Vol2 PDF

national peace coalitions
Learning Experiences Study on Civil-Society Peace Building in the Philippines
VOLUME 2
National Peace Coalitions
J OSEPHINE C. D IONISIO
2005
UP-CIDS
LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIl-SOCIETY PEACE BUIlDING IN THE PHIlIPPINES VOLUME 2: NATIOnAL PEACE COALITIOnS
Published by the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Copyright 2005 the United Nations Development Programme Manila Ofce. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means including information storage and retrieval systems without permission from the UNDP and UP CIDS. Inquiries should be addressed to: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Bahay ng Alumni, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Tel/Fax: (632) 9293540 Email: upcids@up.edu.ph United Nations Development Programme 30/F Yuchengco Tower RCBC Plaza, 6819 Ayala Ave. cor. Sen Gil J. Puyat Ave., Makati City 1226 Philippines Tel: (632) 9010100 Fax (632) 9010200 The National Library of the Philippines CIP Data Recommended entry: Learning experiences study on civil-society peace building in the Philippines.- - Diliman, Quezon City : UP-CIDS, c2005. 5v. ; cm. CONTENTS: v.1. Framework and synthesis of lessons learned in civil-society peace building / Miriam Coronel Ferrer v.2. National peace coalitions / Josephine C. Dionisio v.3. Psychosocial trauma rehabilitation work / Marco Puzon, Elizabeth Protacio-De Castro v. 4. Peace education initiatives in Metro Manila / Loreta Castro, Jasmin Nario-Galace and Kristine Lesaca v.5. Peace building experiences of church-based organizations in the Philippines / Jovic Lobrigo and Sonia Imperial. Published in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1. Peace-buildingPhilippines. 2. Peace-buildingCase studies. 3. Civil societyPhilippines. I. UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS).
JZ5538 303.69 2005 P061000334 ISBN 978-971-742-095-0 (vol. 1) ISBN 978-971-742-096-7 (vol. 2) ISBN 978-971-742-097-4 (vol. 3) ISBN 978-971-742-098-1 (vol. 4) ISBN 978-971-742-099-8 (vol. 5)
cover design Ernesto Enrique book design and layout East Axis Creative
The opinions expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reect the views of the UNDP .
contents
acknowledgments list of acronyms introduction peace coalitions
Coalition as a Form of Organization Coalition Dynamics in the Philippines: Contending Discourses on Peace and Their Implications on Coalition Building Emergence and Development of Peace Coalitions in the Philippines: Socio-historical Context Social Actors/Groups in Peace Coalitions Peace-building Activities of Peace Coalitions Assessing the Impact of Peace Coalitions Peace-Building Strategies Facilitating and Hindering Factors to Peace Coalitions Peace Building Lessons Learned from Peace Coalitions Peace Building Conclusion Endnotes Bibliography
vii xi 1 5 7 10 14 24 33 52 57 63 68 70 74 77 79 81 88 100
toolkit: peace coalition work

Introduction Part 1: Phases of Peace Coalition Building Part 2: Areas of Work of Peace Coalitions Part 3: Tools and Exercises for Effective Peace Coalition Building
acknowledgments
This volume was completed through the generous assistance of several individuals.
Miriam Coronel Ferrer, mentor and friend, encouraged me to accept this project and gave me enough instructions, inspiration, and leeway that enabled me to gain my bearings in the more difcult phases of this research. Her comments on the rst and second drafts of the main paper helped me focus on my research objectives and to strengthen my analysis. Alma Evangelista, my rst mentor on peace studies, patiently gave me a comprehensive and passionate orientation about this project. She provided valuable suggestions on what to include in the toolkit, which accompanies the main paper of this volume. Dean Zosimo Lee (of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy or CSSP) did important preliminary work for this project. Dean Lees preliminary work provided me with important leads on which peace coalitions to include in this study and in identifying key informants. I also tried to retain his vision on how the toolkit might be developed. After reading the revised draft of the main paper, Professor Randolf David nudged me along the direction of further archival research and referred several important sources of data particularly on the topic of peace coalition dynamics in the Philippines. This volume also documents the lifelong commitment to just and lasting peace of several advocates who graciously shared their time and insights for this study. I understand that each one of them was in the thick of their respective crusades when they agreed to make time for me and this study. I will forever be in awe of their passion and commitment, and this documentation is my humble way of paying tribute to their selessness and dedication. 1] Honorable Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Partylist Representative, Akbayan Citizens Action Party Former Secretary General, Coalition for Peace September 29, 2005 9:30am 10:30am At her ofce at the House of Representatives, Batasan Complex, Quezon City
2] Mr. Max De Mesa Executive Director, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines August 3, 2005 4pm 5pm
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At the Waiting Area of the Cardio-Rehab Center of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Quezon City
3] Sr. Arnold Noel Executive Director, Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc. August 4, 2005 9am 10 am At the Balay Ofce, Diliman, Quezon City
4] Dr. Carol Pagaduan-Araullo Secretary General, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan August 6, 2005 1:30 pm 2:30 pm At the Bayan National Ofce, Diliman, Quezon City Also answered the questionnaire sent to her via email.
5] Ms. Karen Taada Executive Director, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute August 15, 2005 9am 10 am At the GZOPI ofce, ADMU, Loyola Heights, Quezon City
6] Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer Program Director, Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights, University Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines August 17, 2005 10am 11am At her ofce at the Faculty Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City
7] Ms. Teresita Quintos-Deles Former Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Lent her book and le copies of her previous speeches, in lieu of a personal interview
8] Mr. Fred Lubang Regional Coordinator, NonViolence-International Southeast Asia Answered the questionnaire sent to him via email
My task was made lighter by the valuable assistance provided by Sarah Domingo who transcribed my interviews and helped tabulate my research data. Salvador Feranil worked with me in developing the tools and exercises in the toolkit. Abraham Baladad Jr. helped me clarify
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crucial details that enabled me to strengthen the presentation of my ndings and to revise some of the tabular presentations in the main paper. I also beneted from the research assistance of Joel Ariate, Jr. (coalitions), Maria Mendoza (socio-historical context), and Nicole Curato (planning tools). Tess Lubang of the UP Main Library assisted me in borrowing peace-related books from the Main Librarys Social Science Section. I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Teresa Tadem, Director of the Third World Studies Center (TWSC), who repeatedly reassured me of her support and allowed me to work on this volume even if TWSC-related work was already piling up on my desk. I am equally indebted to each one of my colleagues in the Department of Sociology at UP Diliman. Through many different ways, they have helped me hone my skills in social research and have motivated me to further enrich my teaching through the conduct of empirical research. As I explained in my introduction to this volume, the UNDP Peace and Development Portfolio shared the vision of this project and provided the necessary funding support to ensure its completion. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my whole family in whose loving embrace I nd the quest for peace necessary and meaningful. Still, I remain solely responsible for all the shortcomings of this volume.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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acronyms
ADMU AFP AKBAYAN AMRSP AOPG AR Now BAYAN BISIG BRSACs CARHRIHL CBCP CBCP-NASSA CEWS CfP CPAR CPP DILG DLSU FDC GfP GMA GRP GZOPI HOPE IPER KARAPATAN KKD KMU LES MILF MLSA MNLF MSPA NAPC NCCP ND Ateneo de Manila University Armed Forces of the Philippines AKBAYAN! (Citizens Action Party) Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines All-Out Peace Group Agrarian Reform Now Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Nationalist Alliance) Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa Bicol Regional Social Action Centers Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines-National Secretariat for Social Action Conict Early Warning System Coalition for Peace Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform Communist Party of the Philippines Department of Interior and Local Government De La Salle University Freedom from Debt Coalition Gathering for Peace President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo Government of the Republic of the Philippines Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute Hearts of Peace Institute for Political and Electoral Reform Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples Rights Kilusan para sa Kapayapaan at Demokrasya (Movement for Peace and Democracy) Kilusan Mayo Uno (May One Movement) Learning Experiences Study Moro Islamic Liberation Front US-RP Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement Moro National Liberation Front Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates National Anti-Poverty Commission National Council of Churches in the Philippines National Democrat
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NDF ND-RAs ND-RJs NFPC NGO NIC NOWARGAMES NPA NPC NSAs NUC OPAPP PCBL PO PPC PPDHR PPI PPSA PRRM PSSC RA RAM RJ SD SEA SOMO SPP SRA TWSC UNDP UNORKA UP UP CAL UP CSWCD US VMG National Democratic Front National Democrat-Reafrmists, the dominant CPP bloc after the splits in the early 1990s National Democrat-Rejectionists, ND bloc that split from the CPP in the early 1990s Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition Non-Governmental Organization Newly-Industrialized Country National Outrage of Women Against Angelo Reyes and Gloria Arroyos Militarism and Erosion of Sovereignty New Peoples Army, military arm of the CPP National Peace Conference Non-State Actors National Unication Commission Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines Peoples Organization Philippine Peace Center Program on Peace, Democratization, and Human Rights Philippine Peasant Institute Philippine Political Science Association Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement Philippine Social Sciences Center Reafrmists, the dominant CPP bloc after the splits in the early 1990s Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (Revolutionary Patriotic Alliance) National Democrat-Rejectionists, ND bloc that split from the CPP in the early 1990s Social Democrat Southeast Asia Suspension of Military Operations Sosyalistang Partido Sa Paggawa Social Reform Agenda Third World Studies Center United Nations Development Programme Ugnayan ng mga Nagkakaisa at Nagsasariling Organisasyon sa Kanayunan University of the Philippines University of the Philippines College of Arts and Letters ment Studies University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development United States (of America) Vision-Mission-Goals
ND-Independent National democratic groups not afliated with RA or RJ ND blocs
PopDem Popular Democrat
UP CIDS University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Develop-
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introduction
This synoptic paper presents an overview of peace-building initiatives of civil-society peace
coalitions at the national level, which emerged from 1986-2005. It is one of four case studies that are part of the UNDP-funded Learning Experiences Study (LES) on Civil-society Peace Building in the Philippines. Key concepts that are used in this study, such as civil society, peace, peace building and peace-building impact areas have already been adequately dened and clearly operationalized in the framework paper for this LES, and will only be briey discussed here. In the said framework paper, civil society is distinguished from the state and the market, and is identied as the public sphere where groups and citizens interact on matters of collective concerns. Peace as a collective concern of civil society is conceptualized not only as the absence of violence (or negative peace) but also as the absence of structural violence, the protection of human rights, and the presence of social justice. Peace building is considered as a general term used to refer to the various initiatives or activities that are part of the peace process, which basically aims to transform a conict situation into a just and lasting peace. The framework for this study assumes that peace building can also be implemented prior to conict resolution or settlement. Three categories of activities were identied as the impact areas of peace building that need to be evaluated. These categories are: building the infrastructure for peace, engagement of state and nonstate actors, and the protection/promotion of community/civilian interests in the context of continuing conict or in moments of relative peace.1 The general objective of this study on peace coalitions is to contribute to our understanding of civil-society peace building by gauging the impact of peace-building strategies employed by peace coalitions, and then analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives. The study also seeks to identify the factors that facilitate or hinder coalition efforts at peace building of peace coalitions by contextualizing these within specic socio-historical contexts. Some of the major themes discussed in this report touch on the nature of civil-society peace coalitions peace-building initiatives, the dynamics within peace coalitions, their current capabilities, and their contributions toward transforming the conicts in the country. For this particular study on peace coalitions, the narrower denition of the term national is used. National-level peace coalitions therefore refer to peace coalitions with a national network
but are actually based in Metro Manila, and which are engaging centers of political power as part of their peace-building efforts. Thus, peace coalitions in Metro Manila that emerged from 1986-2005, and which are actively taking part in national-level advocacy work have been chosen as the subjects of study in this report. The case-study method was used as the main research methodology because it would incorporate two levels of analysis. At one level, civil society-initiated peace coalitions were viewed as a single case that provides the range of strategies used in peace building by peace coalitions and the collective impact of these multiple tracks. This level of analysis allows us to gauge the current level of capability of civil-society peace coalitions as a network of effective actors. At another level, these coalitions were viewed as individual cases that provide insight into specic dimensions of coalition work and peace building. This level of analysis allows us to focus on the specicity of each peace coalition and on the dynamics within and among peace coalitions, thus enabling us to identify facilitating and hindering factors to their peace-building efforts. It also allows us to appreciate the nuances of strategizing as a dimension of peace building. In this study, peace coalitions refer to networks, alliances, or other similar groupings of individuals and organizations that have dened their organizational mission as the achievement of a focused peace agenda. They consider themselves as primarily a civil-society peace organization whose campaigns, services, and other activities revolve around specic peace concerns.2 Included in this study are the following coalitions: Coalition for Peace (CfP); Multisectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA); National Peace Conference (NPC); All-Out Peace Groups (AOPG); Gathering for Peace, Pilgrims for Peace; and the Sulong CARHRIHL (Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law). Based on an initial review of literature, these were the most prominent peace coalitions in engaging the parties in conict at specic junctures from 1986-2005.3 This study also looks at the cases of the Peoples Caucus and the Peoples Congress as coalitions that were not primarily peace coalitions but have tried to put the peace agenda in a different framework. Thus, taken together, these coalitions would represent the spectrum of ideological persuasions that may be found in peace coalitions in Metro Manila for the period covered, the range of peace concerns and organizational goals of Metro Manila-based peace coalitions, and the multiplicity of strategies that have been employed by civil-society peace coalitions as part of peace building. These peace coalitions are described in terms of their current capability as networks of effective actors. Peace-building efforts of peace coalitions are be assessed in terms of their impact on building the infrastructure for peace activism, and in positioning themselves as a third party to the conict. More generally, this impact assessment will bring out the contributions of peace coalitions in transforming the conict at different levels, e.g., policy (creating a more favorable environment for peace building), discourse (changing the things that we talk about in relation
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to peace), and culture (facilitating the emergence of a culture of peace in Philippine society). To increase the reliability and validity of data, and to ensure a multidimensional prole of the case, this study used multiple data sources. An intensive reading of published and unpublished literature was done to piece together a comprehensive overview of civil societyinitiated peace coalitions in Metro Manila (e.g., proceedings of conferences, documentation of roundtable discussions, transcripts of interviews, compendium, institutional reports, and think-pieces written by key informants). A thematic analysis of the content of internal and external institutional documents (e.g., internal organizational assessments, reection papers on peace-building or coalition-building experiences, press releases, position papers) was done to identify themes that allow better understanding of the case. Focused conversations with key informants were conducted to facilitate the systematic reection of prominent peace advocates and coalition builders in relation to peace building, and to validate some of the studys preliminary ndings.
INTRODUCTION
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peace coalitions
coalition as a form of organization
peace coalitions
more social actors formed for mutual advantage in contention with other actors in the same social system.4 The denition asserts that coalitions are formed on the basis of a common agenda for mutual benet, a characteristic that it shares with many other forms of organizations, such as cooperatives or political organizations. Thus, in the denition, focus must be placed on the concept combination of social actors as an identifying characteristic of coalitions as a form of organization. Coalition building necessarily begins from a situation of differences and works toward achieving higher levels of unity or solidarity. Coalitions are generally studied as a kind of social-movement organization that is an organization of organizations. They mobilize based on a set of ideas and demands that challenge existing policies and practices without necessarily offering themselves as a political party.5 While political parties through their hierarchy of leaders could demand obedience and allegiance from its members, coalitions are compelled to observe shared decision-making processes, and to maintain the autonomy of their member-organizations, thus making dynamic tensions generally built into their systems. Coalitions may also be distinguished from other types of organization by their loose and non-hierarchical structure, and it is this looseness that makes coalitions generally temporary but not necessarily short term.6 In the Philippines, an oft-quoted denition of a coalition is that of a coming together of groups carrying different political or developmental perspectives [that] unite around an issue or a set of issues, an agenda, a project, or a process. From these they dene a common analysis, positions, and set of long-term or tactical responses.7 There are various reasons for the eventual formation of coalitions among different organizations. Coalitions may be formed in the hope of bringing about certain changes. Other organizations coalesce around a specic eld of work or a common approach to a eld of work. Coalitions may also be formed around specic issues that may cut across other groups or networks.8 Organizations in the Philippines have coalesced in recognition of coalitions as an effective means to broaden their reach and to intensify their impact. Issue-and sector-based coalitions in the Philippines have effectively engaged the government on policy issues by combining
ecent scholarship on coalitions takes into account a broadened denition of coalitions as any combination of two or
their strength toward mounting large-scale street demonstrations and their skills at incessant lobbying in the corridors of power.9 More recently, coalition building has cut across national boundaries and has made possible transnational acts of solidarity.10 Various types of coalitions have also helped their member-organizations transcend their individual organizational weaknesses, such as insufcient funds or lack of personnel by instituting mechanisms that would avoid the wasteful duplication of efforts and facilitate the sharing of resources.11 Experience shows that coalitions in general also facilitate the emergence of more basic organizations by tapping already consolidated groups or politically active individuals whose subsequent efforts have led to the formation of organizations in previously unorganized territories or sectors.12 Prominent personalities and leaders within the coalition also add credibility to advocacies and facilitate access to a broader range of networks and connections. However, in spite of the many benets that individual organizations stand to gain from coalescing with other organizations, coalition building has always been a formidable task. While the strength of any coalition generally lies in its ability to build the broadest (at this point tentatively referring to the number of social actors that are involved) possible consensus on a particular agenda, coalition building inevitably starts from the management of tensions arising from differing analysis of the situation, stand-point on issues, and strategic agenda of member-organizations. Often, coalitions are not only channels through which resources are shared but are also arenas where the struggle of ideas and interests take place. As a result, most coalitions are gatherings of like-minded organizations. They tend to remain loose networks or temporary alliances for the pursuit of issue-specic campaigns, making them harder to sustain or to consolidate for more strategic campaigns. Coalitions also tend to be dependent on the designated representative to the coalition of its member-organizations. The degree to which the coalition is able to mobilize its members depends on the degree of commitment of the representative to the many activities within the coalition and to his/her capacity to become a conduit through which the coalition could reach out to the whole organization he/she represents. Still, there are coalitions that have successfully built enduring consensus on an increasing number of issues and a more strategic agenda. These coalitions tend to acquire a life of their own. These coalitions are able to set up regular structures that help sustain the formation as a regularly functioning organization. It is able to build an identity and a niche for itself that is independent and may even be different from that of its member-organizations. As a result, coalitions and coalition-leaders tend to personify the social movement in which they belong, which makes it necessary to look at coalitions in understanding specic social movements. Coalition as a form of organization is an important mechanism for peace building. Because
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coalitions embody the achievement of solidarity and consensus amidst a situation of difference and conict, they could become the foundation upon which enduring structures of peace may be built. A lot of insights for peace building could therefore be gained from an intensive examination of coalition work, especially within the peace movement.
COALITION AS FORM OF ORGANIZATION
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coalition dynamics in the philippines: contending discourses on peace and their implications on coalition building
rogressive organizations in the Philippines have historically

been divided on the basis of ideological persuasions13, and the
biggest hurdle to coalition building has been these seemingly impermeable ideological cleavages that tend to group organizations into divergent blocs, each with its own set of principles, priorities, strategies, and brand of collective action14. It is important to understand these ideological differences because they have dened how national-level coalitions in the Philippines have emerged, evolved, and have related with one another. In the case of peace coalitions, the dynamics among them could become more comprehensible by taking stock of these historical antagonisms, especially within the ranks of the Philippine left. The dominant groups comprising the Philippine left before and during the Marcos years could be identied with either the national democrat or the social democrat. National democrats (NDs) are strongly critical of the historically entrenched interconnections between US imperialism, local feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism. They view these three -isms as the root causes of social inequality, injustice, and underdevelopment in the Philippines. They believe that only a national democratic revolution, waged principally through armed struggle and led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), can transform Philippine society into a genuinely developed and democratic society, and bring about meaningful changes in individual lives and in the social structure. Armed struggle is justied as consistent with the genuine interests of the exploited and the oppressed. The state is viewed as the coercive and incorrigible tool of the ruling classes, which cannot and will not promote meaningful reforms. It is thus futile and foolish to ght for reforms within the existing system. Such attempts would only serve to distract the masses from the necessity and the urgency of taking up arms against the state, and should thus be consciously and viciously exposed and opposed.15 From this perspective, the pursuit of peace could be an agenda of the state and its cohorts. Peace as an agenda can be a deceptive ploy that hides or justies the coercive measures of the state and can therefore be an important aspect of the states counter-insurgency strategy. The ND movement before and during the Marcos years has always called attention to the fact that the state,
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as exemplied by its pacication campaigns in Mindanao, pursues peace through consistent acts of violence against the people.16 Peace as an agenda therefore cannot be pursued as a priority of the ND movement unless it is couched in anti-imperialist or anti-fascist terms. In this context, the peace issue is pursued to shield the revolutionary movement against the violence of the state. More recently, the National Democratic Front (NDF) has been pursuing the issue of peace in the context of peace negotiations toward achieving tactical gains for the revolutionary organization. The social democrats (SDs), on the other hand, have generally been silent on the role of US imperialism in the Philippines but have always been critical of the greediness of local elites and of corruption in government. They believe that persistent poverty and inequality may be solved through the gradual but consistent implementation of thoroughgoing reforms. These reforms should destroy the structural bases of unequal power relations in Philippine society, and put in place democratic institutions that would strengthen equality.17 The state is seen as basically an arena in which struggles for the rights and welfare of the powerless and impoverished majority can be fought and won. Thus they have actively pursued collaboration with traditional powerholders and absorption into the existing system in the hope of enacting changes from within that would bring about changes in the social system. Although a radical wing of the SDs recognizes armed struggle as a legitimate and necessary form of struggle, the SDs generally spurn the use of violence toward achieving their political ends. For the SDs, the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties is a fundamental concern. The SDs have always presented themselves as an alternative to the ineptness of traditional politicians and to what they perceive as the avoidable radicalism of the national democrats. The SDs have always claimed to represent the silent majority who they say is not necessarily a supportive base of either the state or the NDs. In the 1980s, some individuals within the ND bloc formed into a group that was eventually referred to as the popular democrats (PopDems). PopDems were able to establish closer links with the SDs by converging in the same coalitions. The differences in perspectives between the NDs and the SDs have necessarily led to differences in preferred strategies and tactics between these two major blocs, which have generally hindered many of their attempts at forging a coalition.18 Both of them have always been suspicious of each other and have consistently questioned the others motives and methods. This antagonism became more manifest in the events leading to and immediately after the peoples uprising in 1986. The NDs who ofcially rejected all forms of electoral processes as farcical called for a boycott of the snap elections, while the SDs who viewed elections as an important component of their strategy to change the system from within supported the candidacy of Corazon Aquino. It was, therefore, not surprising to nd the SDs together with other political and nonpolitical groups at the forefront of the four-day people power revolution, which was triggered by protests against the rigged results of the snap elections and was supported by a coup
peace coalitions
COALITION DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES
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detat. The NDs decided to stay away from this four-day revolt and, as a result, the rainbow coalition that eventually wrested political power from the Marcoses was generally an SD-inuenced coalition that consciously chose to isolate and exclude the NDs. The ND leadership felt contempt for the newly installed rainbow coalition and was tormented by the fact that after years of posing the greatest threat to the Marcos regime, it found itself disenfranchised after the regimes eventual collapse.19 The sudden ouster of the Marcos regime and the recongured political arena that succeeded it intensied the debates within the Communist Party in the Philippines (CPP) concerning arenas and forms of struggle, which culminated in the partys eventual fragmentation in the early 1990s. For example, a challenge was posed to the NDF to heed popular will and to accept Aquinos call for reconciliation by shifting their strategy into more peaceful forms of struggle. But the NDF countered that the genuine interest of the people is to continue defending themselves from the elite-dominated state.20 In the 1980s, the CPP undertook internal cleansing operations, which sought to expose and expunge deep penetration agents of the state within the partys ranks. Unfortunately, even up to now, the guilt of many of those who were eventually executed could not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Victims accounts of torture and of other humanrights violations became a subplot to this grim episode in the CPPs history, which has left in its trail a bloody mess and sad tales of executions and political assassinations, besides ruined friendships and shattered lives.21 Worse, the threat of political executions still hangs in the air for many former comrades as an offshoot of the still-unresolved bickering between the different factions that have emerged from the splintered ranks of the CPP . It is within this context that those who bolted the CPP , specically those who have come to question the primacy of armed struggle as a strategy for revolution, have emerged as a player in peace advocacy. As a result of this realignment of political forces in the post-Marcos years, three major groupings of leftist parties in the Philippines based on their strategic political framework or tradition may be identied, namely, the Communist-National Democratic, mixed (ND/SD/Independent), and Social Democratic.22 Based on their strategic framework we may deduce their respective positions in handling the peace question. (see Table 1) We can observe from Table 1 that all major grouping of leftist parties in the Philippines recognize the value of achieving peace. What has hindered or limited the formation of enduring coalitions among them on the basis of peacebuilding are their rigidly contending positions regarding relations with the state, and their deep-seated suspicions about one anothers motives. Thus, if coalition building is to proceed among these contending ideological/political blocs, it has to proceed on the basis of mutual recognition of the irreconcilability and respect for each others standpoint and viewpoint, and with the willingness to risk sharing with one another leadership over the coalition.
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Table 1: Handling of Peace Question based on Strategic Framework

Social Democratic (SD)
Primary Form of Struggle
Unarmed - Parliamentary or Electoral
Relating with the State

Collaboration
Peace Question
Priority concern is the cessation of hostilities and more long-term peaceful settlement of all internal armed conflicts in the country Revolution should not be limited to armed struggle; pursuit of just, lasting, and positive peace should be an important element of the agenda for change Peace is a natural outcome of the resolution of the basic problems of society. Governments framework of pacification aggravates armed conflict, thus one must guard against the states tactic of using peace negotiations as a counterinsurgency measure
Mixed National Democratic-ReJect (ND-RJ)/ radical SD/ Independent
Combination of Armed and Unarmed
Combination of Critical Collaboration and Militant Actions
National DemocraticReAffirm (ND-RA)
Primacy of Armed Struggle over Parliamentary or Electoral Struggle
Consistent Rejection of the fascist and pro-imperialist state
But even if it is important to pursue coalition building among ideological/political blocs, it might be more fruitful to focus on building new peace coalitions that go beyond these blocs.23It might also be more productive to focus on forging collective action on the basis of less contentious but mutually acceptable issues such as the resumption of peace talks, condemnation of human rights violations, and delivery of basic social services especially to calamity-stricken communities.24
COALITION DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES
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emergence and development of peace coalitions in the philippines: socio-historical context

even under Martial Law and to justice and peace organizations that were part of the broad antidictatorship movement that ourished after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983. These organizations campaigned against the Marcos regime and the brutality of the military, and called for the dismantling of the dictatorship. The issue of peace was only one among the many issues subsumed under the overarching goal of ending the Marcos dictatorship. But it was in the postMarcos era when liberal democratic practices were revived that peace coalitions in the Philippines emerged as a distinct player in the political arena. This section is an analysis of the combination of conditions that characterized each of the successive administrations in the post-Marcos era, and which dened the socio-historical context wherein peace coalitions emerged and developed.
eace coalitions in the Philippines can trace their lineage from

human rights and other political organizations that persisted
1986-1992: peace and democratization uniting against the resurgence of fascist rule
The rst wave (1990) of successive formations of peace coalitions in the Philippines in the post-Marcos era was directly related to the collapse of the planned peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP-New Peoples Army (NPA)NDF in 1987 and to the brewing tension between the parties involved that culminated in the pullout of the US military bases in 1991. The avowed mission of the Aquino administration was the reinstitution of liberal democracy in the Philippines. After assuming the presidency in 1986, Corazon Aquino immediately pursued the track of reconciliation and peace, particularly with the CPP-NPA-NDF. The CPPNPA-NDF, who were wary of the new ruling coalition and its offer of peace, remained steadfast on its basic political and economic demands. ND-afliated groups demanded the withdrawal of the US military bases and the non-renegotiation of a new bases treaty with the US, which carried with it a sizeable military aid package, as a precondition to peace negotiations26. When
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peasants who were demonstrating in Mendiola to demand the immediate implementation of land reform were massacred in January 1987, the CPP-NPA-NDF took this as the worst in a series of undeniable signs that the Aquino administration was incapable of asserting its authority over the military. They decided to pull out of the planned peace talks that were supposed to accompany the historic sixty-day bilateral cease-re in December 1986.26 The military was equally adamant in its position of not pursuing talks with the CPP-NPANDF. A strong military-oriented bloc within the ruling political coalition led by then-Secretary of National Defense Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Renato de Villa, consistently impeded these attempts. Rebel groups in the military and Marcos loyalists mounted a series of failed coups detat that eventually caused the Aquino government to vacillate in its position concerning the peace process.27 It was in this context when the resurgence of fascist rule loomed as a possibility, that the earliest peace coalitions were formed. Their activities were focused on placing the peace process back on track by convincing the parties concerned to resume peace talks.
peace coalitions
coalition for peace (CfP): cease-re, peace talks, peace zones

The Coalition for Peace (CfP) was formed in December 1986 by individuals and organizations that were mostly identied with the SD and PopDem blocs. The intention was to intervene in the peace process by presenting themselves as a third-party formation representing the citizenry. The conveners of CfP consciously excluded the NDs from their ranks to avoid what they perceived would be the unnecessary delays in their work that could be brought about by their irreconcilable differences with the NDs.28 The CfP formulated a framework for the peace talks and a comprehensive peace agenda that could be offered as a possible starting point of negotiations for the parties in conict. But with the breakdown of the planned negotiations in January 1987, CfPs continued efforts to facilitate the negotiations were consistently rebuffed by both the military and the CPP-NPA, which challenged the coalitions mandate and questioned its motives. The coalition had to redene its strategy; thus while it continued to engage the armed parties through advocacy, the coalition also started to focus its attention toward building a solid constituency for its peace advocacy. A series of peace consciousness-raising activities and mobilization campaigns were conducted by CfP, such as the three-day Tent City for Peace in July 1987, which was organized to urge the new Congress to adopt a legislative agenda for peace. Provincial networks were established, and efforts were made toward effecting even a temporary cessation of hostilities, such as negotiating for the declaration of cease-res or a moratorium on military offensives by both parties dur-
EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
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ing the Christmas break (Peoples Christmas Cease-re) or to allow the delivery of basic social services (Immunization for Peace) in specic communities.29 The CfP also adopted the peace zone concept and promoted its establishment in different areas as part of its effort to build its peace constituency. Eventually, from a loose network of individuals and Metro Manila-based institutes, the CfP spun off into more formal organizations at the regional or provincial level. Armed hostilities between the military and the different armed nonstate actors (which included not only the CPP-NPA and the Muslim separatist movement but also factions of the military) continued to escalate from 1987 to 1989. In response, efforts were made by both civilsociety players and the civilian bloc in government to put the peace process back on track. Two more major peace coalitionsthe National Peace Conference (NPC), and the Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA)emerged in 1990, coinciding with the declaration of Corazon Aquino of the 1990s as the Decade of Peace.
national peace conference: poverty alleviation as national peace agenda

In October 1990, the CfP helped convene the NPC, where organizations representing different SD-leaning sectoral and regional organizations gathered to dene a comprehensive national peace agenda. The objective was to blend peace concerns with the basic demands for poverty alleviation and economic development of different social sectors. The result of this conference was a document entitled Basic Peace Agenda that contained proposed executive and legislative actions from four sectors, namely the urban poor, sherfolk, labor, and peasant sectors. After that rst conference in Tagaytay, the NPC eventually functioned as a coalition, which tried to further develop its national peace agenda and persistently lobbied the Aquino administration for its adoption. Still, the NPCs Basic Peace Agenda would only be substantially adopted by the succeeding Ramos administration. The formation of the NPC and its subsequent pursuit of dening and lobbying for a comprehensive peace agenda through sectoral organizations and development NGOs is a conscious effort on the part of the SD bloc to use the development track in pushing for continued peace negotiations and peace building. The strategy called for putting in place policies and programs that would be conducive to the implementation of development projects. The hope was that by achieving some degree of poverty alleviation, some degree of positive peace would also be achieved. Thus, while CfP remained as a coalition that implemented seasonal national campaigns, the NPC became a coalition that focused on upgrading the technical skills of the basic sectors especially in terms of translating their advocacies into doable development programs that could be implemented in partnership with development NGOs.30
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multisectoral peace advocates: inconspicuous channel for peace talks

The MSPA was formed in 1990 after a meeting that was originally intended to convene the representatives to the peace talks of both the GRP and the NDF did not push through and was transformed instead into a meeting of peace advocates. As such, the MSPA is technically not a coalition but a loose grouping of individual peace advocates coming from a broad array of ideological and political persuasions. Although originally convened by the CfP , members of the MSPA come from different ideological leanings. Prominent personalities who are identied to be sympathetic with the NDs and politicians who come from traditional liberal democratic political parties became members of MSPA. Members included personalities from the Peoples Caucus, NPC, Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), the Philippine Peace Center, among others. The MSPA sought to achieve what the CfP could not. As mentioned earlier, because the CfP was perceived as partisan, it was unable to assert itself as a third party to the negotiations between the GRP and the NDF.31 Given this setback and in the face of the perceived necessity to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table, peace advocates established themselves into the MSPA to reach out to the national leadership of the GRP and the NDF through more inconspicuous channels. It was able to establish itself as nonpartisan and gained access to both sides. They were able to meet with the Cabinet Cluster E for Political and Security Affairs under the Aquino administration, but these meetings were short-lived, as the peace talks were eventually foiled by the refusal of both parties to enter into compromises and the series of destabilization plots against the Aquino government that made further talks untenable.
peoples caucus: lasting and substantive peace based on justice and democracy
It is important to note that as early as November 1989, ND-leaning members of the Protestant National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) resolved to work for the resumption of the stalled peace talks and instituted a Special Programme Unit on Peace.31 Together with other peace advocates within the ND bloc, they initiated the formation of the Peace Caucus, the rst ND-initiated peace coalition that could have served as a vehicle for the assertion of the ND agenda into the peace process. However, when it was formally launched in March 1990, it was renamed the Peoples Caucus because it was deemed necessary to highlight that the principal stress of the coalition was to challenge the Aquino government into adopting the Peoples Agenda. The Peoples Agenda, which focused on the call to dismantle the US military bases in
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the Philippines and to redene US-RP relations, drew attention to the imperative of addressing the roots of the peace problem, and of preventing the government from ignoring the peoples resolutions should the peace process falter. The Peoples Caucus comprised political groups, peoples organizations, issue-based coalitions, sectoral and multisectoral alliances, and individuals from the church, academe, media, business, local government councils, and Congress. It mounted a series of conferences, rallies, and demonstrations that culminated in a welgang bayan (peoples strike) to demand from the Aquino government a clear commitment to the pursuit of substantive peace by addressing the basic issues confronting the people. With the eventual pullout of the US from and the dismantling of their military bases in Subic and Olongapo in 1991, the Peoples Caucus seemed to have outlived its purpose as an issue-based coalition and eventually disbanded. It was also during this time that the national democrats were breaking up into various formations, including the RAs and RJs.
1992-1997: peace and development uniting against elite domination

By 1992, when Fidel Ramos assumed the presidency, the world had already witnessed the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the splintering of what used to be the Soviet Union. A new era in global politics opened as the Cold War came to an end. Ramos focused his energy on directing a model of fast-track industrialization for the Philippines. His vision was for the Philippines to achieve newly industrializing country (NIC) status by the year 2000. This may partly explain his motivation in pursuing the peace process during his term. Peace has been offered by peace coalitions as a necessary step toward the achievement of sustained economic growth, and given that the CPP-NPA-NDF was also reeling from the effects of a bitter internal struggle, it became apparent to the Ramos administration that the time was ripe for talking peace with the rebels. In his rst State of the Nation Address, Ramos identied the pursuit of peace as a priority for his administration. The pronouncement dumbfounded many peace advocates who knew the newly elected president as the chief stumbling block in the peace process within the previous Aquino administration. Among the rst acts of Ramos as the new president was the repeal of the antisubversion law (Republic Act 1700) that made it illegal to join the CPP and other similar organizations, the pursuit of exploratory talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the implementation of an amnesty program for all rebels.
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peoples congress: people-centered development toward just and lasting peace

The Peoples Caucus outlived its purpose as an issue-based coalition by this time, and gave way to the formation of the Peoples Congress. The coalition presented The First 100 Days Peoples Alternative Agenda as a challenge to the new president to take decisive measures in the rst 100 days of his administration and show proof of his commitment to the pursuit of a people-centered development program and to a just and lasting peace. Together with many peace advocates, the Peoples Congress also criticized Ramoss amnesty program as being tantamount to a call for the rebels to surrender, and its peace strategy as a strategy toward cooptation.
the national unication commission and the social reform agenda: opportunities or threats?
Ramos created in September 1992 the National Unication Commission (NUC), an ad-hoc executive-legislative body with representatives from the private sector, and appointed Haydee Yorac, a respected human-rights activist and academic, as chairperson. The NUC was mandated to hold consultations with different sectors nationwide toward the formulation of national peace agenda and a viable peace framework that could guide the governments dealings with the CPPNPA-NDF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the rebel military groups. From November 1992 to March 1993, the NUC consulted the different armed groups and the different national peace coalitions including the NPC, the MSPA, and the Peoples Congress. It also held public consultations in different provinces and with different sectoral organizations. By the end of its term of ofce and as a result of these consultations, the NUC summarized its recommendations to President Ramos in the document Six Paths to Peace. The document identied the social, economic, and political reforms, which the NUC saw as necessary in order to solve the root causes of insurgency. It also outlined a set of doable measures that could be immediately implemented by government. Ramos eventually adopted these recommendations as basis of his own peace strategy. While the SDs hailed the adoption by the Ramos government of the Six Paths to Peace as a concrete indicator of the success of their peace advocacy, the NDs rejected the output of the NUC as inadequate because it failed to address many of the more contentious peace-related issues. Despite these mixed reactions, by 1994, Ramos announced that the centerpiece program of his administration would be the implementation of a Social Reform Agenda (SRA), which would address the root causes of rebellion in the country. The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) composed of representatives from non-government organizations (NGOs),
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peoples organizations (POs), and government was created as the main vehicle through which the SRA would be pursued. The NPC, through its conveners, actively participated in the process of crafting the SRA and in the operations of the NAPC itself. The consistent and persistent efforts of national peace coalitions and the presidents framework of governance made possible the achievement of concrete gains for peace building under the Ramos administration. By the end of his term, Ramos was able to reach a comprehensive peace agreement with the military Rebolusyong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM) in 1995, and with the MNLF in 1996. It secured a cease-re agreement with the MILF (1997) and resumed peace talks with the NDF. Together with the NDF, the GRP under the Ramos administration signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, or CARHRIHL in March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands. Toward the end of the Ramos administration, the MSPA, the Peoples Caucus, and the Peoples Congress had become defunct. Members of the MSPA, while remaining actively involved in the peace movement, concentrated on other equally pressing concerns, effectively disbanding the MSPA. The organizations comprising the Peoples Congress were mired in the ND debates and eventual splits, and as a result the Peoples Congress was never convened again.
1998-2005: peace and national security uniting against an all-out war policy
Unfortunately, the short-lived Estrada administration (1998-2001) did not pursue the peace process with the same conviction as his predecessor. Peace talks were conducted and initial steps were taken toward the forging of peace-related agreements, but these never bore fruit. At best, Estrada had a blurred peace plan. Worse, Joseph Estrada made the military renew and intensify its offensive against secessionist Muslim groups in Mindanao. He ordered the siege of the MILFs Camp Abubakar in December 2000. By this time, only the CfP and the NPC, through their conveners and secretariat, had remained relatively active and continued to protest against Estradas all-out war policy. Prominent personalities in Metro Manila identied with these coalitions continued to use the name of these national peace coalitions in calling for the ouster of Estrada in 2001. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was installed as president after Estrada was impeached and then forced out of ofce by another people power in EDSA in January 2001. At the beginning of her term as president, Arroyo tentatively pursued the track of peace by resuming negotiations with the MILF and the NDF.But these were sidetracked by the 9/11 attacks, which precipitated the US-led war against terror. Arroyo made it a policy of her administration to provide all-out sup-
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port to the US campaign. This translated into intensied war efforts against the communist and Muslim rebellion in the country, which was justied as part of the administrations campaign against terrorism.By this time, the CfP and the NPC had become inactive as national peace coalitions, but a number of national peace coalitionsthe Gathering for Peace, the All-Out Peace Group, the Pilgrims for Peace, and the Sulong CARHRIHLemerged in 2002-2004 as civil societys response to this escalation of hostilities. The second wave (2002) of successive formations of national peace coalitions surged as an aftermath of this US-led all-out war against terror and the Arroyo presidencys militarist turn in policies, aided by her defense chief Angelo Reyes.
gathering for peace (GfP): peace and national sovereignty

The Gathering for Peace was formed in February 2002 to serve as a broad-based vehicle to oppose US military operations and interventions in the Philippines, and to assert that true and lasting peace is a consequence of addressing poverty and injustice. It is a loose network of individuals, political blocs, coalitions, NGOs, and POs, whose basis of unity is the protection of national sovereignty and the pursuit of non-violent solutions to the countrys internal conicts. The coalitions membership includes personalities and organizations identied with different ideological groups such as Sanlakas, Akbayan, Peace Camp, Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG), and the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). Secretariat support for Gathering for Peace was provided by the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM).
all-out peace group (AOPG): peace and civil society

The All-Out Peace Group was formed in April 2002 after a series of workshops on ThirdParty Peace Constituency Building organized by the University of the Philippines (UP) Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UPCIDS) and the UP Third World Studies Center (TWSC) to revitalize the Philippine peace movement, and partly in response to governments all-out war policy. It seeks to publicly advocate a national peace policy that would bind all succeeding administrations to pursue the peace process, and to serve as a forum for third-party mediators, who could privately engage the different state and nonstate actors or parties to the conict. The All-Out Peace Group included university-based programs and centers, churchbased peace programs, peace institutes, and various NGOs. Among these were the CfP , NPC,
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GZOPI, Amnesty International-Philippines, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL), Gathering for Peace (GfP), Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), and the Agrarian Reform Now (AR Now).
pilgrims for peace: resisting the terrorist label

Pilgrims for Peace was formed in August 2002 by religious leaders, most of whom were from Protestant churches. It is a loose network of individuals, NGOs, and POs that seeks to become a vehicle for campaigning for the resumption of peace talks, and against the labeling of Jose Ma. Sison as a terrorist and the CPP-NPA as terrorist organizations. Groups that are allied with the Pilgrims for Peace include groups like the Kilusan Mayo Uno (KMU), Bayan, and Karapatan, which are identied as ND-leaning organizations. Secretariat support for the Pilgrim for Peace is provided by the Philippine Peace Center.
sulong CARHRIHL: extracting accountability from the parties in conict

Sulong CARHRIHL was initiated in mid-2004 and the national network was formally launched in February 2005. Two months earlier, the Bicol Chapter of Sulong CARHRIHL was launched by the Bicol Regional Social Action Centers (BRSACs) on December 10, 2004. Sulong CARHRIHL brings together peace, human rights, religious and academic institutions in order to promote the goals, support the implementation, and prevent violations of the CARHRIHL signed by the GRP and NDF. The Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights of the UP CIDS hosts the national secretariat of Sulong CARHRIHL. Sulong CARHRIHL was formed after the government and the NDF agreed to operationalize the 1998 human rights/international humanitarian law agreement in April 2004. The two parties Joint Monitoring Committee was established, with support from the government of Norway. The data in Table 2 suggest that the emergence of national peace coalitions coincide with the threat of escalation of hostilities, such as when the peace talks between the GRP and the NDF were stalled and when the state adopted an all-out war policy. We could therefore say that the emergence of national peace coalitions has largely been reactive and is directed towards conict prevention. The challenge lies in how to initiate the formation of peace coalitions on the basis of positive peace building. We will now assess the impact of the strategies employed by national peace coalitions in the Philippines since 1986 up to 2005 in the context of the broader socio-historical background
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that was briey described above, and in the context of internal organizational dynamics that will be briey described in the next section.
Table 2: Emergence of National Peace Coalitions

Period
19861989
Peace/Conflict Scenario
People Power Revolution - End of Martial Law (Feb 1986) Historic 60-day bilateral ceasefire between GRP and NDF (Dec 1986) Mendiola Massacre (Jan 1987) Collapse of peace talks (Jan 1987) Coups de etat by factions of the military (1987, 1989) Re-negotiation of US Bases Collapse of Berlin Wall and USSR (1989) End of Cold War era Aquino declares 1990 as Decade of Peace Peace talks still suspended Escalation of hostilities between GRP and different NSAs Devastating Earthquake in Northern Luzon Eruption of Mt. Pinatubo Pull out of US Bases from Clark and Subic Ramos repeals Republic Act 1700 Exploratory talks with MILF General Amnesty Program Creation of the National Unification Commission (1992) Adoption of Six Paths to Peace as peace framework (1993) Pursuit of Social Reform Agenda and creation of National AntiPoverty Commission (1994) Peace Agreement with RAM (1995) Split within the CPP Peace Agreement with MNLF (1996) Ceasefire agreement with MILF (1997) Talks with NDF (1995, 1998) CARHRIHL (1998) Estrada orders siege of MILFs Camp Abubakr (2000) Sept 11 attacks (2001) Arroyo pursues all-out war policy against insurgents based on national security framework and her all-out support to US-led war against terrorism (2002) Anti-terrorism bill Oslo Talks between the GRP and NDF; the parties agreed to form the Joint Monitoring Committee of the CARHRIHL in April 2004 but talks broke down in 2005. Oakwood Mutiny Assassinations of leftist leaders at the local level
National Peace Coalitions Formed

Coalition for Peace
Year Formed
Dec 1986
First Wave: 1990
National Peace Conference MultiSectoral Peace Advocates Peoples Caucus Peoples Congress
1990 1990 1990 1992
19911997
19982001
Second Wave: 2002 20032005
Gathering for Peace All-Out Peace Groups Pilgrims for Peace Sulong CARHRIHL
2002 2002 2002 2004
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social actors/groups in peace coalitions
become more or less achievable depending on the coalitions strength. The coalitions strength is measured basically in terms of organizational spread and depth, or the broadness of the coalitions social base. Thus, all coalitions strive hard to become and actually project themselves to be broad-based. Broadness is an ideal that is at the core of coalition building. In the case of the national peace coalitions covered in this study, the term broad may refer to the range of political or ideological groupings that are represented in a coalition. It may also refer to the range of sectors or to the scope of geographic areas that are represented in a coalition. This section describes the social base of national peace coalitions.
coalition as a form of organization is the coming together of

different social actors to pursue mutually benecial goals that
ideological / political bloc

Although a coalition, as an organizational expression of unity, implies the coming together of groups of peoples and individuals with diverse ideological or political persuasions, some peace coalitions may be clearly identied as belonging to a specic ideological persuasion, e.g. SD, PopDem, ND-RA, ND-RJ, independent, etc. For example, the oldest peace coalition in this study, the Coalition for Peace, is basically identied as a coalition of SD-leaning and PopDemleaning organizations and individuals, while one of the younger peace coalitions in this study, the Pilgrims for Peace, is identied with the reafrmist (RA) bloc of the national democrats. The SDs and the PopDems organized the rst national peace coalition in the country, is the Coalition for Peace. That they were the rst ideological blocs to take up peace as a basis for organizing is easy to understand. Peace as an agenda is at the core of the SDs strategy of critical collaboration with the state to be able to institute social reforms from within. From their perspective, the pursuit of radical change through violence is irrational especially in light of the opportunities that have become available after the fall of the Marcos regime. Meanwhile, the PopDems support the view that changes through peaceful means is clearly a popular demand among the masses of the people as illustrated by the EDSA people power experience in 1986.
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They both assert that the people were tired of war and that the rebirth of democracy in the country promised the possibility of achieving thoroughgoing and strategic changes through incremental reforms. The SDs and the PopDems initiated the formation of the CfP , the NPC, and the MSPA. Consistent with their self-denition as an alternative to the state and to the CPP-NPA, these peace coalitions present themselves as a third party to the conict that enjoys the support of the broad masses of the people, referring to what they consider as the silent and nonideological majority of the people. Their earliest calls focused on peace talks and cease-res. A number of bourgeois reformists and liberal democrats belonging to traditional political parties actively participate in various national peace coalitions. They believe that with the ouster of the dictatorship, the biggest stumbling block to instituting pro-people reforms has already been removed and that the re-institution of democracy in the country provides better chances for reform to take root. Peace is thus a paramount concern because it is a prerequisite to democratization and economic development. Conveners of peace coalitions coalesce with sympathetic politicians because they value the credibility and clout that these politicians lend to peace building. The NDs may also be considered an important social base in relation to national peace coalitions. Before and during the Marcos years, in spite of internal debates regarding the handling of the peace question, ND-leaning human rights and justice and peace organizations during this period projected a unied stance in relation to peace issues. The focus of their efforts was to consciously subsume peace issues under anti-imperialist and antifascist themes and to redirect collective action toward more militant actions against the repressive regime. They have consistently presented themselves as the voice of the marginalized majority whose demand is for substantive and radical changes. The NDs assert that no substantive changes have taken place even after the ouster of Marcos in 1986 and that democratization can only be genuine if it addresses issues pertaining to economic democracy, such as land reform. Instead of opportunities, what they saw in the post-Marcos era was the danger of capitulation through cooptation. Thus, the primary concern was to show the bankruptcy of the existing order and to reiterate the legitimacy and urgency of radical social transformation. Contrary to the position of the SDs and the PopDems, the NDs believe that the masses of the people are ready to continue with militant forms of action because it is in line with their class interests. Moreover, they argue that the people have persistently challenged the dictatorship even under conditions of severe repression. Any discussion about peace should necessarily start with the demands of the people and not with calls for the surrender of the option to use force in defense of their rights. It is therefore easy to understand why the Peace Caucus had to be renamed as the Peoples Caucus, and why the issue of the US
peace coalitions
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GROUPS IN PEACE COALITIONS
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military bases in the Philippines or the issue of a thoroughgoing land reform program were seen as necessary elements of a genuinely pro-people and sincere peace process. In the aftermath of the bitter struggles within the movement, the ND bloc has been split into several groups by the mid-1990s. The basic ND position regarding the peace question that was briey discussed above is retained by the ND-RAs. The ND-RAs consider it important to educate the masses of the people on the difference between the ND position on peace and the way it is being handled by other political blocs especially the non-ND-RAs because they also consider it important for the masses of the people to be able to discern which is genuine and which is not. Apparently, this is the context in which we would be able to understand why the Pilgrims for Peace has consciously carved a separate niche for its own peace discourse. While it participates in conferences or forums organized by non-ND-RA peace coalitions, it has refrained from joining their mass mobilizations and other forms of protest actions. Instead it has launched its own parallel campaigns through parallel organizations and without enlisting the cooperation of non-ND-RA peace coalitions. As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the internal crisis that rocked the ND movement was marked by personal, ideological, and even violent contentions, such as executions of leading cadres who broke ranks. As a result, the ND-RJ and the ND-Independent blocs emerged as a distinct social base for peace coalitions. The Independent bloc specically has become a new actor in the peace movement and has taken up the issue of peace and nonviolence as important elements of its advocacy for social transformation. They abhor vanguardism or the principle of trying to ensure dominance by the party in any organization, which they identify as among the root causes of the excesses within the ND movement. They are seriously challenging the strategy of armed struggle as the only means to achieve meaningful social change. Thus, they are consciously inserting the issue of respect for life and human rights, and the value of pluralism into the discourse of social transformation. Peace coalitions formed more recently such as the All-Out Peace Group, Gathering for Peace, and Sulong CARHRIHL exhibit interlocking membership and leadership indicating that peace coalitions in Metro Manila can now more readily transcend ideological or political divisions, and achieve a consensus in specic peace concerns, thus allowing the implementation of joint campaigns and activities. But this interlocking leadership and membership may also indicate a relatively small community of core advocates for peace in Metro Manila. Thus it remains a major challenge for peace coalitions to expand this community, to sustain their peace-building initiatives, and to strengthen their capability to actively take part in the peace process in the Philippines. Peace coalitions need to consciously develop a crop of future peace-building advocates and leaders.
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middle forces
A cursory network analysis of the peace coalitions covered in this study reveals that prominent personalities and leaders coming from what are considered to be the middle forces, such as the religious sector and the academe, are the initiators of peace coalitions. The middle forces are those social sectors that could inuence policies and public opinion on the basis of their status in society. In Philippine society, where religious beliefs and education are highly valued, the religious sector and the academe have become acceptable mediators and effective brokers of peace. Also, since peace is inherently valued within their respective institutions, it is not surprising to nd religious leaders and academics at the forefront of peace advocacy and engagement. Churches and schools, through the initiatives of peace advocates within their ranks, have become sanctuaries for peace coalitions and their members. They have also become spaces for the conduct of peace research and training. Thus, they have contributed a lot in rening the concept and practice of peace building in the country.
religious sector
Church leaders and prominent personalities from religious institutions such as NCCP, AMRSP , and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), etc. have been involved in the formation of the peace coalitions, which were covered in this study. Some of the more prominent peace advocates from the religious sector are as follows:

Macario Francisco, SJ Feliciano Cario (NCCP) Fr. Frank Vargas (AMRSP) Bishop Francisco Claver (ICSI) Fr. Eliseo Mercado Jr, OMI Bishop Estanislao Abainza Rafael Donato, FSC Fr. Frank Vargas, CM Bishop Nestor Cario Most Rev. Deogracia Milguez, Jr. (Ecumenical Bishops Forum) Sharon Rose Joy Ruiz-Durendes (Gen-Sec of NCCP) Rev. Dr. Domingo Diel (Convention of Philippine Baptist Church) Prime Bishop Ignacio Soliba (Episcopal Church of the Philippines) Obispo Maximo Torres Millumena (Iglesia Filipina Independente)
SOCIAL ACTORS
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Rev. Fr. Aristela Miranda, OSC (St. Camillius Seminary) Sr. Rosalind Tanliueco, OSB (Social Pastoral Apostolate, St. Scholasticas College) Sr. Elenita Belardo BSG (Inter-Faith Network for Justice and Peace) Fr. Gilbert Sabado (Promotion of Church Peoples Response) Sr. Alice Areglo, DC (Justice and Peace Coordinator) Sr. Arnold Mary Noel of Balay Rehabilitation Center Inc.
academe
Academics from the University of the Philippines, Miriam College, the Ateneo de Manila University, and the Philippine National University have always been involved in initiating and maintaining peace coalitions. In most cases, they are acting on the basis of their own personal convictions rather than on behalf of the academic institutions with which they are afliated.
sectoral groups and individual peace advocates

Aside from the church and the academe, womens organizations, leaders from the NGO community, and prominent political leaders also gure prominently in national peace coalitions. Most of these personalities come from organizations that were actively involved in the human rights movement and the justice and peace movements during the Marcos years. These sectoral organizations and public intellectuals have helped call attention to other important but less visible expressions of conict (e.g., domestic violence, development aggression, cultural marginalization). They have also helped initiate new forms of organizing, and identify new areas of work for peace coalitions (e.g., community development, promoting a culture of peace). Based on a review of existing documents, some of the individuals who have consistently been involved in peace coalition work are:
Name
Teresita Quintos-Deles Ed Garcia Jose Luis Gascon Jean Llorin Clark Soriano Karen Taada Risa Hontiveros Baraquel Feliciano Cario (deceased)
Table 3: Peace Advocates in Peace Coalitions Peace Coalition

CfP MSPA NPC (was Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, from 2001 to mid-2005) CfP MSPA NPC (now with International Alert) CfP NPC CfP NPC HOPE CfP NPC (now with UNDP) CfP NPC AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL CfP MSPA NPC AOPG MSPA NPC
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Name
Fr. Frank Vargas Wigberto Taada Bonifacio Gillego Cecilia Muoz-Palma Fr. Jun Mercado Felicisimo Joson Corazon Juliano Soliman Ma. Serena Maris Diokno Corazon Fabros Soliman Santos, Jr. Miriam Coronel Ferrer support institutions
Peace Coalition
MSPA NPC MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC Gathering for Peace MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC MSPA NPC Peoples Caucus NPC MSPA NPC MSPA NPC MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC GfP AOPG HOPE CfP AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL
Once formed, a core staff that is provided by member organizations sustains the coalition by providing secretariat support. It is important to note that the more enduring coalitions were sustained through the efforts of a more regularly functioning organization, which is the core group or the secretariat of the coalition. It is the core group, which attends to the day-to-day tasks of the coalition, and facilitates the crafting of the coalitions comprehensive and strategic plans. Some of the organizations that have consistently provided support work for national peace coalitions are:
Table 4: Support Institutions for Peace Coalitions

Institute/Organization
GZOPI (Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute) University of the Philippines-Center for Integrative Development Studies Program on Peace Democratization and Human Rights Philippine Peace Center Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
Peace Coalition
CfP MSPA NPC AOPG AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL Pilgrims for Peace Gathering for Peace
In implementing the myriad tasks of peace building, peace coalitions in Metro Manila have also beneted from the support of various agencies like the UNDP-Philippine ofce, International Alert, the UNICEF Children in Situations of Armed Conict Inter-Agency Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Council of Churches, the Southeast Asian Conict Studies Network-Philippine chapter, and the Asian Peace Alliance. 33 Since peace coalitions are establishing themselves as third party facilitators, they should exercise prudence in choosing their funding partners. They need to ensure that their choice of funding partners will not jeopardize their reputation as a non-partisan organization.
SOCIAL ACTORS
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Coalition (name, facts of establish- Date Estabment, current status) lished

Coalition for Peace (CfP) December 1986 Formed shortly after the collapse of the negotiations between the GRP and the NDF Starting 1991, secretariat support provided by Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI). Active until 2000 but currently inactive Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA) Formed after a meeting that was originally intended for representatives of parties to peace talks did not push through, and was transformed into a small gathering of peace advocates. Currently inactive 1990
Table 5: Organizational Profile of Peace Coalitions (Metro Manila, 1986-2005)34

Coalition Leadership/Ideological Persuasion
Convened by prominent personalities from academe, church, and Manila-based NGOs Conveners: Teresita Quintos-Deles (GZOPI, WAND); Randy David (BISIG); Macario Francisco, SJ; Ed Garcia (GZOPI); Jose Luis Gascon (Youth Committee for Peace); Rolando Librejo; Jean Llarin (HOPE); Nemesio Prudente; Clark Soriano (Movement for Popular Democracy); Karen Taada (GZOPI, KASAPI); Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel Identified with Social Democrats (SDs) and Democratic Socialists (DemSocs) Prominent personalities from academe, church, political parties, and existing peace coalitions Conveners: Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel (CfP); Ed Garcia and Ging Deles (CfP and GZOPI); Feliciano Cario (NCCP); Fr. Frank Vargas (AMRSP); Bishop Francisco Claver (Institute of Church and Social Issues); Wigberto Taada; Bonifacio Gillego (deceased ); Cecilia Muoz-Palma (deceased ); Howard Dee and Florencio Abad (NPC); Fr. Jun Mercado (Peoples Caucus); Mercy Contreras (Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates); Felicisimo Joson (Federation of Free Workers-Labor Advisory Coordinating Council); Corazon Juliano-Soliman (Congress for Peoples Agrarian Reform); Maris Diokno Mostly SD allies but with personalities who are identified to be sympathetic to NDs Prominent personalities from the church, existing peace organizations, NGOs and peoples organizations. Chair: Wigberto Tanada; Exec Officer: Eliseo Mercado Jr, OMI; Member individuals include: Bishop Estanislao Abainza, Rep Greg Andolana, JV Bautista, Ishmael Bernal, RC Constantino Jr, Maris Diokno, Rep. Boni Gillego, Sixto Roxas Mostly ND allies.
Peoples Caucus Formed through a series of meetings, and partly in response to attempts of rightist elements to gain control of government. Name was changed from Peace Caucus to Peoples Caucus. Currently inactive
March 1990
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Coalition (name, facts of establishment, current status)
National Peace Conference (NPC) Formed during the 3-day National Peace Conference. Secretariat support provided by GZOPI Reconstituted in 1993
Date Established
October 1990

Prominent personalities from academe, church, political parties, existing peace coalitions, and peoples organizations. Peasants: Corazon Juliano-Soliman; Leonardo Montemayor; Luis Paterno Labor: Felicisimo Joson; Adelisa Raymundo Urban Poor: Hernani Panganiban; Reynaldo Maclang Youth: Jose Luis Gascon Coalition for Peace: Teresita Quintos-Deles and Edmundo Garcia Citizens Crusade: Diosdado Macapagal and former Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma Education: Fr. Jose Ante, OMI Business: Teresa Nieva, Santiago Dumlao and Jimmy Cura Muslim: Hadjii Abdul Camlian AMRSP: Rafael Donato, FSC and Fr. Frank Vargas, CM CBCP: Bishop Nestor Carino Mostly SD allies but with personalities and organizations who are identified with the ND bloc. Prominent personalities from the church, existing peace organizations, NGOs and peoples organizations. Mostly ND allies.
Peoples Congress Formed after a series of sectoral and multi-sectoral consultations with peoples organizations. Currently inactive Gathering For Peace Secretariat support provided by the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) Currently inactive
July 1992
February 2002
Conveners are prominent personalities from academe and issue-based coalitions. CONVENERS : Former Senator Wigberto Taada (main), Zenaida Quezon Avancea , Ma. Socorro Diokno , Atty. Corazon Fabros , Professor Roland Simbulan, POLITICAL GROUPS/BLOCS : Akbayan Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN!) , Alab Katipunan, Bukluran Para sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG) , KALAYAAN, Kilusan Para sa Pambansang Demokrasya (KPD) , Padayon , Sanlakas, Sosyalistang Partido sa Paggawa (SPP)
SOCIAL ACTORS
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Coalition (name, facts of establishment, current status)
Date Established

-Sr. Rosalind Tanliueco, OSB (Social Pastoral Apostolate, St. Scholasticas College) -Sr. Elenita Belardo BSG (Inter-Faith Network for Justice and Peace) -Dean Joselito Manalili (UP CSWCD) -Atty. Marvic Leonen (UP College of Law) -Sammy Malunes (KMU) -Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCarm (Promotion of Church Peoples Response) -Sr. Alice Areglo, DC (Justice and Peace Coordinator) -Bayani Alonzo III (Student Christian Movement of the Philippines) Identified with the ND-RA bloc.
Sulong CARHRIHL The Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS) serves as national secretariat of Sulong CARHRIHL A Bicol Chapter of Sulong CARHRIHL was launched by the Bicol Social Action Centers on 10 December 2004. Still active
2004 formally launched on February 2005
Non-ideological, broad based coalition Steering Committee: former Senator Wigberto E. Taada of the Citizens' Council for Peace; UP Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer; Karen Taada of the Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute; Sr. Arnold Mary Noel of Balay; Serafin Arviola of the Philippine Normal University; Prof. Jasmin Nario-Galace of Center for Peace Education, Miriam College; Fr. Philip Alcantara of the Apostolic Vicariate of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental; and Baibonn Sangid of the Young Moro Professionals. The secretariat is based at the UP Center for Integrative and Development Sudies (UP CIDS) Program on Peace, Democratization, and Human Rights (PPDHR) where Prof. Ferrer is the Program Convener. Management of the proposed project will be lodged at the PPDHR.
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PEACE COALITIONS
peace-building activities of peace coalitions

It was therefore difcult to neatly peg an activity under a specic category since each of them
policy that would promote or protect community welfare may be in the form of campaigns that involve appealing to the general public for support. It would have been doubly difcult to make sense of the urry of activities of peace coalitions if the research design did not identify early on the three general types of peace-building activities under which the varied peace-building activities may be categorized. In this study, the three general categories of peace-building are: 1) building the infrastructure for peace activism, 2) engaging the parties in conict, and 3) promoting/protecting community interests and welfare. This categorization allowed us to analyze the focus of each activity as reported in the data sources, which in turn allowed us to have a clearer parameter for analyzing the impact of these activities. Based on the tabulated data on peace coalitions peace-building activities, it may be argued that the core areas of action at present of national peace coalitions are building the infrastructure for peace activism through advocacy, and engaging the national leadership of the state and of the armed nonstate actors. Metro Manila-based peace coalitions may have activities that directly promote or protect community interests and welfare, but these hardly constitute the focus of their peace building efforts at present.
peace coalitions
eace coalitions implement activities that vary in form, scope,

or duration depending on the specic objective of the activity.
interrelates with the other activities. For example, lobbying for a specic legislation or state
building the infrastructure for peace activism

Building the infrastructure for peace activism involves the implementation of peace advocacy, peace organizing, and peace research and training programs. The main objective of this area of work has been to build a network of effective peace activists. Toward this goal, peace coalitions implemented activities that would raise peace awareness, facilitate the formation of peace organizations, and provide skills to emerging peace advocates.
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advocacy
Peace advocacy work is done to raise the peace consciousness of both state and civil society as part of the process of building a constituency for peace. Advocacy work of peace coalitions also serves to consolidate a constituency for peace because it becomes an impetus for coalition building at different levels. It involves dissemination of information, analysis, and options on peace-related issues to help the public reach an informed decision regarding these issues. It also involves generating support for a specic position or action in relation to a specic stand on issues. As can be easily gleaned from Table 6, peace coalitions generally converge on issues that pertain to the peace process such as the resumption of peace talks and peace negotiations, the calls for observance of internationally recognized rules of engagement and for peoples participation in the peace process, and on issues that pertain to the substance of peace such as condemning the governments militarist solution to the conict, and addressing the persistent problems of social inequality and injustice. They address these issues either separately or as a coalition of coalitions. But upon closer scrutiny, the divergent positions of peace coalitions on the content and direction of advocacy work become more evident. The divergent positions of peace coalitions toward advocacy work may be traced to their divergent framework in dening their stance vis-vis the state. There are coalitions that generally view the state as an arena where citizens could have a good chance at competing for power, and state personnel as individuals whose decisions could be swayed. Social change could be achieved through small but persistent changes at different levels of the state structure. Thus, the direction of their advocacy work is toward improving the existing policy environment. But there are other coalitions that basically view the state as an apparatus of the ruling classes, and state personnel as cogs of the state apparatus. Meaningful changes in the social structure cannot be expected to emanate from a changed policy environment or from the initiatives of sympathetic state personnel. Only a radical transformation of society could deliver just and lasting peace. Thus, the direction of their advocacy work is toward exposing and opposing the class-based biases of the states policies. Because of this diametrically opposed attitude toward the state, peace coalitions can be observed to employ divergent tactics in terms of policy advocacy. For example, SD-leaning peace coalitions have historically been more open to critical collaboration with the state, while NDleaning peace coalitions historically have been more conscious of maintaining a critical stance toward the state and are against peddling what are considered as false hopes to the masses. While SD-leaning peace coalitions have actively participated in many government-initiated peacerelated processes and have put forward what they considered to be doable policy proposals, the
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NDs have refused or rejected the peace initiatives of the government and have been steadfast in their demands for asset reform. ND-leaning peace coalitions have vehemently opposed the persistent calls for cease-res by SD-leaning peace coalitions when these are made a precondition to peace talks or peace negotiations. As a whole, these divergences that lead to separate and varied activities may in fact serve to complement each others advocacy efforts in that each of them is able to focus on specic peace issues. But when these divergent positions become a hindrance to implementing coordinated actions or a justication for withholding support for each others efforts, then they become a hindrance to peace building in general. Experiences have shown that these deep-seated differences have compelled coalition leaders to exclude from their ranks individuals or organizations that come from the opposing ideological camp. But other experiences have also shown that these differences can also be transcended when ofcial policy obviously turns toward all-out war, and through the efforts of peace advocates who dare to practice what they preach in their advocacy work. This is observed in the cases of joint mobilizations of newly formed peace coalitions such as the All-Out Peace Group and the Gathering for Peace, which consciously sought representation from varied ideological persuasions in order to effectively confront the issue of the governments all-out war policy. This is also observed in the efforts of Sulong CARHRIHL, whose advocacy focuses on the issue of respecting human rights.
Table 6: Peace Coalitions ADVOCACY35

Coalition
Coalition for Peace (CfP)
Examples of Major Advocacies
Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA) Peoples Caucus
Resumption of Peace Talks Declaration of Cease-fires Formulation of a national peace policy Respect for Human Rights Banning of landmines Support for Peace Zones Poverty alleviation Agrarian Reform Banning of Child Soldiers Recognition of Womens rights and Indigenous peoples rights Resumption of Peace Talks Declaration of Cease-fires especially in calamitystricken areas Peoples participation in governance Institutionalization of governments commitment to the peace process Dismantling of US Bases Redefining US-RP relations Repudiation of Foreign Debt Condemning of Oil Price Hike Agrarian Reform
PEACE-BUILDING ACTIVITIES OF PEACE COALITIONS
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Coalition
National Peace Conference (NPC)
Examples of Major Advocacies
Peoples Congress
Gathering For Peace
All-Out Peace Groups
Pilgrims For Peace
Sulong CARHRIHL
National peace policy, basic sectors agenda Resumption of peace talks Respect for Human Rights Banning of Landmines Agrarian Reform Banning of Child Soldiers Recognition of Womens rights and Indigenous peoples rights Resumption of the stalled peace talks Citizens participation in peace process Incorporation of sectoral and human rights issues in peace agreements Condemning US deployment of troops in the Philippines by late 2001 Condemning the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Balikatan Exercises 02-1 De-link peace process from national security framework Resist increasingly militarist policy of government in dealing with rebel groups Resumption of peace talks and peace negotiations Condemnation of the listing of Jose Ma. Sison and the CPP-NPA as terrorists Address root causes of the armed conflict Observance by both parties of the provisions of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law
organizing
It can be observed that the setting up of the peace coalitions covered in this study come in waves, which coincides with major peace-related issues. Examples of these waves would be the breakdown of peace talks in late 1986 and early 1990s, and the pursuit of an all-out war against terror policy in late 2001. Peace coalitions are usually formed as an organizational expression of unity of individuals and organizations to jointly launch major campaigns or to conduct specic initiatives as forms of addressing a burning peace-related concern. Such a unity is usually forged after a series of meetings that may take the form of conferences, workshops, or consultations. A group of advocates come together to convene these meetings, and a core institution is usually designated to function as the secretariat of the coalition once it is formed because coalitions do not have their own human, nancial, and other logistical resources that would allow them to function as a regular organization. As can be gleaned from the tabulated organizational prole of these peace coalitions, each
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coalition was formed to become a vehicle for the achievement of a specic peace-related goal. This goal may be to ensure or to enhance citizens participation in the peace process, or to inject substantive social issues into the peace agenda, or to facilitate the cessation of hostilities. Almost all of the peace coalitions covered in this study dene their organizational goals around three crucial issues, such as peoples participation in the peace process, third-party facilitation toward conict reduction and resolution, and inclusion of substantive/strategic issues in the peace agenda. Except when it is originally formed as a coalition of a broad array of sectoral organizations, peace coalitions founding members are usually prominent personalities and organizations that come mainly from academe, the church, from political formations, and NGOs. Memberorganizations from the other sectoral or geographical groupings are eventually drawn into the coalition as part of its network expansion efforts. Peace coalitions in Metro Manila are also conscious of establishing vertical linkages, or establishing contact and/or working relations with individuals and organizations at the grassroots level. They view this as part of their work to build a constituency for peace, and to establish their authority as a third party and as a major stakeholder in the peace process. Thus, their membership also includes various types of civilsociety organizations, such as political blocs and sector-based POs. Lately, peace-coalition builders have become more conscious of coalescing with organizations that may be identied with different ideological blocs. Most of the national peace coalitions in this study strive to be as open as possible to the participation of individuals and organizations from various political formations or ideological persuasions, as part of its horizontal linkage efforts. Horizontal linkage work involves reaching out and/or working with groupings from various sectoral organizations and from different regional organizations. This is viewed as a necessary component of strengthening the capability of the coalition as a network of effective actors. Although peace coalitions are not directly involved in solid organizing at the ground level, they have facilitated the formation of a number of peace organizations, the institution of peace programs, and the establishment of linkages with sympathetic individuals and organizations. They have already facilitated the formation of provincial peace networks, peace programs in academe and in the church, peace desks in sectoral organizations, and the establishment of linkages with sympathetic media practitioners and business leaders and with regional and global networks. Conferences, forums, consultations, and other similar activities also become venues for sharing ideas and experiences and for individual and group reection, which facilitate consensus building within the coalitions network. For example, the Waging Peace in the Philippines conferences conducted in 1997, and yearly from 2002 to 2005, have brought together
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the different peace coalitions and individual peace advocates to share their learning from their peace-building practices. Thus, peace coalitions public advocacy work also serves to consolidate the ranks of peace workers by clarifying their role in peace building and by honing their skills at strategizing. It is important to repeat here that the community of peace advocates and peace activists in the Philippines is still a relatively small community. Although in many ways peace coalitions have facilitated the emergence of other peace organizations even at the local level, they are still faced with the urgent task of expanding the community of peace advocates and peace activists in Metro Manila and in conict-ridden areas, and consolidating them into a network of effective actors for peace building. The organizational goal of peace coalitions needs to be more explicit about the task of facilitating the formation of primary peace organizations especially among the youth, who could, hopefully craft, effective and sustainable ways of peace building. Peace coalitions also need to become more creative and pro-active in framing sectoral issues as peace issues. This would facilitate the acceptability of peace advocacies to previously un-tapped organizations and sectors. It would also help weave seemingly disjointed sectoral issues into a tapestry of a more comprehensive and strategic peace agenda.
Table 7: Organizing Strategies of Peace Coalitions (Metro Manila, 1986-2005)36

Peace Coalition
Membership/Process of Organizing
Members come from diverse political blocs except those belonging to the National Democratic bloc (NDs) From a loose network of individuals and Metro Manila based institutes, eventually evolved into a more formal organization with regional networks.
Organizational Goal
To serve as mediator in the peace talks To serve as vehicle for grassroots peacebuilding.
Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA)
Members are mostly Manila-based personalities from the Peoples Caucus, National Peace Conference (NPC), Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), among others. MSPA is not strictly a coalition but a loose gathering of independent peace advocates of different persuasions. Without direct links to grassroots peace organizations.
To serve as mechanism for citizen mediation (third party facilitation) in the conduct of dialogues with the parties directly in conflict.
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Peace Coalition
Peoples Caucus
Composed of political groups, peoples organizations, issue-based coalitions, sectoral and multi-sectoral alliances, and individuals from the church, academe, media, business, other professionals, local government councils, government bureaucracy, and Congress.
Organizational Goal
To serve as a broad-based vehicle for citizen participation in the formulation and institutionalization of a Peoples Agenda that would address the roots of the peace problem, and to prevent the government from ignoring the peoples resolutions should peace process falter. To serve as a broad-based vehicle for citizen participation in the formulation and institutionalization of a national peace agenda. To serve as a broad-based vehicle for asserting the peoples needs and aspirations, especially in relation to the resumption of the peace process, as new GRP administration under Pres. Ramos sets its direction and policy framework. To serve as a broad-based vehicle to oppose US military operations and interventions in the Philippines, and to assert that true and lasting peace should address poverty and injustice. Basis of unity is the protection of national sovereignty and the pursuit of non-violent solutions to the countrys internal conflicts.
Made up of individuals and organizations representing major sectors such as farmers, workers, urban poor, indigenous people, women, and religious faiths. Gathering of POs and NGOs, institutional programs, concerned citizens, and leaders.
Peoples Congress
Gathering For Peace
Loose network of individuals, political blocs, coalitions, and NGOs/POs. Membership includes personalities and organizations identified with Sanlakas, Akbayan, Peace Camp, BISIG, FDC
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Peace Coalition
All-Out Peace Groups
Includes university-based programs and centers, Church-based peace programs, peace institutes and various NGOs. Membership includes CfP, NPC, GZOPI, Amnesty International-Philippines, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL), Gathering for Peace, Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), Agrarian Reform Now (AR Now), among others.
Organizational Goal
To publicly advocate a national peace policy that would bind all succeeding government administrations to pursue the peace process. As a forum for dialogue for 3rd party mediators, who could privately engage the different state and non-state actors or parties to the conflict. To become a vehicle for campaigning for the resumption of peace talks, and against the labeling of Jose Ma. Sison as a terrorist and the CPP-NPA as terrorist organizations. To promote the goals, support the implementation, and prevent violations of the human rights/international humanitarian law agreement between the Government and the National Democratic Front, and sustain the peace process.
Pilgrims For Peace
Loose network of individuals, NGOs, and POs Allied with groups like KMU, Bayan, and Karapatan
Sulong CARHRIHL
Brings together peace, human rights, religious and academic institutions.
research and training

Peace coalitions do not directly conduct researches but through the years, peace coalitions have contributed a considerable amount of peace-related literature by publishing the proceedings of their conferences, roundtable discussions, and workshops. Peace coalitions are able to dene themes for further research on peace-building concerns through these forums that become venues for peace researchers to share their individual researches or their latest think pieces with peace-building practitioners. Some of the peace-related concepts and issues that have been discussed and problematized in the many activities of peace coalitions are: positive
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peace and negative peace, conict prevention, peace building, engagement, human rights and international humanitarian law, and terrorism. Peace coalitions should continue to generate interest in peace research. They should also enhance their capability to come up with more popular versions of their publications for the consumption of the broader public. Research work of peace coalitions also include inter-agency documentation or fact-nding missions to conict-affected communities. Data that are gathered from this activity feed into the other areas of peace building, such as advocacy, engagement, and community protection. Peace coalitions provide training on specic campaign-related skills. Some of the trainings conducted by peace coalitions include issue-analysis, public speaking, negotiating, mass campaign planning and administration, etc. Peace coalitions also provide training in terms of actual eld experience. Peace building demands from its advocates a set of skills and stock knowledge that can only be honed through years of actual eld experience. For example, formal trainings can increase understanding of the intricacies of conict resolution and third party facilitation but such learning would be inadequate substitutes for the tolerance and political savvy that one acquires through direct experience in peace building work.
engagement strategies
Engagement as a type of peace-building activity focuses on achieving a nonmilitary solution to the major armed conicts. The activities in this type of work are thus necessarily primarily directed at the principal parties to the conict. Through the years, civil-society peace coalitions at the national level have consistently been involved in engaging the national leadership of both the GRP and the different armed nonstate actors. In tracing the evolution of peace coalitions strategies in this type of work, it can be observed that the earlier efforts were focused on establishing that the citizenry is a third party to the conicts, and in establishing themselves (peace coalitions) as the vehicle for citizens participation in the peace process. Among their earliest advocacies was to demand citizens participation in the peace process, which supports the premise that the citizenry cannot be claimed as a base of either one of the parties in conict. Peace advocates have painstakingly presented themselves both as a third party that may facilitate talks and negotiations and, by forming themselves into peace coalitions, as a vehicle that would enable the citizenry to participate in the peace process. Peace coalitions have employed a combination of strategies that would coax the parties in conict to talk peace. They have facilitated talks between the GRP and the NDF, provided advisory and technical support to both parties in trying to expedite the forging of agreements,
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and utilized formal and informal channels to reach out to the negotiating parties. These efforts may be observed in their strategies toward effecting a cease-re agreement, promoting the observance of internationally recognized human rights and humanitarian law, inserting the concepts of substantive peace agenda and welfare of noncombatants into the negotiations of the parties in conict, and generating support for the establishment of peace zones. In principle, peace coalitions effort to maintain friendly and diplomatic ties with both parties should not limit their capacity to criticize and confront either party with regard to peacerelated issues. For example, peace coalitions have consistently remained vigilant against the growing inuence on government policy of militarist approaches to the conict. They have waged militant campaigns against the all-out war policy of government, and have never wavered in calling for the resumption of peace talks and peace negotiations. The All-Out Peace Group, for example, called for the ouster of the Secretary of National Defense in 2003. The Gathering for Peace launched mass actions against the governments support for the US war on Iraq, and the Pilgrims for Peace campaigned against the labeling of Jose Ma. Sison, and the CPP-NPA as terrorists. They have also relentlessly called upon the leaderships of the government and the CPP-NPA to consistently pursue the peace talks. Establishing peace coalitions as a third party that can be an acceptable mediator to the parties in conict demands, therefore, that peace coalitions attain a certain level of clout, which in turn could only be gained by maintaining impartiality vis--vis the parties in conict. This is best illustrated by the difculties met by the Coalition for Peace in the late 1980s. As a coalition identied with specic ideological blocs (SD/PopDem), it was unable to establish itself as a nonpartisan mediator, and was unable to win the trust of the parties in conict.37 In comparison, the MSPA, however short-lived it was, has been more successful in terms of gaining the trust of the conicting parties because within its ranks are members who had access to either side of the contending parties. More recently, community-level engagement work of peace coalitions presents another type of citizen mediation. Sulong CARHRIHL for example, focuses on active citizen participation in ensuring that the CARHRIHL and other peace-related agreements between the government and nonstate actors are respected and observed at the grassroots level where these are actually operationalized. These initiatives illustrate how national-level advocacy may link up with grassroots-level engagement, and may yet hold the key to sustained activities of Metro Manila-based peace coalitions. In a way, it is similar to the support and networking provided by the CfP to the peace zones in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Sulong CARHRIHL initiatives have brought together a wide array of organizations in Bicol, Mindoro Occidental, Quezon, Northern Luzon, parts of Mindanao and the Visayas to develop a more sustained engagement strategy. Given the current limitations of the state in terms of governance, which tend to diminish the impact
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of the gains from national-level policy advocacy as these trickle down to the local level, peace coalitions should also be more involved in ground-level engagement. Clearly, peace coalitions need to establish and maintain a third-party status as an organization. In the experience of peace coalitions, the contributions of church leaders, academics, and well-respected politicians who lent their stature, credibility, and integrity to peace coalitionswere crucial in achieving the coalitions organizational goals. In addition, individual peace coalition policy advocates need to acquire the brinkmanship of a professional diplomat and the political savvy of a seasoned politician to negotiate the difcult and dangerous terrain of engagement work. Peace coalitions engagement initiatives toward the GRP range from militant confrontation such as the campaign for the ouster of the Secretary of Defense up to collaboration such as joining the technical committee under the GRP negotiating panel. There is an emerging consensus among the peace coalition leaders interviewed for this study of the need to reevaluate the strategy of joining government initiatives as part of engagement work in terms, for instance, of its cost-benet ratio. While joining government initiatives has been benecial in terms of becoming acceptable to the GRP , it may also have compromised their position as an impartial mediator from the perspective of the NSAs, particularly the NDF. With this in mind, peace coalition leaders have also started to look back at the effectiveness of many of their past initiatives in terms of establishing their credibility as an impartial mediator. Another dimension of peace coalitions engagement work that needs to be addressed is promoting the concept of a local third-party mediator as an acceptable proposition. NSAs, particularly the NDF, are still not keen on the concept of a local third-party mediator. From the ND perspective, any Filipino has only two possible options, and these are either to be on the side of the GRP or on the side of the NDF. They believe that neutrality is a euphemism, or a cloak, for being on the side of the GRP . Thus, a local third-party mediator who claims to be impartial could only be nave, or worse, a conscious agent of the state.38 In this difcult context, peace coalitions that believe otherwise cannot afford to ignore the necessity of persistently and patiently persuading anyone and everyone who would care to listen that the concept of a local third-party mediator can be an acceptable and viable proposition.
protection, promotion of community interests and welfare

Other than the peace zone-building supported by the Coalition for Peace and more recent initiatives like Sulong CARHRIHL, peace coalitions in Metro Manila have largely been focused on national-level advocacy directed at the state. Their contributions to the protection and pro-
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motion of community interests and welfare have largely been indirect. Their gains in the arena of policy advocacy trickle down to communities mostly in the form of lessened hostilities, the delivery of much-needed relief and social services, or the formation of more peace organizations. Clearly, peace coalitions need to develop strategies that link more tightly their efforts at the national level with actual ground-level conditions. These strategies would not only serve conict-ridden communities but would also bring their problems more vividly to the public in Metro Manila, and hopefully make the public of Metro Manila more sympathetic to the cause of conict-ridden communities. Still, peace coalitions need to realize that the delivery of social services to conict-ridden communities is a contentious (and dangerous) initiative. While all parties and stakeholders to the conict would agree that communities should not be denied access to basic social services in spite of, or maybe because of, escalating conict, either party to the conict could easily misconstrue this kind of initiative. Thus the channels through which such initiative is pursued should be carefully selected by peace coalitions. For instance, some peace coalition leaders are looking back at how initiatives like the Immunization for Peace could have been more effectively projected as a neutral humanitarian project if it was conducted not through government channels or without seeking the protection of either the police or the military in the target areas, and if it was not used as an entry point to call for cease-res.39 It is suggested that instead of using activities like this as a form of engaging the parties in conict, peace coalitions could align these initiatives to efforts at building the credibility of peace coalitions as an impartial third-party player in the peace process as well as to efforts at building a solid constituency for peace activism. Efforts at protecting and promoting community interests and welfare could be directed toward building mechanisms for local peace building such as the institution of local rights and welfare councils that could be used by local residents as vehicles to raise rights and welfare issues to both the GRP and the armed nonstate actors. Another example of an initiative that should be reviewed is the establishment of peace zones as a way of consolidating local peace constituencies. Peace coalitions need to seriously consider the fact that based on the ofcial ND position, any similar operation at the local level especially in so-called NDF areas should be done with their prior approval or as an offshoot of negotiations at the national level. This framework limits the efforts of peace coalitions to pursue independent initiatives at the local level, lest these be misconstrued as enemy initiatives. Thus, peace coalitions need to be aware that their operations at the local level are in themselves a form of engagement. It entails courage and inventiveness on the part of peace activists to assert their work at the local level. One way of doing this is by using the channels of the church, the academe, local NGOs, and other inuential local leaders with whom they could coordinate the implementation of their initiatives on the ground.
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Table 8: Peacebuilding Strategies of Peace Coalitions (Metro Manila, 1986-2004)40

Coalition
Infrabuilding for Peace Activism: Advocacy, Organizing, Research and Training

Assisted in the formation of the broad-based Kilusan para sa Kapayapaan at Demokrasya (KKD, Movement for Peace and Democracy), an organization to counter the resurgence of fascism as represented by the August 28 coup attempt.
STRATEGIES Engagement of the State and NonState Actors

Pushed for the creation by then-Pres. Aquino of a fulltime Peace Commission Convened a 3-day Tent City for Peace in July 1987 that brought together people from different sectors to assert before Congress a legislative agenda for peace Spearheaded the Peoples Christmas Cease-fire campaign to dramatize peoples power to compel military forces to declare a cease-fire Pushed for the observance of international humanitarian law
Promotion and Protection of Community Interests and Welfare
Launched the Immunization for Peace: Children not Warfare program, where communities pushed for cease-fires in order that basic social services are delivered to their communities. Promoted the establishment of Peace Zones Participated in the Bantay Cease-fire project in Mindanao
Established Peoples Peace Centers and provincial networks Promoted multi-sectoral consultations, paraliturgical celebrations on peace and local cease-fires Helped in groundwork for the International Conference for Conflict Resolutions which was sponsored by International Alert Helped organize the Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA) and the National Peace Conference (NPC) Joined protest rallies against Pres. Estradas all-out war policy on Mindanao in 2000.
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Coalition
Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA)

Conducted meetings, forums, conferences, congresses as venues for sharing concerns, and for articulation of the roots of crisis and obstacles to genuine peace and development Promoted a Peoples Agenda that consisted of 6 major resolutions that included: Framework for Baseland Conversion, Ecological Clean-up of the US bases, Framework of a New US-RP Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Peoples National Defense Alternative Defense and Protection of Peoples Organizations Campaigning for a Nuclear-Free Philippines, and Alternative foreign debt policy in relation to the peoples alternative to the US bases Sponsored a Welgang Bayan (Peoples Strike), Co-sponsored a Long March, joined rallies, and sponsored signature campaigns and Paid Advertisements (Open Letter) Public expression of regret for resumption of hostilities especially in areas devastated by the earthquake in 1990
Called for support of peace formations among ecumenical church leaders and business people with access to then-Pres. Ramos.
Pushed the Aquino government to form a democratic coalition government. Lobbied both parties to declare a cease-fire in areas that were devastated by the earthquake in 1990 Issued a Peoples Agenda on October 14, 1990 highlighting the call for the government and the NDFP to resume peace negotiations and to address the roots of the armed conflict to attain just and lasting peace
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Joined consultations conducted by National Unification Commission Provided sectoral participation in the 1993 Social Pact for Empowered Economic Development, which eventually evolved into the 1994-1995 Social Reform Agenda (SRA) of the Ramos government Participated in the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), which was created by Pres. Ramos to pursue the SRA Issued a 7-point National Peace Agenda, which was presented to both the GRP and the NDF
Drafted Basic Peace Agenda as an output of a national peace conference
Peoples Congress
Held consultation meetings to discuss preparations for the consultation conducted by the National Unification Commission
Presented the Peoples Agenda for Ramos 1st 100 days in office, which recommended that peace negotiations with NDF and peace talks with Moro resistance groups and military rebels should be top priority policy of GRP, that citizens participation be ensured, and that confidence building measures be undertaken by GRP Critical collaboration with the National Unification Commission formed by Pres. Ramos
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Coalition
Peoples Congress

Met with NUC and presented the Peoples Congress Paper on the NUC and Ongoing Consultations, and a Position Paper on Peace and the Peace Process Called for release of political prisoners Called for the adoption of the Hague Declaration Called for peace talks in 1993 Presented a critique of the NUC report and the Ramos Peace Program, and reiterated calls for basic reforms and peace negotiations
Gathering For Peace
Campaigned against US-led war on Iraq and GMAs all-out support to US war on terror and its own all-out war policy Created the Task Force on Anti-Terrorism Bills to work against the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Bills in both houses of Congress, and the AntiBalikatan Task Force to monitor and oppose the US-RP Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) and other joint US-RP military exercises in the Philippines
Created working groups that would propose counteractions to pending legislations that have grave repercussions to exercise of civil liberties Offered the idea of a negotiated political settlement of the protracted war as a new strategy that may be adopted by government.
Sharing of experiences between peace advocates and evacuees in Mindanao
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Coalition
Gathering For Peace

Conducted Speakers training on the MLSA
Conducted conferences with sessions on militarization, and the role of the US in nuclearization Conducted lectures and roundtable discussions on human rights and terrorism Held a march-rally as part of Global Day of Action for Justice and Peace sponsored by the World Social Forum Regular press releases Maintains a website All-Out Peace Groups Advocacy for revitalization of peace processes Forum for dialogue of 3rd parties Protested Arroyo governments all-out support to the US war against terror and criticized US interventions in Iraq and elsewhere Led an anti-war protest march in August 2002 Organized a Walk of Peace in late 2002 Campaigned for the resumption of talks between the Arroyo government and the NDFP, and for the conduct of formal negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Launched the NOWARGAMES (National Outrage of Women Against Angelo Reyes and Gloria Arroyos Militarism and Erosion of Sovereignty), which called on then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes to resign in 2003.
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Coalition
Pilgrims For Peace

Campaigned for the resumption of GRP-NDF peace talks, and against labeling Jose Ma. Sison and the CPP-NPA as terrorists Facilitated dialogue between GRP and NDF
Issued statement calling for the resumption of peace talks, which was also circulated in a signature campaign Organized demonstrations against the US-led war in Iraq Supported calls for the observance of a Day of Prayer and Fasting in February 2003 Conducted peace conferences Campaigned against labeling Jose Ma. Sison and the CPP-NPA as terrorists Urged the Norwegian Secretary of State (Vidar Helgesen) to continue the Norwegian governments support for the resumption of peace talks between GRP-NDF
Participated in factfinding missions, relief and medical missions in Pikit, North Cotabato in February 2003
Sulong CARHRIHL
Held forums and trainings on CARHRIHL and the peace process Monitored and helped address violations of CARHRIHL Pursued joint actions with peace, human rights, academic, and religious organizations, NGOs and local groups
Held dialogues with various stakeholders involved in the peace process Issued letters, statements and other appeals directed at the parties in conflict
The basic strategy is to combine the efforts of national level-policy advocacy with ground level engagement work by involving both Metro Manila-based peace advocates and ground-level peoples organizations in concrete public advocacy campaigns
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and actual engagement work at specific localities where the observance of peace agreements such as CARHRIHL should be implemented.
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assessing the impact of peace coalitions peace-building strategies

should not be the only measures of success of peace-building efforts, especially for civil societyinitiated peace building. It is argued that civil-society peace-building capacity to end the conict is inherently limited by its very nature as a nonstate, third-party actor. As such, civil society can only inuence rather than impose its will upon the parties in conict.41 The strength and focus of civil-society peace building lie in building the constituency for peace and in promoting a culture of peace. Thus, in appraising the gains of civil-society peace building, this study gives equal emphasis on looking at changing conditions at the ground level, at the changing behavior of all the stakeholders to the conict, while looking at gains in terms of facilitating the transformation of rules and structures. In analyzing the impact of the many activities implemented by peace coalitions over the years, an extensive review of documentary evidence was conducted for this study. Copies of legislation, ofcial committee/ commission reports of government and civil-society peace organizations and coalitions, ofcial pronouncements of government ofcials and government bodies, and media articles were analyzed to reveal how civil-society peace coalitions interventions were perceived by the government, the media, and other civil-society organizations involved in the peace movement. Conference proceedings, published interviews, reections of peace advocates were mined to get the insight/perception of peace-coalition actors concerning the impact of their own work. Still, the assessments that are presented here are largely based on the evaluation made by peace-coalition leaders of the outcome of peace building activities of their respective coalitions. As was indicated elsewhere in this report, peace coalitions are generally formed when a pressing peace-related issue should be urgently addressed. The collapse of peace talks and the eruption of hostilities, for example, are major crises that necessitate the concerted intervention of peace advocates and peace organizations. Since 1986 up to the present, the efforts of peace coalitions to bring the parties in conict to the track of peace talks and negotiations, while difcult and protracted, have generally resulted in the exploration by both parties of the possibility of talks and negotiations. Either side has declared, in most cases unilaterally, periodic and area-specic cease-res.
n the overall framework for this study, it was claried

that the absence of armed conicts and political violence
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Through consistent advocacy work, peace coalitions have successfully placed peace in the national agenda of the different government administrations since 1986. Landmark government policy documents such as the Six Paths to Peace and the Social Reform Agenda have largely been based on the advocacies of peace coalitions. In both documents, the need to address the structural causes of violence in pursuing a just and more lasting peace is recognized, and serves as justication for undertaking social reforms. Although the concretization of this agenda and the consistent pursuit of the peace track by government may have differed depending on the preferences of each administration, through governments adoption of these policy documents, peace coalitions have already laid the important groundwork for further peace building. An example that would best illustrate the impact of peace coalitions policy advocacy is an examination of the Ramos administrations attempt at developing a peace agenda. Ramos unveiled his peace plan by offering amnesty to rebels, but this offer was immediately criticized by various peace coalitions because it did not address the causes of rebellion. As a result, Ramos amended Executive Order 350 to include the provision regarding the creation of the National Unication Commission (NUC), which was mandated to draw up a proposal for a comprehensive peace program and peace process through nationwide consultations. Several prominent personalities from the ranks of existing peace coalitions at the time were appointed as members of the commission. Consultations with various social sectors and communities were conducted by the NUC, including consultations with the different peace coalitions, such as the NPC, the MSPA, and the Peoples Congress. By the end of its mandated term of ofce, the NUC submitted a proposal for a comprehensive peace agenda that included many of the issues and proposals that were consistently being raised by peace coalitions in their advocacy work, such as the recognition of poverty and social inequality as among the causes of rebellion.42 Thus, in spite of its many limitations, the NUCs consultative process and its comprehensive peace agenda, which clearly embody peace advocacies, are still artifacts that exhibit the impact of peace coalitions advocacy work. In addition, the willingness of then-President Ramos to listen to the demands and recommendations of peace advocates can also be seen as a manifestation of the impact that peace coalitions have had on the president in terms of seeing peace as an important component in any attempt to achieve economic growth and development. Peace coalitions policy advocacy efforts combined with effective public advocacy have also led to the institution of important mechanisms that would encourage the pursuit of more peaceful solutions to the armed conict. Government agencies/ofcials were created/appointed to focus on peace matters, e.g., the Ofce of the Peace Commissioner, which eventually became the Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; the National Unication Commission, which conducted nationwide consultations toward the formulation of a national peace agenda; the National Anti-Poverty Commission, the mechanism through which the implementation of
peace coalitions
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PEACE COALITIONS PEACE-BUILDING STRATEGIES
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the Social Reform Agenda would be coordinated at the national level. Out of their engagement with the parties in conict, and their insertion of the concepts of human rights and noncombatants into public consciousness, peace coalitions have facilitated the inclusion of provisions, passage of measures, and setting up of mechanisms that would help minimize violence and human-rights violations, e.g., a ban on the use of landmines and child soldiers in the CARHRIHL. Other mechanisms include the establishment of peace zones and other similar spaces for peace in communities, and the recognition of Muslim holidays at the national level. The consistent advocacy of peace coalitions regarding citizen participation in the peace process has also yielded important gains for the peace movement in the country. Government peace and/or negotiating panels appointed by government included negotiators who came from the ranks of civil society, and who were deemed acceptable to both parties. Representatives from previously unrepresented sectors, such as women and indigenous peoples (lumads) have been appointed to government peace panels. Some of the gains achieved at the national level eventually trickle down to the ground level. For example, the declaration of cease-res and the signing of peace agreements have helped ease violence and destruction at the ground level. Peace coalitions have also facilitated the delivery of medical, relief, and social services to conict-ridden communities that are also devastated by natural calamities. Through these efforts, the welfare of children, indigenous peoples, and other noncombatants are now more seriously taken into account even by the warring parties. Obviously, peace coalitions have inuenced the observable changes in behavior of the state and nonstate actors. They are now compelled to recognize the option of engaging in dialogues, the necessity of involving citizens in the peace process, the importance of implementing condence-building measures, and the crucial role of third-party mediation in conict resolution. Changes in behavior and attitudes at the community level have also become observable. The growing number of provincial or community networks of peace and individual peace advocates who participated in various peace-building activities indicates the broadening of the communities peace consciousness. There has also been an observable increase in peace studies in academic institutions. Recently, evacuees in Mindanao mustered enough condence in themselves that they undertook an unprecedented collective action to insist on their right to peace. Over the years, peace coalitions have helped clarify the substance of peace. Peace is now understood not simply as the absence of hostilities but also the absence of structural violence and the root causes of rebellion, most notably poverty and injustice. People talk about the benets of a just and lasting solution to the countrys insurgency problem compared to a militarist solution. In the campaigns of peace coalitions, the role of international politics in the countrys
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peace situation has also been revealed, and the transnational dimension of peace issues has become more apparent. The strategic or long-term value of peace coalitions advocacy and engagement work lies in their contributions to the long-term process of nurturing a culture of peace. By inscribing peace into the public consciousness, peace coalitions are able to effect changes in discursive and nondiscursive practices not only of peace agents but also of society in general. For example, terms such as cease-re, just and lasting peace, nonviolence, nonkilling, noncombatants, human rights, humanitarian law, among many others, have, to a certain extent, become part of public discourse. Nondiscursive practices such as valuing the virtue of tolerance, skills at facilitation and coalition building, choosing nonviolent toys for children, building a nonviolent vocabulary, proliferation of the chicken-feet peace sign as fashion accessory among the youth, indicate that peace advocacy has, to a certain extent, made peace sensitivity not only acceptable but also necessary, and even fashionable.
Table 9: Impact of Peace-building Strategies of Peace Coalitions43

IMPACT Policy Issue / Environment
Agenda, Legislation or Policy
Adoption
Ground Level Situation

Delivery of basic social services to communities, especially those most devastated by armed conflict or by natural calamities Provision of relief and medical provisions to devastated communities Greater attention to welfare of children and non-combatants Mitigated human rights violations as a result of fact-finding missions Reduction of and temporary relief from violence through declaration of cease-fires and establishment of peace zones Continued dialogues and negotiations
Attitudes, Behavior, Perceptions of Primary Stakeholders

On the State and Rebel Groups

of proposed agreements Declaration of 1990-2000 as Decade of Peace Adoption by the national government of the Six Paths to Peace, Social Reform Agenda Passage of related laws Influenced resumption of peace talks and end to military operations Influence media framing of peacebuilding Recognition of Muslim holidays Conduct of peace talks with Moro resistance groups and military rebels Declaration cease-fires Adoption of the ban on landmines
Engagement in dialogues and receptiveness to cease-fires and negotiations Military more conscious of human rights Recognition by GRP of necessity of conducting consultations and enlisting broadest possible participation of citizens in policy-making Implementation of confidence-building measures Release of political prisoners Declaration of suspension of offensive military operations Openness to third-party mediation
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PEACE COALITIONS PEACE-BUILDING STRATEGIES
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IMPACT
Policy Issue / Environment

Creation of Mechanisms and Programs

Ground Level Situation

Empowerment of communities through the formation of citizens peace coalitions and peace zones
Attitudes, Behavior, Perceptions of Primary Stakeholders

On the Community and Citizens

Creation of the Office of the Peace Commissioner, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, National Unification Commission, National Anti-Poverty Commission Recognition of Peace Zones Declaration of Peace Zones as Special Development Areas
Expansion of peace network and growing number of peace advocates Growing interest in peace studies in academe Recognition of differences and value given to tolerance and skills in facilitation Promotion of multi-sectoral consultations on peace and local cease-fires Broadened peace consciousness and recognition of obstacles to genuine peace and development Recognition of necessity of militant collective action as part of peace building Evacuees gained confidence and belief in themselves Learned important role of coalition in facilitating cease-fire as part of assertion of peace process Appreciation of support of international agencies, and transnational dimension of peace issues
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facilitating and hindering factors to peace coalitions peace building

facilitating factors
existence of peace advocates and initiating organizations
The long and difcult struggle for freedom and democracy under the Marcos dictatorship left a trail of human-rights activists and justice and peace advocates who were committed to seeking a just and lasting peace in the Philippines. The peace coalitions covered in this study were set up by these advocates who were willing to commit their personal and organizational resources to activate a vibrant peace movement in the Philippines. It helped that prominent leaders from the church, reputable academics, and respected political gures were at the forefront of peace coalitions activities. Their stature in society or the respect they commanded on the basis of their integrity, commitment to service, and proven impartiality became the building blocks upon which peace coalitions established their own reputation. It also helped that organizations with a clear track record on peace research or development work like GZOPI, UP-CIDS, PRRM, and PPC provided the necessary resources to jump-start peace coalitions activities, like the deployment of a committed and competent core of coalition workers who would perform secretariat functions for the coalition. But beyond individual or organizational reputation, the more important contribution of these individuals and their organizations to peace coalition peace building is the specic knowledge and experience that they bring into peace-coalition work. For example, a simplistic presentation of these contributions would show that from the church, peace coalitions learn the basics of mediation and access to a nationwide network; from public intellectuals they gain sharper analyses of issues and access to spaces for reection; from political gures they get tips on diplomacy and brinkmanship and access to an inside track to the parties in conict; and
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from NGOs and POs they gain a foothold on issues that affect the different sectors of society and access to a much wider constituency. Still, it is the existence of the peace coalition itself, where the net effect of the combined strength of all these competencies is crystallized, that is one of the most crucial facilitating factors in peace building. The impact of peace coalitions peace building is also due in part to the efforts of seasoned campaign workers who are capable of planning and implementing peace coalitions timely and effective campaigns that combine multiple strategies. They are also capable of providing timely and comprehensive analyses of the international context, and of trends in government policies that become bases for the coalitions strategizing. As a whole, peace coalitions are capable of creating opportunities for expanding the coverage of peace building, e.g. creating spaces for peace, campaigning for cease-res in disaster-hit communities, extending medical services to poor communities (Immunization for Peace). Needless to say, it is imperative for peace coalitions to enlarge the community of peace advocates, and to consciously develop a crop of future peace-building leaders. Coalition building is an important competency that present and future peace-building leaders should acquire.
creative and sustained networking / linkage efforts

Peace coalitions have tapped various kinds of networks to expand the reach of their peace building. They have relied on personal connections to reach out to key gures from both sides of the parties in conict. This has been necessary especially in engagement work where personal rapport and more inconspicuous approaches were proven to be more effective in gaining the trust and cooperation of the parties in conict. Peace coalitions have also maximized their links with sector-based networks at the local and international levels in amplifying their peace concerns and advocacies. These connections have opened ways through which peace building could encompass a broader range of issues and a wider coverage area, which in turn became paths to a wider scope for peace building. Besides the institutions already mentioned, peace coalitions have also established durable partnerships with organizations of women and children, workers and peasants, indigenous peoples, relief and rehabilitation agencies, justice and peace and human-rights groups, etc. Lately, they have also urged the media to directly take part in their campaigns especially at the ground level.
availability of nancial and logistical resources

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, coalitions do not have their own nancial or logistical resources. But the type of activities that coalitions are engaged in requires a huge amount
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of resources. Thus, the material support they were able to pool together from their member organizations and supporters are important in sustaining many of their activities. Support from local and international funding agencies for activities such as researches, conferences, publications, and advocacy campaigns helped raise the capability of peace coalitions in elevating peace activism to a higher level. Peace coalitions access to new communications technology also enhances their capability to reach out and amplify their advocacies.
combining strategies
The success of peace coalitions activities in a specic impact area also depends on their capability to employ an effective combination of varied forms of strategies. Documented campaign experiences in the antidictatorship struggle provide peace coalitions with a triedand-tested repertoire for collective action, which they have used in combination with new and innovative forms of mobilizations that are inclusive and empowering. Combining public and policy advocacy, collaboration and critique, concrete demands with strategic calls have helped peace coalitions in building the infrastructure for continued peace activism. Even if the peace movement in this country has always been fractious, the net effect of all their efforts has facilitated the achievement of lasting gains for peace building. For instance, the combination of rallies with dialogues, of issue-based and sectoral organizing with alliance building based on strategic issues, and of continuous engagement with the parties-in-conict has placed the peace agenda at the center of national attention.
building on previous gains

Peace coalitions exert a great deal of effort to reect upon their successes and failures from which they cull the lessons that would guide them in their work. These are important exercises that consolidate the ranks of peace advocates. By taking stock of their small but signicant successes, peace coalitions are able to renew their strength and to rene their role in peace building. An important dimension of peace building is setting up the mechanisms and working for laws and policies that would facilitate further peace building. Through the sustained efforts of peace coalitions, mechanisms that prioritize peace building have been put in place, e.g. the Ofce of the Peace Commissioner, which eventually became the OPAPP , the NUC, negotiating panels, and so on. Peace coalitions have used these various mechanisms in pursuing their peace advocacies. They have invoked previously forged agreements, such as cease-re agreements
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and the CARHRIHL to get the support and cooperation of groups and individuals. Because the issues of peace, human rights, international humanitarian law, cease-res, justice, etc. have been inscribed into public discourse, peace coalitions are now in a better position to lobby for supporting mechanisms or policies that would further enhance the promotion of these issues. Peace coalitions strive to sustain a supportive environment. The existence of sympathetic and inuential policy-makers, the supportive framing of media of peacebuilding initiatives, and the openness of non state actors to pursue peace talks and negotiations are previous gains upon which peace coalitions try to build an even more conducive atmosphere for peace building.
hindering factors
existing organizational weaknesses
In spite of the numerous gains of peace coalitions, many problems and difculties have also come their way over the years. Peace coalitions peace-building efforts have always been hindered by the lack of human and material resources. Peace coalitions generally do not have their own set of full-time personnel. Most peace coalition workers are volunteers, or are loaned-out personnel from the coalitions member organizations. Thus, their stint in the coalition is usually temporary and campaign-bound. They are all-around workers who are usually overworked and, needless to say, underpaid, if at all. Peace coalitions also suffer from a lack of adequate and stable funding. Most of them do not have their own ofce equipment, much less their own ofce. The equipment they use and the ofce space they occupy are usually provided by the member-organization that acts as their secretariat. The looseness of a coalitions inherent organizational setup limits its capability to consolidate organizationally, which is important in sustaining the coalition and its efforts beyond the implementation of major campaigns. Thus, peace coalitions need to devise a way through which they could maintain their exibility and atness as well as the organizational autonomy of its members while being able to exercise a degree of organizational control over its members. Toward this, peace coalitions need to pay more attention to organizational documentation as an important requirement for the organizations critical reection upon its own strengths and weaknesses. For instance, by regularizing their functions as an organization, peace coalitions would nd it necessary to identify success or impact indicators for their efforts as a crucial part of their planning process.
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Peace coalitions still need to continue building their track record and reputation to gain and maintain the condence not only of the principal parties to the conict but also of the broader public. They cannot afford to be perceived as partisan, and should therefore strive harder to reach out to a wider array of individuals or organizations. As noted earlier, because parties to the conict questioned the impartiality of the Coalition for Peace, its calls for a cease-re and return to peace talks were often not reciprocated. In addition, the peace coalitions covered in this study need to nd more ways through which their networking operations and advocacy efforts can extend outside Metro Manila. Peace coalitions need to continuously engage in a process of critical reection within its ranks to be able to collectively raise their peace consciousness, and to be able to forge more unities in relation to peace building.
unsupportive or hostile policy environment

Perhaps one of the most serious challenges to peace building is the strong counter-effort by unsympathetic policy-makers and by the military. In many instances, advocates of the militarist approach have successfully lobbied government administrations to pursue an all-out war policy against the nonstate actors, which led to disastrous consequences for noncombatants in conict-ridden communities. The absence of a clearly peace-friendly policy of government is just as harmful to peace building because, as if by default, it also gives free rein to the militarists to pursue their all-out war strategy. It may be noted that in some instances, the strong militarist (antipeace talks/cease-re) lobby within the Philippine government coincides with the militarist-oriented foreign policy of the US, e.g., during the bases negotiations in the Aquino period and after the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
difculties in engaging state and nonstate actors

Another hindering factor is in the area of governance. Policies and laws that have been crafted at the national level are not immediately or automatically implemented at the local level. Peace coalitions at the local level need to go through another round of taxing campaign and engagement work just to get these policies and laws honored and implemented at the local level. It is also difcult for peace coalitions to condently pursue peace building in areas that are considered to be an NSA stronghold (e.g. CPP-NPA areas, MILF areas). Peace building is still suspected to be a part of counterinsurgency tactics, or a counter-revolutionary track for it supposedly peddles false hopes among the masses of the people and leads them away from the
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path of revolution. This perception necessarily poses serious threats to peace advocates and peace coalition workers, especially those in far-ung areas. This difculty could be lessened if the NSAs, the CPP , for example, commit themselves to the process and become active partners in enhancing conditions for the peaceful settlement of the armed conicts.
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lessons learned from peace coalitions peace building
peace coalitions
on the policy environment
It is important that the states commitment to the peace process be securely institutionalized so that future administrations would be bound to pursue it, instead of leaving the fate of the peace process to the whims of the incumbent president. The absence of an explicitly peace-friendly policy of government gives free rein to the militarists to pursue their all-out war strategy. Thus, peace coalitions should continue campaigning for a military policy that ensures continued demilitarization or the commitment to respect civilian supremacy over the military.
Policy gains at the national level do not automatically trickle down to the local level. There is a need for peace coalitions to specify the mechanisms that must be put in place to ensure the immediate and consistent implementation of peace-related policies and legislation.
The US government has a very strong, if not decisive, inuence on the Philippine government, especially the military leadership. It is remains important for peace coalitions to continue analyzing the Philippines policy environment in the context of a global policy environment, and to locate their peace advocacy or peace agenda within this context.
Corollary to this, as the transnational dimensions of peace issues become more evident, the need to form and strengthen coalitions at the regional (SEA) and global levels becomes more urgent.
The supportive framing of the media of peace-building initiatives is helpful in achieving a supportive policy environment for peace building. Peace coalitions should continue to work with the media in building a more conducive policy environment for the pursuit of peace.
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It is important to continue working with middle class-based individuals and organizations and with inuential policy-makers and politicians in building a favorable opinion for peace advocacies.
on peace issues

Burning peace issues have proven effective in gathering peace advocates toward joint efforts. It is therefore important that peace-coalition builders continue monitoring peace-related trends toward identifying important peace-related issues that require immediate action. Toward this, it may be useful to build the capability of peace coalitions in terms of policy research and database building that would facilitate the identication and analysis of burning peace issues.
The continuing inability to sustain coalitions beyond the life-cycle of an issue-based campaign clearly points out the need for peace coalitions to identify and to act on a more strategic peace agenda. Peace coalitions that unite on the basis of more substantive issues that emanate from the root causes of the conict may provide a longer-lasting sense of mission and direction. Toward this, peace coalitions should study how they can effectively integrate peace issues into persistent sectoral issues, and to lobby existing sectoral formations to adopt this integrated analysis of issues. Corollary to this, peace campaigns must also give high priority to the achievement social and economic reform measures that address the roots of rebellion.
Peace issues range from humanitarian, political, and socioeconomic, to cultural issues, which have community, national, regional, and global dimensions. US unilateralism in the international arena, the agrarian problem, ethnic discrimination, and human-rights violations are some of the persistent issues around which the peace issue is woven in the Philippines. By addressing a broader range of issues, peace coalitions are able to open new paths for peace building. Peace coalitions also need to continue highlighting the transnational dimension of peace issues.
The consistent advocacy of peace coalitions regarding citizen participation in the peace process has yielded important gains for the peace movement in the country and should therefore be pursued further.
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on strategies for civil-society peace building

building the infrastructure for peace activism

Civil-society peace building as part of the process of democratization is necessarily focused on the creation of a constituency for peace. While the success of this effort may be concretely indicated by the existence of a peace vote, this is not the only material indicator of the growth of a constituency for peace. The active participation of commu-nities in peace building at the community level, and their ability to organize themselves into peace-oriented organizations is also an important indicator of the growth and development of a constituency for peace.
The enormity of this challenge makes it imperative for peace coalitions to expand the community of peace advocates and to consciously develop a crop of future peacebuilding leaders. While peace coalitions remain important vehicles to expand the reach and to intensify the impact of peace advocacy and engagement work, sustaining these efforts clearly relies on the ability of peace coalitions to facilitate the emergence of more regularly functioning forms of organizations as an offshoot and as a concrete gain from their campaign and mobilization efforts.
There is growing consensus among peace-coalition leaders that they should come up with appropriate strategies that will facilitate greater involvement of the youth sector in peace building. Toward this, activities that would facilitate the sharing of experiences and ideas between different generations of peace activists or human-rights advocates, and contemporary youth activists need to be pursued. The history and the unnished agenda of the justice and peace movements in the Philippines need to be systematically documented and actively disseminated through various media. Peace coalitions should continue to generate interest in peace research, and should enhance their capability to come up with more popular forms of publications.
The existing infrastructure for peace activism is a product of peace coalitions peace building through the years. This may be credited in part to the efforts of seasoned campaign workers capable of planning and implementing peace coalitions timely and effective campaigns that combine multiple strategies. Still, continued peace building demands from its advocates the continuing development of a set of skills and stock knowledge that can only be honed through years of actual eld experience, as peace building requires both courage and inventiveness among peace activists.
It is important to remember that coalitions build unities, thus divergent positions on issues within and among coalitions should be treated not as a hindrance but as a
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given. It is important for peace coalitions to maintain the diversity and autonomy of its members while striving to achieve tighter unities in addressing a broader set of issues. What must then be developed among peace-coalition builders are the abilities to facilitate the building of consensus, and to institute processes that promote openness and respect for autonomy and diversity among its members.

Peace-coalition workers and leaders need to continue building a culture of peace within their coalitions and among coalitions. They need to continuously engage in a process of critical reection within their ranks to be able to collectively raise their peace con-sciousness, and to be able to forge more unities in relation to peace building. Organizational documentation is an important requirement for the organizations critical reection upon its own strengths and weaknesses.
engaging the state and the NSAs

Peace coalitions should continue engaging the state and the NSAs, without compromising their position as a third-party stakeholder to the conict. They need to attain a certain level of clout, which in turn could only be gained by maintaining a reputation and track record of impartiality. It is important to maintain a critical stance vis--vis the parties in conict, and to carefully choose the forms through which they engage either party. For example, peace coalitions should be more conscious of maintaining a safe distance between them and the initiatives of the state. While it is important for them to cooperate and work with the state as a general principle, it would seem inappropriate to be a direct participant in the states initiatives or to enlist the states active participation in coalition initiatives especially at the ground level.
Peace coalitions engagement work at the national level should continue to focus on calling for the resumption of peace negotiations. Peace coalitions should guard against the tendency to posit cease-res as a precondition to the resumption of peace talks or of peace negotiations. Given peace coalitions different ideological perspectives, effective peace-coalition building requires that the call for the cessation of hostilities be pursued within the framework of respecting human rights and promoting human security.
Peace coalitions need to relentlessly persuade the state, the NSAs, and maybe even established foreign third-party mediators that the concept of a local third-party mediator to the conict as represented by existing networks of peace organizations and peace coalitions is a viable vehicle toward resolving the conict in the country. Foreign third-party mediators should then be lobbied to work more closely with peace organizations and peace coalitions in the country as part of the mediation process.
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protection and promotion of community interests and welfare

Peace coalitions need to give more attention to ground-level engagement and advocacy work. This entails identifying more networks at the ground level through which national-level peace coalitions could channel their assistance.
Humanitarian issues dissolve the barriers to coalition building, and have always been a common ground for action. Humanitarian issues cover a wide array of concerns, which include the delivery of relief and rehabilitation services to war-torn or calamity-stricken communities, provision of medical services to the most vulnerable sectors especially in remote villages, banning the use of weapons that could also victimize noncombatants (landmines, biochemical weapons, etc.), assertion of human rights, and condemnation of human rights violations. Humanitarian missions to conict-ridden communities are dangerous because either party to the conict could easily misconstrue these initiatives as enemy initiatives. Thus, peace coalitions need to be more conscious of maintaining the autonomy and asserting the neutrality of their humanitarian initiatives.
Peace coalitions could also become more involved in ground-level engagement by facilitating the institution of peace building mechanisms at the local level. For example, peace coalitions could facilitate the formation of local rights and welfare councils or justice and peace councils that could become vehicles of local residents in conictridden areas in demanding services from both the state and the NSAs.
An important aspect of this work is the need to continuously safeguard the policy gains from advocacy work. Peace coalitions need to vigilantly ensure that policies, legislation, and agreements that are gained at the national level are implemented and translated into changes in the peace situation at the ground level.
Toward this, it would be helpful if the Waging Peace Conferences or similar venues for exchanges and reections could be replicated at the local levels.
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conclusion
National peace coalitions have emerged as a major player in conict prevention in this country.
Many of them have emerged as the response of a vigilant civil society to the threats of heightened militarism and escalating conict. A relatively small but consolidated network of effective peace activists have spearheaded the formation of national peace coalitions in different periods from 1986 to 2005, and have mounted sustained pressure on the parties-in-conict to seek peace. National peace coalitions have effectively mobilized the expertise and inuence of different individuals and organizations as resources for peace building. Peace advocates from the ranks of religious and academic institutions, sectoral organizations, and conict-affected communities have emerged through the many organizing modes of peace coalitions. Peace coalitions have also mobilized continued support from different sources, both locally and internationally, for their various peace-building activities. Through their persistent advocacy and engagement work, national peace coalitions have helped raise peace awareness and peace consciousness in the country. The process of peace coalition building for instance has become the venue for intensive debates and discussions within the ranks of peace builders not only about peace but also about social transformation. Thus, peace coalitions have helped the different stakeholders of peace building gain a more nuanced understanding of the concept and practice of peace. For example, these debates and discussions have revealed the discontinuity between peace and pacication, have problematized the previously unquestioned relationship between armed struggle and revolution, and have re-dened democratization and development from a peace building perspective. An important outcome of this process is the success of peace coalitions in compelling the parties in conict to institutionalize policies and mechanisms that would promote and protect human rights, and that would compel them to respect and abide by internationally recognized rules and protocols. National peace coalitions remain as a relevant organizational form for peace building. The many modes of organizing that were used by peace coalitions have facilitated the mobilization of new actors in the peace process and have opened up new avenues for peace building. Women, children, indigenous peoples, peasants, and communities have become active participants in peace building through the efforts of peace coalitions, which have facilitated the mobilization
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of resources toward revealing the many hidden dimensions of violence and manifestations of conict in sectoral experiences. They have helped these sectors comprehend their respective issues from a peace building perspective and have provided them with an organizational avenue through which they could insert their agenda into national priorities. Although the road to peace is still marked by detours and dangerous curves, it could be argued that peace coalitions have helped blaze a trail for peace building in this country. Through national peace coalitions, citizens have found a vehicle to become recognized as a major stakeholder and player in the peace process. Through the years, peace coalitions have built themselves as a vehicle for citizens participation in the peace process as a third-party mediator. And, although the capability of civil society peace coalitions to decisively end the conict is inherently limited, their peace building efforts have, to a certain extent, helped undermine the justications for war.
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endnotes
1. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Documentation of Civil-society Experiences in Peace Building: DILGUNDP Decentralization & Local Governance Program: Strengthening Institutional Capacities for Participatory Local Governance (Framework Paper, January 2004), 4-33. 2. Miriam Coronel Ferrer (ed.), Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compendium (Quezon City: UP CIDS and UP Press, 1997), 21-36, 134-138. 3. See, for examples, Rey Casambre Communist Insurgencies: Years of Talks, But No Solution Yet in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacic, April 22, 2005, http://www.conict-prevention.net (accessed on June 6, 2005), and Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Civil-society Institutional Response, Background Paper for the Report 2005 on Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines (Draft only, March 2005). Email attachment to author, June 2005. 4. 5. Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd ed., eds. Edgar F. Borgatta and Rhonda J.V. Montgomery (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2000), s.v. Coalitions (by Theodore Caplow). Christopher G. Pickvance, Democratisation and the Decline of Social Movements: The Effects of Regime Change on Collective Action in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America. Sociology 33, 2 (1999): 354. 6. 7. 8. Terry Mizrahi and Beth B. Rosenthal, Complexities of Coalition Building: Leaders Successes, Strategies, Struggles, and Solutions Social Work 46, 1 (2001): 63-64. Cesar P . Cala, Introduction to Studies in Coalition Experiences in the Philippines, eds. Cesar P. Cala and Jose Z. Grageda (Makati, Metro Manila: Bookmark, 1994), 1-2. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, Introduction to Organizing for Democracy NGOs Civil-society and the Philippine State, eds. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble (Quezon City: ADMU Press, 1998), 11-12. 9. Ferrer, Peace Matters, 8. in Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil-society, and the Philippine State, eds. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 51-58. 11. Alex Brillantes, State-Civil-society Relations in Policy Making Civil-society and the Executive, in Philippine Democracy Agenda Vol. 2 State-Civil-society Relations in policy-Making, eds. Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997), 29-30. 12. Ferrer, Peace Matters, 21, 23. 13. See Cesar P . Cala, Synthesis: A Scan of Themes in Coalition building in Cala and Grageda, 278318; and Karina Constantino-David, Intra-Civil-society Relations An Overview, in Philippine
10. G. Sidney Silliman, The Transnational Relations of Philippine Non-Governmental Organizations,
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Democracy Agenda Vol. 3 Civil-society Making Civil-society, ed. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, 21-50 (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997). 14. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Synthesis Civil-society Making Civil-society, in Philippine Democracy Agenda Vol. 3 Civil-society Making Civil-society, ed. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, 5-6 (Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997). 15. Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution, (Oakland: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979). 16. Satur Ocampo, The Communist Movement in the Philippines, in Media and Peace Reporting Perspectives on Media and Peace Reportage (Pasig City: Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2000), 116-140 . 17. Anna Marie Karaos, The Viability of Social Democracy as a Political Ideology in the Philippines, Kasarinlan, 2 no. 3 (1987): 18. 18. See Constantino-David, 21-50; and Cielito Goo, Peasant Movement State Relations in New Democracies: The Case of the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform in Post-Marcos Philippines, (Quezon City: Institute on Church and Social Issues, 1997). 19. Josephine Dionisio, NGOs in the Web of Power Narratives on Development and Democracy (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 2004), 7-9. 20. See An Alternative Approach to Peace Negotiations and A Reply, Kasarinlan, 2 no. 4 (1987): 66-69. 21. See Robert Francia Garcia, To Suffer Thy Comrades: How the Revolution Decimated Its Own, (Quezon City: Anvil Press, 2001). 22. Nathan Quimpo, Strategic Left Frameworks for Social Change vis--vis Social Movements/Civilsociety and the State Arena (Elections and Governance). Draft Paper presented in A Roundtable Discussion sponsored by the Institute for Popular Democracy on November 5, 2003 at the Sulo Hotel, Quezon City. 23. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, interview by the author on August 17, 2005. 24. Max De Mesa, interview by the author on August 3, 2005. 25. Nick Joaquin, Bobby Taada among the Peaceniks Philippine Graphic, 1 no. 12 (1990): 4-5, 36. and Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., Pointers from a Peacemaker (interview). National Midweek 1 (30), Jl 23, 1986: 4-5. 26. Casambre, ibid. 27. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, The Communist Insurgency and the Peace Process, in Waging Peace in the Philippines Looking Back, Moving Forward, ed. Ed Garcia, Ed Legaspi, Karen Taada 65-73 (Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2003). 28. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Peace Coalitions, Studies in Coalition Experiences in the Philippines, eds. Cesar P. Cala and Jose Z. Grageda (Makati, Metro Manila: Bookmark, 1994). 29. See Hontiveros-Baraquel, ibid.; and Teresita Quintos Deles, Civil-society as Peacemaker, in The Media and Peace Reporting Perspectives on Media and Peace Reportage (Pasig City: Ofce of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, 2000), 209-212.
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30. Interview with Hon. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel last July 29, 2005 from 9:30am to 10:30am in her ofce at the House of Representatives in Batasan, Quezon City. 31. Karen Taada, Retrospective and Update, in Waging Peace in the Philippines Looking Back Moving Forward, eds. Ed Garcia, Ed Legaspi, and Karen Taada (Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2003), 7. 32 . Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS), The Philippines (1986-98)Narrative, http:// www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cis/cews/database/Philippines/philippines.pdf (accessed on June 6, 2005). 33. Ferrer, Civil-society Institutional Response. Draft Only, 21. 34. Sources: Hontiveros-Baraquel, Peace Coalitions, ibid.; Ferrer (ed.), Peace Matters, 14-36, 134138; Conict Early Warning System (CEWS), ibid.; Ferrer, Framework Paper, January 2004, 4-33; Ferrer, Civil-society Institutional Response, ibid.; and Casambre, ibid. 35. See list of sources for Table 7. 36. Sources: Hontiveros-Baraquel, Peace Coalitions, 226-248; Ferrer, Peace Matters, 14-36, 134-138; Conict Early Warning System (CEWS), ibid.; Ferrer, Framework Paper, 4-33; Ferrer, Civil-society Institutional Response, ibid.; and Casambre, ibid. 37. Karen Taada, Retrospective and Update, ibid. 38. Executive Committee of the Central Committee Communist Party of the Philippines, Memorandum-Circular on the Peace Negotiations, Kasarinlan, 8 no. 2 (1992): 65-69. 39. Interview with Max De Mesa last August 3, 2005 from 4pm up to 5pm at the Waiting Area of the Cardio-Rehab Center of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Quezon City. 40. Sources: Soliman Santos, Jr., Peace Advocate: 50 Selected Writings 1986-1997 (Manila: De La Salle University Press Inc., 2002), 44-67, 71-97, 143-172; Ed Garcia, Reections on the Peace process Occasional Papers Series No. 94-1 (Quezon City: UP-CIDS Program on Peace Conict Resolution and Human Rights and UP Press, 1994); National Peace Conference, National Peace Conference, Conference report Vol. 1 (Makati: Metro Manila, 1990); National Peace Conference, Basic Peace: Peace Agenda of Four Sectors (draft edition) (Quezon City: Gaston Ortigas Peace Institute, 1993); Coalition for Peace Organizational Charter 1993; Coalition for Peace Organizational Prole; Peoples Caucus brochure; Peace Studies Institute, Tabulated data re organizational prole of Peoples Caucus and Peoples Congress; Gathering for Peace, The Gathering for Peace Declaration of Unity Against U.S. Military Intervention in the Philippines (February 2002); Casambre, ibid.; Conict Early Warning System, ibid.; Ferrer, Framework Paper, 16-39; Nick Joaquin, Bobby Taada among the Peaceniks, Philippine Graphic, 1 no. 12 (1990): 4-5, 36; and Ed Garcia and Carol Hernancez, eds., Waging Peace in the Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for social Policy and Public affairs, UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, International Alert and Coalition for Peace, 1989), 113-231. 41. Steven Rood, Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil-society Policy Studies, no. 17 (2005) East-West Center Washington: 2-4. 42. Maria Serena I. Diokno, Consensus Building for an Epoch of Peace: The National Unication Consultation Process (nal report, April 2000), 3-14. 43. Additional sources for this table include the following: Ferrer, Philippines National Unication
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Commission: National Consultation and the Six Paths to Peace, http://www.c-r.org/accord/ peace/accord13/phi.shtml (accessed June 6, 2005); Diokno, ibid., 3-14; NUC Secretariat, The National Unication Commission Peace Process (November 1992); Carolyn O. Arguillas, Enlarging Spaces and Strengthening Voices for Peace: Civil-society initiatives in Mindanao. Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, The Mindanao Peace Process: A Supplement to Compromising an Autonomy Issue Update Issue 6 (2003): 12-16; Mary Ann Arnado, Shadowing the GRP-MILF Peace Talks Facilitating, Strengthening, Consolidating Grassroots, in Waging Peace in the Philippines and Asia, ed. Edmundo Garcia, Edgardo Legaspi, Alfredo Lubang, and Rebecca Taada (Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2005), 92-97; Soliman Santos Jr., A New Peace Movement in the Philippines?, in Waging Peace in the Philippines and Asia, ed. Edmundo Garcia, Edgardo Legaspi, Alfredo Lubang, and Rebecca Taada (Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2005), 27-35; Taada, Retrospective and Update, ibid.; and Steven Rood, ibid.
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bibliography
books Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, ed. Peace Matters: A Philippine Peace Compendium. Quezon City: UP CIDS and UP Press, 1997. Garcia, Ed. Reections on the Peace Process, Occasional Papers Series No. 94-1. Quezon City: UP-CIDS Program on Peace Conict Resolution and Human Rights and UP Press, 1994. Garcia, Ed and Carolina Hernandez, eds. Waging Peace in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, International Alert and Coalition for Peace, 1989. Garcia, Ed; Ed Legaspi; and Karen Taada, eds. Waging Peace in the Philippines Looking Back Moving Forward, Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2003. Santos, Soliman Jr. Peace Advocate: 50 Selected Writings 1986-1997. Manila: De La Salle University Press Inc., 2002. Garcia, Robert Francis. To Suffer Thy Comrades: How the Revolution Decimated Its Own. Quezon City: Anvil Press, 2001. Silliman, Sidney and Lela Garner Noble. Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil-society and the Philippine State. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998.
introduction of a book Cala, Cesar P . Introduction to Studies in Coalition Experiences in the Philippines, by Cesar P. Cala and Jose Z. Grageda. Makati, Metro Manila: Bookmark, 1994.
chapter in a book Arnado, Mary Ann. Shadowing the GRP-MILF Peace Talks Facilitating, Strengthening, Consolidating Grassroots. In Waging Peace in the Philippines and Asia, edited by Edmundo Garcia, Edgardo Legaspi, Alfredo Lubang, and Rebecca Taada. Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2005, pp. 92-97. Brillantes, Alex. State-Civil-society Relations in Policy Making Civil-society and the Executive. In Philippine Democracy Agenda Vol. 2 State-Civil-society Relations in Policy-Making, edited by Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997, pp. 21-32. Constantino-David, Karina. Intra-Civil-society Relations: An Overview. In Philippine Democracy Agenda Vol. 3 Civil-society Making Civil-society, edited by Miriam Coronel Ferrer. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center, 1997, pp. 21-50.
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Hontiveros-Baraquel, Risa. Peace Coalitions. In Studies in Coalition Experiences in the Philippines, edited by Cesar P. Cala and Jose Z. Grageda. Makati: Metro Manila: Bookmark, 1994, pp. 226250. Santos, Soliman Jr. A New Peace Movement in the Philippines? In Waging Peace in the Philippines and Asia, edited by Edmundo Garcia, Edgardo Legaspi, Alfredo Lubang, and Rebecca Taada. Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2005, pp. 27-35. Silliman, Sidney. The Transnational Relations of Philippine Non-Governmental Organizations. In Organizing for Democracy: NGOs, Civil-society, and the Philippine State, edited by Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1998, pp. 49-74. Taada, Karen. Retrospective and Update. In Waging Peace in the Philippines Looking Back Moving Forward, edited by Ed Garcia, Ed Legaspi, and Karen Taada. Quezon City: Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2003.
journal article Arguillas, Carolyn O. Enlarging Spaces and Strengthening Voices for Peace: Civil-society initiatives in Mindanao. Accord, The Mindanao Peace Process: A Supplement to Compromising an Autonomy issue Update Issue 6 (2003): 12-16. Karaos, Anna Marie, The Viability of Social Democracy as a Political Ideology in the Philippines, Kasarinlan, 2 no. 3 (1987): 18. Kasarinlan, 2 no. 4 (1987): 66-69. Joaquin, Nick. Bobby Taada among the Peaceniks, Philippine Graphic, 1 no. 12 (1990): 4-5, 36. Mizrahi, Terry and Beth B. Rosenthal, Complexities of Coalition Building: Leaders Successes, Strategies, Struggles, and Solutions. Social Work 46, 1 (2001): 63-64. Pickvance, Christopher G. Democratisation and the Decline of Social Movements: The Effects of Regime Change on Collective Action in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and Latin America. Sociology 33, 2 (1999): 354. Pimentel, Benjamin Jr. Pointers from a Peacemaker (interview). National Midweek 1 (30), Jl 23, 1986: 4-5. 17 (2005).
Rood, Steven. Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil-society Policy Studies, no.
thesis Dionisio, Josephine, NGOs in the Web of Power Narratives on Development and Democracy (M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 2004), 7-9.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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internet article Rey Casambre. Communist Insurgencies: Years of Talks, But No Solution Yet in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacic, http://www.conict-prevention.net, accessed 6 June 2005. Conict Early Warning System (CEWS). The Philippines (1986-98) Narrative, http://www.usc.edu/ dept/LAS/ir/cis/cews/database/Philippines/philippines.pdf, accessed 6 June 2005. Ferrer, Miriam Coronel. Philippines National Unication Commission: National Consultation and the Six Paths to Peace, http://www.c-r.org/accord/peace/accord13/phi.shtml, accessed 6 June 2005. others Coalition for Peace Organizational Charter 1993 Coalition for Peace Organizational Prole Diokno, Maria Serena I. Consensus Building for an Epoch of Peace: The National Unication Consultation Process, Final Report, April 2000. Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, Civil-society Institutional Response, Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines, Draft Paper, March 2005. Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, Documentation of Civil-society Experiences in Peace Building: DILG-UNDP Decentralization & Local Governance Program: Strengthening Institutional Capacities for Participatory Local Governance, Framework Paper, January 2004. Gathering for Peace. The Gathering for Peace Declaration of Unity Against U.S. Military Intervention in the Philippines (February 2002). National Peace Conference. Basic Peace: Peace Agenda of Four Sectors (draft edition). Quezon City: Gaston Ortigas Peace Institute, 1993. National Peace Conference. National Peace Conference, Conference Report Vol. 1 (Makati: Metro Manila, 1990). NUC Secretariat. The National Unication Commission Peace Process (November 1992). Peoples Caucus brochure Peace Studies Institute, Tabulated data re organizational prole of Peoples Caucus and Peoples Congress Quimpo, Nathan. Strategic Left Frameworks for Social Change vis--vis Social Movements/Civilsociety and the State Arena (Elections and Governance). Draft Paper presented in A Roundtable Discussion sponsored by the Institute for Popular Democracy on November 5, 2003.
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toolkit peace coalition work
introduction
This Toolkit on National Peace Coalitions was based mainly on Volume 2 National Peace Coalitions of the Learning Experiences Study on Civil-Society Peace Building in the Philippines. The study presented an overview of the lessons learned from peace-building initiatives of civil society peace coalitions at the national level from 1986-2005. Concepts, themes, and strategies related to peace building and conict transformation initiatives of national peace coalitions are summarized in this toolkit, and incorporated into selected tools and learning exercises that may be eventually custom-designed into training modules. The general objective of this toolkit on national peace coalitions is to contribute to capacity building of civil society peace advocates. This toolkit is primarily intended for peace advocates within civil society organizations, especially NGOs and POs, academic institutions, and civic and religious organizations who intend to build their peace-building capacity through coalitions. But it may also serve as a useful guide for peace workers within government units and supranational agencies who deal with or who intend to forge partnerships with national peace coalitions in the Philippines. This toolkit provides a framework for examining current peace initiatives and in establishing improved peace building and conict transformation programs and activities of both MetroManila based national as well as local coalitions in the country in the future. It is divided into three major parts. The rst part discusses the different phases of peace coalition building and incorporates a set of tools on how to set up, sustain, and transform a peace coalition. The second part of the toolkit explores the different areas of peace coalition work and presents tools that may be useful in building the infrastructure for peace, in engagement work, and in community-level peace work. The last part of the toolkit describes the core competencies that an effective coalition worker should possess and provides a few tools that may be useful in effective coalition building.
Notes:
The outline of this toolkit is based, in part, on an earlier version prepared by Dr. Zosimo Lee. The author developed this toolkit with the able assistance of Salvador H. Feranil.
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part 1: phases of peace coalition building
phase one: how to set up a peace coalition

dening a possible common ground for action
Many civil society organizations may be organized and mobilized to form peace coalitions. But their divergent positions on many peace-related issues have become a stumbling block to coalition building. Experiences have shown, however, that it is possible to transcend these divisions. For example, existing national peace coalitions were able to transcend their differences when ofcial policy obviously turned towards all-out war. In setting up peace coalitions it is therefore crucial for peace coalition builders to choose peace issues that would weave together their separate and varied activities towards coordinated actions. Peace coalition builders need to monitor issues and to dene possible common ground upon which a coalition could be built. For example, issues pertaining to human rights and human security have been able to link up many different social actors and their organizations. Peace issues concern everyone. But sometimes what hinders certain organizations to join a peace coalition is their need to prioritize the use of their meager resources. Peace work is often considered as a separate issue that requires the allocation of separate resources. Peace coalition builders could help overcome this hindrance through skillful framing of peace issues. This would enable them to persuade different organizations to appreciate how peace issues could be
key elements
Defining
a Possible Common Ground for Action Identifying Potential Partners Convening the First Meeting and Formulating the Coalitions VMG Setting up the Coalitions Machinery and Initial Planning Activities
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woven into their own advocacies. Thus, an important task in the process of dening a possible common ground for action is the identication of all the stakeholders of a particular issue and identifying who among them are probable coalition partners. A range of issues that provide common ground for joint action is available for peace coalition builders. For example, in many areas, unities have been built around the following peacerelated issues:

ceasere and the resumption of peace talks or negotiations observance of international humanitarian law peoples participation in peace-building activities and processes condemning militarist solutions to conict addressing persistent problems of inequality and social justice.
identifying potential partners

The next step is to identify possible partners in addressing the chosen issue. Since coalitions aim for broadness, it is crucial to ensure that a diversity of organizations is brought into the coalition. Peace coalitions in particular should strive to be as open as possible to the participation of individuals and organizations from various political formations or ideological persuasions. To avoid the tendency of limiting the membership of the coalition to the usual partners, peace coalition builders need to consciously tap new and non-traditional partners, whose missions and interests may overlap with the identied peace issue. Peace coalitions are expected to create peace networks where there is none. Towards this, peace coalition builders should keep track of existing organizations. Contacts with these organizations should be established whenever possible to be able to build a prole of their missions and goals, which would eventually serve as basis for future dealings with the organization. Experiences have shown that the founding members of peace coalitions are usually prominent personalities and organizations that come mainly from the academe, religious institutions, political formations, and NGOs. Member-organizations from the other sectoral or geographical groupings are eventually drawn into the coalition as part of its network expansion efforts.
convening the rst meeting and formulating the coalitions VMG

The rst meeting may take the form of conferences, workshops, or consultations. A group of advocates usually come together to convene these meetings. Agreement on the course of action of the coalition after the rst meeting should be clearly spelled out during the meeting and properly documented.
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The successful conduct of the coalitions rst meeting is crucial in ensuring that the broadest possible unity is achieved on the most number of issues. Ideally, the coalition would be able to dene their Vision-Mission-Goals (VMG) as a peace coalition during the rst meeting. Conveners should expect a lot of discussion and struggle of ideas during the rst meeting. They should also be able to competently manage conict towards the forging of consensus in the midst of differing interests and points of view.
setting up the coalitions machinery and planning the coalitions initial activities
A core institution is usually designated to function as the secretariat of the peace coalition once it is formed, because coalitions do not have their own human, nancial, and other logistical resources that would allow them to function as a regular organization. An important task of the secretariat is to have an inventory of the resources that may be tapped by the coalition from its members, such as individuals who can commit their time and energy for varied activities like public speaking, campaigns, negotiations, or even skills training. Based on available resources, the secretariat can start implementing the achievable steps dened by the coalition during its rst meeting. The secretariat should ensure the involvement of member-organizations in the coalitions myriad activities. This is crucial in sustaining the coalitions strength and momentum. Towards this, the secretariat needs to facilitate the setting up of an effective communication system between the secretariat and the members and among the members of the coalition.
phase two: how to sustain a peace coalition

dening a strategic plan and peace agenda building
The key to sustaining coalitions beyond the lifecycle of an issue-based campaign is by building consensus within the coalition to act on a more strategic peace agenda. A more strategic peace agenda that emanates from the root causes of the conict may provide a longer-lasting sense of mission and direction to peace coalitions. Towards this, peace coalitions should be encouraged to map out a more strategic plan of action.
key elements
Defining
a Strategic Plan Inclusive and Participatory Organization Structure and Systems Continuous Expansion and Consolidation of Membership
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inclusive and participatory organization structure and systems

Coalitions are complex organizations built on the basis of trust and cooperation. They are expected to respect and to ensure the organizational autonomy of their members, to use consensus-building in analyzing and formulating positions on issues, and to exercise reexivity at all times. In the experience of national peace coalitions, subscribing to these organizational principles entails the patient and skillful handling of conict and dissent. Still, it is important for peace coalitions to nurture conict and dissent within their ranks towards productive and peaceful ends because such a practice is at the heart of their task, which is to build the infrastructure for peace activism. Thus, peace coalitions are also expected to encourage variation, decentralization of operations, and interaction within their ranks. Peace coalitions need to practice the principles of inclusiveness and participation in designing the structure and in dening the systems of their coalition. Since a coalition is a gathering of equal partners, it necessarily has a relatively non-hierarchical organizational structure, and a more process-conscious decision-making practice. A mechanism should be adopted to ensure that all member-organizations are given the chance to share decision-making powers and responsibilities. Conveners should provide multiple channels through which member-organizations may actively participate in all areas of the coalitions work, such as the holding of regular consultation meetings, initiating dialogues by phone or e-mail, and so on.
continuous expansion and consolidation of membership

It is important to repeat here that the community of peace advocates and peace activists in the Philippines is still a relatively small community. Although peace coalitions, in many ways, have facilitated the emergence of other peace organizations even at the local level, they are still faced with the urgent task of expanding the community of peace advocates and peace activists in Metro-Manila and in conict-ridden areas, and consolidating them into a network of effective actors for peace building. One organizational goal that peace coalitions need to be more explicit about is the task of facilitating the formation of primary peace organizations especially among the youth, who could, hopefully, craft effective and sustainable ways of peace building. There are many ways of consolidating the coalitions membership. One way is by ensuring that individual representatives to coalition meetings are able to share back to their home-organizations, the decisions that were forged within the coalition. This would keep the coalitions stakeholders interested and involved, and would therefore prevent uctuations in their participation in coalition activities.
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Another way is by involving them in reection sessions wherein the coalitions efforts and achievements are assessed. Through these sessions, member-organizations are given the chance to look at their own contributions to the coalitions successes or shortcomings; hopefully, this would help them to further clarify their role in the coalitions future plans.
phase three: how to transform a peace coalition

Just like many other organizations, coalitions grow and develop. Growth and development may be in the form of membership or territorial expansion. It could also be in the form of changes in their stated mission and goals. Coalitions, as a specic form of organization, are inherently temporary. They may, in fact, be viewed as organizations in transition. A coalition could evolve from being an issue-based coalition into a coalition that is based on a more strategic agenda. It could also be transformed from being a loose network of organizations into a more structured primary organization with its own set of Vision-Mission-Goals (VMG). In many cases, coalitions simply cease to exist to give way to the formation of another coalition. A host of factors account for the direction of organizational change. What is important to note however is that the nature and direction of organizational change can be directed. Thus, it becomes an important task for coalition builders to enable the coalitions stakeholders to participate in processes where the nature and direction of the coalitions organizational change are dened. Given the still limited number of peace activists, peace coalition work may become too focused on campaign work. But by consciously mapping out strategies towards establishing a more solid or more regularly functioning network for peace, coalitions would be able to more closely monitor and effectively direct the coalitions organizational growth and development.
key elements
Forging
Higher Levels of Unity Institutionalization of Functions Setting-up a New Peace Organization or a New Peace Coalition
forging higher levels of unity

While it is always easier to form coalitions based on a single issue (unity based on grievances), coalitions should work towards forging higher levels of unity (unity based on common aspirations) that would enable them to address more complex issues and to engage in joint

actions in a longer period of time. Organizational documentation and critical reection are important requirements toward evolving or transforming peace coalitions into more regular forms of organizations or into coalitions that are based on a more strategic agenda. A regular review of the coalitions mission and goals vis--vis the peace situation would enable coalition members to see other peace-building challenges that could be more effectively addressed if the coalition is able to forge higher levels of unity, and to get greater commitment from coalition members.
institutionalization of functions
Coalitions could be transformed into more regularly functioning primary organizations by creating a more stable organizational structure, which institutionalizes the functions that are performed by the secretariat and other coalition members on a daily basis. The roles and functions of individuals and of committees, and a system of operating procedures need to be dened through consensus and through the documentation of daily activities. This move towards institutionalization requires a more stable supply or source of human, nancial and other logistical resources. Thus, appropriate measures should be done along this line shortly after the formation of the coalition. It is important to keep in mind, though, that institutionalization should not lessen the structures exibility, accountability and transparency. The regular functioning of any organization depends in part on its ability to secure and mobilize resources. Resources should not necessarily be limited to nances or to funding from external sources. Resources also refer to infrastructural and human resources that the coalition could use. It is important to take stock of existing resources that the coalition may mobilize.
setting-up a new peace organization or a new peace coalition

Sustaining peace-building efforts clearly relies on the ability of peace coalitions to facilitate the emergence of more regularly functioning forms of organizations as an offshoot and as a concrete gain from their campaign and mobilization efforts. Peace coalitions need to give birth to new peace organizations or to more peace coalitions toward building a sustainable infrastructure for peace activism. National peace coalitions in the Philippines have done this in many different ways. For example, the Coalition for Peace has facilitated the formation of autonomous regional formations, and the Sulong CARHRIHLs approach to organizing is to facilitate distinct local peace organizations. Prominent individuals and organizations contribution to peace building is the specic
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knowledge and experience that they bring into peace coalition work. For example, a simplistic presentation of these contributions would show that from the church, peace coalitions learn the basics of mediation and access to a nationwide network, from public intellectuals they gain sharper analyses of issues and access to spaces for reection, from political gures they get tips on diplomacy and brinkmanship and access to an inside track to the parties in conict, and from NGOs and POs they gain a foothold on issues that affect the different sectors of society and access to a much wider constituency. Still, it is in the existence of a peace coalition or a peace organization, where the net-effect of the combined strength of all these competencies are crystallized and become one of the most crucial facilitating factors in peace building.
part 2: areas of work of peace coalitions
area one: building the infrastructure for peace activism

key elements
Peace
The goal of this area of work is to build a broad network of effective activist peace organizations, which will advance and sustain the process of peace building and conict transformation in the country. Building the infrastructure for peace activism encompasses interrelated activities along the lines of peace
Advocacy Organizing for Peace Activism Peace Research and Training
advocacy, peace organizing, and peace research and training.
peace advocacy
Peace advocacy work is conducted in two, separate but interrelated and complementary, elds. One eld for peace advocacy is the general public. In this eld, advocacy work is directed towards the public at large. Its objective is to create a public opinion that supports peace-building initiatives. The other eld for peace advocacy is the arena of policy-making. In this eld, advocacy work is directed towards policy-makers within the structure of the state, and the armed non-state actors through their leaders and allied organizations. In this study, the latter eld of policy advocacy is discussed in another area of peace building, which is engagement work. Public advocacy work of peace coalitions is done continuously and usually becomes more intense when it is part of an issue-focused campaign (e.g. campaign for the resumption of peace talks, campaign for the declaration of cease-res, campaign for the implementation of peace-related agreements, etc.). The broad public support for a specic peace-related demand or policy proposal that is generated through public advocacy is used to pressure government to act favorably on the coalitions demands or proposals.
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Public advocacy of peace coalitions in Metro-Manila is conducted either through sweeping modes or through more organized channels. Public advocacy through more sweeping modes includes issuing public statements, paid advertisements, mass demonstrations, and other activities that maximize the expansive reach of mass media in connecting with the public at large. Peace coalitions have conducted public advocacy work through print and broadcast media (e.g. radio interviews, TV talk shows, press releases, paid advertisements). While the public advocacy campaigns of peace coalitions are not simply media events, peace coalitions have experimented on novel forms of collective actions (e.g. Tent City, Welgang Bayan, Walk for Peace) that may catch medias attention. They have also consciously enlisted the participation of media practitioners in many peace-building activities (e.g. Bantay Ceasere team, fact-nding missions, conferences) in an effort to inuence the way media interpret for the public the peace-building efforts of peace coalitions. Clearly, peace coalitions recognize the capacity of media to extend the reach of peace coalitions advocacy work and to inuence the publics perception of peace building in general. More recently, they have also explored the potentials of the Internet in further expanding the reach of their public advocacy, and in enhancing the speed of transmitting information regarding peace-building activities. Gathering for Peace and Pilgrims for Peace, for instance, have made their public statements and other announcements available online. They either maintain their own websites or link their webpages with websites that are maintained by supportive organizations. The peace coalitions formed more recently also maintain their own egroups and discussion lists. Clearly, the efforts of peace coalitions in establishing institutional linkages have transcended the limitations of physical space by tapping into cyberspace using new communications technology. Public advocacy through organized channels includes holding conferences, forums or consultations, signature campaigns, mass demonstrations, and other activities that maximize the coalitions member organizations structure and network as avenues for reaching the broader public. The activities conducted through this mode of public advocacy become venues for discussing the issues at hand and for clarifying the corresponding position of the coalition regarding these issues. These help ensure a certain level of uniformity in the content of public advocacy that lters through the web of organizational networks within and beyond the coalition. Peace coalitions should view the general public not as a passive receiver of information but rather as composed of reasoning agents who process information before deciding to lend themselves to actual mobilizations. Thus, peace coalitions could measure the effectiveness of their public advocacy work in terms of actual mobilization for activities such as signature campaigns, rallies, marches, etc., and in terms of actual shifts in state action in favor of the coalitions demand or policy proposal. But as a whole, public advocacy work is done not simply
toolkit
PART 2: AREAS OF WORK OF PEACE COALITIONS
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to mobilize warm bodies. It is done as part of the process of building a peace constituency by raising the peace consciousness of the public. The value of national peace coalitions advocacy work has been in bringing peace issues, including community-specic peace issues, to the attention of national government and other centers of political power, and to the consciousness of the broader public.
dening the content of advocacy

Lately, prominence is given by peace advocates and by UN agencies to the human security framework, which incorporates issues of human rights. Prominence is also given to the concept of conict transformation, which highlights the role of civil society peace-builders in compelling duty-bearers to address the root causes of armed conict. Some of the themes on which national peace coalitions in the Philippines have focused their advocacy are: 1. Cessation of Hostilities This specic advocacy includes a range of possible calls to action, such as the suspension of military operations (SOMO), the declaration of cease-res, and the installation of mechanisms for the prevention of hostilities. This advocacy has always been a contentious issue not only between the parties in conict (given their respective tactical considerations) but also among the different coalitions (given their respective ideological persuasions). Effective peace coalitionbuilding requires that the call for the cessation of hostilities is best pursued within the framework of respecting human rights and promoting human security. Peace coalitions should guard against the tendency to posit cease-res as a pre-condition to the resumption of peace talks or of peace negotiations. 2. Peace Process Advocacies that focus on facilitating the peace process have been more effective in forging coalitions across ideological persuasions, compared to the advocacy towards the cessation of hostilities. Peace process refers to a range of activities involving the parties in conict, including peace negotiations leading to a political settlement of the conict. It is important for peace coalitions to sustain their advocacy for continued peace talks even if negotiations towards political settlement may not yet be achievable. 3. Humanitarian Issues Humanitarian issues dissolve the ideological and political barriers to coalition
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building, and have always been a common ground for action for most civil society groups. Humanitarian issues cover a wide array of concerns, which include delivery of relief and rehabilitation services to war-torn or to calamity-stricken communities, provision of medical services to the most vulnerable sectors especially in remote villages, banning or restricting the use of weapons that could also victimize non-combatants (landmines, etc.), assertion of human rights, and condemnation of human rights violations. Either party to the conict could misconstrue humanitarian missions in conictridden communities as enemy initiatives. Peace coalitions need to be more conscious of maintaining the autonomy and asserting the neutrality of their humanitarian initiatives. 4. Citizens Participation National peace coalitions have always projected themselves as vehicles for citizens participation in the peace process. Experience has shown that it is important for peace coalitions to problematize the term citizen to give way to more inclusive practices. National peace coalitions need to consciously evoke advocacies from the ground, and to ensure the inclusion of marginalized sectors (e.g. women, children, indigenous peoples, etc.) in the peace process. Peace coalitions also need to problematize the term participation to be able to identify the mechanisms for effective citizens participation. Mechanisms for participation should ensure the autonomy of activist peace organizations. 5. Peace Agreements Peace coalitions have effectively ushered the forging of peace agreements and the crafting of peace-related policies and legislation. Aside from working for more agreements, policies and legislations, peace coalitions also need to act upon their continued implementation, including the conduct of education campaigns regarding these agreements, policies and legislation. 6. Development and Governance Issues Peace building and conict transformation entail acting on a more comprehensive and strategic agenda. Peace coalitions are thus compelled to identify social and economic reform measures that address the roots of conict, and to effectively integrate peace issues into persistent sectoral issues, such as the agrarian problem, sexual and ethnic discrimination, and US unilateralism in the international arena. Peace coalitions also need to identify political reform measures that would institutionalize the states
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commitment to the peace process, and that would ensure continued demilitarization or the commitment to respect civilian supremacy over the military.
identifying the many publics of advocacy

1. Local, national, and global Policy gains at the national level do not automatically trickle down to the local level and local advocacies do not automatically become amplied at the national level. Thus, advocacy campaigns at the local level become an important task for peace coalitions. As the transnational dimensions of peace issues become more evident, the need for peace coalitions to form and strengthen their network at the regional (SEA) and global levels also become important. 2. Institutional The church, the academe, and the media are both audiences and channels for peace advocacy. The effective reach, the stock of knowledge and skills, and the inuence and prestige of these institutions are important resources for peace building and conict transformation. Peace coalitions need to consciously address them in their advocacy and to persuade them to leverage their resources in favor of peace building and conict transformation. 3. Sectoral While it is important to continue working with the middle forces and with inuential policy-makers and politicians in building a favorable opinion for peace advocacies, it is equally important to lobby existing and emerging formations from the basic sectors to adopt a peace-centered analysis of their sectoral issues.
organizing for peace activism

Peace coalitions generally describe themselves as a loose network of advocates. They do not wield direct leadership over their constituents, as member organizations are not strictly bound by a clear set of organizational rules. It is therefore difcult to approximate a peace coalitions actual organizational spread or strength, but its cohesiveness as an organization may be indicated by the support provided by its member organizations to the coalition s activities. Since a coalition is a gathering of equal partners, it follows a relatively non-hierarchical organizational structure, and more process-conscious decision-making practice. The core
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decision-makers of the coalition are referred to as conveners rather than as leaders to connote their facilitative role in the organization. For instance, peace coalitions are set up as an offshoot of a series of consultative meetings, conferences, and other similar forums where like-minded peace advocates gather to discuss what is deemed to be an urgent peace-related issue. Organizing work is a key task in building the infrastructure for peace activism because it provides the emerging peace constituency with channels through which they could participate in peace-building practices.
issue-based organizing
The loose organizational structure of coalitions allows for exibility in terms of operations, and also allows member organizations to retain a high degree of independence and autonomy organizationally and politically. This looseness however may partly explain why coalitions are mostly issue-based, and tend to become inactive when there are no burning issues. This looseness, or the lack of organizational mechanisms, also makes it difcult to work out common principles on which the coalition would operate. It also makes it difcult for the coalition to come up with a common stand on social issues that place peace issues in a more strategic framework. Thus, the urry of activities of these coalitions seems to come in bursts, as issue-based campaigns zoom into full swing. In between these bursts are periods of seeming inactivity, until another burning issue emerges. Peace coalitions may thus be considered as issue-based coalitions, which become most active when an issue needs to be addressed. Peace coalitions usually become the campaign center for peace building. They provide important resources for campaigns such as statements and other types of published materials, a pool of speakers and negotiators, skills training for campaign workers, among others. It is therefore important to further enhance this capability of peace coalitions. But issue-based organizing remains important fo r peace coalitions because it opens up possible grounds for common action, and facilitates reaching out to new actors. It is important to continuously monitor issues that may be translated into opportunities for coalition building. Effective coalition building is manifested in the achievement of the broadest possible consensus around a distinct set of issues or a specic agenda. Peace coalitions usually start as issue-focused coalitions. Even though issue-based coalitions are harder to sustain when the issue has died down, they are easier to convene and to mobilize because issue-based coalitions usually require only a minimum basis for unity. Issue-based coalitions also allow for the tapping of non-traditional groups. Coalitions that focus on more strategic agenda tend to be harder to build because these require a higher level of unity and commitment to a broader range of issues and concerns. Still, building strategic coalitions is the key to sustaining a vibrant peace movement.
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community-focused organizing
National peace coalitions need to realize that their role is to serve as facilitators of community-based peace-building initiatives. Towards this, national peace coalitions need to consciously ensure that they are not imposing their leadership and agenda into community-based formations. National peace coalitions need to nd ways through which local issues are brought to national attention without necessarily forming a national level organizational formation based on these issues.
sector-based organizing
The role of coalitions in organizing work is to build networks by tapping both traditional and non-traditional partners into peace building. Coalition building jumpstarts the slow and tedious process of direct organizing, and helps sustain direct organizing work. Coalition building may start from identifying contacts, forging partnerships with existing institutions/organizations or prominent personalities, and assisting in direct organizing towards sustained community-level and sector-based peace-building initiatives. Organizing by sector requires that peace coalition builders acquaint themselves with sectoral issues. It also entails rening the concept of peace to be able to frame sectoral issues as peace issues. When done effectively, sector-based organizing may lead to broader and more strategic unities.
peace research and training

The research agenda and training program of national-level peace coalitions could focus on the following themes:
imagining a history for generations of peace activists

Social movements could also be considered as imagined communities. They are built and sustained, in part, on the basis of the ownership and degree of emotional attachment of their constituents to the movements goals, identity, and history. Building a constituency for peace therefore necessitates the creation of narratives about the peace movement. Narratives about the peace movement may be woven from the systematic documentation (and dissemination through various media) of the history and unnished agenda of the justice and peace movements in the Philippines, and the sharing of experiences and ideas between different generations of peace activists or human rights advocates, and contemporary youth activists.
searching for alternatives

National peace coalitions are in the best position to coordinate efforts at documenting emerging peace-building practices emanating from the communities, and to disseminate these through popular forms of publications. Some of the research topics that were suggested in the 2004 Waging Peace Conference are: national peace policy, grassroots peace alternatives, effective cease-re mechanisms, and concrete options for Mindanao. Researches on new practices towards institutional reform become highly relevant especially in light of recent research ndings, which show that civil society organizations political reform advocacies have focused on statutory or constitutional reform measures.
building capacities
Peace coalitions should facilitate the development of training programs that would enable peace advocates to continue developing their set of skills and stock knowledge. Engagement work, for instance, requires peace-coalition builders to hone their skills in providing technical support, such as in the crafting of proposed legislations, or in the preparation of policy briefs, and skills in facilitation that are crucial in conducting dialogues, exploratory talks, negotiations, and other similar processes. Peace coalitions should also actively conduct gender and culture sensitivity trainings and/or skills training on consensus building and mediation for existing and potential peace coalition builders, especially at the community level. Training modules that would help people to develop qualities such as patience, empathy, trust, tolerance, and being non-judgmental should be designed and conducted by peace coalitions.
area two: engaging the state and the armed groups

Engagement is directed not only at the state but also at the non-state armed groups. But an important dimension of engagement is policy advocacy that is directly addressed to policy-makers from the state structure. The main objective of policy advocacy of peace coalitions is to facilitate the creation of structures and a policy environment that are more conducive for peace building. Lately, peace coalitions have focused their policy advocacy on creating structures and legislations that would safeguard peace-related gains. They argue that
two tracks of engagement

Subtantive Peace
Reforms Process Crafting and Implementation of Negotiated Agreements

the states commitment to the peace process should be securely institutionalized so that future administrations would be bound to pursue it, instead of leaving the fate of the peace process to the whims of the sitting President. In the experience of national peace coalitions, the specic objectives of policy advocacy may range from trying to effect a change in policy, to asserting their inclusion into the policymaking process, to trying to effect change in the policy-making process itself. These advocacies are mostly issue-specic and focused on gaining concrete results. Examples of these policy advocacies include the creation of peace-focused mechanisms within the state structure, the adoption of a comprehensive peace agenda that addresses the root causes of the conict, the observance of internationally recognized rules of engagement, among many others. To ensure the adoption of these advocacies, peace coalitions have employed a wide range of tactics that include activities such as participating in consultations, open and discreet lobbying, preparing draft bills or policy briefs, organizing conferences and other forums, pressure tactics through protest actions like rallies or mass demonstrations. Needless to say, because of their more established political commitments, policy-makers are a lot more intractable compared to the public at large. Getting them to support a specic advocacy of peace coalitions necessitates the employment of a creative combination of persistent tactful diplomacy and consistent public pressure. It is in this sense that public advocacy becomes an indispensable component of policy advocacy. Also, coalition workers are required to hone their skills in providing technical support, such as in crafting of proposed legislations, or in the preparation of policy briefs, and skills in facilitation that are crucial in conducting dialogues, exploratory talks, negotiations, and other similar processes. Through the years, peace coalitions have effectively played these elds of engagement to get the state to move towards peace building. Still, there are issues that cannot be easily won through policy advocacy, especially in the context of resolving the armed conict. In many instances, peace coalitions have witnessed how the state could not be convinced or pressured to adopt policy advocacies that touch on the root causes of the armed conict. Certain conditions of possibility that complement these policy advocacies would have to exist for such actions to be successful. This is best illustrated by issues surrounding US-RP relations and agrarian reform. Advocacy campaigns for these issues have been long and arduous struggles, but the state has remained steadfast in its protection of deeply entrenched economic and political interests. It requires an enormous amount of effort as well as an auspicious turn of events to make even a small dent in these policy areas. Still, there is growing consensus among peace advocates and scholars that conict could be directed towards becoming a productive and progressive social resource. The challenge is to prevent conict from degenerating into violence, and to transform it into a productive resource
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for social change. Thus, peace building entails persuading the conicting parties to prevent violence and to transform their conict into a useful social resource. This process of persuasion is what engagement work is all about. Engagement work is the commitment to continuously reach out, communicate, cooperate, or debate with the state and non-state actors in the pursuit of substantive and lasting peace. Ideally, engaging the state and non-state actors proceeds based on cooperation. But, engagement activities may also be more confrontational in form. This is especially applicable in the context of blocking tendencies towards militarist approaches, to conict resolution that may be espoused by either party. In the Philippines, the substantive track of engagement focuses on the achievement of commitment among all stakeholders on which social reforms need be put in place as foundations for positive peace. The process track on the other hand, focuses on the achievement of consensus among all stakeholders on the mutually acceptable mechanisms towards conict resolution. Needless to say, to become more effective in the substantive track of engagement, peace coalitions need to identify and to act on a more strategic peace agenda. Forging solidaritiy and commitment around issues that emanate from the root causes of the conict may provide a longer-lasting sense of mission and direction to peace coalitions. This would enable peace coalitions to mount a more sustained effort at the substantive track of engagement work. Towards this, peace coalitions should study how they could effectively integrate peace issues into persistent sectoral issues, and to lobby existing sectoral formations to adopt this integrated analysis of issues. Corollary to this, peace campaigns must also give high priority to the achievement social and economic reform measures that address the roots of the rebellion. Continued negotiations and the agreements that are forged as a result of these negotiations are essential components of peace building. It is important to keep track of all these agreements and to monitor their implementation. Peace coalitions, media practitioners, individuals from the church and the academe have successfully engaged in negotiations that produced useful agreements. They have also actively monitored the implementation of these agreements especially at the community level. Peace coalitions should continue engaging the state and the NSAs, without compromising their position as a third-party stakeholder to the conict. They need to attain a certain level of clout, which in turn can only be gained by maintaining a reputation and track record of impartiality. It is important to maintain a critical stance vis--vis the parties in conict, and to carefully choose the forms through which they engage either party. For example, peace coalitions should be more conscious of maintaining a safe distance between them and the initiatives of the state. While it is important for them to cooperate and work with the state as a general principle, it seems inappropriate to be a direct participant in state initiatives or to enlist their
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active participation in coalition initiatives, especially on the ground. Peace coalitions need to relentlessly persuade the state, the NSAs, and established foreign third-party mediators that the concept of a local third-party mediator to the conict as represented by existing networks of peace organizations and peace coalitions is also a viable vehicle towards resolving the conict in the country. Foreign third-party mediators should then be lobbied to work more closely with peace organizations and peace coalitions in the country as part of the mediation process.
area three: protecting and promoting community rights and welfare

key concerns
Human
National peace coalitions have always focused their efforts on advocacy and engagement work. Recently, there has been a growing appreciation of the need to redirect peace-building initiatives to the local level. An important aspect of this work is the need to continuously safeguard the policy gains from advocacy work. Peace coalitions need to vigilantly ensure that policies, legisla-
Rights Human Security Vulnerable Sectors
tion, and agreements that are gained at the national level are implemented and translated into changes in the peace situation on the ground. The active participation of communities in peace building at the community level, and their ability to organize themselves into peace-oriented organizations is an important indicator of the growth and development of a constituency for peace. In the Philippines, the involvement of national peace coalitions in protecting and promoting community rights and welfare is most visible in the following initiatives: the formation of peace zones (territories, spaces, sanctuaries for peace), the delivery of relief and medical services to conict-ridden communities (Immunization for Peace), monitoring the implementation of agreements (Bantay Ceasere, Sulong CARHRIHL). As a result of these initiatives, peace coalitions have focused greater attention on the welfare of children and other non-combatants belonging to the most vulnerable sectors, helped mitigate human rights violations, helped reduce violence, and facilitated continued dialogues and negotiations. National peace coalitions have also contributed to the empowerment of communities through the formation of local citizens peace coalitions. Humanitarian issues dissolve the barriers to coalition building, and have always been a common ground for action. Humanitarian issues cover a wide array of concerns, which include the delivery of relief and rehabilitation services to war-torn or calamity-stricken communities, provision of medical services to the most vulnerable sectors especially in remote villages, banning
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or restricting the use of weapons or certain methods that do not distinguish combatants from non-combatants (landmines, aerial bombardment, and so on), assertion of human rights, and condemnation of human rights violations. Humanitarian missions to conict-ridden communities are dangerous because either party to the conict could easily misconstrue these initiatives as enemy initiatives. Thus, peace coalitions need to be more conscious of maintaining the autonomy and asserting the neutrality of their humanitarian initiatives. It is important for peace coalitions to become more involved in ground-level engagement by facilitating the institution of peace-building mechanisms at the local level. For example, peace coalitions could facilitate the formation of local rights and welfare councils or justice and peace councils that could become vehicles of local residents in conict-ridden areas for demanding services from both the state and the NSAs.
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part 3: tools and exercises for effective peace coalition building
tools and exercises

Peace Map Org Map Coverage Matrix Ah-HAH
ffective peace coalition building is basically about nurturing

networks of peace stakeholders, directing promotional cam-
paigns on peace, and creating functional peace organizations. Effective coalition builders should be skilled negotiators because one of their main functions is to manage conict towards consensus. Organizing, advocacy, and engagement work entail constant communication; thus, coalition builders need to hone
their skills in active listening, a crucial element in communication. Effective coalition builders are also conscientious learners because peace building entails continuous monitoring and analysis of changes in the peace situation as well as in the theory and practice of peace building. The different phases of peace coalition building require an understanding of the following bases for action:

Factors that facilitate or hinder peace initiatives and peace coalition work Actors/Groups that may work for or against peace initiatives and peace coalition work Issues that could become the basis of peace initiatives and peace coalition work Strategic direction of peace initiatives and peace coalition work
Peace coalition builders may use the succeeding tools as group exercises to facilitate the collective understanding of these bases for action.
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module 1: knowing your peace map: an environment scanning

learning objectives

Level off on the fundamentals of getting to know the environment Identify various factors that could affect effective coalition building Determine the opportunities and threats to peace coalition building
inputs
Peace coalition-building does not proceed in a neat and smooth manner. Often, coalition building is confronted with problems such as:

Problematic relations among networks Peace building is characterized by individuals, groups, organizations and institutions that individually or collectively carry out activities toward a dened peace agenda or mission. Peace coalitions have tapped various networks to expand the reach of their peace building. But while some of these members work together or complement each others activities in the pursuit of peace, some others tend to compete because of differing interests and/or political persuasions. In most cases, organizations follow their own path without too much concern for other members in the coalition. As a whole, coalition builders must understand that a coalition is a venue where divergent positions of peace groups and organizations become evident and yet, converge over particular peace issues and agenda.
Availability of nancial, human, material and other resources for coalition activities Resources do play an important role in coalition work. Various resources are needed in peace coalitionsto fund and sustain campaigns, to conduct researches, to lobby with lawmakers, to print campaign and advocacy materials, to broaden their constituency, and to network with local, national and international groups that support peace-building initiatives. As a coalition builder, it is important to determine where
toolkit
these resources could come from to ensure that coalition activities are implemented and sustained.

Lack of broad citizens participation in peace-building activities and processes Citizens participation could also inuence outcomes of coalition-building initiatives. Getting the citizens to participate in coalition activities necessitates that coalition builders be attuned to the needs and demands of civilians. This could entail knowing the different sentiments of various groups at the grassroots, regional and national levels. To a cer-
PART 3: TOOLS AND EXERCISES FOR EFFECTIVE PEACE COALITION BUILDING
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tain extent, results and outcomes conferences, symposiums, e-group discussions and signature campaigns aimed at peace building are determined by how various groups identify with different positions on peace-related issues. As a whole peace building is done not simply to mobilize warm bodies, but as part of the process of peace constituency-building.

Unsupportive or hostile policy environment that render initiatives to become ineffective Engaging the state is part of peace building, and often, coalitions and their activities are inuenced by the policy environment where they operate. Rules, laws and programs related to peace as designed and implemented by the state, could determine the success of peace-building initiatives of coalitions. While such policies could be the target of peace-building initiatives, the very same policies could pose serious challenges in peace-building initiatives. For example, the absence of a clear peace-friendly policy of government could easily give free rein to militarists to pursue an all-out war strategy that could target even unarmed and legitimate organizations that advocate peace and other social justice issues.
Peace coalition builders must know their environment, and it would be helpful to gain an understanding of:

how groups, organizations and institutions work toward peace in order to identify potential areas for collaboration and pinpoint potential areas for conict among potential coalition members
the kind of relations that exists among these groups to allow coalition builders to design a more appropriate organizing strategy potential sources of inputs such as nancial, material, human and other resources that could propel and sustain peace-building initiatives and processes the availability and accessibility of resources for peace building demand for participation in peace building among various groups at various levels of polity policies, laws, regulations and programs that could affect the behavior and activities of peace coalitions and their initiatives.
tool 1: the peace map

what is a peace map?
A peace map is a tool that presents the peace environment within a specic or particular
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area. It identies the various opportunities and threats to peace initiatives and/or coalitions within a dened geographic scope. Peace mapping is best done when setting up the coalition, or when dening the direction of peace initiatives in a particular area.
who should be involved in peace mapping?

Peace mapping is most effective when all stakeholders are involved in the process of arriving at a complete Peace Map in their area. The various perspectives, insights and analysis of the whole environment where peace initiatives take place provide useful inputs in dening the different and various factors affecting peace initiatives. Thus, it would be advisable to invite and ensure the participation of stakeholders from various institutions and organizations in the conduct of peace mapping.
facilitating the conduct and use of peace map: stage 1: dening the eld and category of factors in the peace map

Divide participants according to regional or provincial groupings. Provide each group with craft paper, pentels, markers, crayons, art or colored papers, glue and scissors. Dene the eld of analysis i.e. provincial, regional or national Identify factors that could affect peace coalitions and peace-building initiatives a. political or legal factors (government regulations, policy, programs) b. infrastructure (roads, power supply, communication lines,etc.) c. e. economic/nancial (resources necessary for activities) socio-political (power struggles, political tendencies, ideologies) d. social (groups, organizations, institutions)
stage 2: identifying those with positive (opportunities) and negative (threats) impact on peace initiatives and coalition.

Identify factors that have positive and negative impact on coalitions and their initiatives a. positive inuence: green cards b. negative inuence: yellow cards
Identify if the factor is happening or likely to happen. If not, leave the card out. Identify if you or the coalition could inuence the factors directly or not, and classify the factors as related to: a. policies, regulations, rules b. supply/inputs to the coalition
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c. demand/outputs from the coalition
d. competition/cooperation

Mark the factors with (*) that have the highest impact on your eld of analysis. Mark ve positive factors (opportunities) and ve negative factors (threats).
stage 3: analysis and conclusions

What are the major positive factors (opportunities) for coalition and peace building? What are the major negative factors (threats) for coalition and peace building? In the next two to three years, which among the major opportunities and threats identied from the Peace Map should the coalition grab and maximize? Based on a consensus, choose a minimum of three and a maximum of ve priority opportunities and threats that should be considered in setting the direction of peace initiatives and coalition in the area.
In the light of the priorities identied, what initial strategies could be devised to grab these opportunities and deect or reduce impact of the threats identied. Post the results on a separate sheet and keep this as an initial guide for planning.
Notes: The Peace Map is an adaptation from the Envi Scan tool introduced by the Management for Development Foundation of the Netherlands. The tool was presented in doing an environmental scanning of development initiatives under the course Institutional Development and Organizational Strengthening (IDOS). The Organizational Mapping/Coverage Matrix Tool in Module 2 is adopted from the Manage ment Development Foundation of the Netherlands from the Institutional Development and Organizational Strengthening course. Slight modications and revisions were made in order to t the objectives of this module in Peace Coalition Building.
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sample output:
A Peace Map at the National Level
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module 2: facilitating convergence among stakeholders:

learning objectives

Level off on the various areas and issues where coalitions could converge and diverge. Dene characteristics of coalitions and their contribution in peace building. Dene considerations for organizing peace groups into a coalition and in facilitating a common agenda for peace.
inputs:
solidarity amidst difference
Peace groups converge to:

work toward a common goal or agenda work toward common peace-building processes expand coverage and constituency and create spaces for peace share and pool together much-needed resources that propel peace-building activities intensify impact of actions at various levels.
But they could also have differences in terms of:

their views on the state their views on armed conict their views on cease-re as a precondition for peace talks.
Thus, while peace groups (and peace coalitions) have divergent positions on various issues, they generally converge on issues that pertain directly to the peace process.
knowing where to start

Peace coalitions are loose organizations or networks of peace advocates that:

do not have formal structures as an organization of organizations do not wield direct leadership over their constituents and are not bound by a clear set of organizational rules.
But peace coalitions

allow for exibility in terms of operations allow member organizations to retain a high degree of independence and autonomy often come in bursts, as issue-based campaigns zoom into full swing.
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Thus, they are issue-based coalitions that become most active when an issue needs to be addressed. It would always be helpful to identify the issues where they could possibly converge. This could include:

cease-re and the resumption of peace talks or negotiations observance of international rules of engagement peoples participation in peace-building activities and processes condemning militarist solutions to conict addressing persistent problems of inequality and social justice.
Though their agenda may vary from each other, organizing coalitions may be better viewed in terms of:

effecting changes in policy asserting the inclusion of affected groups and other stakeholders in policy-making processes effecting changes in policy making itself.
These initiatives can be better appreciated in terms of short-term and long-term results related to:

the creation of peace-focused mechanisms within State structures the adoption of a comprehensive peace agenda that addresses the root causes of conict observance of internationally recognized rules of engagement.
In organizing the coalition, it is important to note the:

resources for various peace-building initiatives and activities individuals who could commit their time and energy for varied activities like public speaking, campaigns, negotiations, or even skills training commitment of members to agreed goals established and dened by the coalition horizontal and vertical linkages of organizations and the operational working arrangements of national organizations to their regional and local counterparts the participation of individuals, groups and organizations on coalition processes at different stages of the coalitions organizational life.
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tool 2: organizational mapping

organizational mapping: knowing the eld
Initiatives in peace building are characterized by the institutions and organizations that carry out peace initiatives within a certain eld or geographic scope. Peace coalition builders need to be aware of these various players and stakeholders in peace building within their given geographical area. By being aware of how these players and stakeholders interact, the peace coalition builder is able to understand how certain institutions and organizations are able to complement each other in their peace-building initiatives or how they could possibly compete because of different perspectives as regards the attainment of peace. In some cases, organizations simply follow their own path without too much concern about others. Thus, coalition builders need to gather information about how these organizations relate with one another in order to arrive at a more effective networking approach and build stronger coalitions for peace. Knowing the organizations and their relations could lead to an understanding of the institutional setting or what some others call the playing eld. The institutional setting is the whole of organizations and institutions, including their interrelations that could inuence peace-building initiatives at various levels of the polity. By being aware of the full dynamics of these institutions and organizations, interventions and networking are better situated within a specic geographic eld.
cooperation with other organizations

Knowledge of the institutional setting allows the coalition builder to locate interventions that are in the long run more effective and sustainable. Often in peace building, it is useful to collaborate with organizations that can undertake and implement operational activities. These organizations are already working toward peace initiatives and may probably remain in the eld even after the life of a coalition has ended. Hence, it could be useful to relate more with organizations that have the mandate for peace building even prior to the formation of a coalition. It is also very useful to cooperate with other organizations during the analysis and designing stage of coalition building. By rallying these organizations toward the possibility of working together, certain relations and dynamics could be ironed out in the process of coalition building. Such collaboration could lead to the creation of more effective rules for engagement among various stakeholders in peace. These rules could effectively result in dening complementary roles of members within a coalition.
the actors in the eld

These actors may be formal or informal organizations, institutions and probably important
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personalities (who have their own networks or links) that inuence peace initiatives in the area. These actors could include social movements, peoples organizations, and non-government organizations that carry out peace activities in the area. The institutional setting could likewise include institutions like the church, schools, civic groups or clubs, government agencies and local government units that play crucial roles and inuence peace-building initiatives in the geographic eld. These institutions and organizations must be seriously taken into consideration in understanding our institutional setting.
the relations between actors

Relations among and between various actors differ and can be dened in a number of ways. There are hierarchical and operational relations where an organization takes direct orders from other organization/s, like a local NGO or branch taking its directives from their regional unit or NGO in the area. There are also informal relations where organizations relate based only on a particular theme or concern like issue-based collaboration on campaigns and other advocacy initiatives without setting rigid rules on partnership. In some other cases, organizations simply have communication relations and collaborate only in so far as occasional exchange of information is concerned. The various relations among organizations must be looked into by the coalition builder for him/her to come up with an effective networking strategy among these organizations.
the intensity and adequacy of relations

The intensity and adequacy of relations among actors in a given eld may be analyzed by looking into: a) how frequent these organizations interact or relate with one another, b) which organizations deliver more services in formal and informal partnerships, c) the volume of exchanges in information and resources among or between organizations, and; d) how each organization nurtures its relations through regular consultation or meetings. These are important considerations for a coalition builder in analyzing the interaction and relations of various and different actors within a playing eld.
what is an org map?

An Org Map is a tool that helps us visualize the relationship between organizations, or the institutional setting, within a given geographic scope. It allows users to assess existing institutional relationships by helping identify which relationships are already developed or problematic, and which relationships need to be enhanced or need to be established.
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when do we use the org map?

Org mapping is useful in the different phases of coalition building. Prior to building a coalition, the org maps provide coalition builders an opportunity to identify which organizations can take part in a coalition. When a coalition has already been established, the org map is useful in helping coalition members look into the gaps or overlaps in their initiatives, and spot problematic relations among coalition members.
who should be involved in org mapping?

Org mapping may be done by the coalition builder alone based on his/her knowledge of the eld, which refers to both the issue and the geographic territory. Ideally, however, org mapping is done with the participation of the stakeholders to the issue at hand. In this case, the coalition builder needs to handle the org mapping workshop with care because most organizations would not want to have their relationships with other organizations openly discussed. The org mapping workshop should facilitate the identication of common grounds for action rather than causing further strains in an already problematic relationship.
facilitating the org mapping workshop stage 1: dening the locality

Agree as a group what sector or concern is to be analyzed peace initiatives, peace coalition building, peace negotiations, relief and rehabilitation, and so on. Dene the geographic scope of the analysis in the institutiogram village level, municipal, province, regional, island grouping, national. Dene the orientation, whether it is project centered building a coalition of peace groups in the area; or whether it is relations-centered focus on relations between and among different actors; or a combination thereof.
Dene the type of actors that are to be included in the analysis formal organizations, large groups, sectoral groupings, institutions Decide on the level of analysis staff, ofcer, unit, department, organization, clusters of organizations. Dene as a group the type of relations to be analyzed and agree on the symbols or kind of lines that would be used to show these relations hierarchical, operational, communication, cooperation and collaboration, nancial, and so on.
stage 2: drawing the map (depicting the situation in the eld)

Use / Prepare a sketch map of the eld.
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Write the names of the actors identied by the group in the eld. The actors could also be classied accordinglyindividuals, peoples organizations, non-government organizations, government agencies, local government units, funding donors, armed groups, social movements, and so on.
Use different lines to depict different relations between and among the various and actors in the playing eld. Use arrows to depict whether initiatives in interaction and relations are one-way or two-way.
stage 3: analyzing the relations among actors

Once the map has been drawn, engage the participants in a discussion with regard to the relations among actors. Decide on how the group would want to show the intensity and adequacy of relations between and among actors in the elde.g. thick lines for more intense and adequate relations.
Dene the intensity and adequacy of relations between and among actors by asking the participants: Who interacts or communicates more frequently with each other? Who gives more in terms of the exchange in resources? Who receives or benets more from the relations? Who exerts more time and energy to nurture relations? How timely are the exchanges between and among different actors?
stage 4: analyzing the institutional setting

Engage the group to review their org map. Try to see whether all relations have been covered by their output. Analyze the relations among various and different actors by asking and dening: Which relations are most problematic? Which relations could be developed or strengthened (new opportunities for partnership and collaboration, improvement in exchanges)? Which relations require more attention if we are to coalesce?
Draw out some initial conclusions and recommendations from the group. What could be done to strengthen or further improve the quality of relations if we are to coalesce with each other? What could be done to strengthen the coalition (if established already)?
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tool 3: the coverage matrix

what is the coverage matrix?
The Coverage Matrix is a matrix that presents the various stakeholders (institutions and organizations) and the initiatives (programs and activities that are being done and implemented) within a given geographic scope or area. It provides basic information on who does what? that in turn identies possible bases of peace coalition work. It is best used in the setting-up phase of the coalition to identify areas where cooperation can be started and where the complementation of existing initiatives could be enhanced.
who should be involved in the coverage matrix?

As much as possible, all stakeholders should be involved in doing the coverage matrix. While each organization or institution could actually come up with their own coverage matrix, the collective effort to arrive at a coverage matrix allows potential coalition members to see the extent of peace initiatives of organizations in the area, and locate their own initiatives within the emerging peace movement in their area.
facilitating the conduct and use of the coverage matrix stage 1: dening the eld and scope of activities

Divide participants according to provincial or regional groupings. Provide each group with craft paper, pentels, markers, crayons, art or colored papers, glue and scissors. Dene the eld of analysisi.e. provincial, regional or national. Choose your focus in analyzing peace groups and organizations in your eld of analysis. This could mean focusing on the various activities, or issues, or concerns related to peace in which these groups and advocates are involved. If there are a lot of activities/ issues/concerns, the group can cluster them and give a heading to the cluster.
stage 2: listing actors and activities, and analyzing coverage

List all activities/issues/concerns of all peace groups and advocates relevant in your eld of analysis. List all actors relevant to your eld of analysis. It would be possible to cluster some groups and actors if there are too many of them. Indicate the involvement of actors in relation to the activity/issue/concern.
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The following indicators could be used: * some involvement ** substantial involvement *** major involvement
stage 3: analyzing the matrix

Identify gaps, concentrations and overlaps. What areas of work are not adequately covered by stakeholders in the area? Which areas are not covered at all? Where do stakeholders tend to overlap?
identify possibilities for improved coverage, coordination or collaboration
stage 4: reections and conclusions

What common activities could actors possibly conduct to improve coverage of peace initiatives in the area? Under what potential concerns or lines of work could they possibly get their acts together to intensify impact? What concerns would make it more difcult to draw them together?
Where do they meet? Sample of a Coverage Matrix

ACTORS/ACTIVITIES
Research Mass Campaigns International Networking Policy Lobbying Direct Community Organizing in War-torn Areas Support Generation Psycho-social Intervention Training and Education Publications ** * ** * * * ** ** ***
ORG 1
* ** * *** *** *
ORG 2
* ** * *** *** *
ORG 3
* ** * * *** *
ORG 4
* * * * ** *
ORG 5
*** * *** ** * **
ORG 6
*** ** *** ** * ***
ORG 7
*** *** *** ** * **
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tool 4: activity/exercise: ah-hah!!! (poster-making)

what is ah-hah!!!?
Ah-Hah is an activity or exercise that aims to draw out ideas and insights from individuals who form part of a group. It intends to bring out what a participant thinks of feels over a certain theme, issue or problem identied by the group. It is a simple starter activity that aims to break a culture of silence among participants in a group.
when is ah-hah used?

This activity is used when we want to know the different views and perspectives of potential members or stakeholders in a (potential) peace coalition within a specic area. This activity allows every participant to see their differences and similarities as potential members of a coalition. With Ah-Hah, a certain leveling-off on understanding a common issue or concern could be achieved among various and different stakeholders in peace initiatives.
who should be involved in the activity?

All stakeholders and potential members of our desired coalition must be involved in the activity. The activity could initiate interaction among various stakeholders as they tackle a particular concept, issue, or concern related to peace. It gives the participants a chance to get to know better how their fellows think and feel about a certain issue. Hence, it is encouraged that all stakeholders take part in the activity as much as possible.
facilitating ah-hah!!! stage 1: making the poster

Divide participants into two groups. Assign the following topics/themes to each group: Group 1: What is peace? Group 2: How do we achieve peace? Each group is then given craft paper, crayons, marking pens and art paper for them to make their own poster. Each group is given 10 minutes to complete a shared illustration of their assigned theme. Every member of the group gets to share his/her idea by drawing something on the craft paper.
After completing their posters, both posters are posted on the board, and a discussion follows.
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stage 2: plenary discussion on inputs

After posting the output of the group, each participant goes to the board and points at his/her contribution in the poster. He/she presents her idea and insight on the theme/issue/concern/problem assigned to them and explains how he/she ts her contribution to the overall output of the group.
The procedure is repeated until everyone has taken his/her turn to present and discuss his/her ideas and insights in front of the group.
stage 3: reections and conclusions

The facilitator conducts a synthesis by directing the following questions to the body and listing major points that surface from the answers:

What do we see from the posters? What are the shared meanings of peace for each one of us? What are our common perceptions on the achievement of peace? Why is it important to work together toward peace?
Major points are then listed on a cartolina and posted for everyone to see and for their rst output to serve as a guide to the group, especially in building a common agenda for peace.
Note: Ah-Hah is adapted from: Anne Hope and Sally Timmel, Training for Transformation: A Handbook for Community Workers (Book 4). London: Intermediate Technology Publications, Ltd., 1999.
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national peace coalitions

Learning Experiences Study on Civil-Society Peace Building in the Philippines

National Peace Coalitions

toolkit: peace coalition work

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

VOLUME 2: NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

ND-Independent National democratic groups not afliated with RA or RJ ND blocs

PopDem Popular Democrat

UP CIDS University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Develop-

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

coalition as a form of organization

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

2 : NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

COALITION AS FORM OF ORGANIZATION

rogressive organizations in the Philippines have historically

NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

COALITION DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

Table 1: Handling of Peace Question based on Strategic Framework

Primary Form of Struggle

Unarmed - Parliamentary or Electoral

Relating with the State

Mixed National Democratic-ReJect (ND-RJ)/ radical SD/ Independent

Combination of Armed and Unarmed

Combination of Critical Collaboration and Militant Actions

National DemocraticReAffirm (ND-RA)

Primacy of Armed Struggle over Parliamentary or Electoral Struggle

Consistent Rejection of the fascist and pro-imperialist state

COALITION DYNAMICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

emergence and development of peace coalitions in the philippines: socio-historical context

eace coalitions in the Philippines can trace their lineage from

NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

coalition for peace (CfP): cease-re, peace talks, peace zones

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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national peace conference: poverty alleviation as national peace agenda

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multisectoral peace advocates: inconspicuous channel for peace talks

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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1992-1997: peace and development uniting against elite domination

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peoples congress: people-centered development toward just and lasting peace

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

gathering for peace (GfP): peace and national sovereignty

all-out peace group (AOPG): peace and civil society

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

LEARNING EXPERIENCES STUDY ON CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACE BUILDING

pilgrims for peace: resisting the terrorist label

sulong CARHRIHL: extracting accountability from the parties in conict

NATIONAL PEACE COALITIONS

Table 2: Emergence of National Peace Coalitions

National Peace Coalitions Formed

First Wave: 1990

1990 1990 1990 1992

Second Wave: 2002 20032005

2002 2002 2002 2004

EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE COALITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

social actors/groups in peace coalitions