Consti Mock Bar

Constitutional Law Reviewer for Mock Bar
Citizenship
1. What citizenship principle do the Philippines adhere to? Explain, and give illustrative case.
Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
2. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on Ma !", !#$% in &apier 'errace, (roo)e, Western *ustralia, to the spouses, 'eles+oro Ybasco, a ,ilipino citizen and native o+ -aet, .a)arines &orte, and 'heresa Mar/uez, an *ustralian. 0s she a ,ilipino citizen and, there+ore, /uali+ied to run +or 1overnor o+ her province?
Held: Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on ay !", !#$% in &apier Terrace, 'roome, (estern )ustralia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a *ilipino citizen and native of +aet, ,amarines &orte, and Theresa ar-uez, an )ustralian. .istorically, this was a year before the !#$/ ,onstitution too0 into effect and at that time, what served as the ,onstitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the 1nited 2tates governed the country. These were the Philippine 'ill of 3uly !, !#45 and the Philippine )utonomy )ct of )ugust 5#, !#!", also 0nown as the 3ones Law. )mong others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine 6slands. 7 7 7 1nder both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were 2panish sub8ects on )pril !!, !9## and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent:s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on 3anuary /, !9;# in +aet, ,amarines &orte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of 'irths. Thus, under the Philippine 'ill of !#45 and the 3ones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. 'y virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo:s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is li0ewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the !#$/ Philippine ,onstitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the ac-uisition of Philippine citizenship 7 7 7. 2o also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subse-uently retained under the !#;$ and !#9; ,onstitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a *ilipino citizen, having been born to a *ilipino father. The fact of her being born in )ustralia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. 6f )ustralia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim )ustralian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
3. -oes a legiti)ate child born under the !#$2 .onstitution o+ a ,ilipino )other and an alien +ather who elected Philippine citizenship +ourteen 3!%4 ears a+ter attaining the age o+ )a5orit beco)e a ,ilipino?
Held: 1nder )rticle 6<, 2ection !=$> of the !#$/ ,onstitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a *ilipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of ma8ority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. ,.). &o. "5/ which was enacted pursuant to 2ection !=$>, )rticle 6< of the !#$/ ,onstitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to ma0e a valid election of Philippine citizenship. .owever, the !#$/ ,onstitution and ,.). &o. "5/ did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The !#$/ ,harter only provides that the election should be made ?upon reaching the age of ma8ority.@ The age of ma8ority then commenced upon reaching twentyAone =5!> years. 6n the opinions of the 2ecretary of

3ustice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this ,ourt prior to the effectivity of the !#$/ ,onstitution. 6n these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the +epartment of 2tate of the 1nited 2tates Bovernment to the effect that the election should be made within a ?reasonable time@ after attaining the age of ma8ority. The phrase ?reasonable time@ has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three =$> years from reaching the age of ma8ority. The span of fourteen =!%> years that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of ma8ority until he finally e7pressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the re-uirement of electing ?upon reaching the age of ma8ority.@ Philippine citizenship can never be treated li0e a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. Cne who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. )s such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. (Re& A''l"ca(")n *)! A+#"ss")n () (,e ,"l"''"ne Ba!, V"cen(e -. C,"ng, Ba! Ma((e! .). 9/4, Oc(. /, /999, En Banc [0a'unan$%
4. 6ow )a Philippine citizenship be renounced? 0s the application +or an alien certi+icate o+ registration, and the possession o+ +oreign passport, tanta)ount to acts o+ renunciation o+ Philippine citizenship?
Held: In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express . Petitioner:s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her )ustralian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar v. COME EC !"#$ %C&A '() *"++(,- and in the more recent case of Mercado v. Manzano and COME EC !..&. /o. ")$(#), )(' %C&A 0)(, May 10, "+++-. 6n the case of )znar, the ,ourt ruled that the mere fact that he is an )merican did not mean that he is no longer a *ilipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. )nd, in Mercado v. Manzano and COME EC, it was held that the fact that respondent anzano was registered as an )merican citizen in the 'ureau of 6mmigration and +eportation and was holding an )merican passport on )pril 55, !##;, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for viceAmayor of a0ati, were 8ust assertions of his )merican nationality before the termination of his )merican citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an )ustralian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of *ilipino citizenship. *or renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be e7press. )s held by this ,ourt in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an e7press renunciation or repudiation of one:s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an )ustralian passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her )ustralian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship D she was an )ustralian and a *ilipino, as well. oreover, under ,ommonwealth )ct "$, the fact that a child of *ilipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one:s Philippine citizenship. 2ince private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner:s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
5. What are the wa s o+ ac/uiring citizenship? -iscuss.

Held: There are two ways of ac-uiring citizenshipE =!> by birth, and =5> by naturalization. These ways of ac-uiring citizenship correspond to the two 0inds of citizensE the naturalAborn citizen, and the naturalized citizen. ) person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalA born citizen thereof. )s defined in the 7 7 7 ,onstitution, naturalAborn citizens ?are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac-uire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.@ Cn the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become *ilipino citizens through naturalization, generally under ,ommonwealth )ct &o. %;$, otherwise 0nown as the Revised &aturalization Law, which repealed the former &aturalization Law =)ct &o. 5#5;>, and by Republic )ct &o. /$4. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
6. 'o be naturalized, what )ust an applicant prove? When and what are the conditions be+ore the decision granting Philippine citizenship beco)es executor ?
Held: To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the -ualifications and none of the dis-ualifications provided by law to become a *ilipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes e7ecutory only after two =5> years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has =!> not left the PhilippinesF =5> has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or professionF =$> has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rulesF or =%> committed any act pre8udicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies !%ection ", &.A. $)(-. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
7. What /uali+ications )ust be possessed b an applicant +or naturalization?

Held: 2ection 5, )ct %;$ provides the following -ualificationsE =a> .e must be not less than 5! years of age on the day of the hearing of the petitionF =b> .e must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten yearsF =c> .e must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine ,onstitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is livingF =d> .e must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some 0nown lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupationF =e> .e must be able to spea0 and write Gnglish or 2panish and any of the principal languagesF and =f> .e must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the 'ureau of Private 2chools of the Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines re-uired of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
8. What are the dis/uali+ications under 7ection %, *ct %8$, in an application +or naturalization?
Held: 2ection %, )ct %;$, provides the following dis-ualificationsE =a> .e must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governmentsF

=b> .e must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideasF =c> .e must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamyF =d> .e must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitudeF =e> .e must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseasesF =f> .e must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines =or not less than si7 months before filing his application>, mingled socially with the *ilipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the *ilipinosF =g> .e must not be a citizen or sub8ect of a nation with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such warF =h> .e must not be a citizen or sub8ect of a foreign country whose laws do not grant *ilipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or sub8ects thereof. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
9. -istinguish naturalization +ro) repatriation, and discuss the applicable laws in each.
Held: &)T1R)L6H)T6C& is a mode for both ac-uisition and reac-uisition of Philippine citizenship. )s a mode of initially ac-uiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by ,ommonwealth )ct &o. %;$, as amended. Cn the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reac-uiring Philippine citizenship is governed by ,ommonwealth )ct &o. "$ !An Act 2roviding 3or the 4ays in 4hich 2hilippine Citizenship May 5e ost or &eac6uired *"+)0,-. 1nder this law, a former *ilipino citizen who wishes to reac-uire Philippine citizenship must possess certain -ualifications and none of the dis-ualifications mentioned in 2ection % of ,.). %;$. RGP)TR6)T6C&, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due toE =!> desertion of the armed forces !%ection 7, C.A. /o. 0)-8 =5> service in the armed forces of the allied forces in (orld (ar 66 !%ection ", &epublic Act /o. +0$ *"+$),-8 =$> service in the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates at any other time !%ec. ", &epublic Act /o. 10)( *"+0(,-8 =%> marriage of a *ilipino woman to an alien !%ec. ", &epublic Act /o. #"'" *"++$,-8 and =/> political and economic necessity !Ibid-. )s distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the ta0ing of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local ,ivil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. I77 oreover, repatriation results in the recovery o3 the original nationality. This means that a naturalized *ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized *ilipino citizen. Cn the other hand, if he was originally a naturalAborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a naturalAborn *ilipino. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
10. 6ow )a ,ilipino citizens who lost their citizenship reac/uire the sa)e?
Answer: *ilipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may 7 7 7 reac-uire the same in the manner provided by law. ,ommonwealth )ct &o. "$ enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reac-uired by a former citizenE =!> by naturalization, =5> by repatriation, and =$> by direct act of ,ongress. (7!"val+) v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, 8une 25, /999, En Banc [ angan":an$; An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
11. Who )a validl avail o+ repatriation under R.*. &o. 9!8!?

Held: R.). &o. 9!;!, which has lapsed into law on Cctober 5$, !##/, is an act providing for the repatriation =a> of *ilipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and =b> of naturalAborn *ilipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. (4e!a!+) Anga( v. Re'u:l"c, 4.R. .). /32244, Se'(. /4, /999 [V"(ug$%
12. (e+ore what agenc should application +or repatriation under R.* 9!8! be +iled?
Held: 1nder 2ection ! of P.+. &o. ;5/, dated 3une /, !#;/, amending ,.). &o. "$, an application for repatriation could be filed with the %pecial Committee on /aturalization chaired by the 2olicitor Beneral with the 1ndersecretary of *oreign )ffairs and the +irector of the &ational 6ntelligence ,oordinating )gency as the other members. )lthough the agency was deactivated by virtue of President ,orazon ,. )-uino:s emorandum of arch 5;, !#9;, it was not, however, abrogated. The ,ommittee was reactivated on 3une 9, !##/ . .ence, the application should be filed with said )gency, not with the Regional Trial ,ourt. (4e!a!+) Anga( v. Re'u:l"c, 4.R. .). /32244, Se'(. /4, /999 [V"(ug$%
13. Ma a natural:born ,ilipino who beca)e an *)erican citizen still be considered a natural: born ,ilipino upon his reac/uisition o+ Philippine citizenship and, there+ore, /uali+ied to run +or .ongress)an?
Held: &epatriation results in the recovery o3 the original nationality. This means that a naturalized *ilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized *ilipino citizen. Cn the other hand, if he was originally a naturalAborn citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a naturalAborn *ilipino. 6n respondent ,ruz:s case, he lost his *ilipino citizenship when he rendered service in the )rmed *orces of the 1nited 2tates. .owever, he subse-uently reac-uired Philippine citizenship under R.). &o. 5"$4 7 7 7. .aving thus ta0en the re-uired oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the ,ivil Registry of angatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent ,ruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a naturalAborn citizen, a status which he ac-uired at birth as the son of a *ilipino father . 6t bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status be3ore he lost his 2hilippine citizenship. Petitioner:s contention that respondent ,ruz is no longer a naturalAborn citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. JTKhe term ?naturalAborn citizen@ was first defined in )rticle 666, 2ection % of the !#;$ ,onstitution as followsE 2ection %. ) naturalAborn citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to ac-uire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two re-uisites must concur for a person to be considered as suchE =!> a person must be a *ilipino citizen from birth and =5> he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. 1nder the !#;$ ,onstitution definition, there were two categories of *ilipino citizens which were not considered naturalAbornE =!> those who were naturalized and =5> those born before 3anuary !;, !#;$ !the date o3 e33ectivity o3 the "+') Constitution-, of *ilipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of ma8ority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those ?naturalized citizens@ were not considered naturalAborn obviously because they were not *ilipinos at birth and had to perform an act to ac-uire Philippine citizenship. Those born of *ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the !#;$ ,onstitution were li0ewise not considered naturalAborn because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present ,onstitution, however, now considers those born of *ilipino mothers before the effectivity of the !#;$ ,onstitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the ma8ority age as naturalAborn. )fter defining who are naturalAborn citizens, 2ection 5 of )rticle 6< adds a sentenceE ?Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph =$>, 2ection ! hereof shall be deemed naturalAborn citizens.@ ,onse-uently, only naturalized *ilipinos are considered not naturalAborn citizens. 6t is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present ,onstitution that there are only two classes of citizensE =!> those who are naturalAborn and =5> those who are naturalized in accordance with law. ) citizen who is not a naturalized *ilipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a naturalAborn *ilipino. &oteworthy is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subse-uently reac-uire it. The reason therefore is clearE as to such persons, they would either be naturalAborn or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reac-uisition thereof. )s respondent ,ruz was not re-uired by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reac-uire his citizenship, he is perforce a naturalAborn *ilipino. )s such, he possessed all the necessary -ualifications to be elected as member of the .ouse of Representatives. (An()n") Bengs)n 111 v. 2RE3, 4.R. .). /42540, Ma6 7, 200/, En Banc [0a'unan$%
14. -istinguish -ual .itizenship +ro) -ual *llegiance.

Held: +1)L ,6T6HG&2.6P arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. *or instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. 2uch a person, ipso 3acto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. +1)L )LLGB6)&,G, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. (hile dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual:s volition. (Me!ca+) v. Man<an), 307 SCRA 930, Ma6 29, /999, En Banc [Men+)<a$%
15. What is the )ain concern o+ 7ection 2, *rticle 0;, !#98 .onstitution, on citizenship? .onse/uentl , are persons with )ere dual citizenship dis/uali+ied to run +or elective local positions under 7ection %<3d4 o+ the Local 1overn)ent .ode?
Held: 6n including 2ection / in )rticle 6< on citizenship, the concern of the ,onstitutional ,ommission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. .ence, the phrase ?dual citizenship@ in R.). &o. ;!"4, 2ection %4=d> =Local Bovernment ,ode> must be understood as referring to ?dual allegiance.@ ,onse-uently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this dis-ualification. 1nli0e those with dual allegiance, who must 7 7 7 be sub8ect to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable conse-uence of conflicting laws of different states. 'y electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. 6t may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. (Me!ca+) v. Man<an), 4.R. .). /35053, 307 SCRA 930, Ma6 29, /999 [Men+)<a$%
16. .ite instances when a citizen o+ the Philippines )a possess dual citizenship considering the citizenship clause 3*rticle 0;4 o+ the .onstitution.
Held:

!> Those born of *ilipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soliF 5> Those born in the Philippines of *ilipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father:s country such children are citizens of that countryF $> Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter:s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. (Me!ca+) v. Man<an), 4.R. .). /35053, 307 SCRA 930, Ma6 29, /999 [Men+)<a$%
17. 'he general rule is that= res 5udicata= does not appl in cases hinging on the issue o+ citizenship? What is the exception to this rule? -iscuss.
Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in 8udicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res 8udicata in any subse-uent proceeding challenging the sameF citing the case of Moy 9a im 9ao v. Commissioner o3 Immigration !7" %C&A 1+1 *"+'",-. .e insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. .owever, in the case of 5urca v. &epublic !$" %C&A 17# *"+'),-, an e7ception to this general rule was recognized. The ,ourt ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine o3 res judicata may be applied in cases o3 citizenship, the 3ollo:ing must be presentE !> a person:s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a partyF 5> the 2olicitor Beneral or his authorized representative too0 active part in the resolution thereof, and $> the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this ,ourt. )lthough the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy 9a im 9ao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. 6t elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to ma0e the effort easier or simpler. (Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
The Legislative Department 18. -iscuss the nature o+ the Part :List s ste). 0s it, without an /uali+ication, open to all?
Held: !. The partyAlist system is a social 8ustice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawma0ers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. 6t intends to ma0e the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the 2tate:s benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in partyAlist elections would desecrate this lofty ob8ective and mongrelize the social 8ustice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics. (Ang Bag)ng Ba6an" = O7> La:)! a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /47559, 8une 29, 200/, En Banc [ angan":an$% 5. ,rucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social 8ustice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The partyAlist system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. 6t gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. 6t is a message to the destitute and the pre8udiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. 6t is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.

,learly, therefore, the ,ourt cannot accept the submissions 7 7 7 that the partyAlist system is, without any -ualification, open to all. 2uch position does not only wea0en the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresentedF it also pre8udices them. 6t would gut the substance of the partyAlist system. 6nstead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. 6nstead of enabling the marginalized, it would further wea0en them and aggravate their marginalization. (Ang Bag)ng Ba6an" = O7> La:)! a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /47559, 8une 29, 200/, En Banc [ angan":an$%
19. *re political parties > even the )a5or ones > prohibited +ro) participating in the part :list elections?
Held: 1nder the ,onstitution and R) ;#%!, private respondents cannot be dis-ualified from the partyAlist elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. 2ection /, )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution, provides that members of the .ouse of Representatives may ?be elected through a partyAlist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. *urthermore, under 2ections ; and 9, )rticle 6I J,K of the ,onstitution, political parties may be registered under the partyAlist system. I 7 7 +uring the deliberations in the ,onstitutional ,ommission, ,omm. ,hristian 2. onsod pointed out that the participants in the partyAlist system may ?be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, 1&6+C, agsasa0a, or a regional party in indanao.@ 7 7 7. I77 *or its part, 2ection 5 of R) ;#%! also provides for ?a partyAlist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, 7 7 7.@ 2ection $ e7pressly states that a ?party@ is ?either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.@ ore to the point, the law defines ?political party@ as ?an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.@ *urthermore, 2ection !! of R) ;#%! leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the partyAlist system. I 7 7 6ndubitably, therefore, political parties D even the ma8or ones D may participate in the partyAlist elections. That political parties may participate in the partyAlist elections does not mean, however, that any political party D or any organization or group for that matter D may do so. The re-uisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the partyAlist system, as laid down in the ,onstitution and R) ;#%!. I 7 7 (Ang Bag)ng Ba6an" = O7> La:)! a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /47559, 8une 29, 200/, En Banc [ angan":an$%
20. 0s the enu)eration o+ )arginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the part :list s ste) in R* 8#%! exclusive? Will it be correct to assert that the part :list s ste) is not exclusive to the )arginalized and underrepresented sectors, but that even the super:rich and overrepresented can validl participate in part :list elections?
Held: (hile the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not e7clusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the partyAlist system. I 7 7

J(Ke stress that the partyAlist system see0s to enable certain *ilipino citizens D specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties D to be elected to the .ouse of Representatives. The assertion 7 7 7 that the partyAlist system is not e7clusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. 6ts claim that even the superA rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the partyAlist system. 6ndeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantage of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of *orbes Par0. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparateF hence, the 7 7 7 position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. I 7 7 (hile the business moguls and the megaArich are, numerically spea0ing, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the star0 reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one:s constituencyF indeed, it is li0ely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one:s ban0 accounts. 6t is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the ma8ority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. 6t was for them that the partyAlist system was enacted D to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine powerF to give them opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituenciesF and simply to give them a direct vote in ,ongress and in the larger affairs of the 2tate. 6n its noblest sense, the partyAlist system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. <erily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past D the farm hands, the fisher fol0, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement D to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The 2tate cannot now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling the desecrating this social 8ustice vehicle. 'ecause the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 54 percent of the seats in the .ouse of Representatives were set aside for the partyAlist system. 6n arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 94 percent of the seats in the .ouse could participate in the partyAlist elections for the remaining 54 percent, the C2B and the ,omelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the partyAlist elections. )s earlier noted, the purpose of the partyAlist provision was to open up the system, in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the .ouse of Representatives through the simplest scheme possible. Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it D those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the ?simplest scheme possible@ to do so. ,onversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it D those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections. I77 <erily, allowing the nonAmarginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the partyAlist system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The partyAlist system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivilegedF the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the pre8udice of the intended beneficiaries. (Ang Bag)ng Ba6an" = O7> La:)! a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /47559, 8une 29, 200/, En Banc [ angan":an$%
21. 7ection 23?4, *rticle ;0 o+ the .onstitution provides that @AtBhe part :list representatives shall constitute twent per centu) o+ the total nu)ber o+ representatives including those under the part :list.= -oes the .onstitution re/uire all such allocated seats to be +illed up all the ti)e and under all circu)stances?

Held: The ,onstitution simply states that ?JtKhe partyAlist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the partyAlist.@ I77 (e rule that a simple reading of 2ection /, )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution, easily conveys the e-ually simple message that ,ongress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the partyAlist system of representation. The ,onstitution e7plicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the .ouse of Representatives reserved for partyAlist representatives. 6n the e7ercise of its constitutional prerogative, ,ongress enacted R) ;#%!. )s said earlier, ,ongress declared therein a policy to promote ?proportional representation@ in the election of partyAlist representatives in order to enable *ilipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. 6t however deemed it necessary to re-uire parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the partyAlist system in order to be entitled to a partyAlist seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have ?additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.@ *urthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the .ouse of Representatives. I77 ,onsidering the foregoing statutory re-uirements, it will be shown 7 7 7 that 2ection /=5>, )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution is not mandatory. 6t merely provides a ceiling for partyAlist seats in ,ongress. (Ve(e!ans 7e+e!a(")n a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /3975/, Oc(. 9, 2000, En Banc [ angan":an$%
22. What are the inviolable para)eters to deter)ine the winners in a Philippine:st le part :list election?
Held: To determine the winners in a PhilippineAstyle partyAlist election, the ,onstitution and Republic )ct &o. ;#%! mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These areE ;irst, the twenty percent allocation A the combined number of all partyAlist congressmen shall not e7ceed twenty percent of the total membership of the .ouse of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. %econd, the two percent threshold A only those garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the partyAlist system are L-ualifiedL to have a seat in the .ouse of Representatives. <hird, the three seat limit A each -ualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a ma7imum of three seatsF that is, one L-ualifyingL and two additional seats. ;ourth, proportional representation A the additional seats which a -ualified party is entitled to shall be computed Lin proportion to their total number of votes.L (Ve(e!ans 7e+e!a(")n a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /3975/ an+ C)#'an")n Cases, Oc(. 9, 2000, En Banc [ angan":an$%
23. 7tate the guidelines +or screening Part :List Participants.

Held: 6n this light, the ,ourt finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the ,onstitution, to assist the ,omelec in its wor0. ;irst, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in 2ection / of R) ;#%!. 6n other words, it must show D through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and trac0 record D that it represents and see0s to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. <erily, ma8ority of its

membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. )nd it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interest, it has chosen or is li0ely to choose the interest of such sectors. %econd, while even ma8or political parties are e7pressly allowed by R) ;#%! and the ,onstitution to participate in the partyAlist system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ?*ilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors 7 7 7 to be elected to the .ouse of Representatives.@ 6n other words, while they are not dis-ualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. I 7 7 <hird, in view of the ob8ections directed against the registration of )ng 'uhay .ayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the ,ourt notes the e7press constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the partyAlist system. 7 7 7 *urthermore, the ,onstitution provides that ?religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.@ !%ec. 1 *$,, Article I= *C,- The prohibition was e7plained by a member of the ,onstitutional ,ommission in this wiseE ?JTKhe prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. 6 do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited hereF it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.@ ;ourth, a party or an organization must not be dis-ualified under 2ection " of R) ;#%!, which enumerates the grounds for dis-ualification as followsE !> 6t is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposesF 5> 6t advocates violence or unlawful means to see0 its goalF $> 6t is a foreign party or organizationF %> 6t is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposesF /> 6t violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to electionsF "> 6t declares untruthful statements in its petitionF ;> 6t has ceased to e7ist for at least one =!> yearF or 9> 6t fails to participate in the last two =5> preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum =5M> of the votes cast under the partyAlist system in the two =5> preceding elections for the constituency in which it had registered.@ &ote should be ta0en of paragraph /, which dis-ualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include 2ection 5 of R) ;#%!, which states that the partyAlist system see0s to ?enable *ilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties 7 7 7 to become members of the .ouse of Representatives.@ ) party or organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be dis-ualified. ;i3th, the party or organization must not be an ad8unct of, or a pro8ect organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. 'y the very nature of the partyAlist system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. 6t must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a partyAlist candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the ob8ective of the lawE to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organization to be elected to the .ouse of Representatives. %ixth, the party must not only comply with the re-uirements of the lawF its nominees must li0ewise do so. 7 7 7 %eventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectorsF so also must its nominees. To repeat, under 2ection 5 of R) ;#%!, the

nominees must be *ilipino citizens ?who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.@ 2urely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retireeF neither can those of the urban poor or the wor0ing class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the 2tate policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. Eighth, 7 7 7 while lac0ing a wellAdefined political constituency, the nominee must li0ewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. (Ang Bag)ng Ba6an" = O7> La:)! a!(6 v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /47559, 8une 29, 200/, En Banc [ angan":an$%
24. -iscuss the histor o+ the constitutional provision granting i))unit detention o+ Me)bers o+ .ongress, and how should it be construed?
+ro) arrest or
Held: The immunity from arrest or detention of 2enators and members of the .ouse of Representatives 7 7 7 arises from a provision of the ,onstitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an e7emption as a special privilege cannot be e7tended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. 6t may not be e7tended by intendment, implication or e-uitable considerations. The !#$/ ,onstitution provided in its )rticle <6 on the Legislative +epartmentE 2ec. !/. The 2enators and embers of the .ouse of Representatives shall in all cases e7cept treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of ,ongress, and in going to and returning from the sameF 7 7 7. 'ecause of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the e7emption applied only to civil arrests. ) congressman li0e the accusedA appellant, convicted under Title Gleven of the Revised Penal ,ode could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. .e was sub8ect to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. The !#;$ ,onstitution broadened the privilege of immunity as followsE )rticle <666, 2ec. #. ) ember of the 'atasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than si7 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same. *or offenses punishable by more than si7 years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to witE I 7 7 but the 'atasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its ad8ournment for a recess or for its ne7t session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present ,onstitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of ,ongress to surrender the sub8ect ,ongressman to the custody of the law. The re-uirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. *or relatively minor offenses, it is enough that ,ongress is in session. ( e)'le v. 8al)s?)s, 324 SCRA 959, 7e:. 3, 2000, En Banc [@na!esASan("ag)$%
25. *ccused:appellant .ongress)an Ro)eo 1. Calos5os +iled a )otion be+ore the .ourt asDing that he be allowed to +ull discharge the duties o+ a .ongress)an, including attendance at legislative sessions and co))ittee )eetings despite his having been convicted in the +irst instance o+ a non:bailable o++ense. 6e contended that his reelection being an expression o+

popular will cannot be rendered inutile b an ruling, giving priorit to an right or interest > not even the police power o+ the 7tate. Resolve.
Held: The accusedAappellant argues that a member of ,ongress: function to attend sessions is underscored by 2ection !"=5>, )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution which states that D =5> ) ma8ority of each .ouse shall constitute a -uorum to do business, but a smaller number may ad8ourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent embers in such manner, and under such penalties, as such .ouse may provide. .owever, the accusedAappellant has not given any reason why he should be e7empted from the operation of 2ection !!, )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution. The members of ,ongress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a ,ongressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than si7 years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. )ccusedAappellant:s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. %antos !1"1 %C&A '0#, at '') *"++1,-, which states, inter alia, that D The ,ourt should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. (hen the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the 0nowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. 6t is not for the ,ourt, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. :ill not extricate him 3rom his predicament. 6t can be readily seen 7 7 7 that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. 6t does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. oreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. .e remains a ,ongressman unless e7pelled by ,ongress or, otherwise, dis-ualified. Cne rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public selfA defense. 2ociety must protect itself. 6t also serves as an e7ample and warning to others. ) person charged with crime is ta0en into custody for purposes of the administration of 8ustice. )s stated in >nited %tates v. .ustilo !"+ 2hil. 1(#, 1"1-, it is the in8ury to the public which 2tate action in criminal law see0s to redress. 6t is not the in8ury to the complainant. )fter conviction in the Regional Trial ,ourt, the accused may be denied bail and thus sub8ected to incarceration if there is ris0 of his absconding. The accusedAappellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. 6t will be recalled that when a warrant for accusedAappellant:s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the .ouse of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. 6ronically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accusedAappellant is invo0ing to 8ustify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because 7 7 7 aside from its being contrary to wellAdefined ,onstitutional restraint, it would be a moc0ery of the aims of the 2tate:s penal system. )ccusedAappellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial ,ourt of a0ati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the a0ati ,ity 3ail, for official or medical reasons 7 7 7.

.e also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the &ew 'ilibid Prison in untinlupa ,ity, when he was li0ewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises 7 7 7. There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of ,ongress. Gmergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. (hat the accusedAappellant see0s is not of an emergency nature. )llowing accusedAappellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five =/> days or more in a wee0 will virtually ma0e him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. 2uch an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedAappellant:s status to that of a special class, it also would be a moc0ery of the purposes of the correction system. I 7 7 The accusedAappellant avers that his constituents in the *irst +istrict of Hamboanga del &orte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona 3ide member of the .ouse of Representatives, the latter urges a coAe-ual branch of government to respect his mandate. .e also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave 8ail. (e remain unpersuaded. I77 (hen the voters of his district elected the accusedAappellant to ,ongress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the 0nowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full 0nowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so 0nowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office. ( e)'le v. 8al)s?)s, 324 SCRA 959, 7e:. 3, 2000, En Banc [@na!esASan("ag)$% 26. Ma the 7upre)e .ourt properl in/uire into the )otives o+ the law)aDers in conducting legislative investigations? .an it en5oin the .ongress or an o+ its regular and special co))ittees +ro) )aDing in/uiries in aid o+ legislation? Held: The ?allocation of constitutional boundaries@ is a tas0 that this ,ourt must perform under the ,onstitution. oreover, as held in a recent case !/eptali A. .onzales, et al. v. ?on. Catalino Macaraig, @r., et al., ..&. /o. #'0)0, "+ /ovember "++(, "+" %C&A 7$1, 70)- , ?JtKhe political -uestion doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to 8udicial determination of the rival claims. The 8urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this ,ourt. 6t cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the !#9; ,onstitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.@ !%ection ", Article AIII o3 the "+#' ConstitutionThe ,ourt is thus of the considered view that it has 8urisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope and e7tent of the power of the 2enate 'lue Ribbon ,ommittee to conduct in-uires into private affairs in purported aid of legislation. (Beng<)n, 8!. v. Sena(e Blue R"::)n C)##"((ee, 203 SCRA 797, .)v. 20, /99/, En Banc [ a+"lla$% 27. 0s the power o+ both houses o+ .ongress to conduct in/uiries in aid o+ legislation absolute or unli)ited? Held: The !#9; ,onstitution e7pressly recognizes the power of both houses of ,ongress to conduct in-uiries in aid of legislation !In Arnault v. /azareno, #' 2hil. 1+, this Court held that although there :as no express provision in the "+)$ Constitution giving such po:er to both houses o3 Congress, it :as so incidental to the legislative 3unction as to be implied.-. Thus, 2ection 5!, )rticle <6 provides 7 7 7. The power of both houses of ,ongress to conduct in-uiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. 6ts e7ercise is circumscribed by the aforeA-uoted provision of the ,onstitution.

Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be ?in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure@ and that ?the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such in-uiries shall be respected.@ 6t follows then that the rights of persons under the 'ill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one:s self. The power to conduct formal in-uiries or investigations is specifically provided for in 2ec. ! of the %enate &ules o3 2rocedure .overning In6uiries in Aid o3 egislation. 2uch in-uiries may refer to the implementation or reAe7amination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also e7tend to any and all matters vested by the ,onstitution in ,ongress and/or in the 2enate alone. )s held in @ean . Arnault v. eon /azareno, et al, !/o. B)#1(, @uly "#, "+$(, #' 2hil. 1+-, the in-uiry, to be within the 8urisdiction of the legislative body ma0ing it, must be material or necessary to the e7ercise of a power in it vested by the ,onstitution, such as to legislate or to e7pel a member. 1nder 2ec. % of the aforementioned Rules, the 2enate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any 2enator which in its 8udgment re-uires an appropriate in-uiry in aid of legislation. 6n order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an in-uiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an in-uiry is proposed to be made. (Beng<)n, 8!. v. Sena(e Blue R"::)n C)##"((ee, 203 SCRA 797, .)v. 20, /99/, En Banc [ a+"lla$% 28. En !$ 7epte)ber !#99, the 7enate Minorit ,loor Leader, 6on. Cuan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech @on a )atter o+ personal privilege= be+ore the 7enate on the alleged @taDe:over o+ 7ELE0L 0ncorporated, the +lagship on the ,irst Manila Manage)ent o+ .o)panies 3,MM.4 b Ricardo Lopa= and called upon @the 7enate to looD into the possible violation o+ the law in the case, particularl with regard to Republic *ct &o. $<!#, the *nti:1ra+t and .orrupt Practices *ct.=
En )otion o+ 7enator Erlando Mercado, the )atter was re+erred b the 7enate to the .o))ittee on *ccountabilit o+ Public E++icers 3(lue Ribbon .o))ittee4. 'herea+ter, the 7enate (lue Ribbon .o))ittee started its investigation on the )atter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed b the .o))ittee to appear be+ore it and testi+ on @what the Dnow= regarding the @sale o+ the thirt :six 3$"4 corporations belonging to (en5a)in FGoDo H Ro)ualdez.= *t the hearing held on ?$ Ma !#9#, Ricardo Lopa declined to testi+ on the ground that his testi)on )a @undul pre5udice= the de+endants in .ivil .ase &o. <<$2 be+ore the 7andiganba an. Petitioner Cose ,.7. (engzon, Cr. liDewise re+used to testi+ invoDing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicit generated b respondent .o))itteeHs in/uir could adversel a++ect his rights as well as those o+ the other petitioners who are his co:de+endants in .ivil .ase &o. <<$2 be+ore the 7andiganba an. 'he 7enate (lue Ribbon .o))ittee, thereupon, suspended its in/uir and directed the petitioners to +ile their )e)orandu) on the constitutional issues raised, a+ter which, it issued a resolution dated 2 Cune !#9# re5ecting the petitionersH plea to be excused +ro) testi+ ing, and the .o))ittee voted to pursue and continue its investigation o+ the )atter. I xx .lai)ing that the 7enate (lue Ribbon .o))ittee is poised to subpoena and re/uire their attendance and testi)on in proceedings be+ore the .o))ittee, in excess o+ its 5urisdiction and legislative rights, and that there is no appeal nor an other plain, speed and ade/uate

re)ed in the ordinar course o+ law, the petitioners +iled the present petition +or prohibition with a pra er +or te)porar restraining order andJor in5unctive relie+.
Held: ) perusal of the speech of 2enator Gnrile reveals that he =2enator Gnrile> made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 5 2eptember !#99 accusing r. Ricardo ?'aby@ Lopa of ?having ta0en over the * , Broup of ,ompanies.@ I 7 7 <erily, the speech of 2enator Gnrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislationF he merely called upon the 2enate to loo0 into a possible violation of 2ec. / of R) &o. $4!#, otherwise 0nown as ?The )ntiABraft and ,orrupt Practices )ct.@ 6n other words, the purpose of the in-uiry to be conducted by respondent 'lue Ribbon ,ommittee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President )-uino, particularly r. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the $" or $# corporations belonging to 'en8amin ?No0oy@ Romualdez to the Lopa Broup. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. I77 6t appears, therefore, that the contemplated in-uiry by respondent ,ommittee is not really ?in aid of legislation@ because it is not related to a purpose within the 8urisdiction of ,ongress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or r. Ricardo Lopa had violated 2ection / of R) &o. $4!#, the ?)ntiABraft and ,orrupt Practices )ct@, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. 'esides, the ,ourt may ta0e 8udicial notice that r. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. 6n @ohn <. 4atCins v. >nited %tates, it was heldE ?7 7 7. <he po:er o3 Congress to conduct in6uiries in aid o3 legislation is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. 6t encompasses in-uiries concerning the administration of e7isting laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. 6t includes surveys of defects in our social, economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling ,ongress to remedy them. 6t comprehends probes into departments of the *ederal Bovernment to e7pose corruption, inefficiency or waste. 5ut broad as is this po:er o3 in-uiry, it is not unlimited. <here is no general authority to expose the private a33airs o3 individuals :ithout justi3ication in terms o3 the 3unctions o3 Congress. <his :as 3reely conceded by the %olicitor .eneral in his arguments in this case. /or is the Congress a la: en3orcement or trial agency. <hese are 3unctions o3 the executive and judicial departments o3 government. /o in6uiry is an end in itsel38 it must be related to and in 3urtherance o3 a legislative tasC o3 Congress. Investigations conducted solely 3or the personal aggrandizement o3 the investigators or to DpunishE those investigated are inde3ensible.F =italics supplied> 6t cannot be overloo0ed that when respondent ,ommittee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in ,ivil ,ase &o. 44$/ had already been filed with the 2andiganbayan. ) perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the $" =or $#> corporations belonging to 'en8amin ?No0oy@ Romualdez. 2ince the issues in said complaint had long been 8oined by the filing of petitioners: respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent ,ommittee is one over which 8urisdiction had been ac-uired by the 2andiganbayan. 6n short, the issue has been preAempted by that court. To allow the respondent ,ommittee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the 2andiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting 8udgments between a legislative committee and a 8udicial tribunal, but if the ,ommittee:s 8udgment were to be reached before that of the 2andiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate 8udgment of the 2andiganbayan can not be discounted. 6n fine, for the respondent ,ommittee to probe and in-uire into the same 8usticiable controversy already before the 2andiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the e7clusive domain of 8udicial

8urisdiction that had much earlier set in. (Beng<)n, 8!. v. Sena(e Blue R"::)n C)##"((ee, 203 SCRA 797, .)v. 20, /99/, En Banc [ a+"lla$% 29. PetitionersH contention is that Republic *ct &o. 88!" 3'he Expanded:;*' Law4 did not @originate exclusivel = in the 6ouse o+ Representatives as re/uired b *rt. ;0, 7ec. ?% o+ the .onstitution, because it is in +act the result o+ the consolidation o+ two distinct bills, 6. &o. !!!#8 and 7. &o. !"$<. 0n this connection, petitioners point out that although *rt. ;0, 7ec. ?% was adopted +ro) the *)erican ,ederal .onstitution, it is notable in two respectsK the verb @shall originate= is /uali+ied in the Philippine .onstitution b the word @exclusivel = and the phrase @as on other bills= in the *)erican version is o)itted. 'his )eans, according to the), that to be considered as having originated in the 6ouse, Republic *ct &o. 88!" )ust retain the essence o+ 6. &o. !!!#8. Held: This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law A but the revenue bill A which is re-uired by the ,onstitution to ?originate e7clusively@ in the .ouse of Representatives. 6t is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the .ouse may undergo such e7tensive changes in the 2enate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. )t this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the 2enate action, a distinct bill may be produced. <o insist that a revenue statute B and not only the bill :hich initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment o3 the la: B must substantially be the same as the ?ouse bill :ould be to deny the %enateGs po:er not only to Hconcur :ith amendmentsF but also to Hpropose amendments.F 6t would be to violate the coe-uality of legislative power of the two houses of ,ongress and in fact ma0e the .ouse superior to the 2enate. The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the 2enateOs power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the 2enate of the treatyAratifying power and thereby e-ualize its powers and those of the .ouse overloo0s the fact that the powers being compared are different. (e are dealing here with the legislative power which under the ,onstitution is vested not only in any particular chamber but in the ,ongress of the Philippines, consisting of ?a 2enate and a .ouse of Representatives.@ The e7ercise of the treatyAratifying power is not the e7ercise of legislative power. 6t is the e7ercise of a chec0 on the e7ecutive power. There is, therefore, no 8ustification for comparing the legislative powers of the .ouse and of the 2enate on the basis of the possession of a similar nonA legislative power by the 2enate. The possession of a similar power by the 1.2. 2enate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the .ouse of Representatives. I 7 7 Biven, then, the power of the 2enate to propose amendments, the 2enate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are re-uired by the ,onstitution to originate in the .ouse. 6t is insisted, however, that 2. &o. !"$4 was passed not in substitution of .. &o. !!!#; but of another 2enate bill =2. &o. !!5#> earlier filed and that what the 2enate did was merely to ?ta0e =.. &o. !!!#;> into consideration@ in enacting 2. &o. !"$4. There is really no difference between the 2enate preserving .. &o. !!!#; up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause =which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution>, and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same sub8ect matter. 6n either case the result are two bills on the same sub8ect. 6ndeed, what the ,onstitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or ta7 bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the .ouse of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the .ouse can be e7pected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Cn the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are e7pected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. 'oth views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. &or does the ,onstitution prohibit the filing in the 2enate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the .ouse, so long as action by the 2enate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the .ouse bill. The ,ourt cannot, therefore, understand the alarm e7pressed over the fact that on arch

!, !##$, eight months before the .ouse passed .. &o. !!!#;, 2. &o. !!5# had been filed in the 2enate. )fter all it does not appear that the 2enate ever considered it. 6t was only after the 2enate had received .. &o. !!!#; on &ovember 5$, !##$ that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the 2enate ,ommittee on (ays and eans of .. &o. !!!#; and the submission by the ,ommittee on *ebruary ;, !##% of 2. &o. !"$4. *or that matter, if the -uestion were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the .ouse that a bill =.. &o. 5/$> to amend the <)T law was first filed on 3uly 55, !##5. 2everal other bills had been filed in the .ouse before 2. &o. !!5# was filed in the 2enate, and .. &o. !!!#; was only a substitute of those earlier bills. (3)len("n) v. Sec!e(a!6 )* 7"nance, 235 SCRA 930, 99/A993, Aug. 25, /994, En Banc [Men+)<a$%
30. -iscuss the ob5ectives o+ 7ection ?"3!4, *rticle ;0 o+ the !#98 .onstitution, that LAeBver bill passed b the .ongress shall e)brace onl one sub5ect which shall be expressed in the title thereo+.L
Held: The ob8ectives of 2ection 5"=!>, )rticle <6 of the !#9; ,onstitution areE !> To prevent hodgeApodge or logArolling legislationF 5> To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overloo0ed and carelessly and unintentionally adoptedF and $> To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the sub8ects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. 2ection 5"=!> of )rticle <6 of the !#9; ,onstitution is sufficiently complied with where 7 7 7 the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general ob8ective it see0s to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the sub8ect matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub8ect and title. (Ag!"'"n) A. -e 4u<#an, 8!., e( al. v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /29//5, 8ul6 /9, 2000, en Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
31. 7ection %% o+ R.*. &o. 9!9# 3'he ;oterMs Registration *ct o+ !##"4 which provides +or auto)atic trans+er to a new station o+ an Election E++icer who has alread served +or )ore than +our ears in a particular cit or )unicipalit was assailed +or being violative o+ 7ection ?"3!4 o+ *rticle ;0 o+ the .onstitution allegedl because it has an isolated and di++erent sub5ect +ro) that o+ R* 9!9# and that the sa)e is not expressed in the title o+ the law. 7hould the challenge be sustained?
Held: 2ection %% of R) 9!9# is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the sub8ect matter stated in the title of the law. The title of R) 9!9# is LThe <oterOs Registration )ct of !##"L with a sub8ect matter enunciated in the e7planatory note as L)& ),T PRC<6+6&B *CR ) BG&GR)L RGB62TR)T6C& C* <CTGR2, )+CPT6&B ) 2Y2TG C* ,C&T6&16&B RGB62TR)T6C&, PRG2,R6'6&B T.G PRC,G+1RG2 T.GRGC* )&+ )1T.CR6H6&B T.G )PPRCPR6)T6C& C* *1&+2 T.GRG*CR.L 2ection %%, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the sub8ect matter of registration as it see0s to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing guideline for the ,C GLG, to follow in the reassignment of election officers. 6t is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. 6n this regard, it bears stressing that the ,onstitution does not re-uire ,ongress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully inde7 or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein. (Ag!"'"n) A. -e 4u<#an, 8!., e( al. v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /29//5, 8ul6 /9, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
32. -o courts have the power to in/uire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a 6ouse o+ .ongress +ailed to co)pl with its own rules?

Held: The cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of e7pression, all deny to the courts the power to in-uire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a .ouse of ,ongress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the right of private individuals. 6n Osmena v. 2endatun, it was heldE ?)t any rate, courts have declared that Pthe rules adopted by deliberative bodies are sub8ect to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.: )nd it has been said that PParliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.: ,onse-uently, Pmere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate that action =ta0en by a deliberative body> when the re-uisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.:@ 6t must be realized that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. +ue regard for the wor0ing of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on the part of the courts to enter upon an in-uiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the .ouse. ,ourts must accordingly decline the invitation to e7ercise their power. (A!!)6) v. -e Venec"a, 277 SCRA 295, Aug. /4, /997 [Men+)<a$%
33. What is the (ica)eral .on+erence .o))ittee? -iscuss the nature o+ its +unction and its 5urisdiction.
Held: (hile it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the 2enate and the .ouse, it is not limited in its 8urisdiction to this -uestion. 6ts broader function is described thusE ) conference committee may deal generally with the sub8ect matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Gven where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its 8urisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new sub8ect matter can be inserted into the conference bill. 'ut occasionally a conference committee produces une7pected results, results beyond its mandate. These e7cursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee 8urisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. ( ,"l"''"ne 8u+ges Ass)c"a(")n v. !a+), 227 SCRA 703, .)v. //, /993, En Banc [C!u<$%
34. -iscuss the Enrolled (ill -octrine.

Held: 1nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of .. 'ill &o. ;!9# by the 2pea0er of the .ouse and the President of the 2enate and the certification by the secretaries of both .ouses of ,ongress that it was passed on &ovember 5!, !##" are conclusive of its due enactment. 7 7 7 To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the G<)T cases !<olentino v. %ecretary o3 ;inance- that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. 6n one case !Astorga v. Aillegas- we ?went behind@ an enrolled bill and consulted the 3ournal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the 2enate. 'ut, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this ,ourt will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both .ouses that a bill has been duly passed. 1nder this rule, this ,ourt has refused to determine claims that the threeAfourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the ,onstitution had not been obtained, because ?a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.@ 7 7 7 This ,ourt has refused to even loo0 into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been ?surreptitiously@ inserted in the conference committee 7 7 7. !<olentino v. %ecretary o3 ;inance-

6t has refused to loo0 into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of )rt. <6, 2ec. 5"=5> of the ,onstitution that ?upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed.@ !2hilippine @udges AssEn v. 2rado6n other cases, this ,ourt has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officers of both .ouses of ,ongress. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is wellAestablished. 6t is cited with approval by te7t writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerationsE I 7 7 )s the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by ,ongress, an enrolled )ct in the custody of the 2ecretary of 2tate, and having the official attestations of the 2pea0er of the .ouse of Representatives, of the President of the 2enate, and of the President of the 1nited 2tates, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and e7ecutive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and e7ecuting the laws, that it was passed by ,ongress. The respect due to coe-ual and independent departments re-uires the 8udicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed ,ongress, all bills authenticated in the manner statedF leaving the court to determine, when the -uestion properly arises, whether the )ct, so authenticated, is in conformity with the ,onstitution. !Marshall ;ield I Co. v. ClarC, "7) >.%. 07+, 0'1, )0 . Ed. 1+7, )() *"#+",To overrule the doctrine now, 7 7 7 is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence. (A!!)6) v. -e Venec"a, 277 SCRA 295, Aug. /4, /997 [Men+)<a$%
35. When should the Legislative Cournal be regarded as conclusive upon the courts, and wh ?
Held: The 3ournal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are re-uired by the ,onstitution to be recorded therein. (ith respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 3ournals have also been accorded conclusive effects. Thus, in >nited %tates v. 2ons, this ,ourt spo0e of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the 3ournals as ?public memorials of the most permanent character,@ thusE ?They should be public, because all are re-uired to conform to themF they should be permanent, that rights ac-uired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.@ (A!!)6) v. -e Venec"a, 277 SCRA 295, 295A299, Aug. /4, /997 [Men+)<a$%
36. What )atters are re/uired to be entered on the Cournal?

Held: !> The yeas and nays on the third and final reading of a bill !Art. AI, %ec. 10*1,-F 5> The yeas and nays on any -uestion, at the re-uest of oneAfifth of the members present !Id., %ec. "0*7,-8 $> The yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President:s veto !Id., %ec. 1'*",-F and %> The President:s ob8ection to a bill he had vetoed !Id.-. (A!!)6) v. -e Venec"a, 277 SCRA 295, 295, Aug. /4, /997 [Men+)<a$% 37. What are the li)itations on the veto power o+ the President?

Held: The act of the G7ecutive in vetoing the particular provisions is an e7ercise of a constitutionally vested power. 'ut even as the ,onstitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its e7ercise. The veto power is not absolute. I77 The C2B is correct when it states that the G7ecutive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. .e or she cannot act li0e an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she disli0es. 6n the e7ercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. .owever, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the )dministration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain ob8ectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. 6t is for this reason that the ,onstitution has wisely provided the ?item veto power@ to avoid ine7pedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. The ,onstitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Beng<)n v. -!"l)n, 205 SCRA /33, /43A/45, A'!"l /5, /992, En Banc [4u("e!!e<$% 38. -istinguish an @ite)= +ro) a @provision= in relation to the veto power o+ the President. Held: The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. )n item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts 7 7 7 of the bill. 6t is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose . The 1nited 2tates 2upreme ,ourt, in the case of 5engzon v. %ecretary o3 @ustice !1++ >.%. 7"(, 7"7, $' Ct 1$1, #" . Ed., )"1- declared Hthat an itemF o3 an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision o3 la:, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Beng<)n v. -!"l)n, 205 SCRA /33, /43A/45, A'!"l /5, /992, En Banc [4u("e!!e<$% 39. Ma the President veto a law? Ma she veto a decision o+ the 7. which has long beco)e +inal and executor ? Held: (e need no lengthy 8ustifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirtyAfive =$/> years before his or her term of office. &either may the President set aside or reverse a final and e7ecutory 8udgment of this ,ourt through the e7ercise of the veto power. (Beng<)n v. -!"l)n, 205 SCRA /33, /43A/45, A'!"l /5, /992, En Banc [4u("e!!e<$%
40. * dis/uali+ication case was +iled against a candidate +or .ongress)an be+ore the election with the .EMELE.. 'he latter +ailed to resolve that dis/uali+ication case be+ore the election and that candidate won, although he was not et proclai)ed because o+ that pending dis/uali+ication case. 0s the .EMELE. now ousted o+ 5urisdiction to resolve the pending dis/uali+ication case and, there+ore, should dis)iss the case, considering that 5urisdiction is now vested with the 6ouse o+ Representatives Electoral 'ribunal 36RE'4?
Held: !. JPKetitioner vigorously contends that after the ay 9, !##/ elections, the ,C GLG, lost its 8urisdiction over the -uestion of petitioner:s -ualifications to run for member of the .ouse of Representatives. .e claims that 8urisdiction over the petition for dis-ualification is e7clusively lodged with the .ouse of Representatives Glectoral Tribunal =.RGT>. Biven the yetAunresolved -uestion of 8urisdiction, petitioner avers that the ,C GLG, committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the 2econd ,ongressional +istrict of a0ati ,ity. (e disagree. Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the .ouse of Representatives and a member of the same. Cbtaining the highest number of votes in an election

does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. 2ection !; of )rticle <6 of the !#9; ,onstitution readsE The 2enate and the .ouse of Representatives shall have an Glectoral Tribunal which shall be the sole 8udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and -ualifications of their respective embers. 1nder the aboveAstated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes 8urisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and -ualifications of candidates for either the 2enate or the .ouse only when the latter become members of either the 2enate or the .ouse of Representatives. ) candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not ta0en his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the .ouse of Representatives sub8ect to 2ection !; of )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution. (hile the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, '.P. 'lg. 99! in con8unction with 2ec. " of R.). ""%" allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner:s contention that ?after the conduct of the election and =petitioner> has been established the winner of the electoral e7ercise from the moment of election, the ,C GLG, is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the -uestion of -ualification@ finds no basis in law, because even a3ter the elections the ,C GLG, is empowered by 2ection " =in relation to 2ection ;> of R.). ""%" to continue to hear and decide -uestions relating to -ualifications of candidates. (ABu"n) v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 400, 4/7A 4/9, Se'(. /5, /995, En Banc [0a'unan, 8.$% 5. )s to the .ouse of Representatives Glectoral Tribunal:s supposed assumption of 8urisdiction over the issue of petitioner:s -ualifications after the ay 9, !##/ elections, suffice it to say that .RGT:s 8urisdiction as the sole 8udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and -ualifications of members of ,ongress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the .ouse of Representatives !Art. AI, %ec. "', "+#' Constitution-. Petitioner not being a member of the .ouse of Representatives, it is obvious that the .RGT at this point has no 8urisdiction over the -uestion. (R)#ual+e<AMa!c)s v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 300, 340A34/, Se'(. /5, /995, En Banc [0a'unan, 8.$%
41. Will the rule be the sa)e i+ that candidate wins and was proclai)ed winner and alread assu)ed o++ice as .ongress)an?
Held: (hile the ,C GLG, is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to e7ercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by *arinas is a recognition of the 8urisdictional boundaries separating the ,C GLG, and the Glectoral Tribunal of the .ouse of Representatives =.RGT>. 1nder )rticle <6, 2ection !; of the ,onstitution, the .RGT has sole and e7clusive 8urisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and -ualifications of members of the .ouse of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, ta0en his oath, and assumed office as a member of the .ouse of Representatives, ,C GLG,:s 8urisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and -ualifications ends, and the .RGT:s own 8urisdiction begins . Thus, the ,C GLG,:s decision to discontinue e7ercising 8urisdiction over the case is 8ustifiable, in deference to the .RGT:s own 8urisdiction and functions. (4ue!!e!) v. COMELEC, 339 SCRA 455, 8ul6 29, 2000, En Banc [Cu"su#:"ng$%
42. Petitioner +urther argues that the 6RE' assu)es 5urisdiction onl i+ there is a valid procla)ation o+ the winning candidate. 6e contends that i+ a candidate +ails to satis+ the statutor re/uire)ents to /uali+ hi) as a candidate, his subse/uent procla)ation is void ab initio. Where the procla)ation is null and void, there is no procla)ation at all and the )ere assu)ption o+ o++ice b the proclai)ed candidate does not deprive the .EMELE. at all o+ its power to declare such nullit , according to petitioner.
Held: 'ut 7 7 7 in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has ta0en his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the .RGT . The reason for this ruling is selfAevident, for it avoids duplicity of

proceedings and a clash of 8urisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people:s mandate. (4ue!!e!) v. COMELEC, 339 SCRA 455, 8ul6 29, 2000, En Banc [Cu"su#:"ng$%
43. 0s there an appeal +ro) a decision o+ the 7enate or 6ouse o+ Representatives Electoral 'ribunal? What then is the re)ed , i+ an ?
Held: The ,onstitution mandates that the .ouse of Representatives Glectoral Tribunal and the 2enate Glectoral Tribunal shall each, respectively, be the sole 8udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and -ualifications of their respective members. The ,ourt has stressed that ?7 7 7 so long as the ,onstitution grants the .RGT the power to be the sole 8udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and -ualifications of members of the .ouse of Representatives, any final action ta0en by the .RGT on a matter within its 8urisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this ,ourt. The power granted to the Glectoral Tribunal 7 7 7 e7cludes the e7ercise of any authority on the part of this ,ourt that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.@ The ,ourt did recognize, of course, its power of 8udicial review in e7ceptional cases. 6n &obles v. ?&E<, the ,ourt has e7plained that :hile the judgments o3 the <ribunal are beyond judicial inter3erence, the Court may do so, ho:ever, but only Hin the exercise o3 this CourtEs soBcalled extraordinary jurisdiction 7 7 7 upon a determination that the Tribunal:s decision or resolution was rendered without or in e7cess of its 8urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero v. 5ocar !00 2hil. 71+-, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.@ The ,ourt does not 7 7 7 venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the BovernmentF it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the ,onstitution itself calls for remedial action. (L":anan v. 2RE3, 253 SCRA 520, -ec. 22, /997 [V"(ug$%
The Executive Department
44. -id +or)er President Estrada resign as President or should be considered resigned as o+ Canuar ?<, ?<<! when President 1loria Macapagal *rro o tooD her oath as the !% th President o+ the Republic?
Held: Resignation 7 7 7 is a factual -uestion and its elements are beyond -uibbleE there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts o3 relin6uishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal re-uirement as to form. 6t can be oral. 6t can be written. 6t can be e7press. 6t can be implied. )s long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. 6n the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated alacanang Palace in the afternoon of 3anuary 54, 544! after the oathAta0ing of respondent )rroyo. ,onse-uently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after 3anuary 54, 544! or by the totality o3 prior, contemporaneous and posterior 3acts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. 1sing this totality test, :e hold that petitioner resigned as 2resident. I77

6n sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. 6t was confirmed by his leaving alacanang. 6n the press release containing his final statement, ( ! he acCno:ledged the oathB taCing o3 the respondent as 2resident of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legalityF ("! he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sa0e of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. ?e did not say he :as leaving the 2alace due to any Cind o3 inability and that he :as going to reBassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears F (#! he e7pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. (ithout doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as PresidentF ($! he assured that he will not shir0 from any 3uture challenge that may come ahead on the same service of our country. Petitioner:s reference is to a 3uture challenge a3ter occupying the o33ice o3 the president which he has given upF and (%! he called on his supporters to 8oin him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit o3 reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained i3 he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner:s valedictory, his final act of farewell. ?is presidency is no: in the past tense. (Es(!a+a v. -es"e!(), 4.R. .)s. /497/0A/5, Ma!c, 2, 200/, En Banc [ un)$%
45. -iscuss our legal histor on executive i))unit .

Held: The +C,TR6&G C* GIG,1T6<G 6 1&6TY in this 8urisdiction emerged as a case la:. 6n the "+"( case o3 ;orbes, etc. v. Chuoco <iaco and Cross3ield, the respondent Tiaco, a ,hinese citizen, sued petitioner (. ,ameron *orbes, BovernorABeneral of the Philippine 6slands, 3.G. .arding and ,.R. Trowbridge, ,hief of Police and ,hief of the 2ecret 2ervice of the ,ity of anila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to ,hina. 6n granting a writ of prohibition, this ,ourt, spea0ing thru r. 3ustice 3ohnson, heldE ?The principle of nonliability 7 7 7 does not mean that the 8udiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the BovernorABeneralF that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. 2uch a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the e7ecution of the law, could wal0 defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person in8ured by the e7ecutive authority by an act un8ustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. Cn the contrary, it means, simply, that the BovernorABeneral, li0e the 8udges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the conse-uences of an act e7ecuted in the performance of his official duties. The 8udiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion 8ustly warrants it, declare an act of the BovernorABeneral illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status 6uo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the 8udiciary can not do is mulct the BovernorABeneral personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine ,ommission or the Philippine )ssembly. Public policy forbids it. &either does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief e7ecutive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. Cn the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of 8udges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the BovernorABeneral, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have e7ercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. (hat is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and 8udgment, that is, the 8udicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. 6n other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the 6uestion o3 his authority. 6f he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the -uestion of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably -ualified for that position, might honestly

differF but he is not protected if the lac0 of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. 6n such case, he acts, not as BovernorABeneral but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the conse-uences of his act.@ r. 3ustice 3ohnson underscored the conse-uences if the ,hief G7ecutive was not granted immunity from suit, vizJ ?7 7 7. )ction upon important matters of state delayedF the time and substance of the chief e7ecutive spent in wrangling litigationF disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the 2tate and for the office he occupiesF a tendency to unrest and disorderF resulting in a way, in a distrust as to the integrity of government itself.@ Cur "+)$ Constitution too0 effect but it did not contain any speci3ic provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President *erdinand G. arcos and the !#;$ ,onstitution was born. 6n !#9!, it was amended and one o3 the amendments involved executive immunity. 2ection !;, )rticle <66 statedE ?The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in )rticle I<66 of this ,onstitution.@ 6n his second <icente B. 2inco Professorial ,hair Lecture entitled, ?Presidential 6mmunity )nd )ll The Ning:s enE The Law Cf Privilege )s ) +efense To )ctions *or +amages,@ ="5 Phil. L.3. !!$ J!#9;K> petitioner:s learned counsel, former +ean of the 1P ,ollege of Law, )tty. Pacifico )gabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the e7isting law on e7ecutive privilege. To -uote his dis-uisitionE ?6n the Philippines though, we sought to do the )merican one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. *irst, we e7tended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. 2econd, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. )nd third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. 6t can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from )6+2 =or absolute immunity defense syndrome>.@ <he Opposition in the then 5atasang 2ambansa sought the repeal o3 this Marcosian concept o3 executive immunity in the "+') Constitution . The move was led by then ember of Parliament, now 2ecretary of *inance, )lberto Romulo, who argued that the a3ter incumbency immunity granted to President arcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. .e denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism ?the 0ing can do no wrong.@ The effort failed. The !#;$ ,onstitution ceased to e7ist when President arcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in !#9". (hen the "+#' Constitution was crafted, its 3ramers did not reenact the e7ecutive immunity provision of the !#;$ ,onstitution. 7 7 7 (Es(!a+a v. -es"e!(), 4.R. .)s. /497/0A/5, Ma!c, 2, 200/, en Banc [ un)$%
46. .an +or)er President Estrada still be prosecuted cri)inall considering that he was not convicted in the i)peach)ent proceedings against hi)?
Held: (e re8ect his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Gstrada was aborted by the wal0out of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. 6ndeed, on *ebruary ;, 544!, the 2enate passed 2enate Resolution &o. 9$ ?Recognizing that the 6mpeachment ,ourt is ;unctus O33icio.F 2ince the 6mpeachment ,ourt is now 3unctus o33icio, it is untenable for

petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. 2uch a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a nonAsitting President who has not been sub8ected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the ob8ect of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the ,onstitutional ,ommission ma0e it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him 7 7 7. This is in accord with our ruling in In &eJ %aturnino 5ermudez that ?incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure@ but not beyond& ,onsidering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Gstrada cannot demand as a condition sine 6ua non to his criminal prosecution before the Cmbudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. (Es(!a+a v. -es"e!(), 4.R. .)s. /497/0A/5, Ma!. 2, 200/, En Banc [ un)$%
47. 7tate the reason wh not all appoint)ents )ade b the President under the !#98 .onstitution will no longer re/uire con+ir)ation b the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents?
Held: The aforecited provision !%ection "0, Article AII- of the ,onstitution has been the sub8ect of several cases on the issue of the restrictive function of the ,ommission on )ppointments with respect to the appointing power of the President. This ,ourt touched upon the historical antecedent of the said provision in the case of %armiento III v. Mison in which it was ratiocinated upon that 2ection !" of )rticle <66 of the !#9; ,onstitution re-uiring confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments of certain appointments issued by the President contemplates a system of chec0s and balances between the e7ecutive and legislative branches of government. G7perience showed that when almost all presidential appointments re-uired the consent of the ,ommission on )ppointments, as was the case under the !#$/ ,onstitution, the commission became a venue of ?horse trading@ and similar malpractices . Cn the other hand, placing absolute power to ma0e appointments in the President with hardly any chec0 by the legislature, as what happened under the !#;$ ,onstitution, leads to abuse of such power. Thus was perceived the need to establish a ?middle ground@ between the !#$/ and !#;$ ,onstitutions. The framers of the !#9; ,onstitution deemed it imperative to sub8ect certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of the ,ommission on )ppointments and to allow other positions within the e7clusive appointing power of the President. (Manal) v. S"s()<a, 3/2 SCRA 239, Aug. //, /999, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
48. Enu)erate the groups o+ o++icers who are to be appointed b the President under 7ection !", *rticle ;00 o+ the !#98 .onstitution, and identi+ those o++icers whose appoint)ents shall re/uire con+ir)ation b the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents?
Held: ,onformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of %armiento III v. Mison, and in the subse-uent cases of 5autista v. %alonga, KuintosBLeles v. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon v. Carale, under 2ection !", )rticle <66, of the ,onstitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the PresidentE 'irst, the heads of the e7ecutive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the ran0 of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this ,onstitutionF (econd, all other officers of the Bovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by lawF Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appointF 'ourth, officers lower in ran0 whose appointments the ,ongress may by law vest in the President alone.

6t is wellAsettled that only presidential appointees belonging to the first group re-uire the confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments. (Manal) v. S"s()<a, 3/2 SCRA 239, Aug. //, /999, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
49. Nnder Republic *ct "#82 3the -0L1 *ct o+ !##<4, the -irector 1eneral, -eput -irector 1eneral, and other top o++icials o+ the Philippine &ational Police 3P&P4 shall be appointed b the President and their appoint)ents shall re/uire con+ir)ation b the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents. Respondent 7istoza was appointed -irector 1eneral o+ the P&P but he re+used to sub)it his appoint)ent papers to the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents +or con+ir)ation contending that his appoint)ent shall no longer re/uire con+ir)ation despite the express provision o+ the law re/uiring such con+ir)ation. 7hould his contention be upheld?
Held: 6t is wellAsettled that only presidential appointees belonging to the first group =enumerated under the first sentence of 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the !#9; ,onstitution> re-uire the confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the ,ommission on )ppointments. )s held in the case of <arrosa v. %ingson, ,ongress cannot by law e7pand the power of confirmation of the ,ommission on )ppointments and re-uire confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of 2ection !" of )rticle <66 of the !#9; ,onstitution. ,onse-uently, unconstitutional are 2ections 5" and $! of Republic )ct "#;/ which empower the ,ommission on )ppointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not re-uired by the ,onstitution to be confirmed. (Manal) v. S"s()<a, 3/2 SCRA 239, Aug. //, /999, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
50. Will it be correct to argue that since the Philippine &ational Police is aDin to the *r)ed ,orces o+ the Philippines, there+ore, the appoint)ents o+ police o++icers whose ranD is e/ual to that o+ colonel or naval captain will re/uire con+ir)ation b the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents?
Held: This contention is 7 7 7 untenable. The Philippine &ational Police is separate and distinct from the )rmed *orces of the Philippines. The ,onstitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. 1nder 2ection % of )rticle I<6 of the !#9; ,onstitution, ?The )rmed *orces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be provided by law. 6t shall 0eep a regular force necessary for the security of the 2tate.@ Cn the other hand, 2ection " of the same )rticle of the ,onstitution ordains thatE ?The 2tate shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local e7ecutives over the police units in their 8urisdiction shall be provided by law.@ To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, ,ongress enacted Republic )ct "#;/ 7 7 7. Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ran0s in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine &ational Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the P&P 7 7 7 do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees re-uiring

confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments. (Manal) v. S"s()<a, 3/2 SCRA 239, Aug. //, /999, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$% 51. -iscuss the nature o+ an ad:interi) appoint)ent. 0s it te)porar and, there+ore, can be withdrawn or revoDed b the President at her pleasure? Held: )n )+ 6&TGR6 )PPC6&T G&T is a permanent appointment because it ta0es effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has -ualified into office. The fact that it is sub8ect to confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments does not alter its permanent character. The ,onstitution itself ma0es an ad interim appointment permanent in character by ma0ing it effective until disapproved by the ,ommission on )ppointments or until the ne7t ad8ournment of ,ongress. The second paragraph of 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution provides as followsE ?The President shall have the power to ma0e appointments during the recess of the ,ongress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be e33ective only until disapproval by the ,ommission on )ppointments or until the ne7t ad8ournment of the ,ongress.@ Thus, the ad interim appointment remains e33ective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signi3ying that it can no longer be :ithdra:n or revoCed by the 2resident . The fear that the President can withdraw or revo0e at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis. ore than half a century ago, this ,ourt had already ruled that an ad interim appointment is permanent in character. 6n %ummers v. Ozaeta, decided on Cctober 5/, !#%9, we held thatE ?7 7 7 an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph =%>, 2ection !4, )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution, which provides that the PPresident shall have the power to ma0e appointments during the recess of the ,ongress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the ,ommission on )ppointments or until the ne7t ad8ournment of the ,ongress.: It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to con3irmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. )n ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has e7pired. 2aid appointment is of course distinguishable from an Pacting: appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued.@ The ,onstitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment ta0es effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and e7ercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. 6n 2acete v. %ecretary o3 the Commission on Appointments, this ,ourt elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as followsE ?) distinction is thus made between the e7ercise of such presidential prerogative re-uiring confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments when ,ongress is in session and when it is in recess. 6n the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the ,ommission on )ppointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so :ith re3erence to ad interim appointments. It taCes e33ect at once. <he individual chosen may thus 6uali3y and per3orm his 3unction :ithout loss o3 time. ?is title to such o33ice is complete. 6n the language of the ,onstitution, the appointment is effective Puntil disapproval by the ,ommission on )ppointments or until the ne7t ad8ournment of the ,ongress.:@

Petitioner cites 'lac0:s Law +ictionary which defines the term Had interimF to mean ?in the meantime@ or ?for the time being.@ .ence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not new and was answered by this ,ourt in 2amantasan ng ungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we e7plained thatE ?7 7 7 *rom the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should e7perience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent had been e7tended several Dad interimE appointments which petitioner mista0enly understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word Dad interimE which creates such belief. The term is defined by 'lac0 to mean Pin the meantime: or Pfor the time being:. Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent !5lacCEs a: Lictionary, &evised ;ourth Edition, "+'#-. 'ut such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the conte7t of Philippine law. 6n referring to +r. Gsteban:s appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. &ather, it is used to denote the manner in :hich said appointments :ere made, that is, done by the 2resident o3 the 2amantasan in the meantime, :hile the 5oard o3 &egents, :hich is originally vested by the >niversity Charter :ith the po:er o3 appointment, is unable to act. I 7 7.@ Thus, the term ?ad interim appointment@, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. 6t does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revo0ed at any time. The term, although not found in the te7t of the ,onstitution, has ac-uired a definite legal meaning under Philippine 8urisprudence. The ,ourt had again occasion to e7plain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar v. Court o3 Appeals, where the ,ourt statedE ?(e have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. 6n the instant case, the appointment e7tended to private respondent by then 21 President )lonto, 3r. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent:s appointment as G7ecutive )ssistant 66 was recognized and attested to by the ,ivil 2ervice ,ommission Regional Cffice &o. !5. 2etitionerEs submission that private respondentEs ad interim appointment is synonymous :ith a temporary appointment :hich could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent appointment but their terms are only until the 5oard disapproves them.F )n ad interim appointee who has -ualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. .e en8oys the constitutional protection that ?JnKo officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended e7cept for cause provided by law.@ !%ection 1*),, Article I=B5 o3 the Constitution- Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has -ualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he -ualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office . Cnce an appointee has -ualified, he ac-uires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the ,onstitution. .e can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the re-uirements of due process. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 52. 6ow is an ad interi) appoint)ent ter)inated?

Held: )n ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the ,onstitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the ,ommission on )ppointments. The second cause is the ad8ournment of ,ongress without the ,ommission on )ppointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions e7pressly imposed by the ,onstitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a 2word of +amocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. &o one, however, can complain because it is the ,onstitution itself that places the 2word of +amocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$%
53. 6ow is an ad interi) appoint)ent distinguished +ro) an appoint)ent or designation in an acting or te)porar capacit ? Held: (hile an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable e7cept as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revo0ed at the pleasure of the appointing power. ) temporary or acting appointee does not en8oy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 54. (enipa o, 'uason and (orra were appointed .hair)an and .o))issioners, respectivel , o+ the .o))ission on Elections, b the President when .ongress was not in session. -id their appoint)ent violate the 7ec. !3?4, *rt. 0I:. o+ the .onstitution that substantiall provides that @&o )e)ber o+ the .o))ission 3on Elections4 shall be appointed in an acting or te)porar capacit ? Held: 6n the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent ,ommissioners to fill the vacancies in the ,C GLG,, sub8ect only to confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments. 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason were e7tended permanent appointments during the recess of ,ongress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unli0e ,ommissioner .aydee Yorac in 5rillantes v. 9orac and 2olicitor Beneral *eli7 'autista in /acionalista 2arty v. 5autista. The ad interim appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason are e7pressly allowed by the ,onstitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of ,ongress, to ma0e appointments that ta0e effect immediately. (hile the ,onstitution mandates that the ,C GLG, ?shall be independent,@ this provision should be harmonized with the President:s power to e7tend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of the ,C GLG, re-uires the ,ommission on )ppointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President:s power to ma0e ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. 6t will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the ,onstitution. I77 The President:s power to e7tend ad interim appointments may indeed briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and confirming powers. This situation, however, in only for a short period D from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the ,ommission on )ppointments gives or withholds its consent. The ,onstitution itself sanctions this situation, as a tradeAoff against the evil of disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the chec0AandAbalance under the separation of powers, as a tradeAoff against the evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The ,onstitution has wisely sub8ected the President:s appointing power to the chec0ing power of the legislature.

This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the ,C GLG, as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the ,C GLG, are precisely staggered to insure that the ma8ority of its members hold confirmed appointments, and no one President will appoint all the ,C GLG, members. 7 7 7 The special constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the ,C GLG, remain in place !%ee %ections, ), 7, $ and 0, Article I=BA o3 the Constitution-. 6n fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments e7tended by the President to 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason, as ,C GLG, ,hairman and ,ommissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 55. -iscuss the reason wh the +ra)ers o+ the !#98 .onstitution thought it wise to reinstate the !#$2 .onstitution provision on ad interi) appoint)ents o+ the President. Held: The original draft of 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution D on the nomination of officers sub8ect to confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments D did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original intention of the framers of the ,onstitution was to do away with ad interim appointments because the plan was for ,ongress to remain in session throughout the year e7cept for a brief $4Aday compulsory recess. .owever, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the ,onstitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the !#$/ ,onstitution on ad interim appointments. I 7 7 I77 ,learly, the reinstatement in the present ,onstitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions. 6n his concurring opinion in .uevarra v. Inocentes, decided under the !#$/ ,onstitution, 3ustice Roberto ,oncepcion, 3r. e7plained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in this mannerE ?&ow, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limitedQ 'ecause, if they e7pired before the session of ,ongress, the evil sought to be avoided M interruption in the discharge o3 essential 3unctions M may ta0e place. 'ecause the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to be effective during the session of ,ongress and before its ad8ournment. 1pon the other hand, once ,ongress has ad8ourned, the evil aforementioned may easily be con8ured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or reappointments.@ (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 56. 'he ad interi) appoint)ents o+ (enipa o, (orra and 'uason as .hair)an and .o))issioners, respectivel , o+ the .EMELE. were b :passed b the .o))ission on *ppoint)ents. 6owever, the were subse/uentl reappointed b the President to the sa)e positions. -id their subse/uent reappoint)ent violate the prohibition against reappoint)ent under 7ection !3?4, *rticle 0I:. o+ the !#98 .onstitution? Held: There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the ,ommission on )ppointments can no longer be e7tended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the ,ommission on )ppointments in the e7ercise of its chec0ing power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the ,ommission on

)ppointments to give its consent after deliberating on the -ualifications of the appointee. 2ince the ,onstitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. 6n this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on appointment, but because of a final decision by the ,ommission on )ppointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. )n ad interim appointment that is byApassed because of lac0 of time or failure of the ,ommission on )ppointments to organize is another matter. ) byApassed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the ,ommission on )ppointments at the close of the session of ,ongress. There is no final decision by the ,ommission on )ppointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as re-uired by the ,onstitution. )bsent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a byApassed appointee. This is recognized in 2ection !; of the Rules of the ,ommission on )ppointments 7 7 7. .ence, under the Rules of the ,ommission on )ppointments, a byA passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the appointment. 6t is wellAsettled in this 8urisdiction that the President can renew the ad interim appointments of byA passed appointees. 3ustice Roberto ,oncepcion, 3r. lucidly e7plained in his concurring opinion in .uevarra v. Inocentes why byApassed ad interim appointees could be e7tended new appointments, thusE ?6n short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval by the ,ommission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive ob8ection of the ,ommission. 6t ceases, also, upon ?the ne7t ad8ournment of the ,ongress@, simply because the President may then issue new appointments D not because of implied disapproval of the ,ommission deduced from its intention during the session of ,ongress, for, under the ,onstitution, the ,ommission may affect adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by omission. 6f the ad8ournment of ,ongress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the President could no longer appoint those so byApassed by the ,ommission. 'ut, the 3act is that the 2resident may reappoint them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedly inferred from said omission of the ,ommission, but the circumstance that upon said adjournment o3 the Congress, the 2resident is 3ree to maCe ad interim appointments or reappointments.F .uevarra was decided under the !#$/ ,onstitution from where the second paragraph of 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the present ,onstitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The 8urisprudence under the !#$/ ,onstitution governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present ,onstitution. The established practice under the present ,onstitution is that the President can renew the appointments of byApassed ad interim appointees. This is a continuation of the wellA recognized practice under the !#$/ ,onstitution, interrupted only by the !#;$ ,onstitution which did not provide for a ,ommission on )ppointments but vested sole appointing power in the President. The prohibition on reappointment in 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution applies neither to disapproved nor byApassed ad interim appointments. ) disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution. ) byApassed ad interim appointment cannot be revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under 2ection !", )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fi7ed term of seven years. I77

The framers of the ,onstitution made it -uite clear that any person who has served any term of office as ,C GLG, member D whether for a full term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even an une7pired term for any length of time D can no longer be reappointed to the ,C GLG,. I77 I77 6n Aisarra v. Mira3lor, 3ustice )ngelo 'autista, in his concurring opinion, -uoted /acionalista v. Le Aera that a JrKeappointment is not prohibited when a ,ommissioner has held, office only for, say, three or si7 years, provided his term will not e7ceed nine years in all.@ This was the interpretation despite the e7press provision in the !#$/ ,onstitution that a ,C GLG, member ?shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed.@ To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase ?without reappointment@ appears twice in 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the present ,onstitution. The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the ,onstitution. 6n either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any reappointment of any 0ind. .owever, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the ,ommission on )ppointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fi7ed term nor an une7pired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the ,C GLG, without the consent of the ,ommission on )ppointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the ,ommission on )ppointments. The phrase ?without reappointment@ applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the ,ommission on )ppointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President:s power to ma0e ad interim appointments. 6n the great ma8ority of cases, the ,ommission on )ppointments usually fails to act, for lac0 of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees. 6f such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the President will certainly hesitate to ma0e ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of the ,ommission on )ppointments. This will nullify the constitutional power of the President to ma0e ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This ,ourt cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wrea0 havoc on vital government services. The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions. The framers of the present ,onstitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fi7ed term of seven years. 7 7 7.

I77 Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of any 0ind. Cn the other hand, the prohibition on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an appointee:s total term of office e7ceeding seven years. The evils sought to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific D reappointment of any 0ind and e7ceeding one:s term in office beyond the ma7imum period of seven years. &ot contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the ,onstitution tightened even further the screws on those who might wish to e7tend their terms of office. Thus, the word ?designated@ was inserted to plug any loophole that might be e7ploited by violators of the ,onstitution 7 7 7. The ad interim appointments and subse-uent renewals of appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed by the ,ommission on )ppointments. ) reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad interim appointments and renewal of appointments will also not breach the sevenAyear term limit because all the appointments and rene:als o3 appointments o3 5enipayo, 5orra and <uason are 3or a 3ixed term expiring on ;ebruary 1, 1((#. )ny delay in their confirmation will not e7tend the e7piry date of their terms of office. ,onse-uently, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be e7orcised by the twin prohibitions in the ,onstitution. The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office e7pire on *ebruary 5, 5449, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 57. What are the +our situations where 7ection !3?4, *rticle 0I:. o+ the !#98 .onstitution which provides that @AtBhe .hair)an and the .o))issioners 3o+ the .EMELE.4 shall be appointed x x x +or a ter) o+ seven ears without reappoint)ent= will appl ? Held: 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution provides that ?JtKhe ,hairman and the ,ommissioners shall be appointed 7 7 7 3or a term o3 seven years :ithout reappointment. @ There are four situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the ,C GLG,, after confirmation by the ,ommission on )ppointments, serves his full sevenAyear term. 2uch person cannot be reappointed to the ,C GLG,, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his sevenAyear term of office ends. 2uch person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the une7pired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the une7pired term. 2uch person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven years. The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation. Gven if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a reappointment of such person to serve an une7pired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of 2ection ! =5>, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution. This provision refers to the first appointees under the ,onstitution whose terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being reappointed under any situation. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$%

58. 'o what t pes o+ appoint)ents is 7ection !2, *rticle ;00 o+ the !#98 .onstitution 3prohibiting the President +ro) )aDing appoint)ents two )onths be+ore the next presidential elections and up to the end o+ his ter)4 directed against?
Held: %ection "$, Article AII is directed against t:o types o3 appointmentsJ ( ! those made for buying votes and ("! those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within two months preceding the Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Cmnibus Glection ,odeF while the second consists of the soAcalled ?midnight@ appointments. The 2, in 1n Re& 2)n. Ma(e) A. Valen<uela an+ 2)n. lac"+) B. Valla!(a, (295 SCRA 405, .)v. 9, /995, En Banc [.a!vasa C.8.$% clarified this when it heldE ?2ection !/, )rticle <66 has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. 6t may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only ?midnight@ appointments D those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their ma0ing D but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.@
59. Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja was a municipal mayor. She ran for reelection but lost. Before she vacated her office, though, she extended permanent appointments to fourteen new employees of the municipal government. he incoming mayor, upon assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these were !midnight appointments" and, therefore, prohibited under Sec. #$, Art. %&& of the #'() *onstitution. Should the act of the new mayor of recalling said appointments on the aforestated ground be sustained+
Held: The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen =!%> private respondents before the ,2,, the only reason he cited to 8ustify his action was that these were ?midnight appointments@ that are forbidden under )rticle <66, 2ection !/ of the ,onstitution. .owever, the ,2, ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. 6n truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from ma0ing appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. (-e Ra#a v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 353 SCRA 94, 7e:. 25, 200/, En Banc [@na!esASan("ag)$% 60. -istinguish the PresidentHs power o+ general supervision over local govern)ents +ro) his control power. Held: Cn many occasions in the past, this ,ourt has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. 6n <aule v. %antos, we held that the ,hief G7ecutive wielded no more authority than that of chec0ing whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. .e cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 21PGR<62CRY PC(GR, :hen contrasted :ith control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior bodyF it does not include any restraining authority over such body. Cfficers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. 6f they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. 2upervision does not cover such authority. 2upervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. 6f the rules are not observed, he may order the wor0 done or reA done to conform to the prescribed rules. .e cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. (B"()AOn)n v. 7e!nan+e<, 350 SCRA 732, 8an. 3/, 200/, 3!+ -"v. [4)n<agaARe6es$% 61. 0s the prior reco))endation o+ the 7ecretar o+ Custice a )andator re/uire)ent be+ore the President )a validl appoint a provincial prosecutor? Held: This -uestion would 7 7 7 pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the Revised )dministrative ,ode of !#9; !5ooC IA, <itle III, Chapter II, %ection +- to the effect that D

?)ll provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the 2ecretary.@ Petitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily re-uires a prior recommendation of the 2ecretary of 3ustice endorsing the intended appointment 7 7 7. (hen the ,onstitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. 6t should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all ?e7ecutive departments, bureaus and offices.@ ,C&TRCL means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the 8udgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. G7pressed in another way, the 2resident has the po:er to assume directly the 3unctions o3 an executive department, bureau and o33ice . 6t can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the e7ercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations. 6t is the considered view of the ,ourt 7 7 7 that the phrase Hupon recommendation o3 the %ecretary,F found in 2ection #, ,hapter 66, Title 666, 'oo0 6<, of the Revised )dministrative ,ode, should be interpreted 7 7 7 to be a mere advise, e7hortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. <he recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature . The President, being the head of the G7ecutive +epartment, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the e7ercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. (Be!#u+e< v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 Ru:en 3)!!es, 4.R. .). /3/429, Aug. 4, /999, 3 !+ -"v. [V"(ug$%
62. -istinguish the PresidentHs power to call out the ar)ed +orces as their .o))ander:in:.hie+ in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, +ro) his power to proclai) )artial and suspend the privilege o+ the writ o+ habeas corpus. Explain wh the +or)er is not sub5ect to 5udicial review while the latter two are.
Held: There is a clear te7tual commitment under the ,onstitution to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the e7ercise of such power. 2ection !9, )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution, which embodies the powers of the President as ,ommanderAinA,hief, provides in partE The President shall be the ,ommanderAinA,hief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 6n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety re-uires it, he may, for a period not e7ceeding si7ty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the e7ercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of 2ection !9, )rticle <66 7 7 7. 1nder the foregoing provisions, ,ongress may revo0e such proclamations =of martial law> or suspension =of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus> and the ,ourt may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. .owever, there is no such e-uivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the PresidentOs action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the ,onstitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any -ualification. Expressio unios est exclusio alterius. I 7 7 That the intent of the ,onstitution is e7actly what its letter says, i.e., that the

power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is e7tant in the deliberation of the ,onstitutional ,ommission 7 7 7. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by ,ongress and review by this ,ourt. oreover, under 2ection !9, )rticle <66 of the ,onstitution, in the e7ercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concurE =!> there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, =5> public safety must re-uire it. These conditions are not re-uired in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that ?whenever it becomes necessary,@ the President may call the armed forces ?to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.@ The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the e7ercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. 6f the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this ,ourt cannot underta0e an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily -uantifiable and cannot be ob8ectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. 'esides the absence of te7tual standards that the court may use to 8udge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such 8udgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. ,ertain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. 6n many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. Cn the other hand, the President as ,ommanderAinA,hief has a vast intelligence networ0 to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. 6n the e7ercise of the power to call, onAtheAspot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. 6ndeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. 2uch a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in indanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if sub8ected to unfettered 8udicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster as such power may be unduly strait8ac0eted by an in8unction or a temporary restraining order every time it is e7ercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the ,onstitution to vest upon the President, as ,ommanderAinA ,hief of the )rmed *orces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his 8udgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. 1nless the petitioner can show that the e7ercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the PresidentOs e7ercise of 8udgment deserves to be accorded respect from this ,ourt. (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$%
63. ( issuing a 'RE on the date convicted rapist Leo Echegara is to be executed b lethal in5ection, the 7upre)e .ourt was criticized on the ground, a)ong others, that it encroached on the power o+ the President to grant reprieve under 7ection !#, *rticle ;00, !#98 .onstitution. Custi+ the 7.Ms act.
Held: 2ection !#, )rticle <66 of the !#9; ,onstitution is simply the source o3 po:er of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final 8udgment. This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finality. 6n truth, an accused who has been convicted

by final 8udgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. *or instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be e7ecuted while in a state of insanity !%ee Article '+ o3 the &evised 2enal Code-. The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an e7ercise of 8udicial power. 6t is not usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same D the temporary suspension of the e7ecution of the death convict. 6n the same vein, it cannot be denied that ,ongress can at any time amend R.). &o. ;"/# by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is li0e that of commutation of sentence. 'ut by no stretch of the imagination can the e7ercise by ,ongress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the President:s power to commute final sentences of conviction. <he po:ers o3 the Executive, the egislative and the @udiciary to save the li3e o3 a death convict do not exclude each other 3or the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to li3e. (Ec,ega!a6 v. Sec!e(a!6 )* 8us("ce, 30/ SCRA 99, 8an. /9, /999, En Banc [ un)$%
64. -iscuss the nature o+ a conditional pardon. 0s its grant or revocation b the President sub5ect to 5udicial review?
Held: ) ,C&+6T6C&)L P)R+C& is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the ,hief G7ecutive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter sub8ect to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the une7pired portion of the sentence or an additional one . 'y the pardonee:s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the ,hief G7ecutive or his delegate who is dutyAbound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. 1nder 2ection "%=i> of the Revised )dministrative ,ode, the ,hief G7ecutive is authorized to order ?the arrest and reAincarceration of any such person who, in his 8udgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.@ 6t is now a wellAentrenched rule in this 8urisdiction that this e7ercise of presidential 8udgment is beyond 8udicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests e7clusively in the sound 8udgment of the ,hief G7ecutive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the 8udgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invo0e the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. I77 1ltimately, solely vested in the ,hief G7ecutive, who in the first place was the e7clusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own 8udgment, the ac-uittal of the pardonee from the subse-uent charges filed against him, warrants the same. ,ourts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. 6t has been our fortified ruling that a final 8udicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a re-uirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is li0ewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revo0ed by the President in the e7ercise of powers undisputably solely and absolutely in his office. (1n Re& >"l*!e+) Su#ul)ng 3)!!es, 25/ SCRA 709, -ec. 29, /995 [2e!#)s"s"#a$%
65. Who has the power to rati+ a treat ?

Held: 6n our 8urisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the 2enate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. (BA@A. [Bag)ng Al6ansang MaFa:a6an$ v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 R)nal+) Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /35570, Oc(. /0, 2000, En Banc [Buena$% 66. Which provision o+ the .onstitution applies with regard to the exercise b the 7enate o+ its constitutional power to concur with the ;isiting ,orces *gree)ent 3;,*4? Held: The !#9; Philippine contains two provisions re-uiring the concurrence of the 2enate on treaties or international agreements.

2ection 5!, )rticle <66 7 7 7 readsE ?&o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twoAthirds of all the embers of the 2enate.@ 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666, providesE ?)fter the e7piration in !##! of the )greement between the Republic of the Philippines and the 1nited 2tates of )merica concerning ilitary 'ases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines e7cept under a treaty duly concurred in by the 2enate and, when the ,ongress so re-uires, ratified by a ma8ority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting 2tate.@ 2ection 5!, )rticle <66 deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least twoAthirds =5/$> of all the embers of the 2enate is re-uired to ma0e the sub8ect treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of sub8ect matter, such as, but not limited to, e7tradition or ta7 treaties or those economic in nature. )ll treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of sub8ect matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, re-uires the concurrence of the 2enate to be valid and effective. 6n contrast, 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. 1nder this provision, the concurrence of the 2enate is only one of the re-uisites to render compliance with the constitutional re-uirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 further re-uires that ?foreign military bases, troops, or facilities@ may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the 2enate, ratified by a ma8ority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so re-uired by ,ongress, and recognized as such by the other contracting 2tate. 6t is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. 6n particular, 2ection 5! opens with the clause ?&o treaty 7 7 7,@ and 2ection 5/ contains the phrase ?shall not be allowed.@ )dditionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the 2enate is indispensable to render the treaty or international agreement valid and effective. To our mind, the fact that the President referred the <*) to the 2enate under 2ection 5!, )rticle <66, and that the 2enate e7tended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. *or in either case, whether under 2ection 5!, )rticle <66 or 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the 2enate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional re-uirements. Cn the whole, the <*) is an agreement which defines the treatment of 1nited 2tates troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. 6t provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the 1nited 2tates and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal 8urisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, importation and e7portation of e-uipment, materials and supplies. 1ndoubtedly, 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain e7tent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of 2ection 5!, )rticle <66 will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes re-uired to obtain the valid concurrence of the 2enate 7 7 7.

6t is a finelyAimbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. ex specialis derogat generali. (BA@A. [Bag)ng Al6ansang MaFa:a6an$ v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 R)nal+) Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /35570 an+ C)#'an")n Cases, Oc(. /0, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 45/A492, En Banc [Buena$%
67. Should the contention that since the %,A merely involved the temporary visits of -nited States personnel engaged in joint military exercises and not a basing agreement, therefore, Sec. .$, Art. /%&&& of the *onstitution is inapplicable to the %,A, be upheld+
Held: 6t is specious to argue that 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. Cn this score, the ,onstitution ma0es no distinction between ?transient@ and ?permanent@. ,ertainly, we find nothing in 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 that re-uires 3oreign troops or 3acilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. 6t is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law, the ,ourt should not distinguish A >bi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. (BA@A. [Bag)ng Al6ansang MaFa:a6an$ v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 R)nal+) Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /35570 an+ C)#'an")n Cases, Oc(. /0, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 45/A492, En Banc [Buena$%
68. Will it be correct to argue that since no +oreign )ilitar bases, but )erel troops and +acilities, are involved in the ;,*, there+ore, 7ection ?2, *rticle I;000 o+ the .onstitution is not controlling?
Held: 6n li0e manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the <*). &otably, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers H3oreign military bases, troops, )! 3acilities.F 2tated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to H3oreign military bases, troops, )! 3acilitiesF collectively but treats them as separate and independent sub8ects. The use of comma and dis8unctive word )or) clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision contemplates three different situations A a military treaty the sub8ect of which could be either =a> foreign bases =b> foreign troops, or =c> foreign facilities A any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666. To this end, the intention of the framers of the ,harter 7 7 7 is consistent with this interpretation 7 7 7. oreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a landAhome base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. 'esides, vessels are mobile as compared to a landAbased military head-uarters. (BA@A. [Bag)ng Al6ansang MaFa:a6an$ v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 R)nal+) Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /35570 an+ C)#'an")n Cases, Oc(. /0, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 45/A492, En Banc [Buena$% 69. Were the re/uire)ents o+ 7ec. ?2, *rt. I;000 o+ the !#98 .onstitution co)plied with when the 7enate gave its concurrence to the ;,*? Held: %ection 1$, Article =AIII disallo:s 3oreign military bases, troops, or 3acilities in the country, unless the 3ollo:ing conditions are su33iciently met, vizJ (a! it must be under a treatyF (*! the treaty must be duly concurred in by the %enate and, when so re-uired by ,ongress, ratified by a ma8ority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendumF and (c! recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two re-uisites in the case of the <*). The concurrence handed by the 2enate through Resolution &o. !9 is in accordance with the provisions of the

,onstitution, whether under the general re-uirement in 2ection 5!, )rticle <66, or the specific mandate mentioned in 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666, the provision in the latter article re-uiring ratification by a ma8ority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since ,ongress has not re-uired it. )s to the matter of voting, %ection 1", Article AII particularly re-uires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least t:oBthirds o3 all the members o3 the %enate. Cn the other hand, %ection 1$, Article =AIII simply provides that the treaty be Hduly concurred in by the %enate.F )pplying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a twoAthirds vote of all the members of the 2enate is clearly re-uired so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. (hile it is true that 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 re-uires, among other things, that the treaty A the <*), in the instant case A be ?duly concurred in by the 2enate,@ it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in 2ection 5!, )rticle <66, which in more specific terms, re-uires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a twoAthirds vote of all the members of the 2enate. 6ndeed, 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 must not be treated in isolation to 2ection 5!, )rticle <66. )s noted, the ?concurrence re-uirement@ under 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 must be construed in relation to the provisions of 2ection 5!, )rticle <66. 6n a more particular language, the concurrence of the 2enate contemplated under 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 means that at least twoAthirds of all the members of the 2enate favorably vote to concur with the treaty A the <*) in the instant case. 777 .aving resolved that the first two re-uisites prescribed in 2ection 5/, )rticle I<666 are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the re-uirement that the <*) should be recognized as a treaty by the 1nited 2tates of )merica. 777 This ,ourt is of the firm view that the phrase ? recognized as a treatyF means that the other contracting party accepts or acCno:ledges the agreement as a treaty. To re-uire the other contracting state, The 1nited 2tates of )merica in this case, to submit the <*) to the 1nited 2tates 2enate for concurrence pursuant to its ,onstitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. (ellAentrenched is the principle that the words used in the ,onstitution are to be given their ordinary meaning e7cept where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. 6ts language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. oreover, it is inconse-uential whether the 1nited 2tates treats the <*) only as an e7ecutive agreement because, under international law, an e7ecutive agreement is as binding as a treaty . To be sure, as long as the <*) possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be ta0en e-ually as a treaty. 777 The records reveal that the 1nited 2tates Bovernment, through )mbassador Thomas ,. .ubbard, has stated that the 1nited 2tates government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the <*). *or as long as the 1nited 2tates of )merica accepts or ac0nowledges the <*) as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed mar0ed compliance with the mandate of the ,onstitution.

(orth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the <*) and the concurrence of the 2enate should be ta0en as a clear and une-uivocal e7pression of our nationOs consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. 777 (ith the ratification of the <*), which is e-uivalent to final acceptance, and with the e7change of notes between the Philippines and the 1nited 2tates of )merica, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. (BA@A. [Bag)ng Al6ansang MaFa:a6an$ v. EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6 R)nal+) Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /35570 an+ C)#'an")n Cases, Oc(. /0, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 45/A492, En Banc [Buena$% 70. *re the @(aliDatan= exercises covered b the ;isiting ,orces *gree)ent? Held: The holding of ?'ali0atan 45A!@ must be studied in the framewor0 of the treaty antecedents to which the Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the utual +efense Treaty = +T, for brevity>. The +T has been described as the ?core@ of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the 1nited 2tates. 6ts aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through 8oint training with its )merican counterpartsF the ?'ali0atan@ is the largest such training e7ercise directly supporting the +T:s ob8ectives. 6t is this treaty to which the <*) adverts and the obligations thereunder which it see0s to reaffirm. The lapse of the 12APhilippine 'ases )greement in !##5 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in 12APhilippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the <isiting *orces )greement. 6t should be recalled that on Cctober !4, 5444, by a vote of eleven to three, this ,ourt upheld the validity of the <*) !5A9A/ v. Namora, )71 %C&A 77+ *1(((,-. The <*) provides the ?regulatory mechanism@ by which ?1nited 2tates military and civilian personnel Jmay visitK temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Bovernment.@ 6t contains provisions relative to entry and departure of )merican personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal 8urisdiction, claims, importation and e7portation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination. 6t is the <*) which gives continued relevance to the +T despite the passage of years. 6ts primary goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between )merican and Philippine military forces in the event of an attac0 by a common foe. The first -uestion that should be addressed is whether ?'ali0atan 45A!@ is covered by the <isiting *orces )greement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the <*) itself. &ot much help can be had therefrom, unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The <*) permits 1nited 2tates personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in ?activities,@ the e7act meaning of which was left undefined. The e7pression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of underta0ings sub8ect only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that 1nited 2tates personnel must ?abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.@ )ll other activities, in other words, are fair game. (e are not completely unaided, however. The <ienna ,onvention on the Law of Treaties, which contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state 7 7 7. 6t is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an e7amination of the te7t, which is presumed to verbalize the parties: intentions. The ,onvention li0ewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the conte7t of the treaty, as well as other elements may be ta0en into account alongside the aforesaid conte7t. I 7 7

The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the conte7t of the <*). )fter studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word ?activities@ arose from accident. 6n our view, it was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. 6n this manner, visiting 12 forces may so8ourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. )s conceived, the 8oint e7ercises may include training on new techni-ues of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation:s marine resources, sea searchAandAdestroy operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action pro8ects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the li0e. 1nder these auspices, the <*) gives legitimacy to the current 'ali0atan e7ercises. 6t is only logical to assume that ?'ali0atan 45A!,@ a ?mutual antiAterrorism advising, assisting and training e7ercise,@ falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the conte7t of the agreement. 'oth the history and intent of the utual +efense Treaty and the <*) support the conclusion that combatBrelated activities D as opposed to combat itself D such as the one sub8ect of the instant petition, are indeed authorized. (A!(,u! -. L"# an+ aul"n) R. E!san+) v. 2)n)!a:le EDecu("ve Sec!e(a!6, 4.R. .). /5/445, A'!"l //, 2002, En Banc [-e Le)n$%
71. What is the power o+ i)pound)ent o+ the President? What are its principal sources?
Held: 6mpoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by ,ongress. 6t is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment have invo0ed at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. *oremost is the authority to impound given to him either e7pressly or impliedly by ,ongress. 2econd is the e7ecutive power drawn from the President:s role as ,ommanderAinA,hief. Third is the *aithful G7ecution ,lause. The proponents insist that a faithful e7ecution of the laws re-uires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would pre8udice public interest. )n e7ample given is when through efficient and prudent management of a pro8ect, substantial savings are made. 6n such a case, it is sheer folly to e7pect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. ( 21LCO.SA v. En!"Bue<, 235 SCRA 509, Aug. 9, /994 [Cu"as)n$%
The +udicial Department
72. What are the re/uisites be+ore the .ourt can exercise the power o+ 5udicial review?
Held: !. The timeAtested standards 3or the exercise o3 judicial revie: are E ( ! the e7istence of an appropriate caseF ("! an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional -uestionF (#! the plea that the function be e7ercised at the earliest opportunityF and ($! the necessity that the constitutional -uestion be passed upon in order to decide the case (Se'a!a(e O'"n")n, 0a'unan, 8., "n 1sagan" C!u< v. Sec!e(a!6 )* Env"!)n#en( an+ .a(u!al Res)u!ces, e( al., 4.R. .). /35355, -ec. 9, 2000, En Banc% 5. (hen -uestions of constitutional significance are raised, the ,ourt can e7ercise its PC(GR C* 31+6,6)L RG<6G( only if the following re6uisites are complied with, namelyE ( ! the e7istence of an actual and appropriate caseF ("! a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional -uestionF (#! the e7ercise of 8udicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunityF and ($! the constitutional

-uestion is the lis mota of the case. (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$% ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a,
73. What are the re/uisites +or the proper exercise o+ the power o+ 5udicial review? 0llustrative case. Held: Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four re-uisites before this ,ourt may e7ercise its power of 8udicial review in constitutional cases. Cut of respect for the acts of the G7ecutive department, which is coAe-ual with this ,ourt, respondents urge this ,ourt to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President to 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason unless all the four re-uisites are present. I 7 7 Respondents argue that the second, third and fourth re-uisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct in8ury as a result of the ad interim appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by 'enipayo, 'orra or Tuason. &either does petitioner claim to be directly in8ured by the appointments of these three respondents. Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to -uestion the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on )ugust $, 544! despite the fact that the ad interim appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason were issued as early as arch 55, 544!. oreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments. Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioner:s reassignment from the G6+ to the Law +epartment. ,onse-uently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of this case. 4e are not persuaded. 'enipayo reassigned petitioner from the G6+, where she was )cting +irector, to the Law +epartment, where she was placed on detail. Respondents claim that the reassignment was Hpursuant to x x x 5enipayoEs authority as Chairman o3 the Commission on Elections, and as the CommissionEs Chie3 Executive O33icer.F Gvidently, respondents: anchor the legality of petitioner:s reassignment on 'enipayo:s authority as ,hairman of the ,C GLG,. The real issue then turns on whether or not 'enipayo is the lawful ,hairman of the ,C GLG,. Gven if petitioner is only an )cting director of the G6+, her reassignment is without legal basis if 'enipayo is not the lawful ,C GLG, ,hairman, an office created by the ,onstitution. Cn the other hand, if 'enipayo is the lawful ,C GLG, ,hairman because he assumed office in accordance with the ,onstitution, then petitioner:s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the ,ivil 2ervice Law. ,learly, petitioner has a personal and material sta0e in the resolution of the constitutionality of 'enipayo:s assumption of office. Petitioner:s personal and substantial in8ury, if 'enipayo is not the lawful ,C GLG, ,hairman, clothes her with the re-uisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition. Respondents harp on petitioner:s belated act of -uestioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on )ugust $, 544!,

when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as arch 55, 544!. .owever, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, ?if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered on appeal.@ Petitioner -uestioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of 'enipayo, 'orra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this ,ourt, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. *urthermore, this ,ourt may determine, in the e7ercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon . There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time. oreover, the legality of petitioner:s reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of 'enipayo:s ad interim appointment and assumption of office. 1nless the constitutionality of 'enipayo:s ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioner:s reassignment from the G6+ to the Law +epartment cannot be determined. ,learly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner. 6n any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions made by the ,C GLG, in the conduct of the ay !%, 544! national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. 6n 0eeping with this ,ourt:s duty to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the ,onstitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this ,ourt may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised . .ere the petitioner has complied with all the re-uisite technicalities. oreover, public interest re-uires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$%
74. What is an @actual case or controvers =?

Held: )n ?),T1)L ,)2G CR ,C&TRC<GR2Y@ means an e7isting case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of 8udicial determination, and that which is not con8ectural or anticipatory, or that which see0s to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. ) petition raising a constitutional -uestion does not present an ?actual controversy,@ unless it alleges a legal right or power. oreover, it must show that a conflict of rights e7ists, for inherent in the term ?controversy@ is the presence of opposing views or contentions . Ctherwise, the ,ourt will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lac0 such concreteness provided when a -uestion emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments e7ploring every aspect of a multiAfaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. The controversy must also be 8usticiableF that is, it must be susceptible of 8udicial determination . (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$%
75. Petitioners 0sagani .ruz and .esar Europa brought a suit +or prohibition and )anda)us as citizens and taxpa ers, assailing the constitutionalit o+ certain provisions o+ Republic *ct &o. 9$8!, otherwise Dnown as the 0ndigenous Peoples Rights *ct o+ !##8 30PR*4, and its 0)ple)enting Rules and Regulations. * preli)inar issue resolved b the 7. was whether the petition presents an actual controvers .
Held: Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical 6uestions or cases. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether an ?appropriate case@ e7ists for the e7ercise of 8udicial review in the present case. I77

6n the case at bar, there e7ists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. ) law has been enacted, and the 6mplementing Rules and Regulations approved. oney has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. 6t cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse conse-uences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for 8udicial resolution. 6t is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of 2tate ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. oreover, when the 2tate machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this ,ourt possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent in8ury and violation of the constitutional process. (Se'a!a(e O'"n")n, 0a'unan, 8., "n 1sagan" C!u< v. Sec!e(a!6 )* Env"!)n#en( an+ .a(u!al Res)u!ces, e( al., 4.R. .). /35355, -ec. 9, 2000, En Banc%
76. When is an action considered @)oot=? Ma the court still resolve the case once it has beco)e )oot and acade)ic?
Held: !. 6t is alleged by respondent that, with respect to the P,,R JPreparatory ,ommission on ,onstitutional ReformK, this case has become moot and academic. (e agree. )n action is considered ?moot@ when it no longer presents a 8usticiable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. 1nder G.C. &o. %$, the P,,R was instructed to complete its tas0 on or before 3une $4, !###. .owever, on *ebruary !#, !###, the President issued G7ecutive Crder &o. ;4 =G.C. &o. ;4>, which e7tended the time frame for the completion of the commission:s wor0 7 7 7. The P,,R submitted its recommendations to the President on +ecember 54, !### and was dissolved by the President on the same day. 6t had li0ewise spent the funds allocated to it. Thus, the P,,R has ceased to e7ist, having lost its raison dE Otre. 2ubse-uent events have overta0en the petition and the ,ourt has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. 'asically, petitioner as0s this ,ourt to en8oin the P,,R from acting as such. ,learly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be en8oined no longer e7ists. 6t is wellAestablished that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already 3ait accompli. )t this point, any ruling regarding the P,,R would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of 8udicial power. (4)n<ales v. .a!vasa, 337 SCRA 733, Aug. /4, 2000, En Banc [4)n<agaARe6es$% 5. The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrolment. Ta0ing into account the admission of private respondents that they have finished their &ursing course at the Lanting ,ollege of &ursing even before the promulgation of the -uestioned decision, this case has clearly been overta0en by events and should therefore be dismissed. .owever, the case of Eastern 5roadcasting Corporation !L9&E- v. Lans is the authority for the view that ?even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated .@ (e shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition. (Gn"ve!s"(6 )* San Agus("n, 1nc. v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 230 SCRA 79/, 770, Ma!c, 7, /994 [.)c)n$%
77. 7hould the .ourt still resolve the case despite that the issue has alread beco)e )oot and acade)ic? Exception.
Held: &either do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed 'arangay &apico, the petition of the unicipality of ,ainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issue raised by the unicipality of ,ainta in its petition before the ,C GLG, against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of 'arangay &apico are still pending determination before the )ntipolo Regional Trial ,ourt.

6n <an v. Commission on Elections, we struc0 down the moot and academic argument as follows D ?,onsidering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for nonAcompliance with constitutional re-uisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before 1s cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. ,ontinuation of the e7istence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be in-uired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very e7cuse for perpetration of such wrong. *or this ,ourt to yield to the respondents: urging that, as there has been 3ait accompli, then this ,ourt should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. +ismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents: submission will create a dangerous precedent. 2hould this ,ourt decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to rec0lessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this ,ourt will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a 3ait accompli.@ (C"(6 )* as"g v. COMELEC, 3/4 SCRA /79, Se'(. /0, /999, En Banc [@na!esASan("ag)$% 78. En Ma !, ?<<!, President Macapagal:*rro o, +aced b an @angr and violent )ob ar)ed with explosives, +irear)s, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadl weapons= assaulting and atte)pting to breaD into Malacanang, issued Procla)ation &o. $9 declaring that there was a state o+ rebellion in the &ational .apital Region. 7he liDewise issued 1eneral Erder &o. ! directing the *r)ed ,orces o+ the Philippines and the Philippine &ational Police to suppress the rebellion in the &ational .apital Region. Warrantless arrests o+ several alleged leaders and pro)oters o+ the @rebellion= were therea+ter e++ected. 6ence, several petitions were +iled be+ore the 7. assailing the declaration o+ 7tate o+ Rebellion b President 1loria Macapagal:*rro o and the warrantless arrests allegedl e++ected b virtue thereo+. Held: )ll the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of state of rebellion by President Bloria acapagalA)rroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law. 2ignificantly, on ay ", 544!, President acapagalA)rroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a ?state of rebellion@ in etro anila. )ccordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic. )s to petitioners: claim that the proclamation of a ?state of rebellion@ is being used by the authorities to 8ustify warrantless arrests, the 2ecretary of 3ustice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the ?rebellion.@ .e states that what is e7tant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and military agencies to implement Proclamation &o. $9. 7 7 7. (ith this declaration, petitioners: apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest. (Lacs)n v. e!e<, 357 SCRA 759, Ma6 /0, 200/, En Banc [Mel)$%
79. 0n connection with the Ma !!, !##9 elections, the .EMELE. issued a resolution prohibiting the conduct o+ exit polls on the ground, a)ong others, that it )ight cause disorder and con+usion considering the rando)ness o+ selecting interviewees, which +urther )aDes the exit polls unreliable. 'he constitutionalit o+ this resolution was challenged b *(7:.(& (roadcasting .orporation as violative o+ +reedo) o+ expression. 'he 7olicitor 1eneral contends that the petition has been rendered )oot and acade)ic because the Ma !!, !##9 election has alread been held and done with and, there+ore, there is no longer an actual controvers to be resolved. Resolve.
Held: (hile the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the ay !!, !##9 election, its implications on the people:s fundamental freedom of e7pression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. 'y its very nature, e7it polling is

tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a tas0 that could well crop up again in future elections. 6n any event, in %alonga v. Cruz 2ano, the ,ourt had occasion to reiterate that it ?also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. 6t has the 2Y 'CL6, *1&,T6C& of educating bench and bar on the e7tent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.@ 2ince the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invo0ed here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they li0ewise protect the holding of e7it polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. (ABSACB. B!)a+cas("ng C)!')!a(")n v. COMELEC, 4.R. .). /33459, 8an. 25, 2000, En Banc [ angan":an$%
80. What is the )eaning o+ Llegal standingL or locus standi?

Held: !. ?LGB)L 2T)&+6&B@ or LC,12 2T)&+6 has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in8ury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged . The term ?interest@ means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the -uestion involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the -uestion of standing is whether a party alleges ?such personal sta0e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional -uestions.@ (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000% 5. In addition to the existence o3 an actual case or controversy, a person :ho assails the validity o3 a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or :ill sustain, a direct injury as a result o3 its en3orcement. Gvidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and ta7payers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a ?generalized grievance@. Yet, in a sense, all citizenOs and ta7payerOs suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. (Se'a!a(e O'"n")n, 0a'unan, 8., "n 1sagan" C!u< v. Sec!e(a!6 )* Env"!)n#en( an+ .a(u!al Res)u!ces, e( al., 4.R. .). /35355, -ec. 9, 2000, En Banc%
81. *sserting itsel+ as the o++icial organization o+ ,ilipino law ers tasDed with the bounden dut to uphold the rule o+ law and the .onstitution, the 0ntegrated (ar o+ the Philippines 30(P4 +iled a petition be+ore the 7. /uestioning the validit o+ the order o+ the President co))anding the deplo )ent and utilization o+ the Philippine Marines to assist the Philippine &ational Police 3P&P4 in law en+orce)ent b 5oining the latter in visibilit patrols around the )etropolis. 'he 7olicitor 1eneral /uestioned the legal standing o+ the 0(P to +ile the petition? Resolve.
Held: 6n the case at bar, the 6'P primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the ,onstitution. )part from this declaration, however, the 6'P asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the 6'P of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. 'ased on the standards aboveAstated, the 6'P has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. 6ts fundamental purpose which, under 2ection 5, Rule !$#A) of the Rules of ,ourt, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of 8ustice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the arines. 7 7 7 oreover, the 6'P 7 7 7 has not shown any specific in8ury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the -uestioned governmental act. 6ndeed, none of its members, whom the 6'P purportedly represents, has sustained any form of in8ury as a result of the operation of the 8oint visibility patrols. &either is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the arines. (hat the 6'P pro8ects as in8urious is the supposed ?militarization@ of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. &ot only is the presumed ?in8ury@ not

personal in character, it is li0ewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the re-uirement of standing. 2ince petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal in8ury as a conse-uence of the -uestioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the arines. (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$%
82. .onsidering the lacD o+ re/uisite standing o+ the 0(P to +ile the petition /uestioning the validit o+ the order o+ the President to deplo and utilize the Philippine Marines to assist the P&P in law en+orce)ent, )a the .ourt still properl taDe cognizance o+ the case?
Held: .aving stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to taCe cognizance o3 a suit :hich does not satis3y the re6uirement o3 legal standing :hen paramount interest is involved. 6n not a few cases, the ,ourt has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people . Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the ,ourt may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 6n this case, a reading of the petition shows that the 6'P has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this ,ourt in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. oreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the indanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. 6t will stare us in the face again. 6t, therefore, behooves the ,ourt to rela7 the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000%
83. -iscuss the nature o+ a taxpa erHs suit. When )a it be allowed?

Held: !. Petitioner and respondents agree that to constitute a taxpayerGs suit, t:o re6uisites must be met, namely, ( ! that public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed, and ("! that the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act . The same pronouncement was made in Pilosbayan, Inc. v. .uingona, @r., where the ,ourt also reiterated its liberal stance in entertaining soAcalled ta7payerOs suits, especially when important issues are involved. ) closer e7amination of the facts of this case would readily demonstrate that petitionerOs standing should not even be made an issue here, ?since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional -uestion is actually involved.@ 6n the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was only made in !#;/ when the Province bought the lands from Crtigas at P!!4.44 per s-uare meter in line with the ob8ectives of P.+. ";%. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to Crtigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing mar0et value of neighboring lots. The first re-uirement, therefore, which would ma0e this petition a ta7payerOs suit is absent. The only remaining 8ustification for petitioner to be allowed to pursue this action is whether it is, or would be, directly affected by the act complained of. )s we stated in Pilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, ?2tanding is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally in8ured by the operation of a law or by official action ta0en, but by concerned citizens, ta7payers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. .ence the -uestion in standing is whether such parties have Oalleged such a personal sta0e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional -uestions.O !Citing 5aCer v. Carr, )0+ >.%. "#0, ' . Ed. 1d 0)) *"+01,-F 1ndeniably, as a ta7payer, petitioner would somehow be adversely affected by an illegal use of public money. (hen, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown 7 7 7, petitioner, even as a ta7payer, cannot -uestion the transaction validly e7ecuted by and between the Province and Crtigas for

the simple reason that it is not privy to said contract. 6n other words, petitioner has absolutely no cause of action, and conse-uently no locus standi, in the instant case. (3,e An("A4!a*( League )* (,e ,"l"''"nes, 1nc. v. San 8uan, 290 SCRA 250, 253A255, Aug. /, /999, En Banc [R)#e!)$% 5. ) ta7payer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the ,onstitution . Thus, a ta7payer:s action is properly brought only when there is an e7ercise by ,ongress of its ta7ing or spending power. This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and 'roadcast )ttorneys of the Philippines =TGLG')P> and B ) &etwor0, 6nc. -uestioned the validity of 2ection #5 of '.P. 'lg. 99! =otherwise 0nown as the ?Cmnibus Glection ,ode@> re-uiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the ,ommission on Glections during the campaign period !<elecommunications and 5roadcast Attorneys o3 the 2hilippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 1#+ %C&A ))' *"++#,-. The ,ourt held that petitioner TGLG')P did not have any interest as a ta7payer since the assailed law did not involve the ta7ing or spending power of ,ongress. any other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to ta7payers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds by the legislature. 6n %anidad v. Commission on Elections, the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a ta7payer:s suit to -uestion several presidential decrees promulgated by then President arcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with the ,ourt e7plaining that D I 7 7 JiKt is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute D Presidential +ecrees are of such nature D may be contested by one who will sustain a direct in8ury as a result of its enforcement. )t the instance of ta7payers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be en8oined, upon the theory that the e7penditure of public funds by an officer of the 2tate for the purpose of e7ecuting an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential +ecree &o. ##! carries an appropriation of *ive illion Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential +ecree &o. !4$! appropriates the sum of Gight illion Pesos to carry out its provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as ta7payers in the lawful e7penditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the +ecrees appropriating said funds 7 7 7. 6n still another case, the ,ourt held that petitioners D the Philippine ,onstitution )ssociation, 6nc., a nonA profit civic organization D had standing as ta7payers to -uestion the constitutionality of Republic )ct &o. $9$" insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sic0 leaves to 2enators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of ,ongress !2hilippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. .imenez-. )nd in 2ascual v. %ecretary o3 2ublic 4orCs, the ,ourt allowed petitioner to maintain a ta7payer:s suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic )ct &o. #54 appropriating P9/,444 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. )ll these cases involved the disbursement of public funds by means of a law. eanwhile, in 5ugnay Construction and Levelopment Corporation v. aron, the ,ourt declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for in8unction in his capacity as a ta7payer in order to -uestion the legality of the contract of lease covering the public mar0et entered into between the ,ity of +agupan and petitioner. The ,ourt declared that Ravanzo did not possess the re-uisite standing to bring such ta7payer:s suit since ?JoKn its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the ,ity shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the mar0et building.@ ,oming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no e7ercise by ,ongress of its ta7ing or spending power. The P,,R was created by the President by virtue of G.C. &o. %$, as amended by G.C. &o. ;4. 1nder 2ection ; of G.C. &o. %$, the amount of P$ million is ?appropriated@ for its operational e7penses ?to be sourced from the funds of the Cffice of the President.@ 7 7 7 The appropriations for the P,,R were authorized by the President, not by ,ongress. 6n fact, there was no appropriation at all. ?6n a strict sense, appropriation has been defied Pas nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the ,onstitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,: while

appropriation made by la: refers to Pthe act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the 2tate to its creditors.:@ The funds used for the P,,R were ta0en from funds intended for the Cffice of the President, in the e7ercise of the ,hief G7ecutive:s power to transfer funds pursuant to 2ection 5/ =/> of )rticle <6 of the ,onstitution. 6n the final analysis, it must be stressed that the ,ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a ta7payer:s suit. 6n the case at bar, there being no e7ercise by ,ongress of its ta7ing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to -uestion the creation of the P,,R in his capacity as a ta7payer, but rather, he must establish that he has a ?personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct in8ury as a result of its enforcement.@ 6n other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest D that he will stand to be benefited or in8ured by the 8udgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. &owhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to ma0e such a representation. (4)n<ales v. .a!vasa, 337 SCRA 733, Aug. /4, 2000, En Banc [4)n<agaARe6es$% 84. What is the )eaning o+ @5usticiable controvers = as re/uisite +or the proper exercise o+ the power o+ 5udicial review? 0llustrative case. Held: *rom a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. 1nder the undisputed facts there is as yet no 8usticiable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. (e gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioner:s memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim =,)L,> filed by the heirs of ,arantes under the assailed +G&R special orders has not been granted nor the ,)L, applied for, issued. The +G&R is still processing the application of the heirs of ,arantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the +G&R may or may not grant. 6t is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of ,arantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. )s the undisputed facts stand there is no 8usticiable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners: asserted right to possess the land by reason of the implementation of the -uestioned administrative issuance. ) 312T6,6)'LG ,C&TRC<GR2Y has been defined as, ?a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests@ which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law . Courts have no judicial po:er to revie: cases involving political 6uestions and as a rule, :ill desist 3rom taCing cognizance o3 speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. 2ub8ect to certain wellAdefined e7ceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity . 6n the case of 2AC> v. %ecretary o3 Education the petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the 2ecretary of Gducation re-uiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners -uestioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. This ,ourt held that there was no 8usticiable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the -uestioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. ) mere apprehension that the 2ecretary of Gducation will withdraw the permit does not amount to 8usticiable controversy. The -uestioned regulation in the P),1 case may be -uestioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been revo0ed or one whose application therefore has been denied . This ,ourt cannot rule on the basis of petitioners: speculation that the +G&R will approve the application of the heirs of ,arantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause in8ury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the

8urisdiction of this ,ourt may be invo0ed. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of ,arantes under orders from the +G&R. The petitioners: allegation that certain documents from the +G&R were shown to them by the heirs of ,arantes to 8ustify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent +G&R or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. 2uffice it to say that by the petitioners: own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of ,arantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the +G&R may or may not approve ,arantes: application. 1ntil such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at some future time. 'orrowing from the pronouncements of this ,ourt in the P),1 case, ?They =the petitioners> have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law D and, naturally need no relief in the form they now see0 to obtain.@ 6f indeed the heirs of ,arantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners: possession thereof even without prior approval by the +G&R of the claim of the heirs of ,arantes, the case is simply one of forcible entry. (Cu(a!an v. -E.R, 350 SCRA 997, 8an. 3/, 200/, 3!+ -"v. [4)n<agaARe6es$%
85. What is a 5usticiable controvers ? What are political /uestions?

Held: )s a general proposition, a controversy is 8usticiable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. 6t pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. &evertheless, the ,ourt does not automatically assume 8urisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. Cne class of cases wherein the ,ourt hesitates to rule on are ?political -uestions.@ The reason is that political 6uestions are concerned :ith issues dependent upon the :isdom, not the legality, o3 a particular act or measure being assailed. oreover, the political -uestion being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the wor0ings of another coAe-ual branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the ,onstitution. )s <anada v. Angara puts it, PCL6T6,)L R1G2T6C&2 refer ? to those 6uestions :hich, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to :hich 3ull discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch o3 government. @ Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the te7t of the ,onstitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political -uestion. 6n the classic formulation of 3ustice 'rennan in 5aCer v. Carr, ?JpKrominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political -uestion is found a te7tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political departmentF or a lac0 of 8udicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving itF or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 0ind clearly for non8udicial discretionF or the impossibility of a courtOs underta0ing independent resolution without e7pressing lac0 of the respect due coordinate branches of governmentF or an unusual need for un-uestioning adherence to a political decision already madeF or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one -uestion.@ The !#9; ,onstitution e7pands the concept of 8udicial review by providing that H*<,he @udicial po:er shall be vested in one %upreme Court and in such lo:er courts as may be established by la:. @udicial po:er includes the duty o3 the courts o3 justice to settle actual controversies involving rights :hich are legally demandable and en3orceable, and to determine :hether or not there has been a grave abuse o3 discretion amounting to lacC or excess o3 jurisdiction on the part o3 any branch or instrumentality o3 the .overnment.F !Article AIII, %ec. " o3 the "+#' Constitution- 1nder this definition, the ,ourt cannot agree 7 7 7 that the issue involved is a political -uestion beyond the 8urisdiction of this ,ourt to review. (hen the grant of power is -ualified, conditional or sub8ect to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed -ualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is 8usticiable A the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom . oreover, the 8urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this ,ourt . (hen political -uestions are involved, the ,onstitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac0 or e7cess of 8urisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being -uestioned.

'y grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical e7ercise of 8udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty en8oined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is e7ercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 1nder this definition, a court is :ithout po:er to directly decide matters over :hich 3ull discretionary authority has been delegated . 'ut while this ,ourt has no power to substitute its 8udgment for that of ,ongress or of the President, it may loo0 into the -uestion of whether such e7ercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. ) showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to 8udicial in-uiry, for the improvident e7ercise or abuse thereof may give rise to 8usticiable controversy . (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$%
86. 0s the legiti)ac o+ the assu)ption to the Presidenc o+ President 1loria Macapagal *rro o a political /uestion and, there+ore, not sub5ect to 5udicial review? -istinguish E-7* People Power 0 +ro) E-7* People Power 00.
Held: Respondents rely on the case of a:yers eague 3or a 5etter 2hilippines andQor Oliver A. ozano v. 2resident Corazon C. A6uino, and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent )rroyo, ergo, they present a political -uestion. ) more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. 6n the cited cases, we held that the government of former President )-uino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. &o less than the *reedom ,onstitution declared that the )-uino government was installed through a direct e7ercise of the power of the *ilipino people ?in defiance of the provisions of the !#;$ ,onstitution, as amended.@ 6t is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond 8udicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. 6n chec0ered contrast, the government of respondent )rroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she too0 at the G+2) 2hrine is the oath under the !#9; ,onstitution. 6n her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the !#9; ,onstitution. 6ndeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the !#9; ,onstitution. 6n fine, the legal distinction bet:een EL%A 2eople 2o:er I and EL%A 2eople 2o:er II is clear. ED(A , involves the e7ercise of the people power of revolution which overthrows the whole government. ED(A ,, is an e7ercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. ED(A , is e7tra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the sub8ect of 8udicial review, but ED(A ,, is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the <ice President as President are sub8ect to 8udicial review. ED(A , presented a political -uestionF ED(A ,, involves legal -uestions. I 7 7 &eedless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political -uestions. The principal issues for resolution re-uire the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the !#9; ,onstitution, notably 2ection ! of )rticle 66, and 2ection 9 of )rticle <66, and the allocation of governmental powers under 2ection !! of )rticle <66. The issues li0ewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against pre8udicial publicity. )s early as the !94$ case of Marbury v. Madison- the doctrine has been laid down that Hit is emphatically the province and duty o3 the judicial department to say :hat the la: is x x x.F Thus, respondent:s invocation of the doctrine of political -uestion is but a foray in the dar0. (8)se', E. Es(!a+a v. An"an) -es"e!(), 4.R. .)s. /497/0A /5, Ma!c, 2, 200/, En Banc [ un)$%
87. 0s the PresidentHs power to call out the ar)ed +orces as their .o))ander:in:.hie+ in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion sub5ect to 5udicial review, or is it a political /uestion? .lari+ .

Held: 4hen the 2resident calls the armed 3orces to prevent or suppress la:less violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary po:er solely vested in his :isdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the te7t of the ,onstitution itself. The ,ourt, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the PresidentOs wisdom or substitute its own. .owever, this does not prevent an examination o3 :hether such po:er :as exercised :ithin permissible constitutional limits or :hether it :as exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse o3 discretion . 6n view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the PresidentOs decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there e7ists no 8ustification for calling out the armed forces. There is, li0ewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was e7ercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. 6n the performance of this ,ourtOs duty of ?purposeful hesitation@ before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the ,ourt interfere with the PresidentOs 8udgment. To doubt is to sustain. (1n(eg!a(e+ Ba! )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. 2)n. R)nal+) B. Ea#)!a, 4.R. .). /4/254, Aug. /5, 2000, En Banc [0a'unan$%
88. -o lower courts have 5urisdiction to consider the constitutionalit o+ a law? 0+ so, how should the act in the exercise o+ this 5urisdiction?
Held: (e stress at the outset that the lower court had 8urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of 2ection !9;, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the 8udicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. 2pecifically, 'P !5# vests in the regional trial courts 8urisdiction over all civil cases in which the sub8ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to -uestion in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings ta0en against him, particularly as they contravene the 'ill of Rights. oreover, )rticle <666, 2ection /=5>, of the ,onstitution vests in the 2upreme ,ourt appellate 8urisdiction over final 8udgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e7ecutive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in -uestion. 6n the e7ercise of this 8urisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the conse-uences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. )s the -uestioned act is usually the handiwor0 of the legislative or the e7ecutive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher 8udgment of this ,ourt in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the ma8ority of those who participated in its discussion. (-!"l)n v. L"#, 235 SCRA /35, /39A/40, Aug. 4, /994, En Banc [C!u<$%
89. What cases are to be heard b the 7upre)e .ourt en banc?

Held: 1nder 2upreme ,ourt ,ircular &o. 5A9#, dated *ebruary ;, !#9#, as amended by the Resolution of &ovember !9, !##$E I 7 7 JtKhe following are considered en banc casesE !> ,ases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or e7ecutive agreement, law, e7ecutive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in -uestionF 5> ,riminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penaltyF $> ,ases raising novel -uestions of lawF %> ,ases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consulsF

/> ,ases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the ,ivil 2ervice ,ommission, ,ommission on Glections, and ,ommission on )uditF "> ,ases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a 8udge, officer or employee of the 8udiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one =!> year or a fine e7ceeding P!4,444.44 or bothF ;> ,ases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversedF 9> ,ases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three =$> members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a ma8ority of the actual membership of the court en bancF and #> )ll other cases as the court en banc by a ma8ority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. (7"!es()ne Ce!a#"cs, 1nc. v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 334 SCRA 495, 47/A472, 8une 25, 2000, En Banc [ u!"s"#a$%
90. What is +iscal autono) ? 'he +iscal autono) clause?

Held: )s envisioned in the ,onstitution, the fiscal autonomy en8oyed by the 3udiciary, the ,ivil 2ervice ,ommission, the ,ommission on )udit, the ,ommission on Glections, and the Cffice of the Cmbudsman contemplates a guarantee of full fle7ibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs re-uire. 6t recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fi7 rates of compensation not e7ceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. *62,)L )1TC&C Y means 3reedom 3rom outside control. The 3udiciary, the ,onstitutional ,ommissions, and the Cmbudsman must have the independence and fle7ibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the e7press mandate of the ,onstitution but especially as regards the 2upreme ,ourt, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. (Beng<)n v. -!"l)n, 205 SCRA /33, A'!"l /5, /992, En Banc [4u("e!!e<$%
91. Ma the E)buds)an validl entertain cri)inal charges against a 5udge o+ the regional trial court in connection with his handling o+ cases be+ore the court?
Held: Petitioner criticizes the 8urisprudence !Maceda v. Aas6uez, 11" %C&A 707 *"++), and Lolalas v. O33ice o3 the OmbudsmanBMindanao, 10$ %C&A #"# *"++0,- cited by the Cffice of the Cmbudsman as erroneous and not applicable to his complaint. .e insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a 8udge, it was within the authority of the Cmbudsman not the 2upreme ,ourt to resolve whether a crime was committed and the 8udge prosecuted therefor. The petition cannot succeed. I77 (e agree with the 2olicitor Beneral that the Cmbudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting the writs prayed for. The issues have been settled in the case of In &eJ @oa6uin 5orromeo. There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a 8udge for a violation of )rts. 54% and 54/ =0nowingly rendering an un8ust 8udgment or order> can be entertained, there must first be ?a final and authoritative 8udicial declaration@ that the decision or order in -uestion is indeed ?un8ust.@ The pronouncement may result from eitherE

=a> an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the 8udgmentF or =b> an administrative proceeding in the 2upreme ,ourt against the 8udge precisely for promulgating an un8ust 8udgment or order. Li0ewise, the determination of whether a 8udge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an e7clusive 8udicial function !In &eJ 5orromeo, supra, at 70"-. ?To repeat, no other entity or official of the government, not the prosecution or investigation service o3 any other branch , not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a 8udicial order or decision D whether final and e7ecutory or not D and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an un8ust 8udgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. This having been said, we find that the Cmbudsman acted in accordance with law and 8urisprudence when he referred the cases against 3udge Pelayo to the 2upreme ,ourt for appropriate action. (-e Ve!a v. ela6), 335 SCRA 25/, 8ul6 9, 2000, / s( -"v. [ a!+)$%
92. What is a Me)orandu) -ecision?

Held: ) G CR)&+1 +G,626C& is a ?specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of 2ection %4, '.P. 'lg. !5# on the grounds of e7pediency, practicality, convenience and doc0et status of our courts.@ (7!anc"sc) v. e!#sFul, /73 SCRA 324, 333 [/959$%
93. -iscuss the validit o+ @Me)orandu) -ecisions.=

Held: !. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without e7pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of ?memorandum decisions@ which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. I 7 7 .ence, even in this 8urisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at 7 7 7. (O"l an+ .a(u!al 4as C)##"ss")n v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 293 SCRA 29, 8ul6 23, /995 [Ma!("ne<$% 5. (e have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional in8unction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if ?there Jwas leftK much to be desired in terms of JtheirK clarity, coherence and comprehensibility@ provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal -ualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liabilityF or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penaltyF or -uoted the facts narrated in the prosecution:s memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution:s evaluation of the case . (e have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions 7 7 7. (e have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate. 6n ;rancisco v. 2ermsCul, however, we laid the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, thusE

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. *or the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. 6n other words, the memorandum decision authorized under 2ection %4 of '.P. 'lg. !5# should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an anne7 attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. 6t is e7pected that this re-uirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a prior e7amination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the anne7ed statement should suggest that such e7amination has been underta0en. 6t is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with )rticle <666, 2ection !% as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. The ,ourt finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an additive e7cuse for 8udicial sloth. 6t is an additional condition for the validity of this 0ind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the 8udge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will re-uire an e7tended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. I77 .enceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the re-uirements herein set forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. )ny deviation will summon the strict enforcement of )rticle <666, 2ection !% of the ,onstitution and stri0e down the flawed 8udgment as a lawless disobedience. Tested against these standards, we find that the RT, decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional in8unction. The RT, decision is brief indeed, but it is star0ly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. 6t achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. 6ts inade-uacy spea0s for itself. (e cannot even consider or affirm said RT, decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in ;rancisco v. 2ermsCul. 6t merely affirmed in toto the eT, decision without saying more. ) decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolutionF otherwise, the appeal would be pointless (e therefore reiterate our admonition in /icos Industrial Corporation v. Court o3 Appeals, in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substanceF and again in ;rancisco v. 2ermsCul, where we cautioned that e7pediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot e7cuse nonAcompliance with the constitutional re-uirements. This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the e7pense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of 8ustice and fair play, lest the fears e7pressed by 3ustice *eria as the ponente in &omero v. Court o3 Appeals come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was accorded a fair opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at sta0e but also the liberty if not the life of a human being.

*aithful adherence to the re-uirements of 2ection !%, )rticle <666 of the ,onstitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. 6t is li0ewise demanded by the due process clause of the ,onstitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an e7planation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that 8udgment is rendered in favor of I and against Y and 8ust leave it at that without any 8ustification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to 0now why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. ) decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dar0 as to how it was reached and is precisely pre8udicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal . ore than that, the re-uirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching 8udgment, the 8udge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. 6t is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the 8udge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. <ouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the ,onstitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing 8udgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the 8udge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the 8ustness of his decision . Thus the ,ourt has struc0 down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the ,ourt of )ppeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest e7posed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but li0ewise to their avowed fealty to the ,onstitution. Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with 2ection !%, )rticle <666 of the ,onstitution, a decision, resolution or order whichE contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusionsF contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both partiesF convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in -uestion was libelousF consisted merely of one =!> paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricideF consisted of five =/> pages, three =$> pages of which were -uotations from the labor arbiter:s decision including the dispositive portion and barely a page =two J5K short paragraphs of two J5K sentences each> of its own discussion or reasoningsF was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes, or failed to e7plain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages. 6n the same vein do we stri0e down as a nullity the RT, decision in -uestion. (@a) v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 344 SCRA 202, Oc(. 24, 2000, /s( -"v. [-av"+e$%
94. What are the distinctive +eatures and purpose o+ a )e)orandu) decision?
Held: 6n ;rancisco v. 2ermsCul !"') %C&A )17, ))) *"+#+, , the ,ourt described ?JtKhe distinctive features of a memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review. ost li0ely, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. )t any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are being approved or adopted anyway. (@a) v. C)u!( )* A''eals, 344 SCRA 202, Oc(. 24, 2000, /s( -"v. [-av"+e$%
95. -oes the period +or decision )aDing under 7ection !2, *rticle ;000, !#98 .onstitution, appl to the 7andiganba an? Explain.
Held: The above provision does not apply to the 2andiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the ,ourt of )ppeals . The 2andiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the ,ourt of )ppeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of 8ustice, with functions of a trial court.

Thus, the 2andiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one . (Re& !):le# )* -ela6s "n Cases Be*)!e (,e San+"gan:a6an, A.M. .). 00A5A05ASC, .)v. 25, 200/, En Banc [ a!+)$%
The Constitutional Commissions

96. Wh does the .onstitution prohibit the President +ro) appointing in an acting or te)porar capacit the .hair)an and .o))issioners o+ the .onstitutional .o))issions? Explain. Held: J)K temporary or acting appointee does not en8oy security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the 0ind of appointment that the ,onstitution prohibits the President from ma0ing to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the ,C GLG,. Thus, in 5rillantes v. 9orac, this ,ourt struc0 down as unconstitutional the designation by then President ,orazon )-uino of )ssociate ,ommissioner .aydee Yorac as )cting ,hairperson of the ,C GLG,. This ,ourt ruled thatE ?) designation as )cting ,hairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore revocable at will. &o cause need be established to 8ustify its revocation. )ssuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as )cting ,hairman of the ,ommission on Glections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. 6t is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal. The ,onstitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the ,ommission on Glections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is not available to the respondent as )cting ,hairman of the ,ommission on Glections by designation of the President of the Philippines.@ Garlier, in /acionalista 2arty v. 5autista, a case decided under the !#$/ ,onstitution, which did not have a provision prohibiting temporary or acting appointments to the ,C GLG,, this ,ourt nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the 2olicitor Beneral as acting member of the ,C GLG,. This ,ourt ruled that the designation of an acting ,ommissioner would undermine the independence of the ,C GLG, and hence violate the ,onstitution. (e declared thenE ?6t would be more in 0eeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the ,onstitution to appoint a permanent ,ommissioner than to designate one to act temporarily.@ (Ma(":ag v. Ben"'a6), 350 SCRA 49, A'!"l 2, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 97. 0s the constitutional power o+ the .E* to exa)ine and audit govern)ent banDs and agencies exclusive? -oes it preclude a concurrent audit b a private external auditor? Held: The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the ,C) has the sole and e7clusive power to e7amine and audit government ban0s involves an interpretation of 2ection 5, )rticle 6IA+ of the !#9; ,onstitution. This 2ection provides as followsE ?2ec. 5. =!> The ,ommission on )udit shall have the po:er, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and e7penditures or uses of funds and property, owned and held in trust by, or pertaining to, the

Bovernment, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentA owned or controlled corporations with original charters, 7 7 7. ?=5> The ,ommission shall have the exclusive authority, sub8ect to the limitations in this )rticle, to define the scope of its audit and e7amination, establish the techni-ues and methods re-uired therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, e7cessive, e7travagant, or unconscionable e7penditures, or uses of government funds and properties.@ =Gmphasis supplied> The ,C) vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of 2ection 5, the ,C) en8oys the sole and e7clusive power to e7amine and audit all government agencies, including the +'P. The ,C) contends this is similar to its sole and e7clusive authority, under the same paragraph of the same section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessary e7penditures of government agencies. The bare language of 2ection 5, however, shows that the ,C):s power under the first paragraph is not declared e7clusive, while its authority under the second paragraph is e7pressly declared ?e7clusive.@ There is a significant reason for this mar0ed difference in language. +uring the deliberations of the ,onstitutional ,ommission, ,ommissioner 2erafin Buingona proposed the addition of the word ?e7clusive@ in the first paragraph of 2ection 5, thereby granting the ,C) the sole and e7clusive power to e7amine and audit all government agencies. .owever, the ,onstitutional ,ommission re8ected the addition of the word ?e7clusive@ in the first paragraph of 2ection 5 and Buingona was forced to withdraw his proposal. I 7 7 I77 6n sharp contrast, the ,onstitutional ,ommission placed the word ?e7clusive@ to -ualify the authority of the ,C) under the second paragraph of the same 2ection 5. This word ?e7clusive@ did not appear in the counterpart provisions of 2ection 5 in the !#$/ and !#;$ ,onstitutions. There is no dispute that the ,C):s authority under the second paragraph of 2ection 5 is e7clusive as the language of the ,onstitution admits of no other meaning. Thus, the ,C) has the e7clusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government e7penditures. Cther government agencies and their officials, as well as private auditors engaged by them, cannot in any way intrude into this e7clusive function of the ,C). The -ualifying word ?e7clusive@ in the second paragraph of 2ection 5 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another subAsection of 2ection 5. ) -ualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in another paragraph or subAsection. Thus, the first paragraph of 2ection 5 must be read the way it appears, without the word ?e7clusive,@ signifying that nonA,C) auditors can also e7amine and audit government agencies. 'esides, the framers of the ,onstitution intentionally omitted the word ?e7clusive@ in the first paragraph of 2ection 5 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private e7ternal auditors. The clear and unmista0able conclusion from a reading of the entire 2ection 5 is that the ,C):s power to e7amine and audit is nonAe7clusive. Cn the other hand, the ,C):s authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary e7penditures is e7clusive.

I77 anifestly, the e7press language of the ,onstitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion D the ,C) does not have the e7clusive power to e7amine and audit government agencies. The framers of the ,onstitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the ,C) audit, as when there is a private investment in a governmentAcontrolled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows money from abroad. 6n these instances the government enters the mar0etplace and competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the mar0etplace. Ctherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar. 'y design the ,onstitution is fle7ible enough to meet these e7igencies. )ny attempt to nullify this fle7ibility in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such fle7ibility. The deliberations of the ,onstitutional ,ommission reveal elo-uently the intent of 2ection 5, )rticle 6IA+ of the ,onstitution. )s this ,ourt has ruled repeatedly, the intent of the law is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the law. 6f a law needs interpretation, the most dominant influence is the intent of the law. The intent of the law is that which is e7pressed in the words of the law, which should be discovered within its four corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative history. 6n the case of 2ection 5, )rticle 6IA+ of the ,onstitution, the intent of the framers of the ,onstitution is evident from the bare language of 2ection 5 itself. The deliberations of the ,onstitutional ,ommission confirm e7pressly and even elucidate further this intent beyond any doubt whatsoever. There is another constitutional barrier to the ,C):s insistence of e7clusive power to e7amine and audit all government agencies. The ,C):s claim clashes directly with the ,entral 'an0:s constitutional power of ?supervision@ over ban0s under 2ection 54, )rticle I66 of the ,onstitution. I 7 7 .istorically, the ,entral 'an0 has been conducting periodic and special e7amination and audit of ban0s to determine the soundness of their operations and the safety of the deposits of the public. 1ndeniably, the ,entral 'an0:s power of ?supervision@ includes the power to e7amine and audit ban0s, as the ban0ing laws have always recognized this power of the ,entral 'an0. .ence, the ,C):s power to e7amine and audit government ban0s must be reconciled with the ,entral 'an0:s power to supervise the same ban0s. The inevitable conclusion is that the ,C) and the ,entral 'an0 have concurrent 8urisdiction, under the ,onstitution, to e7amine and audit government ban0s. .owever, despite the ,entral 'an0:s concurrent 8urisdiction over government ban0s, the ,C):s audit still prevails over that of the ,entral 'an0 since the ,C) is the constitutionally mandated auditor of government ban0s. )nd in matters falling under the second paragraph of 2ection 5, )rticle 6IA+ of the ,onstitution, the ,C):s 8urisdiction is e7clusive. Thus, the ,entral 'an0 is devoid of authority to allow or disallow e7penditures of government ban0s since this function belongs e7clusively to the ,C). (-evel)'#en( BanF )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. C)##"ss")n )n Au+"(, 373 SCRA 359, 8anua!6 /9, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$% 98. (etween the .E*Hs +indings and conclusions and that o+ private auditors, which should prevail?

Held: oreover, as the constitutionallyAmandated auditor of all government agencies, the ,C):s findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the ,C) audit over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the ,onstitutional ,ommission 7 7 7. The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors who re-uire such private audit. Bovernment agencies and officials, however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the ,C), whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of 2ection 5, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. 99. Ma the power o+ the .E* to exa)ine and audit govern)ent agencies be validl taDen awa +ro) it? Held: The power of the ,C) to e7amine and audit government agencies, while nonAe7clusive, cannot be ta0en away from the ,C). 2ection $, )rticle 6IA, of the ,onstitution mandates thatE ?2ec. $. &o law shall be passed e7empting any entity of the Bovernment or its subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the 8urisdiction of the ,ommission on )udit.@ The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the ,C) of its power to e7amine and audit the same government agencies. (-evel)'#en( BanF )* (,e ,"l"''"nes v. C)##"ss")n )n Au+"(, 373 SCRA 359, 8anua!6 /9, 2002, En Banc [Ca!'")$%

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5. What are the wa s o+ ac/uiring citizenship? -iscuss.

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7. What /uali+ications )ust be possessed b an applicant +or naturalization?

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11. Who )a validl avail o+ repatriation under R.*. &o. 9!8!?

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14. -istinguish -ual .itizenship +ro) -ual *llegiance.

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23. 7tate the guidelines +or screening Part :List Participants.

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34. -iscuss the Enrolled (ill -octrine.

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36. What )atters are re/uired to be entered on the Cournal?

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The Executive Department

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45. -iscuss our legal histor on executive i))unit .

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65. Who has the power to rati+ a treat ?

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The +udicial Department

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74. What is an @actual case or controvers =?

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80. What is the )eaning o+ Llegal standingL or locus standi?

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83. -iscuss the nature o+ a taxpa erHs suit. When )a it be allowed?

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