WST IAC

Volume 3, Number 2 March 2002

W E A P O N S Y S T E M S T E C H N O L O G Y I N F O R M A T I O N A N A L Y S I S C E N T ER

Interview with Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish Director, Missile Defense Agency

Contents
Interview with General Kadish
General Kadish, thank you for agreeing to be interviewed by the Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC). The readers of the WSTIAC Newsletter are very interested in missile defense because it is such a critical part of our homeland defense strategy. We would like to get your response to the following questions: 1. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was redesignated the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in January 2002. This action elevated BMDO to agency status. Has this redesignation changed your mission in any way? The change of name reflects a change in responsibilities and authorities of the MDA Director to manage the development of a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System in a single program within the Department of Defense. The new organization and authorities will impact decision-making, especially with respect to how we proceed. The redesignation did not change the mission, but rather it marked the culmination of last year's extensive missile defense review to determine how to proceed to meet our growing need for protection from ballistic missile attack. 2. What objectives have been established for missile defense?
WSTIAC is a DoD Information Analysis Center Sponsored by the Defense Technical Information Center and Operated by IiT Research Institute

Introducing Dr Scannell 6 Anti-Jam GPS Pt II Directors Corner FYI.. 7 12 8

New Sensors & Seekers Course 1 1 Calendar of Events 15

The objective of the Missile Defense Program is to develop and, in collaboration with the Military Departments and Joint Staff, deploy incrementally a BMD System that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of flight in boost, midcourse, and terminal.1 The system will evolve to address all ranges of threat ballistic missiles and to protect the territories and deployed forces of the United States, allies and friends.
1 The first opportunity to intercept a missile comes in the boost phase, as it rockets towards space. In this phase of flight, the hot missile is easy to see. The disadvantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is very small. The second opportunity is in the midcourse phase of flight, after the missile payload separates from the boosters and is coasting through space. In this phase debris and decoys may accompany warheads, which challenges the capabilities of our discrimination sensors. The advantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is relatively long. The third phase is the terminal, when the warhead plunges through the atmosphere towards its target. In this stage, the warheads move very fast, which means that the opportunity to kill it is very limited. Given atmospheric resistance, however, the lighter weight decoys are more difficult to employ in this stage. Continued on page 2

Continued from page 1

Leveraging mature and advanced technologies, and investigating new basing options unconstrained by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the president has stated that a U.S. missile defense capability will be deployed "when ready." At present, with the first deployments of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (or PAC-3) missiles begun last year and the existing PAC-2 forces, we have a limited capability in the field to defend troops and localized areas against short-range ballistic missiles. We currently have no defenses against longer-range threats to the United States or its interests abroad, forward deployed forces, allies and friends. This past December the president notified Moscow that the United States is withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty so as to remove the 30-year old restrictions on our ability to develop, test, and deploy the system we will need to protect ourselves from missile attacks. In view of this decision, we will develop and recommend deployment of capabilities that make sense within the framework of our mission and that have been tested sufficiently to give us a high level of confidence in their performance reliability and producibility. 3. We understand that the MDA budget for FY2002 is roughly $7 billion. How is this money being spent? The restructured Missile Defense Program will focus almost exclusively on research, development, test and evaluation (or RDT&E) activities. Much of the funding we received this year has been applied to improving elements that have been under development for some years now, such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Sea-Based Midcourse Defense (formerly known as Navy Theater Wide). A significant share of our funding will go toward the continued development of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the system (formerly known as National Missile Defense) and to the expansion of our Pacific Ocean-based BMD System Test Bed. We also plan to do considerable development work in the other defense segments. Following up on our successful "first light" test, we are moving towards a lethality demonstration with the Airborne Laser in the 2004 timeframe against a boosting ballistic missile target. We are also looking at alternative ways to attack a boosting missile using kinetic energy interceptors. On the terminal side, we will continue operational testing of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and we look forward to transitioning PAC-3 to full rate production to build up missile inventory. We also will continue to support the improvement of the Israeli Arrow system. The bottom line is that, with the FY 2002 funding, we will pursue a broad range of activities to aggressively develop and test mature and new technologies for integration into various missile defense elements. The $7 billion figure is roughly correct for what we need to do in this RDT&E program, and funding at about this level will be necessary in the out-years if we are to have the program stability required for sustained developmental progress. 4. Is MDA making a distinction between Theater Missile Defense and National Missile Defense or are they now integrated in some way? From a programmatic standpoint, we are no longer making this distinction. Operationally, "theater" and "national" can take on different meanings. The distinction between theater and national missile defense has gone away because we are now looking at this problem differently. Protection for Japan against ballistic missile attack might be theater for us, but it is national for the Japanese. Protection for Israel is theater for us, but it is national for the Israelis, and so on and so forth. You also have to consider that, at some point, a short-range missile positioned for launch from the sea could be used to threaten this country just as effectively as an ICBM. So, as we look at this prob-

lem, especially after September 11, when we were reminded that surprise dangers from unexpected sources do arise from time to time, we want to make sure that we engineer an integrated system that is effective against all ranges of threat missiles. 5. We understand that a robust missile defense system needs to employ a "layered defense," where threat missiles can be attacked and destroyed at various points along their flight path. Is the United States planning to use a layered defense, and if so, what will this consist of? A defining feature of the BMD System is that it will layer defenses by leveraging different geographic environments and configuring sensors, interceptors, and the battle management, command and control component to optimize the performance of the system. This country's experience in the missile defense field tells us that the technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles are daunting. So we must try to leverage key advantages that may be created when setting up engagement opportunities against a threat missile in each of the phases of flight first boost, then midcourse, and finally terminal. Reliability in the BMD System will be realized, in part, through the redundancy we build into it. Improved effectiveness, in part, will be a function of the number of shot opportunities we are able to take against an in-flight missile and how early in the threat missile's flight we can take those shots. Improving the odds of interception becomes critical when ballistic missiles carry weapons of mass destruction. Also, with boost, midcourse, and terminal defenses, the successful use of ballistic missiles against us will require the attacker to defeat the BMD system using countermeasures at different points along the missile's trajectory. This will not be easy to do. The central point here is that, by not attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we fail to exploit opportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense. This is not to say we will be perfect no system ever is. But rather we believe that the layered approach to missile defense is the key to evolving an increasingly effective system. At present, I do not know which elements will make up these layered defenses. Part of our acquisition approach is to pursue those technologies and system integration concepts that make sense and that are demonstrated through rigorous testing. Concurrent with these activities we must plan to integrate everything into a single, synergistic whole. We do not expect we will deploy everything we are developing today some activities will show more promise than others, and we intend to put our money on the winners. This does not mean we are not making technological progress or that we are lacking for ideas on what we should deploy. Based on our accomplishments to date we believe that in the 2004 to 2006 timeframe we will be in a position to recommend initial deployment of components of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element within the BMD Test Bed. In emergency situations, these same test assets will have an inherent capability to provide a limited defense of all or parts of the United States against longer-range missiles. To counter the short-range air and missile threat, today we are moving the new PAC-3 missile into production and into the field, so we know that PAC-3 will be available. Progress on the Airborne Laser (ABL) means that an early, though limited, capability within the next few years is a possibility. Development progress in the midcourse sea-based interceptor and radars over the next few years could provide us with opportunities to focus on developing mobile (or ship-based) missile defense platforms. So we have a good idea of our near-term deployment possibilities, and our testing over the next few years will help clear up the longer-term picture. Also, the system we are engineering will be able to accept upgrades and reconfigurations (that is, we can change how we deploy our sensors and interceptors), depending on the nature of the threat. What this means is that the composition of our layered defenses will periodically change. Even in battle our configurations may change, so
Continued on page 3

Continued from page 2

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

that the architecture that we take into a war (especially if that architecture includes ships at sea) may not be the same midway into that war or at war's end. 6. We understand that some of our missile defense systems will use a "hit-to-kill" strategy, where the warhead's kinetic energy is the kill mechanism and no explosives are involved, while other defensive systems will employ blast and fragmentation as kill mechanisms. Why are we using different types of kill mechanisms? You are correct to point out we have other kill mechanisms in development, to include interceptors using a blast-fragmentation warhead (PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor that uses a blast-fragmentation warhead to help increase the probability of intercept against cruise missiles and aircraft) as well as weapons that use directed energy to kill the target. The use of blast-fragmentation warheads in the PAC-3 is part of the Patriot legacy, and the use of explosive warheads continues to be important for engaging air-breathing targets. Many of the elements under development today will use "hit-to-kill" technologies, that is, sensor-propulsion packages that rely initially on external sensors and then execute endgame engagement using internal sensors to collide with the in-flight ballistic missile or warhead. We are investigating new technologies in order to identify the best approach(es) for effectively performing the missile defense mission. The development of multiple kill mechanisms will allow us to continue to advance the state of the art for missile defense, choose what works best in meeting the challenges we face (for example, perhaps we will learn that directed energy is critical to deploying a highly effective boost phase intercept capability), and use various kill mechanisms in optimum combinations to help build up the layered defense architecture. 7. The MDA has had a number of fairly recent successes where you demonstrated that it's possible to "hit a bullet with a bullet." Can you please describe the types of tests that have been conducted and what you were able to demonstrate? In order to meet the challenges of flight-testing, we use an extensive test bed. Collectively, ground-test, range, sensor, targets, and instrumentation assets, as well as our modeling and simulation and associated analytical support activities, provide valuable test capability for demonstrating technologies and integration concepts. Missile defense test schedules are complex and use a variety of facilities and ranges spread out across the world. We also use a variety of threat representative targets. This past year we successfully conducted a number of intercept flight tests. We conducted two successful intercept tests involving the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, so that we now have enough confidence in our hit-to-kill interceptor that we can add additional complexity (that is, countermeasures) into upcoming tests. This past January we conducted our first successful midcourse intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile target using a sea-based interceptor. We also conducted with mixed success several intercept tests involving multiple engagements of the PAC-3 ground-based terminal defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missile and airbreathing targets. Our tests in this area are becoming increasingly complex and we have learned that we still have more work do before we can move into full production. 8. Some people claim that the hit-to-kill tests conducted to date have not been realistic enough because an actual threat ballistic missile would employ countermeasures of one sort or another. What types of countermeasures are possible and what are MDA's plans for including realistic countermeasures in future tests?

Many types of countermeasures are possible to design, but not all of them are practical. Also, countermeasures may be developed for use in each of the engagement phases (boost, midcourse, and terminal critics mostly address midcourse countermeasures), but it is not likely that there will be a single countermeasure that is effective in all of the engagement phases. Layered defense introduces significant complexity into an attacker's plans. It also is not easy for many countries, from a technical standpoint, to integrate a countermeasure into a missile payload and successfully employ it. Moreover, few states are likely to test those countermeasures for fear that we will learn about them, and so they will not have confidence that they will work as intended. Yet we also know that the missile defense countermeasures technology is proliferating and that several nations have countermeasures programs. We are taking the countermeasures threat seriously, especially as it may evolve to defeat our midcourse interceptors. Discrimination, or our ability to find the target in the presence of countermeasures, is a major technical challenge. The ability to discriminate between decoys and reentry vehicles has always been a part of our design criteria for the Ground-based Midcourse System. We are developing advanced sensor and propulsion technologies, exploiting major leaps in computer processing, and advancing the state of the art in battle management, command and control to address these challenges. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to what states are developing, and there is every reason to believe that countermeasures technology will continue to advance. Therefore, we are using a capability-based approach in the development of the BMD System, so that we will have capability against many of the known types of countermeasures, and we will improve that capability over time as we learn more about the threat and as we demonstrate critical counter-countermeasure technologies. Because we are not designing the system only to defeat a specific threat, this approach will help us to deal with surprise threats, or so-called "unknown unknowns." We have an extensive countermeasure activity underway to explore countermeasure possibilities and devise responses to them. This activity includes "red team/white team/blue team" analysis and a process whereby we can leverage government and industry experts to vet plausible ideas and identify system weaknesses. As our testing of the individual elements of the BMD system advances from developmental to more realistic operational testing, we will be incorporating more countermeasures into our testing regime. 9. Some people have criticized the MDA for not doing enough tests. Do you think this criticism is warranted and what plans do you have for testing during the rest of 2002? Testing has always been an integral part of the Missile Defense Program, but we have listened to our critics and are taking steps to conduct more tests and introduce a greater degree of realism into our test scenarios. Each test provides valuable data, data that goes directly into development of effective missile defenses. We use disciplined, proven, and scientific methods learned over more than four decades of missile development, deployment, and operations to conduct these tests in order to learn as much as we can we learn from our failures as well as our successes. Our test philosophy is to add step-by-step complexities over time by using countermeasures and testing in increasingly stressful environments. Early in our intercept tests when we are testing hit-to-kill, in other words, we will not employ sophisticated countermeasures. We use a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go approach to testing. When successes come in increasingly complex tests, we know we are on track. So, our tests help us to determine performance capabilities and identify potential design problems. We use what we learn to improve the elements in preparation for the next test. Over all, our
Continued on page 4

Continued from page 3

tests help demonstrate system element performance under varying and stressing conditions and identify challenges. In some cases, the tests we perform help prove out construction, transportation, and logistics concepts we will need to build and operate deployment facilities. This past year, we conducted roughly one major test a month, most of which were intercept flight-tests. For the remainder of FY 2002, we plan to conduct fifteen element flight tests involving PAC-3, Airborne Laser, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Sea-based Midcourse Defense, the Israeli Arrow program, and our kinetic energy concept development work. We are projecting sixteen more element ground tests (to include testing of all the elements listed above as well as THAAD and Space-based Laser), eleven system-wide tests or exercises, and four joint interoperability exercises. As you can see, our testing approach is not limited to flight-testing. Our ground-testing provides performance assessment in a much broader set of conditions and scenarios than can be addressed in flight tests. We have wind tunnels that provide aerodynamic, aero-thermal, aero-optic jet interaction and shroud separation. We have hardware-in-the-loop test facilities that employ state-of-the-art computers in environmental chambers with target scene projection systems and flight motion simulators. We use a unique ballistic missile range facility to investigate real gas effects on aerodynamic shapes above Mach 12 and to test interceptor lethality. We also use modeling and simulation. 10. Can you please explain how modeling and simulation are being used in our missile defense programs? Modeling and simulation is an essential part of our development and test approach. It is used to perform trade-off analyses, to assist in design and engineering of the integrated BMD System and its elements, to aid in the development of operating concepts, and to perform as an adjunct to live testing in the characterization and assessment of BMD System capability and military utility. We make extensive use of modeling and simulation in order to test operational scenarios and conditions that are impractical, difficult, or costly to replicate in fight-tests, such as operating in nuclear environments and engaging multiple ballistic missile attacks against U.S. forces or the United States. Other constraints particularly those related to the physical dimensions of test ranges and the location of fixed test instrumentation present limitations on the performance envelope that can be fully flight-tested. We must rely on computer-based testing in order to advance understanding in these areas. Importantly, our flight tests allow us to gather data to anchor and update our models and simulations, so that they are highly representative of real environments. 11. Can you please describe the an airborne laser and the spacebased laser and explain how these two system fit into our overall missile defense plans? Our acquisition approach is to explore different kill mechanisms and geographic basing modes in order to develop the most effective layered BMD System possible. With the decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, it will now be possible to objectively consider cost, operational, and performance trade-offs that different approaches to missile defense present, to include approaches involving other physical principles, such as directed energy. While hit-to-kill shows great promise and will characterize our early 21st century missile defense capabilities, directed energy has significant military promise over the long-term. A laser, like that under development for ABL, can offer key advantages. High-energy lasers are capable of serving as long-range weapons, especially when they can be operated above the atmosphere. Since we are talking about a speed-of-light weapon, directed energy also can help overcome the timeline problem faced by all kinetic energy interceptors, which rely on boosters and can take several

minutes to reach the point of intercept. Lasers, in other words, can improve our response time. Ballistic missiles can be attacked within or outside the atmosphere. All boosting missiles are vulnerable to attack in the early stages of flight from platforms based in the air, at sea, or on the ground. Similarly, a missile or its payload can be attacked in the midcourse phase from any of the other geographic environments, including from space. The ability to create a layered defense architecture that uses all geographic environments would allow us to improve the overall effectiveness of the BMD System. Should we overcome the technical challenges that face us in the development of an ABL or a Space-based Laser (SBL), these elements could offer a significant enhancement of system performance. The ABL is intended to target a boosting missile above cloud level by focusing a high-energy beam of light on the missile body. The energy of the beam would heat the skin and weaken the missile structure or cause a fuel tank to rupture. This capability, which could be flown to the region of conflict and positioned to attack missiles as they boost, would add an important additional layer of defense to the architecture. By terminating powered flight early, ABL confronts an adversary with the prospect of having missile payloads fall short of their targets, perhaps even on the adversary's own territory. We have known for quite some time that, given adequate deployment of spacecraft, orbiting platforms could give us a capability to destroy in a timely manner ballistic missiles launched from almost anywhere on the globe. The long-stand-off distances involved mean that significant energy and operational demands will be placed on orbiting platforms. With space-based lasers, it would be possible to lase a missile target as it ascended or in the midcourse part of its trajectory. Space-based lasers could provide the upper layer of a defense against theater-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Exoatmospheric weapons could help thin out an attacking force before it released multiple reentry vehicles or countermeasures. There are still a number of challenges to be met, including developing a light-weight system to withstand the rigors of launch. The spacecraft would also have to be designed for refueling in orbit. So there are plenty of technical and operational difficulties to address. 12. We understand that the Russians have deployed a missile defense system to defend Moscow against ballistic missiles and that this system may use interceptors armed with nuclear warheads. Does the United States plan to use nuclear warheads as part of our missile defense system? No, the United States has no plan to develop nuclear-tipped missile defense interceptors. The first U.S. missile defense systems relied on nuclear warheads to increase the probability of killing the warhead and its penetration aids. In 1976 the United States deployed a nuclear missile defense system called Safeguard to defend an intercontinental ballistic missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Concerns about the earth environment and political consequences of nuclear explosions in space and the atmosphere led to Safeguard's dismantling just a few months after it was declared operational. Today, precision has replaced our earlier reliance on the massed and wide-area effects that only a nuclear weapon can deliver. We now have the technology to find an in-flight warhead and to collide with it. Perhaps one day we will also have the capability to destroy that warhead with pinpoint accuracy using directed energy. 13. What are some of the key technologies that the United States will need to develop in order to achieve a robust missile defense system and what progress is being made to develop these technologies? The legacy of technologies employed in our missile defense systems currently under development can be traced back at least to the 1980s.
Continued on page 5

Continued from page 4

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002 This means that we have been able to build on the investments and hard work of the previous decades. The development of groundbased sensor elements, such as the X-Band Radar (XBR) and the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), may be traced back to the days of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) that was fielded in the 1960s. Since that time, we have made significant advances in relevant technologies, including the development of solidstate Transmit/Receive Modules for X-Band Radars, and in electronics for signal and data processing in our sensors and missiles. Over the years, we have had great success in miniaturizing technologies relevant to the BMD mission and making them more reliable. Our sensors are becoming smaller and more sensitive. Space-based sensors for early warning trace their lineage as far back as the development of the Defense Support Program begun in the early 1970s. We also have capitalized on subsequent space-based sensor development programs, so that today we look forward to the deployment of a very capable Space-Based Infrared System (Low) to improve our tracking and acquisition capabilities. Major advances in focal plane array technology and computer processing will allow us to deploy extremely sensitive "eyes" in space and on the ground, on our sensors and interceptors. We have also had advances in development of longer-life cryocoolers needed for infrared sensor operations in space. Similarly, our battle management and advanced information processing and handling capabilities have a legacy going back to early computerized command and control systems like SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), which was developed and deployed in the 1950s. Computers are critical to all aspects of the missile defense mission, but especially for the battle management function and our highly sensitive radars. Using increasingly fast, small, and powerful computers, the battle-management system we have been developing processes large volumes of data in order to integrate operations, sort through and prioritize tracking and cueing information, and control multiple intercepts. Non-nuclear ground-based interceptor technologies owe a great deal to the successes we have had since the 1984 Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), when we had the first exoatmospheric intercept with the relatively large and heavy HOE kill vehicle, to include the Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System (ERIS) program, and the current Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) activities. We are now able to develop exoatmospheric kill vehicles and endoatmospheric interceptors today that are smaller and more agile. The advances in on-board computer processing capability; larger and more sensitive infrared focal plane arrays; lightweight cryogenic cooling; lighter inertial measurement instruments; lighter, higher capacity batteries; lighter-weight structures; and miniaturized propulsion all synergistically combine to provide dramatic advances in hit-to-kill capability. Today's exoatmospheric kill vehicles leverage all these advances. The HOE kill stage weighed roughly 2,500 pounds. This contrasts sharply with the roughly 120-pound Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that has been developed for the legacy NMD program. This much smaller and lighter EKV can help us to keep the costs of production down, while increasing lethality potential, range, and speed. Even at this lighter weight, the high speed of the intercepts helps ensure lethality. Larger, more sensitive focal plane arrays can detect warheads farther away and track them more accurately, allowing earlier corrections of the kill vehicle trajectory toward the intercept point. The dramatic increase in on-board processing capability is essential for processing the flood of data from complex target signatures gathered by these larger focal plane arrays. The enhanced on-board processing combined with the advanced inertial measurement instruments and miniature propulsion thrusters enables rapid, precise adjustments of the kill vehicle trajectory toward the selected aimpoint. We have been able to exploit advanced proportional navigation techniques and smaller, more efficient divert propulsion nozzles for our hit-to-kill interceptors. Furthermore, new capabilities for measuring several different colors or wavelengths in a kill vehicle's optical sensor combined with enhanced on-board processing can dramatically enhance our capability to discriminate between debris or decoys and an actual warhead. We have made significant technology advances. However, we still have a ways to go in areas such as improved target discrimination algorithms, high speed parallel computer processors for multi-color seekers, and automated battle management decision algorithm development. Of course, as we integrate technology into the BMD System, we will need increased technical fidelity in our testing infrastructure to verify increases in system performance. 14. What has MDA accomplished in the last few years that you are most proud of? I am proud to be in the forefront of a development activity that is making steady and consistent progress towards our goal of providing this nation with an effective, reliable BMD System and, in doing so, working with some of the most talented, skilled, and knowledgeable people in a very challenging area of engineering. In both government and industry, the people make a difference. So my focus over these next few years will be to convince the best and the brightest in this country and in allied countries to come to work on this program, to become valued contributing members of our missile defense national team. Because we are trying to build effective missile defenses on a priority basis, and the technical challenges facing us are significant, a rigorous testing program is required if we are to advance towards construction and deployment. So I am proud of the progress we have made in our tests and in advancing the processes (from test preparation to post-test analyses) required to make certain that we spend the taxpayer's money wisely and get the most out of each test. Testing is also one of the most significant ways we, and others, can grade our progress. We have succeeded in introducing significant rigor in our test regimes, which we must do if we are to have any confidence that what we deploy will work reliably. It all comes back to the quality of the people we employ and there are literally hundreds who are involved in the tests we conduct. We are meeting the technical challenges head on and, I am pleased to state, making steady strides. 15. What areas currently give you the most concern? In a program as complex and unprecedented as the Missile Defense Program, I am always concerned about encountering surprises, especially in the engineering, cost, and schedule areas. Unwelcome surprises in any of those areas can delay our achievement by years. We currently have no defenses in place that can protect the nation, or our forces and interests abroad, against a ballistic missile attack. There is a certain urgency, not only to deploy a system, but also to ensure that that system is both effective and affordable. As a program manager, needless to add, I am always on the lookout for better ways to manage this program. Our program is now entering a new phase, moving from technology development to system engineering, and we face a very significant challenge of integrating many diverse elements into one system. We employ thousands of individuals throughout the United States. We also are collaborating extensively with all of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the warfighting CINCs as we investigate different basing modes and deal with associated operational and planning challenges. The manage-

Continued on page 6

Continued from page 5

ment challenges we face pose at least as many difficulties as the technical challenges. 16. Is there anything else you would like to share with our readers? There have been four presidents and nine congresses since 1983 that have been pressing us along in the area of missile defense. While the national guidance and priorities relating to missile defense have changed a number of times over the years, I think we have been good stewards of the resources that have been entrusted to us. The national support we have received in this area has gotten us to the point where we are today. The efforts of the past have not been wasted; they feed directly into the successes we have had this past year. But I believe missile defense today is at a crossroads, both from the decision-making and technological points of view. We will be making some fundamental decisions over these next few years that will give shape to our defenses for the next decades. How we make those decisions, and what we base those decisions on, are highly important in this process. This is why I have focused so heavily on the management of the program not only so that we can be good stewards of the taxpayer's money, but also so that we are structured adequately to make decisions that this country will have to live with for many years to come. The threats we face and the timelines for developing such a complex system are such that we must proceed with all due haste, but not without proper deliberation concerning the direction we must take and adequate validation of our choices regarding the functional elements of the BMD System. That crossroads, in other words, represents the decisions we have to make, and the testing performances that must take place, to either get us into a very effective system or to push deployment somewhere out into the future (a result that will mean that this country will have to abide certain dangers for an undefined period of time). I am confident, however, in our direction and in the progress that is yet to come. General Kadish, thank you very much for updating us on the Missile Defense Agency's program and future plans. The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center and our more than 6,000 users extend our best wishes to you and your staff for future success.

Introducing.... Dr. Edward Scannell

STIAC is pleased to introduce the new Division Manager of the Tactical Systems Division, Dr Edward P. Scannell. Dr Scannell, an internationally renowned specialist in directed energy weapons, joined IITRI in January 2002. He is an experimental physicist with over 30 years of experience in a broad range of technical areas, in both conducting and managing research and development (R&D) programs. His areas of technical expertise include: plasma physics; alternative energy sources, such as controlled fusion, magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generators, nuclear isomers, and fuel cells for both large scale industrial and compact military applications; electromagnetic (EM) accelerators for EM guns, space propulsion and nuclear weapons simulation; and high power microwave (HPM), particle beam, laser and pulse power physics for directed energy (DE) applications. Prior to joining IITRI, Dr. Scannell was the chief of the Directed Energy and Power Generation Division including the Electrochemical Branch, now in the Sensors and Electron Devices Directorate of Army Research Lab at Adelphi MD.

NEWS(cont.)
the third quarter of fiscal 2003. The LSI approach affords opportunities to insert "leap ahead" technology upgrades when they are mature, to incorporate best business practices and to ensure an integrated effort from all concerned. The FCS program is a joint DARPA/Army program that is identifying the promising systems and technologies for achieving the Army's vision of fielding an "Objective Force" beginning this decade. "Future Combat Systems is a major step in the transformation of the Army," stated Claude M. Bolton, Jr., assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology. "The LSI is critical to making the Objective Force a reality in this decade." "FCS is an Army networked system of systems that serves as the core building block within all Objective Force maneuver units of action to enhance advanced joint and coalition warfighting capabilities to provide options for decisive victory to our Nation," said Lt. Gen. John Riggs, director, Objective Force Task Force. The FCS is envisioned as a networked system of systems including manned and unmanned platforms that will be capable of conducting missions for assault, indirect fires, air defense, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition, and battle command and communications. The Objective Force is the Army's future full spectrum force; organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from major theater wars through counter terrorism to homeland security. FCS tactical formations enable the Objective Force to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively as the means to tactical success. "The DARPA/Army Future Combat Systems effort has been and continues to be a close and effective partnership. (Continued on page 10)

In the NEWS...
DARPA, ARMY ANNOUNCE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS LEAD SYSTEM INTEGRATOR
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Army today announced the selection of the team of the Boeing Co. (Anaheim, Calif., and Seattle, Wash.) and Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), (McLean, Va., and San Diego, Calif.) as the Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) for the concept and technology development phase of the Future Combat Systems program. Subject to negotiation, the Boeing-SAIC team will receive a $154 million award for this 16-month effort. The Boeing-SAIC LSI will support the Army's development of the concept design, organization and operational structure, and performance specifications for the FCS program. The LSI Team will develop the architecture for the system of systems envisioned for the FCS, and will identify and evaluate potential concepts and technologies, conduct demonstrations and select the most promising efforts for further definition. The work accomplished by the LSI will ensure the FCS program is ready to transition from the concept and technology development phase into the system development and demonstration phase during8

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Anti-Jam (AJ) GPS Part II

Jamming Weapon Receivers
by Mark Scott IIT Research Institute

is required to deliver a minimum of 21.88 W = 10 log 10 (21.88) = 13.4 dBW of input power to the transmit antenna for the L1 C/A-code signal. The entire set of specified parameter values for minimum guaranteed GPS received signal power is as follows:
Pt = input power to satellitetransmit antenna = 21.88 W =13.4 dBW (minimum) R = range from satelliteto weapon receiver = 25,150 km (max range for satelliteat 5 deg elevation - see Figure1.) G ta = transmit antenna gain = 21.88 = 13.4 dBi (minimum) Latmos = atmospheri c losses =1.58 = 2 dB (maximum)

Background
In the September issue of the WSTIAC newsletter, Part I of this series described the proliferating employment of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation receivers in precision guided munitions (PGMs). Also described were the fundamentals of GPS navigation from the perspective of a weapon guidance function. This discussion explained how a GPS receiver's acquisition and tracking of signals transmitted from the GPS satellites, enables computation of accurate position fixes for application to weapon precision guidance functions. If simple jamming techniques are effective in blocking reception of GPS signals, then the precision guidance that we are beginning to depend on GPS providing, could be denied to current/future generations of weapons. Accordingly, in this newsletter, Part II in this series will describe the characteristics of GPS navigation signals and receivers that relate to the potential for a weapon-grade receiver to be jammed by tactically feasible electronic countermeasure (ECM) devices.

1 = L1 carrier wavelength
= c f ( L1) = 3 10 8 1.575 10 9 = 0.19m Gra = receive antenna gain =1 = 0 dBi (minimum)

GPS Satellite Signals

Each GPS satellite transmits navigation signals at two different carrier frequencies. The primary frequency is called L1 = 1.57542 GHz and the secondary frequency is called L2 = 1.22760 GHz. The reason for employing two different carrier frequencies is to enable the GPS receiver to correct for variations in the speed of light through the ionospheric portion of the earth's atmosphere (ionospheric delay in electromagnetic wave propagation is frequency dependent, and can thus be virtually eliminated via dual-frequency ranging measurements). Both carrier waves are binary phase shift key (BPSK) modulated with wide band, spread spectrum, pseudo-random noise (PRN) codes unique codes being employed by each satellite (code division multiple access or CDMA). These codes are used to accomplish the measurement of range from the receiver to the GPS satellite, as described in Part I of this series. The L1 signal carries two codes: the C/A-code (coarse/acquisition-code) and the P-code (precision-code). The C/Acode has a period of 1 msec, a bandwidth of 1.023 MHz, and was designed to be the navigation modulation for general purpose, unrestricted use in the Standard Positioning Service (SPS). The P-code is a higher rate, wider bandwidth (10.23 MHz), longer code, with a period of 1 week. The P-code was designed to be the navigation modulation for the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) of the GPS system. Intended primarily for use by DoD and US Government agencies, the P-code can be denied to civilian and other SPS users by encryption, to form a secure version of the code known as the Y-code or P(Y)-code. While the L1 signal carries both C/A and P(Y)-codes, L2 usually only carries the P(Y)-code. From the perspective of signal power budget, all three of the GPS satellite signals (L1 C/A-code, L1 P(Y)-code, and L2 P(Y)-code) are quite similar. We will initially focus on the L1 C/A-code signal for purposes of illustration in this article. The transmitter in the GPS satellites
y (Mm)
30

25

GPS Satellite Orbit

20

15

10

25,150 km

Weapon Location 5 25,785 km

5

Horizon

Earth
Rsato Reo x (Mm)
5 10 15 20 25

Re = radius of earth = 6,370 km Rsato = radius of GPS satellite orbit = 26,560 km

Figure 1: Geometry for max range encounter between GPS receiver and satellite.

Continued on page 8

Continued from page 7

These transmitter parameters result in a minimum signal power density incident on the receiver antenna of
Pt Gta 4 R 2 Latmos 21.88 21.88 = 4 ( 25150 10 3 ) 2 1.58 = 3.81 10 14 W m 2

y (Mm)

Pdensity , r =

25

(1)

20

The receiver antenna parameters above result in a minimum effective receive aperture area of
Aer = =

~45 o
15

2Gra 1 4
( 0.19) 2 (1) 4
3 2

10

= 2.87 10 m

(2)

The resulting guaranteed minimum received signal power for the L1 C/A-code GPS signal (for worst case receiver performance analysis) is:
Pr = Pdensity , r Aer = ( 3.81 1014 W m 2 ) ( 2.87 10 3 m 2 ) = 1.09 10 16 W = 160 dBW

x (Mm)

Earth

10

15

20

(3)

Figure 2: Satellite transmit antenna main beam width and orientation minimum gain = 13.4 dBi Using a representative value of 4 dB for the noise figure (numerical factor of 2.51), yields the following thermal noise level at the C/Acoded spread spectrum signal stage in a GPS receiver:
NSS = (1.38 10 23 ) ( 290) (1.023 10 6 ) ( 2.51) W = 1.03 10 14 W = 140 dBW

Note: Power in dBW = 10 log 10 (Power in Watts) This is an incredibly low RF signal! A Christmas tree light bulb suspended from a balloon over the California coastline would supply an approximately equivalent intensity of optical illumination on the face of an observer looking west from the top of the Empire State Building (assuming no atmospheric attenuation)! There are several reasons for the faintness of the GPS signal. The satellite's transmitter power is modest, viz., ~10 W order of magnitude, since the satellite is dependant on autonomous power generation via batteries and solar cells. Neither satellites nor receivers have the luxury of very high antenna gain since both entities have significant field-of-view requirements (about 45 deg beamwidth for the satellites, to cover all of the earth, all the way out to lower satellite orbits (see Figure 2); and almost hemispheric coverage for receivers, to simultaneously observe all satellites above the horizon). Finally, the satellites are pretty far away, ranging from 20,190 km overhead to 25,150 km down near the horizon (see Figure 1 again). Together, these factors result in a whispy power density incident on an earthbound receiver's antenna ~10-14 W/m2 = 0.01 pW/m 2, i.e., one-hundredth of a picoWatt (10-12 W) per square meter! By comparison, the thermal noise resident in the receiver's spread spectrum bandwidth that accommodates the 1 + MHz wide C/Acoded signal is given by
N SS = kT0 BSS F where k = Boltzmann' s constant = 1.38 10 -23 J K T 0 = standard ambient temperature = 290K (17C or 63F) BSS = spread spectrum bandwidth of C/A - coded signal = 1.023 MHz F = receiver's noise figure

(5)

This noise level, small though it may be, is 20 dB above the received GPS signal power, as calculated in equation (3)! The corresponding signal-to-noise power ratio (SNR) is therefore, -20 dB. RF Needle in a Thermal Noise Haystack How then, can a GPS receiver accomplish acquisition and tracking of weak coded navigation signals that are buried so deeply in internal receiver noise? Two features of the GPS signal/receiver interaction process answer this question. These two features are correlation reception and low rate ephemeris data. First, as described in Part I of this series, the receiver has to measure the delay in the received signal associated with its propagation from the satellite transmitter (it can then convert this time delay into an estimated range, or pseudo-range, from the satellite to the receiver, for use in the navigation solution). The receiver attempts to measure the time delay in the received signal by comparing (correlating) the PRN spread spectrum code on the received signal (buried in noise) with a locally generated replica code. The correlation process multiplies the received and local codes together and integrates the product, sequentially varying the phase of the local code until the two codes line up. When the two codes do line up, the correlation process strips the code off the received signal, despreading the spectrum of the resulting signal down to the bandwidth of the satellite ephemeris data. Since this data is of low volume, it can easily be conveyed to the receiver at a low data rate (50 bits/sec) in a narrow bandwidth (50Hz). Accordingly,
Continued on page 9

(4)

Continued from page 8

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002 the code correlation process, first and foremost, accomplishes a bandwidth compression function, squeezing the 1 MHz spread spectrum signal power into a 50 Hz baseband signal. At baseband, the received signal competes with only 50 Hz of noise spectral density, instead of 1 MHz +, thereby realizing a signal processing gain in the ratio of the spread-to-despread bandwidths:
GSS = = Spread SpectrumBW (SSBW ) BaseBW (BBW )
Pj 4 ( R j 10 )
3 2

J (R j ) =

G ja

2 Graj 1 4

BBW

(8) The wavelength, 1 , is again equal to 0.19 m if the jammer centers its transmission on the victim GPS RF signal - L1 in this case. The jamming signal suffers the same circuit losses as the satellite signal traversing the receiver, hence the loss, Lr = 1.58 (2 dB), appears in the denominator. The correlation process in the receiver multiplies the incoming jamming waveform with the local replica of the C/A-code for the satellite being tracked. Rather than compressing the jamming into the receiver's base bandwidth (BBW = 50 Hz in our example), the correlation process spreads the jamming signal out in the frequency domain, thereby diluting its power spectral density (multiplication of waveforms in the time domain results in the mathematical process of convolution of their frequency spectra). If the jamming waveform is initially matched to the spread spectrum bandwidth of the GPS signal, its output spectrum will be doubled in width at the output of the correlation process, hence the factor of 2 x SSBW in the denominator of equation (8). Finally, this diluted jamming spectrum is filtered by the base bandwidth at the receiver's output, hence the factor of BBW in the numerator of equation (8). The jamming power expression from the equation (8) is plotted as a function of receiver-to-jammer range (R j) in Figure 3. Also plotted in Figure 3, for comparison purposes, are the minimum GPS signal output power and the noise floor in the GPS receiver output base band. Notice that the jamming power exceeds the signal power whenever the weapon gets closer than about 16 km to the jammer. This represents the jammer's "keep-out" zone. When the weapon gets within this "keep-out" zone, its receiver can't track GPS signals - the jamming power grows over the signal level causing the receiver's tracking loops to loose lock. The receiver can then no longer acquire/track the received signals, measure satellite ranges, or demodulate satellite ephemeris data, i.e., the GPS receiver can no longer navigate.
-135 -140 -145 -150 Power Levels (dBW) -155 -160 -165 -170 -175 -180 -185 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Lr 2 SSBW

1.023 106 Hz 50 Hz = 2.05 104 = 43 dB

(6)

This spread spectrum signal processing gain yields an amplification in the baseband signal-to-noise power ratio at the receiver output (less receiver implementation losses, Lr, such as cable, insertion, correlation, A/D losses, etc., say L r 2 dB):
SNRBB = SNRSS + GSS Lr dB = 20 + 43 2 dB = 21 dB

(7)

Hence at the baseband output of a GPS receiver, the weak satellite signals come booming out over the narrow band noise, enabling detection/tracking of the signals, measurement of the propagation time delays from the satellite to the receiver, and demodulation of the satellite ephemeris data. RF Monkey Wrenches So what seemed to be a hopelessly weak signal in the receiver's spread spectrum intermediate frequency (IF) section, arrives at the receiver output with apparently ample signal-to-noise margin. This would seem to say that GPS receivers should have some natural tolerance to jamming, due to spread spectrum processing gain. A significant jammer-to-signal power ratio (JSR) is required to overcome this signal margin and inhibit signal acquisition/tracking. On the surface, it appears that it may, in fact, be nontrivial to throw an RF monkey wrench into the signal processing works, and jam a GPS receiver. Such, however, is unfortunately not the case. While it is true, that a large JSR is required to suppress the baseband GPS signal, large values of JSR turn out to be relatively easy to come by. This is a result of the fact that, although spread spectrum processing gain yields ample signal relative to the noise floor, the absolute signal level remains very small, due to the low intensity of the incident GPS signal. Even relatively weak jamming transmitters compare favorably with the modest GPS satellite transmitters (~ 10 W). And earth-based jammers enjoy a tremendous range advantage over the space based satellite transmitters - tens of kilometers for the jammers compared to tens of thousands of kilometers for the satellites. As a numerical example, consider a very small, simple jammer, with an effective transmitter power (Pj) of only 10 W (10 dBW), applied to a unit gain (Gja = 0 dBi), omnidirectional antenna. The gain of the weapon receiver's antenna in the direction of the earthbound jammer (at or below the horizon) is likely to be less than unity, say Graj 0.5 = -3 dBi. Then an expression for jamming power at the GPS receiver's output, as a function of slant range to the jammer (Rj) in km, is given by:

S N J(Rj)

Rj Range to Jammer (km)

Jammer Location Range at which jamming level exceeds signal

Weapon approaching jammer

Figure 3. Signal, noise, and jamming power levels in GPS receiver's output base bandwidth.
Continued on page 10

Continued from page 9

Actually, the situation for our jamming example is a little worse than described above. The signal level actually needs to be somewhat greater than the interference (jamming plus internal receiver noise) for reliable receiver operation: signal acquisition with low false alarm probability; signal tracking and accurate propagation delay measurement; and data demodulation with acceptable error rates. Actual keepout ranges for the jammer in this example with respect to the L1 C/A-code signal, are 20 km for signal tracking and 70 km for signal acquisition and data demodulation (see Figure 4).

Herring, "The Global Positioning System," Scientific American, Vol 274, No 2, February 1996. Hurn, GPS - A Guide to the Next Utility, Trimble Navigation, 1989. Kaplan, Understanding GPS - Principles and Applications, Artech House, 1996. Logsdon, The Navstar Global Positioning System, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992. Parkinson & Spilker, Global Positioning System:Theory and Applications, Volume I, AIAA, 1996. About the Author Mark Scott received B.S. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Michigan State University in 1974 and 1976 respectively. From 1977 to 1982 he was employed by the Instrument Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., working on tactical avionics systems. From 1982 to 1984 he was employed by IIT Research Institute, performing countermeasure/counter-countermeasure (CM/CCM) analyses on air defense radars. From 1984 to 1987 he was with Harris Corporation working on airborne data links, after which he rejoined IITRI. His current research interests include sensor/ countermeasure performance analysis, signal processing, and sensor fusion for smart weapons, multisensor seekers, survivability suites, and C3I applications. Mr. Scott is a member of IEEE, the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society, and the Association of Old Crows.

Acquisition Threshold

15 ~ 12 dB 10 5

Tracking Threshold

~ 1.5 dB 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

SIR (dB)

Range to Jammer (km)

Jammer Location For 20 < R j < 70 km GPS receiver can: track signals, measure ranges.

Weapon approaching jammer For Rj > 70 km GPS receiver can: acquire signals, track signals, measure ranges, demodulate data.

NEWS(continued from page 6)

We look forward to moving ahead in this transformational endeavor with the Army and the Lead Systems Integrator," said Anthony J. Tether, director of DARPA. Army Col. William Johnson, DARPA's program manager for the FCS program, added, "the selection of the LSI begins the physical transformation of the U.S. Army to the Objective Force." Today's LSI selection follows a 21-month concept design phase during which four contractor teams (Boeing, Science Applications International Corp., Team FoCuS Vision Consortium, and Team Gladiator) developed innovative concepts for Future Combat Systems. DARPA and the Army analyzed the concepts and used them to refine the draft FCS requirements. For more information please contact Jan Walker of DARPA at 703696-2404, jwalker@darpa.mil or Army Capt. Amy Hannah, 703697-4314, amy.hannah@hqda.army.mil.

For Rj < 20 km GPS receiver looses lock, cannot track signals, is completely inoperative.

Figure 4. Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) vs. range and receiver per formance thresholds. Conclusion So the claims you may have heard, that relatively small, low power, unsophisticated noise jammers hold the potential to significantly disrupt/deny GPS navigation, are indeed true - at least for C/A-code receivers. Furthermore, since these jammers are based on relatively simple technology, they may represent an electronic countermeasure (ECM) that is tactically feasible to field in large numbers. A large matrix of such jammers could create a GPS denial zone with dimensions of hundreds of kms (areas of tens of thousands of square kms). In the next newsletter, the third and final installment in this series of articles will present the fundamental antijam (AJ) electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) available to GPS receivers in weapon applications. These ECCM techniques are designed to mitigate the effects of the tactically feasible noise jammers described in this article. For a more comprehensive description of ECM/ECCM aspects of GPS in weapon applications (including P(Y)-code receiver performance in jamming environments), WSTIAC will be publishing a state-of-the-art review on this subject this coming summer (4th quarter FY02). Details will be included in the next newsletter article. References Open literature references employed in writing Parts I and II of this series, that you may find useful for background and depth on GPS topics include:

Planning a Conference or Seminar?

WSTIAC can assist with technical support:
Call for papers Announcements Local arrangements Author kits/paper selection Registration Security, meals, transport Exhibits, receptions Proceedings

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

is pleased to announce the availability of its

Introduction to Sensors and Seekers for Smart Munitions and Weapons Course
Primary instructor: Mr Paul Kisatsky, IIT Research Institute
Course Objective:
The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2- day Introduction to Sensors and Seekers for Smart Munitions and Weapons Course to provide an introduction to the most commonly used sensors and seekers employed in smart weapons (projectiles, missiles, and wide area mines). It is oriented to managers, engineers, and scientists who are engaged in smart weapon program development and who desire to obtain a deeper understanding of the sensors they must deal with, but who do not need to personally design or analyze them in depth. An undergraduate technical degree is recommended. Mathematics is kept to a minimum, but important formulas are introduced. This course also serves as an excellent foundation for those scientists and engineers who desire to pursue this discipline to intermediate and advanced levels.

Course Description:
The course stresses the basic principles and underlying physics of how sensors work, what they can do, and how they are limited. Both airborne (projectiles and missiles) as well as ground based (smart mines and wide area denial) weapon platforms are covered. The course provides both managers and non-sensor-specific engineers with the framework they need to manage the development of sensor based smart munitions and weapons. This course assists program engineers to define the boundaries of their "trade space" and to make them aware of the capabilities, potentials and limitations of modern autonomous sensor technology. An overview of the different types and classes of sensors is presented. Fundamental wave propagation phenomena, which governs the behavior of most sensors, is reviewed. How search footprints in time and space must both define and limit the sensor properties is discussed. Noise and clutter, the predominant obstacles to success in autonomous seekers, are given emphasis. The major sensor types are classified and each is discussed. In particular, Infrared, Radar, Optical Laser Radar (LADAR), Imaging and Non-imaging, and Acoustic sensors are individually covered. Of special interest is the discussion on human visionics versus machine recognition, since this concept is of central importance to understanding automomous versus man-in-the-loop sensing systems. The implications of "artificial intelligence", "data fusion", and "multi-mode" sensors are also briefly dicussed. System constraints, which force tradeoffs in sensor design and in ultimate performance, are also covered. Time permitting, a projection of future trends in the role of sensors for smart munitions will be presented, followed by a "brain-storming" session to solicit student views.

Course Outline:
The course covers: Classification of Seekers and Sensors; Fundamentals of Waves and Propagation; Fundamentals of Noise and Clutter; Fundamentals of Search Footprints; Introduction to Infrared; Introduction to Radar; Introduction to LADAR; Introduction to Visionics; Introduction to Acoustics; Future Projections and Interactive Brainstorming.

Course Sponsors:
DUSD(S&T) Weapon Systems Directorate Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

Handout Material:
Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course notes covering the material presented.

About the Instructor:

Mr Paul Kisatsky is a Senior Physical Scientist with the IIT Research Institute. He is a nationally recognized expert on sensors and seekers for smart munitions and weapons and has more than 30 years of hands-on experience developing sensors and seekers fielded in modern smart munitions and weapons.

Fee:
The registration fee for this 2- day course is $950 for US government personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered at the same time, are charged $950 per person.

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this Sensors and Seekers for Smart Munitions andWeapons Course at your location to reduce your travel time and cost. This is a very cost effective way to provide training on sensors and seekers to up to 25 people on-site. Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins at (256) 382-4747 to discuss such training opportunities and/or schedule a course.

Notice:

WSTIAC reserves the right to substitute speakers and cancel and/or change the course schedule for any reason. In the event of a schedule change or cancellation, registered participants will be individually informed.

For additional information, contact:

Ms. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, at (256) 382-4747, fax: (256) 382-4702 or by e-mail: khopkins@iitri.org

Director/Chief Scientists Corner

A view from Washington

by Dr. Wes Kitchens

he fiscal 2003 Department of Defense Budget request of $369 billion (B), plus another $10B if needed to fight the war on terrorism, will accelerate the changes needed to transform the U.S. military and provide for homeland defense. This request represents a $48B increase over fiscal 2002. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, the budget request " addresses our country's need to fight the war on terror, to support our men and women in uniform and modernize the forces we have, and to prepare for the challenges of the 21st Century." The 2003 budget will start to implement the DoD transformation planned as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review examination of defense priorities. The budget reflects several changes in DoD policy. The budget focuses on capabilities needed to counter different types of threats, rather than trying to anticipate where those threats may come from. It also expands the definition of the traditional sea, air and land-based nuclear triad to include a new type of "triad" that emphasizes offensive nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, missile defense, and responsive infrastructure. Since the U.S. is likely to face unconventional enemies that will need to be defeated by precision weapons, agile forces and intelligence, the budget includes a substantial investment in intelligence gathering and $9.9B for science and technology. It also includes $1B for unmanned ground, sea and air vehicles, $9.4B to strengthen our fight against terrorism and $7.8B for missile defense. President Bush has called on Congress to quickly pass his fiscal 2003 defense budget request and not wait until September or October to pass the legislation as it has done in years past. "That's bad budgeting practices in times of peace," President Bush said, and "it's really bad budgeting practices in times of war." Although hearings have already started, only time will tell if Congress will be willing to act quickly on the DoD fiscal 2003 budget request. This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter features an interview with Air Force Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the DoD Missile Defense Agency (previously called Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) and a technical article on Anti-Jam GPS Technology by Mr. Mark Scott, a Senior Science Advisor at the IIT Research Institute. The interview with Lt Gen Kadish comes at a time when the Bush administration is putting increased emphasis on missile defense and the Missile Defense Agency has just recently experienced its fourth successful intercept in six attempts during testing of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Segment, formerly known as National Missile Defense. Mr. Scott's article is the second in a multi-part series that first appeared in the WSTIAC Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 4, September 2001. This article is important because almost all precision-guided weapons currently rely on the global positioning system (GPS). In certain situations GPS can be jammed and rendered unusable and the implementation of robust anti-jam GPS technology is critical to the success of future precision weapons that rely on GPS as their primary or secondary guidance system. We welcome your feedback about the WSTIAC Newsletter and solicit your suggestions for future topics you would like to see included. You can reach me by Email at wkitchens@iitri.org or by phone at (703) 933-3317.

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

FYI . . .
ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONTRATION LIST FOR 2002 ANNOUNCED
Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, announced today the selection of new Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) projects for fiscal year 2002. The ACTD program aids in rapidly transitioning advanced technology into the hands of the unified commanders. Of the funded ACTDs for fiscal year 2002, 11 will directly support the war on terrorism. The military services, theater commanders and Defense agencies submitted nearly 80 proposed fiscal year 2002 ACTD projects. Representatives of the military services and unified commanders reviewed the list of proposals and provided their priorities to the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Marrying new operational concepts with new technologies, ACTDs reduce the time required to field new systems and increase end-user involvement in system refinement and integration. Initiated in 1995, the ACTD program focuses on rapidly placing maturing technologies in the hands of warfighters. In partnership with operational commanders, the services and the Joint Staff, the program delivers prototypes as tailored solutions for validated mission needs. Our products demonstrate the military utility of new technologies while giving warfighters hands-on experience to develop concepts for operational employment. ACTD projects span a broad spectrum of operational requirements with an emphasis on joint capabilities. In many cases, ACTDs yield transformational changes. Products such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unattended ground sensors (UGS) change the paradigms for military operations. Approximately 30 ACTD products support our nation's counterterrorism efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. The ACTDs selected for initiation in fiscal year 2002 include: Active Denial System: A system mounted on stationary and mobile platforms to provide long-range, anti-personnel, non-lethal force options to commanders. Agile Transportation: A system providing visibility of transportation requirements and assets to improve scheduling decision support tools for mode determination and optimization of inter- and intra-theater lift assets. Coalition Information Assurance Common Operational Picture: Provides a detailed information assurance and situational awareness picture of the information system security status of all mission critical systems on a near-or-real-time basis in support of CINC and coalition missions. Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation: Provides a deployable package for a chemical and biological defense capability at seaports of debarkation to minimize impact on seaport operations. Expendable Unmanned Air Vehicle and Air-Launched Extended Range Transporter: Air vehicles providing covert delivery of off-board sensors, tactical surveillance, battle damage assessment and weapons of mass destruction monitoring at low cost. Homeland Security: A homeland security capability for assured, secure, survivable interagency network connectivity to assess and track threats across multiple domains with a coordinated response capability to neutralize threats and recover from damage. HYCAS: A hyperspectral collection and analysis system with sensors integrated onto operational platforms and into the existing tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) architectures supporting a counter-concealment, camouflage and deception intelligence capability. Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal-Knowledge and Technology Operational Demonstration: A system providing a new integrated capability for joint and coalition explosive ordnance disposal forces. Language and Speech Exploitation Resources: Systems automating translation of spoken or written foreign languages for quickly translating captured documents, debriefing witnesses and supporting communication in coalition operations. Micro Air Vehicle: A fully autonomous 6-9 inch micro aerial vehicle providing small ground combat units with situational awareness of enemy activity using a low-cost, disposal air vehicle. Pathfinder: An integration of unattended ground vehicles, unmanned air vehicles and smart sensors in a mobile, self-forming network providing enhanced situational awareness, command, control and communications to commanders and assault forces for urban reconnaissance. Thermobaric: A penetrator payload to defeat enemy tunnel facilities and weapons. Three additional ACTD projects will be initiated during this fiscal year if funding permits. These include:

The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current awareness publication of the Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC). WSTIAC, a Department of Defense (DoD) Information Analysis Center (IAC), is administratively managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) under the DoD IAC Program. The Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for WSTIAC is Mr. H. Jack Taylor, ODUSD (S&T), Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-3080, (703) 588-7405. IIT Research Institute operates WSTIAC, which services Government, industry, and academia as a Center of Excellence in Weapon Systems Technology.

WSTIAC Director: Dr. Wes Kitchens 703.933.3317, Email: wkitchens@iitri.org Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis 703.933.3362 Email: vvalaitis@iitri.org Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/ All data and information herein reported are believed to be reliable; however, no warrant, expressed or implied, is to be construed as to the accuracy or the completeness of the information presented. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this publication are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Agency position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

FYI Cont .
Agent Defeat Warhead: A weapon providing a high temperature incendiary kinetic energy penetrator warhead to destroy biological and chemical manufacturing and storage facilities. Joint Distance Support and Response: A system providing near-real-time, reliable, accurate telemaintenance for forward deployed forces and weapon systems using a collaborative knowledge center and tool suite, with reach-back capability. SPARTAN: An unmanned surface watercraft providing a low-cost force multiplier with integrated expeditionary sensor and weapon systems for use against asymmetric threats. Information on ACTDs can be found at http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/descript.htm.

Smart/Precision Weapons Training Seminar

LOCATION: Huntsville, Alabama, 2002 23-25 April 18-20 June 20-22 August

(Seminar starts at 8:00 AM Tuesday and ends at 12:00 PM Thursday)

Seminar Scope:
The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2- day Smart Weapons Training Seminar to provide a comprehensive understanding of smart weapons and related technologies. This seminar is aimed at providing general knowledge about smart weapons technology and a source of current information on selected U.S. and foreign smart weapons, to include system description, concept of employment, performance characteristics, effectiveness and program status.

About the Seminar:

This seminar was originally developed for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It has proven to be enormously popular with attendees from both government and industry. The seminar is updated annually to include current information about the latest technology and capability upgrades being made to representative US and foreign smart weapon systems. Instructors include: Dr. Wes Kitchens, WSTIAC Director and former DDR&E Director for Weapons Technologies; Mr. Mark Scott and Mr. Hunter Chockley, IITRI Science Advisors; and Mr. Mike Holthus, foreign weapons expert at the National Ground Intelligence Center.

Seminar Objectives:
The seminar's objective is to inform materiel and combat developers, systems analysts, scientists, engineers, managers and business developers about smart weapons to include: State of the art of representative U.S. and foreign smart weapon systems; Employment concepts; Smart weapons related systems, subsystems, and technologies; and Technology trends.

Security Classification:
The security classification of this seminar is SECRET (U.S. Citizens Only).

Fee:
The registration fee for this 2- seminar is $950 for US government personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered at the same time, are charged $950 per person.

Seminar Sponsors:
h DUSD(S&T) Weapons h Defense Technical Information Center(DTIC) h Joint Technical Coordinating Group Munitions Effectiveness(Smart Munitions Working Group)

Registration:
Attendance is limited to 35 people and the seminars generally fill up fast. All registrations will be acknowledged, and each attendee will be sent an agenda, maps, and directions to the seminar site.

Smart Weapons Training Seminar Offered at Your Location

WSTIAC can conduct its 2- day Smart Weapons Training Seminar at your location during 2001 to reduce your travel time and cost. This seminar has been presented to hundreds of students over the past decade. This is a very cost effective way to provide smart weapons training to up to 35 people at your site.

Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins at (256) 382-4747 or email khopkins@iitri.org for more information and a brochure with seminar details.

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Upcoming Conferences and Courses

29 April-1 May 2002 Fuze Conference
Marriott River Walk San Antonio TX For additional information: Email: rmohrmann@ndia.org http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2560

27-29 May 2002 9th Saint Petersburg International Conference on Integrated

Navigation Systems St Petersburg Russia For additional information: Contact: Dr. John Niemela 732 427 4635 Email: john.niemela@maill.monmouth.army.mil http://www.elektropribor.spb.ru/confs/icins02/index.html

5-8 May 5-8 2002 AOC International EW Conference and Exposition

Stockholm, Sweden For additional information: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW E-mail: bnelms@crows.org http://www.crows.org

3-5 June 2002 2002 Mines, Demolition and Non-Lethal Conference

Saddlebrook Resort, Tampa FL For additional information Email: djenks@ndia.org http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID =_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2500

6-9 May 2002 47th Annual Joint EW Conference

Lackland AFB, TX Secret/US Government-Only For additional information contact: John Geise 937.255.2960 E-mail: john.geise@wpafb.af.mil https://jewc.mugu.navy.mil

3-5 June 2002 2nd Annual Intelligent Vehicle Systems Symposium

Grand Traverse Resort & Spa Traverse City, MI For additional information Email: djenks@ndia.org http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID =_0MF0QZX7J&MID=257

6-10 May 2002 Live Fire Test and Evaluation

Monterey CA For additional information: Email: pedmonson@ndia.org http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2190

4-5 June 2002 UAV Payloads Conference

Army Research Lab, Adelphi, MD Secret/US-Only For additional information contact: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW Email: bnelms@crows.org http://www.crows.org

11-15 May 2002 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation

Crystal Gateway Marriott Hotel Washington DC For additional information: http://www.icra-iros.com/icra2002/index.html

21-25 July 2002 Joint Advanced Weapon Systems Sensors, Simulation and Support Symposium (JAWS S3)
Air Force Academy Colorado Springs, CO For additional information: Email: CGriffith@anteon.com

13-16 May 2002 21st Century Military Operations and Technology

Sheraton Atlantic City Convention Center Atlantic City, NJ For additional information Email: djenks@ndia.org http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID =_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2610

23-27 September 2002 20th International Symposium On Ballistics

The Rosen Centre Hotel Orlando, FL For additional information: http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2210

21-22 May 2002 Network Centric Warfare 2002 Conference

Crystal City, Arlington, VA For additional information contact: IQPC, 800.882.8684 E-mail info@iqpc.com http://www.iqpc.com/NA-1763-01

Please return this form to: IIT Research Institute/WSTIAC ATTN: Publication Department 1901 N Beauregard Street, Suite 400 Alexandria VA 22311-1705
Add my name to the WSTIAC Newsletter mailing list Please send WSTIAC Technical Area Task Information (government) Please send WSTIAC general information

or fax.... 703.933.3325
Correct my address information (see below) PleasesendWSTIACSubscriberInformation (industry) Please send WSTIAC publications list

Name: Organization: Address: Telephone: Fax: E-mail:

Please also add my name to the following mailing lists:
MTIAC Manufacturing Technology Quality RAC Reliability Maintainability and Process AMPTIAC Advanced Materials and Testing MSIAC Modeling and Simulation IATAC Information Assurance

1901 N Beauregard Street,Suite 400 Alexandria VA 22311-1705

Inside this issue. . . Interview with LtGen Kadish Anti Jam GPS Introducing Dr Scannell Directors Corner FYI New Sensors and Seekers Course Calendar of Events