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Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics Author(s): E. D. Hirsch, Jr. Source: New Literary History, Vol. 3, No.

2, On Interpretation: I (Winter, 1972), pp. 245-261 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/468314 . Accessed: 02/05/2014 08:11
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of Hermeneutics Three Dimensions E. D. Hirsch, Jr. I

IMPORTANT are thetheoretical thatnow disagreements divideserious students of interpretation? How trueis the resigned opinionthat our variousschoolsand approaches arelikea multitude ofwarring eachwith itsownuncompromising sects, never Is it the destiny of thosewho practice theology? interpretation to achievean eucumenical If that of theoretical principles? harmony is our destiny, so muchthe worsefortheory, whichis thenonlythe senseof a of a sect,and so muchthebetter forthecommon ideology who on his disdains to with work. practitioner theory get Formodes offaith zealots letgraceless fight; His can'tbe wrong, whose life is intheright. A theorist wouldbe right to reply of theory in thattherepudiation of common senseimpliesa theoretical favor and that the position, of common sensewouldseemto require a wide measure commonalty or "good" of theoretical about the natureof a "sensible" agreement In my opinion, such implicit is not only agreement interpretation. of disagreement, but already extant.The appearance widely possible which itself can be tracedback to a producesso many quarrels, ofinterpretive bothwhatinterpreters to lumptogether tendency theory ofthecase they can never agreeon. agreeon and whatin thenature ofhermeneutics in mytitle between various dimensions The distinction theseparable it may purpose; by separating suggests myeucumenical to disclose consharedby apparently areas of agreement be possible theories. flicting theories thatinterpretive shouldnotlump As a first step,I propose of normative and the the aspects interpretation; together descriptive

How

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that theoristsshould disengage the descriptivedimension of herwhichconcerns thenatureofinterpretation, from thenormameneutics, tivedimension, whichconcerns itsgoals. For the goals of interpretation are determined do not and interpreters ultimately by value-preferences, exhibitmore agreement in theirvalues than the generality of people. I know it is usual to argue, as Coleridgedid, that certainvalues and therefore certain interpretive rooted in the norms are permanently natureof literature, that the normative is derivedfromthe descriptive. I know why Coleridge and othershave held this view in the history and universal sanction ofliterary theyhave desireda permanent theory; and what more permanent for certainevaluativenormsof literature, sanction could exist than "the nature of literature"? By the same normativeprinciples reasoning,it is convenientto derive permanent, from"the nature of interpretation." of interpretation I findthe structure of such reasoningentirely circular: good literato the truenatureof literature; tureis thatwhichconforms good interto which the true of is that conforms nature pretation interpretation. of "good But what is this"truenature" excepta tautologicalrephrasing Are therenot numerousexamples literature" or "good interpretation"? which do not conformto this or bad interpretation of bad literature if they true nature? Yet if thesebad examplesare pieces of literature, are instancesof interpretation, they must exhibitthe true nature of the The Coleridgeanargument or of interpretation. literature imports of hand. fromthe beginning, into the descriptive normative sleight by is to construefrom a Stated bluntly,the nature of interpretation (for short, "text") somethingmore than its physical sign-system That we construe is, the natureof a textis to mean whatever presence. it to mean. I am aware that theoryshould tryto provide normative fromillegitimate criteriafordiscriminating good frombad, legitimate of a text,but mere theorycannot change the nature of constructions because the nature Indeed, we need a norm precisely interpretation. wills of a textis to have no meaning except that which an interpreter into existence. We, not our texts,are the makersof the meaningswe understand,a text being only an occasion for meaning, in itselfan where meaning abides. ambiguous form devoid of the consciousness One meaningof a textcan have no higherclaim than anotheron the for all grounds that it derives from the "nature of interpretation," all are are meanings ontologically equally real. interpreted equal; they and illegitimate When we discriminate betweenlegitimate meaningsin the "Lycidas," for example,we cannot claim merelyto be describing natureof Milton'stext,forthetextcompliantly changesitsnaturefrom

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one interpreter to another.This ontological of all interpreted equality shows forth inthefact that hermeneutic hassanctioned meanings theory norm of legitimacy in interpretation. just about everyconceivable Fromthishistorical factI infer thatinterpretive are notreally norms from and thattheory codifies ex postfactotheinterprederived theory, norms we already tive prefer. To take a central the history of interpretation: by examplefrom the eighteenth an impressive had been won overcercentury victory tain medieval modesof interpretation, so thatby thenanachronistic seemedto be permanently allegorizing repudiated.Under the postmedieval texts their view,sinceHomerand VergilwerenotChristian could not legitimately be regarded Schleieras Christian allegories. in thelate eighteenth was merely thework macher, century, codifying of his humanistic when he the as a stated following predecessors canonof interpretation: in a universal text which "Everything given must be explained and determined requiresfullerinterpretation fromthe linguistic domain commonto the authorand exclusively Christian his original Under this of principle, allegorizing public."1 ofall legitimacy, theancients is deprived and thewayis thereby opened to an interpretation thatis truly historical and scientific. to Schleiermacher. But thehumanistic Or, so it seemed repudiation of anachronisms cannot be upheld on purelycognitive or logical no text can Under Schleiermacher's mean canon, grounds. legitimately at a latertime whatit couldnothavemeant but originally, logicalone inference. The medieval this were well hardly supports interpreters aware thatHomerand Vergilhad been paganswho could not conor communicated Christian have intended meanings.The sciously to of held another the Middle which Agesimplicitly exegetes principle in a giventextwhichrequires can be statedas follows: "Everything neednotbe explained and determined fuller exclusively interpretation domaincommon to the authorand his original fromthe linguistic themorecompelling, is logically this public." Whichprinciple implicit The answeris easy. The medieval one, or that of Schleiermacher? is logically becauseself-evidently medieval a text can stronger principle meananything it has beenunderstood to mean. If an ancient text has been interpreted that is as a Christian unanswerable allegory, proof thatit can be so interpreted. of anachronistic Thus, the illegitimacy from canon,is deducedneither allegory, implied by Schleiermacher's
x F. D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik, ed. Heinz Kimmerle (Heidelberg, I959), P. 90. The original reads: "Alles was noch einer niheren Bestimmung bedarf in einer gegebene Rede, darf nur aus dem dem Verfasser und seinem Publikum gemeinsamen Sprachgebiet bestimmtwerden." urspriinglichen

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empirical fact nor logic. His norm of legitimacyis not, of course, and deduced at all; it is chosen. It is based upon a value-preference, over not on theoretical His for necessity. preference originalmeaning an ethical choice. I would conanachronistic meaning is ultimately from this fidently generalize example to assert that the normative dimension of interpretation is always in the last analysis an ethical dimension. At this point I shall not digressto take sides in the ethical dispute betweenthe anachronists and the historicists, for I wish to deal with that issue at the end of this essay. But I do pause to observethat the of the medieval allegorizers is not necessarily less exegeticalmorality admirablethan theirlogic. Indeed, it seemsto me that both Schleiermacher and those medieval interpreters repudiatedby his canon are following according to their different lights the very same ethical meaning and originalmeaning have this principle. For anachronistic in common: theyare both attemptsto achieve legitimacy under the criterionof the "best meaning." In the historyof interpretation it would seem to be a constantprinciple that the "best meaning" is to be considered the mostlegitimate arise meaningof a text. The differences of thethirteenth could in defining "best." An interpreter argue century that Christianallegoryis a bettermeaning than the original,pagan one, while a humanist of the Renaissance could respond that the is superiorto any that could be imposed originalmeaningin antiquity of culture the Middle Ages. In the late eighteenth the graceless by and early nineteenthcenturyRomantics like Schleiermachercould extend the humanisttraditionwith the argumentthat the original meaningis always the best meaningno matterwhat the provenenceof value in its own right;each the text,because everyculturehas infinite as Herder rhapsodized; or cultureis a note in the divine symphony, as Ranke preached, everyage is immediateto God. Althoughwe no with such quasi-religious conceptions, longer shore up our historicism the romantic ideal of cultural pluralism has continued to be the dominantethicalnormforinterpretation duringmostofthe nineteenth and morehumanizcenturies: it is more comprehensive and twentieth to than of be in our the cultures embrace to imprisoned plurality ing to respectoriginalmeaningas the bestmeanown. We oughttherefore has Only recently ing, the most legitimatenorm for interpretation. to announcethatwe are imprisoned turnedback upon itself historicism to a quasiand we musttherefore return in our own culturewilly-nilly, the that best medieval conceptionof interpretation, namely meaning whether we like (for that matterany meaning) mustbe anachronistic it or not. Under this recentconception,the "best meaning" reveals

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itself ethical choiceas to whatis best"forus today" as a self-conscious, to somestandard in ourpresent historical thatis compelling according circumstances. If the normative of hermeneutics dimension belongs,as I have to to the domainof ethicalchoice,is it nevertheless argued, possible ofthesort discover universal Schleiermacher envisioned, truly principles of individual thatdo not dependon the value-preferences principles Is in dimension there an hermeneutics which, analytical interpreters? in contrast is logically to thenormative, deductive, empirically descripand neutral choices?The spirit withrespect to valuesand ethical tive, of the present us skeptically to assumethatsuch a preage inclines would tenseof objective be a maskfora particular merely neutrality set of values. Yet if we could manageto findan area of agreement thenthereality of a truly shared different sects, bywidely interpretive seem more dimension of would come to hermeneutics descriptive of could if the theoretical be And area agreement gradually plausible. in the discipline there a senseof community emerge enlarged, might to a common ofinterpretation, a senseofbelonging enterprise. II and one theoretical One exampleof a purely conception, descriptive meanthatseemsto me potentially fruitful between is the distinction motivaI distinction and When this first my ing significance. proposed withoriginal tionwas farfromneutral;I equated meaning simply of and permanence to pointup the integrity and I wished meaning, I now as This earlier discussion regard beingonly meaning.2 original For ofa conception thatis in principle universal. a specialapplication and the clarifications thedistinction between meaning significance (and is equated to instances wheremeaning it provides)are not limited it for holds well as withthe author's meaning; any and all original of "anachronistic instances meaning."3 is dein thedistinction is readily seenif meaning This universality No normaas thatwhicha textis takento represent. fined toutcourt
2 The structureof this distinction I owe to the writingsof Husserl and Frege, whose influence I acknowledge in the earlier piece alluded to, "Objective Interpretation,"PMLA, 75 (Sept. 196o). 3 This is a shorthand, not a pejorative term which comprises all non-authorial meaning, whether or not such meaning was possible within "the linguisticdomain common to the author and his original public." I use the term in preferenceto "non-authorial meaning" because the chief disputes have centered, as Schleiermacher's canon suggests,on the question of historicity.Either term would serve.

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tive limitations are importedinto the definition, since under it, meandoes Moreover,the definition ing is simply meaning-for-an-interpreter. not (and did not in my earlier discussion) limit itselfmerelyto a paraphrasableor translatable "message," but embraceseveryaspect of and phonemic,which an representation, includingthe typographical construes.My earlierdefinition of meaningwas too narrow interpreter and normative onlyin that it restricted meaningto those constructions wherethe interpreter is governed his by conceptionof the author'swill. The enlarged definition now comprisesconstructions where authorial will is partlyor totallydisregarded. The importantfeatureof meaning as distinctfromsignificance is that meaning is the determinate of a text for an inrepresentation textis always taken to represent terpreter.An interpreted something, but thatsomething can alwaysbe relatedto something else. Significance is meaning-as-related-to-something-else. If an interpreter did not conceive a text'smeaningto be thereas an occasion forcontemplation or application,he would have nothingto thinkor talk about. Its therefromone momentto the next allows it to be conness,its self-identity in an intertemplated. Thus, while meaningis a principleof stability embraces a principleof change. Meaning-forpretation, significance can stay the same although the meaningfulness an-interpreter (sigin nificance) of that meaning can change with the changingcontexts which that meaning is applied. An interpreter could, for instance, find the followingto be variouslymeaningful: "The cat is on the mat," depending on whetherthe cat has left the mat, on whether he likescats,and so on. The pointis not thatan interpreter mustapply but thathe could do so and stillbe able meaningto changingcontexts, in everycase to construe his textas representing an identicalmeaning. Alternative kinds of semanticclassification can, of course be made, as the workof Ingarden demonstrates, but I conceivethisdual classification to be deeply fundamentaland non-arbitrary because of the of speech. An interpreter is always playingtwo roles double-sidedness simultaneously-as speaker (or re-speaker)of meaningand as listener to meaning. Both moments are necessary, forifthe textis not "spoken" it cannot be and if it is not heard,it cannothave "heard," (construed) for the been, spoken. Meaning is what an interpreter interpreter, is that actual speakingas heard in actualizesfroma text; significance a chosen and variable contextof the interpreter's world. experiential The main objectionto thisdistinction betweena principle of stability of changehas been thatit failsto describewhat actually and a principle takes place in the processof interpretation. It is said that the distinction proposeswhat is in fact a psychological If thiswere impossibility.

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so the objection would be fatal, since empiricaltruthis the ultimate of theories in thepracticaldisciplines.But I doubtthe empirical arbiter mind is of the validity objection,which impliesthat the interpreter's not divisible,cannot be in two places at once. As I have just sugbetween meaning and gested, the very foundationof the distinction significanceis that doubling of the mind which is omnipresentin de la personalitd."4 speech, and is called by linguists"de'doublement Such doublingis not a matterof doubt among studentsof literature, who knowmyriadexamplesof self-multiplication withinthe boundaries of individualworks. When a writerputs on a mask for ironic effect, mind must be in as in Swift's"A Modest Proposal," the interpreter's both the perspective of the modest two places at once as he entertains we of Swift.In everyironic construction proposerand the perspective at once, and thereis not, I think,any rigid entertain two perspectives we can entertainat once. limitationon the number of perspectives when an interpreter Similarly, emphaticallyrejectsthe attitudesof a in orderto rejectthem. he also adopts thoseattitudes speakeror writer, because I believe this I have dwelt on meaning and significance of the disagreements can resolve some distinction analytical help purely certain in hermeneutics, involvingthe condisagreements particularly third dimension of to a of This belongs historicity. concept cept to Heidegger'smetaphysics hermeneutics-themetaphysical.Adherents take the view that all attempts accuratelyto reconstruct past meanings are doomed to failuresince not just our textsbut also our understanddeings are historical.It is the natureof man to have no permanently constituted existence.Whatfromhis historically finednature distinct world accommodatedto our own historical ever we know is decisively context.An and cannot be known to us apart fromthat determining learn to live with his historicalself just as must therefore interpreter to Freud would have him live with his subliminalself,not by trying the of best it. is but which making impossible, by consciously negateit, not by reconstructing an make the best of our historicity Interpreters them withinour own alien world fromour textsbut by interpreting world and makingthemspeak to us.

III
This metaphysical position,skepticaland dogmatic at once, needs to No doubt it of hermeneutics. be isolatedfromthe analyticaldimension
4 See Ch. Bally, Linguistique ge'ne'raleet linguistique franfaise, 2nd. ed. (Bern, 1944), P. 37-

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can be argued that analysisalways carriesmetaphysical implications, and no doubt a shrewdontologist could deduce metaphysical principles fromthe analyticaldistinction betweenmeaningand significance.Yet I would wish to replythat the exercisewould be pointless, since the distinction concordswitha numberof different metaphysical positions. Moreover, I would argue that there is far less danger in ignoring than in introducing it prematurely into the practicalquesmetaphysics tionsof interpretation. A precociousascentinto the realm of ontology is just what needs to be avoided in the descriptive, analyticalside of hermeneutic theory. It is a notableironythatHeidegger'smetaphysics itself dependsupon a purelyanalyticalprincipletaken directly fromhermeneutic theory-circle. This principle holds that the processof namelythe hermeneutic is necessarily circular,since we cannot know a whole understanding withoutknowingsome of its constituent parts,yetwe cannot know the as such without the which determines theirfuncwhole parts knowing tions. (This principlecan be easily grasped by self-consciously cona In Sein und the circumZeit, Heideggerexpands struing sentence.) ferenceof the hermeneutic circlebeyond textualinterpretation to emin knowledgethe whole is priorto its brace all knowing. Everywhere of a part is disclosedonlyin its relation parts,since the meaningfulness to or functionwithin a larger whole. The prior sense of the whole which ultimatelylends meaning to any person's experience is his spiritualcosmos or Welt. But, since a person's Welt is always conit followsthat any meaning we experiencemust historical, stitutively have been pre-accommodatedto our historicalworld. We cannot of our experience worldis a pre-given escape the factthatour historical and is therefore constitutive of any textualinterpretation. This generalized version of the hermeneuticcircle seems at first of past glance to support the position that accurate reconstruction to projectourselves into the historical meaningis impossible.It is futile world is alreadyprepast whereour textsarose,since our own present can never be given in our attemptedprojection. Our reconstruction because we can neverexclude our own world through authentic which alone the past was disclosed. Our own present is the pre-given and the If Heidegger's foregoneconclusion in any historicalreconstruction. circleis correct, ofthehermeneutic it follows version thatthetraditional aims of historical scholarshipare largelyillusory. The directapplication of thismetaphysical argumentto textual into on me seems at least two grounds. First,the premature terpretation about subtle principlesays nothing metaphysical questionsof degree. It arguesthatsome degreeof anachronism is necessarily in any present

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historical reconstruction but as to whether a particular reconstruction, is severely or trivially the says nothing.The compromised principle between views of exhibits remarkable history interpretation congruities and shows and twentieth of,say,Hamletin thenineteenth centuries, remarkable of either of interpretation withinthe confines conflicts decisive the be the historical world cannot period.Obviously, pre-given factor thataccounts in suchcasesforthesimilarities different between or the unreconcilable the within of interpretation differences periods sameperiod.A premature to explain to metaphysics in order recourse these can easily anomalies become for serious a facile substitute thought, and historical can cease to be evena plausible reconstruction goal of That of is the not,however, logicalconsequence Heidegger's inquiry. Underhis principles are time-bound all interpretations metaphysics. and anachronistic, boththosewhichattempt accuratereconstruction and thosewhichdo not. Yet deliberate are different reconstructions fromdeliberate or not we followHeidegger, anachronisms whether and particular reconstruction accurateeven underhis maybe fairly It the a reconstruction that decision to follows principles. attempt of a vital,present-day instead is after all, governed not, interpretation Even if Heidegger thetwokindsof attempt is right, by metaphysics. arebothpossible, and thedecision to makeone kindof attempt rather thantheother remains not a an ethical choice, necessity. metaphysical to carrying The secondand moreimportant objection Heidegger's into the theory of interpretation is that his directly metaphysics circle is in crucial ofthehermeneutic version respects probaexpanded of thehermeneutic circledoes notlead inblywrong.The principle If an interpretation is to dogmatichistorical skepticism. evitably entire in theinterpreter's it willno doubtbe different Welt, grounded entire a person's sinceundoubtedly from any past meaning, spiritual in thepast. Yet it is open from willbe different world anythatexisted thewholethatprestructures must be conwhether to question meaning of "hisceived in this comprehensive way. The veryintroduction of Weltmeansthata boundary characteristic has as a chief toricity" is notthe chief of a person's sincehistoricity been drawn, component a limiteddomain of sharedcultural world. It is, rather, spiritual from the domainof unshared that experience bigger experience apart of Weltis at world. The Heideggerian makesup a person's concept from whatused to be calledZeitgeist, times and is undistinguishable earlier To limit the the as as circumference concept. just problematical of Welt (afterhavinginsisted upon its expansion) at the vague
boundarybetweenshared and privateexperienceis entirely arbitrary. convenient.For if Weltis taken a boundaryis certainly Nevertheless,

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in its entirety, then each person'sWelt is unique, and accurate understandingof another'smeaningbecomes impossible. But if I agree to draw a boundary,how do I decide where it should be drawn? I see in the decision,and it is based on only one way to avoid arbitrariness the observation that the Welt which actively an interpreprestructures tationis always a highlyselective of an interpreter's sub-cosmos world. For instance,any person who is now understanding my presentdiscoursemustbe excludingfarmoreof his spiritual worldthan everhe is bringingto the exercise. Such excludingis indeed logicallynecessary to any act of interpretation. On logical grounds,De Morgan has brilshown that we cannot discoursewithoutlimitingthe liantly interpret Welt or "universe" that formsits context,and he coined the phrase "universe of discourse" to describe this necessarylimitation.5Since the spiritualuniversethat activelygovernsan interpretation is limited and selective, no inherent this delimited to be world necessity requires different fromany that existedin the past. This last objection to Heidegger's dogmatichistorical is, skepticism I believe, fatal, but the death strugglewill have to take place elseand not by amateurslike where, conductedby professional wrestlers, me. The implications of these objectionsfor the theoryand practice are the matters I wish to stress, and theseimplications of interpretation are to my mind bluntlynegativeon the questionwhethermetaphysics offers of practicalutility to hermeneutic anything theory. First,metathe power to physicalspeculationhas not yetbroughtto interpretation It a matters of fact. not does demonstrate deduce, priori,significant is impossible; it does not, to my that fairlyaccurate reconstruction doesn't mind, even prove that absolutely accurate reconstruction has no power to legislatewhat is or is actuallyoccur, formetaphysics not the case in the realmof the possible. It cannot,therefore, help us in instances. nature universal, Second, specific metaphysics, being by to all both those that attempt applies indiscriminately interpretations, historicalreconstruction and those that disdain it. Thus, it provides Powerno basis for choice as betweenvarious aims of interpretation. is equally less in deciding mattersof fact, Heideggerian metaphysics powerlessto dictate what ought to be chosen in the realm of values. We can depend neitheron metaphysics nor on neutral analysis in orderto make decisionsabout the goals of interpretation. We have to enter the realm of ethics. For, after rejectingill-foundedattempts
5 Augustus De Morgan, "On the Structure of the Syllogism and on the Application of the Theory of Probabilities to Questions of Argumentand Authority," Cambridge Philosophical Transactions (9 Nov. 1846).

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to derivevalues and goals fromthe presumednatureof interpretation, or fromthe nature of Being,what reallyremainsis ethicalpersuasion.

IV
In resisting some claims of current "metaphysicalhermeneutics"I mustadmitto at least one metaphysical assertion: an interpreter is not so trappedin historicity that he loses his freedom;he is free necessarily to choose his aims, and withinthe contextof thoseaims and the broad conventions of language, he is freeto choose his meanings. I therefore over historicity as a conflictnot understandthe currentcontroversy of abstracttheories, but ofvalues. When we are urgedto adopt present relevanceratherthan originalmeaningas the "best meaning,"we find the old pattern of controversy ourselves betweenthe medieval repeating allegorists(the Heideggerians of an earlier day) and the later humanists. While this conflictcannot be resolvedby mere analysis,its issues can be clarified, and clarification may bring unforeseen agreement. forinstance,the conflict betweenproponents of original Sometimes, and of anachronistic is shown to no be conflict at meaning by analysis all. These arguments about meaning sometimes in a failure originate to notice that meaning and significance-two different things-are being given the same name. To take a homelyand simple example, some time ago, while drivingon the New Jersey Turnpike, my wife and I weretrying to interpret a signthatkeptappearingon the median stripof the highway. It looked like this:

1000

in vain,we beganto notice these a feaAfter pondering hieroglyphics tureof theTurnpike thatwas consistently associated withthesign; a fewseconds after thesign, we wouldpass a gap in themedian seeing

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to let a car cross overto theother wideenough sideoftheroad. strip At thisgap we found another sign:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

that a gap was solved. The mysterious The problem sign foretold would appear in the medianstripafterIooo feet. But I was not of the sign'smeaning, withmywife'sdescription satisfied altogether ontotheother sideofthe carswillbe ableto turn that"official namely feet." roadafter Iooo was justified. No one woulddenythatmywife's My interpretation described thesign's theinterpretation doubt waswhether meaning. only of the sign to drivers of described a significance Whileit certainly what about its sigcars and otherlaw-abiding official personalities, to elude official to a bank-robber who is trying cars? nificance an opportunity to reverse he regardthe sign as signalling Wouldn't or a theorist? hisdirection? Whatabouta stranded Would pedestrian the first as about cars? official meaning something sign interpret they

1000 decided if the authorities Whatwouldhappento the sign'smeaning theuse ofthegaps thatrestricted to takedownall thesecondary signs themysterious to official cars? In these instances, signwould imaginary thata gap will self-identical stillpreserve a stable, namely meaning, in a number ofways. It suggests, first I find instructive thisexample or delimit the conexceed of all, that meaningcannot arbitrarily of thesymbols used. After semantic ventional all, nothing possibilities
occur in the median stripafter feet. 00ooo

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themeaning in the original to official the cars,although signrestricts would: sign,forexample, undoubtedly following FOR

USE ONLY< 1 000 evenifwe wishto determine totheauthor's Second, according meaning underthe above constraint, stilloperates intention, original meaning becausealthough theoriginal thesign'sappliintention was to restrict in thesymbol in a comthatrestriction exhibits cation, nothing system municable from the examplethatprivate way. Third,we can infer or coterie lose their restrictiveness as soon as the code symbol-systems becomes knownoutside of the coterie-in thiscase the closedsociety officials on official the secret business. Once have symbols highway been interpreted forme, the signmeansthesame thing forme (not else or who has to to-me) as it does to a highway patrolman anyone thecode. (The WasteLand was oncea coterie learned poem; nowit is understood school the distinction between Fourth, students.) byhigh thecommunicable of or other the symbolmeaning highway sign, any and its variouskindsof significance to system, applies universally authors and interpreters alike. Thus,whilethe original intention was no doubtto restrict the sign'sapplication or audience, thatdoes not itsoriginal alter communicable itsoriginal but defines meaning, simply which is another matter. significance, quite For sometimenow literary the New Critics, theorists, particularly haveattempted to preserve thisdistinction undera different and guise, have deploredthe use of biographical or historical information for textualmeaningto its originalhistorical or biographical restricting circumstances. EvenifShakespeare had written II to support Richard therebellion ofEssex (whichof course he didn't) thatwouldn't limit oftheplayto itsoriginal themeaning Whenthefollower's application. ofEssexbrought outtheplay'ssignificance to their aims,howpolitical was done to its original ever,no greatviolence meaning.Nor would distortion resultfromdocuments that showedautoany important in Shakespeare's of Richard. Modern biographical impulses portrayal of Shakespeare's could be equallyinnoapplications original meaning centof distortive influence. For a self-identical or meaning(original orcomplex)hasthegreat offlexibility; anachronistic, simple advantage

OFFICIAL

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of itsself-identity, it can enternew worldsand being verysure of itself, play new roleswithconfidence. If one resists one gets the immeaning and significance confusing that most in do not controversies pression interpretation reallyinvolve a conflict overoriginalmeaningversusanachronistic meaning. Usually the debatescan be readilytransposed overthe proper into disagreement of an over it whether is better to explain emphases interpretation, out of or to some of the original meaning bring significance aspect for the for readers. The followers or interpreter meaning, present-day of Essex took the second course,withoutnecessarily Shakedistorting on the Our bankrobber New speare's meaning. Jersey imaginary the meaning of the highwaysign Turnpike would not be distorting if he decided to disregardits "officialuse" and found a special sigforhimself.In exampleslike these,originalmeaningis tacitly nificance is ignored. Whenever inassumed even while original significance conflicts with are concerned only emphasisin the conduct terpretive of a commentary, thentheyare conflicts about immediateaims and not retaina respectfororiginalmeanabout meanings. Most interpreters of some of our disagreements. and this mightmollify ing, recognition No doubt, what I am saying could never bring togethercertain extreme controversialists like Roland Barthes and Raymond Picard who have recentlyacted out the old dilemmas of original versus anachronistic meaning in theirpolemics over Racine. What can one in if Barthes claims to be uninterested say by way of reconciliation Racine's originalmeaning, and Picard argues that Racine could not fromthe texts? It is difficult for have meant what Barthesconstrues a non-specialist to judge the truefactsof thisnotedcase, but I have the provides an unusually pure modern impressionthat the controversy meanexample of the rival claims betweenoriginaland anachronistic between ancientslike Picard and moderns ing. Most recentconflicts like Barthes are not so clearly drawn, since most of us would be mistakesin conchagrined to learn that we had made elementary struingthe language of an early period, and our veryembarrassment the co-equal and harmonious would indicatethatwe recognized claims even if Barthesdoes not. of originalmeaningand modernsignificance, would reject the opposite excess At the same time, most interpreters of betweenoriginal if Picard does not) ignoringthe difference (even an the occupational that is and originalsignificance, oversight meaning vice of antiquarians. With excesseson both sides, Barthesand Picard can serve as a cautionaryexample, to help avoid a head-on collision betweenoriginalmeaningand anachronistic meaning. That much the can serveto do. analyticaldimensionof hermeneutics

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But the ethical problemis not to be solved quite that simply. Even if some interpretive turn out to reside in choice of disagreements emphasis rather than choice of meaning, still a choice of emphasis is ultimately an ethical choice. Many of us have feltat one time or other a distinctpreference for anachronisticover original meaning, of herdimensions althoughnothingin the analyticalor metaphysical meneuticscompels us to choose one over the other. Even textual editors,who owe professional allegiance to the author'soriginalmeaning, have been known to waver. Should "Music when soft voices die" line of Shelley'spoem? Should brightness really reallystand as the first fall fromthe "hair" instead of fromthe "air"? The text sometimes or seems so much betterif we ignorethe author's probable intention has a touch of the medieval what he probablywrote. Everyinterpreter commentator lookingforthe best meaning,and everyeditorhas a drop of Bentley'sblood. It is not rare that anachronistic meaning on some or other the is best ground undoubtedly meaning. let me statewhat I considerto be a fundamental ethical Therefore, maxim forinterpretation, a maxim that claims no privileged sanction frommetaphysics or analysis, but onlyfromgeneralethicaltenets, genshared. is Unless there a powerfuloverriding value in disregarderally as ing an author's intention (i.e. originalmeaning), we who interpret a vocationshould not disregardit. Mere individualpreference would not be such an overriding of value, nor would be the mere preferences The is mentioned because many persons. possible exception only every ethical maxim requires such an escape clause. (Example: unless there is a powerfuloverriding value in lying,a person should tell the truth. Yet thereare timeswhen a lie is ethically betterthan to tellthe truth, so the maxim cannotbe an absoluteone.) Similarly, one mightfudgeon originalmeaningforthe sake of young,impressionable children,and so on. But except in these veryspecial cases there is a strongethical presumption against anachronistic meaning. When we simplyuse an author'swords forour own purposeswithoutrespecting we transgress what Charles Stevensonin another conhis intention, textcalled "the ethicsof language," just as we transgress ethicalnorms when we use anotherpersonmerely forour own ends. Kant held it to be a foundationof moral action that men should be conceivedas ends and not as instruments of othermen. This imperative in themselves, is to the words of men because speech is an extensionand transferable of men in the social domain, and also because when we fail expression to his words we lose the soul of speech, to conjoin a man's intentions what is intendedto be which is to conveymeaning and to understand conveyed.

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I am not impressedwith the view that this ethical imperativeof is not applicable discourse, speech,to which we all submitin ordinary to written theorist to literary texts. No literary speech or, in particular, from Coleridge to the presenthas succeeded in formulating a viable distinctionbetween the nature of ordinarywrittenspeech and the nature of literary writtenspeech. For reasons I shall not pause to can neverbe successfully detail in this place, I believe the distinction the distinction will come to and the futility of attempting formulated, is no viable seen that there be generally if it is Moreover, recognized. of written distinctionbetween "literature" and other classifications that the ethics of will also be come to it language speech, recognized in poetryas well as hold good in all uses of language,oral and written, in philosophy. All are ethicallygoverned by the intentionsof the author. To treatan author'swords merelyas gristforone's own mill is ethicallyanalogous to using anotherman merelyforone's own puris neverjustifiable of interpretation poses. I do notsay such ruthlessness in principle,but I cannot imagine an occasion where it would be The peculiarly in the professional practiceof interpretation. justifiable in mattersof interpretation modern anarchyof everyman forhimself of the Protestant spirit. Actually, may sound like the ultimatevictory thefundamental such anarchyis the directconsequenceoftransgressing ethical normsof speech and its interpretation. The question I always want to ask criticswho dismissauthorialininto the categoritentionas theirnormis one that could be transposed intothe golden rule. I want to ask themthis: or simply cal imperative do you want me to disregard "When you write a piece of criticism, and intention originalmeaning? Why do you say to me 'That is your at I meant not what all; that is not it at all'? Why do you ask me to when you do not honor of honorthe ethics language foryourwritings not It was that M. Barthes of others?" themforthe writings surprising were distorted M. Picard. Few intentions when his was displeased by when their criticsfail to show moral indignation meaning is distorted of theirinterpretations. But their in reviewsand otherinterpretations is often one-way, and in this they show an inconsistency sensitivity amountingto a double standard--one for their authors,anotherfor whose beliefin redistributthemselves.They are like the tenantfarmer extended to land, money, horses,chickens, property ing everybody's and cows, but, when asked about pigs, said: "Aw hell, you know I gotta couple of pigs." has always carried ethical duties. The vocation of interpretation Recently,we have been remindedby FrederickCrews and othersof that devolve on us because interpretation the responsibilities always

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removedfromsocial action. impliesideology,and is thus neverentirely who is not with me can add that a professional We is (He againstme.) an has to shared interpreter knowledgeas well as to other obligation social values, and that shared knowledge implies a shared norm of an interBut aside fromthese public responsibilities, interpretation. of moral other the falls under basic like any imperative preter, person, That is in intention. which to an is author's why, speech, respect ethical terms,originalmeaning is the "best meaning."
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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