JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW

FundaEMINENT DOMAIN; Expropriation; It may be initiated by Republic v. mental court action or by legislation. In both instances, just Salem Powers of compensation is determined by the courts. Investment the State orp., !R "#$%&', (une )#, )***. Same; Same; Two stages: +", the determination of the id. authority of the plaintiff to e-ercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its e-ercise in the conte-t of the facts involved in the suit. +), the determination by the court of just compensation for the property sought to be ta/en. 0he two stages apply to both judicial and legislative e-propriation and said stages are not complete until payment of just compensation. It is only upon payment of just compensation that title to the property passes to the government Same; Same; Expropriation suit is incapable of 2arangay San pecuniary estimation and falls w1in the jurisdiction of the Ro3ue v. R0 , regardless of the value of the subject property. 4eirs of Pastor, !R "#55'&, (une )*, )***. Same; Same; Entry; 0he re3uirements of 67 "*#%, i.e., conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign and detailed engineering1surveys, are not conditions precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession against the property being e-propriated. 0he re3mts for the issuance of a writ of possession, once the e-propriation case is filed, are e-pressly and specifically governed by Sec. ), Rule &$ of the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure. Pursuant to said rule and the Robern 8evelopment orp. case, the only re3uisites for authori9ing immediate entry in e-propriation proceedings are: ;"< the FI=I>! of a complaint for e-propriation sufficient in form and substance. ;)< the ma/ing of a 86P7SI0 e3uivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to e-propriation. 0he owners of the e-propriated land are entitled to =6!?= I>06R6S0 on the compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor ta/es possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited in court. Same; Same; ig!t of "ay; 0he ac3uisition of an easement of right of way falls w1in the power of eminent domain. 2iglang-awa v. (udge 2acalla, !R "#'')$ and "#''#&, >ov. )), )***.

amarines >orte 6lectric oop. v. ?, !R "*'##5, >ov. )*, )***

iti9enship

If an Alien ;i< gave or donated his money to a citi9en of han Sui 2i v. the Phils. so that the latter could invest it in the purchase ?, !R of private agricultural lands, or ;ii< purchased private ")'%*$, Sept, agricultural lands for a citi9en of the Phils., such acts, )', )***. provided they are done in !778 F?I04, do not violate our laws. @hat is prohibited by the ?nti-8ummy =aw and the Retail 0rade =aw then prevailing were the ac3uisition by an alien for himself of private lands in the Phils., and his conduct of retail trade, respectively. E#T ADITION; ig!t to Notice an$ %earing; Private Sec. respondent does not have the right to notice and hearing (ustice during the evaluation stage of the e-tradition process, for =antion, of v. !R

the ff. reasons: ;"< P8 "*&' w1c implements the RP-AS "#'B&%, 7ct. 6-tradition 0reaty provides the time when an e-tradite "$, )***. shall be furnished a copy of the petition for e-tradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the said petition in the e-tradition court. 0here is no provision in the above law and treaty w1c gives an e-trditee the right to demand from the Sec. of (ustice copies of the e-tradition re3uest from the AS government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the re3uest is still undergoing evaluation. ;)< ?ll treaties, including the RP-AS 6-tradition 0reaty, should be interpreted in the light of their intent. 0he RP-AS 6-tradition 0reaty calls for an interpretation that will minimi9e if not prevent the escape of the e-tradite form the long arm of the law and e-pidite their trial. ;#< 0he 6-ecutive 8ept., thru the 8F? and the 87(, has steadfastly maintained that the RP-AS 6-tradition 0reaty and P8 "*&' do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e-tradition process. 0his understanding of the treaty is shared by the AS government, the other party to the treaty. 7ther countries w1 similar e-tradition treaties w1 the Phils. have e-pressed the same interpretation adopted by the Phils. and As governments. ;B< ?n e-tradition proceeding is sui generic. It is not a criminal proceeding that will call into operation all the rights of the accused guaranteed by the 2ill of Rights. 2ill Rights of D&E ' O(ESS; ? decision is void for lac/ of due process, as when a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. ? void judgment never ac3uires finality. 0he Summary 8ismissal 2oard v. 0orcita, !R "#*BB#, ?pril &, )***. Ay v. ?, !R "*'%%$, >ov. )', )***.

Same; ? denial of due process suffices to cast on the official acts ta/en by whatever branch of government the impression of >A==I0C. ? decision rendered w1o due process is void ab initio and may be attac/ed directly or collaterally. E)&A* ' OTE(TION O+ T%E *A"; the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to convict the co-accused, the ac3uittal of the former should benefit the latter. Such doctrine does not apply to this case. 0he strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which 2uenafe was not involved. 4ence, the evidence against petitioner and that against his coaccused were simply not at par with each other. + EEDOM + OM &N EASONA,*E SEA (%ES AND SEI-& ES; In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the onstitution and reiterated in the Rules of ourt must be complied with. In the e-ceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or sei9ure, or when the latter cannot be performed e-cept without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or sei9ure is purely a judicial 3uestion, determinable from the uni3ueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or sei9ure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and sei9ure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

Peligrino v. People, !R "#&)&&, ?ug. "#, )**".

Posadas vs. ?, "55 S R? )55 +"''*,, citing People vs. FI of Ri9al, "*" S R? 5& +"''&,.

Same; "arrant of Arrest; Re3uirements for the valid Ay v. 2IR, !R issuance of search warrant: ;"< the warrant must be issued ")'&%", 7ct. upon probable cause. ;)< PR72?2=6 ?AS6 must be )*, )***. determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person. ;#< In determining probable cause, the judge must 6D?EI>6 under oath or affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. ;B< the warrant issued must P?R0I A=?R=C 86S RI26 the place to be searched and the persons or things to be sei9ed. ? description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer w1 the warrant can, w1 reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Search @arrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of P?R0I A=?RI0C, especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be sei9ed. 0he search warrant is separable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off w1o destroying the whole warrant. Same; Same; 'robable (ause; For the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of ourt re3uires a finding of probable cause in connection w1 one specific offense to be 8606REI>68 P6RS7>?==C 2C 046 (A8!6 after e-amining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Since, in this case, there is no crime to spea/ of, the search warrant is null and void and all property sei9ed by virtue thereof shall be returned in accordance w1 established jurisprudence. Savage v. (udge 0aypin, !R "#B)"$, Eay "", )***.

Same; Same; .uris$iction; ? search warrant is merely a id. process issued by the court in the e-ercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action w1c it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 0he authority to issue search warrants is inherent in all courts and may effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special ourts of IPR. ?dministrative 7rder >o. ""#-'% merely specified w1c court could try and decide cases involving violations of the IPR. It did not, and could not, vest e-clusive jurisdiction w1 regard to all matters +including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes, in any one court. (urisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law, in this case, 2P 2lg. ")', and not by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order. 0he power to issue search warrants for violation of IPR has not been e-clusively vested in the courts enumerated in S ?dmin 7rder >o. ""#-'%. ertification against forumshopping is not re3uired in applications for search warrants. "arrantless Searc! an$ Sei/ure; 0he constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and sei9ures is not absolute but admits of certain e-ceptions, namely: +", @?RR?>0=6SS S6?R 4 I> I86>0?= 07 ? =?@FA= ?RR6S0 recogni9ed under Section "), Rule ")& of the Rules of ourt and by prevailing jurisprudence ;PP vs. PP v. de !racia, )## S R? $"& +"''B, citing PP v. Ealmstedt, Figueroa, )B5 S R? &$' +"''%,. Eorfe vs. Eutuc, )) S R? "'5 S R? B)B +"'&5,. 8avis vs. Anited States, #)5 A.S. %5). <. +), B*" +"''", S6IFAR6 7F 6GI86> 6 I> P=?I> GI6@ ;7bra vs. ?, and Amil v. #"$ S R? %'B +"''',. P vs. 2agista, )"B S R? &# +"''),. Ramos, "5$ Padilla vs. ?, )&' S R? B*) +"''$,. PP vs. =o 4o @ing, "'# S R? #"" S R? ")) +"''",. oolidge vs. >ew 4ampshire, B*# A.S. BB#. <. +"''*,.

+#, S6?R 4 7F E7GI>! G64I =6S ;PP vs. 6scaHo, #)#

S R? $%B +)***,. ?niag, (r. vs. omelec, )#$ S R? B)B +"''B,. PP vs. Saycon, )#& S R? #)% +"''B,. PP vs. 6-ala, ))" S R? B'B +"''#,. Galmonte vs. de Gilla, "$5 S R? )"" +"'5',. arroll vs. Anited States, )&$ A.S. "#). <. +B, 7>S6>068 @?RR?>0=6SS S6?R 4 ;PP vs. Eontilla, )5% S R? $*# +"''5,. PP vs. ui9on, )%& S R? #)% +"''&,. Eustang =umber vs. ?, et al., )%$ S R? B#* +"''&,. PP vs. Ramos, ))) S R? %%$ +"''#,. PP vs. 7maweng, )"# S R? B&) +"''),.<. +%, AS07ES S6?R 4. +&, S07P ?>8 FRISI SI0A?0I7>S +J06RRC S6?R 4K, ;PP vs. Salayao, )&) S R? )%% +"''&,. Posadas vs. ?, "55 S R? )55 +"''*, citing 0erry vs. 7hio, )* =. 6d. )d 5'&.< . and +$, 6DI!6>0

?>8 6E6R!6> C IR AES0?> 6S ;PP vs. de !racia, )## S R? $"& +"''B, citing PP vs. Ealmstedt, "'5 S R? B*" +"''", and Amil, et al. vs. Ramos, "5$ S R? #"" +"''*,<. Same; 0'lain1iew Doctrine2; 0he prosecution against illegal search and sei9ure covers both innocent and guilty ali/e against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers. 0he JplainviewK doctrine +w1c may justify a search w1o a warrant, applies only where the police officer is >70 S6?R 4I>! for evidence against the accused, but I>?8G6R06>0=C comes across an incriminating object. (ust because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not prevent the appellant from invo/ing the protection afforded by the onstitution. 0he right against unreasonable searches and sei9ures is the immunity of oneLs person, w1c includes his residence, papers and other possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and sei9ures, he need not be in his home or office, w1in a fenced yard or private place. Same; Same; ?n object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly e-posed to sight. @here the object sei9ed was inside a closed pac/age, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be sei9ed without a warrant. 4owever, if the pac/age proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei9ed. Same; (onsente$ Searc! or "ai1er; It is fundamental that to constitute waiver: ;i< it must first appear that the right e-ists. ;ii< the person involved had /nowledge, either actual or constructive, of the e-istence of such right. and ;iii< the said person had an actual intention to relin3uish the right. PP v. Galde9, !R ")')'&, Sept. )%, )***.

aballes v. ?, !R "#&)'), (an. "%, )**).

PP v. Figueroa, !R "#B*%&, (uly &, )***.

Same; Same; Essential e3uisites; In case of aballes v. consented searches or waiver of the constitutional ?, !R guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental "#&)'), (an. that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that +", the "%, )**). right e-ists. +), that the person involved had /nowledge, either actual or constructive, of the e-istence of such right. and +#, the said person had an actual intention to relin3uish the right. Same; Same; ?n alleged consent to a warrantless search and sei9ure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. 0his presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and 9eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that PP v. 2aula, !R "#)&$", >ov. "%, )***.

the onstitution itself abhors. Same; Same; 0he constitutional immunity against aballes v. unreasonable searches and sei9ures is ? P6RS7>?= ?, !R RI!40 which may be waived. 0he consent must be "#&)'), (an. voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention "%, )**). and search, i.e., the consent is une3uivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 4ence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 0he 3uestion whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a 3uestion of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: +", the age of the defendant. +), whether he was in a public or secluded location. +#, whether he objected to the search or passively loo/ed on. BB +B, the education and intelligence of the defendant. +%, the presence of coercive police procedures. +&, the defendantMs belief that no incriminating evidence will be found. B% +$, the nature of the police 3uestioning. +5, the environment in which the 3uestioning too/ place. and +', the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State w1c has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. Same; Searc! of Mo1ing 4e!icle; ? warrantless search aballes v. of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not ?, !R practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can "#&)'), (an. 3uic/ly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the "%, )**). warrant must be sought. Searches w1o warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or constructive borders li/e chec/points near the boundary lines of the State. 0he mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches w1o warrants if made w1in the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Same; 0Stop an$ Searc!2; Stop and search at military or aballes v. police chec/points has been declared to be >70 I==6!?= ?, !R P6R S6, for as long as it is warranted by the e-igencies of "#&)'), (an. public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to "%, )**). motorists. ? chec/point may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an e-tensive search. Same; Same; outine Inspection; 0hey are not aballes v. regarded as violative of an individualLs right against ?, !R unreasonable search. 0he search w1c is normally "#&)'), (an. permissible in this instance is limited to the ff: ;"< where "%, )**). the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle w1c is par/ed on the public fair grounds. ;)< simply loo/s into a vehicle. ;#< flashes a light therein w1o opening the carLs doors. ;B< where the occupants are not subjected to aphysical or body search. ;&< where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection. and ;$< where the routine chec/ is conducted in a fi-ed area. In this case, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitionerLs vehicle. 0hey had to reach inside the vehicle,

lift the /a/wati leaves and loo/ inside the sac/s before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine chec/. Same; Same; Extensi1e Searc!; @hen a vehicle is aballes v. stopped and subjected to an e-tensive search, such a ?, !R warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible "#&)'), (an. 7>=C if the officers conducting the search have "%, )**). reasonable or PR72?2=6 ?AS6 to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 0his ourt has in the past found probable cause to conduct w1o a judicial warrant an e-tensive search of moving vehicles in situations where +", there had emanated from a pac/age the distinctive smell of marijuana. +), agents of the >arcom of the P>P had received a confidential report from informers that a si9eable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted. +#, >arcom agents had received information that a aucasian coming from Sagada, Eountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the >arcom agents confronted the accused aucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when re3uested to do so. +B, >arcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. +%, the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large 3uantity of marijuana. and +&, where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy N one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged N that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the bac/ of the vehicle was covered with /a/awati leaves w1c, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. 0he fact that the vehicle =77I68 SASPI I7AS simply because it is not common for such to be covered with /a/awati leaves does not constitute Oprobable causeO as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. ?nd ?bsence of any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. 7ur jurisprudence is replete with cases where 0ipped Information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and sei9ure. Anfortunately, none e-ists in this case. Same; Searc! Inci$ental to a *awful Arrest; ? search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. Ander the Oplain view doctrine,O unlawful objects within the Oplain viewO of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to sei9ure and may be presented in evidence. "& >onetheless, the sei9ure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following elements: +a, a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in PP v. ?spiras, !R "#5#5)5B, Feb. "), )**).

the pursuit of their official duties. +b, the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. +c, the evidence must be immediately apparent. and +d, Oplain viewO justified mere sei9ure of evidence without further search. Illegal Searc! an$ Sei/ure; Exclusionary ule; aballes v. 6nshrined in our onstitution is the inviolable right of the ?, !R people to be secure in their persons and properties "#&)'), (an. against unreasonable searches and sei9ures. 0he "%, )**). e-clusionary rule under Section #+),, ?rticle III of the onstitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. Illegal searc!5arrest; 0his case clearly illustrates how PP v. 2olasa, constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and !R ")%$%B, sei9ures can be violated by over9ealous police officers in 8ec. ), "'''. the arrest of suspected drug offenders. 0he State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citi9ens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. 0he constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and sei9ures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly Ocut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.O For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blan/et prohibition against all searches and sei9ures as it obviously operates only against searches and sei9ures that are Ounreasonable.O 0he arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was li/ewise illegal. 6very evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accusedappellants. hence, their ac3uittal must follow in faithful obedience to the fundamental law. Searc!es an$ Sei/ures; (onfiscation; 6ven if the medicines or drugs sei9ed were genuine and even if they had the proper chemicals or ingredients in their productions, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrants were declared illegal. 0he policy of the law enunciated in R? 5)*# is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen. + EEDOM O+ T%E ' ESS; Aca$emic +ree$om on (ampus .ournalism; Sec. $ of the ampus (ournalism ?ct prohibits e-pulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, 6D 6P0 when such article materially disrupt class wor/ or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. 0he power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or e-pel. It is corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly environment to learning. 0hat power, li/e the power to suspend or e-pel, is an inherent part of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the onstitution. I6%T TO IN+O MATION; ? self-e-ecutory provision which can be invo/ed by any citi9en before the courts. 0he ourt classified the right to information as a public right and Jwhen a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the re3uirement of personal interest is PP v. (udge 6strada, !R ")BB&", (une )&, )***.

Eirriam ollege Foundation v. ?, ")$'#*, 8ec. "%, )***.

!on9ales v. >arvasa, !R "B*5#%, ?ug. "B, )***.

satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citi9en, and therefore, part of the general PpublicL which possesses the right.K 4owever, ongress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic ?ct >o. &$"#, otherwise /nows as the J ode of onduct and 6thical Standards for Public 7fficials and 6mployees,K which too/ effect on Earch )%, "'5'. 0his law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen +"%, wor/ing days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable wor/ing hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality. Same; =imited to Jmatters of public concern,K to Jtransactions involving public interest.K 0he negotiation and subse3uent sale of the property by the !SIS to private respondent was not imbued w1 public interest as it was a purely private transaction. Petitioners cannot therefore demand that they be informed of such negotiation and sale, more so since they no longer had any interest in the property upon their failure to comply w1 !SIS terms for repurchase and its denial of petitionerLs offer to repurchase. + EEDOM O+ ASSO(IATION; 0he constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. 0he right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the S 4? by the simple e-pedient of including them in its ?rticles of Incorporation and 2y-laws w1o their e-press or implied consent. 0rue, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare. 2ut that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association. 0rue also, memberships in homeownersM associations may be ac3uired in various ways N often through deeds of sale, 0orrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property ownership. In the present case, however, other than the said ?rticles of Incorporation and 2y-laws, there is no showing that private respondents have agreed to be S 4? members. 4ence, membership in a homeownersM association is voluntary and cannot be unilaterally forced by a provision in the associationMs articles of incorporation or by-laws, which the alleged member did not agree to be bound to. I6%T TO T A4E*; 6ui$elines on %ol$7$eparture Or$ers 8%DO9: +", 487 shall be issued only in criminal cases w1in the e-clusive jurisdiction of the R0 . +), 0he R0 issuing the 487 shall furnish the 8F? and the 2I w1 a copy each of the 487 w1in )B hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal. +#, 0he 487 shall contain the ff. information: ;a< 0he complete name +incl. the middle name, the date and place of birth and the place of last residence of the person against whom the 487 has been issued or Arbano v. !SIS, !R "#$'*B, 7ct. "', )**".

Sta. lara 4omeownerLs ?ssn v. Sps. !aston, !R "B"'&", (an. )#, )**).

R6: 4old8eparture 7rder Issued by (udge Sardido, ?.E. >o. *"-'-)B%, E0 , 8ec. %, )**".

whose departure from the country has been enjoined. ;b< 0he complete title and doc/et number of the case w1c the 487 was issued. ;c< 0he specific nature of the case. and ;d< 0he date of the 487. If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a 487 has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also be included. +B, @henever the accused has been ac3uitted or the case against him dismissed, the judgment of ac3uittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of the 487 issued. 0he courts concerned shall furnish the 8F? and the 2I w1 a copy each of the judgment of ac3uittal or the order of dismissal )B hours from the time of promulgated1issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal. E# 'OST +A(TO *A"; ?n e- post facto law is one 2enedicto v. which: +", ma/es criminal an act done before the passage ?, !R of the law and which was innocent when done, and ")%#%', Sept. punishes such an act. +), aggravates a crime, or ma/es it B, )**". greater than it was when committed. +#, changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law anne-ed to the crime when committed. +B, alters the legal rules of evidence, and authori9es conviction upon less or different testimony than the law re3uired at the time of the commission of the offense. +%, assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful. and +&, deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or ac3uittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 0he test whether a penal law runs afoul of the e- post facto clause of the onstitution is: 8oes the law sought to be applied retroactively ta/e Ofrom an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against himQO 0he crucial words in the test are Ovital for the protection of life and liberty.QO @e find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic ?ct >o. $&%#. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, e-cept when they are favorable to the accused. >owhere in Republic ?ct >o. $&%#, and in particular Section #&, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. 0here is, therefore, no e- post facto law in this case. Rights of I6%T TO ,E ' ES&MED INNO(ENT; 0he law PP v. =a-a, the presumes the accused innocent unless shown otherwise !R "#5%*", accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 0he burden of proving (uly )*, )**". that an accused is guilty of the offense charged lies upon the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more e-planations, one of w1c is consistent w1 his guilt, then the evidence is not sufficient to support conviction. I6%TS &NDE (&STODIA* IN4ESTI6ATION; ustodial investigation means any 3uestioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is ta/en into PP v. Eorial, !R ")')'%, ?ug. "%,

AS078C or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. It begins when the in3uiry as to oneLs involvement in a crime is no longer general but starts to focus on a particular person as a SASP6 0. Same; Section "), ?rt. III of the "'5$ onstitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a person under custodial investigation for the commission of a crime and the duty of the State to enforce such mandate, w1c are: +", ?ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. 0hese rights cannot be waived e-cept in writing and in the presence of counsel. +), >o torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. +#, ?ny confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Same; ? person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, w1c attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: +", to remain silent. +), to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. and +#, to be informed of the two other rights above. Same; 0he mantle of protection under Sec. "), ?rt. III of the "'5$ onstitution covers the period from the time a person is ta/en into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody. Same; 0he mantle of protection under Sec. "), ?rt. III of the onstitution covers the period from the time a person is ta/en into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime, or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime, although not yet in custody. ustodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general in3uiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or e-acting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 0he place of interrogation is not determinative of the e-istence or absence of custodial investigation but the tone and manner of 3uestioning by the police authorities. 0hus, there was custodial investigation when the police authorities, upon their arrest of some of the accused, immediately as/ed them regarding their participation in the commission of the crime, even while they were still wal/ing along the highway on their way to the police station. 0his is in line w1 prevailing jurisprudence and the provisions of R? $B#5, that the re3uisite of a custodial investigation are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but Jmerely invited for 3uestioningK. Same; 'roce$ure; ? suspect in custodial investigation

)**".

PP v. Suela, !R "##%$*$", (an. "%, )**).

PP v. Eorial, !R ")')'%, ?ug. "%, )**".

PP v. 2ravo, !R "#%%&), >ov. )), "'''.

PP v. 2ari3uit, !R "))$##, 7ct. ), )***. PP v. Feli-minia, !R ")%###, Earch )*, )**).

PP

v.

must be given the following warnings: +", 4e must be Samolde, !R informed of his RI!40 07 R6E?I> SI=6>0. +), he must ")5%%", (uly be @?R>68 that anything he says can and will be used #", )***. against him. and +#, he must be told that he has a RI!40 07 7A>S6=, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. In this case, accusedappellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional re3uirements. 0his manner of giving warnings has been held to be Omerely ceremonial and inade3uate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.O For this reason, we hold accused-appellantMs e-trajudicial confession is invalid. Same; It has been held that these rights attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officers begin to as/ 3uestions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody 3uestioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. 0he presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. 4ence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, e-trajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or e-culpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section ") +",, ?rticle III of the onstitution are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. 0his is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given. Such statements are useless e-cept as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the suspectMs rights. PP v. Figueroa, !R "#B*%&, (uly &, )***.

Same; I6%T TO (O&NSE*; ;0<he right to counsel PP v. =abtan, attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the !R ")$B'#, investigating officer starts to as/ 3uestions to elicit 8ec. 5, "'''. information and1or confessions or admissions from the respondent1accused. ?t such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice e-torting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. 0he moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. Same; Same; 0he right refers to J 7EP606>0 ?>8 I>86P6>86>0 7A>S6=,K not the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. ?n effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically re3uires that the lawyer present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first 3uestion as/ed by the investigating officer until the signing of the e-trajudicial confession. 0he lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the conse3uence of his e-trajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. 0he modifier competent and PP v. Suela, !R "##%$*$", (an. "%, )**).

independent stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uni3uely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices e-plained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. Same; ig!t to !a1e a (ompetent an$ In$epen$ent PP v. =abtan, (ounsel; It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent !R ")$B'#, and independent were terms absent in all organic laws 8ec. 5, "'''. previous to the "'5$ onstitution. 0heir addition in the fundamental law of "'5$ was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uni3uely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer. 0hus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as possible, the choice of the individual undergoing 3uestioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accusedLs behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individualLs constitutional rights. Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation +if the latter could not afford one, Pshould be engaged by the accused +himself,, or by the latterLs relative or person authori9ed by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authori9ed by the accused to file such petition. =awyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. Same; Same; Such right refers to P6FF6 0IG6 7A>S6=K. In essence, it refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process. PP v1 =iwanag, !R ")*B&5, ?ug. "%, )**".

Same; Same; 0he term Oeffective and vigilant counselO, is PP v. =abtan, necessarily and logically ;re3uires< that the lawyer be !R ")$B'#, present and able to advise and assist his client from the 8ec. 5, "'''. time the confessant answers the first 3uestion as/ed by the investigating officer until the signing of the e-trajudicial confession. Eoreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the conse3uence of his e-trajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. ? contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. ?n Jeffective counselK is characteri9ed as Oone who can be made to act in protection of his ;accusedLs< rights, and not by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law degree. Same; Same; 0he accused must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start of custodial investigation until its termination. 0his right was negated by the precipitate departure of the lawyer of the accused before the termination of the investigation. Same; Same; ? counsel who failed to inform the accused PP v. Eorial, !R ")')'%, ?ug. "%, )**". PP v. Eorial,

of the latterLs right to remain silent, who /ept Jcoming and goingK during the custodial investigation, and abruptly departed before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the competent, vigilant and effective counsel contemplated in the onstitution. Same; Same; @here the accused is represented by someone who is not a member of the Phil. 2ar, conviction in the lower court was set aside and the case remanded for new trial.

)**". PP v. ?ran9ado, )**".

PP v. Santociles, !R "*'"B', 8ec. )", "'''.

Same; Same; (onfession; onfessions of the accused in PP v. 0ulin, the absence of counsel are invalid. !R """$*', ?ug. #*, )**". Same; Same; Same; 6ven if a confession is subse3uently signed in the presence of counsel, it is not cured of constitutional defects. Same; Same; it is more than just the presence of a lawyer in the court room or the mere propounding of standard 3uestions and objections. It means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. 0he right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly, at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his /nowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and e-isting jurisprudence. Same; Same; 'olice *ine7up; 0he stage of investigation wherein a person is as/ed to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general in3uiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigative in nature. Same; Same; Same; ?s a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial in3uest. 4owever, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. Same; Same; Out7of (ourt I$entification; ?n out-ofcourt identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. 8uring custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recogni9ed as Ocritical confrontations of the accused by the prosecutionO which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. 0his is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings Omight well settle the accusedMs fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.O @e have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. PP v. Eorial, )**". PP v. ?ran9ado, !R "#)BB)-BB, Sept. )B, )**".

PP v. Pavellare, !R ")''$*, ?pril %, )***. PP v. 6scordial, !R "#5'#B-#%, (an. "&, )**).

PP v. 6scordial, !R "#5'#B-#%, (an. "&, )**).

Same; Same; In1itations; Said right was not violated in this case where the police invited for 3uestioning residents of the compound, including the appellants. 0hey were not yet singled out as the perpetrators of the crime. @hen the accused was as/ed a single 3uestion at the police station regarding his whereabouts on the evening of >ov. )5, it was not a custodial investigation inasmuch as the 3uery was merely part of the Jgeneral e-ploratory stage.K

PP v. Pavellare, !R ")''$*, ?pril %, )***.

Same; A$ministrati1e In1estigation; 0he right to Remolona v. counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal S , !R investigation and not to administrative investigation. "#$B$#, ?ug. ), )**". Same; "AI4E ; ?s a rule, to be valid, must be made in PP v. Eorial, writing, and in the presence of counsel. !ranting that )**". appellant consented to his counselLs departure during the investigation and to answer 3uestions during the lawyerLs absence, such consent was not a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Same; Same; >o valid waiver where admissions obtained during custodial investigations w1o the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the onstitution. Same; Same; Same; 4owever, the manifestation of accused-appellants that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer was deemed a valid waiver of the right, considering that it was une3uivocally, /nowingly, and intelligently made and w1 full assistance of a bona fide lawyer . E#T A7.&DI(IA* (ON+ESSION; ? confession to be admissible must satisfy the following re3uirements: +", the confession must be voluntary. +), the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel. +#, the confession must be e-press. and +B, the confession must be in writing. ? suspectMs confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when ta/en without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellantMs confession were gospel truth. Same; ? judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. 0he presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Indeed, it is hard to believe that a person, of whatever economic status, would confess to a crime that he did not commit for monetary considerations and thus barter away his liberty, and for that matter, even his life, for a mess of potage, for that is what the mere sum of P"*,***.** allegedly paid to him to ma/e the confession means. Same; ?s a Rule, these rights Ocannot be waived e-cept in writing and in the presence of counsel.O ? suspectMs confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when ta/en without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellantMs confession were gospel truth. PP v. Eatignas, !R ")&"B&, Earch "), )**). PP v. 0ulin, !R """$*', ?ug, #*, )**".

PP v. Suela, !R "##%$*$", (an. "%, )**).

PP v. Samolde, !R ")5%%", (uly #", )***.

PP v. 8ano, !R ""$&'*, Sept. ", )*** .

Same; Same; 4owever, SP7>0?>67AS S0?06E6>0S voluntarily given, as where appellant orally admitted /illing the victim before the barangay captain +who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent,, do not fall under custodial investigation. Such admission, even w1o the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate appellantLs constitutional rights.

PP v. 8ano, !R ""$&'*, Sept ", )***. PP v. Eayorga, !R "#%B*%, >ov. )', )***

Same; 'resumption; 0he presumption that official duty PP v. 8ano, has been regularly performed cannot by itself prevail over !R ""$&'*, positive averments concerning violations of the Sept. ", constitutional rights of an accused. )*** . I6%T A6AINST SE*+7IN( IMINATION; @hat is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to e-tort communication and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when material to the case. Same; 0he essence of this right is 06S0IE7>I?= 7EPA=SI7> or the giving of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. 4ence, an accused may be compelled to submit to physical e-amination and have a substance ta/en from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim w1o violating this right. I6%T A6AINST DO&,*E .EO'A D:; ?n accused is placed in double jeopardy when he is again tried for an offense for w1c he has been convicted, ac3uitted, or in w1c the indictment against him was dismissed w1o his consent. Same; 0o raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present: +", a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. +), the first jeopardy must have terminated. and +#, the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Same; E1olution of t!e $octrine. ?ppeal by the !overnment from verdicts of ac3uittal. ?s mandated by the onstitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an ac3uittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the ?. In general, the rule that remand to a trial court of a judgment of ac3uittal brought before the S on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of EIS0RI?=, as in !alman v. Sandiganbayan. PP v. Rondero, !R ")%&5$, 8ec. ', "'''. PP v. 2anihit, !R "#)*B%, ?ug. )%, )***. PP v. ontinente, !R "**5*"*), ?ug. )%, )***. 0upa9 v. 4on. Alep, !R ")$$$$, 7ct ", "'''. Sarabia v. People, !R "B)*)B, (uly )*, )**". PP v. Gelascoi, !R ")$BBB, Sept. "#, )***.

Same; (udgment of ac3uittal in criminal proceedings is Cuchengco v. final and unappeallable whether it happens at the trial ?, !R court level or before the ?. 0his means that a review of "#'$&5, Feb. alleged errors in the said judgment arising from $, )**). misappreciation of facts and the evidence adduced cannot be made w1o trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy. I6%T TO ,E IN+O MED O+ T%E A((&SATIONS A6AINST %IM; this means that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. 0he accused is presumed to have no /nowledge of the facts that constitute the offense charge. PP v. 0abion, !R "#)$"%, 7ct. )*, "'''.

I6%T TO ,E %EA D ,: %IMSE*+ AND (O&NSE* PP v. Cambot, AND TO ' ESENT E4IDEN(E +O %IS DE+ENSE; In !R ")*#%*,

this case, the non-appearance of counsel fort he accused 7ct. "#, )***. on the scheduled hearing was not construed as a waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. 8enial of due process can be successfully invo/ed where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case. Same; ? counsel assisting an accused is guided by the provisions of Sec. )*, Rule "#5 of the Rules of ourt. anon ), "), "$, "5, and "' of the ode of Professional Responsibility and anons B, %, and "% of the anons of Professional 6thics. 0he proper measure of a counselLs performance is R6?S7>?2=6>6SS under the prevailing professional norms. In this case, the issue raised regarding a lawyerLs acts or omissions in the conduct of his duties as counsel for the accused was deemed not proper as it may breed more unwanted conse3uences than merely upholding an accusedLs constitutional right or raising the standard of the legal profession. Same; "ai1er of presentation of E1i$ence; 0he accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. 0his is in consonance w1 the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed w1 and relin3uished w1o infringing on any public right, and w1o detriment to the community at large. PP =iwanag, )**". v.

PP v. 2anihit, !R "#)*B%, ?ug. )%, )***.

I6%T TO S'EED: DIS'OSITION O+ T%E (ASE; 0he 0ai =im v. ?, right of the accused to speedy trial shall not be used to !R "#"B5#, deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly 7ct. )&, "'''. prosecuting criminals. It allows for reasonable continuance. It is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by ve-atious, capricious, and oppressive delays. or, when unjustified postponements of the trial are as/ed for and secured. Same; It is deemed violated 7>=C when the proceedings is attended by ve-atious, capricious and oppressive delays. or when unjustified postponements of the trial are as/ed for and secured, or when w1o cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period as allowed to elapse w1o the party having his case tried. Same; 0he determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. ?lthough it too/ about 5 years before the trial of this case was resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of petitionerLs right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not attributable to the prosecution. Same; Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated: ;"< =ength of delay. ;)< Reasons for such delay. ;#< ?ssertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused. and ;B< 0he prejudice caused by the delay. Same; Not limite$ in a (riminal 'rocee$ing but All (ases an$ 'rocee$ings before .u$icial; )uasi7<u$icial or A$ministrati1e bo$ies. 0he failure of the 7mbudsman to resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost B years is clearly violative of this mandate and the rights of the petitioner as a public official. In such event, 0y- 8a9o v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "B#55%-5&, (an. )", )**). Sumbang v. !en. ourt Eartial, !R "B*"55, ?ug. #, )***.

2lanco v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "#&$%$-%5, >ov. )$, )*** =ope9 v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, !R "B*%)', Sept. &, )**".

petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him. Indeed, the ourt directly dismissed the informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioner. I6%T TO S'EED: T IA*; T!e Spee$y Trial Act of =>>? 8 A ?@>A9; 0he authority of the Sec. of (ustice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict w1 the #*-day period prescribed in Sec. $ of R? 5B'#. Section $ of the Speedy 0rial ?ct of "''5 prescribing the thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section "* of the same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be e-cluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. 0he e-ceptions provided in the Speedy 0rial ?ct of "''5 reflect the fundamentally recogni9ed principle that the concept of Ospeedy trialO is Oa relative term and must necessarily be a fle-ible concept.O prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of (ustice resolves the petition for review 3uestioning the resolution of the prosecutor. 0he delay in such a case is justified because the determination of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical process. 4ence, the length of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be ta/en into account in determining whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. 0he factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay. 0he importance of the review authority of the Secretary of (ustice cannot be overemphasi9ed. as earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of e-haustion of administrative remedies that holds that Omista/es, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.O Same; (oncept of Spee$y Disposition of (ases ,roa$er t!an Spee$y Trial; 0he 2ill of Rights provisions of the "'5$ onstitution were precisely crafted to e-pand substantive fair 0RI?= RI!40S and to Protect iti9ens From Procedural Eachinations which tend to nullify those rights. Eoreover, Section "&, ?rticle III of the onstitution e-tends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases Obefore all judicial, 3uasi-judicial and administrative bodies.O 0his protection e-tends to all citi9ens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section "B+), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. State Immunity from Suit =egislative 8epartment Solar 0eam 6ntertainment v. 4on. 4ow, !R "B*5&#, ?ug. )), )***.

?badia v. ?, !R "*%%'$, Sept. )#, "''B.

A suit against a public officer for !is official acts is; in alub v. ?, effect; a suit against t!e State if its purpose is to hold the !R ""%&#B, State ultimately liable. ?pril )$, )***. +ranc!ise; 'A6(O ; ? historical study of its creation, growth and development will readily show that it was never given a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai. 8el Ear v. P?! 7R, !R "#5)'5, >ov. )', )***

(udicial 8epartment

DO(T INE O+ STARE DECISIS; @hen a court has laid 0ala Realty down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of Services facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future orp. v. cases where the facts are substantially the same. 2anco Filipino Savings and Eortgage 2an/, !R "#$'5*, (une )*, )***. .urispru$ence; 0he ourtLs interpretation of laws are as much a part of the law of the land as the letters of the laws themselves. 6vangelista v. Sisto9a, !R "B#55", ?ug. ', )**".

S&' EME (O& T; En ,anc (ases; It includes all other Firestone cases as the ourt en banc, by majority of its actual eramics v. membership, may deem of sufficient importance. ?, !R ")$*)), (une )5, )***. Same; Same; 0he ourt en banc is not an appellate court to w1c a decision or resolution a 8ivision may be appealed. id., 8issenting opinion of (ustice !on9agaReyes. (udge Fuentes v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsmanEindanao, supra. 0ocao v. ?, !R ")$B*%, Sept. )*, )**". PP v. 8e los Santos, !R ")"'*&, ?pril %, )***.

Same; Super1ision o1er *ower (ourts an$ t!eir 'ersonnel; ?rt. GIII, Sec. & of the onstitution e-clusively vests in the S administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the presiding (ustice of the ? to the lowest municipal trial court cler/. .&DI(IA* 'O"E ; 0he inherent power of the ourt to amend and control its processes and orders so as to ma/e them comformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse it. .&DI(IA* E4IE"; 0he ourt has control over a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably w1 established legal process. It has the authority to suspend the e-ecution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when a supervening event warrants it.

Same; 0he S has the discretionary power to ta/e 8el Ear cogni9ance of the petition at bar where the issues have P?! 7R, generated an oasis of concern, even days of dis3uiet in )***. view of the public interest at sta/e. Same; 0he S has inherent power to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice. For e3uitable considerations, the ourt has rela-ed the application of otherwise stringent rules by giving due course to appeals filed out of time, treating petitions for certiorari as petitioners for review, and remanding the case for trial even though their previous dismissal had become final. *E6A* STANDIN6 8Locus Standi9; Strict interpretation; 0he 3uestion of standing is whether a party has Jalleged such personal sta/e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness

v.

?nacleto v. Gan 0west , !R "#"B"", ?ug. )', )***.

!on9ales v. >arvasa, !R "B*5#%, ?ug. "B, )***.

w1c1 sharpens the presentation of issue upon w1c the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 3uestions.K ;i< Citizen suit. ? citi9en ac3uires standing only if he can establish that he suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. and the injury is li/ely to be redressed by a favorable action. ;ii< Taxpayers suit. ? ta-payer is deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the onstitution. 0hus, a ta-payerLs action is properly brought only when there is an e-ercise of ongress of its ta-ing power or spending power. In the final analysis, the ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a ta-payerLs suit. Same; Same; 0he 3uestion of standing is whether a party has Jalleged such personal sta/e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness w1c1 sharpens the presentation of issue upon w1c the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 3uestions.K ;i< Citizen suit. ? citi9en ac3uires standing only if he can establish that he suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government. the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action. and the injury is li/ely to be redressed by a favorable action. ;ii< Taxpayers suit. ? ta-payer is deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the onstitution. 0hus, a ta-payerLs action is properly brought only when there is an e-ercise of ongress of its ta-ing power or spending power. In the final analysis, the ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a ta-payerLs suit. Same; *iberal 'olicy; ? party suing as a ta-payer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal e-penditure of money raised by ta-ation. In line w1 the liberal policy of the ourt on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to society, the ourt finds the petitioners, as members of the 4ouse of Representatives, to have legal standing to file the petitions at bar, as they claim that the operation of jai-alai constitute infringement by P?! 7R of the legislatureLs e-clusive power to grant franchise. Same; Difference between t!e ule on eal7'arty7in7 Interest an$ t!e ule on Stan$ing; 0here is a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, as the latter has constitutional underpinnings. In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently alleged constitutional ramifications in the 3uestioned public bidding of the P4I=S6 7 that merit the attention of the ourt. Eoreover, the prospect of financial gains arising from the award of the sale of P4I=S6 7 is enough personal sta/e in the outcome of the controversy to vest upon petitioner the locus standi to file the petition for mandamus. ? winning bidder has personality to initiate proceedings to prevent setting at naught his right. otherwise, his right to due process would be violated. !on9ales v. >arvasa, !R "B*5#%, ?ug. "B, )***.

8el Ear v. P?! 7R, !R "#5)'5, >ov. )', )***.

(! Summit 4oldings v. ?, !R ")B)'#, >ov. )*, )***.

DE(ISION; Faithful adherence to the re3uirements of Sec. Cao "B, ?rt. GIII of the onstitution is a paramount component !R

v. ?, "#)B)5,

of due process and fair play.

7ct. )B, )***

Same; 0he Philippine onstitution no less, mandates that PP v. 2aring, no decision shall be rendered by any court w1o e-pressing !R "#$'##, therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which (an. )5, )**). it is based. 0his vital re3uirement is not only demanded from the courts. Ruasi-judicial bodies are similarly re3uired to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the ?dministrative ode whose roots may also be traced to the onstitutional mandate. ? decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. >onetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summari9e the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunalMs assessments and conclusions on the case. 0his practice would better enable a court to ma/e an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. ompliance with this re3uirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law. Same; Efficacy of t!e Decision; 0he judge who rendered the decision was not the one who tried and heard the testimonies of the witnesses. 0he complete records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic notes, were before (udge who rendered the decision and it can be fairly assumed that, in rendering the decision, the records were thoroughly scrutini9ed and evaluated by him. Indeed, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only too/ over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. Same; Memoran$um Decision; ?lthough a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court. 0he court must ma/e a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its own. Same; +orm of $ecision; 0here is no hard and fast rule as to the form of a decision. @hether or not the trial court chooses to summari9e the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties is immaterial. @hat is called for is that the judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared and signed by the judge and that it should contain clearly and distinctly a statement of facts proved or admitted by the parties and the law upon w1c the judgment is based. Same; Obiter Dictum; ?n obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion e-pressed by a court upon some 3uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remar/ made, or opinion e-pressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, Oby the way,O that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the PP v. Catco, !R "#5#55, Earch "', )**).

7ng v. ?, !R ""#**&, >ov. )#, )***.

PP v. 7rdoHo, !R ")'%# S "B#%##-#%, (uly "*, )***.

Gillanueva v. ?, !R "B)'B$, Earch "', )**).

3uestion before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. ?n adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent 3uestions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. ?ccordingly, a point e-pressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. ? decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another 3uestion, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two +), or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition ma/e statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta. ' IN(I'*E ON %IE A (%: O+ (O& TS; @hile the ourt has concurrent jurisdiction w1 the R0 and the ? to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be ta/en as an unrestrained freedom of choice concerning the court to w1c application for the writ will be directed. 0here is after all a hierarchy of courts. ? direct invocation of the ourtLs original jurisdiction to issue the e-traordinary writ is allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition. S!E Realty orp. v. 7ffice of the Pres., !R ")&''', ?ug. #*, )***. People v. uaresma , !R &$$5$, "'5'. 6nrile v. Sala9ar, !R ')"&#-&B, "''*. Sps. Eallari v. ?rcega, !R "*&&"%, Earch )*, )**). Rivera v. 6spiritu, !R "#%%B$, (an. )#, )**).

Same; It is the duty of the lower courts to obey the 8ecisions of this ourt and render obeisance to its status as the ape- of hierarchy of courts. For Othere is only one Supreme ourt from whose decisions all other courts should ta/e their bearings,O as elo3uently declared by (ustice (.2.=. Reyes. Same; @hile the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the P?=-P?=6? agreement. ?s such, petitionersM proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Same; Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory e-planation as to her failure to comply with or nonobservance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. 0here is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the ourt of ?ppeals, considering all the

Cared v. Ilarde, !R ""B$#), ?ug. ", )***.

more that the appeal of the main case was already before it. 7mbudsman .uris$iction; 0he 7mbudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges against a judge of the R0 relative to his handling cases before the court. 0he determination of whether a judge maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is 6D =ASIG6=C a judicial function. IN4ESTI6ATI4E 'O"E S; 0he duty of a government prosecutor to prosecute crimes does not preclude him from refusing to file information when he believes there is no prima facie evidence to do so. 0he ourt will not intervene in this case. 0he power to withdraw the information already filed is a mere adjunct or conse3uence of the 7mbudsmanLs overall power to prosecute. Same; 0he P7@6R 07 I>G6S0I!?06 and 07 PR7S6 A06 granted by law to the 7mbudsman is plenary and un3ualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be I==6!?=, A>(AS0, IEPR7P6R or I>6FFI I6>0. 0he law does not ma/e any distinction between cases cogni9able by the Sandiganbayan and those cogni9able by regular courts. 0he clause Jany illegal act or omission of any public official: is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Eoreover, the jurisdiction of the 7ffice of the 7mbudsman should not be e3uated w1 the limited authority of the SP6 I?= PR7S6 A07R under Sec. "" of R? &$$*. 0he 7ffice of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the 7ffice of the 7mbudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the 7mbudsman. Its power to conduct prelim. Investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases w1in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 4ence, in this case, 0he 7mbudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute the criminal cases against respondents in the R0 , even as this authority is not e-clusive and is shared w1 the regular prosecutors. Same; it has been the consistent policy of the S not to interfere w1 the 7mbudsmanLs e-ercise of his investigative powers. Eamburao v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, !R "#'"B"B), >ov. "%, )*** 2lanco v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "#&$%$-%5, >ov. )$, )*** Presidential ?d 4oc Fact Finding omm. 7n 2ehest =oans v. 7mbudsman, !R "#%B5), ?ug. "B, )**". Pres. 8e Gera v. Pelayo, !R "#$#%B, (uly &, )***.

6spinosa v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, !R "#%$$%, 7ct. "', )***.

Same; It is not the ourt to review the 7mbudsmanLs e-ercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office.

Same; Ander R? &$$*, the 7mbudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be I==6!?=, A>(AS0, IEPR7P6R, or I>6FFI I6>0. 0he prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the 7ffice of the 7mbudsman. 0o insulate the 7ffice from outside pressure and improper influence, the onstitution as well as R? &$$* has endowed it w1 a wide latitude of investigative and prosecutorial powers virtually free from legislative, e-ecutive or judicial intervention. 0he

7mbudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint w1o going through a preliminary investigation as provided in ?dministrative 7rder >o. *$ of the 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, otherwise /nown as the JRules of Procedure of the 7ffice of the 7mbudsman.K

?d 4oc Fact Finding omm. G. 8esierto, !R "#$$$$, 7ct. ), )**".

Same; 0he 7mbudsmanLs resolution of criminal cases >ava v. 7?, under preliminary investigation cannot be the subject of !R "#&B$*, review under Rule B% of the Rules of ourt w1c covers only 7ct. "&, )**". judgments or final orders or resolutions of the ?, Sandiganbayan, R0 Ls and other courts, whenever authori9ed by law. In other words, a party may appeal only from orders or decisions of the 7mbudsman in administrative cases. Same; 4owever, judicial review of the actions of the id. 2aylon v. 7mbudsman via an original action for certiorari under Rule 7mbudsman, &% is available. !R "B)$#5, 8ec. "B, )**". Same; *imitations; +", 0he 7mbudsman may not pass upon errors of the prosecutorLs office in the e-ercise of powers intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the power of review of the Sec. of (ustice. Same; Same; +), 0he 7mbudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a judge. 0he 7mbudsman must indorse the case to the S for appropriate action. !arcia-Rueda v. ?mores, !R ""&'#5, Sept. )*, )**". (udge Fuentes, v. 7ffice of the 7mbidsmanEindanao, !R ")B)'%, 7ct. )#, )**" 0apaidor v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, !R ")'")B, Earch "%, )**).

Same; Same; No Aut!ority to Directly emo1e or Dismiss 6o1ernment Officials or Employees; Ander Sec. "#, subpar. +#, of ?rt. DI of the "'5$ onstitution, the 7mbudsman can only R6 7EE6>8 the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. 0he 7mbudsman has no authority to sirectly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly, from his position in the 2I8. 'reliminary In1estigation; 8espite the 7mbudsmanLs non-compliance w1 the affidavit re3mt., petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and answered the charges against him. 4ence, having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 7mbudsman and having allowed the proceedings to go on until the prelim investigation was terminated and the information filed w1 the Sandiganbayan, petitioner is deemed to have waived whatever right he may otherwise have to assail the manner in w1c prelim investigation was conducted.

2autista v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "#&*5), Eay "), )***.

Decision; Not +inal an$ Executory; ? decision of the !ov. =apid v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman finding respondent ?, !R administratively liable for misconduct and imposing a "B))&", (une penalty of " year suspension w1o pay T is not among those )', )***. listed in the 7mbudsman ?ct of "'5' as final and unappealable, hence, immediately e-ecutory. 0here is no general legal principle w1c mandates that all decisions of 3uasi-judicial agencies are immediately e-ecutory. Sec. &5

of the =ocal !overnment ode only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the 7ffice of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provisions of the ?dministrative ode of "'5$ mandating the e-ecution pending review applies to administrative decisions of the S involving members of the ivil Service. 0here is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the ?dminitrative ode of "'5$ and the =ocal !overnment ode on e-ecution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the 7mbudsman ?ct as there is nothing in the said ?ct w1c provides for such suppletory application. ourts, may not, under the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawma/ers. ?n omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Sandiganbayan .uris$iction; ?s construed in !arcia, (r. v. Sandiganbayan, P8 "&*& creating the Sandiganbayan gave it =IEI068 jurisdiction that did not include jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. ?fter the !arcia decision, ongress enacted R? $'$% +?n ?ct Strengthening the Functional and Structural 7rgani9ation of the Sandiganbayan, ?mending for that Purpose P8 "&*&, as ?mended,, w1c too/ effect on Eay &, "''%. Sec. B U thereof 6DP?>868 the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Same; It has FA== ?A047RI0C to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten wealth case, including the propriety of the writs of se3uestration issued by the P !!. ?bbot v. Eapayo, !R "#B"*), (uly &, )***. ?larilla v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "#&5*&, ?ug. )), )***.

Republic v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "#%$5', (an. #", )**). SE v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "*B&#$-#5, Sept. "B, )***. Pres. ?d 4oc Fact Finding omm. 7n 2ehest =oans v. 8esierto, !R "#*"B*, 7ct. )%, "'''. Republic v. 8esierto, !R "#&%*&, ?ug. )#, )**". Republic v. 7 7F68, !R "B$*&)&B, 8ec. "B, )**".

Se3uestere$ Assets; 0he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to pass upon the partiesL compromise agreement is beyond dispute. 0he compromise agreement does not deal merely w1 private interest. it involves se3uestered shares of stoc/ - and the parties e-pressly ac/nowledged the need to obtain approval of the Sandiganbayan. Recovery of Ill-gotten @ealth Sec. "%, ?rt. ID of the "'5$ onstitution provides that such power is imprescriptible; It applies 7>=C 07 IGI= ? 0I7>S and not to criminal cases.

Sec. "%, ?rt. DI of the onstitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,

Se3uestration Proceedings

'(66; *egal an$ %istorical bacBgroun$; Immediately after the "'5& 68S? Revolution, then President ora9on . ?3uino issued 6-ecutive 7rder +6.7., >os. ", ) and "B. J7n the e-plicit premise that Pvast resources of the government have been amassed by former President

Ferdinand 6. Earcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad,L the Presidential ommission on !ood !overnment +P !!, was created by 67 >o. " to assist the President in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or abroad.K 67 >o. ) states that the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of ban/ accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stoc/s, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other /inds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world. 67>o. "B, on the other hand, empowered the P !!, with the assistance of the 7ffice of the Solicitor !eneral and other government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under 6.7. >os. " and ). Pursuant to these laws, the P !! issued and implemented numerous se3uestrations, free9e orders and provisional ta/eovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. ?mong the properties se3uestered by the ommission were shares of stoc/ in the Anited oconut Planters 2an/ +A P2, registered in the names of the alleged Jone million coconut farmers,K the so-called oconut Industry Investment Fund companies + IIF companies, and Private Respondent 6duardo ojuangco (r. (oco *e1y +un$s; 'rima +acie 'ublic +un$s; the Republic v. coconut levy funds are not only affected with public 7 7F68, interest. they are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Public supra. funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of the State. more specifically, ta-es, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of law for the support of the government or for the discharge of its obligations. Andeniably, coconut levy funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following reasons: ". oconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and ta-ing powers of the State. ). 0hey are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers. #. Respondents have judicially admitted that the se3uestered shares were purchased with public funds. B. 0he ommission on ?udit + 7?, reviews the use of coconut levy funds. %. 0he 2ureau of Internal Revenue +2IR,, with the ac3uiescence of private respondents, has treated them as public funds. &. 0he very laws governing coconut levies recogni9e their public character. ig!t to 1ote Se3uestere$ S!ares; In Presidential ommission on !ood !overnment v. ojuanco, (r., the ourt ruled that who should vote the se3uestered shares re3uires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares and conse3uently the rightful ownership thereof. Same; 0he right to vote se3uestered shares of stoc/ registered in the names of private individuals or entities and alleged to have been ac3uired with ill-gotten wealth shall, as a rule, be e-ercised by the registered owner. 0he P !! v. Sandiganbaya n, !R ""'&*'-"*, Sept. )", )**". Republic v. 7 7F68, supra.

P !! may, however, be granted such voting right provided it can +", show prima facie evidence that the wealth and1or the shares are indeed ill-gotten. and +), demonstrate imminent danger of dissipation of the assets, thus necessitating their continued se3uestration and voting by the government until a decision, ruling with finality on their ownership, is promulgated by the proper court. 4owever, the foregoing Jtwo-tieredK test does not apply when the se3uestered stoc/s are ac3uired with funds that are prima facie public in character or, at least, are affected with public interest. Inasmuch as the subject A P2 shares in the present case were undisputably ac3uired with coco levy funds which are public in character, then the right to vote them shall be e-ercised by the P !!. In sum, the Jpublic characterK test, not the Jtwo-tieredK one, applies in the instant controversy. "rit of Se3uestration: San Miguel (orporation 8SM(9; SE shares were se3uestered in "'5& and the government filed ivil ase >o. **## in "'5$ to determine whether they are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Earcos and his cronies. Said case has remained unresolved by the Sandiganbayan. 0he 86=?C is no longer tolerable for it loc/s in billions of Pesos w1c could well rev-up the sputtering economy. 0he Sandiganbayan must not be the burial ground of cases of far-reaching importance. Same; 0he writ of se3uestration issued against 7@>I is not or has ceased to be valid because the suit in ivil ase >o. ***' against some defendants therein, as stoc/holders of 7@>I, is not a suit against 7@>I. Failure to implead these corporations and merely anne-ing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality w1o a hearing. ommis(OME*E(; Its powers may be classified into ;"< sion on adjudicatory or 3uasi-adjudicatory functions. and ;)< 6lection administrative function or ministerial in character. 7E6=6 Resolution >o. )'5$, w1c provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the re3uired plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the 7E6=6 Ls 3uasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of the plebiscites. thus, said resolution may not be deemed a Jfinal orderK reviewable by certiorari by the ourt. ?ny 3uestion pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well ta/en in an ordinary action before the trial courts. Same; 0he ourt once more reiterates that the onstitution gives the ommission on 6lections the broad power Oto enforce and administer all laws and regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. O )" 0he ommission indisputably e-ercises the power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. 0he ommission must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. )) 0he onstitution upgraded to a constitutional status the statutory authority under 2atas Pambansa 2lg. 55" to grant the ommission broad and more fle-ible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the peopleMs sacred right of

>706: See dissenting opinions of (ustices Gitug, Eelo and 2ellocillo.

SE v. Sandiganbaya n, !R "*B&#$-#5, Sept. "B, )***.

P !! v. Sandiganbaya n, !R ""'&*'-"*, Sept. )", )**".

Salva v. Ea/alintal, !R "#)&*#, Sept. "5, )***.

7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

suffrage. (OME*E( EN BANC; No <uris$iction to !ear an$ $eci$e election cases in t!e first instanceC 0he power pertains to the divisions of the 7E6=6 . ?bad v. 7E6=6 , !R ")55$$, 8ec. "*, "'''. Farate v. 7E6=6 , !R ")'*'&, >ov. "', "'''. Soller v. 7E6=6 , !R "B)'*$, >ov. )', )***. 2ernardo v. ?balos, !R "#$)&&, 8ec. %, )**".

Same; It does not have the re3uisite authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. 0his power pertains to the 8ivisions of the 7E6=6 . ?ny decision by the 7E6=6 en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void. Same; Ex!austion of A$ministrati1e reme$ies in t!e (OME*E(; Petitioners did not e-haust all the remedies available to them at the 7E6=6 level. Specifically, they did not see/ a reconsideration of the assailed 7E6=6 6n 2anc Resolution as re3uired by Section " +d,, Rule "# of the "''# 7E6=6 Rules of Procedure.

%ouse of epresentati1e Electoral Tribunal 8% ET9; !uerrero v. Ander ?rt. GI, Sec. "$ of the onstitution, the 4R60 has 7E6=6 , sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to !R "#$**B, the election, returns, and 3ualifications of E6E26RS of (uly )&, )***. the 4ouse of Representatives. 7nce a winning candidate is proclaimed, ta/es his oath, and assumes office as a member of the 4ouse of Representatives, 7E6=6 Ls jurisdiction over the protests relating to his election, returns and 3ualifications ends, and 4R60Ls own jurisdiction begins. Same; Appeal $irectly to t!e (OME*E( En Banc from 0ypoco v. t!e $ecision of t!e trial court of originC Such recourse 7E6=6 , transgressed Sec. # +c,, ?rt. ID of the onstitution. !R "#&"'", >ov. )', "'''. "rits of (ertiorari; 'ro!ibition; an$ Man$amus; .uris$iction to issue; 2oth the S and the 7E6=6 have concurrent jurisdiction to issue such writs. 0he ourt that ta/es jurisdiction first shall e-ercise e-clusive jurisdiction over the case. ivil Service ommission + S , (areer Executi1e Ser1ice Officers 8(ESO9; ?ppointments, assignments, reassignments, and transfers in the 6S7 are based on ran/. Security of tenure in the 6S7 is thus ac3uired w1 respect to ran/ and not to position. Eobility and fle-ibility in the assignment of personnel, to better cope w1 the e-igencies of public service, is the distinguishing feature of 6S7. A''OINTMENT DISTIN6&IS%ED + OM EASSI6NMENT; E: DESI6NATION; ?n appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to e-ercise the functions of a given office. @hen completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office 7n the other arlos ?ngeles, supra. v.

Sec. of (ustice v. 2acal, !R "#'#5), 8ec. &, )***.

8r. 7sea v. 8r. Ealaya, !R "#'5)", (an. #*, )**).

hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organi9ational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in ran/, status or salary and does not re3uire the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official. Same; 'ermanent Status; It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only Oto a person who meets all the re3uirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.O First, in order to 3ualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the ran/ appropriate to the position. Second, security of tenure in the career e-ecutive service +O 6SO, is thus ac3uired with respect to ran/, and not to position. 0he guaranty of security of tenure to members of the career e-ecutive service does not e-tend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed N a concept w1c is applicable only to first and secondlevel employees in the civil service N but to the ran/ to which they are appointed by the President. Same; Same; In the recent case of +8e =eon v. a, !R )$"5), (an. )), )**",, it held that the mere fact that a position belongs to the areer Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the re3uired 3ualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lac/ of it. ? person who does not have the re3uisite 3ualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. 0he appointment e-tended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. In this case, the subse3uent inclusion of petitionerLs position under 6S, w1o the re3uired eligibility, did not automatically 3ualify her fort he said position. 0he permanent status accorded to her appointment would only allow her to occupy said position until the appointing authority would replace her w1 someone who has the re3uired eligibility therefor. 8imayuga v. 2enedicto, !R "BB"%#, (an. "&, )**).

8imayuga v. 2enedicto, !R "BB"%#, (an. "&, )**).

Same; Acting (apacity; 0he mere fact that a position 8e =eon v. belongs to the areer Service does not automatically ?, ")$"5), confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does 8ec. %, )**". not possess the re3uired 3ualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lac/ of it. ? person who does not have the re3uisite 3ualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an e-ception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. 0he appointment e-tended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. Same; Temporary Appointment; Petitioner was recommended to the position of Schools 8ivision Superintendent of amarines Sur, having been endorsement by the Provincial School 2oard. 4owever, her 3ualification to the office lac/s the essential ingredient, of appointment thereto. PetitionerMs designation as 7fficerin- harge, ?ssistant Schools 8ivision Superintendent, was e-pressly made subject to further advice from the 86 S. 0hus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a 8r. 7sea v. 8r. Ealaya, !R "#'5)", (an. #*, )**).

need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools 8ivision Superintendent of amarines Sur. SE(& IT: O+ TEN& E; Failure to ma/e a courtesy call ?diong v. ?, to the superior or to submit appointment papers is not a !R "#&B5*, ground for dismissal. Failure to report to wor/ in this case 8ec. B, )**". is not tantamount to abandonment. For failure to accord due process to respondent, the termination of her employment is illegal. onse3uently, she is entitled to reinstatement, plus payment of bac/ salaries. ,A(D SA*A IES; Payment of salaries corresponding to astro v. the period when an employee is not allowed to wor/ may !loria, !R be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. "#)"$B, ?ug. 4owever, if the employee is not completely e-onerated of )*, )**". the charges, such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of bac/ salaries. Terminal *ea1e; 0he money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retireeLs highest monthly salary. In this case, petitionerLs highest monthly salary is that corresponding to position of Sec. of Finance w1c petitioner received while he was ?cting Sec., during the travel abroad of the Secretary. 'A ENS 'AT IAE AND 'AT IA 'OTESTAS; applie$ in t!e (i1il Ser1ice; Paternal power should consist or be e-ercised w1 affection, not in atrocity. Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable offense and for which he was suspended for his inability to report for wor/ until the termination of his case, still re3uired to file a formal application for leave of absence to ensure his reinstatement upon his ac3uittal and thus protect his security of tenureQ oncomitantly, will his prolonged absence from office for more than one +", year automatically justify his being dropped from the rolls without prior notice despite his being already placed under suspension by his employer until the termination of his case, which finally resulted in his ac3uittal for lac/ of evidenceQ 0his case was resolved by the ourt w1 a view to do justice to the wor/er where the punctilious adherence to technicality, the re3uirement that private respondent should have filed an application for leave of absence in proper form, petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case. 0he meaning of her suspension until the final disposition of her case is that should her case be dismissed she should be reinstated to her position with payment of bac/ wages. She did not have to apply for leave of absence since she was already suspended by her employer until her case would be terminated. @e have done justice to the wor/ingman in the past. today we will do no less by resolving all doubts in favor of the humble employee in faithful obeisance to the constitutional 2elicena, v. Sec. of Finance, !R "B#"'*, 7ct. "$, )**". Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

mandate to afford full protection to labor. *EA4E O+ A,SEN(E; Automatic *ea1e of absence; ?s a general rule, Secs. )* and %), as well as Secs. #% and &# +Sec. )* of the ivil Service Rules is now Sec. %) of
Rule DGI, on =eave of ?bsence, of Resolution >o. '"-"&#" dated )$ 8ecember "''" as amended by S E >o. B", s. "''5, and Sec. #% is now Sec. &# as amended by S E >os. B", s. "''5 and "B, s. "'''. ,, re3uire an approved leave of

Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

absence to avoid being on ?@7=. ## 4owever, these provisions cannot be interpreted as e-clusive and referring only to one mode of securing the approval of a leave of absence which would re3uire an employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before e-ceeding thirty +#*, days of absence in order to avoid being dropped from the rolls. 0here are, after all, other means of see/ing and granting an approved leave of absence, one of which is the S recogni9ed rule of automatic leave of absence under specified circumstances, i.e., where an applicant could not probable do so as he is legally and physically prevented from doing it or is beyond his control, or in case of illness +Sec. )*, S Rules,. 0he rule of automatic leave of absence clearly falls within the constitutionally delegated power of the S and is reasonable under the circumstances to address absences from wor/ which are not attributable to the concerned government employee. (I4I* SE 4I(E (OMMISSION 8(S(9; Aut!ority to Interpret its Own ules; 0he S li/e any other agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them w1 its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. ?n administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have the force and effect of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of the rule +Foley vs. 2enedict, ")) 0e- "'#, %% S@ ;)d< 5*%, 5& ?=R B$$,. . . 0he contemporaneous construction of a statute +and similarly of rules and regulations, by the e-ecutive officers of the government whose duty it is to e-ecute it is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts +Anited States vs. Philbric/, ")* A.S. %), #* = 6d. %%',. ?nd the interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tas/ed to administer. 0hus, ourts is guided in cases where the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we should apply only these standards: O@hether the delegation of power was valid. whether the regulation was within that delegation. and if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test.O ?n affirmative answer in each of these 3uestions should caution us from discarding the agencyMs interpretation of it own rules. Same; S&S'ENSION; In placing private respondent under suspension until the final disposition of her criminal case, the Eunicipal Personnel 7fficer acted w1 competence so he presumably /new that his order of suspension was not a/in to either suspension as penalty or preventive suspension since there was no administrative case against private respondent. ?s competence on the part of the EP7 is presumed, any error on his part should not prejudice private respondent, and that what he had in mind was to consider her as being on leave of absence w1o pay and their 6R-66 relationship Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

being merely deemed suspended, not severed, in the meanwhile. 0his construction of the order of suspension is actually more consistent with logic as well as fairness and /indness to its author, the EP7. Significantly, the idea of a suspended 6R-66 relationship is widely accepted in labor law to account for situations wherein laborers would have no wor/ to perform for causes not attributable to them. @e find no basis for denying the application of this principle to the instant case which also involves a lowly wor/er in the public service. Same; D O''IN6 + OM T%E O**S; 8ue process demands serving upon the employee himself the notice dropping him from the rolls. 0he ity !overnment of Ea/ati ity slept on the re3uest of private respondent to reinstate her on the basis of the condition in the order suspending her, i.e., her reinstatement upon her ac3uittal. instead, after three +#, long years, without prior warning and out of the blue, adversely by dropping her from the service for not filing an application for leave. 0he action of herein petitioner cuts too deeply into private respondentMs right to continue her employment in the government and unduly dilutes the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process. Same; EINSTATEMENT "IT% ,A(D"A6ES; In loc/ing her out of her job, the ity !overnment illegally deprived her of the opportunity to wor/ and so must be held liable for such unlawful action. ?ll in all, we hold that private respondent must be reinstated as ler/ III or a position of e3uivalent ran/ and compensation in the ity !overnment. She must also be paid bac/ wages and other benefits lawfully due her counted from "' 7ctober "''B when she presented herself for resumption of duties but was refused. 0his is very much consistent with the elementary rule that a government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement had later been ordered is considered as not having left his office +(ustice Gitug is his separate opinion said the award of bac/ salries should be reduced to % years conformably w1 the pronouncement of the ourt in a long line of cases,, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held. ommission on ?udit + 7?, %iring of 'ri1ate *awyers by 6o1ernment Agencies; 7? ircular >o. 5&-)%% dated ?pril ", "'5& R6S0RI 0S government agencies and instrumentalities from hiring private lawyers to render legal services or handle cases and provides that no funds shall be disbursed for payment to private lawyers A>=6SS prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is written conformity and ac3uiescence from the S7=!6> or the !overnment orporate ounsel. Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

Eunicipality of Ea/ati ity v. S , !R "#"#'), Feb. &, )**).

Polloso v. !angan, !R "B*%&#, (uly "B, )***.

'O"E TO E#AMINE AND A&DIT; Ander Sec. ) +",, 82P v. 7?, ?rt. ID-8 od the onstitution, the power of 7? to !R 55B#%, e-amine and audit is >7>-6D =ASIG6. 7n the other (an. "&, )**). hand, under Sec. ) +), of the same ?rticle of the onstitution, 7?Ls authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary e-penditures is 6D =ASIG6. 0he framers of the onstitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the 7? audit, as ;a< when there is a private investment in a !7 , or ;b< when a government corporation is privati9ed or publicly Tlisted, or ;c< as in the

case at bar, when the government borrows money abroad, In these instances the government enters the mar/etplace and competes w1 the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. 0o succeed, the government must abide w1 reasonable business practices of the mar/etplace. 7therwise, no investor or creditior will do business w1 the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar. Same; 0he findings and conclusions of the private auditor 82P v. 7?, may guide private investors or creditors who re3uire such !R 55B#%, private audit. !overnment agencies and officials, however, (an. "&, )**). remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the 7?, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section ), unless of course such findings and conclusions of the 7?, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section ), unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. Same; 0he power of the 7? to e-amine and audit 82P v. 7?, government agencies, while non-e-clusive +Sec. #, ?rt. ID- !R 55B#%, 8 of the onstitution,. 0he mere fact that private auditors (an. "&, )**). may audit government agencies does not divest the 7? of its power to e-amine and audit the same government agencies. 0he 7? is neither by-passed nor ignored since even w1 a private auditor, the 7? will still conduct its usual e-amination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. ?s the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the 7?Ls findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned. Same; %iring of 'ri1ate Au$itors; Section #" of P8 >o. 82P v. 7?, "BB% merely grants authority to the 7? to hire and !R 55B#%, deputi9e private auditors to assist the 7? in the auditing (an. "&, )**). of government agencies. Such private auditors operate under the authority of the 7?. 7n the other hand, Section 5 of P8 >o. )*)' states in part that O0he audit of government corporations by the 7? shall not preclude government corporations from engaging the services of private auditing firms: Provided, however, that even if the services of the latter are availed of, the audit report of the 7? shall serve as the report for purposes of compliance w1 audit re3uirements as re3uired of government corporations under applicable law.O Said Section also provides that the Opolicy of withdrawal of resident auditors shall be fully implemented . . .O Section ) of the same decree also e-cludes from the term O!7 O two classes of corporations. 0he first are originally private corporations the majority of the shares of stoc/ of w1care ac3uired by government financial institutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago. 0he second are subsidiary corporations of government corporations, w1c subsidiaries are organi9ed e-clusively to own, manage or lease physical assets ac3uired by government financial institutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago. Same; Same; !overnment ?uditing ode of the Phils. 82P v. 7?, +P8 "BB%, Secs, )&, #", and #), does not prohibit the !R 55B#%, hiring of private auditors by government agencies. 0hus, (an. "&, )**).

Sec. )& must be applied in harmony w1 Sec. %5 of the entral 2an/ing =aw of )*** +R? 5$'", w1c authori9es une3uivocally the Eonetary 2oard to re3uire ban/s to hire independent auditors and Sec. )% and )5 of the >ew entral 2an/ ?ct +R? $&%#,, w1c authori9e e-pressly the Eonetary 2oard to conduct periodic or special e-amination of all ban/s. 'O"E TO E6&*ATE DIS,& SEMENTS +&NDS AND DISA**O"AN(ES O+ I**E6A* O I E6&*A DIS,& SEMENTS O+ +&NDS; 0he onstitution specifically vests in the ommission the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in the disbursement of government funds and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. In the case at bar, >6?Ms accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardi9ation =aw II is not in accordance with law. 0he "''$ !?? is not selfe-ecutory so as to serve as outright legal authority for >6? to spend what had been appropriated for >6?Ms OPersonal ServicesO under the "''$ !??. 2udgetary appropriations under the !?? do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish. It re3uires further process as the entire budget process consists of four major phases, namely: 2udget Preparation, 2udget ?uthori9ation, 2udget 6-ecution and 2udget ?ccountability. ?fter approval of the Oproposed budgetO by the 82E, the same is submitted to ongress for evaluation and inclusion in the appropriations law w1c sets forth the authori9ed appropriations of the departments and agencies. 4owever, this Oauthori9ationO does not include the authority to disburse. ? program of e-penditures is first prepared showing approved programs and projects. ?n itemi9ation of personal services is also prepared listing authori9ed itemi9ed positions and their corresponding classifications and authori9ed salaries. ?s clearly stated in Section &*, hapter $, 2oo/ GI of the ?dministrative ode, Ono portion of the appropriations in the !?? shall be used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically authori9ed by law or appropriate budget circular.O >2 >o. B%5 is the appropriate budget circular referred to by the law with respect to the payment of the last phase of the Salary Standardi9ation =aw II. 7mnibus 6lection ode E*E(TION; In this jurisdiction, an election means Othe choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote,O through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate.O ?n election is the embodiment of the popular will, the e-pression of the sovereign power of the people. Specifically, the term election, in the conte-t of the onstitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes. +AI*& E O+ E*E(TION; (alling of Special Elections; 2efore 7E6=6 can act on a verified petition see/ing to declare a failure of election, two 8E9 con$itions must concur: first, no voting has ta/en place in the precincts concerned on the date fi-ed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect. and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. ?nd that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following: force majeure, >6? v. 7?, !R "B#B5", Feb. "%, )**).

7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

0ypoco v. 7E6=6 , !R "#&"'", >ov. )', "'''. arlos v. ?ngeles, !R "B)'*$, >ov. )', )***.

violence, terrorism, fraud of other analogous cases. learly then, there are only t!ree 8A9 instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: +a, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fi-ed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. +b, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fi-ed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. +c, after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In all instances there must have been failure to elect. this is obvious in the first scenario where the election was not held and the second where the election was suspended. ?s to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of the election returns which give rise to the conse3uence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. Same; 0he omelec is duty-bound to conduct an 8atu investigation as to the veracity of respondentsM allegations ?mpatuan v. of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct 7E6=6 , of the Eay "B, )**" election. !R "B'5*#, (an. #", )**). Same; .uris$iction; 0he trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, w1c power is vested e-clusively in the 7E6=6 sitting en banc. E*E(TION ET& NS; Discrepancies; 0he wisdom of the order to e-amine the election returns is that . . . between another copy of the 7 and the election returns, the latter could provide a more accurate basis for the determination of the true and genuine results of the votes cast. 0his is obvious because the former constitutes a mere summary of the latter and errors, deliberate or otherwise, may be committed in entering therein the figures obtained from the election returns. 2esides, among the copies of the election returns readily available to the ommission, those intended specifically for it are the least li/ely to be tampered with after leaving the hands of the board of election inspectors. If it finds discrepancies in the election returns, Section )#& of the 7mnibus 6lection ode provides the remedy w1c is a re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the ballots. Same; Manifest Errors; In the case of 0rinidad vs. omelec ;#)* S R? 5#&, 5B# +"''',< , definition of Omanifest errorO is that it is evident to the eye and understanding. visible to the eye. that which is open, palpable, uncontrovertible. needing no evidence to ma/e it more clear. not obscure or hidden. . . O? manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have committed . . . O In the case of have9 vs. omelec ;)"" S R? #"% +"''),<, this ourt e-plained that. . . 0o be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and1or objections thereto must have been made arlos v. ?ngeles, !R "B)'*$, >ov. )', )***. 7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. 0hus, in this case, 0he alleged error w1c the E2 of 2inangonan committed and w1c it attributes to physical e-haustion and sleepless nights, is obviously not a plain error apparent from the ertificate of anvass. Same; (orrection of Manifest Errors; Section % of Rule )$ of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the 7E6=6 re3uires that the correction be one involving a manifest error such as Oa mista/e in the copying of the figures into the Statement of Gotes or into the ertificate of anvass.O 0he provision, however, also re3uires that Osuch errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the e-ercise of due diligence.O 0he rationale for the provision is obvious. If the error sought to be corrected is truly a manifest error, then the matter should have already been raised before the board of canvassers. 0he e-ception is if the error is one that Ocould not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the e-ercise of due diligence.O In the case at bar, the error allegedly committed by the E2 of 2inangonan, w1c it attempted to describe and rationali9e in their affidavits, is one that should have been discovered even with ordinary diligence. 0he truth of the matter, however, is that the error, even assuming it to be true, is not manifest and was not apparent from the ertificate of anvass and, therefore, cannot be corrected simply by correction of alleged tabulation error. ' E7' O(*AMATION (ONT O4E S:; refers to any 3uestion pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the 27 or any matter raised under Secs. )##, )#B, )#% and )#& of the 76 , in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of 6RLs. Sec. )B# of the ode enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a pre-proc controversy. In addition to the R6S0RI 0IG6 ?>8 6D =ASIG6 S 7P6 of its subject matter, all pre-proc controversies on 6RLs or 7 Ls shall be disposed of summarily T by the 27 and then the 7E6=6 . Same; 0he 27 and the 7E6=6 are not to loo/ beyond or behind 6RLs w1c are on their face regular and authentic. 2eing a summary proceeding, there is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde. 7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

hu v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%B)#, >ov. )', "'''. Si3uia v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%&)$, 8ec. ', "'''.

hu v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%B)#, >ov. )', "'''. Si3uia v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%&)$, 8ec. ', "'''.

Same; ? party see/ing to raise issues the resolution of w1c hu v. would compel or necessitate the 7E6=6 to pierce the 7E6=6 , veil of 6RLs w1c are prima facie regular on their face, has !R "#%B)#, his proper remedy in a regular election protest. >ov. )', "'''. Si3uia v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%&)$, 8ec. ', "'''. Same; 0he legislative intent of the summary disposition of pre-proc controversy is to give life to the policy that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible for it is in the public interest that the position for w1c the election was held should be filled promptly, even though hu v. 7E6=6 , !R "#%B)#, >ov. )', "'''.

the proclamation of the winning candidates be provisional in nature, as the same may still be subject to the results of the election protests that may be subse3uently filed. 2esides the 27 Ls are merely ad hoc bodies, e-isting only for the interim tas/ of canvassing 6RLs and do not have the facitlities, time, nor competence to hear, e-amine and decide on alleged election irregularities, unli/e regular courts, the 7E6=6 , or the 6lectoral 0ribunal. Same; It may be filed directly w1 the 7E6=6 pursuant to Section % of Rule )$ of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the 7E6=6 . 're7'roclamation (ontro1ersy 1sC Annulment of Election esult; or +ailure of Election; ? preproclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections. 0hese two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise: O@hile, however, the omelec is restricted, in preproclamation cases, to an e-amination of the election returns on their face and is w1o jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the omelec is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the 7mnibus 6lection ode denominates the same. 0hus, the omelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical e-amination of election documents and compare and analy9e votersM signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.O ANN&*MENT O+ E*E(TION AND5O +AI*& E O+ E*E(TION; 0he fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the omelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In the case at bar, we cannot assume that petitionersM proclamation and assumption into office on (une #*, )**", was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and1or declaration of failure of elections. @e are not unmindful of the fact that a pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been the pernicious Jgrab-the-proclamationprolong-the-protestK slogan of some candidates or parties such that even if the protestant wins, it becomes Oa mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to e-pire or has e-pired.O . . . @e have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office. Same; 0he omelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and1or declare a failure of elections as provided for in Section & of the 7mnibus 6lection ode. =oong v. 7E6=6 , #)& Phil. $'*, 5"B, cited in Eatalam v. 7E6=6 , ##5 Phil. BB$ +"''$,.

8atu ?mpatuan v. 7E6=6 , !R "B'5*#, (an. #", )**).

8atu ?mpatuan v. 7E6=6 , !R "B'5*#, (an. #", )**). 7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**), cited

Same; 0he great breadth of the constitutional and statutory powers granted omelec has brought to the fore judicial pronouncements which have long become guidelines. 0ime and again, this ourt has given its imprimatur on the principle that omelec is with authority

to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.

?guam vs. 7E6=6 , )# S R? 55# +"'&5,. 7Lhara v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5'B"B), Earch "), )**).

E*E(TION (ONTEST; 6lection contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. 0he ourt frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. In any election contest, the ultimate issue is to determine the electoral will. In other words, who among the candidates was the votersM choice. R? &&B&

DIS)&A*I+I(ATION ' O(EEDIN6S; Sec. &, R? &&B& Pere9 v. authori9es the continuation of proceedings for 7E6=6 , dis3ualification, even after the elections if the respondent !R "##'BB, has not been proclaimed. Proclamation bars further 7ct. )5, "'''. proceeding of such nature. Same; 'ossible eme$ies: +",Eove for the suspension Pere9 v. of the proclamation reiterating his prayer in the petition for 7E6=6 , dis3ualification and in the vent it is denied, to file a petition !R "##'BB, for ertiorari in the S w1 prayer for 0R7. or +), File a 7ct. )5, "'''. petition for Ruo @arranto w1in "* days after the proclamation. Same; Dis3ualifications of (an$i$ates for 'ublic Office; Giolation of 2P )) involves moral turpitude. 0he deletion in recent jurisprudence of the penalty of imprisonment and the imposition in lieu thereof, of a fine T does not mean that the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. Gillaber v. 7E6=6 , !R "B5#)&, >ov. "%, )**".

(E TI+I(ATE O+ (ANDIDA(:; Failure to specify the on3uilla v. public office he was see/ing in his 7 was not a fatal 7E6=6 , defect in this case. !R "#'5*), ?pril )5, )***. ,allots; ounting of contested ballots. Since the main issue at hand is the contested ballots claimed by the parties, the computation shall be based on the number of uncontested ballots after revision at the lower court. 0hus, petitioner who garnered )%" uncontested ballots would be credited with )' valid votes per findings after revision. 4e therefore has a total of )5* votes. 7n the other hand, private respondent with )&5 uncontested ballots shall be credited with 5 valid votes out of the "" votes claimed, or a total of )$& votes. (an$i$ates for Electi1e 'ublic Office; (ertificate of (an$i$acyC &se of NicBname; Ander par. +),, Sec. $B of the 76 , # /inds of votes are considered stray: ;"< a vote containing initials. ;)< a vote w1c is illegible. and ;#< a vote w1c does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended. he first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be 3ualified by the third category in the sense that votes in initials only may be counted for a candidate provided that the initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of the rule fails to give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction 7R separating Ferrer v. 7E6=6 , !R "#'B5', ?pril "*, )***.

Gillarosa v. 4R60, !R "B##%", Sept. "B, )***.

the first category from the second, and the second from the third. Same; Same; Same; 0he initials J(0GK were used by id. petitioner as a nic/name, for purpose of being voted upon. 0here is no law or rule that prohibits the adoption of initials as a nic/name. nor is there any law or rule that re3uires that the initials adopted by a person as a nic/name strictly correspond to his or her own initials. Petitioner is the lawful wife of (ose 0. Gillarosa and could legally present or identify herself as OErs. (0GO. >o law was transgressed when she registered O(0GO as her nic/name in her certificate of candidacy. 0herefore, the applicable provision of the 76 is Section )"", par +"#,, which sets out the rule for the appreciation of votes using nic/names. Said rule establishes that a nic/name alone is a valid vote, provided: +", it is that by which a candidate is generally or popularly /nown in the locality, and +), there is no other candidate with the same nic/name running for the same office. 0he underlying purpose for the rule, as e-plained in the opening provision of Section )"" of the 76 , is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, where such intention could be determined with reasonable certainty. 0o this end, every ballot is presumed to be valid and all doubts are to be liberally construed in favor of its validity if only to give effect to the will of the voter as reflected therein. Same; esi$ency e3uirement; 0he onstitution and 0orayno v. the law re3uires residence as a 3ualification for see/ing 7E6=6 , and holding elective public office, in order to give !R "#$#)', candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, ?ug. ', )***. difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies. li/ewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the see/ersM 3ualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Gicente C. 6mano has proven that he, together with his family, +", had actually resided in a house he bought in "'$# in agayan de 7ro ity. +), had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Eisamis 7riental, the provincial capitol being located therein. and +#, has registered as voter in the city during the period re3uired by law, he could not be deemed Oa stranger or newcomerO when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. 6lection laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate. Election 'rotest; 'ayment of filing fees; 0he non- Soller v. payment of the proper filing fees is no longer e-cusable 7E6=6 , and is a valid ground for the dismissal of election protests. )***. Same; Period for disposition of election protest must be observed faithfully. Ri9on v. (udge Ferna, supra.

Same; Opening of ,allot ,oxes; @hen there is an Eiguel v. allegation in an election protest that would re3uire the 7E6=6 , perusal, e-amination or counting of ballots as evidence, it !R "#&'&&, is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening (uly %, )***. of the ballot bo-es and the determination and counting of ballots deposited therein. Timeliness of Motion; Eotion for Reconsideration was timely filed on (une ", "''5 considering that Eay #" was a on3uilla v. 7E6=6 ,

Sunday, hence, he had until the ne-t wor/ing day, w1c was (une ", w1in w1c to as/ for reconsideration. R? 5"5'

supra.

eassignment of Election Officers; GoterLs Registration 8e !u9man v. ?ct of "''& +R? 5"5',C Section BB of R? 5"5' enjoys the 7E6=6 , presumption of validity, and the ourt discerns no ground !R ")'""5, to invalidate it. It $oes not 1iolate e3ual protection: 0he (uly "', )***. singling out of election officers in order to Oensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignmentO does not violate the e3ual protection clause of the onstitution. Neit!er infringe security of tenure: 0he guarantee of security of tenure under the onstitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed +or transferred, from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. @hat it see/s to prevent is capricious e-ercise of the power to dismiss. 2ut, where it is the law-ma/ing authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. More so; un$ermines t!e aut!ority of (OME*E( to appoint: Section BB establishes a guideline for the 7E6=6 to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the 7E6=6 of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. It is still the 7E6=6 which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. 2ut as a government agency tas/ed with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the 7E6=6 is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by ongress. Ander this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organi9ation registered w1 the 7E6=6 may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the 4ouse of Representatives as regular members. 0o determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the onstitution and Republic ?ct +R?, >o. $'B" mandate at least four inviolable parameters. 0hese are: First, the twenty percent allocation N the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not e-ceed twenty percent of the total membership of the 4ouse of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold N only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are O3ualifiedO to have a seat in the 4ouse of Representatives. 0hird, the three seat limit N each 3ualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a ma-imum of three seats. that is, one O3ualifyingO and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation N the additional seats which a 3ualified party is entitled to shall be computed Oin proportion to their total number of votes.O ;"< 0he )*V allocation: translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
!o. of district rep. """"""""""" x .#$ % !o. of party list rep. .&$

Party-=ist System

Geterans Federation Party v. 7E6=6 , !R "#&$5", 7ct. &, )***.

0his formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will

necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. 0hus, 0wenty Percent ?llocation a Eere eiling. ;)< 0he two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the onstitution and the law, but with the very essence of Orepresentation.O Ander a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is e-ercised by representatives chosen by them. 2ut to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. 7therwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of ongress. 0hus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to Othe number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratioO to ensure meaningful local representation. ;#< In adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. ongress set the seat-limit to three +#, for each 3ualified party, organi9ation or coalition. ORualifiedO means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature. thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire 4ouse. ;B< 0o distribute additional seats Oproportionally,O bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law. Formula for 8etermining ?dditional Seats for the First Party:
!umber of votes of first party """""""" Total votes for party list system % 'roportion of votes of first party relative to total votes for party list system

Formula for ?dditional Seats of 7ther Rualified Parties:

!o. of votes of (ddtl seats concerned party !o. of addtl. for concerned % """"""" x seats allocated party !o. of votes of to the first party first party

>ational 6conomy and Patrimony

+is!pon$ *ease; 0he Fisheries ?ct prohibits the holder of a fishpond permit from transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to him, w1o the previous consent or approval of the Sec. of ?griculture and >atural Resources. ,angBo Sentral ng 'ilipinas; Examination an$ Au$it of ,anBs; entral 2an/Ls constitutional power of JsupervisionK over ban/s under Sec. )*, ?rt. DII of the onstitution includes the power to e-amine and audit ban/s. 0hus, 7? and the entral 2an/ have concurrent jurisdiction under the onstitution to e-amine and audit government ban/s. 0he 2ang/o Sentral ng Pilipinas, w1c succeeded the entral 2an/, retained under the "'5$ onstitution and the !eneral 2an/ing =aw of )*** +R?##$, w1 respect to the independent audit of ban/s.

8iancin v. ?, !R ""'''", >ov. )*, )***. 82P v. 7?, !R 55B#%, (an. "&, )**).

Arban =and T!e &rban eform *aw 8'D =F=G9; I6%T O+ +I ST Reform and E+&SA*; 0he right of refusal applies only to tenants who 4ousing have resided for ten +"*, years or more on the leased land declared as w1in the Arban =and Reform Fone, and who have built their homes on that land. It does not apply to apartment dwellers. P8 )*"&, w1c amended P8 "%"$, did

?rlegui v. ?, !R ")&B#$, Earch &, )**).

not e-tend its benefits to apartment dwellers. 0he said law grants the right of first refusal only to legitimate tenants who have built their homes on the land they are leasing. %ousing an$ *an$ &se egulatory ,oar$ 8%*& ,9; %OMEO"NE SH ASSO(IATION; 7riginally, administrative supervision over homeownersL associations was vested by law in the S6 . Pursuant to 67 %#%, however, the 4ome Insurance and !uarranty orporation +4I! , assumed the R6!A=?07RC ?>8 ?8(A8I ?07RC FA> 0I7>S of the S6 over homeownersL associations. 0he powers and responsibilities vested in the 4I! w1 respect to homeownersL associations were later transferred to the 4=AR2 pursuant to R? 5$&#. Same; Same; .uris$iction; 4I! e-ercises limited jurisdiction over homeownerLs disputes. 0he law confines its authority to controversies that arise from any of the ff. intra-corporate relations: ;"< between and among members of the association. ;)< between any and1or all of them and the association of w1c they are members. and ;#< between the association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns its right to e-ist as a corporate entity. 0he omplaint here is for damages. It does not assert membership in the S 4? as its basis. Rather, it is based on an alleged violation of the alleged right of access through the subdivision and on the alleged embarrassment and humiliation suffered by the plaintiffs. 6ducational Institutions Sta. lara 4omeownersL ?ssn. v. Sps. !aston, !R "B"'&", (an. )#, )**).

Sta. lara 4omeownersL ?ssn. v. Sps. !aston, !R "B"'&", (an. )#, )**).

Incremental Tuition +ee Increases; 0he mandatory ebu Institute share of an educational institution in the SSS, Eedicare of Eedicine v. and Pag-Ibig premiums of its employees may be charged ebu Institute against the $*V incremental tuition fee increase of Eedicine authori9ed under Sec. % +), of R? &$)5. 6mployeeLs Anion, !R "B")5%, (uly %, )**". 'O"E TO A''OINT; *ocal (!ief Executi1e; 0he power to appoint is vested in the local chief e-ecutive. 0he power of the city council, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating, reorgani9ing city offices1positions and confirmations. 'O"E TO *E6IS*ATE; *imitation; 0he game of lotto is a game of chance duly authori9ed under R? ""&', as amended by 2P B), the law w1c grants a franchise to the P S7 and allows it to operate the lotteries. 0his statute remains valid today. 4ence, a provincial board may not prohibit the lotto by ordinance or resolution. 0he power of the local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from ongress. 0his basic relationship between the local government unit and ongress has not been enfeebled by the new provisions of the onstitution strengthening local autonomy or the State policy re3uiring all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations w1 appropriate local government units +Secs. ) ;c< and )$ of R? $"&*, otherwise /nown as the =ocal !overnment ode of "''". Eathay v. ?, !R ")B#$B, 8ec. "%, "'''. =ina v. PaHo, !R ")'*'#, ?ug. #*, )**".

=ocal !overnment ode

,O&NDA : DIS'&TE; 0he significance of the monument Prov. 7f mar/er cannot simply be disregarded. It has a technical amarines purpose of preserving the survey being conducted. >orte v. Prov.

Rue9on, !R 5*$'&, 7ct. "", )**". (laim against *ocal 6o1ernment Officials an$ 'ri1ate Eancenido v. (ounsel; In resolving whether a local government official ?, !R may secure the services of private counsel in an action ""5&*%, ?pril filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the "), )***. action and the relief sought are to be considered, as where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, w1c, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. %iring of 'ri1ate (ounsel by *ocal 6o1ernment &nits; =!ALs may be represented by a private attorney only when the provincial fiscal is dis3ualified from representing a particular municipality, as in the ff. instances: +", when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies w1 the S . +), when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province. or +#, when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise. E(A**; 0he Resolution providing for recall is no longer applicable inasmuch as the respondent had already vacated the office of the Gice Eayor to w1c the Recall was directed and has assumed the position of Eayor. 6ven if the Preparatory Recall ommittee were to convene to adopt another resolution for the recall of respondent, this time as Eayor, the same would still not proper since no recall shall ta/e place w1in one +", year from the date the official assumes office or one +", year immediately preceding a regular election. id.

?fiado v. 7E6=6 , !R "B"$5$, Sept. "5, )***.

Internal e1enue Allotment 8I A9; 0he President of the Pimentel v. Philippines may not withhold portions or alter any IR?s ?guirre, !R legally due to the =!As. "#)'55, (uly "', )***. TA# O DINAN(E an$ E4EN&E MEAS& ES; Section "5$ of the =ocal !overnment ode of "''" re3uires that an appeal of a ta- ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of (ustice w1in thirty +#*, days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. 0he timeframe fi-ed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before a competent court is not a Omere technicalityO that can be easily brushed aside. 0he periods stated in Section "5$ of the =ocal !overnment ode are E?>8?07RC. Posting was validly made +0he 7rdinance was posted during the period from >ovember B-)%, "''& in three +#, public places, in lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of 4agonoy. *ocal +ranc!ise Tax; 6-emption claimed by the P=80 T not established. Sec. )# of R.?. >o. $')% cannot be considered as having amended petitionerMs franchise so as to entitle it to e-emption from the imposition of local franchise ta-es. It does not appear that, in approving Sec. )# of R.?. >o. $')%, ongress intended it to operate as a blan/et ta- e-emption to all telecommunications entities. ?pplying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tae-emptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in 4agonoy Ear/et Gendor ?ssn. v. 4agonoy, !R "#$&)", Feb. &, )**).

P=80 v. ity of 8avao, !R "B#5&$, ?ug. )), )**".

favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal ta-ing powers. *O(A* E*E(TI4E O++I(IA*S; Term of Office; 0o apply ?dormeo v. the dis3ualification under Sec. 5. ?rt. D of the onstitution, 7E6=6 , two +), conditions must concur: ;a< that the official !R "B$')$, concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in Feb. B, )**). the same local government post, and ;b< that he has fully serve the three consecutive terms. Ander Sec. B# +b, of the =ocal !overnment ode of "''", the term limit for elective officials must be ta/en to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. onse3uently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local post, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the dis3ualification can apply. G7=A>0?RC R6>A> I?0I7> of a term +as e-ception to the rule, does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the term limit. conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Public 7fficers (o$e of (on$uct; Sec. % of R? &$"# re3uires public officials and employees to respond to letters, telegrams or other communications from the public, w1in "% wor/ing days from receipt thereof, stating the action ta/en thereon. Notary 'ublic; Ex7Officio 'ublic Oficers; ?s ex officio notary public or a public officer authori9ed to administer oath; cannot subscribe a document in w1c he is one of the affiants citing ?rt. )) of the >otarial =aw C 0he function of a >otary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. 0hat function would be defeated if the notary public is one of the signatories to the instruments. Same; ? notary public is not prohibited from acting at the same time as witness to the document notari9ed by him. 0he only 6D 6P0I7> is when the document is a will. Gales v. ?r9agaoRuijano, ?E >o. P-''"##5, >ov. "5, "'''.

Solarte v. ?tty. Pugeda, ?.c. >o. B$%"), (uly #", )***. oronado v. ?tty. Felongco, ?.c. >o. )&"", >ov. "%, )***. 2ongalos v. Eonungolh, ?.E. >o. P*"-"%"5, >ov. "B, )**".

Same; 0he party ac/nowledging a document must appear before the notary public or any other person authori9ed to ta/e ac/nowledgments of documents. >otari9ation is not an empty routine. It converts a private document into a public one and renders it admissible in court w1o further proof of its authenticity. (lerBs of (ourt; Duties an$ +unctions: Ander Section $, Rule "#& of the Rules of ourt and Section ?, hapter II of the Eanual for ler/s of ourt, it is the cler/ of courtMs duty to safely /eep all records, papers, files, e-hibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court and the seal and furniture belonging to his office. ?s court custodian, it was his responsibility to ensure that records are safely /ept and the same are readily available upon the re3uest of the parties or order of the court. 4e must be diligent and vigilant in performing his official duties and in supervising and managing court doc/ets and records. $ 0his custodial duty necessarily e-tends to evidence submitted by the parties and mar/ed as e-hibits.

Same; (usto$y of +un$s; ler/s of ourt may not /eep funds in their custody. ?ll collections from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four +)B, hours by the ler/ of ourt concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the =and 2an/ of the Philippines. Andue delay in remitting collections amounts no less to grave misfeasance if not malversation of funds. >o protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Failure of a ler/ of ourt to turn over money deposited with him and to e-plain and present evidence thereon constitutes gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even malversation of public funds which this ourt will never countenance as they indubitably diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. Same; ? cler/ of court had no authority to mediate among constituents.

Eallare v. Ferry, ?.E. >7. P-**"#5" and ?.E. >o. P**-"#5), (uly #", )**".

?rroyo v. ?lcantara, ?.E. >o. P*"-"%"5, >ov. "B, )**". 0alion v. ?yupan, ?.E. >o. P-*""%)', (an. )#, )**).

S!eriff; 0he sheriff has the primary responsibility of ensuring the speedy and efficient service of court processes and orders. In the discharge of his duty a high degree of professionalism is demanded. For it cannot be overemphasi9ed that a decision or process that is left une-ecuted or unserved because of the inefficiency, negligence, misconduct, or ignorance of the law of those charged with their e-ecution inevitably delays the administration of justice and rightly deserves the condemnation of the parties who are prejudiced thereby. Ander the "''$ Revised Rules of ivil Procedure, the service of summons may be entrusted to the sheriff. 0he sheriff has the duty to serve the process promptly and to ma/e a return of his service within a reasonable time. 0his is necessary in order for the court to determine if the period for filing an answer has not yet e-pired. Same; Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. ?s agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the courtMs writs and processes and implementing its orders, they can not afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. ?s an officer of the court, Sheriff >e3uinto was obliged to conduct himself with propriety and restraint. 4e cannot ma/e use of his public office to oppress or abuse a party especially a sensitive financial institution li/e the 82P. 4is conduct showed unjustified braggadocio. 4e did not comply with the set procedure in the rules. Same; Einisterial duty to promptly enforce writs of e-ecution.

82P v. >e3uinto, ?.E. >7. E0(-*"-"#$&, (an. )#, )**).

?3uino v. =avadia, ?.E. >o. P-*""B5#, Sept. )*, )**". Gisitacion v. 6di9a, ?.E. >o. P-*""B'%, ?ug. ', )**".

Same; Respondent sheriff was tas/ed to enable a prevailing party to benefit from the judgment. ?fter ' years, complainant is entitled to reali9e the lawLs promise that his right to possession would be vindicated as speedily as possible to preserve peace and order in the community. Same; Rule "B", Sec. ', final paragraph, governs the payment of e-penses for the enforcement of writs of e-ecution.

Galencia v. GaleHa, ?.E. >o. P-**"B*', ?ug, "&, )***. 0iongco v. Eolina, ?.E. >o. P-**"#$#, Sept. B, )**". 0an v. 8ael, ?.E. >7. P**-"#'), (uly "#, )***.

Same; Respondent is guilty of misconduct for his failure to prepare an estimate of e-penses to be incurred in e-ecuting the writ, for w1c he must see/ the courtLs approval. to render an accounting. and to issue official receipt for the total amount received from the judgment debtor. and for deducting the money he should have deposited in court the amount for e-penses the former incurred. Same; 7nly the payment of the sheriffLs fees can be lawfully received by a sheriff and acceptance of any other amount is IEPR7P6R, even if it were applied for lawful purposes. ? sheriff acts irregularly when he submits his SheriffLs Partial Report and SheriffLs Return w1o li3uidating the amounts previously received. !overnment 6mployees 6roun$s for Dismissal; 6ra1e Miscon$uct an$ (on$uct 6rossly 're<u$icial to t!e Interest of t!e Ser1ice; ? govLt. employee should be dismissed from the service not only for his failure to give due courtesy and respect to his superiors or to maintain good conduct and behavior, but because of his defiance of basic norms or virtues w1c a government employee must uphold at all times. Same; Dis!onesty; Failure to turn over the e-cess of the bid price.

Ignacio v. Payumo, ?.E. >o. P-**"#'&, 7ct. )B, )***. Eaningas v. 2arcenas, ?E >o. P-''"#"%, >ov. #, "'''.

>eeland v. Gillanueva, ?E >o. P-''"#"&, 7ct. )', "'''. Pilipinas Iao v. ?, !R "*%*"B, 8ec. "5, )**". ?costa v. ?, !R "#)*55, (une )5, )***.

?dministrati '&,*I(ATION; Eandatory re3uirement for the effectivity ve =aw of 27I Eanual of 7perations that is meant to enforce or implement 2P #'" +Incentives for Registration of >ew or 6-panding 6-port Producers,, a law of general application. ADMINIST ATI4E DIS(I'*INA : A(TIONS; 'ublic Sc!ool Teac!ers; 0heir mass action was for all intents and purposes a stri/e, a concerted and unauthori9ed stoppage of, or absence from, wor/. 8ismissal orders of 8ept. 4eads are immediately e-ecutory even pending appeal. Ander Sec. B$+),, Subtitle ?, 0itle I, 2oo/ G of 6-ecutive 7rder >o. )'), otherwise /nown as the ?dministrative ode of "'5$, the decision of a department secretary confirming the dismissal of an employee under his jurisdiction is e-ecutory even pending appeal thereof. Since dismissal orders remain valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period during which an employee is not permitted to wor/ cannot be argued as amounting to unjustified suspension. Same; Same; Petitioners, who were earlier dismissed for

aniete

v.

allegedly participating in a mass action1stri/es, are entitled to their bac/ salaries upon their reinstatement after they were found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulation and penali9ed only with reprimand. Same; '!ilC National 'olice 8'N'9; 0he administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against any member of the P>P is laid down in R? &'$%, otherwise /nown as the O8epartment of the Interior and =ocal !overnment ?ct of "''*.O 0his law defines the summary dismissal powers of the P>P hief and Regional 8irectors, among others in cases, Owhere the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.O Eemo. ircular >o. ')-**& prescribes the ORules and Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring P>P membersO and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section # +c,, Rule II, as: JConduct unbecoming of a police officerO refers to any behavior or action of a P>P member, irrespective of ran/, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a P>P member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character. it may also refer to acts or behavior of any P>P member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a P>P member and e-hibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organi9ation. 7n the other hand, the acts constituting Osimple irregularit in t!e performance of dut O are defined in Eemo. ircular >o. '"-**). It is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of the P>P who shall, among others, be found to Ohave the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office.O +Sec. ).?, Rule GI,.

Sec. of 6ducation, !R "B*#%', (une "', )***. 0he Summary 8ismissal 2oard v. 0orcita, supra.

ADMINIST ATI4E IN4ESTI6ATIONS; ? party in an Remolona v. administrative in3uiry may or may not be assisted by S , )**". counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondentLs capacity to represent himself. ?dmissions by respondent during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal. ' E4ENTI4E S&S'ENSION; "reventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. 7n the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subse3uently considered illegal if respondent is e-onerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. 4ence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. 0hus, WB$+B, states that respondent Oshall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.O 7n the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e. if he is not e-onerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. !loria v. ?, !R "#"*"), ?pril )", "'''.

A$ministrati1e (ases; ig!t to (ounsel; Said right is Sebastian, Sr. not imperative in administrative investigations. v. !archetorina,

!R ""B*)5, 7ct. "5, )***. Same; Due 'rocess; 0he essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to see/ reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. ? formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times essential to due process, the re3mts. 7f w1c is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to e-plain their side. 0he filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfills the r3mts. of due process. 8amasco v. >=R , !R ""%$%%, 8ec. B, )***.

Same; Ex!austion of A$ministrati1e eme$ies; >o Sec. of appeal need be ta/en to the 7ffice of the President from (ustice v. the decision of a department head because the latter is in 2acal, )***. theory the alter ego of the former. 0here is greater reason for not re3uiring prior resort to the 7ffice of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. Same; Deat! of espon$ent; 0he charges against respondent ?ntonio were referred to (udge Para9o for investigation, report and recommendation, and therafter, to the 7ffice of the ourt ?dministrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. Respondent was able to answer the complaint and substantiate his defenses. @hile the administrative case was pending, respondent die. 4is heirs moved for the dismissal of the case against him and to facilitate the release of whatever benefits may have accrued to him during his )* years in service. 0he ourt resolved that respondent ?ntonioMs death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any criminal action against him for malfeasance in office. 4owever, we are not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Appeals from A$ministrati1e Decisions; Philippine ivil Service =aw does not allow the complainant to appeal a decision e-onerating or absolving a civil service employee. 0he above doctrine may have been modified to allow the S to appeal decisions e-onerating an employee. >onetheless, e-cepting the privilege of appeal granted to the S , the law does not contemplate a review of decisions e-onerating officers and employees from administrative charges. Same; ?dministrative charges comprising grave or less grave offenses filed against judiciary employees are to be immediately referred to the ourt )n *anc, from whose decision there is no appeal. 7ffice of the ourt ?dministrator v. ?tty. Saguyod, ?.E. >os. P'&-"))'-#*, Earch )%, )**).

(ustice Eelo, dissenting in Flora v. Sunga, )**".

id.

Desistance; Subse3uent desistance by the complainant in Ri9on v. an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its (udge Ferna, dismissal. ?.E. >o. R0(**-"%$%, Sept. "$, )**". &*E7MADIN6 'O"E of A$ministrati1e Agencies; %ome De1elopment Mutual +un$ 8%DM+9; 0he 48EF 2oard has rule-ma/ing power as provided in Sec. % of R? $$B) and Sec. "# of P8 "$%). 4owever, rules and regulations w1c are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be w1in the scope of the statutory Romulo Eabanta, 2uenaventura , Sayoc S 8e los ?ngeles v. 48EF, !R "#"*5), (une

authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is re3uired that the regulation be germane to the object and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

"', )***.

Same ; Same ; Sec. " of Rule GII of the ?mendments to id. the Rules and Regulations implementing R? $$B) and 48EF ircular >o. ")B-2 prescribing the Revised !uidelines and Procedure for filing application for @aiver or Suspension of Fund overage under P8 "$%), as amended by R? $$B), are null and void insofar as they re3uire that an employer should have both provident fund1retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to 3ualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund overage. ADMINIST ATI4E O++ENSES AND 'ENA*TIES; astro v. Immorality; ? grave offense but first offenders are only !loria, !R suspended as provided for under Section )# +7,, Rule DIG "#)"$B, ?ug. of the Rules Implementing 2oo/ G of 6-ecutive 7rder >o. )*, )**". )') +7therwise /nown as the ?dministrative ode of "'5$ and other Pertinent ivil Service =aws, that for disgraceful and immoral conduct X"st 7ffense, Suspension for si- +&, months and one day +", day to one +", year. )nd 7ffense, 8ismissal.YO Eoreover, such suspension is w1o pay under the general proposition that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. Same; Dis!onesty; ? grave offense punishable by Remolona v. dismissal for the first offense. >eed not be committed in S , !R the course of the performance of duty. ?lthough no "#$B$#, ?ug. pecuniary damage was incurred by the govLt., there was ), )**". still falsification of official document that constitute gross dishonesty. Same; Same; 0he entry in the record of birth that respondent is married is certainly spurious. @hy she has not ta/en any legal step to have it corrected clearly indicates her predeliction to dishonesty. Same; Same; 8emanding and receiving Jgrease moneyK for the implementation of a writ of demolition. Flora v. Sunga, ?.E. >o. ?-*""*-P", >ov. "B, )**". 7ffice of the ourt ?dministrator v. Eagno, ?.E. >o. P**-"B"', 7ct. "$, )**". 0he ourt ?dministrator v. ?bdullahi, ?.E. >o. P*)-"%&*, Earch )*, )**).

Same; Dis!onesty an$ +alsification of Official Document; 0his case involves falsification of 80R. 8ishonesty under Rule DIG, Sec. )#, of the 7mnibus Rules of the ivil Service is punishable by dismissal on commission of the first offense. 0he penalty becomes even more deserved when the dishonesty amounts also to falsification of an official document the penalty for which is dismissal from the service, it being grave in nature, under Eemorandum ircular >o. #*, series of "'5', of the S re +uidelines in the (pplication of 'enalties in (dministrative Cases. 0hus we have not hesitated in previous cases to impose the ultimate penalty of dismissal on officials and employees found guilty of the offense.

'rescription of Offense; ?dministrative offenses do not Flora prescribe. Sunga,

v. ?.E.

>o. ?-*""*-P", >ov. "B, )**". !overnment ?gencies and Instrument alities. &rban *an$ De1elopment an$ %ousing Act of =>>E 8 A GEG>9; 6viction and 8emolition. R? $)$', is not applicable to the instant case. Sect. )5 of the said law which partially provides that: 6viction and 8emolition. N 6viction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. 6viction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: +a, @hen persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad trac/s, garbage dumps, riverban/s, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewal/s, roads, par/s, and playgrounds. +b, @hen government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. or +c, @hen there is a court order for eviction and demolition. 0he petitioner subse3uently see/s the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction on account of the demolition of the houses and forcible eviction of its members from the alderon compound conducted by the respondents in alleged violation of Section )5 of Republic ?ct >o. $)$'. 0he respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the said demolition and eviction were done legally and in accordance with the 7rders of the trial court. that the trial court found that the relocation site in !ayagaya was already fully developed for occupancy. and that the petitioner agreed and undertoo/ to transfer its members to the said relocation site on or before ?pril "%, "''$ provided that the amenities are substantially completed. @ith the complete development of the relocation site at !aya-gaya, to which the remaining members of the petitioner can be relocated, and considering the said Eemorandum of ?greement of the parties, respondent ourt of ?ppeals correctly found and ruled, in effect, that there is no factual and legal basis to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the respondents to allow the members of the petitioner to return to the alderon compound especially since the facilities and structures of the lot owner, respondent 0oyota, have already been established therein. In other words, petitionerMs reliance on Republic ?ct >o. $)$' in connection with its prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction is indeed misplaced. >ag/a/aisang Iapisanan Iapitbahayan sa ommonwealt h ?ve. v. ?, !R "#%5&%, (uly )*, )**".

(ommission on t!e Settlement of *an$ 'roblems Sy v. 8(OS*A'9; 6.7. >o. %&" creating the 7S=?P was 7S=?P, !R issued in "'$'. Relative thereto, Section #+), of the "B*'*#, Sept. e-ecutive order provides: "), )**". Powers and Functions. N 0he ommission shall have the following powers and functions: ". oordinate the activities, particularly the investigation wor/, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the e-pense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes. ). Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the ommission: Provided, that the ommission may, in the following cases, assume

jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and e-plosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations re3uiring immediate action: +a, 2etween occupants1s3uatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires. +b, 2etween occupants1s3uatters and government reservation grantees. +c, 2etween occupants1s3uatters and public land claimants or applicants. +d, Petitions for classification, release and1or subdivision of lands of the public domain. and +e, 7ther similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. 0he ommission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure e-peditious resolution and action on the above cases. 0he resolution, order or decision of the ommission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and e-ecutory within thirty +#*, days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme ourt. 4owever, appeals from the 7S=?P may not be brought directly before us in view of Rule B%, Section ". =i/ewise, if a petition for certiorari under Rule &% is the prescribed remedy, the ourt of ?ppeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted that the 7S=?P is among those 3uasi-judicial agencies e-ercising 3uasi-judicial functions. >o convincing reason e-ists why appeals from the 7S=?P should be treated differently from other 3uasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are directly appealable to the ourt of ?ppeals under Rule B# of the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure. Eoreover, the enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not e-clusive. In that sense, Section #+), of 6.7. >o. %&" declaring that the 7S=?PMs orders, resolutions or decisions are appealable e-clusively to this ourt is erroneous in the light of Section ", Rule B% and Section ", Rule B# of the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure, Same; 67 %&" creating the 7S=?P. (urisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of the land in 3uestion and pasture lease agreement holders. %ousing an$ *an$ egulatory ,oar$ 8%*& ,9; .uris$iction an$ egulatory 'owers; 6-clusive jurisdiction and regulatory powers of the 4=AR2 under P8 '%$ +issued on (uly "), "'$&,, P8 "#BB +issued on ?pril ), "'$5, 67 &B5 dated Feb. $, "'5" and 67 '* dated 8ec. "$, "'5&. 0he 4=AR2 and not the S6 has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision developer +under receivership, for specific performance regarding basic homeownersL needs such as water, security and open spaces. 0he ruling has consistently been that the 4=AR2 has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply w1 its contractual and statutory obligations to ma/e the subdivision a better place ?lcantara v. 7S=?P, !R "B%5#5, (uly )*, )**". ?rran9a v. 2.F. 4omes, !R "#"&5#, (une "', )***.

to live in. 0he fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the 4=AR2 of that jurisdiction. 0he appointment of a receivership does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere w1 the e-ercise of its corporate rights. Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at ma/ing more secure, e-isting rights. it cannot be used as an instrument for the destruction of those rights. Same; .uris$iction; ?n aggrieved townhouse buyer may ?tty. ole v. see/ protection from the 4=AR2 under P8 '%$, otherwise ?, !R /nown as JSubdivision and ondominium 2uyerLs "#$%%", 8ec. Protective 8ecree.K ? direct resort to the S 3uestioning )&, )***. the ?rbiterLs refusal to issue writ of e-ecution is improper and premature. 0he "''& Rules of Procedure of the 4=AR2 provides that the decision of the ?rbiter is reviewable by the 2oard ommission. In turn, any party may appeal the 2oard of ommissionerLs decision to the 7ffice of the President, the aggrieved party can resort to the ?. Subic ,ay Metropolitan Aut!ority 8S,MA9; ,i$s an$ Awar$s of (ontracts; 4PP= has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmista/able right to be declared the winning bidder w1 finality, such that the S2E? can be compelled to negotiate a oncession ontract w1 4PP=. 0he S2E? 2oard Resolution declaring 4PP= as the winning bidder is subject to the control and supervision of the 7ffice of the President. ?ll projects underta/en by S2E? re3uire that approval under =7I >7. &)* dated 7ct. )$, "''$. 0he President may, w1in this authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the S2E? 2oard of 8irectors F7R (AS0IFI?2=6 R6?S7>S. 0he discretion to accept or reject a bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere w1 the e-ercise thereof by the e-ecutive department, unless it is apparent that such e-ercise of discretion is AS68 07 S4I6=8 A>F?IR>6SS 7R I>(AS0I 6. 'ollution A$<u$ication ,oar$ 8'A,9; 0he P?2 has not been divested of its authority +under R? #'#" entitled J?n ?ct reating the >ational @ater and ?ir Pollution ontrol ommission,K as amended by P8 '5B, to hear pollution cases connected w1 mining operations T by virtue of the subse3uent enactment of R? $'B) +Philippine Eining ?ct of "''%, and in relation to 67 "'), series of "'5$ +0he Reorgani9ation ?ct of the 86>R,. @hile the mines Regional 8irector has e-press administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicatory powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Such powers pertain to P?2. '!ilippine Amusement an$ 6aming (orporation 8'A6(O 9; 4as a valid franchise by itself but not in association w1 any other person or entity to operate, maintain and1or manage the game of jai-alai. '!ilippine etirement Aut!ority 8' A9; PR? is a government-owned and controlled corporation under the 7ffice of the President. It was created to oversee an unconventional program designed to meet the tight foreign e-change situation in the country. Its objective is to promote and develop the Philippines as a retirement destination for foreign nationals and former Filipino 4utchison Ports Phils. v. S2E?, !R "#"#&$, ?ug. #", )***.

Republic v. Earcopper Eining orp., !R "#$"$B, (uly "*, )***.

8el Ear v. P?! 7R, !R "#5)'5, ?ug. )B, )**". PR? v. Rupa, !R "B*%"', ?ug. )", )**".

citi9ens. 0o become a PR? member, a retiree must maintain a minimum A.S. dollar time deposit account with a PR?-accredited ban/. 0he PR? then converts this account into active investment. In return, the foreign retiree is e-tended benefits and incentives, such as grants of certain ta- e-emptions, resident status, bali/bayan privileges, etc. 0he 3ualified retiree is also given a multiple entry Special Resident RetireeMs Gisa +SRRG,. Should he decide to withdraw his dollar account, he shall surrender his passport to the PR? for cancellation of the SRRG by the ommission on Immigration and 8eportation + I8,. 0he PR? shall then issue the retireeMs withdrawal clearance to the ban/ where he has a deposit. 7nly then shall the ban/ concerned return the dollar deposit to the retiree. ,oar$ of In1estment 8,OI9 ; Form and contents of 27I 8ecisions . =ac/ing of the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in 3uestion were at best interlocutory orders that did not attain finality nor ac3uire the effects of a final judgment despite the lapse of the statutory period of appeal. ,ureau of Immigration has authority to correct its own records. Pilipinas Iao v. ?, !R "*%*"B, 8ec. "5, )**".

!o /im 4uy v. !o Iim 4uy, !R "#$&$B, Sept. )*, )**".

6o1ernment Ser1ice Insurance System 86SIS9; =iable !SIS v. Sps. for damages resulting from the negligence of its !on9alo, !R employees. "#%&BB, Sept. "$, )**". Same; 4ousing assistance to the less-privileged !SIS members and their dependents. % year restriction on the assignment of the awardeesL rights or the resale of the lot awarded to them. San ?gustin v. ?, !R ")"'B*, 8ec. B, )**".

Sugar egulatory A$ministration; Social ?melioration ru9 v. 7?, 2enefits +S?2,. 0he classification of 7? as to who were !R "#B$B*, entitled to the S?2 and e-cluding therefrom those 7ct. )#, )**". employees hired after 7ctober #", "'5', has no legal basis. 6vidently, any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences, that is, level or ran/, degree of difficulty and amount of wor/. 0o discriminate against some employees on the basis solely of date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social policy of the law. 0he ommission on ?udit, in 7? 8ecision >o. '&-*)*, ruled that the board resolutions of the Sugar Regulatory ?dministration could no longer be considered as the Oprior authorityO for the release of the social amelioration benefits as per R. ?. >o. &$%5 and >o. "*. It further ruled that such benefits may be granted if there was a prior authority from the 7ffice of the President. Cet, when the SR? employees were finally able to secure a post facto approval1ratification from the 7ffice of the President, the 7? declared, by sweeping statement, that only those hired before 7ctober #", "'5', were entitled to the S?2. It did not mention any legal basis or justification for the distinction. R. ?. >o. &$%5 and >o. "* do not ma/e any distinction between those hired before and after 7ctober #", "'5'. >either did the "st Indorsement of the 7ffice of the President ma/e any such distinction. 0he legal ma-im that Owhen the law does not distinguish,

neither should the courtO apply in this case. 'ublic Estate Aut!ority 8'EA9; 0he government agency tas/ed by the 2ases onversion 8evelopment ?uthority to develop the first-class memorial par/ /nown as the 4eritage Par/, =ocated in Fort 2onifacio, 0aguig, Eetro Eanila. (onstruction In$ustry Arbitration (ommission 8(IA(9; 67 "**5 vest upon the I? original and e-clusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected w1 contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Phils., whether the disputes arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. Ander the "''$ Rules of ivil Procedure, the ? can now review 3uestions of fact, of law, or mi-ed 3uestions of fact and law in appeals from judgments or final orders of the I? . National Telecommunications (ommission 8NT(9; Nature of office an$ +unctions; 0he >0 was created pursuant to 67 %B&, promulgated on (uly )#, "'$'. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the 2oard of ommunications and the 0elecommunications ontrol 2ureau, w1c were both abolished under the said 6-ecutive 7rder. Previously, the >0 Ms functions were merely those of the defunct Public Service ommission +PS ,, created under ? "B&, as amended, otherwise /nown as the Public Service ?ct, considering that the 2oard of ommunications was the successor-in-interest of the PS . Ander 67 ")%-?, issued in ?pril "'5$, the >0 became an attached agency of the 8epartment of 0ransportation and ommunications. In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the >0 has the sole authority to issue ertificates of Public onvenience and >ecessity + P >, for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. Specifically, Section "& of the Public Service ?ct authori9es the then PS , upon notice and hearing, to issue ertificates of Public onvenience for the operation of public services within the Philippines Owhenever the ommission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the authori9ation to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.O Same; 'ro1isional +ranc!ise; Rule "%, Sec. # of its "'$5 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides: JSec. #. Provisional Relief. N Apon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the 2oard may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative , the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called within thirty +#*, days from grant of authority as/ed for.K @hile the "''# Revised Rules deleted the phrase Oon its own initiative.O accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the ommission. P6? v. Ay, !R "B$'###B, 8ec. "), )**". Eetro onstruction v. hatam Properties, !R "B"5'$, Sept. )B, )**".

Republic v. 6-press 0elecommuni cations o., !R "B$*'&, (an. "%, )**). 2ayan 0elecommuni cations v. 6-press 0elecommuni cations o., !R "B$)"*, (an. "%, )**).

id.

Same; Tax Exemptions; Public 0elecommunications P=80 v.

ity

Policy ?ct of the Phils. +R? $')%,. 0he grant of ta-ing of 8avao, !R powers to local government units under the onstitution "B#5&$, ?ug. and the =! does not affect the power of ongress to )), )**". grant e-emptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. 0he legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal ta-ing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. @hen e-emption is claimed, it must be shown indubitably to e-ist. ?t the outset, every presumption is against it. ? well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the concession are too e-plicit to admit fairly of any other construction that the proposition can be supported. In this case, the word Oe-emptionO in W)# of R.?. >o. $')% could contemplate e-emption from certain regulatory or reporting re3uirements, bearing in mind the policy of the law. It is noteworthy that, in holding Smart and !lobe e-empt from local ta-es, the 2=!F did not base its opinion on W)# but on the fact that the franchises granted to them after the effectivity of the =! e-empted them from the payment of local franchise and business ta-es. In approving W)# of R.?. >o. $')%, ongress intended it to operate as a blan/et ta- e-emption to all telecommunications entities. ?pplying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tae-emptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal ta-ing powers, we hold that W)# of R.?. >o. $')% cannot be considered as having amended petitionerMs franchise so as to entitle it to e-emption from the imposition of local franchise ta-es. Department of Natural esources an$ En1ironment alub v. ?, 8DEN 9; (onfiscation; +orfeiture an$ Disposition of !R ""%&#B, 6at!ering Timber or Ot!er +orest 'ro$ucts w5o ?pril )$, *icense; 2y authority of the Sec. of the 86>R, subject )***. vehicles sei9ed in accordance w1 law are validly deemed in custodia legis and are not subject to an action for replevin. Same; Same; Ander Sec. &5-? of the Forestry ode of the Phils., the Sec. of the 86>R or a duly authori9ed representative has 6D =ASIG6 ?A047RI0C to order the confiscation in favor of the government of vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said ode. ;?dmin. 7rder +?7, >o. %B-'#, amending 8ept. ?dmin. 7rder +8?7, >o. %'-'* provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations,. 7n the other hand, Sec. &5 of the same ode penali9es the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products w1o legal documents and the criminal case is w1in the jurisdiction of the R0 . 4owever, the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case is IEE?06RI?= to the confiscation of the vehicle under Sec. &5-? w1c involves a different matter cogni9able by the 86>R Secretary. 4ence, the R0 cannot order the release of the confiscated vehicle on the ground that the accused in the criminal case was ac3uitted. 86>R v. 8araman, !R ")%$'$, Feb. "%, )**).

O++I(E O+ T%E SO*I(ITO 6ENE A*; 0he legal ity @arden representative of the government of the Republic of the of the Eanila Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its ity (ail v. officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, 6strella, !R investigation, or matter re3uiring the services of a lawyer, "B")"", ?ug.

e-cepting only as may otherwise be provided by law. 0hat #", )**". the ity @arden appears to have ac3uiesced in the release order of the trial court by his compliance therewith does not preclude the S7=!6> from ta/ing contrary position and appealing therefrom. 'ublic ,i$$ing; 0he right to top, the ?sset Privati9ation (! Summit v. 0rust +?P0, in favor of I4I-P4I violated the rule on ?, !R competitive public bidding. @hile it may be argued that the ")B)'#, >ov. right to top was aimed at giving the best financial )*, )***. advantage to the government, the manner by w1c right was conceived and arrived at in this case manifested bias in favor of I4I, clearly brushing aside the rule on fair competition and completely disregarded the stipulation in the (G? between >I8 and I4I of the &*V-B*V capitali9ation arrangement. onse3uently, the ?P0 rendered nugatory the constitutional and contractual proscriptions clearly to favor a foreign investor. Same; Not re3uire$ under the circumstances of these cases: involving !SIS disposition of ac3uired assets +Arbano v. !SIS, !R "#$'*B, 7ct. ', )**",. purchase of 0erumo blood bags by the >ational Iidney and 0ransplant Institute +2aylon v. 7mbudsman, !R "B)$#5, 8ec. "B, )**",. 6o1ernment Infrastructure (ontracts; Reali9ing the need to adopt a comprehensive, uniform, and updated set of policies, guidelines, rules and regulations covering government contracts for infrastructure and other construction projects in order to achieve a more efficient and effective implementation of these projects, P8 "%'B was enacted to prescribe policies, guidelines, rules and regulations for government infrastructure contracts. PetitionerLs $re$ging contract w1 >?P7 7R being considered as a government infrastructure contract +Ja construction, improvement or rehabilitation of roads and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment.K,, is subject to the provisions of P8 "%'B +Prescribing Policies, !uidelines, Rules and Regulations for !overnment Infrastructure ontracts, and its IRR. ?n Oinfrastructure projectO such as PetitionersL having ac3uired mobili9ation lump sum as provided in the dredging contract is, and should be, considered an advance-payment item which forms part of the contract price and not an addition thereto.O and Osubject to the conditions provided under I B of the Implementing Rules and Regulations for P.8. >o. "%'B that upon the written re3uest of the contractor, the government shall ma/e an advance payment in an amount e3ual to fifteen percent +"%V, of the total contract price, subject to recoupment from periodic progress billings submitted by the contractor. !7 Ls .uris$iction; orporations organi9ed pursuant to the orporation ode of the Phils. are under the S6 , even if the majority or controlling shares thereof are owned by the government. Same; 0he S6 may not have authority over government corporations w1 original charters or those created by ( =ope9 S ?ssociates v. 7?, !R ")5"B%, Sept. %, )**".

P> v. Pabion, !R "#"$"%, 8ec. 5, "'''. P> Pabion, v. !R

special law, it does have jurisdiction over J? RAIR68 ?SS06S 7RP7R?0I7>SK as defined in ?dmin. 7rder >o. %'. Same; 0he S6 en banc has competence to distinguish a private corporation from a !7 .

"#"$"%, 8ec. 5, "'''. P> v. Pabion, !R "#"$"%, 8ec. 5, "'''. =eyson v. 7ffice of the 7mbudsman, !R "#B''*, ?pril )$, )***.

Definition; Par. +"#,, Sec. ), Introductory Provisions of the ?dministrative ode of "'5$, i. e., any agency organi9ed as a stoc/ or non-stoc/ corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the !overnment directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stoc/ corporations, to the e-tent of at least fifty-one +%", percent of its capital stoc/. 0he definition mentions three +#, re3uisites, namely, first, any agency organi9ed as a stoc/ or non-stoc/ corporation. second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature. and, third, owned by the !overnment directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stoc/ corporations, to the e-tent of at least fifty-one +%", percent of its capital stoc/. 0hus, =egaspi 7il, Inc., !rane-port Eanufacturing orp. and Anited oconut hemicals, Inc., are private corporations. "ater Districts; 0he members of the board of directors of water districts are not entitled to receive benefits and allowances in e-cess of those allowed by P8 "'5 +as amended by P8 $&5 and P8 "B$', and the guidelines of the =ocal @ater Atilities ?dministration +=@A?, and other applicable law. R? &$%5, otherwise /nown as the Salary Standardi9ation =aw, does not apply to water districts nor refer to the compensation of its board of directors who do not receive salaries but per diems for their compensation. 0he right to compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts is limited to per diems.

2aybay @ater 8istrict v. 7?, !R "B$)B5-B', (an. )#, )**).