Brandom

September 8, 2006

The Structure of Desire and Recognition:

Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution I. The Historicity of Essentially Self-Conscious Creatures

One of Hegels big ideas is that creatures with a self-conception are the sub ects of de!elopmental processes that e"hibit a distincti!e structure# $all a creature %essentiall& self-conscious' if what it is for itself, its self-conception, is an essential element of what it is in itself# How something that is essentiall& self-conscious appears to itself is part of what it really is# (his is not to sa& that it reall& is ust howe!er it appears to itself to be# )or all that the
definition of an essentiall& self-conscious being sa&s, what such a one is in itself ma& di!erge radicall& from what it is for itself# *t ma& not in fact be what it ta+es itself to be# But if it does mis-ta+e itself, if its self-conception is in error, that mista+e is still an essential feature of what it reall& is# *n this sense,

essentiall& self-conscious creatures are ,partiall&- self-constituting creatures# (heir selfregarding attitudes are efficacious in a distincti!e wa&#

)or such a being can change what it is in itself b& changing what it is for itself# (o sa& of an essentiall& self-conscious being that what it is for itself is an essential element of what it is in itself entails that an alteration in self-conception carries with it an alteration in the self of which it is a conception# .ssentiall& self-conscious creatures accordingl& en o& the possibilit& of a distincti!e +ind of self-transformation/ making themsel!es be different b& taking themsel!es to be different# *nsofar as such a difference in what the essentiall&
self-conscious creature is in itself is then reflected in a further difference in what it is for itself0perhaps ust b& in some wa& ac+nowledging that it has changed0the original change in self-conception can trigger

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Brandom a cascade# (hat process whereb& what the thing is in itself and what it is for itself reciprocall& and se7uentiall& influence one another might or might not con!erge to a stable e7uilibrium of self and conception of self#

Because what the& are in themsel!es is at an& point the outcome of such a de!elopmental process depending on their attitudes, essentiall& self-conscious beings dont ha!e natures, the& ha!e histories# Or, put differentl&, it is their nature to ha!e not ust a past, but a history/ a
se7uence of partiall& self-constituting self-transformations, mediated at e!er& stage b& their selfconceptions, and culminating in them being what the& currentl& are# (he onl& unchanging essence the& e"hibit is to ha!e what the& are in themsel!es partl& determined at e!er& stage b& what the& are for themsel!es# 8nderstanding what the& are re7uires loo+ing retrospecti!el& at the process of se7uential reciprocal influences of what the& at each stage were for themsel!es and what the& at each stage were in themsel!es, b& which the& came to be what the& now are#

9ehearsing such a historical narrati!e ,Hegels :.rinnerung- is a distincti!e wa& of understanding oneself as an essentiall& historical, because essentiall& self-conscious, sort of being# (o be for oneself a historical being is to constitute oneself as in oneself a special +ind of being/ a self-consciously historical being# ;a+ing e"plicit to oneself this crucial structural aspect of the metaph&sical +ind of being one alwa&s implicitl& has been as essentiall& self-conscious is itself a structural self-transformation/ the achie!ement of a new +ind of self-consciousness# *t is a self-transformation genericall& of this sort that Hegel aims to produce in us his readers b& his Phenomenology# (he +ind of selfconsciousness it in!ol!es is a central element in what he calls %<bsolute =nowing'#

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* suppose that when it is s+etched with these broad stro+es, this is a reasonabl& familiar picture# .ntitling oneself to tal+ this wa& re7uires doing a good bit of further wor+, howe!er# >h& should we thin+ there are things that answer to the definition of %essentiall& self-conscious beings'? >hat is a self? >hat is it to ha!e a self-conception 0to ta+e oneself to be a self, to be a self to or for oneself? )or that matter, what is it for anything to be something for one? <nd how might the notion of a self-conception, or an&thing else, being essential to what one reall& is, what one is in oneself, be cashed out or e"plained? Hegels wa& of answering these 7uestions, his detailed filling in and wor+ing out of the
rele!ant concepts, is no less interesting than the general outline of the stor& about essentiall& selfconscious, historical beings those details are called on to articulate#

II. Identification, Risk, and Sacrifice

@et me address the last 7uestion first# Suppose for the moment that we had at least an initial grasp both on the concept of a self, and on what it is to ha!e a self-conception, something one is for oneself# (he stor& *!e ust told about essentiall& self-conscious beings indicates that in order to understand the relationship between sel!es and selfconceptions, we would need also to understand what it is for some features of a selfconception to be essential elements of ones self, that is, what one is in oneself, what one really is# < self-conception ma& include man& accidental or contingent features0things that ust happen to be ,ta+en to be- true of the self in 7uestion# (he notion of an essentiall& self-conscious being applies onl& if there are also some things that one ta+es to be true of oneself such that ones self-conception ha!ing those features is essential to ones being the self one is# How are the& to be thought of as distinguished from the rest?

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Hegels answer to this 7uestion, as * understand it, can be thought of as coming in stages# (he first thought is that what it is for some features of ones self-conception to be essential is for one to take or treat them as essential# (he& are constituted as essential b& the practical attitude one adopts toward them# (he elements of ones self-conception that are essential to ones self ,i#e# that ones self-conception has those features is essential to what one
actuall& is-,

we ma& sa&, are those that one identifies with# (al+ing this wa&, essentiall&

self-conscious beings are ones whose identity, their status as being what the& are in themsel!es, depends in part upon their attitudes of identification, their attitudes of identif&ing with some pri!ileged elements of what the& are for themsel!es# Of course,
sa&ing this does not represent a significant e"planator& ad!ance as long as the concept of the practical attitude of identification remains a blac+ bo" with no more structure !isible than its label#

So we should as+/ what is it that one must do in order properl& to be understood as thereb& identifying oneself with some but perhaps not all elements of ones selfconception? (he answer we are gi!en in Self-Consciousness is that one identifies with what one is willing to risk and sacrifice for# Hegels meton&mic image for this point concerns the important case of ma+ing the initial transition from being merel& a li!ing organism, belonging to the realm of Aature, to being a deniBen of the realm of Spirit# (he +e& element in this inde" case is willingness to ris+ ones biological life in the ser!ice of a commitment0something that goes be&ond a mere desire#3 *t is onl& through sta+ing oneCs life that freedom is wonD onl& thus is it pro!ed that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not E ustF being,
3

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not the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence in the e"panse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as !anishing moments, that it is onl& pure beingfor-self# EG38HF B& being willing to ris+ ones life for something, one ma+es it the case that the life one ris+s is not an essential element of the self one is thereb& constituting, while that for which one ris+s it is# <n e"treme e"ample is the classical Iapanese samurai code of Bushido, which re7uired ritual suicide under a daunting !ariet& of circumstances# (o be samurai was to identif& oneself with the ideal code of conduct# *n a situation re7uiring seppu+u, either the biological organism or the samurai must be destro&ed, for the e"istence of the one has become incompatible with the e"istence of the other# )ailure to commit biological suicide in such a case would be the suicide of the samurai, who would be sur!i!ed onl& b& an animal# (he animal had been a merel& necessar& condition of the e"istence of the samurai ,li+e the presence of o"&gen in the atmosphere, which is important to us, but with which we do not ust for that reason count as identif&ing oursel!es-# Ao doubt e!en sincere and committed samurai must ha!e hoped that such situations would not arise# But when and if the& did, failure to act appropriatel& according to samurai practices would ma+e it the case that one ne!er had been a samurai, but onl& an animal who sometimes aspired to be one# One would thereb& demonstrate that one was not, in oneself, what one had ta+en oneself to be, what one was for oneself#
(he decision as to whether to ris+ oneCs actual life or to surrender the ideal self-conception is a decision about who one is#

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* called the sort of e"ample Hegel uses to introduce this thought :meton&mic because * thin+ that a part is being made to stand for the whole in this image# (he point he is after is far broader# )or identification in the general sense is a matter of being willing to ris+ and if need be sacrifice something one actuall& is ,in oneself- for something one is merel& for oneself, e!en if what is ris+ed is not life, but onl& other commitments or entitlements# Hegels arresting stor& of the struggle-unto-death offers a !i!id image of one important dimension of the transition from Aature to Spirit# But once the realm of Spirit0all of our normati!el& and conceptuall& articulated doings0is an up-and-running enterprise, most of what we ha!e to lose, to ris+, and to sacrifice is not a matter of biolog&, but of culture# >hat we at these subse7uent stages in our de!elopment are in oursel!es is in large part a matter of status, commitment, authorit&, and responsibilit&# 9e ecting something one alread& is because it collides with some commitment is identif&ing with the commitment one endorsed, b& sacrificing something else#
So for instance ris+ing or sacrificing ones ob for a point of moral or political principle is a selfconstituting act of identification in the same sense that ris+ing or sacrificing ones life for it is# <nd acts of identification through ris+-or-sacrifice need not be such large-scale, wholesale affairs as these# )rom the point of !iew of identification, pa&ing ta"es, though seldom a threat to biological endurance ,though there is a bo" labeled %death and ta"es'-, does belong together with liabilit& to militar& ser!ice ,a ris+ of a ris+ of life-# Both e"press ones practical identification, through sacrifice, with the communit& one thereb& defends or supports# >hene!er underta+ing a new commitment leads to brea+ing a habit or abandoning a prior intention one is identif&ing with that commitment, in practical contrast to what is gi!en up# (he historical cascade of se7uential self-transformations b& identification with elements later sacrificed, each stage building on the pre!ious ones, ta+es place largel& in the normati!e realm opened up b& the initial bootstrapping transition from the merel& natural#

*ndeed, * want to claim that Hegelian .rfahrung, the process of e"perience, ought to be understood as ha!ing this shape of identification and sacrifice# *t, too, is a process of self-constitution and selftransformation of essentiall& self-conscious beings# .ach ac+nowledged error calls for an act of selfidentification/ the endorsement of some of the mutuall& incompatible commitments one has found oneself with, and the sacrifice of others# ."perience is the process whereb& sub ects define and determine themsel!es as loci of account, b& practicall& :repelling incompatible commitments# ,$ompare the wa&

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Brandom ob ects are determinatel& identified and indi!iduated b& the specific properties the& e"hibit, and hence the materiall& incompatible properties the& modall& e"clude0properties themsel!es determinatel& contentful in !irtue of their relation of e"clusi!e difference from a specific set of materiall& incompatible properties# 2Sub ects do that b& changing their do"astic and inferential commitments/ re ecting some, refining others, reciprocall& ad usting and balancing what claims are ta+en to be true, what one is committed to doing, and what is ta+en to follow from what, so as to remo!e and repair discordances# (his is the process b& which the alwa&s somewhere colliding and competing claims of the mediating authorit& codified in uni!ersals and the immediate authorit& e"ercised b& particulars are negotiated and ad udicated# *t is accordingl& the process b& and in which conceptual contents de!elop and are determined#

III. Creatures Things Can Be So ething For: Desire and the Tri!artite Structure of Erotic "#areness:

(he stor& about essentiall& self-conscious beings, elaborated in terms of identification through
ris+-and-sacrifice, is what forged the lin+ between the constitution through de!elopment of selves and the constitution through de!elopment of conceptual contents in the process of e"perience# <nd that stor&

presupposes a conception of sel!es, and so of self-conceptions# *n order to entitle oursel!es to an account of the shape * ha!e ust s+etched, we must answer the 7uestions/ >hat is a self? >hat is it to ha!e a self-conception0to ta+e oneself to be a self, to be a self to or for oneself? )or that matter, what is it for anything to be something for one?

(he first and most basic notion, * thin+, is practical classification# < creature can take or treat some particular as being of a general +ind b& responding to it in one wa& rather than another# *n this sense, a chun+ of iron classifies its en!ironments as being of one of two
2

(his comparison is de!eloped in %Holism and *dealism in Hegels Phenomenology', $hapter Si" of Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical ssays in the Metaphysics of !ntentionality, 9obert B# Brandom EHar!ard 8ni!ersit& Jress, 3662F# 122022031 H 224515684#doc

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+inds b& rusting in some of them and not in others# (he repeatable response-+ind, rusting, induces a classification of stimuli, accordingl& as the& do or do not reliabl& elicit a response of that +ind# Since reliable differential responsi!e dispositions are ubi7uitous in the causal realm, e!er& actual ph&sical ob ect e"hibits this sort of beha!ior# )or that reason, this sort of beha!ioral classification is not b& itself a promising candidate as a definition of concepts of semantic content or awarenessD pansemanticism and panps&chism would be immediate, unappealing conse7uences#

Hegels alternati!e wa& in is to loo+ to the phenomenon of desire, as structuring the li!es of biological animals# < hungr& animal treats something as food b& %falling to without further ado and eating it up,' as Hegel sa&s ,Phenomenology G306-# (his is clearl& a species of the genus of practical classification# (he state of desiring, in this case, hunger, induces a two-sorted classification of ob ects, into those consumption of which would result in satisf&ing the desire, and the rest# (he constellation of hunger, eating, and food has structure be&ond that in pla& in the inorganic case of rusting ,response- and "et ,stimulus-# >hat ultimatel& dri!es the classification is the difference between hunger being satisfied and its not being satisfied# But the classification of ob ects b& that difference is conditioned on a mediating performance, process, or response# >hat is classified is ob ects which if responded to b& eating "ould satisf& the hunger, and those that do not ha!e that propert&# Both the role pla&ed b& the practical acti!it& of the desirer, that is, what it does in response to the ob ect, and the h&pothetical-dispositional character of the classification in terms of the effect of that doing on the satisfaction of the desire are important to Hegels picture#

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Brandom Kesires and the responsi!e practical performances that subser!e them pla& distincti!e roles in the li!ed life of an animal# (he& are intelligible in terms of the contributions the& ma+e to such functions as its nutrition, reproduction, a!oidance of predation, and so on# Because the& are, the& direct the erotic awareness of the desiring animal to the ob ects that show up as significant with respect to them in a distincti!e wa&# (he& underwrite a +ind of primiti!e intentionalit& whose character shows up in the !ocabular& it entitles us to use in describing their beha!ior# Kennett4 considers in a related conte"t a laborator& rat who has been conditioned to produce a certain +ind of beha!ior in response to a stimulus of a repeatable +ind, sa&, the sounding of a certain note# >e can in principle describe the repeatable response in two different wa&s/ %(he rat wal+s to the bar, pushes it down with his paw, and sometimes recei!es a rat-&umm&,' or %(he rat ta+es three steps forward, mo!es its paw down, and sometimes recei!es a rat-&umm&#' Both describe what the rat has done in each of the training trials# >hat has he been conditioned to do? >hich beha!ior should a reducti!e beha!iorist ta+e it has been inculcated and will be continued? <bstractl&, there seems no wa& to choose between these co-e"tensional specifications of the training# Let the wa& in which desiring organisms li+e rats are directed at desire-satisf&ing ob ects !ia e"pectations about the results of performances lead us confidentl& to predict that if the rat is put si" steps from the bar, when the note sounds it will wal+ to the bar and push it down with his paw, not wal+ three steps forward and mo!e its paw down# >e do so e!en in this artificial case for the same reasons that we e"pect that if we mo!e a birds nest a few feet further out on a limb while it is awa&, on its return it will sit in the nest in its new location, rather than on the bare limb in the nests old location# (he bird is :onto its nest ,to use a locution fa!ored b& Iohn ;cKowell in this conte"t- rather than the location# (hat is, the ob ect that has ac7uired a practical significance because of the functional role it pla&s in the animals desire-satisf&ing acti!ities# < desire is more than a disposition to act in certain wa&s, since the acti!ities one is disposed to respond to ob ects with ma& or ma& not satisf& the desire, depending on the character of those ob ects#

.rotic awareness has a tripartite structure, epitomiBed b& the relations between hunger, eating, and food# Hunger is a desire, a +ind of attitude# *t immediatel& impels hungr& animals to respond to some ob ects b& treating them as food, that is, b& eating them# #ood is accordingl& a significance that ob ects can ha!e to animals capable of hunger# *t is something things can be for desiring animals# ating is the acti!it& of ta+ing or

treating something as food# *t is what one must do in order in practice to be attributing to it the desire-relati!e erotic significance of food# ating is the acti!it& that is

instrumentally appropriate to the desire of hunger# *t is sub$ectively appropriate, in that it is the acti!it& hungr& animals are in fact impelled to b& being in the desiring state of hunger# *t is ob$ectively appropriate in that it is an acti!it&, a wa& of responding to en!ironing ob ects, that often ,enough- results in the satisfaction of the desire#

Kennett, Kaniel $# M*ntentional s&stemsM, reprinted in Iohn Haugeland ,ed#-, Mind design, EBradford Boo+s, 3683F# 122022031 6 224515684#doc

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(his distinction between two sorts of instrumental propriet& of acti!it& to desire funds a distinction between appearance and reality for the ob ects responded to, between what things are for the organism ,the erotic significance the& are taken to ha!e- and what things are in themsel!es ,the erotic significance the& actually ha!e-# <n&thing the animal responds to b& eating it is being ta+en or treated as food# But onl& things that actuall& relie!e its hunger reall& are food# (he possibilit& of these two coming apart is the organic basis for conceptual e%perience, which in its full& de!eloped form is the collision of incompatible commitments# .!en at the le!el of merel& erotic awareness, it can lead to the
animals doing things differentl&, in the sense of altering which ob ects it responds to b& treating them as ha!ing the erotic significance generated b& that desire# *ts dispositions to respond to things differentiall& as food, that is, b& eating them, can be altered b& such practical disappointments# *f all goes well with an e"periential episode in such a process of learning, the sub$ectively appropriate differential responsi!e dispositions become more reliable, in the sense of more ob$ectively appropriate to the desire that moti!ates those acti!ities#

I$: %ro

Desire to Recognition: T#o Inter!reti&e Challenges

(his account of the tripartite structure of erotic awareness offers a reasonabl& detailed answer to the 7uestion/ >hat is it for things to be something for a creature? *t is a stor& about a +ind of proto-consciousness that is intelligible still in wholl& naturalistic terms and &et pro!ides the basic practical elements out of which something recogniBable as the sort of theoretical conceptual consciousness discussed in the first three chapters of the Phenomenology could perhaps be understood to de!elop# >e +now that Hegel subscribes to the =antian claim that there can in principle be no consciousness ,properl& so described- without self-consciousness# So ma+ing the step from the erotic awareness
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of animal deniBens of the realm of Aature to the conceptual consciousness of +nowers and agents who li!e and mo!e and ha!e their being in the normati!e realm of Spirit0 creatures who ha!e achie!ed the status of selves or sub$ects0re7uires the ad!ent of selfconsciousness# >e need to understand what this achie!ement consists in, and wh& genuine consciousness re7uires it# <s well see, what is re7uired to be able to ta+e something to be a self is be able to attribute attitudes that ha!e distincti!el& normative significances/ to mo!e from a world of desires to a world of commitments& authority& and responsibility#

(he account of the tripartite structure of erotic awareness gi!es us a place to start in addressing this issue# >e should appl& the answer we ha!e in hand to the 7uestion %>hat is it for things to be something for a creature?' to the more specific case/ %>hat is it for selves to be something things can be for a creature?' (hat is, what would be re7uired for the erotic significance something had for a desiring animal to be not food or predator, but self or sub$ect, in the sense of something things can be something for? <nd second, once we understand what it is to ta+e or treat things as sel!es or sub ects, what must one do to ta+e oneself to be a thing of that +ind, to ta+e oneself to be a self?

(he tripartite account of the structure of erotic awareness pro!ides two sorts of resources for answering these 7uestions# )irst, it tells us something about what a self or sub ect is# *t is something things can be something for# >hat it offers is a construal of that status in terms of what it is to be a desiring animal, a sub ect of erotic awareness, an institutor of erotic significances, an assessor of the consilience or disparit& of what things are for it or sub ecti!el& and what the& are in themsel!es or ob ecti!el&, the sub ect of the e"perience of error and the c&clical feedbac+ process of re!ision-and-e"periment it initiates and guides# (his is what a ,proto--self in the sense of a sub ect of erotic awareness is in itself# (he 7uestion then is

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Brandom what it is for something to be one of those, to ha!e that erotic significance, for some ,to begin with, some other- creature# (he second contribution the tripartite structure of erotic awareness ma+es to understanding the nature and possibilit& of self-consciousness consists in pro!iding the form of an answer to this more specific 7uestion# )or it tells us that what we must come up with to understand what it is for something to be accorded this sort of erotic significance b& some creature0to be for it something things can be something for0is two-fold/ an account of the desire that institutes that erotic significance, and an account of the +ind of acti!it& that is instrumentall& appropriate to that desire# (he latter is an account of what one must do in order thereb& to count as taking some creature as itself a ta+er, something things can be something for, an instituter of erotic significances#

(he philosophical challenge, then, is to see what sort of an account of self-consciousness one can produce b& assembling these raw materials/ appl&ing the tripartite account of erotic awareness to itself# (he interpreti!e challenge is see to what e"tent one can b& doing that e"plain the inde" features characteristic of Hegels distincti!e claims about the nature of self-consciousness# (wo features of his approach are particularl& worth& of attention in this regard, both of them features of his master-concept of recognition# )irst is his !iew that both self-conscious indi!idual sel!es and the communities the& inhabit ,a
+ind of uni!ersal characteriBing them-

are s&nthesiBed b& reciprocal recognition among

particular participants in the practices of such a recogniti!e communit&# Selfconsciousness is essentiall&, and not ust accidentall&, a social achie!ement# Second, recognition is a normative attitude# (o recogniBe someone is to ta+e her to be the sub ect of normati!e statuses, that is, of commitments and entitlements, as capable of underta+ing responsibilities and e"ercising authorit&# (his is what it means to sa& that as reciprocall& recogniBed and recogniBing, the creatures in 7uestion are geistig, spiritual,

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beings, and no longer merel& natural ones# Here are some of the familiar representati!e passages/ Self-consciousness e"ists in and for itself when, and b& the fact that, it so e"ists for anotherD that is, it e"ists onl& in being ac+nowledgedN#(he detailed e"position of the Aotion of this spiritual unit& in its duplication will present us with the process of 9ecognition EG3H8F# < self-consciousness e"ists for a self-consciousness# Onl& so is it in fact self-consciousnessD for onl& in this wa& does the unit& of itself in its otherness become e"plicit for it# N < self-consciousness, in being an ob ect, is ust as much C*C as Cob ectC# >ith this, we alread& ha!e before us the Aotion of Spirit# >hat still lies ahead for consciousness is the e"perience of what Spirit is0this absolute substance which is the unit& of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, en o& perfect freedom and independence/ C*C that is C>eC and C>eC that is C*C EG3HHF# But according to the Aotion of recognition this Ethat a self-consciousness certaint& of itself ha!e truthF is possible onl& when each is for the other what the other is for it, onl& when each in its own self through its own action, and again through the action of the other, achie!es this pure abstraction of being-for-self EG386F# * see two principal philosophical challenges that arise in understanding the discussion of recognition and self-consciousness in these and related passages in the material in SelfConsciousness that precedes the discussion of Herrschaft und 'nechtschaft#

)irst, how are we to

understand the transition from the discussion of the concept of desire to the discussion of the concept of recognition? (his corresponds to the shift from consideration of particular merel& biological creatures impelled wholl& b& natural impulses, in relation to their species, on the one hand, to consideration of genuinel& social self-conscious indi!iduals moti!ated b& normati!e relations of authority and responsibility within their communities, on the other# How one understands the relation between these, both conceptuall& and historicall&, is e!identl& of the first importance in understanding what Hegel has to teach us about the normati!e realm he calls :Oeist#

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(he second issue concerns the formal structure of his account of the s&nthesis of social substance b& relations of reciprocal recognition# (o recogniBe someone is to ta+e or treat that indi!idual in practice as a self/ a +nowing and acting sub ect, hence as sub ect to normati!e assessment as potentiall& committed, responsible, authoritati!e, and so on# (he picture that is presented of the sort of communit& within which full& ade7uate selfconsciousness is achie!ed is one in which recognition is an e7ui!alence relation/ e!er&one in the communit& recogniBes and is recogniBed b& e!er&one else ,%each is for the other what the other is for it'-, and so recogniBes e!er&one recogniBed b& an&one else# *ndi!iduals are, roughl&, particulars whose e"hibition of, characteriBation b&, or participation in uni!ersals is essential to them# *n the case of self-conscious indi!iduals, this means that the norms of the communit& the& are members of are essential e7uall& to the indi!idual members and to the communit& as a whole#1 *n such an ideal communit&, each member is to be able to recogniBe himself as a member# (o sa& that is to sa& that recognition is refle%ive# 9ecognition is also to be symmetric, that is to sa&, reciprocal or mutual ,Hegels :gegenseitig-# *t is this aspect that is
lac+ing in the defecti!e forms of recognition that structure the defecti!e forms of self-consciousness
1

Hegel ma+es claims along these lines in his telegraphic discussion of the relation between selfconsciousness and desire# One e"ample is the summar& claim that %the unit& of self-consciousness with itself must become essential to self-consciousness, i#e# self-consciousness is Desire in general' EG36HF# He stresses that %Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness ' EG3H5F, that is, in another recogniBed recogniBer# %(he satisfaction of Kesire isNthe reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certaint& that has become truth# EBB/ that is, what things are for it and what things are in themsel!es coincide#F But the truth of this certaint& is reall& a double reflection, the duplication of selfconsciousness# $onsciousness has for its ob ect one which, of its own self posits its otherness or difference as a nothingnessN'EG3H6F# (he ob ect is the other one recogniBes, who cancels the difference between it and the inde" consciousness in the sense that it, too, recogniBes the other, thereb& appl&ing to both the other and itself one uni!ersal e"pressing a respect of similarit& or identit&/ being something things can be something for# %< self-consciousness e"ists onl& for a self-consciousness# Onl& so is it in fact a selfconsciousnessD for onl& in this wa& does the unit& of itself in its otherness become e"plicit for it' EG3HHF# %Self-consciousness e"ists in and for itself when, and b& the fact that, it so e"ists for anotherD that is, it e"ists onl& in being ac+nowledged Enur als ein <nner+anntesFN(he detailed e"position of the Aotion of this spiritual unit& in its duplication will present us with the process of 9ecognition E<nner+ennenF' EG3H8F# 122022031 31 224515684#doc

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rehearsed in the Phenomenology, beginning with the discussion of ;aster&#

(he !iew appears to be

that insofar as recognition is de facto not symmetric, it cannot be refle%ive# * cannot be properl& self-conscious ,recogniBe m&self- e"cept in the conte"t of a recognition structure that is reciprocal/ insofar as * am recogniBed b& those * recogniBe# ,(his is the essence of Hegels wittgensteinean !iew of self-consciousness, which b& contrast to a cartesian !iew sees it as a social achie!ement, which accordingl& ta+es place in important respects outside the self-conscious indi!idual# *t is not a +ind of inner glow#< big 7uestion is then/ wh&? >h& should it be the case that reciprocal ,that is, symmetric- recognition is a necessar& condition of refle%ive recognition ,that is, selfconsciousness, awareness of oneself as a self-? Here is a thought about the shape of a possible answer# *t is a formal fact that if a relation is both s&mmetric and transiti!e, then it is also refle"i!e, and hence is an e7ui!alence relation# (hat is, if ",& E"9&&9"F and ",&,BE"9&P&9B"9BF, then "E"9"F# )or we can ust appl& the transiti!it& condition to the s&mmetr& pairs "9& and &9" to &ield "9"#5 So if recognition were ,for some reason- de $ure transiti!e0if it were part of the nature of recognition that one is committed to recogniBing an&one recogniBed b& someone one recogniBes0then achie!ing de facto s&mmetr& of recognition would suffice for achie!ing de facto refle"i!it& of recognition# (hat is, each communit& member would recogniBe himself0and in that sense count as self-conscious0so long as e!er&one was recogniBed b& e!er&one the& recogniBe, that is, so long as recognition were reciprocal# So one wa& to forge the desired connection between social reciprocity of recognition and
5

9efle"i!it& is not redundant in the mathematical definition of e7ui!alence relation because the argument depends on the relation being e!er&where-defined, in the sense that that for e!er& " there is some & such that "9&, i#e# that e!er&one recogniBes someone# Oi!en the philosophical surround, this condition can, * thin+, be suppressed# 122022031 35 224515684#doc

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self-consciousness would be to establish that recognition must b& its !er& nature be transitive# *n what follows, well see how the tripartite account of erotic awareness can be used in a natural wa& to build a notion of recognition that satisfies these twin philosophical constraints on the interpretation of Hegels notion of self-consciousness in terms of desire and recognition# Koing so will both clarif& the nature of the transition from desire to recognition, and
e"plain wh& reciprocal recognition is the +e& to self-consciousness#

$: Si !le Recognition: 'eing so ething things can 'e so ething for 'eing so ething things can 'e for one >e can thin+ of the tripartite structure of erotic awareness as consisting of three elements and three relations among them# (he three elements are/ a- an attitude ,desire-, e#g# hungerD b- a responsi!e activity, e#g# eatingD and c- a significance, e#g# food# (he three relations are/ d- (he attitude must motivate the acti!it&, in the sense of activating a ,more or less reliable, in a sense determined b& the assessments in ,f- below- disposition to respond differentiall& to ob ects# e- 9esponding to an ob ect b& engaging in the acti!it& is ta+ing or treating it in practice as ha!ing a significance defined b& the attitude that moti!ates the acti!it&# (his is the sub$ective significance of the ob ect#

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f-

(he desiring attitude assesses the ob ect, implicitl& attributing to it an ob$ective significance, accordingl& as responding to it b& engaging in the acti!it& the attitude moti!ates does or does not satisf& the desire# *f it does not, if what the ob ect was sub ecti!el& or for the animal does not coincide with what it was ob ecti!el&, or in itself, that is, if the acti!it& was not successful in satisf&ing the moti!ating desire, then an error has been committed# *n that case the desire moti!ates
changing the reliable differential responsi!e disposition to engage in the associated acti!it& when acti!ated b& the desire and stimulated b& a range of ob ects#

>hat we are now interested in is a more complicated constellation of elements and relations, in which the tripartite structure of erotic awareness enters t"ice# *t is, of course, the structure of the whole thing/ %Self-consciousness is desire#' EG3H1F, at least in the sense that the most primiti!e form of self-awareness is to be understood as a de!elopment of the basic structure of erotic awareness# <nd we want to understand wh& it is also recognition, specificall& reciprocal recognition# >ithin the tripartite structure of desire as it applies to self-consciousness, the significance attributed to an ob ect, what it is for the organism e"hibiting the erotic awareness in 7uestion, is to be eroticall& aware/ to be something things can be something for# (hat is, the significance attributed b& engaging in a responsi!e acti!it& and assessed b& the moti!ating attitude ,item * abo!emust itself e"hibit the tripartite structure of erotic awareness# )or one to ha!e that significance for oneself0not ust being in oneself something things can be something for, but being that for oneself as well0that significance must be something things can be or ha!e for one#

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(he tripartite structure of erotic awareness ,(S.<- tells us that the two big 7uestions that must be answered are these/ >hat activity is it that institutes this significance ,namel&, ha!ing the (S.<-? (hat is, what is it that one must do, how must one respond to something, to count thereb& as taking or treating it as e"hibiting the (S.<? >hat is to the (S.< as eating is to food? >hat desire or other attitude is it that moti!ates that activity and assesses the success of ta+ing something as ha!ing the erotic significance of being a (S.<, i#e# being something things can be something for? >hat is to the (S.< as hunger is to food?

(o begin to address these 7uestions, and to indicate an important point of contact with Hegels own !ocabular&, we ma& call what * must do, the acti!it&, whate!er it is, that * must engage in, in order thereb& to be taking or treating something in practice as something things can be something for, %recogniBing' that other creature# So far, this is ust a label for an answer to the first 7uestion# 9ecogniBing others is attributing to them the practical significance of e"hibiting the tripartite structure of erotic awareness/ ta+ing them to be ta+ers, sub ects for whom things can ha!e a practical significance relati!e to a desire and mediated b& an acti!it&# >hat can we then sa& at this le!el of abstraction about the desire or attitude that is the third element completing the (S.< whose attitude is recogniBing and whose significance is e"hibiting the (S.<? Hegels answer is, * thin+, clear, if surprising/ it is desire for recognition, the desire that others ta+e or treat

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one in practice as a ta+er, as something things can be something for, as an instituter of significances#

*f we brac+et for the moment the crucial 7uestion of "hy a desire to be recogniBed is the attitude for which recogniBing others is the appropriate acti!it&, and so wh& it institutes the significance of being something things can be something for0ma+ing that something things can be for one, a proto-conception of selves0we ma& as+ what would happen if a being with that desire got what it wanted# *f the desire for recognition is satisfied b& responding to others b& recogniBing them, then according to the (S.< the sub ecti!e significance the recogniBed ones ha!e for the recognition-desirer shows up as being correct, as what the& ob ecti!el& are in themsel!es/ sub ects of significance-instituting attitudes and acti!ities# <nd what is re7uired for that is ust that one be recogniBed ,for that is what it ta+es to satisf& the desire- b& those one recogniBes ,for that, on the line of thought being considered, is what one must do in order, if all goes well, to satisf& the desire-# So it follows from the claim that the desire that completes the higher-order (S.< whose acti!it& is recognition and whose instituted significance is e"hibiting the (S.< is a desire for recognition that the recognition-desire can be satisfied onl& b& achie!ing reciprocal recognition# On this construal, then, ha!ing a practical protoconception of selves0being able to ta+e or treat things as sub ects things can be something for, recogniBing them0and being self-conscious in the sense of reciprocal recognition are two aspects of one achie!ement, two sides of one coin#

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*n order to gi!e a reading of these claims in terms of the tripartite structure of erotic awareness, the blac+-bo" notion of recognition must be filled in so as to answer the following three 7uestions/
3#

9ecogniBing/ >hat, e"actl&, is it that one must do in order to be recogniBing someone? (hat is, what is the acti!it& we ha!e labeled :recogniBing? How is it
that doing that is ta+ing or treating someone as e"hibiting the tripartite structure of erotic awareness? >hat is the differential responsi!e disposition that is to be licensed b& the instituting attitude?

2# Being recogniBed/ >h& should the desire to be ta+en or treated that wa& oneself, that is, to be recogniBed, be the one ma+ing appropriate that acti!it&, namel&, recogniBing? 4# Self-$onsciousness/ >h& does the reciprocal recognition that results when that desire for recognition is satisfied b& recogniBing someone else amount to selfconsciousness, in the sense of appl&ing a ,proto--conception of selves to oneself? (he challenge is to gi!e an answer to the first 7uestion that will entail plausible answers to the other two 7uestions#

(he first point to ma+e is that general recognition, ta+ing someone to be something things can be something for, must be understood in terms of specific recognition/ ta+ing someone to be something things can ha!e a specific significance for, sa& being of +ind = ,e#g# food, a predator, a potential se"ual partner-# One ta+es someone to be a ta+er in general ust in case there are some specific significances, !alues of =, for which one ta+es it that that indi!idual is a =-ta+er, i#e# can ta+e things to be =s# So it will suffice to answer the 7uestions abo!e for specific recognition, relati!iBed to some instituted
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significance = things can ha!e for a creature, in order to answer those 7uestions for the more general case#

Specificall& recogniBing someone as a =-ta+er re7uires, according to the tripartite structure of

erotic awareness, responding to the other in a wa& that practicall& or implicitl& attributes both an attitude and an acti!it& related to each other and to the significance = in the three wa&s specified as ,d-, ,e-, and ,fabo!e# (his means/

One must attribute an acti!it& that one ta+es to be what it is for the other to be responding to something as a =#

One must attribute a desire or other attitude that one ta+es to license or authori(e responding to things as =s, i#e# b& engaging in that acti!it&#

One must ac+nowledge in practice a distinction between correct and incorrect responses of that sort, assessed according to the attributed attitude that authoriBes responses of that +ind#

;& suggestion as to where we start is with the thought that in the most basic case, one can onl& ta+e another to be a =-ta+er if one is oneself a =-ta+er# (a+ing the other to be a =-ta+er will then be attributing to him acti!it& of the same sort in which one oneself engages in response to things one ,thereb&- ta+es to be =s# (hat is, m& ta+ing &ou to be able to treat things as food is m& ta+ing it that &ou respond to some things with the same beha!ior, eating, with which * respond to food#

>e are now in a position to put in place the +e&stone piece of this e"planator& structure#

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>hat the recogniBing attributor responds differentiall& to as the success of a desireauthoriBed responsi!e acti!it& is the cessation of that acti!it&# (hus no longer being disposed to respond to things b& eating things indicates that hunger was satisfied, so the thing pre!iousl& responded to as food was in itself what it was for the one recogniBed as a desirer of food#

>hat, then, is the differential response that is +e&ed to this difference in the one being recogniBed as a =-ta+er? (his is the decisi!e point# ;& ta+ing your =-response to ha!e been authoriBed b& a =-desire that ser!es as a standard for the success of &our =-ta+ing, and ta+ing that =-response to ha!e been correct or successful b& that standard is m& ac+nowledging the authority of &our =-ta+ing, in the practical sense of being disposed myself to ta+e as a = the thing you too+ to be a =# (a+ing it that the +ind of fruit &ou ate reall& was food, in that it satisfied your hunger is being disposed to eat that +ind of fruit m&self when and if ! am hungr&, i#e# ha!e a desire of the same +ind# (his is a secondorder disposition, in!ol!ing a change in m& first-order dispositions# ;& specific =recogniti!e response to &ou is to ac7uire the disposition/ if * ha!e the =-desire, then * will =-respond to the things to which * ,thereb&- ta+e &ou to ha!e successfully =-responded# ;& ac+nowledging your =-desire as authoritative in the dual sense of licensing your responsi!e =-acti!it& and ser!ing as a standard of normative assessment of its success or correctness consists in m& treating it as authori(ing m& o"n =-ta+ings, should ! ha!e a =-desire#

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So in the first instance, m& treating &our =-desire as ha!ing the normati!e significance of being authoritati!e for =-ta+ings is treating it as authoritati!e for them full stop0not ust for your =-ta+ings, but for =-ta+ings generall&, and so for mine in particular# >hat it is for
it to be '-ta+ings ,and not some other significance or no significance at all that &ou are practicall& attributing to things b& responding to them in that wa&- that * take &our responses to be consists in the fact that it is my '-ta+ing responsi!eness ,and not some other acti!it&- that * am conditionall& disposed to e"tend to the +ind of ob ects that satisfied &our desire#

(he lin+ b& which the specificall&

recogniBed ones acti!it& is assimilated to that of the recogniBer is forged b& the interpersonal character of the specific authorit& of the recogniBed ones successful ta+ings, whose ac+nowledgment is what specific recognition consists in# (he only wa& the recogniBers erotic classifications can be practicall& mapped onto those of the other so as to be intelligible as implicitl& attributing specific desires, significances, and mediating responsi!e acti!ities e"hibiting the tripartite structure of erotic awareness is if the authority of the assessments of responsi!e significance-attribution on the part of the one recogniBed is ac+nowledged in practice b& the recogniBer# So specific recognition in!ol!es ac+nowledging another as ha!ing some authorit& concerning how things are ,what things are =s-# >hen * do that, * treat &ou as one of us, in a primiti!e normati!e sense of :us0those of us sub ect to the same norms, the same authorit&0that is instituted b& ust such attitudes#

$I: Ro'ust Recognition: S!ecific Recognition of "nother as a Recogni(er

@oo+ing bac+ at the most primiti!e sort of pre-conceptual recognition of others, from the !antage-point of the full&-de!eloped conceptuall& articulated +ind, brings into relief the

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crucial boundar& that is being crossed/ between the merel& natural and the incipientl& normative# *n the merel& eroticall& aware animal, desire is a state that motivates and regulates responsi!e acti!it& immediately# *t causall& acti!ates differential responsi!e dispositions to engage in acti!ities, and its matter-of-factual satisfaction causes the creature to desist from or persist in them# But the recogniBer, who is aware of the creature as aware of things, does not feel that creatures desires, but onl& attributes them, implicitl& and practicall&, b& treating the creature as ha!ing them# (he recogniBer accordingl& ta+es up a more distanced, mediated, abstract attitude toward these significance-generating attitudes# (he recogniBed creatures attitudes are seen ,treated in practice- as assessing the correctness of practical responsi!e classifications, as licensing or authori(ing the responsi!e acti!it&0in the first instance in the case of the one recogniBed, but then also on the part of the recogniBer who merel& attributes the attitude to the other# (he relation between the attitude the recogniBer attributes and the acti!it& he himself engages in is a normative one# .!en in the most primiti!e cases it is intelligible as the ac+nowledgment of authority rather than mere ac7uiescence in an impulse# *n treating the attitudes of the recogniBed other as ha!ing authorit& for those who do not feel them, the recogniBer implicitl& accords them a significance be&ond that of mere desires/ as normatively and not merel& immediately significant attitudes#

(he stor& * ha!e rehearsed about what happens when the tripartite structure of erotic awareness is applied to itself as significance shows how recognition de!elops out of and can be made intelligible in terms of desire# But it also shows wh& ust being eroticall& aware is not enough to gi!e one a conception of a self# (hat is something one can get

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onl& b& recogniBing others# )or the possibilit& of treating attitudes as ha!ing a distincti!el& normative significance opens up in the first instance for the attitudes of others, for desires one attributes but does not immediatel& feel# (he claim we ha!e been shaping up to understand is Hegels central doctrine that self-consciousness consists in reciprocal recognition# *t is clear at this point that recogniBing others is necessar& and sufficient to ha!e a conception of sel!es or sub ects of consciousness# But the relation between that fact and reciprocity of recognition as what ma+es it possible for the participants to count as appl&ing that concept to themsel!es in the wa& re7uired for selfconsciousness has not &et been made out# (o ma+e it out, we can appl& the obser!ation made in the pre!ious section that if recognition could be shown to be de $ure transiti!e, then an& case in which it was also de facto s&mmetric ,reciprocal- would be one in which it was also de facto refle"i!e# )or refle"i!it& follows from transiti!it& and s&mmetr&#

Simple recognition is not in the rele!ant sense transiti!e# )or what * am doing in ta+ing another to be a sub ect of erotic awareness0namel&, simpl& recogniBing that desirer as a desirer0is not what * ta+e that desirer to be doing# (he one simpl& recogniBed need not be capable of being in its turn a simple recogniBer, and so something with e!en a basic conception of sel!es# )or that we need to go up a le!el, and consider what it is to ta+e another not ust to be eroticall& aware, but to be aware of others as eroticall& aware# (hat is, we must consider what it is to recogniBe another as a simple recogniBer, hence as itself the +ind of thing for which things can ha!e a specificall& normative significance# *ll call that practical attitude robust recognition# 9obust recognition is a +ind of simple recognition/ simple recognition of someone things can ha!e a specific +ind of erotic

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significance for, namel& the significance of being something things can ha!e erotic significances for#

>hat is important for m& stor& is that robust recognition is transiti!e# (his is clear from the account alread& offered of recognition in terms of ac+nowledging the authorit& of what things are for the recogniBed one# 9ecogniBing someone as a recogniBer is ac+nowledging the authorit& of their recognitions for ones own/ recogniBing whoe!er the& recogniBe# *f one presses the details, there are some subtleties that arise, but when the& ha!e been carefull& considered, the basic conclusion about the transiti!it& of robust recognition remains# So * suppress them here# Since it is a +ind of simple recognition, the acti!it& element of the erotic structural triad characteristic of robust recognition0what one must do to be ta+ing or treating someone as ,ha!ing the significance of- a simple recogniBer0is practicall& ac+nowledge as authoritati!e for ones own ta+ings ta+ings of the one being recogniBed ,if the& are successful, and within the range of significance of ones simple recognition-# *n this case, doing that is ac+nowledging the authorit& of the recogniBed ones simple recognitions# (hose simple recognitions are themsel!es a matter of ac+nowledging the authorit& of the ground-le!el erotic ta+ings of the one simpl& recogniBed# So what the robust recogniBer must do to be ta+ing someone as a simple recogniBer is to ac+nowledge as authoritati!e whate!er ground-le!el ta+ings the one robustl& recogniBed ac+nowledges as authoritati!e# <nd that is to sa& that the robust recogniBer treats as transitive the inheritance of authorit& of ground-le!el ta+ings that is what simple recogniBing consists in# *t might seem that the hierarch& generated b& ac+nowledging different le!els of recognition is open-ended/ robust recognition is ta+ing to be ,simpl& recogniBing as- a simple recogniBer, super-robust ,sa&- recognition would be simpl& recogniBing as a robust recogniBer, super-duper-robust recognition would be simpl& recogniBing as a super-robust recogniBer, and so on# Jerhaps surprisingl&, the crucial structural features of recognition dont change after we ha!e reached robust recognition# (he +e& point is that robust recognition is a specific instance of simple recognition, i#e# recognition of something as ha!ing a special +ind of erotic awareness, namel&, awareness of something as being eroticall& aware# <s we ha!e seen, that is a particular +ind of erotic significance things can ha!e# <s a result of this fact, the nascent recognitional hierarch& could be formulated as/ erotic awareness, simple recognition of something as eroticall& aware, simple recognition of something as simpl& recogniBing, simple recognition of something

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as a simple recogniBer of simple recogniBers, and so on# But what one must do in order thereb& to be simpl& recogniBing someone0the acti!it& ,corresponding to eating in the paradigmatic erotic desire-acti!it&-significance triad of hunger& eating& food- one must engage in to count as ta+ing or treating an organism as ,ha!ing the significance of beingeroticall& aware0is to ac+nowledge the normative authority for ones own responses of their ta+ings of things as something# (a+ing someone to be a simple recogniBer is accordingl& ac+nowledging in practice the authorit& of their ta+ings of someone as an erotic ta+er, which is ac+nowledging the authorit& of their ac+nowledgings of authorit&# >hate!er ground le!el ta+ings of things as something the one being robustl& recogniBed ,simpl& recogniBed as a simple recogniBer- ta+es to be authoritati!e the robust recogniBer ta+es therefore to be authoritati!e# *n robustl& recogniBing &ou, * must simpl& recogniBe whoe!er &ou simpl& recogniBe# (he effect is to produce the transitive closure of the ac+nowledgment of authorit& of ground-le!el ta+ings in which simple recognition consists# B& the :transiti!e closure of a relation is meant the relation 9 that is generated from 9 b& the two principles/ i"&E"9&"9&F and ii- "&BE,"9& P &9B-"9BF# *t is an elementar& algebraic fact that the transiti!e closure of the transiti!e closure of a relation is ust the transiti!e closure of that relation# ,(echnicall&/ closure operations are idempotent#- <ll the structural wor+ has been done the first time around# )or a to recogniBe b in the :superrobust wa&0simpl& to recogniBe b as a robust recogniBer0would commit a to ac+nowledge as authoritati!e bs simple recognitions of someone c as a simple recogniBer# )s simple recognition of c as a simple recogniBer ,which is b*s robust recognition of c-, we ha!e seen, consists in bs practical commitment to inherit c*s ac+nowledgments of anothers0ds0ground-le!el ta+ings as authoritati!e# (he effect is then that a must li+ewise be practicall& committed to inherit bs inherited ac+nowledgments of those ground-le!el commitments as authoritati!e# But this puts a in e"actl& the position a would be in if a recogniBed b robustly, rather than super-robustl&# )ormall&, once one has established that a relation is transiti!e, that "&BE,"9& P &9B-"9BF, that has as a conse7uence ,and hence re7uires nothing else to establish- that w"&BE,w9" P "9& P &9B-w9BF# Since robust recognition is the transiti!e closure of simple recognition, there is no difference between simple recognition of someone as a robust recogniBer, and robust recognition ,simple recognition of someone as a simple recogniBer- of someone as a robust recogniBer# <nd robust recognition is transiti!e/ for what one is doing to be robust recogniBing, it must include commitment to robustl& recogniBe ,simpl& recogniBe as a simple recogniBer- whoe!er is robustl& recogniBed b& those one robustl& recogniBes# (hese are facts about the acti!it& pole of the structure of simple and ,therefore of- robust recognition# >hat relates them is that the significance pole of robust recognition is the whole structure of simple recognition0 ust as the significance pole of simple recognition is the whole triadic structure of ground-le!el erotic awareness# *ndeed, we ha!e seen that the significance pole of ground-le!el erotic awareness is the crucial element in the acti!it& pole of simple recognition ,and therefore of robust recognition-# )or practical ac+nowledgment of the authorit& of the ground-le!el significances attributed in nonrecognitional erotic awareness is what the acti!it& of simple recogniBing consists in#

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*f these are the relations between the activity and significance poles ma+ing up the triadic structure of recognitional awareness, what, then, about the attitude or desire pole? (he stor& told so far la&s it down both that the desire that moti!ates simple recogniBing ,and so institutes its characteristic significance- is a desire for ,simple- recognition, and that the onl& erotic ta+ings on the part of one recogniBed that a simple recogniBer is obliged to ac+nowledge as authoritati!e are those that the one recogniBed ta+es to be successful# So we should as+/ which of the recogniBings of a simple recogniBer should a robust recogniBer ta+e to be successful? (he answer is/ onl& those that satisf& the rele!ant desire# (hat is a desire to be simpl& recogniBed, which is to sa& a desire to ha!e the authorit& of the simple recogniBers ta+ings ac+nowledged b& another# But that is precisel& what a robust recogniBer does in simpl& recogniBing an&one as a simple recogniBer# So from the point of !iew of a robust recogniBer, all the simple recognitions of the one robustl& recogniBed count as successful, and hence as authoritati!e# (here is nothing that could count as ta+ing someone to ha!e a desire to be simpl& recogniBed, moti!ating that ones simple recognitions, which fails to be satisfied# >ith this obser!ation, we ha!e reached our e"planator&-interpreti!e goal# )or we wanted to +now/ 3# how recognition should be understood to arise out of desire, 2# how normativity should be understood as an aspect of recognition, 4# how self-recognition, that is refle%ive recognition relations, should be understood to re7uire reciprocal recognition, that is to sa& symmetric recognition relations, and 1# how self-consciousness should be understood to consist in the self-recognition achie!ed b& reciprocal recognition# (he answer to the first 7uestion was supplied b& seeing how the tripartite structure of erotic awareness could be applied to itself, so that what something was ta+en or treated in practice as was a desiring, significance-instituting creature# (he answer to the second was supplied b& seeing how simple recogniBing consists in the recogniBers achie!ing a mediated, distanced, relation to the immediate felt impulse of the recogniBed ones desire,

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in the form of its significance, conditional upon the recogniBers own desires, for the recogniBers own practical awareness# *n this wa& the others desire is practicall& ac+nowledged as authoritative, and the others desire shows up for the recogniBer in the shape of the recogniBers commitment or responsibility# (he answer to the third 7uestion was supplied b& showing how ,because of the idempotence of transiti!e closure operations- the social authorit& structure constituti!e of robust recognition is essentiall& and in principle, hence una!oidabl&, transitive# )or it is a basic algebraic fact that where!er a transiti!e relation happens to hold symmetrically, it is also refle%ive# (he argument that a relations being de $ure transiti!e and de facto s&mmetric suffices for it to be refle"i!e shows a certain +ind of socialit& to be sufficient for self-recognition# >hat shows it to be necessary is that * cannot practicall& distinguish impulse from authority in m& o"n case# *t remains onl& to put these answers together to suppl& a response to the fourth and final 7uestion#

$II: Self-Consciousness

(he connection between robust recognition and self-consciousness is as immediate as that between the tripartite structure of erotic awareness and consciousness# )or to be a self, a sub ect, a consciousness0for Hegel as for =ant0is to be the sub ect of normative statuses/ not ust of desires, but of commitments# *t is to be able to ta+e a normati!e stand on things, to commit oneself, underta+e responsibilities, e"ercise authorit&, assess correctness# 9ecognition of an& +ind is ta+ing or treating something as such a self or sub ect of
normati!e statuses and attitudes# *t is consciousness of something as ,ha!ing the normati!e significance ofa self or sub ect# )or recognition itself e"hibits the tripartite structure of erotic awareness0proto-

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Brandom consciousness# (he significance it accords to the one recogniBed is that of e"hibiting that same structure# <nd adopting that practical attitude toward another is ta+ing or treating its states as ha!ing normati!e significance as authoriBing and assessing performances0not merel& producing them but ma+ing them appropriate# .ating on the part of the one recogniBed is now treated as something that in!ol!es a commitment as to how things are, a commitment that can be assessed b& both recogniBed and recogniBer ,who need not agree- as correct or incorrect#

Self-consciousness then consists in appl&ing this practical proto-conception of a self to oneself/ recogniBing not ust others, but oneself# (his is self-consciousness, or ha!ing a selfconception, in a double sense# )irst, it is a matter of consciousness of something as a self/ treating it as ha!ing that practical significance# Second, it is an application of that conception to oneself# Ha!ing a selfconception in the first sense consists in a capacit& for recognition# >e might call this a :conception of sel!es# )or that is what one must be able to do in order thereb& to be ta+ing or treating something as a self, in the sense of a sub ect of normati!e statuses of authoritative ,in the sense of probati!e, though still pro!isional and defeasible- commitments as to how things are# sense

Ha!ing a self-conception in the second

is a matter of the refle%ive character of ones recognition/ that among those one

recogniBes is oneself# (he lowest grade of self-conception that e"hibits these two dimensions would be simple recognition of oneself/ being eroticall& aware of oneself as eroticall& aware of things# >e might call this :simple self-consciousness# But the two dimensions are much more tightl& bound up with one another if one is aware of oneself as able simpl& to recogniBe things# *n that case, the conception of sel!es that one applies to oneself is as something that has a conception of sel!es# >e might call this :robust self-consciousness#

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*f a robustl& recogniBes b, then a ac+nowledges the ,probati!e, but pro!isional and defeasible- authorit& of bs successful simple recognitions# 9obust recognition, we ha!e seen, is a +ind of simple recognition/ simple recognition as able to ta+e others to be simple recogniBers# *f b robustly recogniBes someone, then that recognition is successful ust in case it satisfies bs desire for robust recognition# *f bs robust recognition of someone is successful in this sense, then in !irtue of robustl& recogniBing b, a must ac+nowledge bs robust recognition as authoritati!e# But since b& h&pothesis a does robustl& recogniBe b, bs desire for robust recognition is satisfied, so all his robust recognitions are successful ,in as e&es-# (hus if it should happen that b does robustly recogniBe a, then since a robustl& recogniBes b, we ha!e a s&mmetr& of robust recognition# Since, as we ha!e seen, robust recognition is transiti!e, this means that a will ac+nowledge the authorit& of bs robust recognition of a# So a counts as robustl& recogniBing himself# (hus robust self-consciousness is achie!able onl& through reciprocal recognition/ being robustl& recogniBed b& at least some of those one robustl& recogniBes# (his means that a community ,a +ind of uni!ersal- is implicitl& constituted b& ones own robust recognitions, and actuall& achie!ed insofar as the& are reciprocated# (hat is the sort of reciprocall& recogniti!e communit& within which alone genuine ,robust- self-consciousness is possible/ the %* that is :>e and :>e that is :*'# $III: Conclusion

* can now bring m& stor& to a 7uic+ close# * started it with the concept of essential elements of ones selfconception being ones that one identifies with, in the sense of being willing to ris+ or if need be sacrifice for them# One conse7uence of the transition from desire to commitment within the attitude component of the tripartite structure of erotic awareness is that where the acti!it&-moti!ating character of desire is

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Brandom e"tinguished with its satisfaction, the acti!it&-licensing character of commitment need not be# *n particular, desire for recognition in the form of a commitment to being recogniBed is a standing, structural element of self-consciousness# *t persists e!en when fulfilled b& the achie!ement of reciprocal recognition that is selfconsciousness# Because it persists as part of the necessar& bac+ground against which an& other commitments are adopted and relin7uished, being for oneself a recogniBer is an essential element of ones self-conception# Ones identification with it consists practicall& in the structural impossibilit& of relin7uishing that commitment in fa!or of others# (o be self-conscious is to be essentially self-conscious/ to be for oneself, and identif& oneself with oneself as something that is for oneself, a recogniBed and recogniBing being#

< fuller telling would continue with an account couched in the same basic terms of the specific distorted form of self-consciousness that construes itself under the distincti!el& modern, alienated categor& of independence that Hegel epitomiBes in the form of the :;aster# *t would e"plain how the self-conception characteristic of ;aster& arises from o!ergeneraliBing from its capacit& immediatel& to constitute itself as essentially self-conscious0ma+ing it so ust b& ta+ing it so0to &ield an ultimatel& incoherent model of a self-consciousness all of whose conceptions are immediatel& constituti!e, thus eliding 7uite generall& the crucial %distinction that consciousness in!ol!es', between what things are for it and what the& are in themsel!es# <nd it would e"plain what Hegel elsewhere calls %die >ir+ung des Schic+sals'/ the metaph&sical iron& that undermines the ;asters e"istential commitment to possessing authorit& without correlati!e responsibilit&, to being recogniBed as authoritati!e without recogniBing an&one as ha!ing the authorit& to do that# But that is a stor& for another occasion#

.AK

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