Phoenicians

Chapter 21

January of 1913 saw a “coup d’etat” inside Istanbul, one that issued in the first
predominately pro-Unionist cabinet to power, whereas previous coalition cabinets in
the government had been liberal (by force or by choice), the Unionist enforced the
power of the central authority and driven by a desperate sense of mission, and
established a much sterner position on matters of state. Their intent, to
concentrate their attentions around the “central government” in order to salvage
the state from the “perilous” position it had fallen into. In this sense they showed
little concern for local need or concerns of the “local” needs throughout the Empire.
In this vein, the Mount Lebanon resistance to the Ottoman legislation that
imposed fees and dues on their activities tested this new direction of Istanbul. The
central government constantly “urged” Ohannes Pasha to use his authority to
prevent unlawful action within his jurisdiction, warning him that central troops
“might” be dispatched to do his job against the factions.
He was not in a position to exercise much authority, except with the cooperation
of the Council, and in fact --- he was unwilling to take any action that would have
diminished the power of the body. He firmly believed that this would be unwise and
even unlawful and as well known he was first a “legalist bureaucrat” and personally
disliked confrontations. Because of this he chose to play the part of the
“intermediary” between the two parties, pleading from time-to-time for moderation
and mutual understanding. Although his influence with both was limited, his
position and his overall decision to act in cooperation with the Council many times
prevented the escalation of events. This Mount Lebanon resistance to Istanbul
mandates continued until the Ottomans entered into WWI and placed Mount
Lebanon under martial law.
In 1914, some 300,000 to 350,000 Lebanese left the region, with over 66%
emigrating to the United States, and the rest to other parts of Latin America and
Brazil. They left for various reasons that included:
1. Population pressure in the Mountain
2. Social and religious unrest
3. Fear of military service
 4. New attraction to the West, prompted by the Foreign schools

It is the money they sent home, and the skill and capital that some of them
returned with that contributed “significantly” to the economic development of
Lebanon.

Martial rule (or) Martial Law in any country means the same. The suspension of
regular law and the suspension of individual rights, it was no different for Mount
Lebanon, whereas any form of resistance was going to treated as “treason”, an
there would be no “proper” court or foreign consulate where one could appeal. The
Mount Lebanon political leadership well understood this and consequently urged the
cessation of active resistance to the population and its authorities.
Ohannes did not want to be a part of this regime and resigned in May-1915,
upon his resignation the Istanbul government abolished the imperial decrees that
governed the privileges status of Mount Lebanon. Ottoman sovereignty finally
reigned supreme, but at the expense of whatever respect for it that had remained.
At the outbreak of World War I on June 28th, 1914 (when a Gavrilo Princip – a
Bosnian Serb student, shot and killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the
Austria-Hungarian throne, and his wife, Sophia Chotek --- in Sarajevo) Lebanon
inherited many problems in that the Ottoman’s having become an ally of Germany
and Austria-Hungary. Among them was the harsh rule of “Jamal Pasha” (a former
naval minister of the central government as commander in chief of their Turkish
forces in Syria) setting up his command in Beirut. He replaced the Armenian
governor (who had resigned) with a fellow Turk – Ali Munif Pasha (the 2nd Turk ever
to rule Lebanon).
It had always been understood that if the Turks entered the conflict that one of
their first moves would be to attack and secure the Suez Canal operating and
controlled by the British – it was almost a foregone conclusion.
The former commander of the navy and his counterpart in Germany, Chief of
Staff “Kress von Kressenstein” led an expedition on January 14th, 1915 across the
Sinai Peninsula (from Beersheba) with their combined force of 25,000 men to do
just that!
While Jamal the Turkish leader intended to concentrate his attack at the primary
gates, he hoped to confuse the British defense by launching diversionary attacks all
along the canal. Since the British had feared such an attack (watching conditions
go from bad to worst in Europe) since the outbreak of war they had concentrated on
enhancing the canal’s defense. As the intentions of the Turks were being analyzed
and considered they asked for and received some 30,000 troops from their satellite
country, India and in addition an Anglo-French navy squadron was added as well as
a small air reconnaissance team.
Their focal point in placing the majority of their defense matched that of Jamal’s
primary attack – the center of the canal, the “Ismailia”. However they also
managed to deploy some of the forces along the entire length of the canal.
The attacking forces based their future success on “surprising” this defense; this
was averted by the forces advancement being seen by a lone reconnaissance
aircraft which spotted them on February 1st, 1915.
On February 2nd the two forces clashed and the advance elements of the
Ottoman Fourth Army were beaten back by the combined forces of the Indian Army
and the Australian infantry – Jamal persisted with his assault until February 3rd, but
after losing some 2,000 casualties (to the Brits only losing 150) his force retreated
back to Beersheba – the attack a failure.
In the later part of February, in frustration over his failure in Egypt he initiated a
blockade of the entire eastern Mediterranean coast to prevent supplies from
reaching his enemies; this blockade caused thousands of deaths from widespread
famines and plagues. Lebanon suffered more for this than any other Ottoman
province whereas the blockade deprived Lebanon of its tourists, summer visitors
and the remittances from their relatives and friends from abroad, which were lost or
delayed for months.

On May 6th, 1916, in a place that would be remembered for years to come as the
“Square of Martyrs” (Place des Canons) the Turks executed publicly (hung) six
citizens in downtown Beirut. In addition to the hanging he had imposed military
conscription on the citizens, requisitioned beast of burden, and gave direct orders
for the population to provide supplies to his troops.
His reign of terror was unequal in its scope, the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut
was exiled to Turkey (where he later died) and his troops did much in the cutting of
Lebanese trees to feed their locomotives. With their Empire collapsing they
introduced “worthless” Turkish money in the economy, only adding to the general
decline in the economy and in 1916 a great famine and starvation surfaced in the
country as a result of the blockade. Living conditions deteriorating led to epidemics
of typhoid and the bubonic plague --- estimations place the resulting death toll from
100,000 to 150,000 lives.
Certainly not the outcome the Ottomans were looking for, although they wanted
to keep Mount Lebanon under the Ottoman flag they had also desired the respect of
the people – they failed. And now under all appearances the Council ran Mount
Lebanon, in doing so it rivaled the Church.
The Church’s image of itself as the creator of Lebanon had changed little, in this
the Maronite clergy had a point, after-all the idea of Lebanon was their invention,
wasn’t it! They pointed to the fact that it was the Church’s resistance to the
inclusion of Mount Lebanon in the Ottoman regime, and had through time and time
again been the “catalyst” in shaping the position of autonomy for the community,
which the governors adopted and the Council now upheld. Furthermore, the
schools, hospitals, and land under their control put them in a position to render
services and create opportunities for “all” Lebanese. Finally, they pointed out that
certain Maronite leaders commanded the respect of non-Maronite communities for
their piety, intellectual achievements, broad-minded patriotism, and other personal
merits.
Although deep inside the Church, their concept of Lebanon, lay a religious sense
of nationhood that fed on “fear” and “suspicion” of Muslims and the belief that
Maronite cultural and moral superiority would rule the end of the day. The Church
felt the purpose of the Council was to protect and promote the further development
of the Christian population, in general the Maronites. In this belief, they felt it was
their charge to never let the government lose sight of this fundamental goal –
having “assumed” such a supervisory position; it was natural for the ideologically
oriented Maronite religious dignitaries to expect government officials and politicians
to act in conformity with the will of the Church. But, other events in the Middle East
during this time would show the Church gradually meld within the society of
Lebanon.
In 1918, in addition to the French and British forces fighting in the Middle East,
there was an Arabian-led force led by Prince Faisal (“Faysal”)1 whose adviser and
aid was T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) and that because of previous promises
1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria
made to his father (by the British), he firmly believed that with a victory over the
Ottomans, he would rule over that territory of the Ottoman Empire, which included
Syria, Lebanon and Jordon – Prince Faisal was wrong.
As the war was drawing to an end and victory over the Ottomans for certain, the
British and the French engaged in vigorous competition over who would control and
influence the Middle East and only intent on serving their own interests.
After leading his troops into Damascus in 1918, Prince Faisal sent a group of
approximately 100 commandoes to Beirut where they raised the “Hejaz” (Arabian
Flag) on October 5th, 1918. This move seriously alarmed the French who sent
warships on the following day into the Beirut harbor, landed a contingent of their
troops and on October 8th – General Allenby (Supreme Commander of the Allied
Forces), entered Beirut, removed the flag from its flagstaff and order the Arabian
commandoes to withdraw – they did.
The victorious Allies gathered in Paris in 1919 to determine the disposition of the
defeated Ottoman Empire, whereas the Patriarch of Lebanon “Elias Hoyek” led a
delegation of Lebanese notable which came to Paris under the banner, “in the name
of the government and the Administrative Council of Lebanon, and in the name of
the people of all of Lebanon”, to request of the Peace Conference for the autonomy
of Lebanon and the restoration of its natural and historical frontiers, with the
mandate of France.
While in Paris, the Patriarch and his delegation were hosted by the French
government, and the Patriarch Hoyek met with many political notables including the
French President Raymond Poincare (1913-1920), and the French Premier George
Clemenceau. On October 27th, 1919 the Patriarch presented to the Peace
Conference a detailed long memorandum which listed the desires and demands of
the Lebanese.
On November 10th, Premier George Clemenceau wrote to the Patriarch restating
the close bonds that France had with Lebanon over the years, and assured him that
Lebanon’s desire for autonomy and independence coincided with the French liberal
traditions. He concluded: “with the help and support of France, the Lebanese are
assured of preserving their traditions, of developing their political and
administrative institutions, of reclaiming completely their country, and of seeing
their children educated in their proper schools for public service in Lebanon…
Desirous of the most favorable economic relations in all the countries confided to its
mandate, France will give the greatest consideration that in determining the
boundaries of Lebanon, it is necessary to include the “Mountain”, the territories of
the plain, and access to the sea, as indispensable to its prosperity.”
Meantime, Prince Faisal was having difficulty ruling over the various factions in
Damascus, that ranged from the conservative “traditional” families who had been
pro-Ottoman to pro-Arab, and anti-French groups, and others who supported the
establishment of a greater “Syria”. The Prince called for elections to a “General
Syrian Congress”. This body assembled in 1919 and immediately called for an
independent Greater Syria, which would include Syria, “Lebanon”, Jordan and
Palestine.
In Lebanon, Patriarch Hoyek being alarmed by the events in Damascus and other
moves against the Lebanese independence formed a new delegation in December
of 1919 composed of Lebanese and led by Patriarchal Vicar, Archbishop “Abdullah
Khoury” and sent them off to Paris to defend the cause of the country.
Premier Clemenceau offered Prince Faisal a compromise --- he would rule over
Syria, without Lebanon, under a loose French trusteeship. This compromise was
voted down by the Syrian General Congress in January of 1920, and in March of
1920 they voted again and declared an independent Greater Syria that included
Lebanon and Palestine, with Prince Faisal as the constitutional monarch.
Britain and France did not like this development and on May 27th, 1920 the
French Commander in Beirut, General “Henri Joseph Eugene Gouraud” was ordered
to take the field against Prince Faisal and to move on to Damascus. He occupied
Damascus on the 26th of July and removed Faisal from Syria.
Before this, May 19th, 1920 – the new French Premier “Alexandre Millerand”,
wrote to Archbishop Khoury: “In virtue of a decision of the Supreme Council, the
Allied Powers have conferred the ‘mandate’ over Syria to France which has never
varied in its intentions to call for Lebanon’s independence under French mandate.”
On August 24th, he again penned a communication to Archbishop Khoury: “…
Your country’s claims on the Bekaa, that you have recalled for me, have been
granted. On instructions from the French government, General Gouraud has
proclaimed at ‘Zahle’ the incorporation into Lebanon of the territory that extends up
to the summit of the Anti-Lebanon Range and of Hermon. This is the ‘Greater
Lebanon’ that France wishes to form to assure your country of its natural borders.
Lebanon ought to extend from Jebel Akkar in the north to the confines of Palestine
in the south, along with the cities of Tripoli and Beirut.”
On September 1st, 1920 Greater Lebanon was officially proclaimed in Beirut by
General Gouraud – the new state included the ports of Tyre, Saida (Sidon), and
Tripoli, in addition to Beirut, its new capital. Besides Balbeck and the Bekaa,
Hasbayya, Rashayya and Marjayoun were included. Lebanon’s territory had
doubled in size, and its population had increased by more than half, the vast
majority being Muslim.
On July 24th, 1922 --- the League of Nations approved the “French” mandate over
Syria and Lebanon --- on May 23rd, 1926, Lebanon was declared a Republic.

The preceding was mainly taken from a Maronite account of what happened
after “The Great War”, and as you have read it, place the events in contrast to the
following. Found in “The Long Peace” by Engin Akarli and published in 1993

At the end of the war the Administrative Council remained in charge of the
government for about 20-months, with a French commissar appointed by the Allied
Forces acting as a governor (or sorts).
During this period the Council’s principal concern was to defend the Mountain’s
autonomy against “actual” or “potential” incursions from the new military overloads
of the region.
It was also active in the ongoing regional and international negations, and
quarrels over defining the future of the area, whereas in these activities the Council
acted as the “official” representative of the Lebanese, and was recognized as such
in diplomatic circles as long as its position “coincided” (agreed) with that of the
French. “Otherwise”, the French “only” recognized the Maronite Patriarch, along
with the Greek Catholic Church, as the representative of Lebanon --- a situation that
had important repercussions for the Church-Government relations as time went by.
After the repercussions of “The Great War” it was well known that the French
had a weak position in geographical Syria, where the British controlled the entire
coastal region and other strategic positions. The Arab nationalist force controlled
the inland area and were pre-occupied with laying the foundations of a Syrian-Arab
state under Emir “Prince” Faisal’s leadership. The French, who also claimed the
coastal lands, had to rely mainly on diplomatic means and relationships to achieve
their objective. In this they hoped to convince “Faisal” to accept a French mandate
over the state he would head.
These developments were observed with “anxiety” in Mount Lebanon --- from
the Councils point-of-view, Faisal’s program (ambitions) was a major threat to the
Mountain’s interest. In Faisal’s mind he didn’t really want to accept the
“autonomous” region already existing known as Mount Lebanon operating inside his
realm, much less the proposed enlargement of that “autonomous” Mountain. As it
was known the Mountain needed land to survive and even the minimum they asked
for was far too much in his view – the minimum, the addition of the Bekaa valley
and the City of Beirut, so-called the “Kiyanist” position, which argued for a “Greater
Lebanon” (Lebanon in its historical and natural-geographical boundaries) – the
“Kiyanists” were in the majority on the Council.
The Council, eager to make the Lebanese voice heard in the negotiations over
the future of the region, reached a resolution concerning its demand in December
1918, and appointed a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. The delegations
mission to demand the expansion of Mount Lebanon;
1. Economical and historical reasons
2. Lebanon’s right to independence and self-government, with viable territories
3. Due to protection of minority rights
4. And a showed interest to accept – support from the French Government
a. for the cultural and political progress of Lebanon
b. for the security it would provide against infringements upon its
independence

The delegation, made of two council members and five officials and intellectuals,
was briefly detained in Alexandria by British authorities, but with French
intervention it finally reached Paris. In Paris, the French diplomats and the lobby of
Lebanese who had settled there, convince the main speaker “Daud ‘Ammun” to
emphasize only the territorial requests and the Lebanese desire for French
“protection” not “only” in Lebanon but in Syria at large.
This position served the French interest in two ways --- it gave credence to
French claims to Syria in the peace talks, and enabled France to “use” the Lebanese
desire for their “own” territorial enlargement in the negotiations with Faisal in order
to “make” him agree to a French mandate over his government. This change of
attitude and change of demands did not sit well with the people of the Mountain.
When Prince Faisal reached a “preliminary” agreement with France in April-
1919, the Administrative Council reacted by declaring Lebanon independent.
The Council proclaimed, “in its capacity as the representative of the people of
Lebanon, -- the political and administrative independence of Lebanon in its
historical and natural geographical boundaries ( and reasserted) the commitment of
the Lebanese government to a democratic regime based on the principles of liberty,
fraternity, and equality, and to the protection of minority rights and religious
freedom.”
The Council called for French support also, but “only” in assisting Lebanon with
regard to the coordination of assisting in their economic relations with neighboring
government.
In addition to the above (made on June 16th) ), the Council “granted” a mandate
to Patriarch Hoyek (“Huwayyik”) to convey the Lebanese wishes to the participant
of the Paris Peace Conference, labeled expressly, “on behalf of the government of
Lebanon and its Administrative Council.” No more or no less! The Councils position
was made more than “clear”. In that it would agree to the French Mandate so long
(or) if Lebanon’s self-rule was respected, and its territorial demands honored along
“reasonable” lines.
In their endorsement of the Patriarch as their representative, this idea was
strongly encouraged by the French; they went along with the suggestion simply
because the Patriarch was as anxious as the Councilors to prevent the
“incorporation” of Lebanon into a Syrian federation, and also in expanding their
territories. He “also” gave them the appearance of sharing their idea of
independence and democracy.
The delegation which the Patriarch assembled comprised of only Maronite
bishops, with the exception of “one” Greek Catholic. As “Zamir” puts it, “although
Huwayyik requested a French mandate over Lebanon, the memorandum clearly
aimed at curbing the ability of the mandatory power to interfere with the
independence and sovereignty of the future state.”
It is noted (French records) that in numerous interviews and discussions in which
the Patriarch and his delegates participated in during their “extended” stay in Paris,
the emphasis was on the Christians and Christianity in Lebanon. They continually
stressed the “differences” between the Western-oriented Lebanese Christians and
the mostly “Bedouin” and culturally backward “Arabs”, and described over libations
and cookies, the many atrocities inflicted upon the Christians during the war for
their loyalty to France. They also appealed to France’s responsibility in protecting
Christians against Muslims.
This position of Lebanon against the Arabs, and Christianity against Islam was
not the position of the Councilors, as later events were to prove.
In the autumn of 1919, France and Great Britain were finally able to resolve their
differences concerning their interests in the Middle East, and a large French force
descended on the region to replace the British in Syria, Lebanon and Cilicia2.
General Henri Gouraud, who was known for his devotion to the Catholic Church and
his closeness to colonialist circles, commanded the force as the high commissioner
of Syria.
The Maronite and Greek Catholic communities (in general) welcomed the French
force, while other communities grew increasingly hostile not “only” to the French
but to whoever associated with them. The French responded and repressed
“unruly” action promptly and with extreme force, and in the interim “armed” their
supporters.
Nevertheless, they continued to have serious difficulties in making themselves
popular with the Syrian-Arab nationalists, who controlled the interior.
The Council took a very “dim” view of the actions of the French and its military
rule and created a resolution, very lengthy and full of action items on November
19th, 1919. In this resolution they vented their resentment of the French Military
Expedition into the “administration” of Mount Lebanon, whereas it reasserted in
position and its general “belief” that “genuine support and guidance”, from the
French government would facilitate progress and reform in Lebanon. They firmed
up their stance that if the French presence continued in its “domination and
exploitation”, this ran in direct contradiction of not only Lebanese expectations and
the promises made by the French statesmen and violated the government system
that “existed” in Mount Lebanon that was still “under the guarantee of still valid
international protocols” and in accord with “native traditions and customs.”

2
Cilicia (Greek: Κιλικία) was the name of a region, now known as Çukurova, and often a political unit, on the southeastern coast
of Asia Minor (modern Turkey), north of Cyprus
 They went on to state that it was true they wanted to improve on the system,
but they would not “willingly” agree to giving up of the self-rule, rights, privileges,
and what little freedom it provided them and that until arrangements were made for
a new order in the area, the French authorities should respect the existing system.
With that general consideration in mind they then listed the practices which
disturbed them the most:
A. French supervisors and inspectors, who were supposed to act as advisors and
trainers, disregarded the hierarchy of the native government and gave orders
directly to district and sub-district governors
B. They appointed and dismissed judges on slight accusations and without
informing the Council (or) showing due respect for the established procedure
in these mattes
C. French officers showed disrespect to their Lebanese colleagues and
interfered in the administration of the Lebanese security force
D. Made attempts to introduce the principle of competition in the appointment
of government employees, without the regard to the existing principle of
sectarian distribution of government position, which protected “the rights of
the communities.
All the above (they wrote) created confusion in all branches of government,
weakened it in the eyes of the people, dishonored government employees, and
revealed disrespect for native traditions and institutions.
Needless to say, the Council’s resolution made no impact of the French
authorities.
Opinion had shifted in Paris toward a “military solution” to the Syrian problem,
this as opposed to a “negotiated’ settlement with Prince Faisal – a position that
made it necessary that they consolidate their position in the “coastal zone” before a
final showdown with the Syrian-Arab nationalists. In the showdown, General Henri
Gouraud had been assured of the Patriarch’s absolute support,
The Patriarch was actively involved in the efforts to “generate” support for the
French --- not necessarily because his commitment to Lebanon’s independence had
changed, but rather his conception of Lebanon as a Christian “entity” affected its
priorities. He continued to visualize the “Muslim Syria” as the major wall between
the powers-to-be and the creation of “his” Lebanon, and the Catholic France as the
savior of Lebanon --- this thought gaining strength once France had “guaranteed”
him that Lebanon (however its boundaries were drawn), would be kept separate
from Syria --- for this reason he stood solidly behind the French policy in Lebanon.
As this surfaced more and more in everyday affairs, the problems of the sitting
Lebanese government were obviously of little significance to the Patriarch. In
parallel, the Syrian-Ahab nationalists were becoming “visibly” better organized and
moved toward a “National Congress” to decide their position with regard to the
French demands for a mandate over Syria, this action led the Patriarch to “assume”
a position above the government and to direct “all” Lebanese policy.
He sent to Paris a 3rd delegation, which successfully negotiated the boundaries of
a “Greater Lebanon”, along with action he made statements on the “behalf” of the
Lebanese, accepted foreign delegations, and made no attempt to hide his backing
of the French in their campaign to gather signatures for the appointment of a
French governor to Lebanon.
All the time, he was treated and received by French authorities as if he were the
head of Lebanon, and of the Lebanese – par excellence. It could be said, he was
indeed – but of “only” one group of Lebanese.
There did exist another liberal vision of Lebanon, one represented by the
“majority” of the Administrative Council, whereas they disagreed with the French
movement and the French ideals, in this, but for their inexperience (or) naiveté in
international politic they might have had more sway over the outcome.
They had evidently hoped to take advantage of the difference between the
French and the Syrian-Arab nationalists to create their “Greater Lebanon” after the
mutasarrifiyya model, but when they finally realized their inability to control or
influence the French presence and/or assistance, they made moves to seek
“reconciliation” with the Syrian-Arab nationalists.
In this aspect in can be said that the nationalists had for some time “abandoned”
their opposition to the notion of an “autonomous Lebanon”. The Syrian declaration
of independence in Damascus on March 7th, 1920, recognized the right of the
Lebanese to preserve their own form of administration, “within their pre-war
boundaries”; on the sole condition they “shun” foreign influence. In this proposal,
not only did the Syrian government finally recognize the “right” of the Lebanese to
complete independence but reconfirmed the legitimacy of their demands for
territorial enlargement, “provided” the renounce the French mandate.
 A “group” of Lebanese councilors, officials, and other leaders agreed to
cooperate with the Syrian government, this in view of Syria’s “new” position
---unfortunately this happened at a time when the French had aspirations of direct
rule in Mount Lebanon, and had increased their efforts to accomplish their goal.
Notwithstanding, the group had the support of the “majority” of the councilors, who
on June 10th, 1920 showed their face and decided to challenge French rule.
Their resolution re-emphasized the determination of the Lebanese to have
“complete and absolute independence,” the need for the extension of Mount
Lebanon’s borders, and “the vital importance for the welfare and security of its
people that live in peace with their neighbors,” and with themselves.
The resolution than “expressed” the willingness of the Council to reach an
agreement with the Syria government along these guidelines, and called upon the
major powers to recognize the “right” of the Lebanese people to “self-government”,
which (the reinstated) had been and was guaranteed to them by their existing
constitution (the Reglement