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Sectarianism and social degradiation of society Martyrs have harmed the truth.... Even today it only takes the crudest sort of persecution to give an otherwise inherently indiffe rent sectarianism an honorable name. Friedrich Nietzsche Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon. It has been present in every society since the dawn of human history on the face of the earth. Nations entered into the new millennium with this unresolved issue. Pakistan is the main victims of sectarianism, which has been a major obstacle in the way of national integration. Violations of the universal right to practise religion are systematic and widespread in Pakistan. Religious minorities face political, social, and economic marginalisation, and are formally persecuted by the state through discriminatorylegislation such as blasphemy laws. Prejudiced public school curricula describe minority beliefs and practices as heretical, while extremist organisations issue edicts against religious minorities and circulate pamphlets maligning theirbeliefs with impunity. These and similar practices foster an atmosphere of intolerance in which religiously motivated violence is endemic. There are two categories of such violence in Pakistan: inter-faith and sectarian. The former involves attacks against members of non- Muslim faiths, particularly Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians, who along with Parsis, Sikhs and Buddhists account for fewer than 4% of the 180 million-strong population. Interfaith violence largely comprises vigilante attacks by individuals or mobs in the wake of unsubstantiated accusations against members of non-Muslim minorities of their blaspheming against Islam. Sectarian violence, on the other hand, unfolds between members of different Islamic sects. Most frequently, such violence involves clashes between members of the two main sects of Islam, Sunnis and Shias. Pakistan is a Sunni majority country, but Shias account for between 15% and 20% of the population.1 Violent incidents are also common between the Barelvi and Deobandi sub-sects of Sunni Islam. Approximately 50% of Pakistanis identify as Barelvis, but Deobandis who account for approximately 20% of the population, follow a more orthodox version of Islam and consider certain Barelvi practices un-Islamic exert a significant influence over Pakistans security situation.2 This is because most extremist militant organisations in Pakistan are Deobandi and more than 65% of all madrassas (Islamic schools) are run by Deobandis. Sectarian violence in Pakistan manifests variously as tit-for-tat targeted killings of members of rival sects; suicide bombings or gun attacks against another sects mosques, funerals or religious processions; and attacks against sectarian targets using explosives. Since Pakistans is the second-largest Shia community in the world after Iran, widespread sectarian violence threatens to destabilise the country and the

region. Because sectarian affiliations are ubiquitous and deeply felt, this kind of violence has the potential to involve large swathes of the population and spur radicalisation. Sectarian strife is also likely to further fragment Pakistans polity, already divided by language and ethnicity. Moreover, the growing power, networks and resources of sectarian organisations will lead to an overall deterioration of Pakistans already fragile security situation. Given this destabilizing potential, this report focuses on the resurgence of sectarian violence in Pakistan and interrogates whether this kind of violence poses one of the greatest threats to the stability of present-day Pakistan. Why Sectarian Violence thrives in Pakistan? Internal and External Factors of Sectarianism in Pakistan Internal Factors Misperception of Sunni Tilt. Pakistan is an Islamic state with its principles and laws based on Shariah and teachings of Holy Quran, yet due to Sunni majority, it has created misperception in Shia factions that Pakistan has a Sunni identity and most decisions and state policies favour Sunnis and their religious beliefs. Zias Islamization Policies. Zias Islamization Policy is/was a factor of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. He was totally in favor of an Islamization policy and during his period many Madrassa (religious seminaries) were established. Conflicts between Shia and Sunni sects become organized during his regime. Zia introduced the Islamic Sharia law; which devastated the bond of unity between Shia and Sunni community. The obligation of zakat by Zia-ul-Haq, in 1980s, was resisted by Shia. Mufti Jaffar Hussein the prominent leader of the Shia supposed that if Pakistan was to have its own Islamic law then the Shia should be allowed to follow its own Fiqa (Hudson Institute 2006). It clearly showed that the Shias of Pakistan were inspired by the Iranian Revolution and refused to accept the Sunni based Sharia laws and demanded their own recognition as a different denomination in Islam. Lack of Madrassah Reforms. Madrassahs are serving as breeding house of sectarianism.Certain factors such as quality of education, background of students and kind of training have attributed towards sectarian hatred and divide. Funding by government to appease clergy for their own political gains is another factor. Lastly, there is also a perception that foreign funding by Islamic countries to particular sectarian groups is also encouraging sectarianism. Failure of Government and Security Agencies. General Musharraf banned sectarian organizations in 2001 and introduced madrassah reforms to neutralize sectarianism.There is no strict law or punishment to arrest and prosecute militants involved with sectarian organizations.The state police and law enforcement agencies have been lousy to investigate, punish or arrest sectarian cases due to lack of evidence. External Factors

Iranian Revolution. The Islamic revolution in Iran had great influence on its neighboring countries. The Shia communities get organized due to this revolution. Iran supported the Shia groups of Pakistan and a Shia version of new militancy emerged. . There are apprehensions that Shia institutions got some financial assistance from Iranian sources to counter Sunni attacks and anti-Shia propaganda. The Shia institutions especially in Khurram Agency, Hangue, and Peshawar district got assistance from Iran. Islam was divided by sectarianism through Iranian Shia and Arab Sunni. Iran and Saudi Arabia share a couple of advantages; both have petro dollars they can use to finance their campaigns both draw religious sectarian and ethical appeal to pre-empt ready- made blocks of supports Saudi Influence. Saudi Arabia other Muslim countries and NGOs funded the Sunni group in Pakistan against Iranian inspired activitism. This rivalry between the two Islamic countries led Pakistan towards sectarian strife between the Sunni and Shia groups. During that time LJ, the most violent Sunni organization was formed. In fact, the controversary between the two Islamic countries the Iran and Saudi Arabia, with two different sects failed to comprehend that their clash would create insecurity in the other Muslim countries. Iran-Iraq war. The Iran-Iraq war which continued for eight years also weakened the position of other Muslim countries and induced the aspect of sectarianism. The consequences of Iran-Iraq war was also seen in Pakistan, which become a battlefield of Sunni dominated regime of Saddam Hussein and Shia state of Iran. Both countries funded their proxies in Pakistan who used the sectarian card for their own interest. In addition, Pakistan became a battleground for Iran and Saudi Arabia of supporting their relevant sects with funds in shape of money. The external powers intervention led Pakistan towards sectarian violence... Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: The Afghan Crisis played a vital role in the rise of sectarian strife in Pakistan. The Soviet invasion worsened the situation in Pakistan when the United States fought a proxy war for containing Communism in this region. The US assisted Pakistan financially and militarily which gave rise to radicalization in the society. During that time, many organizations were formed in Pakistan like Jamiat Ulima-e-Islam (JUI), organized the Sipah-eSahabah Pakistan (SSP) in 1985 and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), while adherents to the Ahl Hadith school of thought organized the Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) in 1987. Mujahidin who were recruited against the Russian forces were Sunni. The Shias began to fear that the balance of population was in favor of Sunnis as a result of the influx of heavy armed in Sunni Afghan refugees. The Shias organized its militia with the name of Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) in 1991 (Moonis Ahmar and Ali Riaz 2005).The Afghanistan Crisis since 1979-till date posed alarming threats to the domestic and external security of Pakistan, because of the enormous arrival of Afghan refugees in Pakistan which culminated in the spread of terrorism; militancy and extremism; the

Talibanization of Pakistani society and ethno-political crisis in Karachi and in the province of Baluchistan started after 9/11. In addition, Pakistani society has also suffered from a huge supply of drug and narcotics, Kalashnikov culture, and lawlessness due to the Afghan crisis (Nasar Dotani 2011). Resurgence of sectarian violence Since 2007 there has been a sharp resurgence of sectarian violence in Pakistan. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, an online database, there were 631 sectarian incidents in Pakistan between 2007 and 2011 that led to the deaths of over 1,649 people. In 2010, 509 people were killed and 1,170 injured in 57 incidents of sectarian violence. In 2011 the incidence of sectarian violence decreased (203 killed and 297 injured in 30 incidents), only to soar in the first five months of 2012: between January and May 177 people were killed in 51 incidents.4 In keeping with historical trends, the majority of recent violence has occurred between Sunnis and Shias (Shias accounted for 70% of all sectarian deaths between 1985 and 2005).5 That said, intra-sectarian violence between Deobandi and Barelvi Sunnis is also on the rise: hundreds of Barelvi (Sufi) worshippers were killed in more than 70 suicide attacks at shrines between 2005 and 2010. Moreover, two prominent Barelvi leaders were targeted by Deobandi militants in 2009: in June, Mufti Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi, a senior Barelvi cleric who had repeatedly spoken against the Pakistani Taliban, was killed in a suicide bombing in Lahore; in September, Hamid Saeed Kazmi, then Pakistans minister for religious affairs, was shot by two gunmen. In Karachi, Pakistans largest city and commercial capital, clashes between extremist Sunni organisations are common one exchange of fire in the citys Godhra area in September 2011 left eight people dead. The current resurgence of sectarian violence particularly Sunni-Shia clashes can be traced back to the mid-2000s and is arguably the most dangerous fallout for Pakistan of the U.S.-led war against terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan. In 2006 Taliban fighters seeking sanctuary in Pakistans north-western tribal belt exploited decades-old sectarian tensions in the Kurram tribal region and launched attacksagainst the Parachinar-based Shia tribes. The hardline Deobandi Taliban were ideologically anti-Shia, but their sectarianism had a pragmatic element as well: they needed to access routes into Afghanistan via Kurram that were under the control of local Shias. The Talibans sustained antiShia campaign in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) led to the reconsolidation in north-western Pakistan of Shia extremist groups seeking to defend their community. The resurgence of Shia groups in turn remobilised extremist Sunni organisations that, with support from the Taliban, revived their sectarian mandate across the country. Main actors Unlike inter-faith violence, where ordinary members of congregations have been known to mobilise against religious minorities on the prompting of extremist clerics or groups, sectarian violence is largely carried out by members

of extremist militant organisations. The following are the main actors currently engaging in sectarian violence in Pakistan: Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ): The ASWJ is the new name of the banned sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The SSP is an extremist Sunni (Deobandi) militant organisation and has carried out attacks against Shias, whom it believes to be infidels, since 1985. In recent years the SSP has also clashed with Barelvi groups. The group has also developed strong ties with the Pakistani Taliban and sends its recruits to Pakistans tribal belt for training. The SSP also operates as a political party and its members have been elected to the Pakistani parliament or offered key support to politicians from mainstream political parties, especially in the Punjab province. Responding to the recent rise in sectarian violence, the Pakistan government banned the ASWJ in March 2012, although the group remains operational. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ): LeJ, an offshoot of the SSP, is an extremist Sunni group that regards Shia Muslims as infidels and is activein sectarian warfare in Karachi, Balochistan and southern Punjab. In 2012 LeJ has focused its sectarian attacks against the ethnically distinct Shia Hazaras of Balochistan. In recent years it has also diversified from its original anti-Shia focus and allied itself with other militant groups in attacks against the Pakistani state and Western interests in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The outlawed group has developed close linkages with the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda, and provides them with weapons, finances and recruits. Intelligence reports have linked LeJ to the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The group is also accused of a previous assassination attempt against former prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, in 1999. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban): The Pakistani Taliban is a coalition of FATAbased militant groups that seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state and impose Islamic law. The grouping has been waging a campaign of suicide bombings against state security and civilian targets since 2007. In recent years it has provided funding, logistical support, training and sanctuary to militants involved with Deobandi sectarian organizations such as LeJ and the ASWJ, and can thus be credited with the current resurgence in sectarian violence. Sipah-e-Mohamadi Pakistan (SMP): The SMP was founded in 1993 in an effort to protect Pakistans Shia community from extremist Sunni militant groups. The group resurfaced in 2008-2009 and is most active in the urban centres of Karachi and Lahore. In addition to engaging in tit-for-tat sectarian killings of LeJ and ASWJ members, the SMP has been recently accused of killing prominent Sunni doctors. Reportedly, the group has previously received support and funding from Iran. Last year, four militants affiliated with the SMP were arrested in connection with a grenade attack against the Saudi Arabian consulate in Karachi in May 2011. Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP): The TJP is an offshoot of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafria, a Shia political party founded

in 1979 with the aim of protecting Pakistans Shia community from General Ziaul Haqs Sunnioriented interpretations of Islamic law and widespread discrimination within army ranks and government departments. The TJP has been banned twice, but continues to operate under different names. Its members primarily organise Shia resistance to Sunni extremism, but have also been involved in sectarian violence. Sunni Tehrik (ST): The ST sees itself as a political organisation working to defend Barelvi Sunnis against sectarian attacks by Deobandi groups. It is one of the largest and best organised among 4,000 Sunni Barelvi organisations in Karachi, many of which operate within a single neighbourhood. The STs militant wing retaliates against sectarian attacks launched primarily by the ASWJ and engages in turf wars to gain control of the mosques of rival sects through land acquisition. Jundullah: This is a newly formed anti-Shia militant group with ties to the Pakistani Taliban, LeJ and the ASWJ. Jundullah militants have been arrested in connection with a blast at a Shia procession in Karachi in December 2009 that killed 40 people. Because of its ties with the Pakistani Taliban, Jundullah has also launched attacks against state security forces Pakistans current sectarian landscape Owing to sectarian and class divides among the population, Sunni and Shia extremist groups have traditionally been active in the southern regions of Pakistans largest province, Punjab. In the mid- 2000s many sectarian organisations regrouped with Taliban help in the tribal region along the Pakistani-Afghan border. But resurgent Sunni- Shia violence has a broader geographic base: in recent years, fighting has spread beyond the FATA to include the urban centres of Karachi and Lahore, the south-western Balochistan province (particularly the city of Quetta and Mastung district) and the northern Gilgit-Baltistan region. Owing to the social, ethnic and linguistic diversity of Pakistans Shia population, sectarian violence has varying dynamics in different parts of the country. The following examples of sectarian violence should be seen as illustrative of the scope, variety and intensity of sectarian dynamics rather than as a comprehensive listing of sectarian incidents. Karachi, Pakistans largest city and financial hub, was the worst hit by sectarian violence in 2011, with 36 attacks roughly 32% of all sectarian incidents recorded in Pakistan claiming 58 lives.6 According to a report by the Criminal Investigation Department, an anti-terrorist police unit, more than half of the 246 terrorists arrested in Karachi between 2001 and 2010 were affiliated with sectarian groups.7 The growing presence of sectarian militants in the city led to attacks against Shia religious processions on December 28th 2009 and February 5th 2010 that killed 40 and 25 people, respectively. Tit-for-tat sectarian killings continue on an ongoing basis between extremist Sunni organisations, including the ASWJ, LeJ and Jundullah, and Shia groups such as the SMP. In 2012 militant groups targeted lawyers representing activists of rival sectarian

groups in January alone three Shia lawyers and four lawyers representing members of the ASWJ were assassinated in different shooting incidents. In Balochistan sectarian attacks are directed against the minority Hazara community, whose members are Shia. In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the targeting of Hazaras, starting with the killing of the chairman of the Hazara Democratic Party in January 2009 (in the prior decade, from 1998 onwards up to 700 Hazaras were killed in Balochistan for sectarian reasons).8 Last year LeJ claimed responsibility for several brutal attacks against Hazaras: on October 4th, 13 Shia Hazara were dragged off a bus and shot dead; on September 23rd, three Hazara men working at a coalmine outside Quetta were killed; on September 20th, 26 Shia pilgrims travelling to Iran were forced offa bus in Mastung and shot dead in front of their families. The trend of targeting Shia Hazaras has continued unabated in 2012 and 46 people have fallen victim to sectarian killings in the provincial capital of Quetta, primarily in the months of April and May.9 On June 28th a bomb attack near Quetta on a bus transporting Shia pilgrims killed 15 people. The surge in LeJ violence against Hazaras is related to the growing presence of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militants in Balochistan: the extremist Sunni Taliban have historically been anti-Shia and anti-Hazara, and their financial and operational links with LeJ have bolstered sectarian violence in the province. Unlike in other parts of Pakistan, sectarian killings in Balochistan rarely target prominent individuals such as doctors, lawyers or leaders of religiopolitical organisations. Instead, the Hazara victims, who have Asian features and are thus easier to identify and target as Shias, hail from lower socioeconomic strata and are primarily targeted while in transit when gunmen open fire on their vehicles. As such, the sectarian violence in Balochistan has an ethnic dimension. In the north of the country the semi-autonomous Gilgit-Baltistan region is also plagued by soaring sectarian violence nine people died in 21 sectarian incidents in 2011. Sectarian clashes flared there on February 28th 2012 after Jundullah militants forced 18 Shia residents of Gilgit-Baltistan returning from pilgrimage in Iran off their bus and shot them to death. The attack sparked riots in which 22 people were killed, forcing authorities to enforce a threeweek curfew. Weeks later, on April 2nd 2012, 14 more people were killed when a grenade attack against an ASWJ protest rally in Chilas sparked sectarian clashes, including the murder of ten Shia bus passengers. The authorities once again responded by imposing a curfew, closing schools and offices, jamming mobile phones, and barring entry to the two main mosques in the area. GilgitBaltistan is notable for the fact that sectarian violence is continuing to spread in the region despite strong and prompt responses from local law enforcers, government officials and religious leaders. Meanwhile, intra-sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandis and Barelvis is also geographically scattered. Attacks by Deobandi Taliban militants against Barelvi (Sufi) shrines have been prevalent in but not limited to the north-western Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

province: in July 2010 suicide bombers attacked Lahores famous Data Darbar shrine, killing 42 people; in October of the same year suicide bombers also attacked Abdullah Shah Ghazis shrine in Karachi. Deobandis and Barelvis also engage in gun battles and tit-for-tat targeted killings in Karachi and Lahore. Direct and indirect costs of terrorism Terrorism has both direct and indirect costs for the economy. The direct costs include human casualties, collateral damage to the infrastructure, factories and standing crops; and interruption of economic activities. The indirect costs include the decline in investment, inability to proceed with development work, loss of production time, increase in unemployment and the high cost of supporting and rehabilitating the displaced persons. Impact on the Economic Institutions The consequences of sectarianism were multifaceted. On the one hand it tears apart the social fabric while on the other hand it produced economic turmoil in the city. People lost their business and those who wholly depend on the business lost their earnings. So, it created a crunch situation for the middle classes and the working classes. While the owners did face some problems but later due to perpetual crisis they shifted their businesses to other towns. The business centers became the killing courtyards as main bazaar and rail bazaar were near to Deobandi populated areas. Whenever the SSP strikes traders union too follows the same because majority of the members of that trade union consists of Deobandi. Maulana Jhangvis dearth played a decisive role in the future of the business of the city. During the crisis period majority of the shopping centers were closed for weeks and some of these were set on fire by the activists. Out-migration As we have already mentioned in the above section that sectarianisms main affect was on the middle class from both sides. Many people sold their property and running business on low rates and migrated to the other places. In 1990 over 50 families migrated from one Mohalla Purani Eidgah and more than 40 families migrated from Jhang city. These were not the only places from where people migrated, but other Mohallas of Jhang city and Saddar also witnessed major proportion of out-migration. Main proportion of the out migration was of labor class which was majorly due to the damage of the economic institution in Jhang. They tend to do so because they have no other choice. The factories were not properly working, labor activities were stopped and people who were totally dependent on the daily labor could not afford to be out of work. They have families to support. The laborers migrated to other cities like Lahore, Faisalabad, Toba Tek Sing, Multan and some also migrated to Karachi. Further there are some other reasons for out-migration. Firstly, people were fed up form the uncertain and crisis situation, they want a peaceful environment to live in. Secondly, people dont want their children to be involved in the activity of sectarian

clashes. Thirdly, people who were the main target groups left the city to hide in other places. Fourthly, businessmen shifted their business to other towns and migrated with their business. Drug Smuggling, Robbing, and Looting In post Maulana Jhangvi killing, Jhang became the hub of drug smuggling, robbing and looting. During crisis situations in Jhang, only the drugs suppliers reported to move without any difficulty. According to Zahab (2004) the sectarian situation was also manipulated by the drug mafia-Jhang which is at the cross-roads of drug and arms distribution network, the drug mafia had an interest of maintaining a certain level of tension and resorted to provocations whenever the situation was clam for activities. Heroin smuggling becomes a main commercial activity in Jhang after the onset of sectarian violence and electoral campaigns were financed by the profits of the drug business. Both sides were involved; a Shia feudal who is an ex-MNA is regularly denounced as one of the drug mafia bosses and the SSP apparently controlled the retail sales with connivance of police. When Jhang experienced the worst violence in 1992, drug dealers and drug users were the only persons who could more freely between the different parts of the city. Fears in Performing Religious Ceremonies Sectarianism not only affected the lives of the people but created uncertainty in the minds of the performers of daily prayers and Muharram rituals. Majority of the respondents identified that they have been facing difficulty in performance of Muharram ritual, like majales, matam, and processions due to these brutal forms of the sectarian clashes. Although security was provided by the police department during the crisis periods but the intensity and magnitude of the fear was so high that it ultimately stopped people to enter in the worship places. One of the main reasons of this Deobandi-Shia divide was due to the performance of the Muharram rituals. So, the Deobandis sect targeted the Shia Imambargahs during their ritual performance sessions which produced uncertainty among the performers to attend these rituals. Target Killing and Suicide Attacks Sectarianism form its emergence in the case of Pakistan paid its price with large scale killing. Sectarianism has affected the life of many people in Pakistan from its emergence till now. The first major victim of sectarian killing was Maulana Jhangvi who was killed in February 1990 in Jhang. The methodologies tailored by the two groups changed in this period. Both became more proactive in achieving their goals. Kriesberg (1973) mentioned that a full cycle of social conflict consists of five stages; First, in the objective or underlying social conflict relationship. Second, when two or more parties believe they have incompatible goals, a social conflict has emerges. Third, there is an initial way in which the adversaries pursue their contradictory aims. Fourth, in intensity and scope struggle escalates and de-escalates and then finally, the struggle comes to some kind of end, there is an outcome.

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In first stage, the objectives of Shias and Deobandis were different which indicates that this was a conflicting situation. They also have defined goals, as both sides leaders indicated several time through their speeches and through the media to demolish opposite sects motives, this can be called the second stage of Kriesbergs conflict model. Both factions adopted a violent attitude towards each other in the process of gaining their objectives and they fought each other and targeted the religions places, and also killed the key personalities on both sides to decrease the growth of opposite sect, is the third stage of Kriesbergs conflict model. The ambition to demolish the other sect was helpful in escalating sectarianism. Both factions took the steps which helped to increase the tension and helped to gain the specified goals which clearly targeted the other faction. Both factions escalated the conflict situation by using the arms and implementing the harsh strategies. They were totally against the steps which reduced the tension is the fourth stage according to conflict model of Kriesberg. The end product of the sectarian conflict was disharmony in social structure by larger number of killing all over the country by producing tension in specified areas and also unstable economic situation of the district, can be considered as a final stage. Future Scenarios of Sectarian Violence The future picture of sectarian violence seems more dangerous than the past. It is expected that with the increasing religious intolerance in the society the incidents of sectarian violence will grow. More organized form of sectarian violence will occur through target killings and radicalization of youth. The new wave of sectarian violence is likely to target ordinary citizens particularly doctors, lawyers and business class. There may be exponential rise of killings in tribal areas, Karachi, Balochistan and Punjab with the emerging nexus of TTP and sectarian groups within Pakistan. The fault line between sectarian violence and terrorism will diminish. The financial support through foreign sources to these sectarian elements for strategic interests in the region is expected to rise in the post-2014 when NATO has withdrawn. Recommendations Given the destabilising potential of sectarian violence, the Pakistani government should implement the following recommendations with immediate effect: State apparatus should be neutral and must not side with any sectarian party. The government machinery must work effectively to suppress extremist elements within the society. There should be a strict ban on militant sectarian organizations. train and equip special police force units to track, investigate and arrest members of sectarian organizations provide special security for judges and public prosecutors involved in the trials of suspected sectarian militants

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track and eliminate sources of funding for sectarian organisations, especially those originating outside Pakistan Reforms in madrassahs must be introduced to improve quality of education for youth. Proper investigation and trial of individuals involved in sectarian crimes should be carried out. Elimination of sources of foreign funding and external intervention in sectarian violence should be carried out. Introduction of specific legislation for outlawed sectarian organisations, hate speech and publication of sectarian organizations that promote sectarian agendas. Check on radicalized government individuals who maintain links with sectarian parties. Provision of jobs, education and economic and social facilities for deprived class to prevent them from becoming extremists. Media must play positive role in curbing extremism. Religious parties must project religious harmony among different sects. Political means should be used to mitigate violence and religion should not be used as a political tool by the politicians. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic state.This diversity needs to be respected by all. The role of civil society is important as they can bring social reforms at the grass root level. At individual level, citizens must have awareness about sects and the need for tolerance and respect for all sects. Conclusion Sectarian violence is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. It has posed great security threat to Pakistan at present. There is heavy bloodshed in the name of sectarian violence in Karachi, Quetta and Southern Punjab. This situation has alarmed the government and to tame the sectarian violence there is an urgent need to resolve the crisis of sectarian divide in Pakistan by taking practical measures to curb sectarianism from the society. The role of media, madrassahs, sectarian parties and religious leaders is important to bring change at societal and state level. The misperceptions, attitudes and deep rooted hatred and mistrust among Shias and Sunnis must be addressed. The state policies and law enforcement agencies must play active role along with the civil society for sectarian reforms. The religious diversity must be respected and religious tolerance promoted. The government must act in a prudent manner to bring sectarian parties at one page by addressing their concerns. Both internal and external factors promote sectarian violence and likely future scenarios be analyzed before formulation of counter sectarianism policies. In short, for long lasting peace and harmony in Pakistan, short term anti sectarianism plans will

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not work. A long term counter sectarianism strategy be implemented for an effective remedy of the sectarian issue Finally, what is needed most is the faith and unity among sects. One must think in terms of being a Pakistani rather than being called Shia or Sunni. Therefore it is considered that through aforementioned preventive and corrective measures and implementing given recommendations the sectarian violence can be tamed. Total words:5154