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COMES NOW Defendant Hill Erickson, LLC(“HE”), by counsel, and pursuant to Uniform
District Court Rule 7.2(H) files this Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Cancel and/or
Expunge Lis Pendens Notice and Request for Expedited Consideration and in support thereof states
the following:
FranklinSquires Companies, LLC (“FSC”) and that, in connection therewith, Coughlin approached
Mr. Jeff Brantley (“Brantley”) about purchasing his Clinton, MS home (“Brantley Property”).
Coughlin’s Complaint at paras. 14 and 15. Coughlin further alleges that he “negotiated a deal with
Jeff Brantley for the sale of his home” and that FSC subsequently purchased the Brantley Property
through HE, an entity Coughlin alleges is under the control of FSC. Coughlin’s Complaint at paras.
16 and 18. Coughlin also alleges that FSC has breached a contractual obligation to pay him a twenty-
five percent commission arising out of FSC’s purchase of the Brantley Property through HE.
At the time Coughlin filed his complaint in this matter, Coughlin also filed a Lis Pendens
Case 3:06-cv-00288-HTW-LRA Document 7 Filed 07/05/2006 Page 2 of 4
Notice with the Hinds County Chancery Clerk in relation to the Brantley Property owned by HE. See
Exhibit A to HE’s motion and Exhibit C to HE’s Counter-Claim, a true and correct copy of HE’s
Warranty Deed to the Brantley Property, incorporated herein by reference pursuant to F.R.C.P. 10.
As will be demonstrated herein, Coughlin’s Lis Pendens Notice is improper and without ANY
II. Argument.
A. Coughlin’s Lis Pendens Notice is improper because Coughlin merely seeks to obtain
a money judgment against the defendants arising out of FSC’s alleged breach of a contractual
obligation to pay him a real estate commission rather than to enforce a lien upon, right to, or interest
in the Brantley Property owned by HE.
Even if the allegations of Coughlin’s Complaint are true, which is denied by HE, the
Lis Pendens Notice filed by Coughlin in relation to the Brantley Property should be canceled and/or
expunged by this Court. Coughlin’s Complaint does not seek to enforce a lien upon, right to, or
interest in the Brantley Property. Rather, Coughlin seeks to obtain a money judgment against the
defendants arising out of FSC’s alleged breach of a contractual obligation to pay him a twenty-five
percent commission in relation to FSC’s alleged purchase of the Brantley Property through HE.
Under such circumstances, Coughlin’s Lis Pendens Notice has absolutely no basis in law and is
improper as a result. W.H. Hopper and Assoc. v. Dunaway, 396 So. 2d 43, 44-45 (Miss. 1981)(“lis
pendens may not be predicated on an action or suit merely to recover a personal or money judgment
unless and until a valid judgment has been secured and made a lien against the property”; “[i]t (a lis
pendens) does not apply to an action of trespass, or a suit for an accounting, or to any other action
or suit which does not directly affect property”); Lord v. Jeffreys, 205 S.E. 2d 563, 564 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1974)(in action to recover commissions due on sale of real estate and damages for breach of
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contract, Court concluded that action was for personal judgment for payment of money, that lis
pendens notice was improper, and that trial court properly struck plaintiff’s lis pendens notice from
the property records as a result); 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 11 (“The doctrine of lis pendens may not
be predicated on an action or suit seeking merely to recover a money judgment. An action for money
only, even if it relates in some way to specific real property, will not support a lis pendens.
Accordingly, where the primary purpose of a lawsuit is to recover damages and the action does not
directly affect title to or right of possession of real property, the filing of a notice of lis pendens is
inappropriate”).
B. Coughlin asserts that FSC, not HE, has a contractual obligation to pay Coughlin a
commission and therefore no legitimate basis exist upon which Coughlin could
conceivably file a valid lis pendens notice in relation to the Brantley Property owned
by HE.
Even if FSC has breached a contract with Coughlin, which is denied, there is no basis alleged
in Coughlin’s Complaint upon which HE could be found liable for a breach of contract to which it
is not a party. Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So. 2d 330,336 (Miss. 1992)(elements of breach of contract
are: (1) existence of valid and binding contract; (2) that defendant has broken or breached contract;
and (3) that plaintiff has been damaged thereby monetarily). Moreover, Coughlin has neither alleged
nor is there, in fact, any contract or statute that gives Coughlin a lien on the Brantley Property. See
Lord v. Jeffreys, 205 S.E. 2d 563, 564 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). As a result, Coughlin merely seeks to
obtain a personal money judgment against the defendants arising out of a claimed contract with FSC.
Such a set of circumstances clearly do not support and/or justify the filing of Coughlin’s Lis Pendens
III. Conclusion.
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For the reasons set forth herein, as well as HE’s related motion, the Court should enter an
order that requires Coughlin and/or the Hinds County Chancery Clerk to cancel and/or expunge
Coughlin’s Lis Pendens Notice filed in relation to the Brantley Property owned by HE.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 5, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of
the Court using the ECF System which sent notification of such filing to the following:
s/Eddie J. Abdeen
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