Right-centric Non-Ideal Theory; Good-centric Ideal Theory

Intro One question that can be posed about normative theories whether ideal or non-ideal in their methodology concerns how tightly such theories should combine theses about right action or correct policy! or appropriate procedure! etc"# with theses about the goods that action is supposed to promote or preserve" This raises the possibility that certain ways o$ understanding the relation between thought about the right and that about the good could help us to ma%e progress within the debate between ideal and non-ideal theorists itsel$" In this vein! one promising strategy $or retaining some advantages o$ ideal theorising without the disadvantages which opponents have noted involves lin%ing non-ideal theory with the traditional domain o$ the right deontic status! responsibility! best action while restricting ideal theorising to questions about the good about what %ind o$ lives we should want to lead! and what %ind o$ world we should want to live in" In this paper I shall present a motivation $or this strategy! which is suggested by wor% by &isa Tessman! and then de$end it by clari$ying some o$ its constitutive moves" 'lthough this strategy potentially has quite general application across normative theory! my discussion will remain within the slightly (# narrower $rame o$ theorising speci$ically about )ustice" *y position throughout much o$ the paper mirrors Tessman+s $airly closely! but also involves some important di$$erences! which I can+t go into in detail now" ' summary o$ her own argument! including some %ey quotes! is on your handouts"# ,To begin! I+ll give brie$ characterisations o$ some important terms" .irstly! $or the purposes o$ this paper! I+m thin%ing o$ )ustice as the absence o$ wronging! or possibly the absence o$ significant wronging! or possibly the absence o$ unrectified wronging" These di$$erences aren+t relevant to my argument"# To clari$y! this is not equivalent to the absence o$ wrongdoing or wrong action/ $irstly! because some wrongdoing probably does not involve wronging anyone in particular as in e0amples involving the destruction o$ beauti$ul ob)ects which no-one will ever see and! secondly! because it is at least conceptually possible that action which wrongs someone can nevertheless not be a wrong action" .or my purposes! the concept o$ )ustice can also be made quite ecumenical" .or instance! the agents here those in whose actions the wronging is located could be collective or individual! as can the relevant patients those who are wronged" .inally! di$$erent views o$ )ustice could endorse additional restrictions on which wrongings count as

in)ustices! such as a restriction to wrongings which implicate the Rawlsian basic structure o$ society" 1econdly! +wrongings+ are actions in a potentially very broad sense o$ +action+# which are bad and which are! as such! to be regretted because they involve impairment o$ our interrelations" Thirdly! ideal theory $ollowing *ills 2334# is theory which begins $rom an idealised model o$ humans and their relations! and then wor%s e0clusively $rom that model in generating the principles which do the basic normative wor%" The world that is the target o$ the model what the theory is meant to represent is a world in which people are in something li%e Rawls+ sense# +strictly compliant+ with the relevant norms" .inally! non-ideal theory! by contrast! aims to represent the actual world with its structural in)ustices intact! and thus engages in comparatively little idealisation o$ the compliance o$ people with norms" I won+t go into the arguments $or non-ideal theory here! but will rather assume throughout that there are good reasons to incorporate non-idealised representations o$ the social world into our normative thin%ing! at least in certain places" &i%ewise! I won+t discuss general motivations $or ideal theory! although what I say will probably cohere with at least some o$ these" ,2/ These preliminaries aside! I can begin the argument o$ the paper" This centres on an e0ample! which I+ll call""" +1a$e 1pace+/ ' woman is setting up a political discussion group $ocussed on a controversial and di$$icult genderrelated issue! under social-structural conditions much li%e those which prevail in the contemporary world" These structural conditions generate problems that she must respond to" .or e0ample! masculine genderings and $eminine genderings will tend to interact in such a way as to generate both epistemic unreliability o$ the group and serious epistemic in)ustices directed at individuals! as women to put it e0tremely crudely are silenced by the active presence o$ men" 1ee! $or e0ample! 5otson 23-- $or some plausible details"# The need to avoid the threat o$ these in)ustices that is! the need to create a +sa$e space+ )usti$ies the e0clusion o$ men $rom this $orum" In this e0ample! a case can be made that the a$$ected men are wronged! and an in)ustice is done! even though it is plausible that the course o$ action that involves this wronging is not only the best

one available! and the right one to choose! but is also the most just one available! because it involves the least wronging" To put it a little more e0pansively! my thought about +1a$e 1pace+ is that men are wronged by being e0cluded on the basis o$ their gender! and that this is something we can appropriately regret! because it constitutes an in)ustice! however minor in comparative terms that in)ustice may be" It is not plausible that a world in which people are e0cluded $rom opportunities $or political participation or %nowledge-creation on the grounds o$ their gender alone is a )ust world a world in which people are relating to one another in a way we should accept" The thought is not! however! that those involved $or e0ample! the woman who sets the e0clusionary policy# are responsible in any weighty sense#! or blame- or resentment- or anger-worthy! $or this wronging; nor that they act impermissibly or non-optimally! nor even that they are anything less than the most )ust e0emplars o$ humanity to have ever lived" It remains an unacceptable wronging nevertheless" Thus! I ma%e 6 claims about this case/ -/ 70cluding male persons $rom the discussion on the basis o$ their gender is the right thing to do at least! in terms o$ )ustice#" It is what the agent at the heart o$ +1a$e 1pace+ should do" 8erhaps it is not mandatory! but it is certainly permissible" 2/ This is only recognisable $rom an at least largely non-ideal theoretical perspective! since strongly idealising theories ma%e structural in)ustices li%e the hierarchy o$ constructed gender identities invisible! because they would not e0ist in the world o$ strict compliance" 9/ 70cluding male persons on the ground o$ their gender is not acceptably )ust it is not good! in terms o$ )ustice and is regrettable" 6/ These truths about what is acceptable )ustice-wise! or what ma%es lives good )ustice-wise! are not accessible $rom a perspective that doesn+t idealise in terms o$ compliance" Rather! assessing what is acceptable in terms o$ )ustice what would provide a su$$icient amount o$ the goods that )ustice involves requires re$lection on how it would be good $or us to live together" 1ince our lives in the actual world are deeply inadequate in terms o$ )ustice as we must ac%nowledge when we register! $or e0ample! the ubiquity and deep-rootedness o$ in)ustices li%e racism! se0ism! and class inequality thin%ing about the acceptably )ust world just is thin%ing about a world through a substantially idealised lens" ' world which contains the goods o$ )ustice can only be a world in which people are radically more )ust than they are in the actual world! so idealisation is involved in the process o$ thin%ing about these goods" These 6 claims! ta%en together! require normative thought to include both non-ideal and

signi$icantly idealised elements! and also point the way to the proper division o$ labour between them" Non-idealising theories which hoo% the right and the good closely together may generate accurate accounts o$ right action and responsibility! but will miss the wronging involved in cases such as +1a$e 1pace+" Ideal theories which hoo% the right and the good together will have the opposite problem" The alternative way to respond to e0amples li%e this involves adopting a relatively loose account o$ the relation between right action and good action" 8erhaps! although e0cluding male persons $rom certain discussions is the right thing to do! it is not a good thing to do! in the sense that it is not )ust! simpliciter; it does not appropriately realise the good o$ )ustice" 8eople are wronged! and that is something that we should not accept" I believe that the notion o$ toleration is a help$ul substitute $or the notion o$ acceptance here/ we must tolerate many things that we do not accept! and wrongings such as that involved in my e0ample can be added to this list" These wrongings are things that in Tessman+s words are +necessary and yet unacceptable+ :--#" In acting rightly! we must tolerate the bad because the good is beyond our reach" ,9 I thin% that the $oregoing is a good motivation $or the general strategy concerning idealisation that I+ve outlined" ;owever! there is a cluster o$ potentially very damaging problems looming! which I+ll address in the remainder o$ the paper" 'll o$ these problems are generated by the di$$iculty that may seem inherent in the idea that there can be situations in which the good o$ )ustice is impossible to attain" 'part $rom the $act that many philosophical traditions have tended to lin% right action and the attainment o$ related goods in a tight way! this is also a potentially troubling idea in its own right" To see this! consider what a traditional act-consequentialist thin%s about the good" .or them! right action is good-ma0imising action the actions that are right must ensure the greatest possible good" I$ we have a conception o$ the good available! it then ma%es sense to wor% bac% $rom it to the relevant conte0t o$ action! mapping out an optimal path" On the $ace o$ it! there is no reason why such a path would not be available" 'nd! i$ it is! it will then be the case that the right action will necessarily be the best possible action! $ullstop" This issue is made even more di$$icult in e0amples li%e +1a$e 1pace+ because interaction in social conte0ts could potentially be socially trans$ormative! in a way that radically a$$ects the terms o$ action $rom that point on! and thereby ma%es possible new goods! perhaps by removing structural in)ustices by e"g" trans$orming the social meaning o$ masculinity" The necessity o$ modelling many agents at once in mapping any path to the good ma%es it di$$icult

to assert conclusively that actions which would have radical e$$ects on our interrelations are not possible" 'voiding this consequentialism-inspired %ind o$ critique then seems to require the insistence that the good is impossible in a particularly strong sense" This! in turn! seems unpalatable" There are three problems which need to be addressed here" .irstly! the idea o$ an impossible good remains obscure! and needs disambiguation" 1econdly! we need to clari$y it in a way that avoids the unpalatable implication that core human goods are $orever beyond our reach! in some mystical metaphysical sense" .inally! we need reassurance that there are no alternative e0planations o$ e0amples li%e +1a$e 1pace+ which are easier to swallow" I+ll begin with the $inal problem $irst" 'll o$ the alternative e0planations which I+ll consider ta%e the $orm o$ attac%s on claim -; they all aim to de$eat the claim that the wronging-involving action is nevertheless right" .irstly! some might argue that when the social comple0ities are ta%en into account! there is some alternative! non-e0clusionary course o$ action which would nevertheless avoid the epistemic in)ustices that motivate e0clusion" It is impossible to argue against this %ind o$ criticism without a concrete proposal on the table! so I+ll )ust note that I am sceptical; but this is certainly one way in which my argument is hostage to empirical $ortune" 'dditionally! this seems to involve the wildly implausible thought that women are responsible and presumably blameworthy $or the e0clusionary actions they ta%e with the intention o$ preventing epistemic in)ustice" 1econdly! some might argue that I have con$used )usti$ication with e0culpation in ma%ing claim -" On this view! rather than the agent being )usti$ied in e0cluding men! she merely has a good e0cuse" 's a result! the divergence that +1a$e 1pace+ evidences will not be between right action and good action! but between right action and action $or which there is no e0cuse" This could occur because doing the non-e0clusionary# right thing would be too costly $or the agent! and so she has a demandingness-based e0cuse" Or it might be that wor%ing out that the alternative non-e0clusionary action is available to her would be too epistemically costly! which is more plausible i$ wor%ing it out requires modelling comple0 social interactions over time" This response would avoid some o$ the most implausible implications at least! i$ she is e0culpated! she will not be blameworthy but it doesn+t seem very plausible when applied to the conte0t" 'gain! it is hard to )usti$y this in the absence o$ a detailed alternative story this e0culpation-based response still requires that there be a better alternative to e0clusion but it does not seem plausible on the $ace o$ it that the agent in +1a$e 1pace+ is merely e0culpated! it loo%s li%e she is )usti$ied" The $irst and second problems can now be addressed together" <e need a way o$ ma%ing sense o$ the good as an impossibility which does not ma%e it mysterious how it could be a good $or us;

which does not ma%e it mysterious how we can %now at least some things about it; and which ideally# is congruent with the considerations that motivate the original worry with the thought that structural in)ustices li%e racism! se0ism! and classism are what lies behind the unavailability o$ the good" I thin% that all these desiderata can be met i$ we thin% about the impossibility o$ the good as dependent upon the $ailures o$ others past! present! or $uture where! $or the purposes o$ assessing right action at a particular time! the past and $uture versions o$ the agent hersel$ count as +others+" <hen we thin% this way! it is true that i$ no-one had ever acted wrongly! no-one would ever be wronged" =ut i$ wrongdoing has occurred! or will occur! wronging is li%ely to become unavoidable! and the good o$ )ustice unavailable! and we need both idealising and non-idealising methodologies to see this"