Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus

First published Sat May 7, 2005; substantive revision Wed Jul 8, 2009
This article introduces Plato's dialogue the Theaetetus (section 1), and briefly
summarises its plot (section 2). Two leading interpretations of the dialogue, the
Unitarian and e!isionist readings, are contrasted in section ". #ections $ to % e&plain
and discuss the main arguments of the chief di!isions of the dialogue. #ection '
pro!ides some afterthoughts about the dialogue as a whole.
( 1. )ntroduction
( 2. #ummary of the *ialogue
( ". +!erall )nterpretations of the Theaetetus
( $. The )ntroduction to the *ialogue, 1$2a-1$.e
( .. *efinition by /&amples, 1$0a-1.1d
( 0. 1irst *efinition (*1), 23nowledge is Perception4, 1.1e-1%5a
o 0.1 The *efinition of 3nowledge as Perception, 1.1d-e
o 0.2 The 26old 7ind4 8rgument9 and the Theory of 1lu&, 1.2a-10:e
o 0." The efutation of the Thesis that 3nowledge is Perception, 10:e.-
1%0e12
o 0.$ The *igression, 152c1-155b5
o 0.. ;ast +b<ection to Protagoras, 155c0-15'b.
o 0.0 ;ast +b<ection to =eracleitus, 15'c1-1%"c2
o 0.5 The 1inal efutation of *1, 1%"c$-1%5a%
( 5. #econd *efinition (*2), 23nowledge is True >udgement4, 1%5b-2:1c
o 5.1 The Pu??le of @isidentification, 1%5e.-1%%c%
o 5.2 #econd Pu??le 8bout 1alse Aelief, 2Aelie!ing 7hat is Bot4, 1%%c1:-
1%'b'
o 5." Third Pu??le 8bout 1alse Aelief, llodo!ia , 1%'b1:-1':e$
o 5.$ 1ourth Pu??le 8bout 1alse Aelief, the 7a& Tablet, 1':e.-1'0c.
o 5.. 1ifth Pu??le 8bout 1alse Aelief, the 8!iary, 1'0d1-2::d$
o 5.0 The 1inal efutation of *2, 2::d.-2:1c5
( %. Third *efinition (*"), 23nowledge is True >udgement 7ith an 8ccount4,
2:1d-21:a
o %.1 The *ream of #ocrates, 2:1d%-2:2d5
o %.2 6ritiCue of the *ream Theory, 2:2d%-2:0c2
o %." Three 8ttempts to Understand "o#os , 2:0c2-21:a'
( '. 6onclusion
( Aibliography
( +ther )nternet esources
( elated /ntries

1 1
1. Introduction
The Theaetetus, which probably dates from about "0' A6, is arguably Plato's greatest
worD on epistemology. (8rguably, it is his greatest worD on anything.) Plato ($25-"05
A6) has much to say about the nature of Dnowledge elsewhere. Aut only the Theaetetus
offers a set-piece discussion of the Cuestion 27hat is DnowledgeE4
;iDe many other Platonic dialogues, the Theaetetus is dominated by Cuestion-and-
answer e&changes, with #ocrates as main Cuestioner. =is two respondents are
Theaetetus, a brilliant young mathematician, and Theaetetus' tutor Theodorus, who is
rather less young (and rather less brilliant).
8lso liDe other Platonic dialogues, the main discussion of the Theaetetus is set within a
framing con!ersation (1$2a-1$"c) between /ucleides and Terpsion (cp. $haedo .'c).
This frame may be meant as a dedication of the worD to the memory of the man
Theaetetus. #edley 2::$ (0-%) has argued that it is meant to set some distance between
Plato's authorial !oice and the !arious other !oices (including #ocrates') that are heard
in the dialogue. 8lternati!ely, or also, it may be intended, liDe Sy%posiu% 152-", to
prompt Cuestions about the reliability of Dnowledge based on testimony. (6p. the law-
court passage (Theaetetus 2:1a-c), and #ocrates' dream (Theaetetus 2:1c-2:2c).)
The TheaetetusF most important similarity to other Platonic dialogues is that it is
aporeti&Git is a dialogue that ends in an i%passe. The Theaetetus re!iews three
definitions of Dnowledge in turn9 plus, in a preliminary discussion, one would-be
definition which, it is said, does not really count. /ach of these proposals is re<ected,
and no alternati!e is e&plicitly offered. Thus we complete the dialogue without
disco!ering what Dnowledge is. 7e disco!er only three things that Dnowledge is not
(Theaetetus 21:c9 cp. 1%"a., 1%5a1).
This matters, gi!en the place that the Theaetetus is normally assigned in the chronology
of Plato's writings. @ost scholars agree that Plato's first writings were the 2#ocratic4
dialogues (as they are often called), which asD Cuestions of the 27hat isHE4 form and
typically fail to find answers, 27hat is courageE4 ("a&hes), 27hat is self-controlE4
('har%ides), 27hat is <usticeE4 (l&ibiades (9 )epubli& 1), 27hat is holinessE4
(*uthyphro), 27hat is friendshipE4 ("ysis), 27hat is !irtueE4 (Meno), 27hat is
nobilityE4 (+ippias Ma,or). 8fter some transitional worDs ($rota#oras, -or#ias,
'ratylus, *uthyde%us) comes a series of dialogues in which Plato writes to a less
tightly-defined format, not always focusing on a 27hat isHE4 Cuestion, nor using the
Cuestion-and-answer interrogati!e method that he himself depicts as strictly #ocratic,
the $haedo, the $haedrus, the Sy%posiu%, and the )epubli&. )n these dialogues Plato
shows a much greater willingness to put positi!e and ambitious metaphysical !iews in
#ocrates' mouth, and to maDe #ocrates the spoDesman for what we call 2Plato's theory
of 1orms.4
8fter these, it is normally supposed that Plato's ne&t two worDs were the $ar%enides
and the Theaetetus, probably in that order. )f so, and if we taDe as seriously as Plato
seems to the important criticisms of the theory of 1orms that are made in the
$ar%enides, then the significance of the Theaetetus's return to the aporetic method
looDs ob!ious. 8pparently Plato has abandoned the certainties of his middle-period
worDs, such as the theory of 1orms, and returned to the almost-sceptical manner of the
early dialogues. )n the Theaetetus, the 1orms that so dominated the )epubli&'s
discussions of epistemology are hardly mentioned at all. 8 good understanding of the
dialogue must maDe sense of this fact.
2 2
2. Summary of the Dialogue
8t the gates of the city of @egara in "0' A6, /ucleides and Terpsion hear a sla!e read
out /ucleides' memoir of a philosophical discussion that tooD place in "'' A6, shortly
before #ocrates' trial and e&ecution (1$2a-1$"c). )n this, the young Theaetetus is
introduced to #ocrates by his mathematics tutor, Theodorus. #ocrates Cuestions
Theaetetus about the nature of e&pertise, and this leads him to pose the Dey Cuestion of
the dialogue, 27hat is DnowledgeE4 (1$"d-1$.e). Theaetetus' first response (*:) is to
gi!e e&amples of Dnowledge such as geometry, astronomy, harmony, arithmetic (1$0a-
c). #ocrates ob<ects that, for any !, e&amples of ! are neither necessary nor sufficient for
a definition of ! (1$0d-1$5e). Theaetetus admits this, and contrasts the ease with which
he and his classmates define mathematical terms with his inability to define of
Dnowledge (1$5c-1$%e). #ocrates offers to e&plain Theaetetus' bewilderment about the
Cuestion 27hat is DnowledgeE4 by comparing himself with a midwife, Theaetetus, he
suggests, is in discomfort because he is in intellectual labour (1$%e-1.1d).
Thus prompted, Theaetetus states his first acceptable definition, which is the proposal
(*1) that 23nowledge is perception4 (1.1d-e). #ocrates does not respond to this
directly. )nstead he claims that *1 entails two other theories (Protagoras' and
=eracleitus'), which he e&pounds (1.1e-10:e) and then criticises (10:e-1%"c). #ocrates
e!entually presents no fewer than ele!en arguments, not all of which seem seriously
intended, against the Protagorean and =eracleitean !iews. )f any of these arguments hit
its target, then by %odus tollens *1 is also false. 8 more direct argument against *1 is
e!entually gi!en at 1%$-5.
)n 1%5b$-%, Theaetetus proposes a second definition of Dnowledge, (*2) 23nowledge is
true belief.4 *2 pro!oDes #ocrates to asD, how can there be any such thing as .alse
beliefE There follows a fi!e-phase discussion which attempts to come up with an
account of false belief. 8ll fi!e of these attempts fail, and that appears to be the end of
the topic of false belief. 1inally, at 2::d-2:1c, #ocrates returns to *2 itself. =e
dismisses *2 <ust by arguing that accidental true beliefs cannot be called /no0led#e,
gi!ing 8thenian <urymen as an e&ample of accidental true belief.
Theaetetus tries a third time. =is final proposal (*") defines Dnowledge as 1true belief
with an account (lo#os)4 (2:1c-d). The ensuing discussion attempts to spell out what it
might be liDe for *" to be true, then maDes three attempts to spell out what a lo#os is.
)n 2:1d-2:2d, the famous passage Dnown as The 2rea% o. So&rates, a two-part
ontology of elements and comple&es is proposed. Parallel to this ontology runs a theory
of e&planation that claims that to e&plain, to offer a lo#os, is to analyse comple&es into
their elements, i.e., those parts which cannot be further analysed. 6rucially, the *ream
Theory says that Dnowledge of 3 is true belief about 3 plus an account of 3's
composition. )f 3 is not composite, 3 cannot be Dnown, but only 2percei!ed4 (2:2b0).
7hen #ocrates argues against the *ream Theory (2:2d%-2:0b11), it is this entailment
that he focuses on.
#ocrates then turns to consider, and re<ect, three attempts to spell out what a lo#os isG
to gi!e an account of 2account.4 The first attempt taDes lo#os <ust to mean 2speech4 or
2statement4 (2:0c-e). The second account (2:0e$-2:%b12) of 2lo#os of 34 taDes it as
2enumeration of the elements of 3.4 The third and last proposal (2:%c1-21:a') is that to
gi!e the lo#os of 3 is to cite the s4%eion or diaphora of 3, the 2sign4 or diagnostic
feature wherein 3 differs from e!erything else.
8ll three attempts to gi!e an account of 2account4 fail. The day's discussion, and the
dialogue, end in aporia5 #ocrates lea!es to face his enemies in the courtroom.
" "
3. Overall Interpretations of the Theaetetus
The Theaetetus is a principal field of battle for one of the main disputes between Plato's
interpreters. This is the dispute between 6nitarians and )evisionists.
Unitarians argue that Plato's worDs display a unity of doctrine and a continuity of
purpose throughout. Unitarians include 8ristotle, Proclus, and all the ancient and
mediae!al commentators9 Aishop AerDeley9 and in the modern era, #chleiermacher, 8st,
#horey, *iIs, oss, 6ornford, and 6herniss.
e!isionists retort that Plato's worDs are full of re!isions, retractations, and changes of
direction. /minent e!isionists include ;utoslawsDi, yle, obinson, unciman, +wen,
@c*owell, AostocD, and many recent commentators.
Unitarianism is historically the dominant interpreti!e tradition. e!isionism, it appears,
was not in!ented until the te&t-critical methods, such as stylometry, that were de!eloped
in early nineteenth-century Jerman biblical studies were transferred to Plato.
)n the twentieth century, a different brand of e!isionism has dominated /nglish-
speaDing Platonism. This owes its impetus to a desire to read Plato as charitably as
possible, and a belief that a charitable reading of Plato's worDs will minimise their
dependence on the theory of 1orms. (6orollary, Unitarians are liDelier than e!isionists
to be sympathetic to the theory of 1orms.)
Unitarianism &ould be the thesis that all of Plato's worD is, really, #ocratic in method
and inspiration, and that Plato should be credited with no !iew that is not endorsed in
the early dialogues. ()n some recent writers, Unitarianism is this thesis, see Penner and
owe (2::.).) Aut this is not the most usual form of Unitarianism, which is more liDely
to 2read bacD4 the concerns of the $haedo and the )epubli& into the #ocratic dialogues,
than to 2read forward4 the studied agnosticism of the early worDs into these more
ambitious later dialogues. ;iDewise, e!isionism &ould be e!idenced by the ob!ious
changes of outlooD that occur, e.g., between the 'har%ides and the $haedo, or again
between the $rota#oras and the -or#ias. Aut the main focus of the
e!isionistKUnitarian debate has ne!er been on these dialogues. The contrasts between
the 'har%ides and the $haedo, and the $rota#oras and the -or#ias, tell us little about
the Cuestion whether Plato e!er abandoned the theory of 1orms. 8nd that has usually
been the Dey dispute between e!isionists and Unitarians.
=ence the debate has typically focused on the contrast between the 2the @iddle Period
dialogues4 and 2the ;ate dialogues.4 e!isionists say that the @iddle Period dialogues
enounce positi!e doctrines, abo!e all the theory of 1orms, which the ;ate dialogues
criticise, re<ect, or simply bypass. The main place where e!isionists (e.g., yle 1'"')
suppose that Plato criticises the theory of 1orms is in the $ar%enides (though some
e!isionists find criticism of the theory of 1orms in the Theaetetus and Sophist as well).
The main places where e!isionists looD to see Plato managing without the theory of
1orms are the Theaetetus and Sophist.
yle's e!isionism was soon supported by other +&ford Plato scholars such as
obinson 1'.: and unciman 1'02 (2%). e!isionism was also defended by J./.;.
+wen. @ore recently, @c*owell 1'50, AostocD 1'%%, and Aurnyeat 1'': are three
classic booDs on the Theaetetus of a decidedly e!isionist tendency. (@c*owell shows
a particularly marDed reluctance to bring in the theory of 1orms anywhere where he is
not absolutely compelled to.)
e!isionists are committed by their o!erall stance to a number of more particular !iews5
They are more or less bound to say that the late Plato taDes the $ar%enides7 critiCue of
the theory of 1orms to be cogent, or at least impressi!e9 that the Sophist8s theory of 2the
$ $
fi!e greatest Dinds4 (Sophist 2.$b-2.%e) is not a de!elopment of the theory of 1orms9
and that the Ti%aeus was written before the $ar%enides, because of the Ti%aeus7
apparent defence of theses from the theory of 1orms. Their line on the Theaetetus will
be that its argument does not support the theory of 1orms9 that the Theaetetus is
interesting precisely because it shows us how good at epistemology Plato is once he
.rees himself from his obsession with the 1orms.
#ome of these e!isionist claims looD easier for Unitarians to dispute than others. 1or
e&ample, Plato does not thinD that the arguments of $ar%enides 1":b-1".c actually
disprove the theory of 1orms. ather, it is ob!iously Plato's !iew that Parmenides'
arguments against the 1orms can be refuted. #ee $ar%enides 1".a-d, where Plato
e&plicitly saysGusing Parmenides as his mouthpieceGthat these arguments 0ill be
refuted by anyone of adeCuate philosophical training. (7hether anyone 2of adeCuate
philosophical training4 is a!ailable is, of course, another Cuestion.)
8nother problem for the e!isionist concerns +wen 1'0.'s proposal, adopted by
AostocD 1'%%, to redate the Ti%aeus to the @iddle Period, thus escaping the conclusion
that Plato still accepted the theory of 1orms at the end of his philosophical career. The
trouble with this is that it is not only the Ti%aeus that the e!isionist needs to redate. )n
Cuite a number of apparently ;ate dialogues, Plato seems sympathetic to the theory of
1orms, see e.g., $hilebus 01e and "a0s '0.c.
+n the other hand, the e!isionist claim that the Theaetetus shows Plato doing more or
less completely without the theory of 1orms is !ery plausible. There are no e&plicit
mentions of the 1orms at all in the Theaetetus, e&cept possibly (and e!en this much is
disputed) in what many taDe to be the philosophical bacDwater of the *igression. The
main argument of the dialogue seems to get along without e!en implicit appeal to the
theory of 1orms. )n the Theaetetus, e!isionism seems to be on its strongest ground of
all.
The usual Unitarian answer is that this silence is studied. )n the Theaetetus, Unitarians
suggest, Plato is showing what Dnowledge is not. =is argument is designed to show that
certain sorts of alternati!es to Plato's own account of Dnowledge must fail. Plato
demonstrates this failure by the LmaieuticF method of de!eloping those accounts until
they fail. Thus the Theaetetus shows the impossibility of a successful account of
Dnowledge that does not in!oDe the 1orms.
The fault-line between Unitarians and e!isionists is the deepest fissure separating
interpreters of the Theaetetus. )t is not the only distinction among o!erall interpretations
of the dialogue. )t has also been suggested, both in the ancient and the modern eras, that
the Theaetetus is a sceptical worD9 that the Theaetetus is a genuinely aporetic worD9 and
that the Theaetetus is a dis<ointed worD. =owe!er, there is no space to re!iew these
possibilities here. )t is time to looD more closely at the detail of the arguments that Plato
gi!es in the distinct sections of the dialogue.
. !he Introduction to the Dialogue" 12a#1$e
7e should not miss the three philosophical theses that are e&plicitly ad!anced in the
)ntroduction. They are offered without argument by #ocrates, and agreed to without
argument by Theaetetus, at 1$.d5-1$.e.,
1. The wise are wise sophiai (M byK because ofK in respect ofK as a result of
wisdom,1$.d11).
2. To learn is to become wiser about the topic you are learning about (1$.d%-').
". 7isdom (sophia) and Dnowledge (epist4%4) are the same thing (1$.e.).
. .
8ll three theses might seem contentious today. (1) seems to allude to $haedo 1::e's
notorious thesis about the role of the 1orm of F-ness in any !'s being FGthat ! is F 2by
the 1orm of F-ness.4 (2) looDs contentious because it implies (")9 and (") brings me to a
second Cuestion about 1$2a-1$.e (which is also an important Cuestion about the whole
dialogue), 7hat is the meaning of the JreeD word that ) am translating as 2Dnowledge,4
epist4%4E
@uch has been written about Plato's words for Dnowledge. +ne important Cuestion
raised by unciman 1'02 is the Cuestion whether Plato was aware of the commonplace
modern distinction between Dnowing that, Dnowing how, and Dnowing what (or whom).
Bothing is more natural for modern philosophers than to contrast Dnowledge of ob<ects
(Dnowledge by acCuaintance or ob<ectual Dnowledge9 1rench &onna9tre) with Dnowledge
of how to do things (techniCue Dnowledge), and with Dnowledge of propositions or facts
(propositional Dnowledge9 1rench savoir). unciman doubts that Plato is aware of this
threefold distinction (1'02, 15), 28t the time of writing the Theaetetus Plato had made
no clear distinction NbetweenO Dnowing that, Dnowing how, and Dnowing by
acCuaintance.4
8gainst this, Plato's word for Dnowing how is surely te/hn4, from which we get the
/nglish word 2techniCue.4 Plato ob!iously thinDs te/hn4 incidental to a serious
discussion of epist4%4. This is part of the point of the argument against definition by
e&amples that begins at 1$0d (cp. 155c-15'b).
8s for the difference between Dnowing that and Dnowledge by acCuaintance, the
Theaetetus does mi& passages that discuss the one sort of Dnowledge with passages that
discuss the other. This does not imply that Plato was unaware of the difference. Perhaps
he wants to discuss theories of Dnowledge that find deep conceptual connections
between the two sorts of Dnowledge.
8 grammatical point is rele!ant here. The ob<ectual 2) Dnow So&rates: in classical
JreeD is oida (or #i#n;s/;) ton S;/rat4n9 the propositional 2) Dnow #ocrates is 0ise: is
oida (or #i#n;s/;) ton S;/rat4n sophon einai, literally 2) Dnow #ocrates to be wise.4
The 2to be4 (einai) is idiomatically dispensable9 dispensing with it, we get oida ton
S;/rat4n sophon, literally 2) Dnow (the) 0ise So&rates.4 Thus JreeD idiom can readily
treat the ob<ect of propositional Dnowledge, which in /nglish would most naturally be a
that-clause, as a thin# &onsidered as havin# a <uality. 7e might almost say that JreeD
treats what is Dnown in propositional Dnowledge as <ust one special case of what is
Dnown in ob<ectual Dnowledge. This suggests that the ancient JreeDs naturally saw
propositional and ob<ectual Dnowledge as more closely related than we do (though not
necessarily as indistinguishable). )f so, Plato may ha!e felt able to offer a single
treatment for the two Dinds of Dnowledge without thereby confusing them. The point
will be rele!ant to the whole of the Theaetetus.
$. Definition %y &'amples" 1(a#1$1d
8t 1$.d #ocrates states the 2one little Cuestion that pu??les4 him, 27hat is
DnowledgeE4 Theaetetus' first response (*:) is to offer e&amples of Dnowledge (1$0c).
#ocrates re<ects this response, arguing that, for any !, e&amples of ! are neither
necessary nor sufficient for a definition of !. They are not necessary, because they are
irrele!ant (1$0e). They are not sufficient, because they presuppose the understanding
that a definition is meant to pro!ide (1$5a-b). @oreo!er (1$5c), a definition could be
briefly stated, whereas talDing about e&amples is 2an interminable di!ersion4
(aperanton hodon).
0 0
*oes #ocrates produce good arguments against definition by e&amplesE @any
philosophers thinD not (@c*owell 1'50 (11.), Jeach 1'00, #antas 1'52, Aurnyeat
1'55). They often argue this by appealing to the authority of 7ittgenstein, who
famously complains (The =lue and =ro0n =oo/s, 2:) that 27hen #ocrates asDs the
Cuestion, L7hat is DnowledgeEF, he does not regard it e!en as a preli%inary answer to
enumerate cases of Dnowledge.4 1or arguments against this modern consensus, see
6happell 2::. ("0-"5).
#ome commentators ha!e taDen #ocrates' critiCue of definition by e&amples to be an
implicit critiCue of the )epubli&'s procedure of distinguishing Dnowledge, belief, and
ignorance by distinguishing their ob<ects. The suggestion was first made by yle 1'':
(2"), who points out that 2#ocrates maDes it clear that what he wants discussed is not a
list of things that people Dnow,4 2but an elucidation of the concept of Dnowledge.4 yle
suggests that 28ttention to this simple point might ha!e sa!ed 6ornford from saying
that the implicit conclusion of the dialogue is that Ltrue Dnowledge has for its ob<ects
things of a different orderF.4 yle thinDs it 2silly4 to suggest that Dnowledge can be
defined merely by specifying its ob<ects.
=owe!er, 1$.e-1$5c cannot be read as a critiCue of the )epubli&'s procedure of
distinguishing Dnowledge from belief by their ob<ects. 1$.e-1$5c is not against defining
Dnowledge by e&amples of ob,e&ts of Dnowledge9 it is against defining Dnowledge by
e&amples of /inds of Dnowledge. (#ee e.g., 1$0e5, 27e weren't wanting to maDe a list of
Dinds of Dnowledge.4) This is a different matter.
7hy, anyway, would the Platonist of the )epubli& thinD that e&amples of the ob<ects of
Dnowledge are enough for a definition of DnowledgeE =e is surely the last person to
thinD that. The person who 0ill thinD this is the empiricist, who thinDs that we acCuire
all our concepts by e&posure to e&amples of their application, ;ocDe, *ssay )).1,
8ristotle, $osterior nalyti&s 1::a$-'. 1or the Platonist, definition by e&amples is ne!er
e!en possible9 for the empiricist, definition by e&amples is the natural method in e!ery
case. This suggests that empiricism is a principal target of the argument of the
Theaetetus. @ore about this in sections 0-%.
Theaetetus is pu??led by his own inability to answer #ocrates' reCuest for a definition of
Dnowledge, and contrasts it with the ease with which he can pro!ide mathematical
definitions. =e gi!es an e&ample of a mathematical definition9 scholars are di!ided
about the aptness of the parallel between this, and what would be needed for a definition
of Dnowledge. #ocrates' response, when Theaetetus still protests his inability to define
Dnowledge, is to compare himself to a midwife in a long and intricate analogy.
@any ancient Platonists read the midwife analogy, and more recently 6ornford 1'".
has read it, as alluding to the theory of recollection. 7hile we should not accept that
suggestion, the midwife passage does tell us something important about how the
Theaetetus is going to proceed. )n line with the classification that the ancient editors set
at the front of the dialogue, it is going to be peirasti/os, an e!peri%ental dialogue. )t
will try out a number of suggestions about the nature of Dnowledge. 8s in the aporetic
dialogues, there is no guarantee that any of these suggestions will be successful (and
e!ery chance that none of them will be).
#o read, the midwife passage can also tell us something important about the limitations
of the Theaetetus7 inCuiry. The limitations of the inCuiry are the limitations of the main
inCuirers, and neither (the historical) #ocrates nor Theaetetus was a card-carrying
adherent of Plato's theory of 1orms. Perhaps the dialogue brings us only as far as the
threshold of the theory of 1orms precisely because, on #ocratic principles, one can get
no further. To get beyond where the Theaetetus lea!es off, you ha!e to be a Platonist.
5 5
(1or booD-length de!elopments of this reading of the Theaetetus, see #edley 2::$ and
6happell 2::..)
(. )irst Definition *D1+" ,Knowledge is Perception-"
1$1e#1./a
Aetween #tephanus pages 1.1 and 1%5, and lea!ing aside the *igression, 152-155
(section 0d), "1 pages of close and comple& argument state, discuss, and e!entually
refute the first of Theaetetus' three serious attempts at a definition of Dnowledge (*1),
23nowledge is perception.4
8s before, there are two main alternati!e readings of 1.1-1%5, the Unitarian and the
e!isionist. +n the Unitarian reading, Plato's purpose is to sal!age as much as possible
of the theories of Protagoras and =eracleitus (each respectfully described as ou phaulon,
1.1e%, 1.2d2). Plato's strategy is to show that these theories ha!e their own distincti!e
area of application, the perceptible or sensible world, within which they are true.
=owe!er, the sensible world is not the whole world, and so these theories are not the
whole truth. 7e get absurdities if we try to taDe them as unrestrictedly true. To a!oid
these absurdities it is necessary to posit the intelli#ible 0orld (the world of the 1orms)
alongside the sensible 0orld (the world of perception). 7hen this is done, Platonism
subsumes the theories of Protagoras and =eracleitus as partial truths. +n this reading,
the strategy of the discussion of *1 is to transcend Protagoras and =eracleitus, to
e&plain their !iews by showing how they are, not the truth, but parts of a larger truth. )n
the process the discussion re!eals logical pressures that may push us towards the two-
worlds Platonism that many readers, e.g., oss and 6ornford, find in the )epubli& and
Ti%aeus5
+n the e!isionist reading, Plato's purpose is to refute the theories of Protagoras and
=eracleitus. =e thinDs that the absurdities those theories gi!e rise to, come not from
trying to taDe the theories as unrestri&tedly true, but from trying to taDe them as true at
all, e!en of the sensible world. 8nyone who tries to taDe seriously the thesis that
Dnowledge is perception has to adopt theories of Dnowledge and perception liDe
Protagoras' and =eracleitus'. Aut their theories are untenable. Ay %odus tollens this
shows that *1 itself is untenable. +n this reading, the strategy of the discussion of *1 is
to mo!e us towards the !iew that sensible phenomena ha!e to fall under the same
general metaphysical theory as intelligible phenomena.
This outline of the two main alternati!es for 1.1-1%5 shows how strategic and tactical
issues of Plato interpretation interlocD. 1or instance, the outline shows how important it
is for an o!erall understanding of the Theaetetus to ha!e a !iew on the following
Cuestions of detail (more about them later),
1. 8t 1.0a-1.5c, is #ocrates <ust reporting, or also endorsing, a =eracleitean flu&
theory of perceptionE
2. 7hat is the date of the Ti%aeus, which seems (2%-2', $.b-$0c, $'e) to present a
!ery similar theory of perception to that found in Theaetetus 1.0-5E
". 7hat does Plato taDe to be the logical relations between the three positions
under discussion in 1.1-1%$ (*1, Protagoras' theory, and =eracleitus' theory)E
The closer he taDes them to be, the more support that seems to gi!e to the
e!isionist !iew that the whole of 1.1-1%5 is one gigantic %odus tollens. The
more separate they are, the better for those !ersions of Unitarianism that suggest
that Plato wants to picD and choose among the positions offered in 1.1-1%5.
#o much for the o!erall structure of 1.1-1%59 now for the parts.
% %
(.1 !he Definition of Knowledge as Perception" 1$1d#e
8t 1.1d5-e" Theaetetus proposes *1, 23nowledge is nothin# other than perception4
(aisth4sis). This proposal is immediately eCuated by #ocrates with Protagoras's thesis
that 2man is the measure of all things4 (=m for ho%o%ensura), which in turn entails the
thesis that things are to any human <ust as they appear to that human (P# for
phenomenal sub<ecti!ism). #ocrates then adds that, in its turn, P# entails =eracleitus'
!iew that 28ll is flu&,4 that there are no stably e&isting ob,e&ts with stably enduring
<ualities.
The first of these deft e&changes strucD the 8nonymous 6ommentator as disingenuous,
2Plato himself Dnew that Protagoras' opinion about Dnowledge was not the same as
Theaetetus'4 (8non, ad lo&5). 6ertainly it is easy to see counter-e&amples to the alleged
entailment. TaDe, for instance, the thesis that Dnowledge is a0areness (which is often
the right way to translate aisth4sis). +r taDe the thesis that to Dnow is to percei!e things
as Jod, or the )deal +bser!er, percei!es them, and that we fail to Dnow (or to percei!e)
<ust insofar as our opinions are other than Jod's or the )deal +bser!er's. These theses
are both !ersions of *1. Beither entails =m, the claim that 2man is the measure of all
things49 nor the Protagoreanism that lies behind that slogan.
#o how, if at all, does *1 entail all the things that #ocrates apparently maDes it entail in
1.1-1%$E 8nd does Plato thinD it has all these entailmentsE /!idently the answer to that
depends on how we understand *1. )n particular, it depends on the meaning of the word
aisth4sis, 2perception,4 in *1. )f the slogan 23nowledge is perception4 eCuates
Dnowledge with what ordinary speaDers of classical JreeD would ha!e meant by
aisth4sis, then *1 does not entail Protagoras' and =eracleitus' !iews. )n the ordinary
sense of aisth4sis, there are (as <ust pointed out) too many other possible ways of
spelling out *1 for the mo!e from *1 to =m to be logically obligatory. Aut if the slogan
23nowledge is perception4 eCuates Dnowledge with what Protagoras and =eracleitus
meant by aisth4sis, *1 does entail Protagoras' and =eracleitus' !iews. +f course it does9
for then *1 simply says that Dnowledge is <ust what Protagoras and =eracleitus say
Dnowledge is.
(.2 !he ,0old 1ind- 2rgument3 and the !heory of )lu'" 1$2a#1(4e
8t 1.2b1-1.2c% #ocrates begins his presentation of Protagoras' !iew that things are to
any human <ust as they appear to that human by taDing the e&ample of a wind which
affects two people differently. #uch cases, he says, support Protagoras' analysis, 2that
the wind is cold to the one 0ho .eels &old, but not cold to the one 0ho does not .eel
&old54
#ome scholars (6ornford 1'"., ""-$9 7aterlow 1'55) thinD that the point of the
argument is that both 2the wind in itself is cold4 and 2the wind in itself is not cold (but
warm)4 are true, 2L7armF and LcoldF are two properties which can co-e&ist in the same
physical ob<ect. ) percei!e the one, you percei!e the other.4 The trouble with this
suggestion is that much of the detail of the ProtagoreanK=eracleitean position in 1.1-
1%$ seems to be generated by Protagoras' desire to avoid contradiction. )f 6ornford
thinDs that Protagoras is not concerned to a!oid contradicting himself, then he has a
huge tasD of reinterpretation ahead of him.
ather, perhaps, the point of the argument is this, Beither 2The wind in itself is cold4
nor 2The wind in itself is warm4 is true. )f we had grounds for affirming either, we
would ha!e eCually good grounds for affirming both9 but the con<unction 2The wind in
itself is cold and the wind in itself is warm4 is a contradiction. This contradiction, says
Protagoras, obliges us to gi!e up all talD about 2the wind in itself,4 and switch to
relati!ised talD about the wind as it seems to %e or to you, etc. (The same contradiction
' '
pushes the Plato of the )epubli& in the opposite direction, it leads him to place no
further trust in any relati!ised talD, precisely because such talD cannot get us beyond
such contradictions.)
#o we ha!e mo!ed from *1, to =m, to P#. 8t 1.2c%-1.2e1 #ocrates adds that, in its
turn, P# entails =eracleitus' !iew that 28ll is flu&,4 that there are no stably e&isting
ob,e&ts with stably enduring <ualities5 The reason gi!en for this is the same thought as
the one at the centre of the cold-wind argument, that e!erything to which any predicate
can be applied, according to one perception, can also ha!e the negation of that predicate
applied to it, according to an opposite perception with eCually good credentials.
8fter a passage (1.2e1-1."d.) in which #ocrates presents what seem to be deliberately
bad arguments, eight of them, for =eracleitus' flu& thesis, #ocrates notes three shocDing
theses which the flu& theory implies,
1. Pualities ha!e no independent e&istence in time and space (1."d0-e1).
2. Pualities do not e&ist e&cept in perceptions of them (1."e"-1.$a%).
". (The dice parado&,) changes in a thing's Cualities are not so much changes in
that thing as in perceptions of that thing (1.$a'-1..c0).
These shocDing implications, #ocrates says, gi!e the phenomenal sub<ecti!ist his reason
to re<ect the entire ob<ectKCuality metaphysics, and to replace it with a metaphysics of
flu&.
)n 1..c-1.5c the flu& theory is used to de!elop a ProtagoreanK=eracleitean account of
perception, to replace accounts based on the ob<ectKproperty ontology of common sense.
#ocrates notes the sub!ersi!e implications of the theory of flu& for the meaningfulness
and truth-aptness of most of our language as it stands. (=e returns to this point at 1%"a-
b.) The ontology of the flu& theory distinguishes Dinds of 2process4 (/in4sis), i.e., of
flu&, in two ways, as fast or slow, and as acti!e or passi!e. =ence there are four such
processes. +n these the flu& theory's account of perception rests.
8 rather similar theory of perception is gi!en by Plato in Ti%aeus $.b-$0c, 05c-0%d.
This fact has much e&ercised scholars, since it relates closely to the Cuestion whether
Plato himself accepts the flu& theory of perception (cp. Theaetetus 1.5c.). The Cuestion
is important because it connects with the Cuestion of whether the e!isionist or
Unitarian reading of 1.1-1%5 is right. (1or more on this issue, see 6ornford 1'". ($'-
.:)9 6rombie 1'0", )) (21-22)9 Aurnyeat 1'': (15-1%)9 @c*owell 1'5" (1"'-1$:),
6happell 2::. (5$-5%).)
8t 1.5c-10:c #ocrates states a first ob<ection to the flu& theory. This asDs how the flu&
theorist is to distinguish false (decepti!e) appearances such as dreams from the true
(undecepti!e) appearances of the waDing world. The flu& theorist's answer is that such
appearances should not be described as LtrueF and LfalseF appearances to the same
person. ather they should be described as different appearances to different people.
8ccording to the flu& theorist, we ha!e the same person if and only if we ha!e the same
combination of a perception and a percei!ing (1.'c-d). #o there is no need to call any
appearances .alse. Thus we preser!e the claim that all appearances are trueGa claim
which must be true if Dnowledge is perception in the sense that #ocrates has taDen that
definition.
10:b-d summarises the whole of 1.1-10:. #ocrates shows how the e&ploration of
Theaetetus' identification of Dnowledge with perception has led us to de!elop a whole
battery of !iews, in particular, a Protagorean doctrine of the incorrigibility of
perception, and a =eracleitean account of what perception is. Thus 2perception has one
of the two marDs of Dnowledge, infallibility4 (6ornford 1'"., .%)9 2and, if we can
1: 1:
accept Protagoras' identification of what appears to me with what is, ignoring the
addition Lfor meF and the distinction between being and becoming, the case will be
complete.4
(.3 !he 5efutation of the !hesis that Knowledge is Perception" 1(4e$#
1.(e12
10:e marDs the transition from the statement and e&position of the definition of
Dnowledge as perception (*1), to the criticism and e!entual refutation of that definition.
#cholars ha!e di!ided about the o!erall purpose of 10:e-1%0e. @ostly they ha!e
di!ided along the lines described in section ", taDing either a e!isionist or a Unitarian
!iew of Part +ne of the Theaetetus.
e!isionists say that the target of the critiCue of 10:e-1%0e is e!erything that has been
said in support and de!elopment of *1 e!er since 1.1. Unitarians argue that Plato's
criticism of *1 in 10:e-1%0e is more selecti!e. +b!iously his aim is to refute *1, the
eCuation of Dnowledge with perception. Aut that does not oblige him to re<ect the
account of perception that has been offered in support of *1. 8nd Plato does not re<ect
this account, he accepts it.
Thus the Unitarian 6ornford argues that Plato is not re<ecting the =eracleitean flu&
theory of perception. =e is re<ecting only *1's claim that /no0led#e is that sort of
perception. )t remains possible that perception is <ust as =eracleitus describes it.
;iDewise, 6ornford suggests, the Protagorean doctrine that 2man is the measure of all
things4 is true pro!ided it is taDen to mean only 2all things that 0e per&eive.4
)f some form of Unitarianism is correct, an e&amination of 10:-1%0 should show that
Plato's strategy in the critiCue of *1 highlights two distinctions,
1. 8 distinction between the claim that the ob,e&ts o. per&eption are in flu&, and the
claim that everythin# is in flu&.
2. 8 distinction between bare sensory awareness, and <udgement on the basis of
such awareness.
+ne !ital passage for distinction (1) is 1%1b-1%"b. )f Unitarianism is right, this passage
should be an attacD on the =eracleitean thesis that everythin# is in flu&, but not an attacD
on the =eracleitean thesis that the ob,e&ts o. per&eption are in flu&. 8ccording to
Unitarians, the thesis that the ob<ects of perception are in flu& is a Platonic thesis too.
eaders should asD themsel!es whether this is the right way to read 1%1b -1%"b.
*istinction (2) seems to be e&plicitly stated at 15'c. There also seems to be clear
e!idence of distinction (2) in the final argument against *1, at 1%$-1%5. *istinction (2)
is also at worD, apparently, in the discussion of some of the nine ob<ections addressed to
the Protagorean theory. #ome of these ob<ections can plausibly be read as points about
the unattracti!e conseCuences of failing to distinguish the Protagorean claim that bare
sense-awareness is incorrigible (as the Unitarian Plato agrees) from the further
Protagorean claim that ,ud#e%ents about sense-awareness are incorrigible (which the
Unitarian Plato denies).
The criticism of *1 breaDs down into twel!e separate arguments, interrupted by the
*igression (152c-155c, translated and discussed separately in section 0d). There is no
space here to comment in detail on e!ery one of these arguments, some of which, as
noted abo!e, ha!e often been thought fri!olous or comically intended (cp. 1.2e1-
1."d.). #ome brief notes on the earlier ob<ections will show what the serious point of
each might be.
11 11
The first ob<ection to Protagoras (10:e-101d) obser!es that if all perceptions are true,
then there is no reason to thinD that animal perceptions are inferior to human ones, a
situation which #ocrates finds absurd.
)f this ob<ection is really concerned with perceptions strictly so called, then it ob!iously
fails. Protagoras <ust accepts this supposedly absurd conseCuence9 and apparently he is
right to do so. )f we consider animals and humans <ust as percei!ers, there is no
automatic reason to prefer human perceptions. @any animal perceptions are superior to
human perceptions, and the JreeDs Dnew it. The ob<ection worDs much better rephrased
as an ob<ection about ,ud#e%ents about perceptions, rather than about per&eptions
strictly so called. =umans are no more and no less per&eivers than pigs, baboons, or
tadpoles. Aut they are different in their powers of <udgement about perceptions.
This distinction between arguments against a Protagorean !iew about perception and a
Protagorean !iew about <udgement about perception is rele!ant to the second ob<ection
too (101d-102a). This ob<ection (cp. 'ratylus "%0c) maDes the point that Protagoras'
theory implies that no one is wiser than anyone else. Botably, the argument does not
attacD the idea that per&eption is infallible. ather, it attacDs the idea that the opinion or
<udgement that anyone forms on the basis o. perception is infallible (101d"). (This is an
important piece of support for Unitarianism, cp. distinction (2) abo!e.)
8 third ob<ection to Protagoras' thesis is !ery CuicDly stated in #ocrates' two rhetorical
Cuestions at 102c2-0. #ince Protagoras' thesis implies that all perceptions are true, it not
only has the allegedly absurd conseCuence that animals' perceptions are not inferior to
humans. )t also has the conseCuence that humans' perceptions are not inferior to the
gods'. This conseCuence too is now said to be absurd.
8s with the first two ob<ections, so here. )f we consider di!inities and humans <ust as
percei!ers, there is no automatic reason to prefer di!ine perceptions, and hence no
absurdity. Plato may well want us to infer that the JreeD gods are not different <ust in
respect of being per&eivers from humans. Aut they are different in their powers of
<udgement about perceptions.
The ne&t four arguments (10"a-10%c) present counter-e&amples to the alleged
eCui!alence of Dnowledge and perception. The fourth obser!es that, if perception M
Dnowledge, then anyone who percei!es an utterance in a gi!en language should ha!e
Dnowledge of that utterance, i.e., understand itGwhich plainly doesn't happen. The fifth
raises a similar problem about memory and perception, remembering things is /no0in#
them, but not per&eivin# them. The si&th (the 2co!ered eye4) ob<ection contrasts not
per&eivin# an ob<ect (in one sensory modality) with not /no0in# it. )f perception M
Dnowledge, seeing an ob<ect with one eye and not seeing it with the other would appear
to be a case of the contradictory state of both Dnowing it and not Dnowing it. The
se!enth points out that one can percei!e dimly or faintly, clearly or unclearly, but that
these ad!erbial distinctions do not apply to ways of DnowingGas they must if Dnowing
is percei!ing.
)n 10.e$-10%c., #ocrates sDetches Protagoras's response to these se!en ob<ections.
Protagoras maDes two main points. 1irst, he can meet some of the ob<ections by
distinguishing types and occasions of perception. #econd, teaching as he understands it
is not a matter of getting the pupil to ha!e true rather than false beliefs. #ince there are
no false beliefs, the change that a teacher can effect is not a change from false belief to
true belief or Dnowledge. ather, Protagoras' model of teaching is a therapeuti& model.
7hat a good teacher does, according to him, is use arguments (or discourses, lo#oi) as a
good doctor uses drugs, to replace the state of the soul in which 2bad things are and
12 12
appear4 with one in which 2good things are and appear.4 7hile all beliefs are true, not
all beliefs are bene.i&ial.
8 difficulty for Protagoras' position here is that, if all beliefs are true, then all beliefs
about which beliefs are beneficial must be true. Aut surely, some beliefs about which
beliefs are beneficial contradict other beliefs about which beliefs are beneficial9
especially if some people are better than others at bringing about beneficial beliefs. (1or
e&ample, no doubt Plato's and Protagoras' beliefs conflict at this point.) This means that
Protagoras' !iew entails a contradiction of the same sort as the ne&t ob<ectionQthe
famous peritrop4Gseems to be meant to bring out.
The peritrop4 (2table-turning4) ob<ection (151a-b) is this. #uppose ) belie!e, as
Protagoras does, that 28ll beliefs are true,4 but also admit that 2There is a belief that
LBot all beliefs are trueF.4 )f all beliefs are true, the belief that 2Bot all beliefs are true4
must be true too. Aut if that belief is true, then by disCuotation, not all beliefs are true.
#o ) refute myself by contradicting myself9 and the same holds for Protagoras.
The !alidity of the ob<ection has been much disputed. Aurnyeat, *enyer and #edley all
offer reconstructions of the ob<ection that maDe it come out !alid. @c*owell and
AostocD suggest that although the ob<ection does not pro!e what it is meant to pro!e
(self-contradiction), it does pro!e a different point (about self-defeat) which is eCually
worth maDing.
#ocrates' ninth ob<ection presents Protagoras' theory with a dilemma. )f the theory is
completely general in its application, then it must say that not only what counts as
,usti&e in cities, but also what bene.its cities, is a relati!e matter. 8s Protagoras has
already admitted (105a"), it is implausible to say that benefit is a relati!e notion. Aut the
alternati!e, which Protagoras apparently prefers, is a conceptual di!orce between the
notions of <ustice and benefit, which restrict the application of Protagoras' theory to the
notion of <ustice. #ocrates ob!iously finds this conceptual di!orce unattracti!e, though
he does not, directly, say why. )nstead, he offers us the *igression.
(. !he Digression" 1/2c1#1//%/
The *igression is a critiCue of the society that produces the conceptual di!orce between
<ustice and benefit that has <ust emerged. #ocrates draws an e&tended parallel between
two types of character, the philosophical man and the man of rhetoric, to show that it is
better to be the philosophical type.
The *igression is 2philosophically Cuite pointless,4 according to yle 1'00, 1.%. ;ess
dismissi!ely, @c*owell 1'50, 15$ suggests that the *igression ser!es 2a purpose
which, in a modern booD, might be ser!ed by footnotes or an appendi&.4 #imilarly,
6ornford 1'". (%") suggests that Plato aims to gi!e the reader some references for anti-
relati!ist arguments that he presents elsewhere, 2To argue e&plicitly against it would
perhaps taDe him too far from the original topic of perception. )nstead, he inserts Nthe
*igressionO, which contains allusions to such arguments in other worDs of his.4
Perhaps the *igression paints a picture of what it is liDe to live in accordance with the
two different accounts of Dnowledge, the Protagorean and the Platonist, that Plato is
comparing. Thus the *igression shows us what is ethically at staDe in the often abstruse
debates found elsewhere in the Theaetetus. )ts point is that we can't maDe a decision
about what account of Dnowledge to accept without maDing all sorts of other decisions,
not only about the technical, logical and metaphysical matters that are to the fore in the
rest of the Theaetetus, but also about Cuestions of deep ethical significance. #o, for
instance, it can hardly be an accident that, at 150c2, the difference between <ustice and
in<ustice is said to be a difference between Dnowledge (#n;sis) and ignorance (a#noia).
1" 1"
8nother common Cuestion about the *igression is, does it introduce or mention the
Platonic 1ormsE 6ertainly the *igression uses phrases that are indisputably part of the
@iddle-Period language for the 1orms. )f Plato uses the language of the theory of 1orms
in a passage which is admitted on all sides to allude to the themes of the )epubli&, it
strains credulity to imagine that Plato is not intentionally referring to the 1orms in that
passage.
+n the other hand, as the e!isionist will point out, the Theaetetus does not seem to do
much with the 1orms that are thus allegedly introduced. Aut perhaps it would
undermine the Unitarian reading of the Theaetetus if the 1orms 0ere present in the
*igression in the role of paradigm ob<ects of Dnowledge. That would be a case of
2gi!ing away the plot.4
(.$ 6ast O%7ection to Protagoras" 1//c(#1/8%$
8fter the *igression #ocrates returns to criticising Protagoras' relati!ism. =is last
ob<ection is that there is no coherent way of applying Protagoras' relati!ism to
<udgements about the future.
=ow might Protagoras counter this ob<ectionE Protagoras has already suggested that the
past may now be no more than whate!er ) now remember it to ha!e been (100b).
Perhaps he can also suggest that the future is now no more than ) now belie!e it will be.
Bo prediction is e!er pro!ed wrong, <ust as no memory is e!er inaccurate. 8ll that
happens is it seems to one self at one time that something 0ill be true (or has been true),
and seems to another self at another time that something different is true.
Aut these appeals to distinctions between Protagorean sel!esGfuture or pastGdo not
help. #uppose we grant to Protagoras that, when ) maDe a claim about how the future
will be, this claim concerns how things will be .or %y .uture sel.. )t is <ust irrele!ant to
add that my future self and ) are different beings. 6laims about the future still ha!e a
form that maDes them refutable by so%eone7s future e&perience. )f ) predict on @onday
that on Tuesday my head will hurt, that claim is falsified either if ) ha!e no headache on
Tuesday, or if, on Tuesday, there is someone who is by con!ention picDed out as my
continuant whose head does not hurt.
#imilarly with the past. #uppose ) Dnow on Tuesday that on @onday ) predicted that on
Tuesday my head would hurt. )t is no help against the present ob<ection for me to
reflect, on Tuesday, that ) am a different person now from who ) was then. @y @onday-
self can only ha!e meant either that his head would hurt on Tuesday, which was a false
belief on his part if he no longer e&ists on Tuesday9 or else that the Tuesday-self would
ha!e a sore head. Aut if the Tuesday-self has no sore head, then my @onday-self made a
false prediction, and so must ha!e had a false belief. /ither way, the relati!ist does not
escape the ob<ection.
@oreo!er, this defence of Protagoras does not e!ade the following dilemma. /ither
what ) mean by claiming (to taDe an e&ample of AostocD's) that 2The wine will taste raw
to me in fi!e years' time4 is literally that. +r else what ) mean is <ust 2(t see%s to %e that
the wine will taste raw to me in fi!e years' time.4
#uppose ) mean the former assertion. )f the wine turns out not to taste raw fi!e years
hence, Protagoras has no defence from the conclusion that ) made a false prediction
about how things would seem to me in fi!e years. +r suppose ) meant the latter
assertion. Then ) did not maDe a predi&tion, strictly speaDing, at all9 merely a remarD
about what presently seems to me. /ither way, Protagoras loses.
1$ 1$
(.( 6ast O%7ection to 9eracleitus" 1/8c1#1.3c2
#ocrates argues that if =eracleitus' doctrine of flu& is true, then no assertion whate!er
can properly be made. Therefore (a) =eracleitus' theory of flu& no more helps to pro!e
that Dnowledge is perception than that Dnowledge is not perception, and (b)
=eracleiteans cannot coherently say anything at all, not e!en to state their own doctrine.
There are two !ariants of the argument. +n the first of these !ariants, e!ident in 1%1c2-
e1:, #ocrates distinguishes <ust t0o Dinds of flu& or process, namely Cualitati!e
alteration and spatial motion, and insists that the =eracleiteans are committed to saying
that both are continual. +n the second !ariant, e!ident perhaps at 1%2a1, 1%2e$-.,
#ocrates distinguishes indefinitely many Dinds of flu& or process, not <ust Cualitati!e
alteration and motion through space, and insists that the =eracleiteans are committed to
saying that every Dind of flu& is continual.
Bow the !iew that e!erything is always changing in e!ery way might seem a rather
foolish !iew to taDe about e!eryday ob<ects. Aut, as 1%2a2-b% shows, the present
argument is not about e!eryday ob<ects anyway. Plato does not apply his distinction
between Dinds of change to e!ery sort of ob<ect whate!er, including e!eryday ob<ects.
=e applies it specifically to the ob<ects (if that is the word) of =eracleitean metaphysics.
These items are supposed by the =eracleitean to be the reality underlying all talD of
e!eryday ob<ects. )t is at the le!el of these =eracleitean percei!ings and percei!ers that
Plato's argument against =eracleitus is pitched. 8nd it is not ob!iously silly to suppose
that =eracleitean percei!ings and percei!ers are constantly changing in e!ery way.
The argument that #ocrates presents on the =eracleiteans' behalf infers from
2/!erything is always changing in e!ery way4 that 2Bo description of anything is
e&cluded.4 =ow does this followE @c*owell 1'50, 1%1-2 finds the missing linD in the
impossibility of identi.i&ations. 7e cannot (says @c*owell) identify a mo!ing sample
of whiteness, or of seeing, any lon#er once it has changed into some other colour, or
perception.
Aut this only e&cludes reidentifications, presumably ) can identify the mo!ing whiteness
or the mo!ing seeing until it changes, e!en if this only gi!es me an instant in which to
identify it. This point renders @c*owell's !ersion, as it stands, an in!alid argument. )f it
is on his account possible to identify the mo!ing whiteness until it &han#es, then it is on
his account possible to identify the mo!ing whiteness. Aut if that is possible, then his
argument contradicts itself, for it goes on to deny this possibility.
#ome other accounts of the argument also commit this fallacy. 6ompare #ayre's account
(1'0', '$), 2)f no statement, either affirmati!e or negati!e, can remain true for longer
than the time taDen in its utterance, then no statement can be treated as either true or
false, and the cause of communicating with one's fellow beings must be gi!en up as
hopeless.4
#ayre's argument aims at the conclusion 2Bo statement can be treated as either true or
false.4 Aut #ayre goes !ia the premiss 28ny statement remains true no longer than the
time taDen in its utterance.4 )f there are statements which are true, e!en if they are not
true for !ery long, it is not clear why these statements cannot be treated as true, at least
in principle (and in practice too, gi!en creatures with the right sensory eCuipment and
sense of time).
@c*owell's and #ayre's !ersions of the argument also face the following ob<ection. )t is
ob!ious how, gi!en flu&, a present-tense claim liDe 2)tem > is present4 can CuicDly
cease to be true, because e.g., 2)tem ? is present4 comes to replace it. Aut it isn't
ob!ious why flu& should e&clude the possibility of past-tense statements liDe 2)tem >
1. 1.
flowed into item ? between t
1
and t
2
,4 or of tenseless statements liDe 2)tem > is present
at t
1
, item ? is present at t
2
.4 8s AostocD 1'%%, 1:.-0 points out, 2#o long as we do ha!e
a language with stable meanings, and the ability to maDe temporal distinctions, there is
no difficulty at all about describing an e!er-changing world.4
1So lon# as:, to maDe the argument worDable, we may suggest that its point is that the
%eanin#s o. 0ords are e&empt from flu&. )f meanings are not in flu&, and if we ha!e
access to those meanings, nothing stops us from identifying the whiteness at least until
it flows away. Aut if meanings are in flu& too, we will ha!e the result that the argument
against =eracleitus actually produces at 1%"a., anything at all will count eCually well as
identifying or not identifying the whiteness. 2Unless we recognise some class of
Dnowable entities e&empt from the =eracleitean flu& and so capable of standing as the
fi&ed meanings of words, no definition of Dnowledge can be any more true than its
contradictory. Plato is determined to maDe us feel the need of his 1orms without
mentioning them4 (6ornford 1'"., '').
(./ !he )inal 5efutation of D1" 1.3c#1./a.
#ocrates completes his refutation of the thesis that Dnowledge is perception by bringing
a twelfth and final ob<ection, directed against *1 itself rather than its Protagorean or
=eracleitean interpretations. This ob<ection says that the mind maDes use of a range of
concepts which it could not ha!e acCuired, and which do not operate, through the
senses, e.g., 2e&istence,4 2sameness,4 2difference.4 #o there is a part of thought, and
hence of Dnowledge, which has nothing to do with perception. Therefore Dnowledge is
not perception.
Unitarians and e!isionists will read this last argument against *1 in line with their
general orientations. Unitarians will suggest that #ocrates' range of concepts common to
the senses is a list of 1orms. They will point to the similarities between the image of the
senses as soldiers in a wooden horse that #ocrates offers at 1%$d1 ff., and the picture of
a =eracleitean self, e&isting only in its awareness of particular perceptions, that he drew
at 1.0-10:.
e!isionists will retort that there are important differences between the =eracleitean
self and the wooden-horse self, differences that show that =eracleiteanism is no longer
in force in 1%$-1%5. They will insist that the !iew of perception in play in 1%$-1%5 is
Plato's own non-=eracleitean !iew of perception. Thus Aurnyeat 1'':, ..-.0 argues
that, since =eracleiteanism has been refuted by 1%$, 2the organs and sub<ects dealt with
Nin the 7ooden =orse passageO are the ordinary stable Dind which continue in being
from one moment to the ne&t.4 +n the other hand, notice that Plato's eCui!alent for
Aurnyeat's 2organs and sub<ects4 is the single word aisth4seis (1%$d2). +n its own, the
word can mean either 2senses4 or 2sensings49 but it seems significant that it was the
word Plato used at 1.0b1 for one of the two sorts of =eracleitean 2offspring.4 Plato
speaDs of the aisth4seis concealed 2as if within a 7ooden =orse4 as pollai tines
(1%$d1), 2indefinitely many.4 Aut while there are indefinitely many =eracleitean
sensin#s, there are not, of course, indefinitely many senses. )ndeed e!en the claim that
we ha!e %any senses (pollai), rather than several (enioi, tines), does not sound Cuite
right, either in /nglish or in JreeD. This is perhaps why most translators, assuming that
aisth4seis means 2senses,4 put 2a number of senses4 for pollai tines aisth4seis. Perhaps
this is a mistaDe, and what aisth4seis means here is 2=eracleitean sensings.4 )f so, this
e&plains how the aisth4seis inside any gi!en 7ooden =orse can be pollai tines5
)f the aisth4seis in the 7ooden =orse are =eracleitean sensin#s, not ordinary, un-
=eracleitean senses, this supports the Unitarian idea that 1%$-1%5 is contrasting
10 10
=eracleitean percei!ing of particulars with Platonic Dnowing of the 1orms (or Dnowing
of particulars via, and in ter%s o., the 1orms).
8nother piece of e!idence pointing in the same direction is the similarity between
Plato's list of the 2common notions4 at Theaetetus 1%0a and closely contemporary lists
that he gi!es of the 1orms, such as the list of 1orms (li/eness, %ultitude, rest and their
opposites) gi!en at $ar%enides 12'd, with ethical additions at $ar%enides 1":b. There
are also the the %e#ista #en4 (2greatest Dinds4) of Sophist 2.$b-2.%e (bein#, sa%eness,
otherness, rest and &han#e)9 though whether these #en4 are 1orms is contro!ersial.
/. Second Definition *D2+" ,Knowledge is !rue
:udgement-" 1./%#241c
1.1-1%5 has considered and re<ected the proposal that Dnowledge is perception.
#ometimes in 1.1-1%5 2perception4 seems to mean 2immediate sensory awareness49 at
other times it seems to mean 2<udgements made about immediate sensory awareness.4
The proposal that 23nowledge is immediate sensory awareness4 is re<ected as
incoherent, 23nowledge is not to be found in our bodily e&periences, but in our
reasonings about those e&periences4 (1%0d2). The proposal that 23nowledge is
<udgement about immediate sensory awareness4 raises the Cuestion ho0 <udgements, or
beliefs, can emerge from immediate sensory awareness. 8nswering this Cuestion is the
main aim in 1%5-2:1.
/mpiricists claim that sensation, which in itself has no cogniti!e content, is the source
of all beliefs, which essentially ha!e cogniti!e contentGwhich are by their !ery nature
candidates for truth or falsity. #o unless we can e&plain how beliefs can be true or false,
we cannot e&plain how there can be beliefs at all. =ence Plato's interest in the Cuestion
of false belief. 7hat Plato wants to show in 1%5-2:1 is that there is no way for the
empiricist to construct contentful belief from contentless sensory awareness alone. The
corollary is, of course, that we need something else besides sensory awareness to
e&plain belief. )n modern terms, we need irreducible se%anti& properties5 )n Plato's
terms, we need the 1orms.
)n pursuit of this strategy of argument in 1%5-2:1, Plato re<ects in turn fi!e possible
empiricist e&planations of how there can be false belief. )n the 1irst Pu??le (1%%a-c) he
proposes a basic difficulty for any empiricist. Then he argues that no mo!e a!ailable to
the empiricist circum!ents this basic difficulty, howe!er much comple&ity it may
introduce (the other four Pu??les, 1%%d-2:1b). The 1ifth Pu??le collapses bacD into the
Third Pu??le, and the Third Pu??le collapses bacD into the 1irst. The proposal that gi!es
us the 1ourth Pu??le is dispro!ed by the counter-e&amples that maDe the 1ifth Pu??le
necessary. 8s for the #econd Pu??le, Plato deploys this to show how empiricism has the
disabling drawbacD that it turns an outrageous sophistical argument into a !alid disproof
of the possibility of at least some sorts of false belief.
Thus 1%5-2:1 continues the critiCue of perception-based accounts of Dnowledge that
1.1-1%5 began. 6ontrary to what someGfor instance 6ornfordGha!e thought, it is no
digression from the main path of the Theaetetus. +n the contrary, the discussion of false
belief is the most ob!ious way forward.
8s Plato stresses throughout the dialogue, it is Theaetetus who is caught in this problem
about false belief. )t is not #ocrates, nor Plato. There is clear e!idence at $hilebus "%c
ff. that false belief (at least of some sorts) was no problem at all to Plato himself (at
least at some points in his career). Plato's Cuestion is not 2=ow on earth can there be
false <udgementE4 ather it is 27hat sort of bacDground assumptions about Dnowledge
15 15
must Theaetetus be maDing, gi!en that he is pu??led by the Cuestion how there can be
false <udgementE4
)s it only false <udgements of identity that are at issue in 1%5-2:1, or is it any false
<udgementE +ne interpretation of 1%5-2:1 says that it is only about false <udgements of
misidentification. 6all this !iew %isidenti.i&ationis%. The main alternati!e
interpretation of 1%5-2:1 says that it is about any and e!ery false <udgement. 6all this
!iew anti@%isidenti.i&ationis%. @y discussion assumes the truth of anti-
misidentificationism9 see 6happell 2::., 1.$-1.5 for the arguments.
) turn to the detail of the fi!e proposals about how to e&plain false belief that occupy
#tephanus pages 1%5 to 2:: of the dialogue.
/.1 !he Pu;;le of <isidentification" 1./e$#1..c.
The first proposal about how to e&plain the possibility of false belief is the proposal that
false belief occurs when someone misidentifies one thing as another. To belie!e or <udge
falsely is to <udge, for some two ob<ects 3A and 32, that 3A is 32.
=ow can such confusions e!en occurE Plato presents a dilemma that seems to show that
they can't. The ob<ects of the <udgement, 3A and 32, must either be Dnown or unDnown
to the <udger !. #uppose one of the ob<ects, say 3A, is unDnown to !. )n that case, 3A
cannot figure in !'s thoughts at all, since ! can only form <udgements using ob<ects that
he Dnows. #o if 3A is not an ob<ect Dnown to !, ! cannot maDe any <udgement about 3A.
.ortiori, then, ! can maDe no .alse <udgement about 3A either.
)f, on the other hand, both 3A and 32 are Dnown to !, then ! can perhaps maDe so%e
<udgements about 3A and 329 but not the false <udgement that 23A is 32.4 )f ! /no0s
3A and 32, ! must Dnow that 3A is 3A and 32 is 32, and that it would be a confusion
to identify them. #o apparently false belief is impossible if the <udger does not Dnow
both 3A and 329 but also impossible if he does Dnow both 3A and 32.
) cannot mistaDe > for ? unless ) am able to formulate thoughts about > and ?. Aut )
will not be able to formulate thoughts about > and ? unless ) am a&<uainted with > and
?. Aeing acCuainted with > and ? means /no0in# > and ?9 and anyone who Dnows >
and ? will not mistaDe them for each other.
7hy thinD this a genuine pu??leE There seem to be plenty of e!eryday cases where
Dnowing some thing in no way pre!ents us from sometimes mistaDing that thing for
something else. +ne e&ample in the dialogue itself is at 1'1b (cp. 1$$c.). )t is perfectly
possible for someone who Dnows #ocrates to see Theaetetus in the distance, and
wrongly thinD that Theaetetus is #ocrates. The 1irst Pu??le does not e!en get off the
ground, unless we can see why our Dnowledge of > and ? should guarantee us against
mistaDes about > and ?. 7ho is the pu??le of 1%%a-c supposed to be a pu??le .orE
#ome authors, such as AostocD, 6rombie, @c*owell, and 7hite, thinD that Plato
himself is pu??led by this pu??le. Thus 6rombie 1'0", 111 thinDs that Plato ad!ances
the claim that any Dnowledge at all of an ob<ect 3 is sufficient for infallibility about 3
because he fails to see the difference between 2being acCuainted with >4 and 2being
familiar with >.4 Aut to confuse Dnowing everythin# about > with Dnowing enough
about > to use the name L>F is really a !ery simple mistaDe. Plato would not be much of
a philosopher if he made this mistaDe.
)f 1%5-2:1 is an indirect demonstration that false belief cannot be e&plained by
empiricism (whether this means a de!eloped philosophical theory, or the instincti!e
empiricism of some people's common sense), then it is liDely that the 1irst Pu??le states
the basic difficulty for empiricism, to which the other four Pu??les looD for alternati!e
solutions. The nature of this basic difficulty is not fully, or indeed at all, e&plained by
1% 1%
the 1irst Pu??le. 7e ha!e to read on and watch the de!elopment of the argument of 1%5-
2:1 to see e&actly what the problem is that gi!es the 1irst Pu??le its bite.
/.2 Second Pu;;le 2%out )alse =elief" ,=elieving 1hat is >ot-" 1..c14#
1.8%8
The second proposal says that false <udgement is belie!ing or <udging ta %4 onta,
2things that are not4 or 2what is not.4 #ocrates obser!es that if 2what is not4 is
understood as it often was by JreeD thinDers, as meaning 2nothing,4 then this proposal
leads us straight into the sophistical absurdity that false beliefs are the same thing as
beliefs about nothing (i.e., contentless beliefs). Aut there can be no beliefs about
nothing9 and there are false beliefs9 so false belief isn't the same thing as belie!ing what
is not.
#ome thinD the #econd Pu??le a mere sophistry. AostocD 1'%%, 10. distinguishes two
!ersions of the sophistry, 2+n one !ersion, to belie!e falsely isH to belie!e what is not
L<ust by itselfF9 on the other !ersion, it is to belie!e what is not Labout one of the things
which areF4. The argument of the first !ersion, according to AostocD, 2is <ust that there
is no such thing as what is not (the case)9 it is a mere nonentity. Aut <ust as you cannot
percei!e a nonentity, so eCually you cannot belie!e one either.4 AostocD proposes the
following solution to this problem, 27e may find it natural to reply to this argument by
distinguishingH propositions NfromO facts, situations, states of affairs, and so on. Then
we shall say that the things that are belie!ed are propositions, not factsH so a false
belief is not directed at a non-e&istent.4
This raises the Cuestion whether a consistent empiricist can admit the e&istence of
propositions. 8t least one great modern empiricist, Puine 1'.", 1.0-5, thinDs not. Plato
agrees, he regards a commitment to the e&istence of propositions as e!idence of
$latonis%, acceptance of the claim that abstract ob<ects (and plenty of them) genuinely
e&ist. #o an e&planation of false <udgement that in!oDed entities called propositions
would be una!ailable to the sort of empiricist that Plato has in his sights.
AostocD's second !ersion of the pu??le maDes it an e!en more transparent sophistry,
turning on a simple confusion between the 2is4 of predication and the 2is4 of e&istence.
8s pointed out abo!e, we can reasonably asD whether Plato made this distinction, or
made it as we maDe it.
)f the structure of the #econd Pu??le is really as AostocD suggests, then the #econd
Pu??le is <ust the old sophistry about belie!ing what is not (cp. Parmenides *3 2'A%,
*uthyde%us 2%"e ff., 'ratylus $2'd, )epubli& $55a, Sophist 20"e ff.). @oreo!er, on this
interpretation of the #econd Pu??le, Plato is committed, in his own person and with full
generality, to accepting (at least pro!isionally) a !ery bad argument for the conclusion
that there can be no false belief. )t would be nice if an interpretation of the #econd
Pu??le were a!ailable that saw it differently, e.g., as accepted by him only in a conte&t
where special reasons maDe the #econd Pu??le !ery plausible in that conte&t.
+ne such interpretation is defended e.g., by Aurnyeat 1'':, 5%, who suggests that the
#econd Pu??le can only worD if we accept the 2scandalous analogy between <udging
what is not and seeing or touching what is not there to be seen or touched4, 28 model
on which <udgements relate to the world in the same sort of unstructured way as
percei!ing or (we may add) naming, will tie anyone in Dnots when it comes to the
Cuestion L7hat is a false <udgement the <udgementK name ofEF. The only a!ailable
answer, when the <udgement is taDen as an unstructured whole, appears to be, Bothing.4
Botice that it is the empiricist who will most naturally tend to rely on this analogy. )t is
the empiricist who finds it natural to assimilate <udgement and Dnowledge to perception,
1' 1'
so far as he can. #o we may suggest that the #econd Pu??le is a mere sophistry for any
decent account of false <udgement, but a good argument against the empiricist account
of false <udgement that Plato is attacDing. The moral of the #econd Pu??le is that
empiricism !alidates the old sophistry be&ause it treats belie!ing or <udging as too
closely analogous to seeing, 1%%e$-5. 1or empiricism <udgement, and thought in
general, consists in awareness of the ideas that are present to our minds, e&actly as they
are present to our minds. )t cannot consist in awareness of those ideas as they are not9
because (according to empiricism) we are immediately and incorrigibly aware of our
own ideas, it can only consist in awareness of those ideas as they are. Bor can
<udgement consist in awareness of ideas that are not present to our minds, for (according
to empiricism) what is not present to our minds cannot be a part of our thoughts. #till
less can <udgement consist in awareness of ideas that do not e&ist at all.
The old sophists tooD false belief as 2<udging what is not49 they then fallaciously slid
from 2<udging what is not,4 to 2<udging nothing,4 to 2not <udging at all,4 and hence
concluded that no <udgement that was e!er actually made was a false <udgement. The
empiricism that Plato attacDs not only repeats this logical slide9 it maDes it looD almost
reasonable. The point of the #econd Pu??le is to draw out this scandalous conseCuence.
/.3 !hird Pu;;le 2%out )alse =elief" Allodoxia" 1.8%14#184e
;iterally translated, the third proposal about how to e&plain the possibility of false
belief says that false belief occurs 2when someone e&changes (antalla!a%enos) in his
understanding one of the things that are with another of the things that are, and says is4
(1%'b12-c2).
Perhaps the best way to read this !ery unclear statement is as meaning that the
distincti!e addition in the third proposal is the notion of inadverten&y. The point of
#ocrates' argument is that this addition does not help us to obtain an adeCuate account of
false belief because thought (dianoia) has to be understood as an inner process, with
ob<ects that we are always fully and e&plicitly conscious of. )f we are fully and
e&plicitly conscious of all the ob<ects of our thoughts, and if the ob<ects of our thoughts
are as simple as empiricism taDes them to be, there is simply no room for inad!ertency.
Aut without inad!ertency, the third proposal simply collapses bacD into the first
proposal, which has already been refuted.
The empiricist conception of Dnowledge that Theaetetus unwittingly brings forth, and
which #ocrates is scrutinising, taDes the ob<ects of thought to be simple mental images
which are either straightforwardly a!ailable to be thought about, or straightforwardly
absent. The 1irst Pu??le showed that there is a general problem for the empiricist about
e&plaining how such images can be confused with each other, or indeed semantically
con<oined in any way at all. The #econd Pu??le showed that, because the empiricist
lacDs clear alternati!es other than that someone should have a mental image or la&/ it,
he is wide open to the sophistical argument which identifies believin# with havin# a
%ental i%a#e, and then identifies believin# 0hat is with havin# a %ental i%a#e, tooG
and so 2pro!es4 the impossibility of false belief. The Third Pu??le restricts itself (at
least up to 1':d5) to someone who has the reCuisite mental images, and adds the
suggestion that he manages to confuse them by a piece of inad!ertency. #ocrates'
re<oinder is that nothing has been done to show ho0 there can be inad!ertent confusions
of things that are as simple and unstructured, and as simply grasped or not grasped, as
the empiricist taDes mental images to be. >ust as speech is e&plicit outer dialogue, so
thought is e&plicit inner dialogue. 7hat the empiricist needs to do to show the
possibility of such a confusion is to e&plain how, on his principles, either speech or
thought can fail to be fully e&plicit and fully 2in touch4 with its ob<ects, if it is 2in
touch4 with them at all.
2: 2:
)n the discussion of the 1ourth and 1ifth Pu??les, #ocrates and Theaetetus together worD
out the detail of two empiricist attempts to e&plain <ust this. )t then becomes clearer why
Plato does not thinD that the empiricist can e&plain the difference between fully e&plicit
and not-fully-e&plicit speech or thought. Plato thinDs that, to e&plain this, we ha!e to
abandon altogether the empiricist conception of thought as the concatenation
(somehow) of semantically inert simple mental images. )nstead, we ha!e to understand
thought as the syntactic concatenation of the genuine semantic entities, the For%s.
@istaDes in thought will then be comprehensible as mistaDes either about the logical
interrelations of the 1orms, or about the correct application of the 1orms to the sensory
phenomena.
/. )ourth Pu;;le 2%out )alse =elief" the 1a' !a%let" 184e$#18(c$
The 7a& Tablet passage offers us a more e&plicit account of the nature of thought, and
its relationship with perception. The story now on offer says e&plicitly that perception
relates to thought roughly as =umean 2impressions4 relate to =umean 2ideas4 (1'1d9
compare =ume, First *n<uiry ))). The ob<ects of perception, as before, are a succession
of constantly-changing immediate awarenesses. The ob<ects of thought, it is now added,
are those ob<ects of perception to which we ha!e chosen to gi!e a measure of stability
by imprinting them on the wa& tablets in our minds.
This new spelling-out of the empiricist account of thought seems to offer new resources
for e&plaining the possibility of false belief. The new e&planation can say that false
belief occurs when there is a mismatch, not between two ob<ects of thou#ht, nor
between two ob<ects of per&eption, but between one ob<ect of each type.
This proposal faces a simple and decisi!e ob<ection. Bo one disputes that there are false
beliefs that &annot be e&plained as mismatches of thought and perception, e.g., false
beliefs about arithmetic. The 7a& Tablet does not e&plain how such false beliefs
happen9 indeed it entails that they &an7t happen. #uch mistaDes are confusions of two
ob<ects of thought, and the 7a& Tablet model does not dispute the earlier finding that
there can be no such confusions. #o the 7a& Tablet model fails.
There is of course plenty more that Plato &ould ha!e said in criticism of the 7a& Tablet
model. @ost ob!iously, he could ha!e pointed out the absurdity of identifying any
number with any indi!idual's thou#ht of that number (1'.e' ff.)9 especially when the
numerical thought in Cuestion is no more than an ossified perception. )n the present
passage Plato is content to refute the 7a& Tablet by the simplest and shortest argument
a!ailable, so he does not maDe this point. Aut perhaps the point is meant to occur to the
reader9 for the same absurdity reappears in an e!en more glaring form in the 8!iary
passage.
/.$ )ifth Pu;;le 2%out )alse =elief" the 2viary" 18(d1#244d
)f we had a solution to the !ery basic problem about how the empiricist can get any
content at all out of sensation, then the fourth proposal might show how the empiricist
could e&plain false belief in!ol!ing perception. The fifth and last proposal about how to
e&plain the possibility of false belief attempts to remedy the fourth proposal's incapacity
Gwhich Plato says refutes it, 1'0c.-5Gto deal with cases of false belief in!ol!ing no
perception, such as false arithmetical beliefs.
)t attempts this by deploying a distinction between Dnowledge that someone merely has
(latent Dnowledge) and Dnowledge that he is actually usin# (acti!e Dnowledge)5
(Perhaps Plato is now e&ploring 2the intermediate stages between Dnowing and not
Dnowing4 mentioned at 1%%a2-".) The suggestion is that false belief occurs when
21 21
someone wants to use some item of latent Dnowledge in his acti!e thought, but maDes a
wrong selection from among the items that he Dnows latently.
)f this proposal worDed it would co!er false arithmetical belief. Aut the proposal does
not worD, because it is regressi!e. )f there is a problem about the !ery possibility of
confusing two things, it is no answer to this problem to suppose that for each thing there
is a corresponding item of Dnowledge, and that what happens when two thin#s are
confused is really that the two corresponding ite%s o. /no0led#e are confused (2::a-b).
The 8!iary rightly tries to e&plain false belief by complicating our picture of belief. Aut
it complicates in the wrong way and the wrong place. )t is no help to complicate the
story by throwing in further ob<ects of the same sort as the ob<ects that created the
difficulty about false belief in the first place. 7hat is needed is a different sort of ob<ect
for thought, a Dind of ob<ect that can be thought of under different aspects (say, as 2the
sum of . and 5,4 or as 2the integer 124). There are no such aspects to the 2items of
Dnowledge4 that the 8!iary deals in. 8s with the conception of the ob<ects of thought
and Dnowledge that we found in the 7a& Tablet, it is this lacD of aspects that dooms the
8!iary's conception of the ob<ects of Dnowledge too. ;iDe the 7a& Tablet, the 8!iary
founders on its own inability to accommodate the point that thought cannot consist
merely in the presentation of a series of inert 2ob<ects of thought.4 7hether these
ob<ects of thought are mental images drawn from perception or something else, the
thinDing is not so much in the ob<ects of thought as in what is done with those ob<ects
(1%0d2-$).
7e may illustrate this by asDing, 7hen the dunce who supposes that . R 5 M 11 decides
to acti!ate some item of Dnowledge to be the answer to 27hat is the sum of . and 5E,4
0hi&h item of Dnowledge does he thus decide to acti!ateE 8t first only two answers
seem possible, either he decides to acti!ate 12, or he decides to acti!ate 11. )f he
decides to acti!ate 12, then we cannot e&plain the fact that what he actually does is
acti!ate 11, e&cept by saying that he mistaDes the item of Dnowledge which is 11 for the
item of Dnowledge which is 12. Aut this mistaDe is the !ery mistaDe ruled out as
impossible right at the beginning of the inCuiry into false belief (1%%a-c). 8lternati!ely,
if he decides to acti!ate 11, then we ha!e to asD 0hy he decides to do this. The most
plausible answer to that Cuestion is, 2Aecause he belie!es falsely that . R 5 M 11.4 Aut
as noted abo!e, if he has already formed this false belief, 0ithin the account that is
supposed to e&plain false belief, then a regress looms.
)n fact, the correct answer to the Cuestion 27hich item of Dnowledge does the dunce
decide to acti!ateE4 is neither 2124 nor 211.4 )t is 2that nu%ber which is the sum of .
and 5.4 Aut this answer does not sa!e the 8!iary theorist from the dilemma <ust pointed
out9 for it is not a!ailable to him. To be able to gi!e this answer, the 8!iary theorist
would ha!e to be able to distinguish 2that number which is the sum of . and 54 from
212.4 Aut since 2124 is 1that number which is the sum of . and 5,4 this distinction
cannot be made by anyone who taDes the ob<ects of thought to be simple in the way that
the 8!iary theorist seems to.
8t 1''e1 ff. Theaetetus suggests an amendment to the 8!iary. This is that we might
ha!e items of i#noran&e in our heads as well as items of Dnowledge. 8s #ocrates
remarDs, these ignorance-birds can be confused with Dnowledge-birds in <ust the same
way as Dnowledge-birds can be confused with each other. #o the addition does not help.
/.( !he )inal 5efutation of D2" 244d$#241c/
8t 2::d-2:1c #ocrates argues more directly against *2. =e offers a counter-e&ample to
the thesis that Dnowledge is true belief. 8 sDilled lawyer can bring <urymen into a state
22 22
of true belief without bringing them into a state of Dnowledge9 so Dnowledge and true
belief are different states.
@c*owell 1'50, 225-% suggests that this swift argument 2contradicts the most
characteristic e&positions of the Theory of 1orms, which indicate that the title
LDnowledgeF should be reser!ed for a relation between the mind and the 1orms
untainted by any reliance on perception.4 Ay contrast Plato here tells us, Cuite
unambiguously, that the <ury are persuaded into a state of true belief 2about things
which only someone who sees them can Dnow4 (2:1b%). This implies that there can be
Dnowledge which is entirely reliant on perception. (+ne way out of this is to deny that
Plato e!er thought that Dnowledge is only of the 1orms, as opposed to thinDing that
Dnowledge is paradi#%ati&ally of the 1orms. 1or this more tolerant Platonist !iew about
perception see e.g. $hilebus .%d-02d, and Ti%aeus 25d ff.)
The <ury argument seems to be a counter-e&ample not only to *2 but also to *", the
thesis that Dnowledge is true belief 0ith an a&&ount (pro!ided we allow that the <ury
2ha!e an account4).
8 third problem about the <ury argument is that Plato seems to offer two incompatible
e&planations of why the <ury don't Dnow, first that they ha!e only a limited time to hear
the arguments (2:1b", 152e1)9 and second that their <udgement is second-hand (2:1b').
.. !hird Definition *D3+" ,Knowledge is !rue
:udgement 1ith an 2ccount-" 241d#214a
Theaetetus' third proposal about how to Dnowledge is (*") that it is true belief with an
account (%eta lo#ou al4th4 do!an).
*" apparently does nothing at all to sol!e the main problems that *2 faced. Aesides the
<urymen counter-e&ample <ust noted, 1%5-2:1showed that we could not define
Dnowledge as true belief unless we had an account of .alse belief. This problem has not
<ust e!aporated in 2:1-21:. )t will remain as long as we propose to define Dnowledge as
true belief plus anything. #ignificantly, this does not seem to bother PlatoGas we might
e&pect if Plato is not e!en trying to offer an acceptable definition of Dnowledge, but is
rather undermining unacceptable definitions.
+ne crucial Cuestion about Theaetetus 2:1-21: is the Cuestion whether the argument is
concerned with ob<ectual or propositional Dnowledge. This is a basic and central
di!ision among interpretations of the whole passage 2:1-21:, but it is hard to discuss it
properly without getting into the detail of the *ream Theory, see section %a.
8 second Cuestion, which arises often elsewhere in the Theaetetus, is whether the
argument's appearance of aporia reflects genuine uncertainty on Plato's part, or is rather
a Dind of literary de!ice. )s Plato thinDing aloud, trying to clarify his own !iew about
the nature of Dnowledge, as e!isionists suspectE +r is he using an aporetic argument
only to smoDe out his opponents, as Unitarians thinDE
The e!idence fa!ours the latter reading. There are a significant number of other
passages where something !ery liDe Theaetetus' claim (*") that Dnowledge is 2true
belief with an account4 is not only discussed, but actually defended, for instance, Meno
'%a2, $haedo 50b.-0, $haedo '5d-''d2, Sy%posiu% 2:2a.-', )epubli& ."$b"-5, and
Ti%aeus .1e.. #o it appears that, in the Theaetetus, Plato cannot be genuinely pu??led
about what Dnowledge can be. Bor can he genuinely doubt his own former confidence
in one !ersion of *". )f he does ha!e a genuine doubt or pu??le of this sort, it is simply
incredible that he should say what he does say in 2:1-21: without also e&pressing it.
2" 2"
7hat Plato does in 2:1-21: is, present a picture (#ocrates' *ream) of how things may
be if *" is true (2:1c-2:2c)9 raise ob<ections to the *ream theory which are said
(2:0b12) to be decisi!e (2:2c-2:0c)9 and present and re<ect three further suggestions
about the meaning of lo#os, and so three more !ersions of *" (2:0c-21:a). Aut none of
these four interpretations of *" is Plato's own earlier !ersion of *", which says that
Dnowledge M true belief with an account o. the reason 0hy the true belie. is true. )f what
Plato wants to tell us in Theaetetus 2:1-21: is that he no longer accepts any !ersion of
*", not e!en his own !ersion, then it is e&traordinary that he does not e!en mention his
own !ersion, concentrating instead on !ersions of *" so different from Plato's !ersion
as to be ob!iously irrele!ant to its refutation.
Unitarians can suggest that Plato's strategy is to refute what he taDes to be false !ersions
of *" so as to increase the logical pressure on anyone who re<ects Plato's !ersion of *".
)n particular, he wants to put pressure on the empiricist theories of Dnowledge that seem
to be the main target of the Theaetetus. 7hat Plato wants to show is, not only that no
definition of Dnowledge e&cept his own, *", is acceptable, but also that no !ersion of
*" e&cept his own is acceptable.
..1 !he Dream of Socrates" 241d.#242d/
ather as #ocrates offered to de!elop *1 in all sorts of surprising directions, so now he
offers to de!elop *" into a sophisticated theory of Dnowledge. This theory, usually
Dnown as the 2*ream of #ocrates4 or the 2*ream Theory,4 posits two Dinds of e&istents,
comple&es and simples, and proposes that 2an account4 means 2an account of the
comple&es that analyses them into their simple components.4 Thus 2Dnowledge of !4
turns out to mean 2true belief about ! with an account of ! that analyses ! into its simple
components.4
TaDen as a general account of Dnowledge, the *ream Theory implies that Dnowledge is
only of comple&es, and that there can be no Dnowledge of simples. #ocrates attacDs this
implication.
8 common Cuestion about the *ream Theory is whether it is concerned with ob<ectual
or propositional Dnowledge. Those who taDe the *ream Theory to be concerned with
propositional Dnowledge include yle 1'':, 25-":, 2from 2:1 onwards Plato
concentrates on LDnowF (&onna9tre), N#ocrates' *reamO is a logician's theory, a theory
about the composition of truths and falsehoods.4 Those who taDe the *ream Theory to
be concerned with ob,e&tual Dnowledge include 7hite 1'50, 155, and 6rombie 1'0",
)), $1-$29 also AostocD 1'%%. 8 third way of taDing the *ream Theory, which may well
be the most promising interpretation, is to taDe it as a "o#i&al to%is%, as a theory
which founds an account of propositional structure on an account of the concatenation
of simple ob<ects of e&perience or acCuaintance such as 2sense data.4
The ;ogical-8tomist reading of the *ream Theory undercuts the propositionalK
ob<ectual distinction. +n this reading, the *ream Theory claims that simple, pri!ate
ob<ects of e&perience are the elements of the proposition9 thus, the *ream Theory is
both a theory about the structure of propositions and a theory about simple and comple&
ob<ects. )t claims in effect that a proposition's structure is that of a comple& ob<ect made
up out of simple ob<ects, where these simple ob<ects are concei!ed in the ussellian
manner as ob<ects of inner perception or acCuaintance, and the comple&es which they
compose are concei!ed in the phenomenalist manner as (epistemological andK or
semantic) constructs out of those simple ob<ects.
This supposition maDes good sense of the claim that we oursel!es are e&amples of
comple&es (2:1e2, 2the primary elements (pr;ta stoi/heia) of which we and e!erything
else are composedH4). )f the *ream theorist is a ;ogical 8tomist, he will thinD that
2$ 2$
there is a clear sense in which people, and e!erything else, are composed out of sense
data. =e will also thinD that descriptions of ob<ects, too, are comple&es constructed in
another way out of the immediately a!ailable simples of sensation.
1or such a theorist, epistemology and semantics aliDe rest upon the foundation pro!ided
by the simple ob<ects of acCuaintance. Aoth thought and meaning consist in the
construction of comple& ob<ects out of those simple ob<ects. Philosophical analysis,
meanwhile, consists in statin# ho0 the comple&es in!ol!ed in thought and meaning are
constructed out of simples. This statement in!ol!es, amongst other things, di!iding
down to and enumerating the (simple) parts of such comple&es.
7hat then is the relation of the *ream Theory to the problems posed for empiricism by
the discussion of *2 in 1%5-2:1E The fundamental problem for empiricism, as we saw,
is the problem how to get .ro% sensation to &ontent, the problem of how we could start
with bare sense-data, and build up out of them anything that deser!ed to be called
%eanin#. Plato thinDs that there is a good answer to this, though it is not an empiricist
answer. #ense e&perience becomes contentful when it is understood and arranged
according to the structures that the 1orms gi!e it. #o to understand sense e&perience is,
in the truest sense, 2to gi!e an account4 for it.
The empiricist cannot offer this answer to the problem of how to get from sensation to
content without ceasing to be an empiricist. 7hat the empiricist &an do is propose that
content arises out of sets of sense e&periences. 7e get to the le!el of belief and
Dnowledge only when we start to consider such sets, before that we are at the le!el only
of perception. +ur beliefs, couched in e&pressions that refer to and Cuantify o!er such
sets, will then become Dnowledge (a) when they are true, and (b) when we understand
the full story of their composition out of such sets.
)f this is the point of the *ream Theory, then the best answer to the Cuestion 27hose is
the *ream TheoryE4 is 2)t belongs to the empiricist whom Plato is attacDing.4
..2 0riti?ue of the Dream !heory" 242d.#24(c2
The *ream Theory says that Dnowledge of 3 is true belief about 3 plus an account of
3's composition. )f 3 is not composite, 3 cannot be Dnown, but only 2percei!ed4
(2:2b0).
#ocrates' main strategy in 2:2d%-2:0c2 is to attacD the *ream's claim that comple&es
and elements are distinguishable in respect of Dnowability. To this end he deploys a
dilemma. 8 comple&, say a syllable, is either (a) no more than its elements (its letters),
or (b) something o!er and abo!e those elements.
2:2d%-2:"e1 shows that unacceptable conseCuences follow from alternati!e (a), that a
comple& is no more than its elements. )f ) am to Dnow a syllable S3, and that syllable is
no more than its elements, then ) cannot Dnow the syllable S3 without also Dnowing its
elements S and 3. )ndeed, it seems that coming to Dnow the parts S and 3 is both
necessary and sufficient for coming to Dnow the syllable S3. Aut if that is right, and if
the letterKsyllable relation models the elementK comple& relation, then if any comple& is
/no0able, its elements will be Dnowable too9 and if any comple&'s elements are
un/no0able, then the comple& will be unDnowable too. This result contradicts the
*ream Theory.
2:"e2-2:.e% shows that unacceptable conseCuences follow from alternati!e (b), that a
comple& is something o!er and abo!e its elements. )n that case, to Dnow the syllable is
to Dnow something for which Dnowledge of the elements is not sufficient. The syllable
turns out to be 2a single )dea that comes to be out of the fitted-together elements4
(2:$a1-2). Aut then the syllable does not ha!e the elements as parts, if it did, that would
2. 2.
compromise its singularity. 8nd if the elements are not the parts of the syllable, nothing
else can be. #o the syllable has no parts, which maDes it as simple as an element. Thus if
the element is unDnowable, the syllable must be unDnowable too. This result contradicts
the *ream Theory too.
1inally, in 2:0a1-c2, Plato maDes a further, !ery simple, point against the *ream
Theory. +ur own e&perience of learning letters and syllables shows that it is both more
basic and more important to Dnow elements than comple&es, not vi&e versa as the
*ream Theory implies. The thesis that the comple&es are Dnowable, the elements
unDnowable, is false to our e&perience, in which 2Dnowledge of the elements is
primary4 (Aurnyeat 1'':,1'2).
..3 !hree 2ttempts to @nderstand Logos" 24(c2#214a8
The refutation of the *ream Theory's attempt to spell out what it might be liDe for *" to
be true is followed by three attempts to gi!e an account of what a lo#os is. The first
attempt to gi!e an account of 2account4 taDes lo#os <ust to mean 2speech4 or
2statement.4 This is deemed ob!iously insufficient (2:0c1-2:0e").
8 second attempted e&planation of 2lo#os of +4 taDes it as 2enumeration of the
elements of 3.4 The lo#os is a statement of the ele%ents of the ob<ect of Dnowledge.
Sou ha!e Dnowledge of something when, in addition to your true belief about it, you are
able also to 2go through the elements4 of that thing.
Plato's ob<ection to this proposal (2:%b) is that it lea!es open the possibility that
someone could count as ha!ing Dnowledge of the name 2Theaetetus4 e!en if they could
do no more than write out the letters of the name 2Theaetetus4 in the right order. #ince
such a person can enumerate the elements of the comple&, i.e., the letters of the name
(2:5c%-d1), he has an account. #ince he can arrange those letters in their correct order
(2:%a'-1:), he also has true belief. 1or all that, insists Plato, he does not ha!e
Dnowledge of the name 2Theaetetus.4
7hy not, we might asDE To see the answer we should bring in what Plato says about
syllables at 2:5d%-2:%a". #uppose someone could enumerate the letters of
2Theaetetus,4 and could gi!e their correct order, and yet Dnew nothing about syllables.
This person wouldn't count as Dnowing 2Theaetetus4 because he would ha!e no
understanding of the principles that get us from ordered letters to names. Those
principles are principles about ho0 letters form syllables, and ho0 syllables form
names. 8 person who can state only the letters of 2Theaetetus4 and their order has no
awareness of these principles.
To put it a modern way, a robot or an automatic typewriter might be able to reproduce or
print the letters of 2Theaetetus4 correctly and in order. )t might e!en be able to store
such a correct ordering in its electronic memory. That would not show that such a
machine understood how to spell 2Theaetetus,4 any more than the symbol-manipulating
capacities of the man in #earle's 6hinese oom show that he understands 6hinese. 7hat
is missing is an awareness of bridging or structuring principles, rules e&plaining ho0 we
get from strings of symbols, via syllables, to representations of JreeD names.
3nowledge of such bridging principles can reasonably be called Dnowledge of 0hy the
letters of 2Theaetetus4 are what they are. #o it is plausible to suggest that the moral of
the argument is to point us to the need for an account in the sense of an e&planation
27hyE,4 and so to the !ersion of *" that Plato himself accepts.
The third proposed account of lo#os says that to gi!e the lo#os of 3 is to cite the
s4%eion or diaphora of 3. )n the 7a& Tablet passage, s4%eion meant LimprintF9 in the
present passage, it means the LsignF or diagnostic feature wherein ! differs from
20 20
e!erything else, or e!erything else of 3's own Dind. #o, presumably, Dnowledge of (say)
Theaetetus consists in true belief about Theaetetus plus an account of what differentiates
Theaetetus from e!ery other human.
#ocrates offers two ob<ections to this proposal. 1irst, if Dnowledge of Theaetetus
reCuires a mention of his s4%eion, so does true belief about Theaetetus. #econd, to
possess 2an account of Theaetetus' s4%eion4 must mean either (a) ha!ing true belief
about that s4%eion, or else (b) ha!ing Dnowledge of it. Aut it has already been pointed
out that any true belief, if it is to Cualify as being about Theaetetus at all, must already
be true belief about his s4%eion5 #o interpretation (a) has the result that Dnowledge of
Theaetetus M true belief about Theaetetus' s4%eion R true belief about Theaetetus'
s4%eion. 8s for (b), if we want to Dnow what Dnowledge is, it is no help to be told that
Dnowledge of 3 M something else R /no0led#e of the s4%eion of 3. 7e still need to
Dnow what Dnowledge of the s4%eion of 3 is. Bor will it help us to be launched on a
!icious regress, as we will be if we are told that Dnowledge of the s4%eion of 3 M
something else R Dnowledge of the s4%eion of the s4%eion of 3.
This is where the argument ends, and #ocrates lea!es to meet his accusers.
8. 0onclusion
The Theaetetus is an e&tended attacD on certain assumptions and intuitions about
Dnowledge that the intelligent man-in-the-streetGTheaetetus, for instanceGmight find
initially attracti!e, and which some philosophers Dnown to PlatoGProtagoras and
=eracleitus, for instanceGhad worDed up into comple& and sophisticated philosophical
theories. Aasic to all these assumptions and intuitions, which ) ha!e grouped together
under the name 2empiricism,4 is the idea that Dnowledge is constructed out of
perception and perception alone.
The first part of the Theaetetus attacDs the idea that Dnowledge could be simply
identi.ied with perception. Perceptions alone ha!e no semantic structure. #o if this thesis
was true, it would be impossible to state it.
The second part attacDs the suggestion that Dnowledge can be defined as true belief,
where beliefs are supposed to be semantically-structured concatenations of sensory
impressions. 8gainst this Plato argues that, unless something can be said to e&plain ho0
impressions can be concatenated so as to gi!e them semantic structure, there is no
reason to grant that the distinction between true and false applies to such beliefs any
more than it does to perceptions.
1inally, in the third part of the Theaetetus, an attempt is made to meet this challenge,
and present some e&planation of how semantic structures can arise out of mere
perceptions or impressions. The proposed e&planation is the *ream Theory, a theory
interestingly comparable to ussellian ;ogical 8tomism, which taDes both propositions
and ob<ects to be comple&es 2logically constructed4 out of simple sensory impressions.
+n this conception, Dnowledge will come about when someone is capable not only of
using such logical constructions in thought, but of understanding how they arise from
perception.
#ocrates' basic ob<ection to this theory is that it still gi!es no proper e&planation of ho0
this logical construction taDes place. 7ithout such an e&planation, there is no good
reason to treat the comple&es that are thus logically constructed as anything other than
simples in their own right. 7e need to Dnow how it can be that, merely by con<oining
perceptions in the right way, we manage to achie!e a degree of semantic structure that
(for instance) maDes it possible to re.er to thin#s in the 0orld, such as Theaetetus. Aut
this is not e&plained simply by listing all the simple perceptions that are so con<oined.
25 25
BorGand this is where we reach the third proposal of 2:%b11-21:a'Gis it e&plained by
fi&ing on any of those perceptions in particular, and taDing it to be the special marD of
Theaetetus whereby reference to Theaetetus is fi&ed.
The third proposal about how to understand lo#os faces the difficulty that, if it adds
anything at all to differentiate Dnowledge of 3 from true belief about 3, then what it
adds is a diagnostic Cuality of 3. )f there is a problem about how to identify 3, there is a
problem about how to identify the diagnostic Cuality too. This launches a !icious
regress.
+ne way of pre!enting this regress is to argue that the regress is caused by the attempt
to worD up a definition of Dnowledge out of empiricist materials. =ence there is no way
of a!oiding such a !icious regress if you are determined to try to define Dnowledge on
an empiricist basis. The right response is to abandon that attempt. 3nowledge is indeed
indefinable in empiricist terms. )n those terms, it has no lo#os. )n those terms, therefore,
Dnowledge itself is unDnowable.
The official conclusion of the Theaetetus is that we still do not Dnow how to define
Dnowledge. /!en on the most sceptical reading, this is not to say that we ha!e not
learned anything about what Dnowledge is liDe. 8s Theaetetus says (21:b0), he has
gi!en birth to far more than he had in him.
8nd as many interpreters ha!e seen, there may be much more to the ending than that. )t
may e!en be that, in the last two pages of the Theaetetus, we ha!e seen hints of Plato's
own answer to the pu??le. Perhaps understandin# has emerged from the last discussion,
as 0isdo% did from 1$.d-e, as the Dey ingredient without which no true beliefs alone
can e!en begin to looD liDe they might count as Dnowledge. Perhaps it is only when we,
the readers, understand this pointGthat epistemological success in the last resort
depends on ha!ing epistemological !irtueGthat we begin not only to ha!e true beliefs
about what Dnowledge is, but to understand Dnowledge.
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Other Internet 5esources
( +riginal te&ts of Plato's *ialogues (Perseus *igital ;ibrary, Tufts Uni!ersity)
2' 2'
5elated &ntries
Plato V Plato, method and metaphysics in the Sophist and States%an V Plato, middle
period metaphysics and epistemology V Platonism, in metaphysics
6opyright W 2::' by
Timothy 6happell Xt5&happellGopen5a&5u/Y
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