Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant. Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiffappellee. FERNANDO, J.: The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not. The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm." Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits." Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda. 1wph1.t Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6 The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988 RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners, vs. THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOSAGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows: Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners. Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code. Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1 The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2 The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3 On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4 After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5 Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court). The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda RamosAgonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows: Art. 335. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction; xxx xxx xxx In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included". But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7 Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335. Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. 10 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.[1] At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RegionalTrial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. [2] In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.[3] Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. [Emphasis added.] It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.[5] An interpretation should, if possible, be

avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. [6] It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code w hich shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x. Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we can not countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x [8] The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.[9] ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982 MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna, defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No. 2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an information 3 which reads as follows: That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company, registered under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the Philippines. CONTRARY TO LAW. The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder: IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March, 1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C; on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present information was filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor, charging wife of Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously acted, "as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla Compaa de Seguros, ... without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines." and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's desk to renew ... Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October 22, 1974. 5

In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without giving due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20, 1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his Brief 9 while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the following errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court: 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT. 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F17, INCLUSIVE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER. We find the petition meritorious. The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph. The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as follows: No insurance company doing business within the Philippine Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance, unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company. Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject. Any person or company violating the provisions of this section shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any person acting as agent, sub-agent, or broker, of the commission of any offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such convicted person. A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under its first paragraph. Thus

... it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and then acting as agent, and received the pay thereof her defense that she was only acting as helper of her husband can no longer be sustained, neither her point that she received no compensation for issuance of the policy because any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits for a person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent of such company is subject. paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance Law, now it is true that information does not even allege that she had obtained the insurance, for compensation which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant apparently overlooks is that she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec. 189 wherein it is provided that, No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker, in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Island, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled.
12

From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance agent. We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence Any person who for compensation ... shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, ... Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. 17 Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid

section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 20 After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982 BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch III, and CALIXTO V. GASILAO, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.: This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of respondent Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, rendered on October 25, 1973 in Civil Case No. 90450 for mandamus filed by Calixto V. Gasilao against the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration. The facts as found by the Court a quo to have been established by the pleadings find by the parties are stated in the decision under review from which We quote the following: Calixto V. Gasilao, pauper litigant and petitioner in the above-entitled case, was a veteran in good standing during World War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9, Republic Act No. 65. The claim was disapproved by the Philippine Veterans Board (now Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration). Meanwhile, Republic Act 65 was amended by Republic Act 1362 on June 22, 1955 by including as part of the benefit of P50.00, P10.00 a month for each of the unmarried minor children below 18 of the veteran Republic Act No. 1362 was implemented by the respondents only on July 1, 1955. On June 18, 1957, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was further amended by Republic Act 1920 increasing the life pension of the veteran to P100.00 a month and maintaining the P10.00 a month each for the unmarried minor children below 18. Fortunately, on August 8, 1968, the claim of the petitioner which was disapproved in December, 1955 was reconsidered and his claim was finally approved at the rate of P100.00 a month, life pension, and the additional Pl0.00 for each of his ten unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the approval of the claim of petitioner, he requested respondents that his claim be made retroactive as of the date when his original application was flied or disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not act on his request. On June 22, 1969, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65 was amended by Republic Act No. 5753 which increased the life pension of the veteran to P200.00 a month and granted besides P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a month each for his unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the new law, respondents increased the monthly pension of petitioner to P125.00 effective January 15, 1971 due to insufficient funds to cover full implementation. His wife was given a monthly pension of P7.50 until January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was fully implemented. Petitioner now claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from October 19, 1955 to June 21, 1957 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his six (6) unmarried minor children below 18. lie also alleges that from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968 he is entitled to the difference of P100.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his seven (7) unmarried nor children below 18. Again, petitioner asserts the difference of P100.00 per month, plus P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference of P20.00 a month each for his four (4) unmarried minor children below 18 from June 22, 1969 up to January 14, 1971 and finally, the difference of P75.00 per month plus P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference of P20.00 a month for his three (3) unmarried minor children below 18 from January 15, 1971 to December 31, 1971. 1

According to the records, the parties, through their respective counsels, filed on September 24, 1973 the following stipulation of facts in the lower Court: STIPULATION OF FACTS COME NOW the parties thru their respective counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully state that they agree on the following facts which may be considered as proved without the need of the introduction of any evidence thereon, to wit: 1. Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled. 2. The Philippine Veterans Administration, formerly the Philippine Veterans Board, (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents; that it has the power to adopt rules and regulations to implement said laws and to pass upon the merits and qualifications of persons applying for rights and privileges extended by this Act pursuant to such rules and regulations as it may adopt to insure the speedy and honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes. 3. On July 23, 1955, petitioner filed a claim (Claim No. Dis-12336) for disability pension under Section 9 of RA 65, with the Philippine Veterans Board (later succeeded by the Philippine Veterans Administration, now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office), alleging that he was suffering from PTB, which he incurred in line of duty. 4. Due to petitioner's failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service connected illness, his claim was disapproved by the Board of the defunct Philippine Veterans Board on December 18, 1955. 5. On August 8, 1968, petitioner was able to complete his supporting papers and, after due investigation and processing, the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of RA 65, and was therefore given a pension of P100.00 a month and with an additional P 10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children pursuant to RA 1920, amending section 9 of RA 65. 6. RA 5753 was approved on June 22, 1969, providing for an increase in the basic pension to P200.00 a month and the additional pension, to P30.00 a month for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. Petitioner's monthly pension was, however, increased only on January 15, 1971, and by 25% of the increases provided by law, due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose, and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. 7. On January 15, 1972, more funds were released to implement fully RA 5753 and snow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that a decision be rendered in accordance with the foregoing stipulation of facts. It is likewise prayed that the parties be granted a period of (15) days within which to file their memoranda. 2 Upon consideration of the foregoing and the Memoranda filed by the parties, the lower Court rendered judgment against therein respondent Board of Administrators, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered for petitioner and the respondents are ordered to make petitioner's pension effective as of December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month; and the rate increased to P100.00 per month plus P10.00 per month each for his ten unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to August 7..1968; to pay the difference of P100.00 per month plus P30.00 per month and P20.00 per month each for his ten unmarried children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1969 up to January 15, 1971, the difference of P75.00 per month plus P22.50 per month for his wife and P20.00 per month each for his unmarried nor children then below 18 years of age from January 16, 1971 up to December 31, 1971. SO ORDERED. Manila, October 25, 1973. 3

In its Petition before this Court, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, through the Office of the Solicitor General, challenges the abovementioned decision of the Court a quo on the following grounds: 1. The lower Court erred in ordering the petitioners to retroact the effectivity of their award to respondent Calixto V. Gasilao of full benefits under section 9 of RA 65 to December 18, 1955, the date when his application was disapproved due to dis failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service connected illness, and not August 8, 1968, the date when he was able to complete his papers and allow processing and approval of his application. 2. The lower Court erred in ordering payment of claims which had prescribed. 3. The lower Court erred in allowing payment of claims under a law for which no funds had been released. 4 The question raised under the first assigned error is: When should private respondent Gasilao's pension benefits start The lower Court, quoting excerpts from Our decision in Begosa vs. Chairman Philippine Veterans Administration, 5ruled that Gasilao's pension benefits should retroact to the date of the disapproval of his claim on December 18, 1955, and not commence from the approval thereon on August 8, 1968 as contended by the Board of Administrators. Petitioner maintains the stand that the facts of the Begosa case are not similar to those of the case at bar to warrant an application of the ruling therein on the retroactivity of a pension award to the date of prior disapproval of the claim. In the Begosa case, the Supreme Court speaking thru then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Fernando, affirmed the decision of the lower Court, and ruled in part as follows: From the facts just set out, it will be noted that plaintiff filed his said claim for disability pension as far back as March 4, 1955; that it was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955, because his dishonorable discharge from the Army was not a good or proper ground for the said disapproval and that on reconsideration asked for by him on November 1, 1957, which he continued to follow up, the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, composed of herein defendants, which took over the duties of the Philippine Veterans Board, finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964, at the rate of P30.00 a month. 6 Had it not been for the said error, it appears that there was no good ground to deny the said claim, so that the latter was valid and meritorious even as of the date of its filing on March 4, 1955, hence to make the same effective only as of the date of its approval on September 2, 1964 according to defendant's stand would be greatly unfair and prejudicial to plaintiff. 7 In other words, the favorable award which claimant Begosa finally obtained on September 2, 1964 was made to retroact to the date of prior disapproval of the claim on June 2, 1955 for the reason that such disapproval was erroneously made. In the instant case, on the other hand, the herein claim of respondent Gasilao was denied on December 18, 1955 because of his "failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness" (Stipulation of Facts, Par. 4, ante). Nonetheless, the Stipulation of Facts admitted in par. 1 that "Petitioner was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy, and due to his military service, he was rendered disabled." From this admission in par. 1, it can reasonably be deduced that the action on the claim of Gasilao was merely suspended by the Philippine Veterans Administration pending the completion of the required supporting papers and evidence to establish his service-connected illness. Hence, Our ruling in the Begosa case making retroactive the award in favor of the veteran still holds. Republic Act No. 65 otherwise known as the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, does not explicitly provide for the effectivity of pension awards. However, petitioner seeks to remedy this legislative deficiency by citing Section 15 of the law which in part reads as follows: Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advantage of the rights and privileges provided for in this Act should file his application with the Board ... Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should commence form the date of he approval of the application.

This stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law, considering that Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits granted thereunder, among which are the right to resume old positions in the government, educational benefits, the privilege to take promotional examinations, a life pension for the incapacitated, pensions for widow and children, hospitalization and medical care benefits. As it is generally known, the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate, as far as may be, a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered, 8 and more particularly, those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. 9 A veteran pension law is, therefore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war or revolution, by extending to them regular monetary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. 10 Significantly, the original text of RA 65 provided that: Sec. 6. It also shall be the duty of the Board (then the Philippine Veterans Board) to pass upon the merits and qualifications of persons applying for the rights and/or privileges extended by this Act, pursuant to such rules as it may adopt to insure the speedy and honest fulfillment of its aims and purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing provision clearly makes it incumbent upon the implementing Board to carry out the provisions of the statute in the most expeditious way possible and without unnecessary delay. In the Begosa case, it took nine years (from June 2, 1955 to September 2, 1964) before the claimant finally obtained his pension grant, whereas in the instant case, it took about twelve years (from December, 1955 to August 8, 1968) for respondent Gasilao to receive his pension claim. To Our mind, it would be more in consonance with the spirit and intentment of the law that the benefits therein granted be received and enjoyed at the earliest possible time by according retroactive effect to the grant of the pension award as We have done in the Begosa case. On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the corresponding application which would be dependent on the discretion of the Board of Administrators which as noted above had been abused through inaction extending to nine years, even to twelve years, the noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could easily be thwarted or defeated. On the issue of prescription, petitioner cites Article 1144 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; and (3) Upon a judgment. Petitioner now contends that since the action was filed in the lower Court on April 13, 1973 seeking the payment of alleged claims which have accrued more than ten (10) years prior to said date, the same should have been disallowed as to the prescribed claims. The obligation of the government to pay pension was created by law (Sec. 9, R.A. 65). Hence, the ten-year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of passage of the law which is September 25, 1946, the reason being that it is only from said date that private respondent could have filed his application. Taking September 25, 1946 as the point of reference, the actual filing of Gasilao's application on July 23, 1955 was clearly made within and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. It is not the date of the commencement of the action in the lower Court which should be reckoned with, for it was not on said date that Gasilao first sought to claim his pension benefits, but on July 23, 1955 when he filed his application with the defunct Philippine Veterans Board. As We had the occasion to state in the case of Vda. de Nator vs. C.I.R., 11 "the basis of prescription is the unwarranted failure to bring the matter to the attention of those who are by law authorized to take cognizance thereof." The Stipulation of Facts do not show and neither do the records indicate when Gasilao attempted to reinstate his claim after the same was disapproved on December 18, 1955. What is evident is that he did take steps to reinstate his claim because on August 8, 1968, herein petitioner finally approved his application. We find it more logical to presume that upon being properly notified of the disapproval of his application and the reasons therefor, Gasilao, being the interested party that he was proceeded to work for the

completion of the requirements of the Board, as in fact he was successful in meeting such requirements. There is nothing in the record to show intentional abandonment of the claim to as to make the prescriptive period continue to run again. The third ground relied upon in support of this Petition involves the issue as to whether or not the payment of increased pension provided in the amendatory Act, R.A. 5753, could be ordered, even where there was no actual release of funds for the purpose, although the law itself expressly provided for an appropriation. In the case of Board of Adminitrators, Philippine Veterans Administration vs. Hon. Agcoili, et al., 12 penned by Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, the same issue was treated in this wise: ... The inability of the petitioner to pay Abrera the differential of P60.00 in monthly pension is attributed by it, in its own words, "to the failure of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds to cover all claims for benefits, pensions and allowances." And the petitioner states that it has "no alternative but to suspend (full implementation of said laws until such time, as sufficient funds have been appropriated by Congress" to cover the total amount of all approved claims. We find the explanation of the petitioner satisfactory, but we nevertheless hold that as a matter of law Abrera is entitled to a monthly pension of P120.00 from January 1, 1972 when Republic Act 5753 was implemented up to the present, if his physical disability rating has continued and continues to be 60%. Payment to him of what is due him from January 1, 1972 must however remain subject to the availability of Government funds duly set aside for the purpose and subject further periodic re-rating of his physical disability. But even if we have thus defined the precise terms, nature and scope of the entitlement of the respondent Abrera, for the guidance of petitioner, we nevertheless refrain from ordering the petitioner to pay the amount of P120.00 per month from January 1, 1972 that is due to the respondent by virtue of the mandate of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended by Republic Act 5753, because the Government has thus far not provided the necessary funds to pay all valid claims duly approved under the authority of said statute. 13 (Emphasis supplied.) ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court a quo is hereby modified to read as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is hereby ordered to make Gasilao's pension effective December 18, 1955 at the rate of P50-00 per month plus P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968. The differentials in pension to which said Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from June 22, 1969 to January 14, 1972 by virtue of Republic Act No. 5753 are hereby declared subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose. SO ORDERED.