FISCAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY DURING THE JAGELLO PERIOD Martyn Rady

Introduction There can scarcely be many occasions when a single article not only challenges most contemporary scholarship on a historical period but also obliges a reconsideration of views and opinions held for almost half a millennium. This achievement belongs to a young Czech scholar, who in the course of his research on late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth-century ungary has found and published several neglected manuscripts relating to the size and composition of the ungarian army at the time of Moh!cs. "n the #ournal Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek $%&', no &, &''(, )'*+&%,, -nton.n /alous draws attention to new evidence relating to ungarian participation in the battle and to the losses sustained, as well as to a description of the royal army as it processed ceremonially from 0uda on &' 1uly, %2&), little more than a month before its fatal engagement. -lthough /alous eschews analysis of the figures and descriptions given in the sources he has uncovered, the evidence he presents has the following implications. 3irst, and as some historians have already argued, it is plain that the ungarian army was of substantial size by contemporary standards, numbering even though not at full strength some &2,''' combatants by the time of the battle.% 4econdly, it had been ad#usted to fight the Tur5s by the inclusion in its ran5s not only of hussars but also of a significant number of infantry. The ratio of cavalry to foot soldiers is li5ely thus to have been around the )67 ratio previously estimated by
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The present essay is partly based on the author8s introductory essay to The Laws of Hungary, 1490 1!"#, ed. and trans. 9:ter 0any;, <solt unyadi and Martyn Rady, with the assistance of 1!nos 0a5, $e%reta &egni 'ediae(alis Hungariae =hereafter >RM ?, vol. 7, 0udapest and "dyllwild, C-, forthcoming $&'%'@%%,. -n earlier version of this essay was delivered in Aovember &''B to the Cate Medieval Research 4eminar at Trinity College >ublin. The author is grateful for the insightful criticism that he received on this occasion. 0. 1!nos 4zab;, D- moh!csi csata :s a EhadFgyi forradalom8,G =The 0attle of Moh!cs and the DMilitary RevolutionG? Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek, %%( $&''7,, 77*+(HI ibid, %%H, &''2, 2(*+)&( $72'+22,.

-ndr!s /ubinyi.& The deployment of a relatively large infantry force, most of whom appear to have been harJuebusiers and pi5emen, comports with accounts of the battle that describe the ungarian line as being drawn up in an integrated formation with bloc5s of infantry supporting sJuadrons of cavalry.* Thirdly, the ungarian army was well supplied and eJuipped. -ccording to the information given by /alous, its provisions were conveyed by some 2''' waggons, which might also be deployed on the field as a )agen*urg, a form of defense the Tur5s especially feared.7 -ccompanying the army were H2 cannon and 2'' smaller guns $*ar*atos +ragenses,. 4ome of the infantry are described as bearing pavises Das big as a manG while others were armored and carried pi5es tipped with iron. "n reviewing /alous8s findings, the military historian C!szl; Keszpr:my concludes that the ungarian army at Moh!cs had at its disposal Dall the modern military innovations of the age.G2 The ungarian army may, as it turned out, have lost in battle against the Tur5s, but in terms of its numbers and composition it was plainly a formidable fighting force. Lver since %2&), Moh!cs has served as the prism through which the 1agello 5ingdom has been viewed and as a verdict on the larger failure of its rulers, Mladislas "" $%7B'+%2%), and his son, Couis "" $%2%)+&),. 0oth contemporaries and historians have thus been apt to contrast the supposed indignities of 1agello rule with the achievements of Matthias Corvinus $%72H+B',. "n so doing, they have freJuently drawn attention to the decline in the royal revenues after %7B' which, we are told, meant that the 5ingdom was unable to maintain the military strength it had previously possessed. "n support of this contention, we are often
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-ndr!s /ubinyi, DThe 0attle of 4z!vaszentdemeter-Aagyolaszi $%2&*,6 Nttoman -dvance and ungarian >efence on the Lve of Moh!cs,G in ed. O:za >!vid and 9!l 3odor, ,ttomans, Hungarians and Ha*s*urgs in -entral .uro+e/ The 'ilitary -onfines in the .ra of ,ttoman 0d(an%e . Condon &''', (%+%%2 $H2,. * DTomoreo distese P longa fronte tutte le genti in sJuadra, interponendo battaglioni de fanti tra li sJuadroni de cavalli, acciQ non fussero si facilmente circondati dalla moltitudine de turchi, et missa Juella poca artiglieri c8havea in lochi opportune.G 9aolo Oiovio, -ommentarii delle %ose de Tur%he. Kenice %27%, fol &Br. 3or Oiovio and his 5nowledge of the %2&) campaign, see K.1. 9arry, DRenaissance istorical Citerature in Relation to the Aear and Middle Last $with special reference to 9aolo Oiovio,,G in ed. 0ernard Cewis and 9.M. olt, Historians of the 'iddle .ast. Condon, %B)&, &((+HB $&H),. - translation into ungarian is provided in 0. 1!nos 4zab;, 'oh1%s. 0udapest &''), %2H+B. 7 Colin "mbert, The ,ttoman .m+ire/ The 2tru%ture of 3ower. Aew Ror5 S 0asingsto5e, &''&, &)B. 2 C!szl; Keszpr:my, EThe state and military affairs in east-central Lurope, %*H'+c. %2&'s,8 in ed. 3ran5 Tallett and >.1.0 Trim, .uro+ean )arfare, 14!0 15!0. Cambridge &'%', B)+%'B $%'B,.

assuredTJuite wronglyTthat the ungarian revenues under Matthias had eJualed those of the 5ings of 3rance.) Nnce we ac5nowledge, however, that ungary8s military capability under the 1agello rulers was actually Juite considerable and the 5ingdom able to field an army that counted amongst the most numerous and best eJuipped in Christendom, then we must necessarily reconsider the capacity of the 5ingdom to wage war. "t is the purpose of this essay to review the resources available to the 1agello 5ings, to reconsider the fiscal-military arrangements that prevailed in the 5ingdom after %7B', and in conclusion to offer some more general observations on the relationship between these arrangements and the 5ingdom8s larger organization. "n this way, we would hope to tease out the importance of /alous8s discoveries for late medieval ungary as a whole.

Finance E!e"#tion$ and E!#edient$ Lstimates of the royal income and expenditure for the 1agello period largely derive from brief statements and #ottings that are, almost literally, Dbac5 of the envelopeG calculations.( >esigned for the most part to convince the diet to agree to further supply or to convince foreigners that ungary was needful of financial support, they should be treated with caution.H Oenerally, they seem to agree that the royal income wavered at around &'',''' florinsTsplit more or less evenly between ordinary revenue and extraordinary taxesTand this remains the figure that most historians usually Juote as the royal income.B "t is indeed a
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The myth that the ungarian royal income in the %7H's was eJuivalent to the income of the 5ing of 3rance rests on Marino 4anuto8s $iarii, and found its way into ungarian literature through >ezsU Cs!n5i, D" M!ty!s udvara,G =The Court of Matthias "? 2z1zadok %( $%HH*,, 2%2+H%, )%(+)(, (H'+2 $2&2,. The 3rench royal income was in fact eJuivalent to about 7 million florins per year in the late fifteenth century, more than five times Matthias8s. ( The ma#ority of these calculations come from Kenetian accounts. 4ee "stv!n 0alogh, 6elen%zei di+lomat1k 'agyarorsz1gr7l 81!00+1!"#9. =Kenetian >iplomats on .? 4zeged %B&B, vii+viii, xvi, xxviii+ix, lxxvii. H <suzsanna ermann, DVllamh!ztart!s :s a p:nz :rt:5e a Moh!cs elUtti Magyarorsz!gon,G =>omestic economy and the value of money in . before Moh!cs? 2z1zadok %'B $%B(2,, *'%+*) $*'*, *&',I -ndr!s /ubinyi, DMagyarorsz!g hatalmasai :s a tWrW5 vesz:ly a 1agell;-5orban,G =The resources of . and the Tur5ish threat in the 1agello period? in /ubinyi, :1ndorfehr(1rt7l 'oh1%sig; 0 '1ty1s s a <agell7=kor hadtrtnete. 0udapest &''(, &*&+)' $&*B,. B 4ummarized in -ndr!s /ubinyi, D ungary8s 9ower 3actions and the Tur5ish Threat in the 1agellonian 9eriod $%7B'+%2&),,G in ed. "stv!n <ombori, >ight 0gainst the Turk in -entral .uro+e in the >irst Half of the 2i?teenth -entury. 0udapest &''7, %%2+72 $%&%+*,.

very low sumTabout X7',''' in the Lnglish money of the time, which was smaller than the Lnglish crown8s revenue even in bad years.%' Moreover, even excluding the income that Matthias had derived from his foreign conJuestsT4ilesia, Moravia and Cower -ustriaTit is considerably less than that previously obtained in ungary during the %7H's, possibly by up to two-thirds.%% The problem that ungary faced was commonplace throughout Lurope. 4ince the thirteenth century and the birth of the noble estate in ungary, the nobility had been exempt from taxation. The ungarian nobleman8s privileged status was deeply entrenchedTso much so that when 4igismund in %7*7 laid a fiftieth tax on all noble incomes to pay for the ussite wars, he had to promise never to repeat the levy.%& -ccordingly, the list of the cardinal liberties of ungarian nobles, provided in the principal legal text of this period, MerbUczy8s Tri+artitum of %2%(, included that Dthey are entirely exempt and free of all servile obligations, and of paying taxes and dues, tolls, customs and the thirtiethI and they need only serve under arms in defense of the realm.G%* -s MerbUczy8s explanation suggests, the nobleman8s exemption from taxation arose from his personal commitment to serve the ruler at time of war. The law of %7BH accordingly explained in respect of the nobles8 exemption that their ancestors had Dwon and defended this realm by the shedding of their blood and who and whose descendants still have to defend and protect it.G%7 -s it happened, however, the descendants did nothing of the sort, for the insurre%tio, the collective mobilization of the
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Oerald arriss, 2ha+ing the :ation/ .ngland 14#0+14#1. Nxford &''2, )%. Conversion of currencies is facilitated by the eJuivalence of the ungarian florin and the ducat which was recognized even at the time6 see ungarian Aational -rchive, -olle%tio 0ntemoha%siana, >l %27(2. %% 3or the royal revenues in the %7H's, see "stv!n >ras5;czy, D/ing Matthias8 Revenue and the Royal Treasury,G in ed. 9eter 3arba5y, 'atthias -or(inus, the King/ Tradition and &enewal in the Hungarian &oyal -ourt, 14!@+ 1490. 0udapest &''H, &H*+7 $&H7,I 1!nos M. 0a5, DMonarchie im Mellental. Materielle Orundlagen des ungarischen /Wnigtums im fFnfzehnten 1ahrhundert,G in ed. Reinhard 4chneider, $as s+Atmittelalterli%he Knigtum im .uro+Ais%hen 6erglei%h. 4igmaringen $KortrYge und 3orschungen, *&,, %BH(, *7(+H7 $*2B+)',. %& Llem:r M!lyusz, DCes d:buts du vote de la taxe par les ordres dans la ongrie f:odale,G :ou(elles Btudes HistoriCues. & vols, 0udapest %B)2, %, 22+H& $)',. %* Tri+artitum, ", B =7? $available with parallel Lnglish-language translation as 2te+hen )er*D%zy/ The -ustomary Law of the &enowned Kingdom of Hungary in Three 3arts. ed. 1!nos M. 0a5, 9:ter 0any; and Martyn Rady, 0udapest and "dyllwild, C- &''2, published as >RM 2. "bid, 2(,. %7 %7BH6 *2 $references in this form refer to the laws of the realm, as given in the -or+us <uris Hungari%i,.

whole nobility for war, might only serve in e?tremis and on ungarian soil.%2 -ccordingly, it had long fallen into desuetude, surviving only in rhetoric and in the general muster that accompanied some meetings of the diet.%) The failure of the 5ingdom8s nobles to perform their traditional function as warriors and to protect ordinary fol5 from Tur5ish raiders was a criticism leveled at them during the peasant uprising of %2%7.%( The nobility8s exemption from taxation rested upon an outmoded formulation of its members8 role as 5nights in the 5ing8s service. The impact of this exemption upon the medieval ungarian 5ingdom was, however, substantial. Aoble wealth accumulated over generations in the form of coin, #ewelry, money lent out, herds and floc5s, was not sub#ect to a moveables tax. Aor was the income taxable that the nobleman obtained from his peasant tenants in the form of dues in 5ind, the DninthG on produce $where it was paid,, tolls, mills and payments in lieu of labor services. Oiven that there were about *'',''' peasant households in ungary paying annually between two and four florins to their lords, we can estimate that about a million florins flowed every year into noble coffers that was not being directly taxed.%H Moreover, because the nobles were left untaxed, they had no great incentive to extract additional dues from their peasants. -s a conseJuence, the burden falling upon the peasantry in terms of what they owed to their lords was relatively lightTabout five per cent

%2 %)

%7B&6 %H, %BI %7BH6 %(. The insurre%tio is mentioned in the laws of this period as if still an institution of war. 4ee thus %7B&6 %H+BI %7BH6 %(I %2%H $Tolna,6 &I %2&)6 B. -lthough many nobles #oined the colors in the %2&) campaign, a general levy was not summoned. %( 1!nos M. 0a5, D>elinJuent Cords and 3orsa5en 4erfs6 Thoughts on Mar and 4ociety during the Crisis of 3eudalism,G in ed. 4teven 0ela Kardy and -gnes uszar Kardy, 2o%iety in -hange/ 2tudies in Honor of Ela K; Kir1ly. 0oulder and Aew Ror5 %BH*, &B%+*'7 $&B%+&, &B7+),. %H The number of peasant plots derives from -ndr!s /ubinyi, D- magyar 5ir!lys!g n:pes:ge a %2. sz!zad v:g:n,G =9opulation of the 5ingdom of . at the end of the %2th c.? in ed. 1;zsef /ov!csics, 'agyarorsz1g trtneti demogr1fi1Fa 8@9#=199!9. 0udapest %BB(, B*-%%' $%'2,. The value of peasant payments to lords is hard to Juantify with any certainty as a significant part might be paid in 5ind or services, but was seldom less than a florin in cash per plot. 4ee C!szl; /redics and C!szl; 4olymosi, 0 (esz+rmi +Gs+ksg 1!"4; (i ur*1riuma. 0udapest %BB*.

of their average income.%B "n short, because of the nobles8 exemption from taxation, the wealth of the ungarian countryside went largely untapped. There were some obvious ways by which to compensate for this deficiency, of the type to which most Luropean rulers had resort. The alienation of lands and revenues was a standard recourse and one which the diet identified as a ma#or cause of the hemorrhaging of the royal income.&' -n easy alternative was to extract loans that were eventually paid off with such properties as might from time to time escheat to the crown.&% 0y %2%), Mladislas "" had accumulated debts of possibly 7'',''' florins in this way, and his son continued to raise loans even though the lenders 5new that they had little chance of speedy repayment.&& Aevertheless, while rulers elsewhere in Lurope might acJuire the bul5 of their revenue from taxing the cities and trade, this was not possible in ungary. Certainly, ungary had a lively commerce and wealthy merchant class, sustained primarily by the export of metals and cattle.&* Merchant capital was, however, difficult to tax, for the great venturers were often foreigners, from Auremberg, Kienna and -ugsburg. "f pressed, they might withdraw their trade and ingenuity and bring commerce and mining industry to a halt. -ccordingly, the loans extracted from them, although amounting to several hundred thousand florins over the %2&'s,&7 were never as burdensome as the income tax or benevolences of Tudor Lngland. 3or their part, native merchants often bought their way into the nobility, thus putting their wealth outside the reach of royal and urban taxation.

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Vrp!d A;gr!dy, D- fWldesZri ad; :s az ad;z!s elve a 5esU 5Wz:p5ori Magyarorsz!gon,G =4eigneurial tax and the basis of taxation in late medieval .? in ed. -ndr!s /ubinyi, 1;zsef C!szlovsz5y and 9:ter 4zab;, Hazdas1g s gazd1lkod1s a kz+kori 'agyarorsz1gon/ gazdas1gtrtnet, anyagi kultIra, rgszet . 0udapest &''H, *)*+ () $*(*,. &' %7B&6 &(I %2%76 %I %2%H $0!cs,6 B, %H, 72I %2&%6 *. &% More complicatedly, escheated estates might be pledged in return for cash and then the pledge itself used to reimburse an existing loan, thus netting the 5ing a double profit. && 1;zsef 3;gel, JJ; LaFos ud(artart1sa 1!1#+1!"#. =The Court of C. ""? 0udapest %B%(, %)+%H. &* 4ee 9!l Lngel, The &ealm of 2t 2te+hen/ 0 History of 'edie(al Hungary, trans. Tam!s 9!losfalvi. Condon S Aew Ror5 &''%, *&*+2. &7 3;gel, JJ; LaFos ud(artart1sa, %)+(.

Cet us ta5e #ust one famous example of this. -lready by the %72's, 1ohn Lrnuszt, a converted 1ew from Kienna, was recorded as a merchant of 0uda.&2 e seems to have made his money selling goods to the court. Nn account of his business s5ills, Lrnuszt was appointed royal treasurer in %7)(, elevated to the nobility and awarded by Matthias with the castle lordship of Cs!5tornya. Lvidently continuing in business $it was difficult for any royal treasurer not to do so,, Lrnuszt acJuired considerable mining interests in 0eszterceb!nya. is son, 4igismund, was elevated to the bishopric of 9:cs in %7(*, which was always closely lin5ed to the treasurer8s office, and he succeeded to his father8s office in %7B*, while still maintaining the family8s mining interests. "n %7B), however, 4igismund was accused of embezzlement. "n order to forestall the same sentence of imprisonment as had befallen his deputy, 4igismund bought his freedom for the incredible sum of 7'',''' florins.&) ad it not been, however, for this windfall, we may guess that little or none of the Lrnuszt family8s wealth would have otherwise made its way to the royal treasury.&( 0eyond the nobility and the 5ingdom8s commercial elite, there was the church. 0y the early sixteenth century, the church owned about fifteen per cent of properties in the realm and about a fifth of ungary8s mar5et towns. The income of the bishops and prelates of the realm $excluding Croatia, is rec5oned to have been about &'',''' florins per year.&H Certainly, a part of this, tithe income, might be effectively converted into a royal resource by specifying that it be used to furnish military contingents. -ccording to the law of %7BH, the principal churchmen of the realm were thus obliged to field retinues, amounting in all to ))'' cavalrymen, and the lesser clergy to contribute to furnishing the local county contingents.&B

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Lrnuszt maintained close lin5s with 0uda8s 1ewish community throughout his lifeI his coat-of-arms bore a double 4tar of >avid. 4ee ed. O:za /omor;czy, <ewish Euda+est. 0udapest %BBB, %*. &) 3erenc 4o;s, 'agyarorsz1g kin%start7i 1440 1!40. 0udapest %BBB, 7*+7, 2'+%. &( Lrnuszt had, in fact, embezzled %',''' florins, through an easily-spotted accounting fraud. &H -ndr!s /ubinyi, >D+a+ok, egyh1zi intzmnyek s (all1soss1g a kz+kori 'agyarorsz1gon. =9relates, ecclesiastical institutions and faith in medieval ungary? 0udapest %BBB, HH. This figure roughly comports with our earlier estimate of total noble income being about a million florins per year. &B %7BH6 %2.

The wea5ness of the clerical estate at the diets meant, moreover, that its members might be sub#ected to additional imposts.*' Aevertheless, the resources of the church remained for most of this period largely outside the treasury8s reach. "ndividual churchmen, such as the cardinal primate 0a5;cz, might thus accumulate substantial private wealth, sufficient to found their own dynasties. "n 0a5;cz8s case, however, the 5ing confiscated upon his death in %2&% his entire moveable wealth, which amounted to at least 7',''' florins $he was unable to get hold of his landed assets,.*% The royal right to seJuester the entire property of prelates who had recently died in office was subseJuently approved by the diet.*& Thus although 0a5;cz8s successor as primate, Oeorge 4zatm!ri, left upon his death )',''' florins of his personal fortune to the 5ing, Couis seized the whole of his moveables.** The private wealth of 0a5;cz and 4zatm!ri may have been rather less than 4igismund Lrnuszt8s. Aevertheless, their example indicates the extent to which the treasury was failing to exploit the accrued wealth of the church, leaving this instead to the prelates to sweep up.

Fi$ca% Decentra%i&ation The adage, Erich land, poor country8, was never appropriate for ungary. The country was richI it was the 5ingdom8s government that was poor. [nder the 1agello rulers, however, a system of decentralized revenue collection was put in place that bro5e with the methods previously used by Matthias, whereby taxes were paid directly into the treasury and expended on the recruitment of a largely mercenary $and foreign, royal army. "t is not clear how the fiscal arrangements practiced after %7B' wor5ed in all their details. The texts of the laws

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%2%H $0!cs,6 %H. 4ee also %7B26 *%. Kilmos 3ra5n;i, .rdDdi Eak7%z Tam1s lete. =Cife of T0 of LrdUd? 0udapest %HHB, %(), &''I ungarian Aational -rchive, -olle%tio 0ntemoha%siana, >l HH'2. *& \2&2 $ atvan,6 %(.
**

9!l T;th-4zab;, 2zatm1ri Hyrgy +rim1s 814"5+1!"49. =Cife of 9rimate O. 4z.? 0udapest %B'), *'%+&.

relating to royal finance are often ambiguous and they do not always comport with the surviving charter material. 4ome guidance is, however, provided by the survival of a volume of treasury records for %7B7+B2, compiled as part of the evidence laid against 4igismund Lrnuszt.*7 This tells us that treasury expenditure was &'',''' florins, but that actual income was %H',''' florins, leaving a &',''' florin deficit. "ncome should, however, have been about a %'',''' florins more, but there was significant non-payment to the treasury of a part of the one-florin household tax raised on the peasantry.*2 "f we examine these figures closely, however, several discrepancies become apparent. Most obviously, no tax income is recorded from twelve of the counties in the south-east of the 5ingdom. "nstead, a single payment was made on their behalf of a to5en 2''' florins by the military captain, 9aul /inizsi, who bore responsibility at that time for the defense of the Cower >anube frontier.*) 9lainly, /inizsi had himself collected the tax of the twelve counties, allocated it according to his own military needs, and handed over what remained to the treasury. Ci5ewise, there are in the treasury accounts no references to income accruing from 4lavoniaTpresumably, these too were retained at source. The figures given elsewhere in the treasury accounts in respect of non-payment of the household tax are eJually suggestive. Certainly, there were in every county petty nobles who because they owned no land of their own had become liable to taxation but who were, nonetheless, incapable of payment. The vast ma#ority of the unpaid tax had, however, been assessed by officials on behalf of the treasury by reference to peasant households, but the relevant lords had not released the money. These lords included the principal barons of the realm, most notably the palatine, so we are hardly dealing here with the seJuestration of royal revenues by unscrupulous robber lords living on the political or geographical margins of the 5ingdom.
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&egistrum omnium +ro(entuum regalium, published in 1ohann Christian von Lngel, Hes%hi%hte des ungris%hen &ei%hs und seiner :e*enlAnder. Kol. %, alle %(B(, %(+%H%. *2 "bid, %H%+&. *) "bid, %(.

The income which local lords were diverting in %7B7+B2 was the so-called su*sidium of a florin. This was an extraordinary tax, normally voted by the diet $although in some years the diet was bypassed and the tax approved by the royal council alone,, that was raised on peasant households. 3rom no later than %7B*, however, the leading men of the realm were permitted to collect this tax themselves and use it to recruit troops for their own retinues, and this arrangement prevailed for most of the 1agello period.*( These private armies or *anderia were supposed to operate at a fixed size, but the figure was ad#usted to the resources available.*H 0arons fielding armies on the frontier and those reJuired to maintain standing forces had their income supplemented with direct grants from the royal treasury. *B Ci5ewise, the ma#or prelates were expected to retain *anderia, furnished out of the revenue of their tithe income, and to deploy these on the border.7' Nrdinary nobles who did not have their own *anderia or standing forces were expected to enforce collection of the su*sidium from their tenant peasants. - part of the money they raised was paid to the treasury, which used the proceeds to sustain the border defenses and to subsidize the main baronial *anderia.7% The remainder, about a half of the total that was collected, was not, however, paid to the treasury but to the county. These +e%uniae e?er%ituales $+e%uniae ad e?er%ituandum,, as they were 5nown, were used to recruit mercenaries, mainly heavy cavalrymen, although lightly-armed hussars were increasingly demanded, especially in the south, as they were better at dealing with Tur5ish raiders, while in the northern counties harJuebusiers were reJuired.7& -s far as we can ma5e out, these mercenaries were local men, possibly landless peasants or drovers who followed a military

*(

1enU !zi, 2o+ron sza*ad kir1lyi (1ros trtnete; ,kle(lt1r. = istory of the Royal 3ree City of 4opron. >ocuments? & vols, 4opron %B&%+**, vol %, part ), p. %&*I %2%H $Tolna,6 %(. *H !zi, 2o+ron, ibid, %&&I %7B&6 &'I %2%H $0!cs,6 %. *B These are listed in %7BH6 &%. 7' %7BH6 %2I %2&%6 %2. 7% /ubinyi, DThe 0attle of 4z!vaszentdemeter-Aagyolaszi $%2&*,,G ()I ed. ]rvin Ciptai, 'agyarorsz1g hadtrtnete. =Military history of .? & vols, 0udapest %BH7, %, %7%. 7& %7BH6 %)I %2&*6 %B.

vocation for part of the year. The names of the mercenaries8 captains, where they are preserved, certainly suggest a ungarian origin.7* The number of troops that any individual county was supposed to furnish rested on a ratio determined by the number of peasantry. The ratio varied from one warrior per *) households, to one per twenty and even one per ten.77 Mhen the number of troops needed or their period of service increased, the su*sidium also went up, after %2%H from one to two florins per peasant household. The principle of the ratio went bac5 to militia +ortalis introduced during the reign of 4igismund by the terms of which the peasants themselves had been obliged to furnish set numbers of warriors from out of their ran5s. -lthough this form of military recruitment had long been abandoned, the +e%uniae e?er%ituales were understood as payments made in lieu of military service.72 "n time of emergency, however, some or all peasants might yet be expected to #oin local units.7) The fiscal methods of the 1agello rulers involved the decentralization to the barons and the counties of revenue collection and its disbursement locally on military recruitment. This sort of arrangement reJuired, however, a high degree of trust, which was in short supply in 1agello ungary. The common nobles who gathered at the diet or sent delegates there, were convinced that the lords and larger landowners were not in fact collecting taxes from their peasants to field armies but were purloining the money instead for their own ends. This was true to the extent that the lords collected the su*sidium every year from their tenants but
7*

/abos /andra, D0a5;cz-codex,G in /andra, 0datok az egri egyh1zmegye trtnelmhez . Kol. %, Lger %HH2, ***-72H $*2'-%, 7'&-*,I -ndr!s /ubinyi, DThe Road to >efeat6 ungarian 9olitics and >efense in the 1agiellonian 9eriod,G in ed. 1!nos M. 0a5 and 0:la /. /ir!ly, >rom Hunyadi to &1k7%zi/ )ar and 2o%iety in Late 'edie(al and .arly 'odern Hungary. Aew Ror5 %BH&, %2B+(H $%)H,. 4ee also %2&%6 %). 77 %7B&6 &'I %7BH6 %)I %2%H $Tolna,6 &I %2&*6 %B. 72 Carolus Magner, 3etri de )arda .+istolae, 9ressburg S /assa %((), &%H. ere +raediales of the -rchbishop of /alocsa who should have served with the contingent of 4olt county were held liable to +e%uniae e?er%ituales, but they claimed poverty $%7B%,I -ndr!s /ubinyi, 'atthias &e?. 0udapest &''H, %%H. 4ee also %2&)6 &H. 7) Llem:r M!lyusz, D"". Ca#os 5ir!ly levelei a erceg 0atthy!ny-csal!d 5Wrmendi levelt!r!ban $%2&),,G =Cetters of /ing Couis "" in the 9rince 0atthy!ny 3amily -rchive in /Wrmend? Le(lt1ri Kzlemnyek 7 $%B&(,, H'+B2 $H%, H(, HB+B',I -ntal 3e5ete Aagy et al;, 'onumenta &usti%orum in Hungaria &e*ellium 0nno '$KJ6, 0udapest %B(B, %'2I %2&*6 %BI %2&)6 %'.

were seldom obliged to raise their *anderia for service in war, deploying such troops as they raised for private purposes. -ccordingly, in %2%% the diet succeeded in securing the appointment of an Eestates treasurer,8 elected by itself, who in company with one of the barons, was supposed to supervise the collection and administration of the tax voted that year.7( The institution soon languished and after %2%) the royal council assumed control of the treasury apparatus.7H Clearly though, the common nobility remained convinced that money was being diverted to personal ends. -t the Tolna diet of %2%H, the diet sought to have representatives of the counties supervise the collection of taxes, after which they were held to report to the diet.7B Cater that year, an even more ambitious scheme was proposed whereby the diet would, as in %2%%, appoint its own estates treasurers who would arrange for the collection of taxes, see to the recruitment of mercenary forces, and ensure that the barons fielded *anderia appropriate to the revenues that they raised. The system of supervision inaugurated at the 0!cs diet of %2%H scarcely lasted much more than a year.2' Aevertheless, in %2&% an even more radical remedy was attempted by the diet. -ll payments of tax were henceforth to go through estates treasurers appointed by the diet and the previous arrangement whereby barons and larger landowners funded their contingents by diverting revenues was abolished. 3rom now on, their *anderia and retinues were to be paid for out of central funds. The aim behind this was both to prevent defalcation and to eJuip a larger mercenary force.2% -s it turned out, however, the scheme imposed in %2&% was far too ambitious as well as too cumbersome and inflexible. Money continued to be diverted at source in order to fund military recruitment and thus never made its way to the treasury. 2& Nn the ground, many of the collectors were inexperienced and selected on account of their
7(

OyWrgy 0;nis, D4tYndisches 3inanzwesen in [ngarn im frFhen %). 1ahrhundert,G in :ou(elles Btudes historiCues. & vols, 0udapest %B)2, %, H*+%'* $H(+HB,. 7H >ezsU 4zab;, 0 magyar orsz1ggyLlsek trtnete JJ; LaFos kor1*an. = istory of the . diets in the reign of C. ""? 0udapest %B'B, &&. 7B %2%H $Tolna,6 B+%&. 2' 0;nis, D4tYndisches 3inanzwesen,G B&. 2% /ubinyi, DThe 0attle of 4z!vaszentdemeter-Aagyolaszi,G H%+&. 2& 4zab;, 0 magyar orsz1ggyLlsek trtnete, %((

connections rather than their expertise. "n the end, less than a paltry %'',''' florins reached the treasury. The arrangement was accordingly abandoned and previous methods of military financing reintroduced, with the barons, larger landowners and counties once again eJuipping their forces out of tax revenue ta5en at source.2* The financial reform of %2&% was accompanied by two further innovations. 3irst, the treasury undertoo5 a reform of the coinage, replacing its silver denar currency with heavily debased coin, an expedient from which, it was anticipated, a great sum of money could be added to =the 5ing8s? revenues.27 -s it turned out, the reform resulted in immediate inflation and yielded only a one-off dividend of about %&',''' florins.22 4econdly, the principle of the nobility8s exemption from taxation was for the first time called into Juestion. "n a remar5able act, the diet meeting in %2&% imposed a fifty per cent levy on the ma#or sources of noble income, Dnotwithstanding the privilege of their liberty.G2) "t is uncertain whether this extreme measure was applied in the years immediately following and Couis promised that it would not be.2( "n %2&2, however, a record of all noble incomes, including revenue streams that had been left out of the law of %2&%, was reJuired by the diet with a view to establishing the military obligations of the individual counties of the realm.2H - few months later, local captains were given the right to assess noble incomes on the spot and ta5e what they needed to fit out troops.2B -lthough this last measure was set aside as the diet that had agreed it was deemed illegal, the assembly that convened the next year approved the principle of taxes being raised according to the capacity of individual nobles.)' "t may well be that the taxes on noble income and wealth were never actually imposed or, if they were, never collected in full

2* 27

0;nis, D4tYndisches 3inanzwesen,G B7+%''. %2&%6 ), %7I %2&)6 *). 22 -ndr!s /ubinyi, DMagyarorsz!g hatalmasai :s a tWrW5 vesz:ly,G &*B. 2) %2&%6 %(. 2( %2&%6 &%. 2H %2&2 $R!5os,6 B. 2B %2&2 $ atvan,6 %'. )' %2&)6 %%.

$the Lnglish lay subsidies seldom yielded more than a small fraction of what they should have done,.)% Aevertheless, the implication in the laws was clear6 henceforth nobles should regard their revenues as being, at least in e?tremis, a taxable resource. The arrangements briefly adopted in %2&%Tremoval of the nobility8s exemption, debasement of the coinage and the attempt to have all taxes go through the treasuryTshould not distract us from the principle of fiscal decentralization that prevailed throughout most of the 1agello period. -ccording to this principle, a part of the 5ingdom8s military capacity was funded at a local level, with royal revenues being ta5en at source to eJuip the *anderia of the barons and to provide for the up5eep of the local contingents maintained by the counties. Mhat passed to the 5ing was used to fund the border garrisons and the few *anderia that were sustained directly by the royal treasury. These forces were supplemented with retinues provided by the church out of its tithe income. "t is for this reason that the treasury receipts loo5 so low, since much of what was actually feeding into the 5ingdom8s military capacity never actually went through the treasury. "ts income of &'',''' florins listed in the %7B7+B2 treasury records thus represents only a portion of the wealth that the treasury mobilized. "f we consider the money ta5en at source by the barons, larger landowners and counties, and add in the tithe income used to furnish the prelates8 own retinues along with the money accruing through ordinary revenues $salt, customs and so on,, then we may rec5on on an imputed income in the early sixteenth century of around )'',''' florins per year, plus windfalls, forced loans and so on. -lthough this sum was still small in comparison to the sums raised in contemporary 3rance or 4pain, it was about the same amount as Matthias obtained from domestic sources during the last decades of his reign.

A'a( )ro" t*e Fi$ca%+Mi%itar( State

)%

M. 1ur5ows5i, C.C. 4mith, >. Croo5, Lay Ta?es in .ngland and )ales 11@@+1#@@. /ew %BHH, %*'+*.

>espite the misgivings of the diet, the decentralized fiscal arrangements practiced under ungary8s 1agello rulers proved sufficient to field an army of impressive size and composition. -s it happened, the army deployed at Mohacs was no match for the 4ultan who, being aware of the 5ingdom8s military strength, had ta5en care to raise against it a double army that was made up of both his -natolian and Rumelian $that is 0al5an, forces. The fiscal-military organization of the realm not only, however, resulted in the provision of an army capable of ta5ing on the Tur5s, albeit unsuccessfully, but also hastened political decentralization within the 5ingdom, thereby reinforcing existing relations of power. The relationship between war and the development of polities has by now become generally accepted. Me are told that from the late Middle -ges onwards $the date is unclear,, the burden of military provision obliged governments to shift from domain-based to taxbased systems of revenue raising. -long with this, came the bureaucratic and professional organization of government, increased governmental reach over available resources, larger administrative and financial centralization, and by degrees a greater apprehension among those called upon to shoulder the burden of taxation that they belonged to a political, even national community. 0y this measure, the fiscal imperatives engendered by warfare led to the foundation of the modern state. "n reviewing these developments in the later Middle -ges, 1ean-9hilippe Oenet has remar5ed, DThe costs of war were enormous and rising =^?. 4purred on by the vital necessity to generate an ever-increasing amount of capital, =^? the growing Emodern states8 of western Lurope had developed a means of raising money which guaranteed more abundant revenues than before =^?. -s the revenues of these societies increased, so they functioned more effectively as states.G)& There are plenty of criticisms of the fiscal-military model of state development, not least its teleology, the many exceptions to its rules $most signally the case of 9russia, the
)&

1ean-9hilippe Oenet, D9olitics6 Theory and 9ractice,G in ed. Christopher -llmand, The :ew -am*ridge 'edie(al History, vol ( $c. %7%2+c. %2'',. Cambridge %BBH, *+&H $)+(,.

revenues of which long remained significantly domain-based,, and its emphasis upon the coercive nature of government. -s Charles Tilly reminds us, besides forcing the costs of war from their sub#ects, rulers might also pursue other routes, negotiating with existing powerholders and having them use their local muscle to extract the cash that the rulers themselves needed. "n return, rulers might be induced to concede new rights to these power-holders, thus reinforcing their privileges and power. -s Tilly observes, D=^? bargaining over the state8s extractive claims produced rights, privileges and protective institutions that had not previously existed.G)* -s a conseJuence, the fiscal demands of government brought about by war might not have the transforming, modernizing influence that may be observed in some parts of Mestern Lurope, but serve instead through bargaining to entrench existing relations of power, even at the expense of the centre8s own authority. -t its most extreme, this phenomenon may be discerned in parts of the Nttoman Lmpire after around %)'', when substantial tax-raising and military responsibilities were vested by the 4ultan in local pashas and potentates, who thereafter exercised an almost independent power in their provinces. 4uch also occurred, however, in late-seventeenth and eighteenth-century Lngland, which is often otherwise regarded as one of Lurope8s premier fiscal-military states. -s N80rien and unt have argued in relation to Lngland after %)HH, DThe level, structure and mode of government deployed for direct taxation reflected compromises between court and country, centre and locality, monarchy and aristocracy over the division of political power within the realm.G)7 The same set of considerations surely also apply to last decades of medieval ungary.)2 The decentralized system of tax collection and military recruitment employed by the 1agello 5ings had the conseJuence of entrenching the powers of the principal power
)*

Charles Tilly, -oer%ion, -a+ital and .uro+ean 2tates, 0$ 990 1990. Nxford %BB', %'*. Tilly8s analysis is obviously indebted to 0arrington Moore8s 2o%ial ,rigins of $i%tatorshi+ and $emo%ra%y. 0oston, M- %B)). )7 9atric5 N80rien and 9hilip -. unt, DLngland, %)H2+%H%2,G in ed. Richard 0onney, The &ise of the >is%al 2tate in .uro+e, %; 1"00 1@1!. Nxford %BBB, 2*+%'% $(H,. )2 3or this and what follows, see Martyn Rady, :o*ility, Land and 2er(i%e in 'edie(al Hungary. 0asingsto5e and Aew Ror5, &''', %2*+7, %('.

holders and institutions in the realm, thereby diminishing the scope and persuasiveness of royal government. The counties thus had their autonomy and authority extended, and they accordingly became semi-autonomous corporations, vested not only with the authority to collect taxes and raise contingents for war but also with an extended #urisdictional competence that included the right to choose their own magistracies. "t was, however, the great lordsTthose who collected the tax revenues due from their estates and converted this resource into their own private armies or *anderiaTthat profited the most. -fter %7BH, the leading men of the 5ingdom, the so-called Dbanderial lords,G were recognized as constituting a hereditary class of barons. Mhereas previously the dignity of baron and thus automatic membership of the royal council had belonged to the 5ing8s main office holders and so depended upon the royal right of nomination, from this point on a hereditary peerage was also ac5nowledged with rights identical to those of the 5ingdom8s Dtrue barons.G These *arones naturales or barons e? natu were chosen from among those families who by reason of their wealth had the physical resources to eJuip and field their own military contingents and have them muster under their own banner. Ci5e the office-holding barons, the hereditary peers had the address of magnifi%us, received a personal royal summons to attend meetings of the diet and were entitled to seal documents with red wax. The establishment of a hereditary baronage, with full entitlement to sit on the royal council, presaged the emergence #ust a century later of the [pper ouse of the ungarian diet. Together with the county gentry, it was this group of hereditary barons which would later prove the main obstacle to absburg bureaucratic centralization.

Conc%u$ion -s -nton.n /alous8s wor5 has demonstrated, the ungarian army that fought the Tur5s in %2&) was both numerous and well eJuipped. "t was sustained through a system of military

recruitment and finance that rested not upon the centralization of functions, as was typical of fiscal-military states, but upon its very reverse. 3iscal decentralization was effective and probably resulted in an imputed, indirect yield to the treasury that was little different to that previously obtained in the fifteenth century, during the reign of Matthias. This decentralization, however, resulted in a consolidation of the powers of both the counties and the emerging class of hereditary peers. "n this way, fiscal developments during the 1agello period, although yielding an efficient army, served to entrench ungary8s existing structure of power relations, thus contributing to the 5ingdom8s political complexity and to the wea5ness of its central authority.