Gorbachev's glasnost: a civil mistake?

When Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March
1985, he could have never imained that he !ould be the last to occu"y that "osition# What he did
reali$e !as that the economy after the lon %re$hnev era !as &stanatin& and that the Union !as
the ede of crisis# 'hus under Gorbachev the era of perestroika (restructurin) bean# Gorbachev
*ne! that the &!ithin system reforms& !hich he and his su""orters "ut throuh !ould chane the
Soviet system in a revolutionary !ay and !ould leave its values &standin on their heads& (%ro!n
1995+ 1,8)# -fter si. years of "roressive reform, the collaborators of the G/ChP tried to "ut a sto"
to it in order to "reserve the Soviet Union# %ut the Soviet 0ussians and the democratic overnment
of 1eltsin, !hich they su""orted, resisted the cou"# -s a conse2uence the Soviet Union had to be
dissolved#
'he focus of this essay !ill be on glasnost (o"enness)+ Gorbachev&s reforms of the state media since
his a""ointment in 1985 until the -uust3cou" of 1991 and !hich amounted to the liberali$ation
and democrati$ation of Soviet Society# What !ere the motives and reasons for Gorbachev to
introduce &"luralistic& elements into the traditionally monolithic Soviet System4 What *ind of
society did emere as a conse2uence of these reforms and !as that !hat Gorbachev envisioned4
5n this essay 5 arue that Soviet society and "olitics reacted aainst Gorbachev e."ectations,
because of one most vital fla! in his desin+ he tried to liberate a society !ith means that !ere in
their essence totalitarian# While Gorbachev !anted a &manaed& brea*do!n of state control over the
media, he "ut societal machinations at !or* that eventually bro*e free and esca"ed his control# -
ro!in self3a!areness of an &embryonic civil society& rendered the Soviet leadershi" redundant and
the ideoloy of Mar.ism36enninism !as denounced after increasin "ublic scrutini$ation# 'he
leadershi" of the CPSU, !hich had determined the course of the sub7ects of the Soviet re"ublics for
a ood seventy years, lost its leitimacy# So, !ith hindsiht, 5 ac*no!lede that glasnost !as
essential in creatin an atmos"here in !hich the end of the Soviet Union became a "ossibility#
8urther assessment of this arument !ill be made based on a research into secondary literature on
Gorbachev&s glasnost and the society that emered as an effect of it# 8irstly, Gorbachev&s reasons for
glasnost are evaluated# 9e res"onded to societal trends that !ere a leacy of the %re$hnev era, so
these deserve attention# Secondly, !e loo* at the sco"e and limits of glasnost. 6astly, the focus !ill
be on !hat *ind of society emered as an effect of glasnost and !hat it did !ith its ne! freedoms#
The reasons for Glasnost
When the Soviet Union !as "assed on under Gorbachev&s rule in march 1985, it !as in a
dila"idated state# Under the %re$hnev leadershi" (19:;3198,) the Soviet "lanned economy started
to stanate, and this continued under -ndro"ov (198,3198;) and Chernen*o (198;31985)# 'his had
danerous societal conse2uences, "rom"tin Gorbachev to s"ea* of a &"re3crisis situation&# What did
this stanation com"romise4 What !ere relevant societal develo"ments to !hich Gorbachev !as
reactin4 - short analysis of Soviet Society under %re$hnev is in "lace here#
'he %re$hnev societal leacy !as consists of t!o im"ortant develo"ments# 5n combination !ith an
economic decline, these !ere a threat to the stability of the Soviet Union#
'he first develo"ment started !hen the %re$hnev administration !as installed# %re$hnev&s
administration had bro*en !ith /hruschev&s idea that the Union could overta*e -merica in terms of
economy by the 198<s and that communism !ould be attained# 5nstead the idea of &develo"ed
socialism& !as "romoted, !hich communicated that socialism !as already at its "ea*# 5n order to
leitimi$e this claim and thereby the leadershi" that made it, %re$hnev had to come to terms !ith
the soviet "easants and urban consumers# %y the late 19=<s the bureaucratic leadershi" and the
Soviet "o"ulation lived in a so3called &social contract& or social com"act# 'his im"lied a &tacit
understandin bet!een leaders and led about each side&s functions and s"here of o"eration, and the
demarcation bet!een them#& 'he leadershi" !ould "rovide a decent standard of livin and the
"o"ulation !ould not "rotest aainst their rule, a social status32uo !hich could be summari$ed by
the motto &you "retend to "ay us, and !e "retend to !or*& (Miller 199>+ ,:)#
'his re"ression by means of !elfare !or*ed !ell durin the early %re$hnev years, !hen the
economy !as ro!in# 'he reime could deliver more consumer oods and subsidies, and the
"eo"le attained a decent standard of livin# %ut this also created hih "ublic e."ectations# 'he
social contract relied on the continuin su""ly by the leadershi"# - "roloned stanation of the
economy !ould thus be a ris* for the status32uo (Connor ,<<>+ ;=)#
'he second im"ortant develo"ment !as that of underround culture and "olitics# Under the social
contract and the ideoloy that nothin hiher than &develo"ed socialism& could be attained, cynicism
reined in !ithin the Soviet "o"ulation# ?s"ecially the better educated intelligentsia, felt
disa""ointed !ith the ideoloical course of the %re$hnev 6eadershi" and !ere frustrated that they
!ere obstructed from "olitics by the bureaucracy of the CPSU# - unofficial culture develo"ed,
!hich could serve as an alternative to the official culture endorsed by the "arty# 5t could
autonomously orani$e and e."ress itself throuh systems that !ere out of reach for the state
a""aratus (for e.am"le samizdat+ self3"ublishin)# Since the %re$hnev reime could not control
these areas of life, it !as allo!ed to ro! to a considerable si$e# %ut this meant in turn that the
&centre& in Mosco! !as losin its ri" on "arts of Soviet society (5bidem+ ;53;8)#
5t is in the conte.t of the %re$hnev leacy that Gorbachev decides that a !ide reform of the Union&s
&rotten& economy !as needed to ensure the Soviet Union&s future# %ut he thouht that the tas* of
reformin the economy !ould demand a broader societal chane+ a certain level of &democracy& !as
needed in order to "ut the &human factor& bac* into the static Soviet leadershi"# 9e needed broader
societal "artici"ation in ivin sha"e to his &socialist mar*et& based economy (%ro!n 1995+ 1,:3
1,9)#
8rom a overnmental "oint of vie!, glasnost seemed necessary for Gorbachev to reali$e his reforms
of the Soviet economy# Galeotti summari$es four main reasons that "rom"ted Gorbachev to
introduce the idea of glasnost into the "olitical reality of the Soviet Union# 8irst, he reali$ed he
needed the su""ort of the literary and cultural intellientsia in order to convince both the elite and
the masses, and ma*e a brea* !ith the cynicism by the old3reime# 'his !ould at the same time
brin the underround movements into the "olitical arena and ma*e them more manaeable#
Second, he reali$ed that he could not rely only on his control over the bureaucracy and the
information it fed to him# 9e needed to create nation3!ide !histle blo!ers !ho !ould inform him
on !hat !as really oin on in the union# 'his !ould ive Gorbachev "olitical leverae vis3@3vis
the conservative apparatchiks. 'he third reason is that Gorbachev !anted to have more o"en debate
!ithin the elite itself# 9e "referred a style of "olitics in !hich he !ould start a discussion by
dro"in a bu$$3!ord (li*e glasnost or perestroika) and then remained in the middle, !hile different
cam"s discussed on the to"ic he started so he could ado"t one line of arument as his o!n# 5n fact
this !as a sort of &"olitical "luralism& !hich meant a brea* !ith the Soviet tradition of &democratic
centralism&# 'he last reason is that he also reali$ed that a system of overnment !hich e.cessively
limits and distorts information flo!s is one !hich cannot "ro"erly function and evolve# 'he most
illustratin e.am"le here is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in -"ril 198:# 'he overnment *e"t the
nuclear overload secret, if they !ould have done that citi$ens and villaers could have done that#
5nstead the ne!s that Chernobyl ha""ened had to come from S!eden (Galeotti 199=+ :83=>)#
Gorbachev&s aims !ere as ambitious as they !ere noble# 'houh he had his su""ort !ithin the
CPSU he !anted to chane overnment and overned from a monolithic and static !hole into a
&"luralistic& and "roressive vehicle for reform#
Glasnost: its scope and obstacles
5n this section the focus !ill be on the "olitics of glasnost. Miller ma*es a careful analysis of the
im"lementation of glasnost in the Soviet Union only t!o years after the Soviet Union dissolved
(Miller 199>)# %elo! there !ill be an elaboration on glasnost both as a conce"t and as a "olicy,
follo!in Miller#
'he conce"t of glasnost !as not ne!, !rites Miller# 5t had been a "art of the "olitical vocabulary
since the tsarist "eriod, !ell into the Soviet era# 9o!ever, !hat !as ne! !as that Gorbachev really
!anted to institutionali$e it# Glasnost could be inter"reted as &&o"enness& or &fran*ness&,!ith
overtones of &"ublicity&, "erha"s &"ublic relations&, but !ithout the "sycholoical overtones of
&sincerity& (ibidem+ 9>)# Gorbachev already used the conce"t "ublicly in 198;, but only after the
Chernobyl accident in 198: it !as ra"idly develo"ed into real "olicies# 5m"ortant is to note that
Gorbachev !as sincere in advocatin glasnost !hich ave !riters and 7ournalist the "ossibility to
"ush its boundaries# Whereas it initially connoted &reater freedom& in 198:, by 1989 it became
synonymous !ith &freedom of s"eech and "ublication& (%ro!n 1995+ 1,:31,=)# 5n -uust 199< this
freedom of the "ress !as "ut into la! !ith On the press. 8rom then on, everyone !ho !anted could
"ublish and censorshi" !as abolished# Within half a decade the Gorbachev administration !as able
to ive the Soviet "eo"le of !hich it had been de"rived for over si.ty years+ the freedom of s"eech
and the riht to information#
9o!ever, Miller arues that before the la! of 199< glasnost did not facilitate an autonomous
Soviet "ress, since the structure of the media and the "atterns of o!nershi" of the "resses and
"a"ers !as never chaned# 'he CPSU still o!ned all the "resses and "a"ers in the Union, a""ointed
the 7ournalists and "rovided them !ith the material for their articles# 5t did not ive "eo"le the riht
to access the "ublishin sources or "ublish inde"endently# -lso the Party 0ules or the criminal
codes !ere never chaned (Miller 199>+ 9>)# 5t could thus be arued that glasnost facilitated reater
freedom to 7ournalists and editors, but that this !as a eclectic freedom !hich !as still totalitarian in
nature# 5t !as an order from the to" to !rite freely on sub7ects and by material "rovided by the to"#
5t is easy to see !hat the benefit of these more3free3but3manaeable media !ere to Gorbachev#
When he !anted an s"ecific issue addressed in the Central Committee, li*e the "arlous state of
hos"itals for e.am"le, it !as "ossible to et an article "ublished that addressed this issue in "ublic#
9o!ever, the conservative "oliticians could do so as !ell# 'he affair of the -ndreeva letter in march
1988 is an e.am"le thereof# 'his letter, !ritten by a chemistry teacher and alleed neo3Stalinist,
denounced Gorbachev&s reforms of the media# 5t covered the front "ae of the national ne!s"a"er
Sovetskaya Rossiya and contained hints of insider information# 'he letter !as clearly "ublished to
the benefit of Party "oliticians !ho advocated a retreat in media "olicy (ibidem+ 9=)# 'his sho!s
ho! fraile glasnost !as and that it could not be asserted from belo! until auust 199<#
Aevertheless, glasnost made it "ossible for 7ournalists and !riters to !or* on sub7ects that !ere
formerly taboo# ?ven if Gorbachev could manae the issues !hich !riters could !or* on, radicals
could be encouraed to "ush the limits of !hat could be investiated# So is, !rites Miller
(ibidem+95), the dilemma of glasnost: &!as it a overnment cam"ain or the unleashin of forces
that could end u" "uttin the overnment at ris*4&
'hat this !as so !as demonstrated by Gorbachev&s announcement of the ob7ective of &fillin in the
&blac* s"ots& in history# -t first this suited Gorbachev since he became increasinly a!are of the
affinities bet!een his "olicies and that of Stalin&s o""onents# 5nvestiatin Stalin&s crimes and
rehabilitatin his "olitical o""onents ave leitimacy to his reforms# %ut by late 1989 radical
7ournalists and historians had delved !ell into the "eriod "ast Stalin and hit u"on 6eninism and the
revolution itself# 5n -uust 199< all victims of collectivi$ation and "rosecution bet!een 19,< to
195< !ere rehabilitated by "residential decree (ibidem+ 9539:)# (*i7* hier even oed naar#)
Glasnost and Soviet society
-s has already been !ritten above, Gorbachev&s reforms !ere a res"onse to the society !hich !as
inherited from the %re$hnev era# 'his inheritance consisted of a society based around the idea of
&develo"ed socialism& and the tacit &social contract&# 5n this section !e loo* ho! this society
res"onded to glasnost.
%y glasnost Gorbachev ho"ed to encourae a &"olitical "luralism& not only !ithin the "arty but also
in society itself# 9e ho"ed that his reforms !ould facilitate more discussion bet!een the society and
the state# 'his sounds reminiscent of our !estern term &civil society&# Bid glasnost ive rise to a civil
society in the USS04
'he media had e.cessively chaned durin the last half of the 198<s# Con Seth studied (von Seth
,<1,) ho! the lanuae of the ne!s"a"ers chaned durin the Gorbachev era# 9e discovered that
glasnost !riters started increasinly usin the 53form !hen e."ressin sub7ective vie!s and also
used collo2uial lanuae more often (above all for claims comin from the CPSU)# 9e notes that
citi$ens are s"o*en to &on more e2ual footin&, and that claims are &more often "resented as vie!s
amon other vie!s& (von Seth ,<1,+ :=)#
-s a result of this, !e see that ne!s"a"er3readin became more "o"ular bet!een 198; and 1989+ it
increased !ith ,5D over the "eriod# More "eo"le !ere "artici"atin (albeit "assively) in the
discussions that !ere started by the "ress# -ddin u" to that !as that the reime !as forced in an
defensive "osition as a conse2uence of the dee"enin "olitical and economic crisis of the late
198<s# 'herefore it !as forced to try to 7ustify its "olicies to the "o"ulation and address the readers
as &active citi$ens ca"able of ma*in sense of the messaes delivered by the "ress&# 'he ne!
lanuae of the ne!s"a"ers facilitated more serious discussion bet!een the state and Soviet
&citi$ens&, therefore von Seth concludes that glasnost 'ave rise to mobili$ation and enaement in
civil society& (ibidem+ :83:9)#
%ut did this society, that !as more enaed in readin ne!s"a"ers, amount to a civil society4 Con
Seth does not even ive us a definition of civil society by !hich !e could aue his claims#
67ubo!*ni*o!, !ho studied civil society in soviet 0ussia, does "resent a useful definition of civil
society# 9e defines it as a s"ace &overla""in net!or*s of autonomous voluntary associations E
formal and informal, "olitical and non3"olitical E create the s"ace for "ublic (collective) action
bet!een the individual and the state&# 5n his assessment of society under Grobachev, 67ubo!ni*o!
concludes that glasnost did not create a s"ace for autonomous collective action that serve as a
bride bet!een the individual and the state (67ubo!ni*o! ,<1>+ 1583159)# 'hus here!ith he says
that there !as no civil society understood by measure of the definition iven by himself and o""ose
von Seth&s claim#
Fther scholars endorse the conce"t &embryonic civil society& to describe the society that emered
durin the reforms (5natieff 1995G %ro!n 199:G Connor ,<<>)# 'he much freer flo! of information
!as a revolutionary develo"ment, !hich is one of the vital conditions facilitatin a civil society#
9o!ever ma*in a &full fleded civil society& emere is not only a matter of &maneuverin room
and the individuals and rou"s to o"erate !ithin it but also of the relationshi"s amon them
accordin to understood and areed &rules of the ame#&& (Connor ,<<>+ =>)# 5n Gorbachev&s Soviet
society there had yet to be develo"ed such &rules of the ame&# 'hese rules are of a more tacit nature
and are develo"ed from belo!, rather than from the to"# Gorbachev&s glasnost could be called and
attem"t to create a civil society &from above, by desin and in a hurry& (5natieff 1995+ 1>:)# -ll the
reforms, not only glasnost, reached their a"e. around 199<# Aot only had soviet "eo"le then
attained the freedom on information, they also had the freedom to form "olitical or cultural
associations and the riht to elect their overnment# 'he rules of "olitics !ere chanin e.tremely
fast and it could not be e."ected that Soviet society could co"e !ith these chanes at the same "ace#
5t !ould need a lot of time for society to et used to their ne! freedoms and democratic
res"onsibilities# Unfortunately this time !as limited by the cou"3attem"t in 1991#
%ut the cou" could not sim"ly "ut Gorbachev under house arrest, "ut tan*s around overnment
buildins and "retend everythin !as oin to turn out normal# %al$er ma*es a com"ellin case for
the many &ordinary& 0ussians that o""osed the cou"# 9e arues that there actually !ere a
considerable number of "eo"le resistin the cou" (in Mosco! some t!o hundred and fifty thousand
"eo"le !ent to the streets and in 6eninrad another t!o hundred thousand)# 'he failure of the cou"
sho!s ho! dynamic Soviet society had become at that "oint# %ut after the cou" the o""ortunity of
limited and controlled chane !ere destroyed toether !ith the Soviet Union# Hthe failure of the
cou" so !e*ened !hat !as left of the Soviet control mechanisms that a neotiated devolution of
"o!er became im"ossible#I (%al$er ,<<5+ 195)
Conclusion
Gorbachev did not et !hat he !anted# 9e did not create the society that !ould "rovide criticism to
him and su""ort him in reformin and revitali$in the Soviet Union he so enuinely loved# 9e
introduced "olitical "luralism into both society and the c"su, and before he *ne! he !as torn
bet!een radicals and conservatives# 'he control !as sli""in out of his hands, it !as either a return
to the monolithic soviet union of the "recedin "eriod, or more radical democratic reforms# 'he
cou" ha""ened and the "eo"le resisted# 'houh he never !anted to Gorbachev&s Glasnost laid
furtile rounds for the very end of the soviet Union#
he emerence of this &embryonic civil society& that 2uestioned the Soviet system in the "ast and the
"resent, all the !ay to 2uestion Mar.ism36eninism itself# 'he social com"act (if it even had
e.isted) !as definitaly bro*en by glasnost. %y the 198<s the reime, because of economic "errils,
could not deliver any more# -t the same time, the s"lendid isolation of the soviet union !as
disru"ted by the ne! flo!s of information and suddenly the soviet "eo"le sa! that &they had been
livin a bier lie tan it had collectively understood& (Connor ,<<>+ 8<)
Referenced Literature
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%ro!n, -# The Gorbachev actor. Ae! 1or*+ F.ford University Press, 199:#
Connor, W#B# (,<<>) &Soviet Society, Public -ttitudes, and the Perils of Gorbachev&s 0eforms+ 'he
Social Conte.t of the ?nd of the USS0&# !o"rnal o# $old %ar St"dies 5(;)+ ;>38<#
Galeotti, M# Gorbachev and his revol"tion. 6ondon+ Macmillan "ress ltd, 199=#
5natieff, M# (1995) &Fn Civil Society&# oreign &##airs 'MarchJ-"ril)+ 1,831>:#
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Miller, K# )ikhail Gorbachev and the *nd o# Soviet (o+er. 6ondon+ Macmillan "ress ltd, 199>#
Con Seth, 0# (,<1,) &'he 6anuae of the Press in Soviet and Post3Soviet 0ussia+ Creation of the
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