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Economics Group
Special Commentary
Figure 2
Contributions to U.K. GDP Growth
8%
6% 4% 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -12% 2014 -8% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 -4%
Net Exports: 2013 @ 0.2% Government Spending: 2013 @ 0.2% Investment: 2013 @ 0.2% Consumption: 2013 @ 1.4% Year-over-Year GDP Growth: 2013 @ 1.7%
4%
4%
2%
2%
0%
0%
-2%
-2%
-4%
-6%
-6%
-8%
Indeed, growth in real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) has been the primary driver of British economic growth over the past two years. Real GDP grew 1.7 percent in 2013, with 1.4 percentage points of this growth attributable to real PCE (Figure 2). Although investment spending, government spending and net exports all made positive contributions to the overall rate of real GDP growth in 2013, real PCE clearly was the main driver. Economic theory posits that growth in real disposable income should be the primary determinant of growth in real PCE, a hypothesis that generally is supported by empirical analysis. In 2013, real
disposable income in the United Kingdom fell 0.5 percent. Although employment growth was fairly solid in 2013it grew 1.5 percent over the course of the yearstubbornly high inflation, which we will discuss further below, eroded purchasing power. Despite the contraction in real disposable income, real PCE rose 2.2 percent in 2013. What kept growth in British consumer spending aloft? A decline in the savings rate has helped to support growth in consumer spending. British consumers were able to finance solid growth in PCE last year by allowing their savings rates to recede somewhat (Figure 3). The personal savings rate spiked during the global financial crisis due to the combination of a surge in precautionary savings and an apparent desire among British consumers to de-lever. Indeed, the debt-to-disposable income ratio, often considered to be a measure of leverage, has declined markedly over the past five years (Figure 4). British consumers apparently feel less need today to maintain elevated savings rates now that the immediacy of the global financial crisis has passed and some de-leveraging has occurred. Moreover, household balance sheets are in much better shape today than they were a few years ago now that net worth has risen to an all-time high.1 Figure 3
U.K. Personal Savings Rate
12%
Figure 4
U.K. Household & Nonprofit Debt
As a Share of Gross Disposable Income
12%
10%
10%
140%
8%
8%
6%
6%
4%
4%
100%
100%
90% 80% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
2%
2%
90%
0% 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14
0%
80% 1998
Lower interest rates have also helped to support consumer spending. At the height of the British housing bubble in late 2007/early 2008 British households were devoting about 8 percent of disposable income to servicing mortgage debt (Figure 5). Not only were households highly indebted in 2007, but interest rates rose steadily from 2003 through 2007 due to policy tightening by the Bank of England. However, the mortgage debt-servicing obligations of British households tumbled sharply in 2008 as the Bank of England slashed its main policy rate from 5.75 percent in December 2007 to 0.50 percent in March 2009, where it has subsequently been maintained. Most households in the United Kingdom have floating-rate mortgages, and the sharp decline in interest rates has resulted in significantly lower monthly mortgages payments. Today, British households spend less that 1 percent of disposable income servicing their mortgage obligations. Lower mortgage payments have freed up income that households can use on consuming other goods and services. Looking forward, we forecast that the recovery underway in the British economy will remain intact. After growing by 1.7 percent in 2013, we project that real GDP will grow nearly 3 percent in both 2014 and 2015.2 As noted above, growth in employment remains solid, which should help to support growth in consumer spending. A widely-followed measure of consumer confidence has rebounded to levels that were last seen in 2006-07, which should lead to further declines in the
The plunge in asset prices during the global financial crisis caused household net worth to tumble 12 percent in 2008. Due to the rise in asset prices over the past few years, net worth at the end of 2012 (latest available data) stood at 7.6 trillion, which was 11 percent higher than the previous high in 2007. Net worth undoubtedly increased further last year due to the continued rise in asset prices. 2 For details see our Monthly Economic Outlook which is posted at www.wellsfargo.com/economics.
1
household savings rate. Businesses expect that output will strengthen in coming months, which should support growth in business fixed investment spending ( Figure 6). Continued economic growth in the Eurozone, to which the United Kingdom sends about one-half of its exports, should lead to acceleration in British exports of goods and services. Figure 5
U.K. Household Financial Indicators
180%
170% 160% 150% 140% 130% 120% 110% 100% 90% 80% 1999
Financial Liabilities: Q4 @ 140.3% (Left Axis) Interest Expense: Q4 @ 0.69% (Right Axis)
Figure 6
U.K. Business Indicators
10%
9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% Percent of Disposable Income
40%
30% 20% 10% 0% -10% -20%
Year-over-Year Percent Change; Volume Business Fixed Investment (YoY% Change): Q4 @ 8.7% (Left Axis) Expected Output in Next 3 Months: Q1 @ 23.3 (Right Axis)
40
30 20 10 0 -10 -20
-30%
-40% -50% 1996
-30
-40 -50 2014
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
We forecast that the MPC will raise its main policy rate to 1.50 percent by the end of 2015. See our Monthly Economic Outlook for details.
3
Figure 7
U.K. Consumer Price Index
6%
Year-over-Year Percent Change
8.5%
8.0%
8.5%
8.0% 7.5% 7.0% 6.5% 6.0%
7.5%
4% 4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
5.5%
1% 1%
5.5%
5.0% 4.5% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
5.0%
0% 1997 0% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
4.5% 1997
Source: IHS Global Insight, Bloomberg LP and Wells Fargo Securities, LLC
Conclusion
Economic activity in the United Kingdom accelerated last year, and recently released data show that real GDP growth remained strong in the first quarter of 2014. The overall rate of real GDP growth has been driven in recent quarters by real personal consumption expenditures, and monthly data suggest that growth in consumer spending remained solid in the first three months of the year. We look for the expansion to remain intact for the foreseeable future, and the drivers of economic growth should broaden as investment spending and exports accelerate. If, as we forecast, real GDP grows roughly 3 percent per annum in both 2014 and 2015, it would mark the strongest two-year period of British economic growth since the onset of the global financial crisis. Although real GDP growth in the United Kingdom has been and should continue to be solid, the MPC likely will keep its main policy rate at only 0.50 percent, where it has been maintained for more than five years, throughout 2014. Indeed, we forecast that the MPC will refrain from hiking rates until mid-2015. The MPC judges that there still is spare capacity in the economy, and it desires that some of this excess capacity is absorbed before it starts to tighten policy. With CPI inflation currently below the MPCs target of 2 percent, policymakers can afford to wait before hiking rates. What would induce the MPC to tighten policy earlier than most investors expect? 4 In our view, one of the main indicators to watch is the monthly series on average weekly earnings. Growth in earnings has generally been running below two percent for more than two years. Not only would wage acceleration indicate that spare capacity is being absorbed, but it could also put upward pressure on CPI inflation. Stay tuned.
According to the Bloomberg consensus forecast, most analysts do not expect a rate hike until Q1-2015.
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