Finalisation Project Deliverance Despite the budget and schedule slash from approximately $450 million to $140 million

and 6 years to 3 years respectively, the project was a massive success being finished on time and under budget. There were a few minor communication errors between the major stakeholders being the RAF, ADF and Commonwealth Government, and the prime contractor Tenix Defense Systems which will be discussed in this section. The finalisation of the SEA 1654 project technically became the handing over or transition period from a Tenix (the prime contractor) crew to the new RAN crew. The turnover from one crew to the other was not perfect, the RAN units had little to no experience with the unique nature of machinery and plant onboard the HMAS Sirius and hence it took valuable time for them to learn the ropes. Some measures could have been taken to mitigate the turnover woes include: When the Tenix crew was in the late modification period more of the RAN units needed to be aboard to absorb knowledge and gain confidence in operating the machinery that they are unfamiliar with, as this was not the usual warship the RAN crew is used to working on. Some of the Navys engineering staff should have been on board with the Tenix crew for extended periods and sharing duties with them, to garner hands-on experience in operating and maintaining the machinery on-board. Finalisation SEA 1654 Project as a Whole

Communication Barrier Lack of Client Involvement Lack of Meetings Lack of Auditing the project to identify lessons learned Poor and incomplete documentation Poorly informed stakeholders The hierarchical positions and important titles worn by project stakeholders inhibiting access Frequent Scope Changes Changing Project Personnel

Table 1 - Finalisation communication barriers - adopted from Hartley (2009)

Lessons Learned From the previous acquisition of HMA Ships Kanimbla and Manoora the RAN had learnt that there was a major risk inherent in buying second hand ships. The project team for SEA 1654 mitigated this risk by using a qualified and experienced external entity to provide a detailed examination report of the condition of each ship under consideration. The RAN contacted Teekay Shipping Pty Ltd as they knew they didnt have the personnel with the required skills and experience to make the safest call.

The RAN chose to widen the SEA 1654s technical support network to include a large range of technical advisory authorities. The project team was focused on maintaining visibility of the design development that was sure to happen on the conversion of Delos to Sirius. The larger TSN with the already large number of stakeholders that come with all major stakeholders did pose additional problems; difficulty encountered in managing a large group of advisors with different interests; managing timely input to accord with the contractors systems engineering and design development schedule; ensuring that stakeholder comments were clear and actionable; ensuring continuity of representatives to ease project read in and encourage consistency over time of the authoritys position on issues adequate preparation for design reviews;

The project team learnt that more is not merrier as the larger number of support personnel actually hindered the progress of the project slightly, and that quality not quantity should be employed when choosing you TSN. Teekay also expressed their thoughts on the large number of stakeholders and TSN, stating that it was a lot more complex and political rather than purely commercial with stakeholder involvement, compared to their usual one-on-one approach that they would normally use.
The Royal Australian Navy Test Evaluation and Acceptance Authority (RANTEAA) did raise a number of safety related concerns, which they shared in the audit. These concerns had to do with tests and safety checks on a number of machines and operations on HMAS Sirius that where not done by the date of contractual acceptance, which suggests a lack of time in this department was allowed for.

Tests and Trials Not Completed Domestic Fridge/Freezer Equipment; Accommodation: Sprinkler Piping Pressure;
Galley Fire Extinguishing System Equipment; Sprinkler Operational Test; Fresh Water Service System Chlorination Test Firemain Piping Pressure Test; FBF (firefighting foam) Piping Pressure Test Plant Equipment; Plant Piping Pressure Test; Plant tank Pressure Test; Plant Biofilter Test; System Operational Test; System Environmental Certification Doors and Hatches; Breathing Air Compressor Operational Test; Navigation and Signal Lighting Functional Test; Switchboards and Transformers Operational Test; Deck FBF (firefighting foam)

Aviation Deck: Sewerage:

Platform: Replenishment at Sea: Lifeboat:

Davit Set To Work and Load Test

Table 2: Tests and Trials not completed by prime contractor on date of contractual acceptance.

As you can see from the above table, a lot of the tests and trials that where not completed had to do with fire deterrents and firefighting equipment, which poses large safety risks if they are not done. After the date of contractual acceptance, Commonwealth agencies took over the testing procedures as the prime contractor had already handed the ship over.