of The Regions And Communities Of The Province Of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam And The Islands Of Nias, Province Of North Sumatera April 2005 published by BAPPENAS Dept. of Planning Indonesian Government BRR (2005) Village Planning Guidelines Badan Rekonstruksi Dan Rehabilitasi (BRR) NAD Nias Extended Guidelines for Infrastructure Redevelopment in Tsunami Affected Areas ISSUED DRAFT #1 15 September 2005 CARE (2004) Making Markets Work for the Poor. CARE Canadas Strategy for Helping the Poor through Enterprise 2004. Fardanesh G (2005) UNHCR Report on Suitable House Designs in Banda Aceh UNHCR Banda Aceh, Feb 2005. SPHERE (2004) Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. The Sphere Project Geneva Switzerland ISBN 92-9139-097-6 Stevens M. (2002) Indonesian Land Law Paper was prepared by Matt Stephens in Feb 2002 for the World Bank Justice for the Poor Project. UNHCR (2000) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR (1998) Handbook for Emergencies pub Wilkinson T (2005) Report On Coastal Design And Tsunami Mitigation For Shelter /House Reconstruction Along West Coast Aceh Province pub. UNHCR
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POST-TSUNAMI DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND; Leungbootnak, N., et. al.
POST-TSUNAMI DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THAILAND

Narong Leungbootnak1), Chotchai Charoenngam2), and Riza Yosia Sunindijo2) Faculty of Engineering Khon-Kaen University, 123 Friendship Road Khon-Kaen, Thailand 2) Construction Engineering and Infrastructure Management, School of Civil Engineering Asian Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120, Thailand E-mail of corresponding author: lnaron@kku.ac.th
1)
ABSTRACT
Tsunami disaster can happen at anytime and can bring great destruction to the affected areas. Loss of life, destruction of buildings and infrastructures, and destruction of agriculture land are the devastation that this disaster can bring. Therefore, effective post-tsunami disaster reconstruction management is important to minimize the impact of the disaster for the surrounding community. This study also discusses three stages of tsunami disaster management: before, during, and after disaster. It is found that there are five levels of coordination and collaboration that need to be considered in the disaster management: international, national, regional, organization, and project level. It is important to consider carefully the coordination and collaboration problems that may arise because they can affect the effectiveness of tsunami disaster management significantly. This study focuses more detail at the national and project level coordination and collaboration. Case study of the reconstruction process during the last tsunami disaster is given. It is discovered that lack of information is the main problem during reconstruction process. Therefore, critical success factors to improve this condition are presented. In addition, the study also presents possible frameworks for coordination and collaboration at other levels in tsunami disaster management. Key words: Tsunami disaster, Coordination and collaboration, Reconstruction management.
INTRODUCTION
Tsunami disaster can transpire without warning during day or night, during working or sleeping, in school or at home [Burling and Hyle, 1997]. Tsunami is a rare disaster and its action is only short lived. However, the violent activity of tsunami means its occurrence is often linked to catastrophic loss of life, destruction of properties and engineered structures, and destruction of crops and agriculture lands [Dominey-Howes, 1998]. A good example of the devastation that tsunami can bring is the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster. Magnitude 9.0 earthquake on December 26, 2004 at the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered a tsunami that caused more casualties than any other in recorded history and was recorded nearly world-wide on tide gauges in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. 12 countries were affected, more than 280,000 people have died and millions of people were homeless [BBC News World Edition, 2005; USGS, 2005]. In this kind of disaster, people need shelters and clean water immediately. Therefore, rapid housing building is important and providing infrastructure for water delivery is vital. This relief program and development can help the people in overcoming the disaster. Coordination among the involved parties in the relief program is a paramount important in this case. However, coordination also becomes a major challenge in responding to disaster, especially an international disaster like 2004 Asian tsunami. The difficulty happens because there are many parties from different countries and different organizations involved in the reconstruction programs [McEntire, 2002; Suparamaniam and Dekker, 2003].
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This study would like to explore the existing reconstruction management process of post-tsunami disaster and common problems that are present. In addition, suggestion for improving the existing tsunami disaster management was presented.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Tsunami disaster is violent and can bring great destruction to the impact areas. Therefore, it is important to understand the characteristics of the disaster and the necessary prevention method. Moreover, it is crucial to have an effective reconstruction management programs to develop and build the disaster areas. Coordination and collaboration between involved parties is vital for tsunami disaster reconstruction management [Ryan and Walsh, 2004]. However, previous studies showed that coordination problems still happen and can create ineffectiveness in the reconstruction management program [McEntire, 2002; Suparamaniam and Dekker, 2003]. Moreover, lack of cooperation or collaboration exists between the involved parties and results in mistrust and open hostility [Trim, 2004] although research showed that cooperation is important for providing services to the people or community [Ryan and Walsh, 2004].
OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
Fundamentally, this study attempts to explore the process of reconstruction management during tsunami disaster in Thailand. In order to achieve this, the following sub-objectives are investigated: - To identify the reconstruction problems of Thai tsunami disaster management. - To propose the appropriate proactive methods for reducing the problems of tsunami disaster in the reconstruction project.
STAGES OF TSUNAMI DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Basically, tsunami disaster management can be divided into three apparent stages: before disaster/proactive approach, during disaster, and post disaster. This study mainly explores the post disaster stage. The common activities in each stage are given below. 1. Before disaster/proactive approach Proactive approach in tsunami disaster management is important to minimize the impact of the disaster. In this case, effective disaster preparedness is essential. There are several steps that can be considered for creating an effective disaster preparedness program and government should involve seriously for ensuring its successfulness [McEntire and Myers, 2004]: - Establishing law: Law will give the program power and authority. It shows that the government has commitment in the preparedness program and shows the responsible personnel in the program. - Assessing the tsunami hazard: Assessment can be done by recording prior disaster events and searching information for historical data on the disaster. - Creating an emergency operation plan (EOP): An EOP indicates the general courses of action to be taken during the disaster, however should be flexible enough to allow some improvising. - Creating a warning system: Warning provides vital information for the community such as when the disaster will occur, how long the disaster will last, and what people can expect in term of impact. - Identifying and acquiring resources and grants: An emergency manager should be able to reach people who can authorize the use of personnel, equipment, and supplies for relief activities. - Initiating mutual aid agreement: Mutual aid agreement is a contract between different local governments to assist each other during the disaster. - Training and exercising: Both are important to ensure that the personnel understand their responsibility during the disaster and also to test the applicability of the EOP. - Public education: Public education will provide information regarding the disaster to the community, therefore they will understand to take proactive action during the disaster.
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2. During disaster During the critical time of disaster, it is important that people are well informed regarding the disaster. People should remain calm and follow the emergency procedures and proactive actions that have been prepared in advance. If possible, it is vital to inform the tsunami disaster to other areas that may be affected later on due to the time tsunami needs to travel across the ocean. This information can save many lives and help other areas preparing for the disaster. 3. After disaster An effective relief program is essential to help people recover from the impact of the disaster. Some aspects that should be considered in relief program are as follow [McEntire, 1999]: - Declaration of the disaster: The declaration shows that the government acknowledges the disaster and that help is needed. - Distribution of aid: It is necessary to understand the needs of the people suffered because of the disaster. Moreover, aid should be distributed evenly so every one can gain benefits. - Coordination and collaboration: Relief operations need coordination and collaboration among various agencies and organizations. They are important for facilitating the sharing of resources and minimizing the duplication of efforts. - Knowledgeable relief workers: Experience in relief work is essential to ensure that people can get appropriate caring. Experience workers also will understand the needs of local disaster victims. - Integration of relief and development: Development should become a high priority in the relief program. Development will help people to rebuild their areas and bounce back from the effects of the disaster.
LEVEL OF COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION IN TSUNAMI DISASTER MANAGEMENT

As mentioned previously, coordination and collaboration are important to manage all the parties that involve in the tsunami disaster management program and to ensure that victims of the disaster can get maximum benefits from the program. There are five levels of coordination and collaboration in tsunami disaster management: international level, regional level, national level, organizational level, and project level. This study mainly discusses coordination and collaboration at the project level.
International Level It is common in practice that there are many countries involved in the disaster management, especially for tsunami disaster that usually affects many areas in different countries. Sometimes, international relief efforts face problems related with socio-cultural and religious aspects that can create mistrust and hostility [Trim, 2004]. Moreover, international relief works mostly use military command and control model that can create false assumption and misdirected efforts. It is suggested that this command and control method is shifted to coordination and collaboration method. It is recommended that coordination and collaboration should renegotiate the existing authority, procedures, structures, hierarchies, and formalities [Suparamaniam and Dekker, 2003]. Regional Level This is similar with the coordination and collaboration in the international level. Regional level involves countries in one particular region. It is typical for countries in the same region to have regional coordination and collaboration in order to increase the effectiveness the countries in the region. An example of regional level coordination and collaboration is Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which objectives are to accelerate development and promote regional peace and stability in the region [ASEAN, 2004]. National Level Tsunami disaster usually affects one country greatly and become a national disaster. The role of government in that particular country is important in this case. Government should recognize the importance of the disaster management program and has commitment in the program. It is necessary to make a formal organizational entity for handling the disaster management program [Nateghi-A, 2000].
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An example for government involvement in disaster management can be examined in Iran. Iran has Natural Disaster Headquarter (NDH) under the ministry of interior which has full authority and responsible for policy, guidance, supervision, coordination of the disaster management. NDH also has responsibility in coordinating rescue and relief operations, temporary settlement and reconstruction with the cooperation of all the respected government agencies [Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999].
Organizational Level Obviously, there are many organizations involved in the disaster management program, such as Red Cross, fire department, humanitarian organizations, social organizations, and churches. Consequently, disaster management is a complex process and requires the involvement of many actors and the coordination of numerous emergency, recovery, and development activities [McEntire, 2002]. Project Level Tsunami disaster management will involve many projects for its implementation. This project level management usually happens after the disaster. Basically, there are three main projects that should be done after the disaster: rescue and relief, temporary settlement, and reconstruction [Ghafory-Ashtiany, 1999]. Once again, coordination and cooperation are important to ensure that public will get maximum benefits from the projects.
METHODOLOGY
Previous part shows that there are five levels of coordination and collaboration in tsunami disaster management. This study explored the project level of this tsunami disaster management. Reconstruction project in recent tsunami disaster was taken as a case study in this study. There are six development stages in the tsunami disaster reconstruction project, namely planning, budgeting, project design, project procurement, construction and supervision, and operation and maintenance stage. The study examined each development stage to find the existing procedure and common problems during the reconstruction process. The methodology framework for this research is presented in Fig. 1.
Development Stages: Planning Budgeting Project Design Project Procurement - Construction & Supervision - Operation & Maintenance -
Problem Examination
Instrumentation: Case Study Sampling Method: Convenient Sampling Data Collection: Review of Case Study Data Analysis: Problem Determination Examination Process: - Existing Procedure - Problems Characteristic
Result of the Study
Fig. 1: Methodology framework of the study
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DISCUSSION
This part shows two case studies of typical reconstruction project after recent tsunami disaster. First case study explored public reconstruction project and second case study explored private reconstruction project.
Public Reconstruction Project In Thailand, there is a Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation to manage this issue which duties and responsibilities are as follow [Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2005]: 1. Formulate policy, guideline and set up criteria for disaster management. 2. Study, analyze, research and develop the prevention, warning and disaster mitigation systems. 3. Develop information technology system for disaster prevention, warning and mitigation. 4. Mobilize people's participation in establishing disaster prevention and mitigation. 5. Create people's awareness and preparedness in disaster prevention and mitigation. 6. Arranging the training and exercise in disaster prevention and mitigation, rehabilitation devastated area and in assisting the victims as stated by law. 7. Promote, support and carry out disaster prevention and mitigation activities, provide assistance to the victims and rehabilitate devastated areas. 8. Direct and coordinate the operation of assisting the victims and rehabilitate the areas devastated by large-scale or high magnitude disaster. 9. Coordinate the assistance with the organizations both internal and international in disaster prevention mitigation and rehabilitation. 10. Perform any other functions stated in by the laws as the Department's tasks or as assigned by Ministry of Interior or the Cabinet.
This department should manage and lead other parties in the country to ensure an effective disaster management plan. An example of disaster management coordination and collaboration among parties is shown in Fig. 2. Department of disaster prevention and mitigation should collaborate with other government departments in national disaster management. In case of disaster, this department should coordinate other departments for disaster management activities according to policy and regulation. The department also collaborates with other parties and coordinates them for improving the effectiveness of the disaster management program.
Other Government Departments
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
Engineering Institute
Architect Institute
University and Research Institute Research in disaster prevention and management Propose new method for disaster management
Reconstruction Implement disaster prevention plan
Rapid house design Low cost design Sanitation design
Fig. 2: National disaster management 2004 Asian tsunami disaster forced Thailand government to carry out reconstruction to its impacted areas and this study investigated this reconstruction process. Thailand government effort by constructing temporary shelter or housing for the tsunami victims in Ranong province was taken as a case study. The
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construction process itself was conducted by Thai Royal Air Forces [Disaster Construction Task Force, 2005]. The house characteristics are as follow: Two-storey house (3m x 6m) with two bedrooms (3m x 3m) in the second floor. Kitchen and toilet are in first floor with concrete pavement as floor. The second floor is a timber house with concrete column in the first floor. Second floor slab made by 15mm thick plywood. Cement boards were used as the walls. Cement rolling was used as roof.
For the construction process, civil work division of Royal Thai Air Force mobilized the skill labors from the soldiers. Each working team consisted of 10 to 12 people including 4 to 5 people skill labors and 5 to 6 people general labors. Each unit of house can be finished within 7 days.
Private Reconstruction Project Government is not the only party that involved in the reconstruction process, private parties also joined in this reconstruction project. This study investigated private reconstruction project in Lanta Island, Krabi. The construction characteristics are as follow: - One or two stories resort hotel. - 80 rooms capacity - Reinforced concrete structure - Brick wall - Timber floor finishing - Built-in and loose furniture - Swimming pool and spa - Restaurant and sport facilities Findings of the Study The first finding of the study investigated level of information clarification in each reconstruction development stage both for public and private project. Weight Average Index (WAI) was used to assess the project in every stage of development as shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Weight Average Index (WAI) of Information Clarification

Development Stage 1. Planning 2. Budgeting 3. Design 3.1 Drawings 3.2 Specification 3.3 Cost estimation 3.4 Method statement 4. Procurement 4.1 Bid method 4.2 Bid evaluation 4.3 Contractor selection 5. Construction & Supervision 5.1 Time 5.2 Cost 5.3 Quality 6. Operation & Maintenance 6.1 Operation 6.2 Routine maintenance 6.3 Interval maintenance 6.4 Emergency maintenance Total Average Public Project EE ME SAN RH RH Average RH RL M L Average RL RL RL Average H M M Average M N/A N/A M 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 Private Project EE ME SAN RL M RL RL M RL Average RL M RH RH RH RH RL M M RH RH RH RH RH RL
WAI 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.73 1.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 No No 0.60 0.64
OA RH RH M RH RL M L RL RL RL RL RH H M M M M N/A N/A M RH
A RH RH RL RH RL RH RL M RL
S M RH RH RH RH RH RH RH M
ID M M M M M H M M H
WAI 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.60 0.77 0.63 0.80 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.60 0.67
OA M M RH M RH RH RH RH M RH M RH RH RH RH RH H M M M RH
Average RL M RL M RL RH
Average RH M RH RH RH RH RL M M RH RH M M M M M M M
0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63
Average H M M M 0.66 H M M M 0.75 RH M RL RL 0.50 RH M RL RL 0.65 RH M RL RL 0.63 H M M M 0.68
0.90 0.60 0.50 0.50 0.63
Legend: - Clarification level of information: L = Low RL = Rather Low M = Moderate RH = Rather High H = High - A = Architectural Work S = Structural Work EE = Electrical Work ME = Mechanical Work SAN = Sanitary Work ID = Interior Work - WAI level: Low (L) Rather Low (RL) Moderate (M) Rather High (RH) High (H) 0.21-0.40 0.41-0.60 0.61-0.80 0.81-1.00 0.00-0.20 The table shows that problems of unclear information still exist in both public and private project during the reconstruction effort. Both have similar total WAI, 0.64 for public project and 0.63. Therefore, it means that unclear information during reconstruction tsunami disaster project is around 36-37%. This number shows that uncertainty is high in this kind of project. Although public and private project have similar WAI, they have different root problems of unclear information. Public project has better information during planning and budgeting compares with private project during these stages. However, public project has less clear information during design and procurement stage than private project. Public project should improve this situation especially for information related with specification, method statement, bid method, bid evaluation, and contractor selection. To improve the existing condition, this study suggests these following success factors that need to be considered in the project level [Charoenngam, 2004]: - Clear defined goals (national policy, organizational goals, and project objectives). - Top management support (executive commitment, on time decision, and acceptable cost overrun). - Competent project manager (management competency, technical competency, law and contract competency, and responsive to clients).
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Competent project members (project owner, project consultant, contractor, sub-contractor, and supplier). Sufficient resources (labors, material, tools and equipment, and clear shop drawings). Client consultation (marketing or user, cost adjustment, time management, and appropriateness of quality). Adequate communication (to reduce cross culture problems, functional problems, and conflict of interest problems).
Moreover, this study would like to emphasis the importance of competence project manager in this kind of construction. Lack of available information makes the project manager faces a lot of uncertainties, therefore it is important to choose a competent and experienced project manager in management, technical, and contract. For the next finding, it is found that post-tsunami disaster reconstruction project is different with another normal-practice project. Method statement for reconstruction project is important because usually the project needs to be finished immediately. However, if there is unclear data or information during reconstruction process, it is necessary to review back the design to clear up the situation. The difference between normal-practice construction and post-tsunami reconstruction project is given in Fig. 3.
NormalDesign Specification CostConstruction
Post-tsunami Design Specification Method CostConstruction Unclear N
Fig. 3: The Difference between Normal-practice and Post-tsunami Project In addition, the study also found some common processes in the private reconstruction project. Lastly the study explored schedule control, quality control, and public involvement in each stage of public reconstruction project. The findings are presented in Table 2 and 3. Table 2: Common Processes in Private Reconstruction Project Damage Investigation Architectural Work Structural Work Electrical Work Communication Work Air Conditioning Work Sanitary Work Virtual inspection Virtual inspection Virtual inspection & testing Virtual inspection & testing Virtual inspection & testing Virtual inspection Necessary for Testing No Yes or No Yes Yes Yes No Necessary for Rework No No Yes Yes Yes No Remark
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Table 3: Schedule Control, Quality Control, and Public Involvement in Public Reconstruction Project Schedule Control High Medium Medium High High Medium Quality Control High Medium Medium Medium Medium Public Involvement No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Remark
Planning Budgeting Design Procurement Construction Operation
CONCLUSION
The renovation of any building after tsunami disaster is an unusual practice. Consequently, it does not have clear information in the initial stage of the project. This situation creates problems during construction and supervision, such as difficulty to control time, cost, and quality. It also brings negative impacts to the operation and maintenance stage. This condition is a big constraint for the construction industry and needs to be addressed by all concerned parties. This study also found another problem related with the investors. Mostly, they do not know the process and the problems in construction, but they want to see the success of the project that can bring direct impact to their business cycle. In the reconstruction project, lack of information in all stages of development is the main problem that needs to be addressed. This study presents some critical factors that can be utilized to improve the situation. It is found that coordination and collaboration are essential in tsunami disaster management. The study has investigated tsunami disaster management in the project level coordination and collaboration which can be utilized to improve the existing practice. In addition, the study also gave possible coordination and collaboration in other levels as well.
REFERENCES
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2004). Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEAN Secretariat. Retrieved on April 19, 2005 from Website: http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm. BBC News World Edition. (2005). In Depth Tsunami Disaster. BBC. Retrieved on March 16, 2005 from Website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/world/2004/asia_quake_disaster/. Burling, W. K. and Hyle, A. E. (1997). Disaster Preparedness Planning: Policy and Leadership Issues. Disaster Prevention and Management, 6, 4, 234-244. Charoenngam, C. (2004). Integrated Project Planning and Control Hand-out. Asian Institute of Technology, Pathumthani, Thailand. Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. (2005). Duty and Responsibility. Ministry of Interior. Retrieved on April 20, 2005 from Website: http://www.disaster.go.th/english/eng02.htm. Disaster Construction Task Force. (2005). Royal Thai Air Force, Ranong Province, Bangkok, Thailand. Dominey-Howes, D. T. M. (1998). Assessment of Tsunami Magnitude and Implications for Urban Hazard Planning in Greece. Disaster Prevention and Management, 7, 3, 176-182. Ghafory-Ashtiany, M. (1999). Rescue Operation and Reconstruction of Recent Earthquakes in Iran. Disaster Prevention and Management, 8, 1, 5-20. McEntire, D. A. (1999). Issues in Disaster Relief: Progress, Perpetual Problems and Prospective Solutions. Disaster Prevention and Management, 8, 5, 351-361. McEntire, D. A. (2002). Coordinating Multi-organizational Responses to Disaster: Lessons from the March 28, 2000, Forth Worth Tornado. Disaster Prevention and Management, 11, 5, 369-379. McEntire, D. A. and Myers, A. (2004). Preparing Communities for Disasters: Issues and Processes for Government Readiness. Disaster Prevention and Management, 13, 2, 140-152.
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Authors Index Name Adisornsupawat K. Charoenngam, C. Chidtong, Y. Donnges, C. Fernando, S. Galagedara, L.W. Giao, P.H. Gunaratna, L.H.P. Gupta, A.D. Hanaoka, S. Hemachandra, S.K. Heng, S. Ito, T. Kamiko, N. Karim, M.F. Kobayashi, H. Kusanagi, M. Kuwahara, Y. Lefebvre, B.G. Leungbootnak, N. Nissanka, S.P. Nobuoka, H. Potangaroa, R. Phien-wej, N. Qadir, F.M. Rouvre, J.B. Singh, V. Shuto, N. Soorasena, J.M. Page 77 144 60 93 22 22 77 22 84 106 22 50 13 13 13 13 66 13 117 33, 144 22 13 33, 125, 134 77 106 42 77 1, 60 22
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Authors Index Name Srivichai, M. Sunindijo, R.Y. Supratid, S. Thaicharoen, C. Thapa, R.B. Tingsanchali, T. Tripathi, S. Weerakkody, W.A.P. Weesakul, S. Wickramarachchai, B. Yokoki, H. Page 60 144 60 84 66 33 50, 66 22 84 111 13
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Proceedings

SCIENTIFIC FORUM ON THE TSUNAMI, ITS IMPACT AND RECOVERY

6th 7th June 2005 Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand Organized by

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Prof. Mario T. Tabucanon

Prof. Chongrak Polprasert

Prof. Tawatchai Tingsanchali

Tel: Fax: Forum website: E mail:

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI OF 2004

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

GENERATION, PROPAGATION AND AMPLIFICATION

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMI DEFENCE WORKS

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

FORECASTING AND EVACUATION

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

TSUNAMIS: THEIR COASTAL EFFECTS AND DEFENSE WORKS; Shuto, N.

0 1 Sudden rise near the shore. Rapid tide.

2 4 Wall of water in the offing. Second wave breaks.

3 8 Wave front often breaks.

4 5 16 32 First wave may show plunging breaker.

Fig.1 Phenomena of and damage due to tsunamis in terms of tsunami intensity

NARRATIVES OF THE RESIDENTS

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES OF TSUNAMI AND POST-TSUNAMI REHABILITATION IN SRI LANKA

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

0 <6 6 20 21-60 >60 Age (years)

50-100 Distance (m)

0 <50 51-100 Distance (m) >100

<51m 51-100m >100m

24% <51 m 51-100 m 14% >100 m

60 40 20 0 Completely destroyed Partially Cracked Mud deposited Sunken

quantity 60% 48% 84% 51%

From all families(%)

8% Yes No No respoinse 82%

Yes No 57% 5% No response

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND

STAGES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

1. Preparedness for prevention and mitigation

4. Recovery and rehabilitation

Figure 1. Disaster Management Cycle

COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND

Before Government Reform

After Government Reform

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

MASTER PLAN FOR WATER-RELATED NATURAL DISASTERS IN THAILAND

IMPROVEMENT OF WATER-RELATED DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THAILAND; Tingsanchali, T. and Luengbootnak, N.

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