IR203 Week 14 Readings

Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism and the Origins of
Multilateralism (Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein 2002)
- Often described in geographical terms, regions are political creations not
fixed by geography. Even regions that seem most natural and inalterable are
products of political construction and subject to reconstruction attempts.
- Aftermath of WWII: US attempted to create and organise both a NA and SEA
region the institutional forms of these regional groupings differed A LOT
- With NA partners the US preferred to operate on a multilateral basis with
SEA partners the US preferred bilateral operations perceptions of
collective identity played an underappreciated role in this decision
- Shaped by racial, historical, political and cultural factors: US saw Europeans
as relatively equal members of a shared community whereas their potential
Asian allies were seen as a part of an alien and inferior community
- At beginning of the cold war: difference in mutual identification nin combo
with material factors and considerations of efficiency was of critical
importance in defining the interests and shaping the choices of US decisions
in Europe and Asia
- Different forms of cooperation make less or greater demands on shared
identities
- Multilateralism: more demanding form of international cooperation
requires strong sense of collective identity in addition to shared interests
- Realists vs. liberals on the relative importance and efficacy of material
capabilities versus institutions in world politics: realists= international
anarchy and security dilemma make international institutions
epiphenomenal or at best marginal to world politics
- Liberals: institutions have noticeable affects that can ameliorate the security
dilemma
- After end of cold war and collapse of USSR neorealist theor expected NATO to
disintegrate. Neoliberalism argued NATO helped create conditions that were
conducive to peace in Europe after 45 and therefore it would endure
- Neoliberal institutionalism restricted to small pool of successful western
institutions: NATO, EU, WTO, GTT but why didnt the Warsaw pact persist as
uncertainty increased in Eastern Europes security environment in 1989-90
and why did NATO rather than the OSCE become Europes preferred security
regime in the 90s? an exclusive focus on unmeasured institutional
efficiencies that are created by a stipulated lowering of transaction costs and
a variety of institutional asset specificities risk slighting the causal
importance of material capabilities and collective identities
- Wallander: institutional assets affect the costs and effectiveness of
alternative strategies but they do not determine purpose
- Neoliberal institutionalism: institutions develop when states foresee self
interested benefits from cooperation under conditions that are propitious for
overcoming obstacles to cooperation.
- Security arrangements in Asia remain a puzzle- multilateral institutions
failed despite presence of self interested benefits from cooperation. Even
though as in Europe, multilateral security arrangements would have
provided information, reduced transaction costs, made commitments more
credible and established focal points for coordinating policies, after 45 the US
gov opted for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia with the
US at the centre
- Neoliberalism does not explain, neither does realism that focuses exclusively
on capabilities and interests. They insist that main US interests were served
well by forming a set of bilateral alliances in Asia (Kohno 1996) but remain
silent on the issue of why those interests favoured multilateral arrangements
in Europe and bilateral in asia.
- Eclectic explanations: highlight causal importance of social facts such as
power status and threat perceptions in addition to the material facts and
efficiency consideration stressed by rationalist approaches
- Eclectic explanations also undercut reifications such as the distinction
between domestic/international levels of analysis- cuts against the
paradigmatic organisation of IR
- Thinking in terms of schools of though as Fearon and Wendt argue: can
encourage scholars to be method driven rather than problem driven in
research which may result in important questions or answers ignored if they
are not amenable to the preferred paradigmatic fashion
- Constructivism adds considerations of the effects identities have on both
formal and informal institutions to liberalism and to neorealism it adds
considerations of the effects of ideational rather than material structures
specifically the effect of identity on actor interests
Constructing regions and regional institutions after 45
- US and Europe as regional? North atlantic region?
- Regions are social and cognitive constructs that can strike actors as more or
less plausible (Paasi 86)
- In early CW US initiated a number of regional alliances to help organise some
recently defined regions: US consistently treated newly minted NA region
differently than the newly minted SEA region (multi vs bilateral)
- SEATO has more than 2 states but it is not multilateral in same sense as
NATO
- Language of the treaty commitment is much weaker instead of the NATO
commitment to collective defence outlined in article B in which states that
attack o none will be considered an attack on all, article IV of the SEATO
merely classifies such as attack as threat to peace and safety
- SEATO: us made clear it retained its prerogative to act bilaterally or
unilaterally formalised in the Rusk-Thanat joint statement of 62 US
stressedcommitment to Thailand does not depend upon prior agreement of
all the other parties to the treaty since the obligation is individual as well as
collective
- Organisationally: SEATO no unified command and no specifically allocated
unified forces. Any action taken udner SEATO auspices handled individually
by member states and not institution as a whole (modelski 62)
- US policymakers contemplated Asian NATO many of its prospective
members favoured NATO type but US remained adamantly opposed to using
NATO as the model
Universal and indeterminate explanations
- Many seek to explain rise of multilateral/bilateral institutions after WWII
with universal explanations but cannot account for regional differnces in US
policy other explanation for US pref for multi in Europe and Bi in Asia is
undetermined
- Opportunities and constraints to which these accounts point as the driving
force behind US choices could have been satisfied with either bi or multi so
these explanations are insufficient
Universal
- Ruggie draws attention to importance of multilateralism as a novel social
institution in 20C diplomacy. Focuses on Europe in this context, interprets
expansion of multi after WWII as the result of US vision as to what
constitutes a desirable world Order (Ruggie 94)
- US has pushed multi principles abroad for number of reasons: principes are a
mask for US hegemony duplicate US domestic order and are consistent with
US view of itself explains why US may find multi principles attractive cannot
explain why US pushed it more in europe than in asia (Ruggie just says it was
not possible in asia)
- Burley offers similar universal explanation following Maier (93, 78) that
multilateralism was an attempt to apply lessons from great depression on
international scale. Argues that US attempted to implement a global new deal
following the war. Cannot explain regional differences
- One explanation highlights unwillingness of US to delegate authority if US
was going to bear largest share of burden for military defense in Asia why
should it cede control or limit freedom of action in multilateral institution?
But why would it be willing to do so in Europe but not asia? A realist could
say that US accepted loss in Europe because European states offered a
compensating military advantage. Which is partially correct Europe offered
more advantages to US than Asian but during early CW was so far ahead of
both war destroyed European states and the newly emerging Asian states
that any difference between 2 regions was proably marginal compared ot he
gulf separating US from both
Undetermined
- Webers argues that US policymakers believed a multipolar world would be
more stable than the bipolar world of after WII (1991 and 1993)
- The only way a multipolar world would come would be for centers of power
to emerge that were independent of the US and USSR. The US promoted
multilateralism in Europe according to Weber to encourage emergence of
independent center of power that could usher in am ore peaceful period of
multipolarity
- Logic would lead him to expect that US pref for multipolarity should also
have led to promote development of independent centers of power in Asia as
well as in Europe00> US did try to restore Japans power. However, in
building up an independent centre of power in Asia the US choise to do so in
terms of bilateral. Thus by itself the US desire to see the emergence of
independent centres of power has no direct relationship to the choice
between bi or multi security arrangements
- Second explanation points to hostilities that existed between japan and
neighbours after 45- fearful of Japans re-emergence as imperialist power
many Asians were hesistant to join any pacific alliance with Japan as a
member (Dulles 1952). But fear of Japan does not offer explanation for US
decision to work bilaterally. Germanys pariah status did not prevent US from
supporting multilateral initiatives that soon included Germany
(Trachtenburg 99) there were many calls for US to rehabilitate Japan in eyes
of neighbours so it could become a member of a wider pacific pact. Such
policy would require a sharper break with past than Macarthur and US
occupation of Japan were prepared to make particularly w/ respect to
Political status of emperor Hirohito. US gov never made same efforts to
integrate Japan into Asia through multi as it did for Germany in Europe
- Third explanation centers on Eisenhower administrations new look policy.
Central to this was reducing defence budget by limiting reliance on costly
ground troops and focusing on a less expensive nuclear deterrent. Some
argue that limited nature of US commitment to SEATO flowed from the fiscal
conservatism and massive retaliation of Eisenhower admin reinforced bu
lessons of Korean War (Marks 1994). Sec of State Dulles emphasised the
mobile striking power of US force sthat need not and out not be easily pinned
down at many points around circumference of communist world (US Senate
54)
- While plausible explanation for why US wanted to limit any ground
commitment to SEATO it doenst explain lack of multilateralism in SEATO at
same time as SEATO US was also trying to limit ground commitments nad
increase nuclear deterrence reliance in Europe in NATO the uS attempted to
do this multilaterally through sharing of nuclear within alliance (Weber
91/trachtenburg 99) thus limited ground commitment and multilateral
alliance structure could been compatible in asia as in Europe but uS did not
try in asia.
- Conclusion: universal and undetermined both do not consider regional
variations or they identify constraints and opportunities for US FP that could
have been satisfied by either bi or multilateral arrangements

Eclectic explanations: power, threats and identity
- Realists focus on distribution of power among US and it putative allies and
enemies while liberal explanations focus on the relative efficiencies of
different institutional forms. Both offer some insight both rely on non-
rationalist arguments about identity to make their case plausible
- Johnston and Spiro argued in eclectic rendering of realist analysis, variables
like power status and threats are social facts whose signifiacne while
anchored in material reality cannot simply be read off material capabilities (J
95 S 99)
- Constructivist explanations focussed on identity alone are similarly
incomplete, divorced from material and efficiency factors stressed by realist
and liberals constructivist arguments about importance of identity risk being
too empirically thin and analytically too malleable
Great power status
- Relative weakness of regional members of SEATO is a strong realist
argument for why SEATO was not formed along NATO lines. Discrepancy
between power of US and power of its Asian allies may have made the
multilateral bargain an unattractive one for US
- Modelski- in NAto the benefits and obligations are shared fairly equaly. IN
SEATO the disparity between great and small powers is greater most of
SEATOs concrete operations represent one way traffic to help area states not
a two way cooperative enterprise. If restricted to material capabilities only
this explanation encounters some problems. A huge disparity between US
and regional allies existed also in war destroyed Europe. Moreover Jpan eas
not invited to join SEATO even though as a modern industrialised state it
could potentially have constributed many resources to the fledgling alliance.
Other regional states with strong militaries were also not asked (SK Taiwan)
- Great power status did matter, US officials believed that despite current
disparities in capabilities due to WWII, European allies would soon rebuilt
their strength while their Asian allies would remain permanently weak. US
policymakers may have acted condescendingly to their European allies in
comparison to their Asian allies it was condescension tempered by
expectation of Europes revival
- Much of US policy towards Europe was driven by perception of European
states as great powers. Ccording to Weber, Eisenhower one of strongest
proponents of multilateralism in NATO held strong views about traditional
place of Britain, france and even Germany as great powers in world politics
their position as secondary actors was simply unnatural most SEA was in
the late 40s only at threshold of shedding colonial status and gaining national
sovereignty for the first time. In Asia US had only one potentially great power
ally- Japan however an analysis on solely material BoP leaves important qs
unanswered in asia why did the US not ally with China against USSR? Chinese
revolution and Maos victory in 49 was of critical importance. A threat is
rooted not solely in differential material capabilities but also in view of
differences between self and other that shapes interpretations of actor
intentions and interests. So although conceivable in material bop, communist
china was not plausible alliance for US after 49 b/c of ideology.
Efficient response to threat
- Liberal explanation focuses on different threats faced in Asia and Europe and
the most institutionally efficient response to those threats
- Military and civilian leadership in US was in general agreement that SEA was
less important and less threatened that Europe (Reiter 96) the threat in Asia
was one of national insurgencies rather than cross border war
- In Europe the military structure of NATO was designed to hold off a massive
soviet offensive. US officials expcted no large scale offensive by USSR or
China in asia. The primary prob in Asia was fighting communist insurgencies
security arrangemnts designed to fend off a soviet offensive not appropriate
for dealing with national insurgencies- the varied nature of internal
subversive threats faced by the different states may have made a one size fits
all multilateral defence arrangement like nATO inappropriate.
- HOWEVER different perceptions of threat were tied to questions of identity.
Acheson (Jackson 01): the threat to which NATO responded was posed not
only to our country but also to the civilisation in which we live to
understand this threat one had to go back more than 2000 years to the
beginning of western civilisation. Undersec of state Lovett : the cement of
the treaty was not the soviet threat but the common western approach and
that western attachment to the worth of the individual (Reid 77)
- It is evident that different threat perceptions often frustrated US officials
throughout SEAT negotiations. US state department official complained that
Asian states were preoccupied with internal probs and distracted by
memories of colonialism.
- Sec Dulles: the countries which had won or were winning their
independence from western colonialism or Japan were often more concerned
with past dangers that the threat of new peril Dulles 54. Historical enmities,
colonial legacies and newly won state sovereignties affected how Asian elites
viewed the communist threat in asia.
- Direct line from certain type of threat (cross border soviet) to a particular
institutional form (multilateralism) cannot be drawn in Europe. The
European situation after WWII (like Asia) was complicated. Early days of
NATO US neither expected nor feared a massive soviet assult. US officials saw
the creation of NATO as a political move that bolstered the moral of
European governemtns and thus helped them deal with their internal
troubles and as a means of reassuring other European states against the
resurgence of a threat from Germany (Gheciu 2001)
- While multilateral nature of NATO grew over time with perceived probability
of a potential soviet attack in Europe the increased salience of cross-border
conflict in asia failed to have the same impact on US relation with its pacific
allies
- Korean war in particular intensified US threat perception of the USSR role in
Europe, NATO military buildup and german rearmament became a political
option only after onset of military hostilities on the korean peninsula. In asia
the k war fialed to spur any movement toward multilateralism. The 2 states
most at risk of cross border threat from china (SK and Taiwan) were kept
outside of SEATO
- Different responses raise a difficult problem for those who see a direct
relationship between a specific threat and institutional response. Why does a
conventional war (US view) in korea lead to a multilateral response in
Europe but not in asia, the actual location of the fighting? Similarly it saw
Vietnam war as a cross border attack but not spur multilateralism in Asia.
- Whether the nature of this cross border threat can explain US preference for
multilateralism in Europe. The implementation of marshall plan shows that
US preferred to operate multilaterally in Europe even when the Soviet threat
was seen as one of internal subversion rather than cross border. Therefore
makes no difference
- Stephen Walts theory of threat is major departure from neorealism and
pushes beyond rationalist analysis. Ideology is a variable that competes with
others for explanatory power. Ideology is a system of meaning that entails
the distinction between self and other in the definition of threat. The cost
calculations that states make when they weigh ideological solidarity against
security interests are thus not exogenous to their ideological affinities. Hence
the threat perception of enemies is an explanatory variable that does not
offer a compelling answer as much as it invites further investigation
(Katzenstein 96)
- Explanations stressing differences in the great power status of European and
Asian states or efficient institutional reposnes to the nature of communist
threat share an emphasis on importance of identity as a certain kind of
power and as a specific kind of enemy.
Regions, identification and institutional form
- Simmel (Gienow-Hecht 2000) a border is not a geographic fact that has
sociological consequences but a sociological fact that takes geographic form.
The same can be said of regions
- Policy of US regarding organisation of both regions is puzzling. Realism: US
preference for multilateralism in Europe after WWII is surprising as Weber:
hegemon can maximise bargaining leverage by forging a series of bilateral
deals with its allies rather than tying its hands in a multilateral framework
(91) Liberals: find the US pref for bilateralism in SEA after WWII greater
puzzle. Burley: multilateralism is theform to be expected from a set of
international regimes established by a liberal state (93)
- Effects of collective identity: institutional forms that US favoured in
European andd asia were shaped by different levels of identification that
policymakers had with these newly constructed regions.
- Finnemore: identification emphasizes the affective relationships between
actors and is an ordinal concept allowing for degrees of affect as well as
changes in the focus of affect (96) consistent with Social identity theory
(Tajfel 78)
- People identify with a group treat members of ingroup differently from
outgroup. When people distribute gains within a defined group they tend to
look more towards maximising absolute gains, in dealing with outsiders they
tend ot look more on relative gains and maximising the differential between
insiders and outsiders (Mercer 95)
- In terms of SIT once NATO was constructed as a region that put US in a
grouping of roughly equal state with whom it identified, multilateral
organizing principles followed closely. Bevin- UK FM: bilateral relations
imposed by the strongest power similar to what Soviets were doing in
eastern Europe are not in keeping with the spirit of western civilisation and
if we are to have an organism in west I must be spiritual union it must
contain all the elements for freedom for which we all stand Us policy makers
agreed believing in that Europe could be trusted with additional power and
that they deserved this influence (Jackson 01)
- What was basis for identification of US with Europe and lack thereof with
asia? Evidence is sketchy- in identification with Europe US officials tupically
refer to religion and democratic values as bedrock of NA a common race is
mentioned though less often b/c of Germany genocidal policies in 40s
delegitimated that concept in political discourse. Perceived affinitites
reinforced political trust rooted in common democratic political institutions
(we-feeling and mutual responsiveness) Deutsch described as central to
NATO (Deutsch et al 57). In asia these were absent religion and democratic
values were only shared in a few cases and race was invoked as powerful
force separating US and asia.
Origin of NATO
- Creation of political concept of NA community is an excellent example of the
process of identification at work in US politics as well as demo of how issues
of identity are intertwined with material factors and instrumental political
calculations
- Emergence of NA region followed dramatic change in the prevalent image of
US place in world that occurred during WWII
- Henrikson (75): before war maps were drawn with US in center surrounded
by 2 oceans however efforts to resupply UK and to later transport troops to
europe caused a change in that cartographic and cognitive image. During and
after war more and more maps appeared putting atlantic in the centre with
US and Europe positioned on either side. The atlantic association thus
become more natural in WWII. The shift to a north atlantic focus was given a
boost after 45 USSR pressured Norway to sign defence pact. Had the USSR
established a zone of influence over Norway it would have gained a large
window on atlantic thus exposing europes northern flank
- Creation of new geographic category of NA also served political ends-
- Folly 88: the idea of a nA system was a stroke of genius on part of Bevin. In
the early 40s UK gov embarked on a political strategy regime to prevent
disengagement of US from Europe after end of war. Bevin recognised that US
would hesitate to join a euoprean alliance but would be much more
comfortable talking about sea lanes, access to bases and NA alliance the NA
focus meshed nicely with US military concerns with stepping stones across
the atlantic. Reliance on bases and stopping off points for the transportation
of troops and equipment across atlantic the armed services emphasis on the
importance of Iceland, Greenland and the Azores put atlantic in the
foreground (Lundestad 1980) in domestic US politics, the focus on NA
community promised to be an easier sell to an electorate and congress wary
of European entanglements, the concept of community established a basis of
identification that transcended military consideration (Kaplan 84)
- Technogical innovation also suited Canada- seeking to minimise bilateral
dealings with US Canada opposed any sort of dumbbell shaped arranagment
combining US and Europe- NA arrangement allow canada to use Europe as
balance against US also allow Canadian gov to portray its concessions to the
alliance as concession to a NA group of states- Did not have to deal with US
alone
- Geographically defined category constrained but did not determine
membership
- In 1948 official and public discourse regarding Europe saw major and
sudden change before March a possible transatlantic alliance was invariably
discussed under rubric of a European or WE alliance, after march the focus
shifted radically to NA treaty system and community. The rapidity of this
shift maintain US State department that the treaty merely codified a political
community that had been existence for centuries
Origins of SEA
- Rise of prominence of term Sea came with Japans occupation of the area
during the pacific war. To designate the areas south of china that fell to
Japanese occupation
- After victory of communist forces in China, the handsoff policy of US adopted
after pacific war shifted. The Truman administration discovered SEA at the
intersection of its policy toward china, japan, UK and France. Bolstering pro
western forces in the region could help contain china, restore japans
economy strengthen Britain and halt the bleeding of france
- US policy became regionalised. Rotter- US policy makers no longer regarded
SEA as disparate jumble of states but as a region to be tied to most important
independent nations of Far east and WU.
- SEATO established in Sept 54 should be seen as extention of this
regionalisation and the political attempt at tying region to rest of world (as
only 2 of 6 were actually in SEA)
- Inclusion of France and UK show the importance of sense of identity in
forming alliances. As US endeavoured ot construct alliances outside of
Europe it sought the cooperation of European states even as European
colonialism was collapsing in Asia. With UK and France in the alliance why
not work multilaterally? The answer points to malleability of identity. Source
of weakness for explantions that focus only on identity
- Roosevelt initially had hoped to work with china rather than european
colonial powers in bringing stability to asia when victory of communism in
china made that impossible US reluctantly turned to Europe as 2
nd
best
solution. US gov unwilling to identify too closely with colonial practices of
European states in asia. Limited the degree to which US Wanted to work
multilaterally with euroepan states in asia. The pliability of identity- US is
like Europeans in Europe but not like the Europeans in asia- shows
limitations that focus only on collective identity

NATO and SEATO
- Based on civilizational, ethnic, racial and religious ties, shared historical
memories, identification with Europeans rather than peoples of SEA was
considered to be quite natural. Different levels of mutual identification
important cause of different institutional forms that US favoured for its
alliance in EU and asia during CW
- One of most striking aspects of the discussion surrounding the formation of
NATO is the pervasive identification of US With Europe. Exemplified by
strident assertion that NA already existed as a political community and that
the treaty merely formalised this pre-existing community of shared ideals
and interests
- Harriman there is a spiritual emotion..free men ar standing shoulder to
shoulder US senate 87, community common ideals
- Identification had an undeniable racial component. Former assistant sec of
state clayton my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be
composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom that are
composed of the white race Senate 49)
- In part b/c americans identified strongly with Europe it was judged to be
strong a ally- strong estimates of strength- Jackson 67 saw it center of world
- US reaction to the formation of SEATO was different- US debates show hardly
a trace of identification and there are not statements of shared ideals or
future visions of the Asian allies as great powers
- It is differences not commonalities in civilisation, race, ethnicity, religion and
historical memories that lead to the articulation of strong doubts about the
current and future strength of these nations as parts of an Asian alliance.
- Even though colonials was ending the colonial mindset remained strong- this
outlook stemmed from personal backgrounds of men who dominated the US
FP machinery after WWII- drawn from elite prep schools ivy leagues and wal
street business and law firms these men ventured into post WWII world with
a European and even atlantic bias (Isaacson and Thomas 86)
- Multilateralism approach in Europe also allowed American politicians to
evade the potentially delicate challenge posed by different ethnic voting
blocs in the US. With large nos of American tracing their ancestry to different
European countries attempting to play faves or to make distinctions among
states in US FP would be risky strategy for elected politicians if these uspet
significant ethnic voting blocs. By treating all European allies the same
multilateralism offered a solution and as Asian-american voting blocs were
less important during early stages oF CW a similar electoral dilemma did not
arise with US FP in Asia
- There were segments in US society that had more interactions with the
material interests in asia than in Europe. asia firsters criticized US FP into
the CW for paying too little attention to asia. Driven by desire to criticise the
European focused eastern establishement that dominated the democrats,
presidency and FP apparatus of government. Also driven by commercial links
western business had forged across pacific and missionaries who had gone to
asia (westerfield 55)
- Why did preference of americna elites look to Europe prevail over those of
asia firsters
- Answer lies in combination of identity and material factors. Identifying with
Europe, the eastern establishment not only had preference for cooperating
with and focusing on Europe it also controlled institutional means of power
within the US to implement such a FP.
- And the United States had "a tradition of selecting foreign service officers
from the Ivy League, and secretaries of state and treasury from Wall
Street."97 In addition, a large number of the Foreign Service officers that did
specialize in Asian affairs were purged from the governments as a result of
the McCarthy Red Scare following the fall of China.
- In explaining why one set of ideas triumphs over another: general ideological
context, existing political institutions and pressing polticial concerns. Laffey
and Weldes: fit doesnt simply exist it is made by political actors (97)
- Drawing on both identity, material factors it was an easier sell to a nation
that saw itself as an offshoot of euope and whose levers of power were in
hands of men who identified closely with Europeans. In addition strong
economic links between us and Europe provided ample material incentive
- Asia firsters also did not push for multilateralism- demonstrates the
indeterminancy of arguments linking perceived interests and threats to
particular institutional forms without consideration of collective identity.
The belief of asia as foreign but also inferior helped pushed individuals to
support unilateral or bilateral rather than multilateral in Asia
- There is a strong note of condescension in amny of US discussions of SEATO-
did not exist with nATO
- US policymakers did not see asia as ready or sufficiently sophisticated to
enjoy trust and same degree of power
- Summary: US decision makers ready identification with Europe and
perception of Europe as belonging ot same political community as the US
helped together with material and instrumental factors move us in favour of
multilateralism in Europe. The weakness of identification with asia nad belief
that the Asian countries belonged to different and inferior political
community led to US preference for bilateralism in Asia
Conclusion
-

Making Process, not progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order:
Jones and Smith 2007

- What exactly is ASEAN? The main puzzle of the argument
- Can it be used as a new model of cooperation in other regions
- Findings: ASEAN is not really that much of a constructivist type of
organisation theres a lot less cooperation than some may argue
- Making
- Constraints
- NASEN security community
-
-