MODAL VERBS

MOOD AND MODALITY The grammatical category of mood is one of the available ways of expressing modality in a language. The moods in English are: the indicative, the subjunctive, the infinitive and the imperative. The notional definition of the category mood covers the semantic distinction between factual, i.e., related to facts in reality (the indicative mood) and non-factual (the subjunctive, the infinitive and the imperative). esides the grammatical moods of the verb, various nouns, adjectives, adverbs, verbs and modal auxiliary verbs can also express modal concepts and attitudes: !ouns: allegation, hypothesis, command, exhortation, re"uest, assumption, certainty, doubt, expectation, etc. #djectives: sure, certain, possible, necessary, probable, compulsory, imperative, lawful, legal, permissible, etc. $erbs: assume, believe, fancy, fear, feel, guess, hope, imagine, presume, rec%on, surmise, suspect, thin%, trust, declare, etc. &odal auxiliary verbs: can, may, must, will, shall, could, might, ought to, would, should, need, dare. &odal expressions such as the ones enumerated above allow us to tal% about states of affairs that are not present in the current situation and may never occur in the actual world. The logical notion of modality presupposes the existence of modal operators. # modal operator is one which, when appended'added to a proposition p, yields another proposition ". (# proposition describes the semantic content of a sentence). (oughly spea%ing, the modal operator expresses an attitude towards the operand proposition (i.e., towards the proposition on which it operates). )n all the examples that follow, the modal operators (italici*ed) express attitudes towards the proposition Tom is the murderer: (+) a. Tom is the murderer b. Tom must be the murderer c. Tom might be the murderer d. )t is believed by the police that Tom is the murderer (but they are wrong) e. )t is possible that Tom is the murderer f. Necessarily, Tom is the murderer g. The police declared that Tom was the murderer

)n general, conversation unfolds against a common conversational bac%ground, which is the set of propositions accepted as true by the discourse participants. This common conversational bac%ground is simply referred to as conversational (back)ground. The propositions in the conversational bac%ground play an important role in human reasoning, since they are ta%en as implicit premises in the judgements spea%ers ma%e. These implicit premises are sometimes explicitly signalled by using phrases of the type: by virtue of what is known, by virtue of what is reasonable/lawful, etc. ,or instance, all spea%ers'hearers in our real world interpret a sentence such as (-) as true in our solar system: (-) !othing can travel faster than light

.hen we tal% to other people we generally suppose that they share with us a common ground, which is the same for all community members. #s a rule, we do not suppose that a person we address comes from another solar system regulated by other physical laws and where sentence (-) can be false. /et us consider now the interpretation of the examples in (+ a0g). )n uttering (+a) the spea%er ma%es an unmodalized assertion. 1is statement expresses a commitment that the proposition Tom is the murderer is true in the real world. The proposition is ta%en as a fact and the mood used is the indicative. 2entence (+a) is true in all the worlds determined by the conversational bac%ground () state'The police states that Tom is the murderer, etc.). )n contrast to (+a), sentences (+b) and (+c)

contain modal operators and express modalized assertions. 2entences (+b) and (+c) are conclusions that the spea%er may draw on the basis of what is known in the context. Therefore, they rely on an epistemic conversational background. 2entences (+b) and (+c) differ regarding the strength of the conclusion. 2entence (+c) (containing the modal verb might) says that given what is %nown, it is possible ' it is not impossible for Tom to be the murderer. Thus, for sentence (+c) to be true it is enough that it is true in one world consistent with what is %nown. # similar idea is expressed in sentence (+e) except that the modal operator is the adjective possible. )n contrast, for (+b) to be true, given what is known in the current situation, the proposition Tom is the murderer must be true in all the worlds that are consistent with what is %nown. The same interpretation is ac"uired by sentence (+f), except that it contains the modal operator necessarily. These examples show what ingredients are involved in the interpretation of modalised assertions (cf. 3rat*er, +455, +44+). First, there is the conversational background, which contributes the premises rom which the conc!usions "re #r"wn$ )n the examples above, the conversational bac%ground was epistemic, since the evidence involved in drawing the conclusions represented what was known in the context. /et us call modal base the set o wor!#s where "!! the propositions consi#ere# "s premises in the mo#"! in erence "re true (e.g., worlds compatible with what is %nown, worlds compatible with what someone believes, etc.). 2entence (+d) is true if the proposition Tom is the murderer is true in those worlds which are consistent with the police6s beliefs. !otice, as suggested by the brac%eted continuation in (+d), that what is believed by the police does not have to be true in the real world. Thus, more generally, the modal base does not necessarily include the real world. Mo#"! oper"tors e%press #i erent t&pes o commitment to the truth o the mo#"!ise# proposition$ 'h"t ch"n(es is the )in# o wor!# or situ"tion where the proposition is e*"!u"te# (i.e., what changes is the modal base, that is, situations compatible with what is %nown, situations compatible with what someone believes, etc.). The modality of the sentence signals the context in which it is evaluated7 this context is determined by the modal operator. &ore often than not mo#"! b"ses "re in erre# rom the pr"(m"tic+con*ers"tion"! conte%t . 8ne and the same modal verb can be evaluated with respect to various modal bases. )n the following examples (ta%en from #nna 9apafragou, -:::) the verb ;#! is evaluated in the pre0 posed modal bases, which are thus made explicit7 in these contexts, ;#! conveys different types of possibility (physical, social, legal, biological): (<) a. #s a former champion, =ohn can lift heavy weights b. #s a simple guest, =ohn can dress casually c. #s a >niversity employee, =ohn can get health benefits d. #s a human being, =ohn can have conscious mental states

# modal base can be realistic or better said totally realistic when it represents a set of propositions that are true in the given world. )t follows that a realistic modal base is a subset of the common ground. 2uch a bac%ground is signalled by phrases such as in view of facts of such and such kind or in view of what is the case. ,or instance, the sentences in (+a) and (-) are evaluated with respect to a totally realistic modal base and they are used in the indicative. 8ther modal bases can be weakly realistic. ,or instance, predicates such as understand, know, think, believe, consider, say, tell, declare, promise, swear are modal operators that introduce only one possible situation or possible world into the context7 it is in this world that the proposition on which the modal operator operates is supposed to be true. 2uch a world always intersects with the common ground. )n other words, what is %nown, understood, believed, declared, promised etc., is part of what is true. !otice that since a wea%ly realistic context of evaluation is close enough to a totally realistic one, the complement clause of these verbs may be used in the indicative mood. This is what happens in (+g) and in the following examples: (?) 1e believes ' %nows ' says ' promises that he will win

# particularly salient ingredient in interpreting modality is that it may have a strong normative component. 9eople reason function of ideals, which represent perfect behavior, the reali*ation of all

one6s wishes, etc. This is the case of modal verbs such as should, ought to, may or modal operators such as want, wish, desire, prefer, etc. (@) a. 2tudents should be polite to their teachers b. 8ne ought to do one6s duty c. They prefer that the building should be restored at once

2uch modal operators not only introduce a modal base with respect to which they are evaluated in terms of truth but also order various alternatives function of how close they come to the envisaged ideals. )n the above examples for instance, should is stronger in terms of moral obligation (i.e., it is closer to the ideal) than ought to. $erbs such as want, desire, would like, order, command, be bizarre/odd/bad, etc. imply a non-realistic modal base, in the sense that there is no intersection between these ideals and the conversational context. )n fact, their truth0value in the real world is not at sta%e. ;onsider: (A) a. They desire that he should be here b. .e advised &ary that she should wait

&odal judgements of this type imply not only a modal base but also an ordering source, i.e., a set of principles that impose an ordering among the considered alternatives. 8rdering sources capture the idea that the understanding of a modali*ed sentence often implies the description of the world as it should be and not as it is (according to the law, according to the normal course of events, according to what is desirable, etc.) 8rdering sources may be explicitly introduced by such phrases as in view of what is normal, in view of what is desirable, according to the law , etc. 8rdering sources are also sets of propositions, which describe norms, ideals of action and behaviour. The conceivable alternatives in a modal base are ordered function of how well they reali*e the norms and ideals, which represent the ordering base. !o ordering source is involved when we use the indicative mood since its modal base is totally realistic and it implies no normativity. 1owever, whenever there is an ordering source and the context of evaluation is non0 realistic, the subjunctive is selected: (5) a. They re"uire that new solutions should be sought b. ) recommend you should be more careful

On Root "n# Epistemic Me"nin(s o Mo#"! Verbs )n the linguistic literature, it is ac%nowledged that modal verbs such as can, must, may, could, should, might, ought to are used to communicate at least two clusters of meaning: the root (or deontic) mo#"! me"nin( and the epistemic mo#"! me"nin(. The root modal meaning roughly deals with the possibility or necessity of acts performed by morally responsible agents, such as obligation and permission. This meaning of modal verbs is agent0oriented. The epistemic modal meaning roughly deals with the possibility or necessity of an inference drawn from available evidence. This meaning of modal verbs is subject0oriented. The examples in (4) illustrate root modality while those in (+:) illustrate epistemic modality (cf. 9apafragou, -:::): (4) a. Employees must feed the animals twice a day b. .hoever has finished may go c. Bou should be grateful to your parents for their support d. This boo% might serve as a good introduction to 9icasso e. 1e ought to do as she says a. Bou must be =ohn6s wife b. )t may rain later in the afternoon c. ioethics lectures should prove interesting d. &ight ) as% whether you are using the typewriterC

(+:)

e. The sea ought to be visible from the balcony These examples show that a single modal expression is capable of conveying both root and epistemic meanings. ;onsider another set of examples that contains the various modal meanings of the verb &>2T (3rat*er (+455): (++) a. #ll &aori children must learn the names of their ancestors b. The ancestors of the &aoris must have arrived from Tahiti c. )f you must snee*e, at least use your hand%erchief d. .hen 3ahu%ura0mir died, the people of 3ahunguru said: (a%aipa%a must be our chief

The verb &>2T in (++a) has a root meaning: it refers to a duty. The verb &>2T in (++b) is used epistemically: it refers to a piece of %nowledge. The verb &>2T in (++c) has been called Ddispositional must6: it refers to dispositions people have. The verb &>2T in (++d) is sometimes called Dpreferential must6: it refers to preferences and wishes. 3rat*er tries to identify the feature that connects the four distinct uses of the verb &>2T in the above examples. 2he does this by means of paraphrasing the sentences in (++) in the following way: (++6) a6. )n view of what their tribal duties are, all &aori children must learn the names of their ancestors b6. )n view of what is %nown, the ancestors of the &aoris must have arrived from Tahiti c6. )f E in view of what your dispositions are 0 you must snee*e, at least use your hand%erchief d6. .hen 3ahu%ura0mir died, the people of 3ahunguru said: )n view of what is good for us, (a%aipa%a must be our chief

#ll these paraphrases show that the verb &>2T has shifted its meaning to different D in view of phrases. F#nd what we find now in these four paraphrases are four different occurrences of the word must which all seem to have the same meaning. #nd this meaning seems to be the common %ernel of meaning whose presence we felt somehow in the four occurrences of the word must in the sentences in (++)G (3rat*er, +455: <?:). /et us now loo% closely at the common %ernel of meaning that we have isolated in all the occurrences of the verb &>2T in (++6). )n sentences (++6) the verb &>2T is used relationally. .e might say that what we have in these sentences is not an absolute &>2T but a relative &>2T in view of. Thus, a sentence that contains a modal verb is tripartite7 we exemplify this tripartite structure with the sentence (++6 b): 8perator &>2T &odal ase in view of what is 3nown 9roposition p the ancestors of the &aoris have arrived from Tahiti

The operator ta%es scope over the proposition p7 it relates p to the modal base by placing p in relation to a modal base in which p is evaluated. )t is the modal base (which constitutes another set of propositions: e.g., in view of what is %nown, in view of what is good for somebody, etc.) that is responsible for the different types of modal concepts which a modal expression is capable of expressing in different contexts. The modal base may be either linguistically indicated as in (++6) or is pragmatically inferred. &odal bases are organi*ed in various domains: the factual domain (i.e., propositions that describe the factual world), the regulatory domain (i.e., propositions that include legal rulings, social regulations, religious rules, chess rules, etc.). There are also the domain of moral beliefs (i.e., propositions that are descriptions of states of affaires in ideal worlds), the domain of desirability (i.e., propositions that are descriptions of states of affaires in worlds desirable from someone6s point of view), etc. )ndividual modal verbs will come out as permitting different %inds of domains of propositions as modal bases.

There are instances when the spea%er 0 hearer misunderstand each other because they may be mista%en in the recovery of the modal base. =o%es are a good example to illustrate misunderstanding in the identification of the right modal base. (cf. 9apafragou, -:::). 2uppose that a *oo%eeper says sentence (+-) to his new assistant: (+-) The mon%ey can climb to the top of the tree

/ater on in the day, the mon%ey is missing and the *oo%eeper is angry with the assistant because he warned the assistant that the mon%ey was able to climb to the top of the tree and so could escape. The assistant replies that he interpreted the sentence to be about what the mon%ey was allowed to do, and was therefore not worried when the mon%ey behaved in just this way. The misunderstanding is due to a domain mismatch: the *oo%eeper had in mind potentiality in terms of the mon%ey6s physical abilities, while the assistant had in mind potentiality in terms of the *oo6s regulations. # further piece of evidence, which shows that interlocutors are sensitive to subtle aspects of the modal bases, is that spea%ers and hearers fre"uently shift and modify modal domains'bases during the same conversational exchange. )magine that #lice and her lawyer have been discussing the prospect of #lice6s having a divorce. #lice utters sentence (+<) and her lawyer replies as in (+?): (+<) (+?) ) can6t leave my husband penniless 8f course you can E the law allows you to

The modal domain in (+<) includes assumptions about #lice6s feelings and moral profile whereas in (+?) it includes assumptions about legal regulations. This example is a clear demonstration of how the modal base affects the truth0conditional content of a modal sentence. 3rat*er (+44+) and 9apafragou (-:::) argue that there are clear intuitive differences between modals with root meaning (i.e., permission, ability, obligation, etc.) and epistemic meaning (i.e., possibility, necessity). /et us consider the following example: (+@) Tom must be at wor%7 he doesn6t answer the phone

Epistemic mo#"!it&, as exemplified in (+@), involves Dwhat is %nown6. That is, when we utter a sentence such as (+@), we understand that, given the circumstances, ) %now Tom has a lot of wor% to do and he hasn6t got home yet7 that6s why he doesn6t answer the phone. )t is not the case that Dwhat is %nown6 is ta%en in the strong sense, but it should be understood as what evidence the spea%er has in ma%ing an inference or drawing a conclusion. This Dpersonali*ed6 %ind of %nowledge reduces in fact to the belief0sets of the spea%er. That is why, we say that epistemic modality is subject0oriented while root modality is agent0oriented. Epistemic modality involves the spea%er6s mental representation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation based on inferential processes. The spea%er6s mental representation of reality is a metarepresentation of reality (cf. 9apafragou, -:::). )n contrast, root modality involves relations Damong circumstances6 (3rat*er, +44+). ,rom the spea%er6s point of view, the employment of epistemic modality rests crucially on his ability to reflect on the content of his own beliefs. The spea%er ta%es into account the reliability of these beliefs and performs deductive operations on them. 8n this picture, in the epistemic interpretation of modal verbs, the spea%er uses the embedded proposition p as a representation of an abstract hypothesis he ma%es (i.e., metarepresentation) and sees whether this abstract hypothesis is compatible with or entailed by the his set of beliefs. Epistemic operators ta%e scope over a proposition p interpreted as an abstract hypothesis that embodies his attitude (e.g., doubting, proposing, wondering, etc.) in terms of its content not form. /et us ta%e two examples and compute their epistemic derivation: (+A) (+5) rian6s resignation may prove a big mista%e 2ome of the neighbors must have seen the burglars

8n hearing (+A), the addressee will have to determine the modal base compatible with the spea%er6s embedded proposition p (i.e., rian6s resignation proves a mista%e). 2ince p involves a future event,

the spea%er cannot simply reason from facts when evaluating the proposition in the present. Therefore, the spea%er should be ta%en to communicate that p describes a possible conclusion with respect to the set of assumptions available to him (i.e., the spea%er6s beliefs are such that rian6s resignation will prove a mista%e, which in the real world, can or cannot turn out as correct). The resulting interpretation is epistemic. Example (+5) is very similar to (+A). The embedded proposition " has a determinate truth0value at present, since it refers to an event that either has or has not ta%en place in the past (i.e., some of the neighbors did or did not see the burglars). )f the spea%er had intended a factual modal base he would have chosen an unmodalised version of (+5) (i.e., 2ome of the neighbors saw the burglars). 8n the most plausible interpretation of the sentence, the spea%er lac%s complete %nowledge of what happened at the relevant time in the past, during the burglary. #ll he can do, therefore, is reason on the basis of incomplete and partly supported evidence, which he reconstructs from general %nowledge of burglaries and situation0specific information about burglaries. ,or instance: in general, burglaries ta%e time to operate, the burglars have used one of the usual methods for getting into the house (the windows, by forcing the door), the neighbors pay some attention to what ta%es place in nearby properties, etc. Thus, " is presented as a necessary conclusion given an epistemic modal base. )n sum, epistemic interpretations of modals arise in contexts in which it is mutually manifest that an individual, in drawing a conclusion, say p, is not in the position to ta%e into account every proposition that could affect the truth of p, because he'she is ignorant of existing evidence. The individual will then draw the most plausible conclusion according to presently available evidence, and the overall degree of support for it will depend on the degree of strength of various premises. )n other words, the individual ends up with a logical conclusion whose premises are nevertheless more or less disputable7 in the end, this logical conclusion is ascribed a low degree of strength. !ote that an epistemically modalised assertion is wea%er in strength than its non0modalised counterpart (i.e., in the modalised sentence the spea%er is less committed to the truth of the sentence). ;ompare: (+H) (+4) 2an &arino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world 2an &arino must be the country with the highest life expectancy in the world

2entence (+H) offers a piece of factual information and the spea%er trusts it to be true. )n (+4), the spea%er possesses compelling evidence about the country with the highest life expectancy in the world but the possibility that there are pieces of evidence beyond the spea%er6s beliefs is left open. These extra pieces of evidence may disconfirm the fact that 2an &arino is the country with the highest life expectancy in the world. That is why sentence (+4) is felt as wea%er than (+H) in spite of the fact that p is in the scope of an operator of epistemic necessity. 8ne obvious conse"uence of the fact that epistemic modality involves the spea%er6s mental representation of reality and the evidence he has for that representation is based on inferential processes is that epistemic modals, unli%e root modals, cannot appear sentence0initially in yes-no interrogatives: (-:) (-+) &ay the race startC F)s there permission for the race to startCG FI)s it possible that the race startsCG 2hould =ohn leaveC F)s it re"uired that =ohn leaveCG FI)s it predictable that =ohn will leaveCG

Morpho,s&nt"ctic properties o Mo#"! Verbs ecause of their morpho0syntactic properties, modal verbs form a special class of auxiliary verbs. Their properties set them apart from both lexical verbs and the other class of auxiliaries (i.e., the aspectual auxiliaries have and be). The most stri%ing characteristics of the English modals are the so0called NI-E properties (1uddleston, +45A) (!);E is the acronym from !egation, )nversion, ;oda and Emphasis properties of modals). The following properties distinguish the English modals from lexical verbs:

+. Negation can attach to the modal, without do0support: (-:) ) cannot come ' I) do not can come -. Inversion of the subject with the modal is obligatory in interrogative sentences and in tags7 do cannot be inserted: (-+) &ust they leaveC ' IJo they must leaveC (--) Bou can spea% English, can6t youC ' Bou can spea% English, Idon6t youC <. &odals can appear in the FcodaG: (-<) ) can come and so can ill ' I) can come and so does ill ?. Emphatic affirmation is possible, again without do0support: (-?) Bou shall have the money by tomorrowK ' IBou do shall have the money by tomorrowK The following properties distinguish the modal auxiliaries from the aspectual auxiliary verbs have and be: +. modals lac% conjugation: (-@) I1e cans swim ' ) am swimming ' 1e has written -. modals cannot be followed by non0finite forms: (-A) I1e can to swim ' I1e can swimming ' 1e has left ' 1e is writing <. modals always select a short infinitive as their complement: (-5) 1e can (Ito) swim ?. li%e aspectual auxiliaries, modal auxiliaries may have both past and present tense forms (see -5)7 some of them have a past tense form that can only be used in reported speech (see -H): (-5) They can play the piano ' 1e could play the piano when he was young (-H) The boss said he might go right away @. modals have no passive form A. modals have no imperative 5. modals cannot co0occur (with the exception of some dialects): (-4) IBou might would say that 1offman (+45A) noticed a systematic syntactic distinction between the epistemic and the root sense of modal verbs. .hen modal verbs are interpreted epistemically (when they span notions such as possibility, probability, and logical inference) they evince the following syntactic patterns: +. with this interpretation, modals can occur in the progressive aspect: (<:) 1e can be singing now -. with this interpretation, modals can occur with the perfect infinitive form: (<+) 1e must have already left <. with this interpretation, modals have no selection restrictions on the subject: (<-) The apple'the boy must have fallen from the tree .hen modal verbs are interpreted deontically, that is, they have root meaning (which spans notions such as duty, volition, permission, capability, etc.) they evince the following syntactic patterns: ?. with this interpretation, modals cannot occur in the progressive aspect: (<<) I1e can be singing now (no ability interpretation) @. with this interpretation, modals cannot occur with the perfect infinitive form: (<?) I1e must have already left (no permission interpretation) A. with this interpretation, modals impose selection restrictions on the subject: the subject must be animate: (<@) I&y car must leave now (no obligation interpretation)