Valuing Humanity: A Korsgaardian Defense of Moral Proceduralism As Presented in The Sources of Normativity

In The Sources of Normativity,1 Christine Korsgaard discusses the basic challenge facing accounts of moral theory, viz., the question Why be moral? Korsgaard refers to this challenge as the normative question. !he normative question, she e"#lains, becomes urgent $hen the obligations of morality demand a difficult sacrifice on the #art of a moral agent. Korsgaard describes this question as an a##eal for %ustification. In The Sources of Normativity, she attem#ts to offer a satisfying res#onse to this a##eal. In formulating her argument, Korsgaard sets out to establish a criterion of %ustificatory adequacy for the authority of moral claims by offering an e"#lanation of the source of their authority. Korsgaard&s $or' has generated an abundance of re#lies from critics over the last ten years, including the moral e"#ressivist (llan )ibbard. In his revie$, *orality as Consistency in +iving
,

)ibbard describes The Sources of Normativity as a modern classic in ethical

thought...a frustrating classic, though. - )ibbard e"#lains that the te"t frustrates him not because of Korsgaard&s starting #oints, but because of the elaborate Kantian #ac'age . she develo#s. /e argues that given her starting #oints, $hat should follo$ is something more modest. 0 In his revie$, )ibbard criticizes Korsgaard&s Kantian #ac'age, ultimately trying to sho$ that her moral theory fails to satisfactorily meet her stated criterion of %ustificatory adequacy. !o date, Korsgaard has not res#onded to these criticisms. )ibbard&s account, though, #roves interesting on t$o levels. 1irst, )ibbard&s revie$ differs from the critical accounts to $hich Korsgaard has re#lied insofar as he actually acce#ts her fundamental starting #oints. 2econd, his challenges derive from a common reading of the te"t. Considering these t$o reasons
1 2

Korsgaard, Christine, The Sources of Normativity, 3d. 4&5eill. 65e$ 7or'8 Cambridge 9niversity :ress, 1;;<=. )ibbard, (llen, *orality as Consistency in +iving8 Korsgaard&s Kantian Lectures, 3thics, >ol. 11?, 5o.1 64ct. 1;;;=8 1.?@1<.. 3 )ibbard, 1.?. 4 Ibid., 1.1. 5 Ibid., 1.1.

and the significance of )ibbard&s $or' in the field of metaethics, his criticisms should solicit a res#onse. In this #a#er, I $ill address )ibbard&s concerns and sho$ ho$ they stem from a misreading of the te"t. !o do so, I $ill s#end the heart of the #a#er #resenting Korsgaard&s #osition. 4nce the argument is established, I $ill outline )ibbard&s #rimary concerns follo$ed by a Korsgaardian res#onse. *y res#onse $ill serve as a defense of the original #osition set for$ard in The Sources of Normativity. Korsgaards Moral Theory: A General Presentation Korsgaard o#ens The Sources of Normativity by discussing the challenge facing the moral theorist. ( satisfactory moral theory, she claims, is charged $ith finding a solution to the #roblem of the normative question. !he normative question, by as'ing Why be moral?, threatens morality $ith a regress. It searches for an unconditioned reason on $hich to %ustify moral action. If a moral theory cannot offer an end to the regress, then it fails to $ard off the threat of moral s'e#ticism. *oral s'e#ticism, Korsgaard clarifies, is not s'e#ticism about $hether moral truths e"ist, but about $hether they have authority over us. In short, a satisfactory moral theory accounts for not only how moral truths obligate moral agents, but also im#ortantly, why moral agents ought to obey the authority of those truths. Korsgaard attem#ts to detail a moral theory that satisfies both criteria of adequacy. 2he states, from the outset, that in order to succeed, her theory must meet three conditions. 1irst, the theory must address the agent as'ing the question. *orality, she e"#lains, leads an agent to as' the question on a #ersonal level. !he agent as's Why must I obey? It is not a question in the third@#erson #osition, but rather a first@#erson inquiry. It is a question about the nature of authority, about $hat claim morality has over me, the agent as'ing the question. 1or this reason, Korsgaard states that her theory must offer a sub%ective ans$er.< 2econd, the theory must meet a condition of $hat Aernard Williams calls trans#arency. 2he e"#lains this conce#t thus8 ( normative moral theory must be one that allo$s us to act in the full light of 'no$ledge of $hat morality is and $hy $e are susce#tible to its influences, and at the same time to believe that our actions are %ustified and ma'e sense. B 1inally, the theory must a##eal, in a dee# sense, to our identitiesC it concerns our conce#tion of $ho $e ta'e ourselves to be. Korsgaard e"#lains that insofar as morality, in its name, demands sacrifices, sometimes even death, a moral theory must account for ho$ moral claims bind themselves to our identities. 2he argues, If moral claims are

6 7

Ibid., 17. Ibid., 1B.

ever $orth dying for, then violating them must be in a similar $ay, $orse than death. (nd this means that they must issue in a dee# $ay from our sense of $ho $e are.
D

Korsgaard observes that this vie$ of morality as a #ractical sub%ect is inherited from the $or' of Immanuel Kant. Korsgaard identifies Kant&s account of moral theory as an a##eal to autonomy. 2he describes the a##eal to autonomy as a vie$ in $hich the #ractical movements of the agent&s o$n $ill give rise to the reasons and obligations of normativity. In this vie$, she e"#lains, the source of normativity must be found in the agent&s o$n $ill, in #articular in the fact that the la$s of morality are the la$s of the agent&s o$n $ill and that its claims are ones she is #re#ared to ma'e on herself. ; Korsgaard models her o$n account after the a##eal to autonomy. 2he claims that the legislative activity involved in such a vie$ derives from the human ca#acity for self@conscious reflection. Ay reflecting on our actions 6or #ossibilities of action=, $e determine some ends to be good and some actions to be right, and in doing so identify certain ends as valuable and certain actions as $orth$hile. !his #rocess of reflection leads us to become a 'ind of authority over ourselvesC it gives us reasons to act one $ay rather than another. It is this authority, she claims, $hich gives rise to the normativity of moral claims.1? !he a##eal to autonomy, Korsgaard also asserts, is in fact a realist account in a limited sense. Insofar as it admits there are right and $rong 6truth@trac'ing= $ays to ans$er moral questions, it #resu##oses the e"istence of good ends and right actions as real ans$ers to these moral questions. Korsgaard is careful to note though that this vie$ differs from more traditional, conservative vie$s of moral realism. 2he refers to her form of moral realism as #rocedural moral realism, the vie$ that moral facts emerge out of human volitional #rocesses. !ruth, she e"#lains, refers to moral facts arrived at through correct #rocedures. 11 Korsgaard contrasts this form of realism $ith $hat she calls substantive moral realism, the vie$ that there e"ist moral facts inde#endent of human volitional activity. !ruth in this case a##lies to $hether moral claims corres#ond to moral entities in the $orld.1, Korsgaard e"#lains that because of substantive realism&s ontological commitments, it understands the #rocedures for ans$ering normative questions as methods for discovering #arts of the $orld. :rocedures are $ays of finding out the normative facts of morality. 1or this reason, she argues, substantive moral realism treats ethics as a branch of 'no$ledge, a branch
8 9

Ibid., 1D. Ibid., 1;. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., -<. 12 Ibid.

#ursuing 'no$ledge of the normative #art of the $orld. 1- Korsgaard considers this a##roach if not misguided, at least in shar# contrast to her #ractical #ro%ect. *orality, at its most basic level, she insists, concerns questions of action, not 'no$ledge. !his distinction lies at the heart of the larger meta@ethical argument in The Sources of Normativity. I $ill return to this #oint in my discussion of )ibbard, for it is in failing to maintain this distinction that he falls #rey to a misreading of Korsgaard. )ibbard #resents Korsgaard&s discussion of value as a theoretical treatment, and in so doing he ties her argument to commitments and undesirable conclusions that she avoids by treating value #ractically. I $ill #resent )ibbard&s criticisms after the follo$ing e"#osition of Korsgaard&s argument for the source of moral normativity. Korsgaards Argument: The Source of Moral Normati ity Korsgaard&s argument for the source and authority of moral claims divides into three ste#s. In ste# one, she #resents a transcendental argument to demonstrate that normativity arises from the reflective structure of human consciousness. 2he begins by describing the character of human consciousness, and from there she $or's to sho$ ho$ it requires reasons and ma'es normativity #ossible. In ste# t$o, she locates the necessary and universal conditions of moral normativity in our valuing of our #ractical identities, more s#ecifically in our valuing of our conce#tions of ourselves as human beings. Korsgaard argues that if $e value our #ractical identity as human beings, then $e must value our humanity in general. If $e value humanity in general though, then $e $ill value the humanity of others. Ay valuing the humanity of others, others can ma'e normative claims u#on us E normative claims of the moral sort. In ste# three, Korsgaard revisits the claim that valuing her o$n humanity entails valuing the humanity of others. 2he #roceeds by #resenting a Wittgensteinian argument in $hich she re%ects the e"istence of #rivate reasons. 2he e"#lains the reasons by $hich $e obligate ourselves are the same reasons by $hich $e are obligated by others. !hus, if valuing our humanity obligates us to act in a certain $ay then by a logical e"tension of the !u"lic reasons $e are obligated to value others in a similar fashion.1. 2!3: 4538 !he !ranscendental (rgument Korsgaard begins the transcendental argument by assuming the rational character of human nature. Feasons, she e"#lains, arise as a necessary #roduct of the reflective structure of
13 14

Ibid., -B. Considering that )ibbard only treats the section in #assing, I $ill forego outlining the third ste# of the argument in this #a#er.

human consciousness. Ay nature, $hen #resented $ith an im#ulse, our consciousness dra$s us bac', distancing us from the im#ulse, and thereby creating s#ace in $hich to reflect u#on the im#ulse. In this s#ace, our consciousness treats the im#ulse as a reason for actionC through reflection, $e determine $hether to endorse or re%ect the reason. Korsgaard asserts that reasons are an essential #art of #ractical life. Genying reasons, she e"#lains, is li'e denying the reality of color. It is only under the influence of the theoretical or scientific attitude that $e ever question the reality of color. In our daily lives, or in the #ractical mindset, $e ta'e color to be an undeniable feature of life. 2o too $ith reasons, she e"claims. !he 2cientific World >ie$ is no substitute for human life. If you thin' colors are unreal, go and loo' at a #ainting by Aellini or 4lits'i, and you $ill change your mind. If you thin' reasons and values are unreal, go and ma'e a choice, and you $ill change your mind.
10

In other $ords, she ta'es reasons as a natural #art of

the $ay in $hich $e interact $ith the $orld. It is through reasons that $e ta'e charge of our im#ulses, and thereby determine our actions in the $orld. Feasons are necessary, #ractically@ s#ea'ing, and thus their e"istence can be treated as real. 1ollo$ing Kant, Korsgaard argues that reflective human consciousness must be free. Feflective consciousness, she e"#lains, determines $hich reasons to endorse and thereby $hich actions to #ursue. It directs #ractical activity. In %udging $hich reasons to endorse, she argues, the reflective consciousness al$ays %udges under the conce#tion of freedom. It imagines itself to be, in some fundamental $ay, in control and res#onsible for its actions. Korsgaard claims, 5othing in human life is more real than the fact $e must ma'e our decisions and choices under the idea of freedom.
1<

1or this reason, li'e the $ill, the reflective consciousness, $hen faced

$ith an im#ulse arising from some e"ternal source, must itself choose $hether to endorse the im#ulse as a reason for action. In Kantian language, the reflective consciousness must decide to ma'e it a ma"im to act 6or not to act= on the im#ulse. Ay deciding the ma"im $ithin reflective s#ace, the reflective consciousness claims the decision as its o$n. It acts under the idea of freedom. Korsgaard as's8 Ay $hat means does the reflective consciousness decide to endorse an im#ulse as a reason? /o$ does it determine the sub%ective #rinci#le of a ma"im? If the reflective consciousness decides based on something in the desire or the ob%ect of desire, then she is left $ith a form of substantive realism. /o$ever, if the normativity of the im#ulse comes from some$here else, then $here?1B
15 16

Ibid., 1,.@0. Ibid., ;B. 17 Ibid., ;B.

!o ans$er this, Korsgaard turns to Kant&s formulation of the Categorical Im#erative. Kant, she claims, e"#lains that reasons derive or are determined by #rinci#les, and since the free $ill is a rational causality it must have a #rinci#le. /o$ever, she states, because the Kantian $ill is autonomous, it must determine its o$n #rinci#les. !herefore, by its nature, the free $ill must determine a #rinci#le of action for itself. /o$ever, since the $ill acts based on reasons, it requires reasons in order to establish a #rinci#le. !o solve this #roblem, Kant #resents the Categorical Im#erative. !he Categorical Im#erative states that the $ill must act only according to ma"ims that it could $ill as a la$. Korsgaard claims that this is the la$ of the free $ill8 the $ill must choose a #rinci#le, and that #rinci#le must be able to be $illed as a la$.
!he Categorical Im#erative merely tells us to choose a la$. Its only constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a la$. (nd nothing determines $hat that la$ must be. All that it has to be is a law. Hit does not im#ose any e"ternal constraints on the free $ill&s activities, but sim#ly arises from the nature of the $ill. It describes $hat a free $ill must do to be $hat it is. It must choose a ma"im it can regard as a la$.1D

Korsgaard refers to the Categorical Im#erative to characterize the manner in $hich normativity arises from the nature of the reflective consciousness. !he Categorical Im#erative, though, does not determine the actual content of the #rocedure. !hough it establishes normativity in general, it fails to #osition one set of #rinci#les above another. Korsgaard e"#lains that the Categorical Im#erative a##lies to a free $ill or reflective consciousness, obligating it to establish a la$, a #rinci#le that holds universally. !he la$ though, she observes, could a##ly to any domain. 2he states,
(ny la$ is universal, but the argument I %ust gave doesn&t settle the question of the domain over $hich the la$ of the free $ill must range. If the la$ is the la$ of acting on the desire of the moment, then the agent $ill treat each desire as a reason, and her conduct $ill be that of a $anton. If the la$ ranges over the agent&s $hole life, then the agent $ill be some sort of egoist.1;

!herefore, Korsgaard states, in order to narro$ the domain to that of the moral, she must reformulate the Categorical Im#erative. Korsgaard argues that the domain of the reformulated version of the Categorical Im#erative ought to range to include all rational beings. 2he states that $hen establishing a la$, it is only by including every rational being as #art of one&s concern that the resulting la$ could in turn be #ro#erly moral. Korsgaard claims that the Categorical Im#erative, reformulated as the *oral +a$, instructs us as follo$s8 (ct only on those ma"ims that all rational beings could

18 19

Ibid., ;D. Ibid., ;;.

agree to act on together in a $or'able coo#erative system. Kingdom of 3nds.

,?

Kant refers to this as the la$ of the

Korsgaard e"#lains that the la$ of the Kingdom of 3nds is the *oral +a$C as a la$ it is essentially concerned $ith the relation bet$een our actions and other #ersons. !his ne$ domain though, she clarifies, is not inherent in the Categorical Im#erative itself. !he reformulation of the Categorical Im#erative, as the *oral +a$, does not demonstrate that it a##lies necessarily or universally. Korsgaard claims that a further argument is needed in order to sho$ the conditions of #ossibility by $hich the authority of the *oral +a$ covers the entire range of rational beings.,1 2!3: !W48 >aluing /umanity Korsgaard begins the second ste# of her argument by sho$ing that the reasons the reflective consciousness chooses to endorse are characterized by its self@conce#tion of its #ractical identity. :ractical identity, she claims, is best understood as the descri#tion under $hich $e value ourselves.,, 2he describes #ractical identity as including a #erson&s %ob, #lace in the family, #osition in society, etc. Korsgaard argues that our conce#tion of our #ractical identity gives rise to sub%ective #rinci#les that e"#ress or conform to that self@conce#tion. Insofar as $e value our conce#tions of ourselves, $e see' to endorse reasons consistent $ith that conce#tion. Korsgaard e"#lains that because sub%ective #rinci#les are rooted in our conce#tions of ourselves, $e treat them as authoritative. !o disregard the sub%ective #rinci#le is to disregard #art of your self@conce#tion, #art of $hat you ta'e to be valuable. Ay valuing the source of the normativity, $e sub%ect ourselves to the authority of their claims. Korsgaard e"#lains that the significance of this relationshi# arises in regards to the sub%ective #rinci#les that are based on our dee#est or most meaningful self@conce#tions. 2he ca#tures the intensity of this relationshi# as follo$s8
It is the conce#tions of ourselves that are most im#ortant to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. 1or to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be $ho you areH$hen an action cannot be #erformed $ithout loss of some fundamental #art of one&s identity, and an agent could %ust as $ell be dead, then the obligation not to do it is unconditional and com#lete.,-

Korsgaard argues though that our most fundamental conce#tion of #ractical identity is our conce#tion of ourselves as human beings. Aeing human, she insists, is the most basic
20 21

Ibid. Ibid., ;;@1??. 22 Ibid., 1?1. 23 Ibid., 1?,.

conce#tion $e have of our #ractical identity. Korsgaard claims that for us to value any of our conce#tions of identity, $e must first value ourselves as human beings, as the ty#e of agents ca#able of having #ractical identities. Korsgaard e"#lains that insofar as $e value our humanity as a #ractical identity, our humanity acts as a source of normativity for us. Ay valuing our humanity, our humanity serves as a sub%ective #rinci#le obligating us to endorse only those reasons that do not contradict $ith the value of humanity.,. If $e $ere to contradict this value by failing to follo$ such a #rinci#le, then $e $ould be re%ecting our most basic self@ conce#tions. Auilding u#on this, Korsgaard claims that if $e value humanity as $e see it in ourselves, then by logical e"tension $e should also value humanity as something in general 6or as something in itself=. /er thin'ing here is that by coming to an a$areness of our o$n humanity as our most basic #ractical identity, $e recognize humanity in general as the condition of #ossibility for this identity. !his leads us to value humanity as something in itself. Korsgaard claims then that in loo'ing at others, $e should come to recognize their #artici#ation in humanityC $e should recognize that they also ta'e a #art in humanity in general. If this is the case, she e"#lains, the sub%ective #rinci#le about valuing, $hen a##lied to this more general form of humanity, can be reformulated as the *oral +a$. In other $ords, insofar as $e ta'e ourselves and our o$n actions to be valuable, $e value 6consciously or unconsciously= our o$n humanity as the most basic #ractical identity, the ground out of $hich all our other #ractical identities gro$. /o$ever, valuing our o$n humanity leads us to value humanity in general. !a'ing humanity in general to include the humanity of others, a valuing of humanity includes the valuing of the humanity of others. !hus, if $e establish a sub%ective #rinci#le that obligates us to only endorse im#ulses that do not contradict a valuing of humanity, then $e can be faced $ith claims or obligations of the moral sort. !he reflective valuing of our o$n self@conce#tions leads, in a la$@li'e manner, to moral considerations. In summary, Korsgaard&s transcendental argument $or's in the follo$ing $ay. 2he begins by assuming the reflective character of human nature. 2he sho$s ho$ this character gives rise to reasons. 2he then e"#lains that in order to endorse reasons, the reflective consciousness $ould require a #rinci#le. /o$ever, because of the nature of consciousness, this #rinci#le must arise from the consciousness itself and the consciousness must be able to $ill it as a la$. 2he refers to this as the la$ of the free $ill or the Categorical Im#erative. !he Categorical Im#erative though does not dictate the domain of the la$. In order for the domain of
24

!he value here refers to a value constructed by the #ractical act of valuing, not some mysterious ontological quality inherent and discoverable in humanity itself.

the la$ to be moral, it must range over all rational beings. Korsgaard grounds the conditions for the *oral +a$&s #ossibility in #ractical identity. 2he sho$s ho$ valuing our #ractical identities causes us to formulate sub%ective #rinci#les that obligate us. 4ur most basic #ractical identity though is our humanity. It is the condition of #ossibility from out of $hich all of our other self@ conce#tions arise. (s a result, $e necessarily value our humanity 6consciously or unconsciously=, and thereby ta'e humanity to be valuable in general 6#ractically s#ea'ing, not theoretically=. !a'ing humanity to be valuable, she concludes, sets a sub%ective #rinci#le by $hich $e endorse only reasons in accordance $ith the la$ of the Kingdom of 3nds8 the *oral +a$. In this $ay, Korsgaard derives the source and authority of morality from our #ractical valuing of humanity and our conce#tion of our #artici#ation in it. 2he sees this as a universal and #ractically necessary characteristic human nature. Gi""ards Argument In his revie$ of The Sources of Normativity, (llan )ibbard begins by affirming several of the starting #oints for Korsgaard&s argument. /e agrees $ith Korsgaard that the #roblem of morality, the #roblem of the $hy, lies in $ait for reflective moral agents.,0 /e a##roves of her re%ection of meta#hysical moral realism because he agrees that normative questions, at heart, are #ractical questions, not theoretical questions. !hey are questions about $hat to do or $hat to thin', not questions concerning entities e"isting in the $orld.,< 1inally, he a##lauds Korsgaard&s notion that moral #ro#erties arise out of human dis#ositions. !he claim behind this last #oint, he notes, aligns $ith his doctrine of e"#ressivism. /e summarizes this doctrine as follo$s8 moral statements express #ractical states of mindI#olicies for living and the li'e. claiming to follo$ from them. In #articular, )ibbard focuses his criticism on Korsgaard&s faith in #rocedures. /e attac's her account of #rocedural moral realism, re%ecting her claim that it is better equi##ed than substantive realism to handle the $eight of the normative question. !hroughout the revie$, )ibbard challenges this claim, telling his reader, We need to as' $hether #rocedures claim any advantage, as $hy@sto##ers, over substantive #rinci#lesIthose substantive #rinci#les that seem most evident, those #olicies for living that $e find most clearly un#roblematic.
25 26

,B

)ibbard acce#ts all of these starting #oints. /o$ever, he re%ects $hat he inter#rets Korsgaard as

,D

(t the end of

)ibbard, 1.? Ibid., 1.1. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 1.,.

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his revie$, )ibbard concludes that Korsgaard&s #rocedures do not offer any advantage. In fact, he claims, her #rocedural moral realism, $hen follo$ed through, leaves the door o#en for some nasty or vicious conclusions. )ibbard begins his criticism by distinguishing bet$een t$o levels of substantive moral realism. !he first level, he e"#lains, includes a meta#hysical commitment to some real though nonem#irical entities. /e argues that, on this level, the substantive moral realist engages morality as a theoretical investigation of a nonnatural realm of #ro#erties, $hich #arallel the natural #ro#erties of studies by science. #ro#er.
-? ,;

)ibbard a##lauds Korsgaard for re%ecting this

a##roach. !he second level, though, he e"#lains, refers to the substantiveJ#rocedural contrast /e argues that re%ecting meta#hysical moral realism does not establish the truth of #roceduralism. )ibbard argues that substantive #rinci#les can e"ist inde#endent of the meta#hysical commitments assumed by traditional moral realists. /e #oints to the #leasure #rinci#le as an e"am#le of a substantive #rinci#le that e"ists and acts as a normative source $ithout being an obscure meta#hysical entity. )ibbard sees this as different from the issue that sets Korsgaard&s e"#ressivism against a gratuitous meta#hysical moral realism. criticizes her for $hat he sees as a $holesale re%ection of substantive #rinci#les. )ibbard also criticizes the form of #roceduralism he sees Korsgaard as ta'ing in Sources of Normativity. In the te"t, he argues, Korsgaard for$ards a #osition stronger than sim#le #roceduralism. /e claims that she can be read as asserting that morality consists sim#ly in the logical consistency of ma"ims. 1or her, he insists, morality is a logical #ro%ect, a #ro%ect in $hich an agent must follo$ the logic of $hat to do. (s long as an agent is logically consistent in the ma"ims endorsed, then those ma"ims are morally #ermissible. )ibbard refers to this #osition as moral logicism.
-, -1

/e

/e challenges it on - counts.

1irst, )ibbard criticizes that moral logicism&s only requirement is consistency8 it does not require truth or goodness inde#endent of logical consistency. /e admits that on his o$n account logic yields requirements of consistencyC these requirements though do not necessarily yield truth. /e observes that there are many $ays of being consistent. /e states, consistency, I $ould insist, is no guarantee of truth, $e can coherently disagree $ith someone $e recognize as fully consistent.
--

!o ma'e his #oint, he #resents the e"am#le of a very

intelligent creationist. Aoth he and the creationist could be logically consistent yet still
29 30

Ibid. Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 1.-. 33 Ibid., 1...

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fundamentally disagree. )ibbard&s concern here is that one cannot reason to the truth or goodness of morality from logic alone. 2im#le consistency, as in moral logicism, fails to meet the measure of truth that Korsgaard claims it does. 2econd, )ibbard criticizes an as#ect of Korsgaard&s #osition that he refers to as logically constrained reflective sub%ectivism. +ogically constrained reflective sub%ectivism, )ibbard e"#lains, accounts for the #rinci#les against $hich ma"ims are %udged as logically consistent. /e identifies it $ith Korsgaard&s treatment of the Categorical Im#erative. )ibbard&s concern is that the Categorical Im#erative, in #articular its moral formulation, #uts too much faith in the #o$er of the $ill to constrain agents. )ibbard fears that given the multitude of logically consistent #ositions, agents could consistently endorse any number of un%ust and immoral im#ulses. /e states, (ccording to this logically constrained reflective sub%ectivism, reflectively deciding to do something makes it the thing to do, so long as your #olicies for action are logically consistent.
-.

)ibbard finds this vie$ #articularly troubling because it im#lies that by endorsing something as good it becomes the case that the thing is good. /e clarifies this #oint using the e"am#le of biodiversity. /e claims that according to logically constrained reflective sub%ectivism, $hat ma'es biodiversity good is that $e desire it. !his form of sub%ectivism treats us, reflective agents, as the source from $hich all goodness stems. /e argues that $hen ta'en negatively, the vie$ assumes the follo$ing #remise8 We $ouldn&t thin' biodiversity im#ortant KgoodL unless $e reflectively desired it. )ibbard #rotests though that the logical conclusion, biodiversity $ouldn&t be im#ortant KgoodL unless $e reflectively desired it is entirely unacce#table. /e argues that many of us assume the im#ortance of biodiversity regardless of $hether #eo#le desire it. )ibbard clarifies the #oint further by discussing the vie$ in relation to value and valuing. +ogically constrained reflective sub%ectivism, he argues, assumes that an agent&s act of valuing results in the ob%ect of valuing becoming valuable. )ibbard e"#lains that this is #roblematic for t$o reasons. 1irst, it assumes that value is solely created by and de#endent u#on human reflective activity. !his, he #rotests, does not seem to be ho$ $e actually treat value in life. We consider certain things to be valuable inde#endent of our o$n or others logical considering. We do not treat the notions of im#ortance, goodness, or value in this sub%ective manner. 2econd, he e"#lains, since the vie$ entails that value is sub%ectively determined and sustained, it also entails that anything can be made valuable as long as it undergoes the #ro#er
34

Ibid., 1.D@1.;.

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reflective #rocess, a #rocess of valuing in a logically consistent manner. !his, )ibbard #oints out, o#ens the door to validating or %ustifying the vilest of value systems as long as the values in those systems are logically consistent for the endorser. )ibbard claims then that the only thing #reventing a #erson from #ursuing the logically consistent values of a 'nave is the constraining #o$er of the $ill. It is left to the discretion of the $ill to decide bet$een equally valid values. )ibbard asserts that this stri#s a$ay any vestiges of normativity. /e concludes that a moral theory devoid of normativity, a theory that cannot close the door on 'navery, fails to meet its intended #ur#ose. 1inally, )ibbard criticizes Korsgaard&s moral logicism on the count that it is unclear the role that valuing one&s o$n humanity #lays in her central argument. )ibbard asserts that in her argument, Korsgaard uses valuing one&s o$n humanity in one of t$o $ays. 3ither she treats it as a form of self@$orthJ#ride or she treats it as a strong form of reflective sub%ectivism. In the first form, )ibbard e"#lains, valuing one&s o$n humanity entails valuing oneself as a reflective chooser. It is a matter of ta'ing #ride in the characteristic human ability, namely, one&s ability to thin' reflectively and ma'e endorsements. )ibbard #rotests though that this self@ $orth, this form of valuing one&s o$n humanity, fails to #rovide normativity. /e as's, If valuing my humanity is ta'ing #ride in being a reflective chooser, ho$ does that constrain $hat I do, $hat I reflectively choose?
-0

/e claims that at best it $ould lead #eo#le to endorse that

$hich #romoted reflective choice, something he sees as a far cry from 3nlightenment morality. In the second form, )ibbard e"#lains, valuing one&s o$n humanity entails that one #ursues the goals and ends one ado#ts sim#ly because one created and ado#ted them. /e identifies this treatment $ith her logically constrained reflective sub%ectivism. In addition to his #revious concerns regarding this vie$, )ibbard challenges $hether mere logical consistency could #revent a #erson from ado#ting immoral ends. /e reasserts his #revious concern that a 'nave or fanatic that valued their o$n humanity dee# enough could endorse an immoral action and be logically consistent.-< !herefore, he thin's this form of valuing one&s o$n humanity also fails to entail moral normativity. In either form, )ibbard concludes, valuing one&s o$n humanity fails to entail morality. !hus, )ibbard as's if there is a more #romising reading of her central argument from #ractical identity, for he claims that he has not found one. /e asserts that her treatment of #ractical identity dra$s attention to im#ortant #henomena, things that are both interesting and
35 36

Ibid., 10<. Ibid., 10B.

13

suggestive, things needing to be e"#lored.-B /o$ever, he discounts her attem#t to use #ractical identity to sho$ that logical commitments and the valuing of our humanity can get us to morality. /e clarifies that he is not o##osed to arguments for morality on #ain of inconsistency in our rationales for action, but he contends that she has not attained such an argument. (s a result, he im#lies that this failure deals a deadly blo$ to her moral logicism. In short, )ibbard argues that Korsgaard&s argument ta'es the form of a moral logicism, but this logicism fails to meet its intended goal. )ibbard a##lauds Korsgaard for her interesting contributions made in the Sources of Normativity, but he re%ects her claim that #rocedures serve better as $hy@sto##ers in ending the regress of the normative question. #es!onding to Gi""ard: A Korsgaardian Defense Go )ibbardMs criticisms hit their mar'? I shall argue they do not. In his first critical thrust, )ibbard criticizes Korsgaard&s moral account for relying on consistency as the only condition necessary for morality. /e argues that logical consistency bet$een one&s ma"ims and one&s values is no guarantee of the goodness of those ma"ims. Korsgaard&s argument, ho$ever, seems to rest on more than %ust an a##eal to sim#le consistency. 4n #ages 1?B@11? of the Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard describes the qualities of a good ma"im, a ma"im that can be $illed into a la$. ( good ma"im, she e"#lains, is good in virtue of its functional arrangement, the combined arrangement of the #arts and the #ur#ose. -D 2he em#hasizes that it is not %ust the #arts or the #ur#ose, but it is ho$ the form arranges the #arts to$ards a #ur#oseful end. 2he states, Its internal structure, its form, ma'es it fit to be $illed as a la$. ( good ma"im is therefore an intrinsically normative entity.
-;

(ccording to

Korsgaard, a good ma"im must serve as a final good because of its intrinsic structure. It must counteract the %ustificatory regress by being good in and of itself by $ay of its functional arrangement..? !he im#ortance of this is t$o@fold. 1irst, by establishing a good ma"im as an intrinsically normative entity, Korsgaard #ushes the conditions of her #roceduralism beyond sim#le consistency. 2he introduces a criterion of goodness or rightness. In order for an im#ulse to be ta'en as a reason for action it must meet this criterion of goodness. 2econd, in order to reach the domain of morality, the domain $hich includes every rational being, Korsgaard has to establish the criterion of goodness as something universal, something accessible to any
37 38

Ibid., 10D. Ibid., 1?D. 39 Korsgaard, 1?D. 40 Ibid., 11?.

14

reflective chooser. In order to do so, she grounds it in the universal condition of the valuing of humanity. 2he defines a good ma"im as a ma"im that could be endorsed by any #erson in such a $ay that it does not o##ose the valuing of humanity. !his seems to involve consistency in a meaningful $ay, but logical consistency is not the sole requirement. !he consistency acts as #art of a #rocedure by $hich ma"ims are evaluated to see if they accord $ith the valuing of humanity, in other $ords to see if they meet the criterion of goodness in order to become a reason for action. !hus, consistency does not re#resent the entire #rocedure, nor does the #rocedure fail to include goodness. !his can be made clearer by investigating )ibbard&s further criticism that Korsgaard&s argument leaves the door o#en for %ustifying the ma"ims of 'naves and fanatics. )ibbard argues that Korsgaard&s argument %ustifies the immoral ma"ims of 'naves $ho embrace their 'navish character as an essential #ractical identity. In his $ords, he claims that it allo$s for 'naves $hose characters runs dee# enough. !his same ob%ection can be seen in ).( Cohen&s critical counter@e"am#le of an Nidealized& *afioso $hose most self@identifying ideals and guiding #rinci#les consist in strength and #ride. Cohen, li'e )ibbard, argues that $hat the *afioso ta'es to be his ma"ims and thereby his obligations can be made to fit the Korsgaardian formula. /e argues though that even if the *afioso $ould reflectively endorse these ma"ims and consistently adhere to subsequent obligations, $e $ould be e"tremely reticent to suggest that his strength or #ride@based actions are thereby right or his ends good..1 !his counter@e"am#le, though, #resumes that Korsgaard&s moral #roceduralism only requires consistency. Korsgaard admits that insofar as the *afioso ta'es strength and #ride 6im#lying the ideals of mafia@life= as his most fundamental values, he $ould be %ustified in adhering to the subsequent obligations. Korsgaard denies, ho$ever, that the *afiosoMs ma"ims are morally %ustified. /e $ould in fact be obligated by the commitments of his *afioso #ractical identity, but these $ould not be obligations of the moral sort. 2he re%ects the claim that so long as a ma"im is consistent and reflectively endorsed it is thereby com#atible $ith the *oral +a$. Father, she argues that the moral formulation of the Categorical Im#erative, stressing the value of humanity, $ould obligate the *afioso to re%ect the mafia@style ma"ims. In order for this to ha##en, the *afioso $ould first have to value his #ractical identity as a human being before that of himself as a *afioso. 4nly then could he autonomously ma'e the *oral +a$ a la$ unto himself. 4nly then $ould the *afioso recognize that he has moral obligations running dee#er than his obligations to strength and #ride.
41

Cohen, ).(., Feason, /umanity, and the *oral +a$, The Sources of Normativity, 3d. 4&5eill. 65e$ 7or'8 Cambridge 9niversity :ress, 1;;<=8 1D-@D..

15

In his second critical thrust, )ibbard attac's $hat he calls Korsgaard&s logically constrained reflective sub%ectivism. /e criticizes it for asserting that reflectively endorsing something as good, im#ortant, or valuable ma'es it the case that that thing is in fact good, im#ortant, or valuable 6in a meaningful sense=. !o ma'e his #oint, )ibbard used the e"am#le of biodiversity. /e argues that $e do not thin' the im#ortance of biodiversity de#ends on each individual reflectively choosing it as im#ortantC rather, he insists, $e generally use the notions of good, im#ortance, and value to suggest something larger than %ust a reflective #rocedure. In this e"am#le and the surrounding discussion, it a##ears as if )ibbard fails to maintain the #racticalJtheoretical distinction. )ibbard com#lains that consistency in reflective endorsement does not determine $hether biodiversity is in fact im#ortant. /is com#laint, though, focuses on the im#ortance of biodiversity inde#endent of any #ersonC it focuses on an ob%ective im#ortance, a theoretical im#ortance. Korsgaard, in contrast, is interested in the #ractical. /er #oint is that if a #erson reflectively endorses biodiversity as im#ortant, biodiversity becomes im#ortant for that !erson. 1or that #erson, the im#ortance of biodiversity $ill inform other ma"ims or reflective choices. Korsgaard is not concerned $ith the meta#hysical or ob%ective im#ortance of biodiversity, but rather $ith its resha#ed #ractical role in the reflective #rocess. )ibbard also a##ears to blur the distinction in his treatment of value and valuing. )ibbard com#lains that valuing something does not entail that it is valuable. /e seems, though, to have a more ob%ective or theoretical value in mind. Korsgaard $ould agree that valuing something does not entail that it suddenly has some inde#endent, ob%ective value. /er #oint is that valuing something entails that that thing becomes valuable for the !erson valuing it. It ta'es on a ne$ #ractical value for the reflective endorser. !his is crucial to her argument for it informs ho$ $e are su##osed to understand the idea of valuing humanity. 1rom Korsgaard&s #ractical stand#oint, our valuing of humanity means that $e ta'e humanity as something valuable to us. It becomes something that sha#es $hat $e doC it alters ho$ $e thin' and the reasons $e subsequently endorse. It is $ith this rene$ed #ractical #ers#ective, a #ers#ective concerned $ith the value of humanity that $e begin to #lace moral obligations u#on ourselves. If $e $ere to inter#ret the valuing of humanity from a theoretical #ers#ective, and the valuing of humanity still entails that humanity subsequently becomes valuable, then $e $ould receive a much different understanding of her argument. 4ur act valuing of humanity $ould be the determining factor of $hether or not humanity $as in fact valuable in and of itself. (side from #robably having some odd moral im#lications, this inter#retation $ould give an almost divine

16

li'e #o$er to the human reflective #rocess. !his does not seem to be $hat Korsgaard has in mind. 2he states s#ecifically from the beginning that she is concerned $ith the #ractical, not the theoretical. 2he is interested in $hat $e take to be valuable, not in $hether or not something is in fact valuable 6in the ob%ective sense=. )ibbard a##ears to blur the same distinction in his third critical thrust. In this thrust, he attac's the role that valuing one&s o$n humanity #lays in Korsgaard&s argument. /e claims that Korsgaard #resents valuing one&s o$n humanity in t$o #ossible forms. /e inter#rets one form as aligning $ith his understanding of her logically constrained reflective sub%ectivismC to this I have already s#o'en. /e inter#rets the other form though as referring to a sort of #ride or self@ $orth. Ay this, he means that valuing one&s o$n humanity equates to ta'ing #ride in oneself as a reflective chooser. )ibbard argues that this form of valuing only leads one to value the characteristics of reflective choiceC it is a far cry from entailing moral normativity. (s mentioned, )ibbard inter#rets Korsgaard&s argument as #ro#ounding a theoretical inter#retation of value. In this inter#retation, valuing refers to a reflective #rocess by $hich one chooses to evaluate some ob%ect or ob%ective quality and determines $hether or not to im#art a sub%ective value u#on it. If this is the case, he argues, then one does not necessarily have to value one&s o$n humanityC valuing one&s o$n humanity only equates to valuing oneself as a reflective chooser. /e claims that Korsgaard attem#ts to #resent her argument in the follo$ing manner8 6:1= if one values one&s o$n humanity then one ought to value the humanity othersC 6:,= one does value one&s o$n humanityC 6C1= therefore, one ought to value the humanity of others. ., !he #roblem $ith )ibbard inter#reting valuing one&s o$n humanity as #ride or self@ $orth is that his subsequent inter#retation of her argument im#lies that one does not necessarily have to value one&s o$n humanity. If one does not have to value one&s o$n humanity, then the second #remise does a##ly universally. !hus, even if the first t$o #remises entail the conclusion, Korsgaard cannot get to universal morality because she cannot #rove the necessity of the second #remise. 1or Korsgaard, though, valuing one&s humanity includes more than ta'ing #ride or self@ $orth in one&s reflective abilitiesC it arises necessarily because of the de#endence on one&s humanity as one&s fundamental #ractical identity. Insofar as one vie$s any action or reason as meaningful, one already ta'es one&s humanity as valuable. It is the most basic #ractical identity
42

Gibbard 154.

17

from $hich all lesser #ractical identities stem. 1urthermore, humanity is universal to human natureC any #erson $ho reflectively endorses a reason de#ends u#on her humanity as the source of reflective activity and identity. It is the necessary condition of #ossibility for human reflective activity. !his de#endence generates value in the #ractical sense. We de#end u#on our humanity in order to do the things $e do, and thereby $e ta'e it as #ractically valuable to us. Instead of )ibbard&s inter#retation, the argument could #erha#s be better stated in the follo$ing manner8 6:1= If one is human then by nature one values and ta'es reasonsC 6:,= If one values anything or ta'es reasons, then one values 6in the #ractical sense= one&s o$n humanity as the condition of #ossibilityC 6:-= If one values one&s o$n humanity, then one ought to value the humanity of othersC 6C1= therefore, if one is human, then one ought value the humanity of others. Korsgaard&s Kantian debts emerge in her descri#tion of valuing one&s o$n humanity. 2he treats valuing one&s o$n humanity in the same $ay that Kant discusses transcendental conditions. 4ne values one&s o$n humanity because it ma'es #ossible the conditions for valuing or meaningful activity. :art of being human is to ta'e one&s o$n humanity as valuable. It is the ground u#on $hich reflective activity o#erates, and therefore, it is a necessary condition ma'ing #ossible the reasons by $hich one ta'es one&s life to be $orth living. In this $ay, she e"#lains, that valuing one&s o$n humanity is both universal and necessary. It is only after establishing this #oint that Korsgaard then em#hasizes the need for logical consistency. +ogical consistency ensures that the valuing of one&s o$n and others humanity agrees $ith the moral formulation of the Categorical Im#erative. !his a##lication of consistency in her argument only ma'es sense though if one ta'es a #ractical inter#retation of the valuing of humanity. In all three of his critical thrusts, )ibbard a##ears to hinge his attac' on an inter#retation that fails to read Korsgaard as #resenting a #ractical argument. (s a result, he classifies her account as moral logicism, claiming that she tries to get the $hole of morality through logical consistency, a #osition he describes as much stronger than moral #roceduralism. /o$ever, I argue that Korsgaard first grounds morality in the #ractical valuing of humanity, and only then introduces logical consistency after she has already established the universality and necessity of moral normativity. 2he understands moral truths as arising through reflective #rocedures that involve a valuing of humanity consistent $ith the moral formulation of the Categorical Im#erative. 1or this reason, I argue that Korsgaard&s argument is better classified as moral

18

#roceduralism. !o reduce that #osition to moral logicism suggests an oversight in gras#ing the core of her #ractical #ro%ect. 1inally then, in res#onding to )ibbard&s challenge that Korsgaard&s #rocedures fail to offer any advantage as sto##ers to the normative question, it is hel#ful to loo' at the im#etus behind her su##ort for #rocedural #rinci#les. Korsgaard favors #rocedures because she claims they offer the strongest %ustificatory res#onse to the normative question. 2he argues that in moments of moral crisis, #rocedures that arise from one&s o$n consciousness #rovide greater #ersuasiveness than the most robust substantive #rinci#les. 2he e"#lains that if an agent is #resented $ith the full $eight of the normative question, as'ing Why must I be moral? What claim does morality have over me in this situation? then substantive #rinci#les lac' the #ersonalized %ustification to res#ond $ith a conclusive because ". Aecause the substantive #rinci#les do not arise from the consciousness of the one in crisis, $hen that #erson loses confidence in the authority of substantive #rinci#les, those #rinci#les fail to #rovide a satisfactory ans$er. !here is nothing intrinsically $orth dying for in a substantive #rinci#le. :rocedural #rinci#les, on the other hand, derive from the very core of one&s identityC they are rooted in the #ractical valuing of one&s o$n humanity and humanity in general. !o re%ect the obligation of #rocedural #rinci#les is to re%ect oneself. !herefore, if Korsgaard&s argument holds, #rocedures do seem to offer a better res#onse to the normative question. I argue that Korsgaard&s argument, regardless of ho$ it fares against other challenges, holds u# against the attac' of )ibbard&s criticism. In re#lying in this manner, I $as not trying to defend Christine Korsgaard&s moral theory as if it $ere a #ro%ect $ithout faults. Korsgaard&s argument, li'e most #hiloso#hical arguments, suffers from shortcomings of its o$n. *y res#onse to )ibbard is merely an attem#t to address several interesting challenges that had not yet been discussed in the literature. 9ndoubtedly, further challenges and criticisms $ill continue to arise against Korsgaard&s moral #roceduralism. 5evertheless, she has #resented a unique #osition in the Sources of Normativity, a #osition that ta'es interesting strides to$ards ans$ering the normative question8 Why be moral?

19

Wor's Cited
)ibbard, (llan. *orality as Consistency in +iving8 Korsgaard&s Kantian Lectures. 3thics, >ol. 11?, 5o.1 64ct. 1;;;=8 1.?@1<.. Korsgaard, Christine. The Sources of Normativity. Com. Cohen, )euss, 5agel, Williams. 3d. 4&5eill. 5e$ 7or'8 Cambridge 9niversity :ress, 1;;<.