Institutionalizing performance

management in Asia: looking East

or West?
Osamu Koike
International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Yokohama National University,
Yokohama, Japan
Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the features and impact of performance
management reforms implemented in the bureaucracies of several Asian states.
Design/methodology/approach The paper draws on government reports, reports of
international bodies, and the data produced for various governance indicators, as well as scholarly
analysis of performance management and new public management.
Findings After the 1997 Asian nancial crisis, many Asian countries, including developed and
developing, have introduced a variety of performance management systems into their bureaucracies.
This has been encouraged by international agencies as part of their good governance agendas.
Despite this, the goal of achieving efcient and workable public administration has still not been
realized in many cases. Anti-corruption measures are not effective, and efciency and service delivery
in public organization has not signicantly improved. However, political leaders must recognize that
the building of rational legal bureaucracy in which patronage inuence is reduced, creating networked
governance, allowing engagement with civil society, and fostering high employee motivation, are the
other prerequisites for achieving efcient and accountable government. Only then will performance
management contribute to this aim.
Originality/value The value of this paper is to show that within the context of Asian
bureaucracies, performance management is not a panacea to guarantee improvements in public
administration. Other requirements are necessary, as indicated above, especially the creation of
rational legal bureaucracy.
Keywords Asia, Public administration, Performance (public administration), Administrative reform,
New public management, Institutionalization, Performance management, Good governance, Corruption,
Corporate governance
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
After the 1997 Asian nancial crisis, Asian political leaders welcomed new public
management (NPM) measures to improve public administration for coping with
globalised economy. Reform measures included privatisation, agencication,
decentralisation, civil service reform, and performance management. However, as
Mark Turner pointed out, enthusiasm for NPM is diverse among Asian countries
(Turner, 2002). He identied three different types of diners in Asia. The rst is a
group of enthusiastic diners who have experimented with many items off the NPM
menu, consisting of countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. The second is the
cautious diners wary of unfamiliar dishes with countries like the Philippines,
Thailand, and Indonesia. Finally, there is a group of unfamiliar diners who have little
knowledge of NPM like Laos and Cambodia who lack certain fundamental prerequisite
conditions to build many NPM reforms (Turner, 2002).
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
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Performance
management in
Asia
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International Journal of Public Sector
Management
Vol. 26 No. 5, 2013
pp. 347-360
qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
0951-3558
DOI 10.1108/IJPSM-05-2013-0066
With regard to performance management, however, almost every country tastes it
as shown in Table I. In 1999, Malaysia introduced the Integrated Results-Based
Management (IRBM) following the implementation of the Modied Budgeting System
since 1990. Indonesia launched the Government Agency Performance Accountability
System (SAKIP) in 1999 modelled after the Government Performance and
Accountability Act of the US. Other Asian countries, including less developed
Cambodia, have introduced some performance management frameworks in the early
years of the twenty-rst century. It suggests a phenomenon of institutional
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) emanating in Asian countries after the
economic crisis. However, as many scholars have already afrmed, convergence in the
mode of NPM would be an oversimplication in Asia (Haque, 2000). For this article, an
application of push-pull framework will be productive. On the push side,
international funding agencies such as World Bank (2011a) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have urged recipient countries to make their old-fashioned
bureaucracies more efcient and friendly within a market economy. In the eyes of the
reformists, the management of government performance must be a gateway for public
sector reform. In the end, development assistance has led to a coercive isomorphism on
performance management among Asian developing countries. On the pull side,
however, Asian political leaders have room to choose reform items from the reform
menu (Turner, 2002). They can choose safer items as long as the donors admit their
effectiveness in administrative reforms. Consequently, Asian political leaders took a
leadership role in the promotion of management reforms, rather than adopt political
reforms, as a way of modernizing government in the new century. However, the
institutionalisation of performance management varies greatly among Asian countries.
This suggests that some elements of bureaucratic politics may have intervened in the
administration of performance management of government.
Country Programme Key features Year
Indonesia Government Agency Performance
Accountability System (SAKIP)
Five year performance plan, Annual
performance agreement
1999-
Japan Policy Evaluation System Performance evaluation 2001-
Malaysia Integrated Results-Based
Management (IRBM) system
Results-based budgeting system,
Results based personnel performance
system
1999-
Philippines Performance Management System
Ofce Performance Evaluation
System
Introduction of Point System;
Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF)
1998-
Singapore Performance-informed Budgeting
System
Ministry Report Cards; Focus on
Outcome
2006-
South Korea Performance-based Budgeting Performance agreement, Performance
target
1999-
Thailand Performance Agreement, Strategic
Performance-Based Budget (SPBB)
Four-year performance plan, Balanced
Scorecard
2003-
Source: Compiled by the author
Table I.
Performance
management in selected
Asian countries
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As Anthony Cheung describes, many Asian countries retain the features of a strong
bureaucracy (Cheung, 2005). Consequently, it has been difcult for political leaders to
blame bureaucracy for its budget-maximisation behaviour. It makes the background
of administrative reforms in Asia fundamentally different from those of western
democracies. Most of the East and South-East Asian countries continue to have a
tradition of authoritarian regime. In the process of national development, political
leaders have emphasised Asian values rather than the democratic norms which
originated in Western societies. Except in some industrialized nations like Japan and
South Korea, the middle class has not developed as assumed, and, civil society as a
non-state actor remains less developed in Asia. These conditions continue to allow
Asian political leaders to be selective in applying NPM measures, including
performance management, to the political agenda of administrative reforms. It seems
paradoxical that authoritarian governments are eager to introduce public management
reforms. However, it would be better for political leaders who face increasing pressure
for democratisation. Bidhya Bowornwathana assumes that in Thailand NPM reform
measures are preferred to governance reform. The objective of NPM is primarily to
improve the efciency of public sector organisations, while good governance
contains broader reform strategies (Bidhya, 2000). In other words, a customer-oriented
government does not threaten the power base of government agencies (Bidhya, 2000,
p. 401).
Assessing performance management in Asia
In December 2005, the OECD-Asia Public Sector Performance Symposium was held in
Seoul, South Korea. It was the rst Asian meeting to discuss the strategies, tools, and
techniques of government performance management. In the Symposium,
representatives from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines,
South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam presented papers on performance management in
their countries. After the 2005 symposium, the author has been working to up-date the
development of performance management in the selected Asian countries from 2006 to
2010. In the updating, the author adds Singapore because the government there seems
the most advanced in the institutionalisation of performance management. On the
other hand, the author deleted Cambodia, China, and Vietnam from the list, mainly due
to the lack of information.
Indonesia: Government agency performance accountability system (SAKIP)
In Indonesia, a working group in the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency
(BPKP) initiated a study on performance management in 1996. According to Sobirun
Ruswadi, this initiative had been inspired by the Government Performance and Result
Act (GPRA) of 1993 in the US (Sobirun, 2005). The working group developed and
introduced a public sector performance management model named Government
Agency Performance Accountability System (SAKIP). The development of this system
then was driven more by the monetary and economic crisis, implementation of regional
autonomy, and change of regime in the late 1990 s. In 1999, the government issued the
Presidential Instruction No. 7/1999 on Government Agency Performance
Accountability, in accordance with Act No. 28/999 on Good Governance of the State.
SAKIP comprises a strategic plan, performance measurement, performance
reporting, and performance evaluation. The strategic plan is dened as a ve-year
Performance
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349
performance plan of an agency or institution which identies its vision, mission,
ve-year strategic goals, annual strategic objectives, and programmes. It is followed by
an Annual Performance Plan. Performance measurement is done by comparing the
performance indicator achievements with the targets planned, and with the
achievements of previous years. Performance achievement is reported annually in
the Government Performance Accountability Report. In 2005, 68 ministries and central
agencies, 29 provinces, and 356 counties and municipalities submitted performance
reports to the President.
From budget year 2005, the Annual Performance Agreement was required
between a government ofcial, a subordinate, and his or her superior. Along with a one
page statement of the Performance Agreement, a summary of the Annual Performance
Plan, which reveals the main programme to be accomplished by the signing ofcial, the
strategic objectives that are expected to be attained, performance indicators (outputs
and/or outcomes), and the budget of each programme have to be attached. At the same
time, the government attempts to integrate the performance accountability system
with the budgeting system to establish a performance-based budgeting system
(Blondal et al., 2009).
According to the Ministry of Administrative Reform (MENPAN), however, there
have been signicant obstacles in the development and implementation of SAKIP
(Sobirun, 2005). First, the annual evaluation by the BPKP of the Government
Performance Accountability Report revealed that the commitment of the government
ofcials to implement SAKIP was a key factor in the effort of improving both agencies
management process and performance. Second, the traditional paradigm is that public
servants are there to serve the government rather than the public, and occupy positions
by virtue of patronage rather than by their professional competence. Third,
performance indicators are considered as the key factor in performance measurement,
but the question of howto determine the right performance indicators remains difcult.
Fourth, there are still variations in the denition of performance. While some scholars
limit the meaning of performance to output, others interpret performance as an
accomplishment of the process. SAKIP itself denes performance as the results in
terms of output and/or outcomes. (Sobirun, 2005). In spite of the effort taken by the
MENPAN, these obstacles remain unsolved, while the use of SAKIP is expanding.
Japan: policy evaluation system
In 2001 the Government of Japan introduced a policy evaluation system in ministries
and agencies. This was based on the Final Report in 1997 of the Administrative Reform
Council chaired by the late Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Hashimoto attempted
to include some of the principles of NPM in his reform package (Hori, 2003; Kikuchi,
2010). One was a policy evaluation system and the other was agencication of service
delivery organisations including national hospitals and national universities. The
Government Policy Evaluation Bill was enacted in June, 2001 and came into effect in
April 2002. The newly created Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications was
assigned the responsibility for implementing policy evaluation across the ministries
and agencies.
Japans policy evaluation has a decentralized structure where individual ministries
plan and implement evaluation. The roles of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications are to check the results of the self-evaluation of ministries and
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conduct a comprehensive assessment of cross-cutting issues. In addition, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications summarises and publishes the results of the
evaluation and how these results are reected in policy and other administrative
affairs. Part of its task in this regard is to hold a meeting of the Liaison Conference for
Policy Evaluation Organisations. The Government Policy Evaluation Act (GPEA)
identies three standard evaluation methods; project assessment, performance
evaluation, and comprehensive evaluation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications provides guidelines on performance evaluation for the evaluators.
The Mid-term Evaluation Report on the implementation of GPEA in 2005 has pointed
out that there was s growing interest among the ministries for the positive use of
performance and comprehensive evaluation to improve the quality of public policies
and programmes. However, it is often pointed out that ministries tend to submit
evaluation results mainly for protecting their policies and programmes. Since the
beginning of the policy evaluation system, the Ministry of Finance has attempted to
use performance evaluation results in the formulation of the budget. However, the
linking of policy evaluation and budget formulation has not been accomplished as
expected (Koike et al., 2007).
On the other hand, the government introduced a new personnel evaluation system
in the revision of the National Public Service Act of 2009. It called for the adoption of
personnel performance appraisal and its use in determining pay increases, bonuses,
and standards for promotions. Besides, the revised Act denes that if public employees
fail to have a good performance record, they will be subjected to a reduction of pay. If
employees score the lowest mark in the ability evaluation or performance evaluation,
they may be demoted to a lower grade of duty or a lower pay scale. Through these
measures, the government attempts to transform the traditional Career System based
on seniority rule into a system reecting the abilities and performance of individuals
(NPA (National Personnel Authority), 2008). However, the outcome of the new
performance evaluation system seems limited. The management level ofcers tend to
provide a small increment in pay to those employees who have achieved some results.
Also, there are few cases of downgrading through the personnel evaluation. Such
practices indicate that the culture of seniority is hard to change in Japan. To promote
civil service reform, the new DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) government has recently
proposed a reform package including the establishment of the Cabinet Personnel
Agency to replace the National Personnel Authority. Its job would be to manage senior
executive ofcers in an integrated manner, and make collective labor agreements with
civil servants. However, the civil service reforms remain stalled in the Diet. The reason
is that as a comprehensive package of reforms leading to fundamental changes in
public personnel administration, they require detailed scrutiny by both houses of the
Diet and by the committees of the Diet.
Malaysia: integrated results-based management: IRBM
According to Koshy Thomas, the Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance,
the Malaysian government rst introduced the Results-Based Management system in
1990 under the Modied Budgeting System (Thomas, 2007). The original performance
framework, however, created only limited linkages between budget performance,
resource usage, and policy implementation. Based on the recognition that there were
fundamental missing links, the government introduced the Integrated Results-Based
Performance
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Management (IRBM) system in 1999. The IRBM system includes an Integrated
Performance Management Framework (IPMF) that attempts to integrate the
Results-Based Budgeting (RBB) System and the Personnel Performance System
(PPS). In this system, ministries and departments analyse problems at various stages
of programme implementation, including resource utilisation (inputs), activity
completion, output achievement and outcome/impact achievement. It aims to
establish a government-wide results-based management system in Malaysia.
The IRBM system consists of ve key components two primary and three
complementary or support components. The primary components are the RBB and the
PPS. Three support components are the Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation
(M&E) System, the Management Information System (MIS), and an Enabling
E-Government (EG) System. The RBB measures the results achieved at almost every
stage of the project from input application, activity completion, output delivery, and
impact achievement. The measured results are utilized for planning, implementing,
monitoring and reporting organisational performance, with systematic links to
personnel performance. These are important for resource allocation decisions by the
Central Budget Ofce. The IPMF is mandated as the strategic planning framework
under the IRBM. Therefore, all ministries and departments are required to prepare
their strategic plan for resource allocation using the IPMF as part of the RBB system.
In sum, Malaysias IRBM seeks not only vertical integration, but also horizontal
integration at the programme level. The Malaysian government recognises that human
capital plays a pivotal role in organisational and personnel performance (Thomas,
2007).
The Philippines: performance management system ofce performance evaluation
system (PMS-OPES)
In 2007, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) of the government of Philippines initiated
a re-assessment of the existing Performance Evaluation System(PES) and introduced a
new scheme known as Performance Management System-Ofce Performance
Evaluation System (PMS-OPES). The purpose of the new system is to establish a
high-performance culture in the government by aligning individual objectives to the
organisational objectives. According to the ofcial web site of the Philippine Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the PMS-OPES is a means of getting better results from the
organisation, teams and individuals, by understanding and managing performance
within an agreed framework of planned goals, standards and competency
requirements. The unique component of the PMS-OPES is the use of a points
system in the measurement of the collective performance of individuals within an
operating unit. The PMS-OPES is primarily concerned with outputs (the achievement
of results or quantied objectives). In PMS-OPES each output is assigned a number of
points based on the length of time it takes for one person to produce an output. The
conversion of one hour to one point is used in this method. The CSC explains that this
makes it simpler to compare the performance of different ofces by just comparing the
amount of points each ofce produces. Each ofce creates a compilation of outputs
called the PMS-OPES Output Reference Table that contains a consolidated list of its
outputs. This also indicates the corresponding points that an ofce would earn for
completing an output. It also contains operational denitions that spell out the criteria
or standards the output must meet to earn points. The performance management
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process consists of the following four phases: performance planning and commitment,
performance monitoring and coaching, performance review and feedback, and
performance evaluation and development planning.
In addition, the Philippines government attempts to link performance management
with the budget through the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).
According to the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID, 2007),
the 2007 Budget marked the rst instance that accurate forward estimates for all 21
departments were available, and used in the budget formulation process through the
MTEF. The Organisational Performance Indicator Framework (OPIF) is an important
component of the MTEF. It shifts indicators from inputs to output/outcome
performance indicators and attempts to establish an integrated performance
management system where organisational performance targets are cascaded down
to lower level units and used as a basis for performance-based compensation (Domingo
et al., 2011).
Singapore: performance-informed budgeting system
Singapore is well-known for its extensive use of performance and results information
in the budget process. According to the OECD report, performance management in
Singapore focuses on further developing outcome indicators (Blondal, 2006).
Singapores objective is not to directly link funding with performance and results
indicators, but rather to inform resource allocation decisions. In fact, the very use of
budget ceilings (block budgets) is acknowledged to explicitly weaken any such
linkages from the perspective of the Ministry of Finance. Performance and results
information, according to the OECD report, does however form an integral part of the
budgetary dialogue between the Ministry of Finance and the line ministries. The
philosophy is that the line ministries should take ownership in the area of performance
and results in the same manner as they do for allocation of their block budgets. It is
recognised that the principal uses of performance and results information is within the
line ministries.
There are three principal external venues for performance and results
information. First is the budget documentation itself. Each ministrys desired
outcomes are listed together with key performance indicators. Interestingly, indicators
used often include the standing of Singapore in rankings against other countries in
respective areas. Second, individual government organisations often publish detailed
annual reports where a greater number of performance and results indicators are
published and often accompanied by a narrative discussion. Third, a agship initiative
known as Ministry Report Cards is currently being developed. Each Ministry will
complete these report cards in a standardised structure and the Ministry of Finance
will provide commentary on them. This would include commentary on howdemanding
their targets were and the management of resources. They are then submitted to the
Cabinet for review (Blondal, 2006).
The Singapore government has moved towards a focus on outcomes. Singapore
recognises that outcomes by themselves are not sufcient to drive further
improvements. For instance, according to the OECD Report, infant mortality is a
principal outcome indicator for the Ministry of Health. Although infant mortality in
Singapore is the second lowest in the world, the Health Ministry reviews the indicators
frequently to ensure their relevance for driving further improvement (Blondal, 2006).
Performance
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353
Key performance indicators have been developed for each of the outcomes, and
assigned to owner ministries. This is to be submitted to the Cabinet each year together
with the Ministry Report Cards. In addition, the Singapore government attempts to
align the governments strategic planning with the budget cycle (APEC (Asia-Pacic
Economic Cooperation), 2007). The initiatives and projects undertaken to achieve an
integrated government cover three broad areas: framework and architecture for
integration; cross-agency collaboration projects; and supporting structures, policies
and information and communications technology (ICT). It should be noted that
performance and results information do not determine salaries. Rather, performance
bonuses are determined by performance appraisals and economic growth.
South Korea: performance-based budgeting
South Korea has been ambitious in the promotion of performance management reforms
after the Asian nancial crisis in 1997. The reform measures introduced include a
performance agreement, an annual policy evaluation system, and performance-based
budgeting. In the performance agreement, both managers and supervisors negotiate
performance targets every year. In the Korean government structure, a minister signs
the performance contract with a vice minister who in turn contracts with a bureau
director and assistant director in sequential order down to the rank and le.
Performance agreements require a strategy, goals, monitoring, and evaluations.
Achievement of targets is usually linked to performance-based pay as well as
promotion in the career based system (Lee and Moon, 2010, p. 436).
In the annual policy evaluation system, a policy evaluation committee, established
by the Prime Ministers Ofce, evaluates policies that the ministries executed in the
previous year. After ministries determine performance goals and measurements for
policies, they develop key indicators such as the degree of goal achievement,
difculties of implementation, degree of social effect, and amount of resources invested.
The evaluations categorise ministries in terms of policy performance: high, medium,
and low. Incentives or disincentives are given according to the results. The President
often provides incentives or more prestigious cabinet assignments for ministers with
high scores and dismisses ministers with lower scores (Lee and Moon, 2010, p. 439).
Finally, Korea has developed the performance-based budgeting system modelled on
the GPRA and the Programme Assessment Rating Tool (PART) of the US with some
modications (Kim and Park, 2007). In Korea, ministries and agencies submit annual
performance plans to the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) along with their annual
budget requests. The performance plan includes performance targets that are set by the
ministries/agencies. Following an initial self-assessment by the ministries/agencies, the
MPB makes a nal assessment of performance. The MPB uses annual performance
reports in its negotiations with line ministries during the annual budget process. If an
agency/ministry does not meet its performance target or receives a poor evaluation, it
may be penalized with a 10 per cent budget cut for the next nancial year.
As John M. Kimand Nowook Park note, South Korea is in the early stage of building
a performance system and faces various challenges (Kim and Park, 2007). However, it
seems certain that performance management reforms are changing Koreas
administrative culture. Kim and Park observe that Korean civil servants are coming
to accept results-oriented performance management as a normal part of its
bureaucratic culture (Kim and Park, 2007, p. 9).
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Thailand: results-based management
In 2003, the Ofce of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPSDC) of the Thai
Government implemented the results-based management approach to measure and
drive performance of ministries, departments and all provincial administrations. In
2004, all government agencies were required by the Cabinet to draw up a performance
agreement and to use a series of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for achieving
targets (World Bank, 2006). To measure performance, the OPSDC introduced the
concept of the Balanced Scorecard, which attempts to measure the effectiveness of
strategic plan implementation, efciency of public sector work, quality of service
delivery, and organisation development. In 2007, a total of 310 public sector
organisations, including departments, universities, and provincial authorities had
performance agreements. The government agencies have to develop their performance
indicators, consisting of four perspectives (effectiveness of strategy implementation,
quality of service delivery, efciency of work performance, and organisational
development), as well as the scoring criteria to be used. The agencies have to report
their implementation progress in the form of a Self-Assessment Report Card (SAR)
three times a year (Lorsuwannarat and Buracom, 2011).
An assessment report compiled by the World Bank in, 2006 concluded that, in
general, Thailand is successfully implementing results-based management system in
its early stages (World Bank, 2006). Some examples of improved services include the
establishment of call centres for registration and insurance, streamlining of regulatory
procedures, and local service centres for social, employment, and other services.
However, the World Bank report also states that Thailands implementation of
results-based management has also encountered several challenges. These include
uneven integration with other management systems, difculties in measuring
outcomes, the burden of extra work in undertaking performance management, on top
of main stream work, and resistance to change by those who are tasked with
implementing the performance management system (World Bank, 2006). This means
that the creation of an organisational culture that supports performance management
is important and necessary for further progress of results-based management in
Thailand (Lorsuwannarat and Buracom, 2011).
Good governance and performance management
There is no doubt that there is a convergence in the institutionalisation of
performance management in Asia. Most of the Asian governments attempt to apply
the principles of results-based management to public sector organisations. It is
observed that key results area and performance indicators are commonly adopted
in the management of public policies and programmes. It is also popular among many
Asian governments to link performance measurement with budgeting. Furthermore,
performance-related pay schemes have been introduced in many countries mostly at
the level of senior executives. However, the effectiveness of performance
management and the outcomes of results-based management vary to a certain
degree among the Asian countries. Table II shows the current economic performance,
government effectiveness, and extent of corruption in selected Asian countries. It
indicates there is no relation between performance management, government
effectiveness, and corruption. For example, the Philippines have developed a
performance management system which combines performance measurement and
Performance
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355
remuneration. However, the Philippines economic performance, government
effectiveness, and freedom from corruption measures are the lowest among the
listed countries. South Korea has an advanced system of performance management,
but remains only in the middle rank in the extent of corruption. The situation in Japan
is unusual because, contrary to high economic performance, government effectiveness,
and freedom from corruption, its performance management remains in a rudimentary
stage. In 2009, the Japanese government introduced a new personnel evaluation system
that aims to shift the personnel management from a traditional seniority system to a
system reecting abilities and performance of individuals. However, this is only a
small step in the path to changing the old style bureaucracy into modernized,
results-oriented government agencies.
An important factor inuencing the adoption of performance management in Asian
countries is the tradition of a government- controlled, authoritarian bureaucracy in
many Asian states. In governments characterised by such a bureaucracy, there are few
obstacles to the institutionalisation of performance management. In fact, there is an
increased possibility that political capital may be made of performance management to
impress on the voters the development of government modernisation.
On the other hand, as an impediment to achieving the benets of performance
management, a patrimonial culture based on patron-client relations (in contrast to a
merit based rational-legal culture), is still pervasive in the bureaucracies of many Asian
states. Patronage in a patrimonial bureaucracy weakens the merit principle and
scientic management in public organisations, and may thus undermine the
implementation of performance management. This implies that the establishment of a
Country
Performance
management
a
World Banks
government
effectiveness
indicator for 2010
Transparency
Internationals
(2011)
corruption
perception
index ranking
for 2011
b
GDP per
capita
in USD
c
Singapore Advanced 2.194 5
th
9.2 37,394
Japan Limited 1.256 14
th
8.0 39,530
Korea Advanced 1.112 43
rd
5.4 17,225
Malaysia Moderate 0.989 60
th
4.3 6,967
Indonesia Limited 20.21 100
th
3.0 2,349
Philippines Moderate 20.14 129
th
2.6 1,747
Thailand Limited 0.152 80
th
3.4 3,894
Notes:
a
Advanced: performance evaluation linked to budgeting; Moderate: performance
evaluation links to remuneration; Limited: government agencies engage in performance
evaluation but only to a limited extent.
b
World Bank government effectiveness gures are point
scores on a scale from22.5 (a lot of corruption) to +2.5 (little or no corruption).
c
Corruption Perception
Index gures are the global ranking out of 182 (the higher the ranking the less the corruption) while
gures in brackets are scores out of 10 (0= lot of corruption and 10= little or no corruption)
Source: Government effectiveness: World Bank, 2011; Corruption perception index: freedom from
corruption, Transparency International, 2011; GDP per capita: Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communication, Japan, 2011
Table II.
Performance
management and good
governance in seven
Asian countries
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merit-based rational-legal bureaucracy, is necessary to ensure effective performance
management.
It should be pointed out that there are risks using the public management models as
part of the good governance initiatives proposed by international funding agencies.
The donors tend to introduce these models into the recipient countries, which are
derived from certain western states with a different historical development and a long
period of democratic evolution. As Merilee S. Grindle argues, the good governance
agenda is unrealistically long and growing longer over time. She argues that it is only
realistic for the developing countries to set a goal of good enough governance
(Grindle, 2004).
Other questions arise relating to modernisation reforms based on NPM, including
performance and results-based management, which must be confronted by Asian
governments (Schick, 1998; Dunleavy et al., 2006). One is the fragmentation of public
organisations. Since the mid-1990 s, public managers have recognised that such
fragmentation as a result of the creation of quasi-market structures under NPM. This
may make it difcult to deal with wicked problems such as juvenile crime and social
exclusion that require more horizontal co-operation among public organisations. Since
the end of 1990 s, a priority has been given to Whole of Government (WOG) or
Joined-up Government ( JOG) in the advanced countries, which emphasises the
importance of horizontal co-operation among public sector organisations in networked
governance. In Asia, however, under NPM, political leaders have promoted
market-oriented competitive governance in their administrative reforms, without
taking into account the necessity for co-operation and networked governance. In such a
market-driven environment, achieving the immediate performance targets within their
own organisation, as stated in performance agreements, becomes a central priority for
executives and public managers, taking precedence over cooperating with and helping
other organisations in meeting complex social problems.
Furthermore, while recognising that performance management is a good measure to
embed a results-oriented culture, political leaders may not be mindful of the need to
respect the human aspect of the organisation. It is necessary to take into account the
motivation of public employees, including their participation in organisational
decisions and in the reform process, and fostering a sense of commitment to
corporate goals and an esprit de corps based on professional norms (Rauch and
Evans, 2000; Brewer, 2010). Addressing these additional questions will determine if
performance management can be effectively implemented and produces its intended
benets.
Conclusion
Public administration in Asia appears to have become increasingly modernized, with
the introduction of systems of performance management, resembling western
bureaucracies that have implemented New Public Management (Haque, 2000).
However, as illustrated by the governance indicators, most Asian governments are still
lacking in terms of performance, efciency and integrity. In addition, the process of
democratisation, where it has occurred, has not always rectied these deciencies in
governance so impeding a governments ability to gain full legitimacy. Paradoxically,
in some Asian countries, such as China and Vietnam, public trust in government has
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357
been quite high, mainly because the authoritarian nature of government has restrained
freedom of information and restricted freedom of expression.
However, as evidenced by the recent riots in Thailand, a growing middle class has
increasingly questioned the authority of government. Such claims should encourage
Asian states to transform their bureaucracies to become more efcient, workable, and
customer-centred, and to be less prone to corruption. There is no doubt that some New
Public Management tools like performance evaluation and accountability based on
results will contribute to the establishment of good governance.
However, other conditions must exist to achieve this end. It must be recognised that
the building of rational legal bureaucracy and the lessening of the patronage networks
and patrimonial culture are a prerequisite for efcient and accountable government
that will be trusted by people. In this process, an active civil society is necessary for
checking the performance of public sector organisations. This means that further
progress depends on meaningful governance reform (Berman, 2011, p. 24). A further
requirement is creating conditions conducive to co-operation and networked
governance to deal with multi-faceted social issues.
In addition, more attention should be paid to the human aspect of the organisational
culture rather than just to the impersonal and utilitarian tools of performance
management. It is an Asian tradition that puts a high value on human relations in
organisations and is embedded in the organisational behaviour that has been described
as the human-side of enterprise (McGregor, 1960) or Theory Z (Ouchi, 1981). We
should remember that the Quality Control Circles (QCCs) were welcomed by public
employees in many Asian countries in the 1990 s. QCCs put a high value on employees
participation and co-operation in achieving organisational goals. Consequently, it
contributes to the establishment of a high-performance organisation.
Finally, we should explore the theoretical frameworks on the performance of public
organisations in Asia. Public managers have adopted organisational performance
models developed primarily for private sector organisations. However, as Colin Talbot
points out, the public sector is different in important ways that affect how we theorize
performance (Talbot, 2010, pp. 170-1). In order to establish a performance-driven
culture (Marr, 2009) in public sector organisations, it is necessary for scholars to focus
on both empirical studies on performance management as well as new theoretical
perspectives in Asia.
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About the author
Professor Osamu Koike is a member of the International Graduate School of Social Sciences.
Previously he was Associate Professor in the Faculty of Humanities at Ibaraki University of
Japan. He has servied as Visiting Professor since 2006 for the United Nations University
Institute of Advanced Studies. He specializes in Comparative Public Policy and Administration
and his recent studies include civil service reforms in Asian countries. Professor Osamu Koike
can be contacted at: okoike@ynu.ac.jp
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