Ramirez vs.

Court of Appeals
Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Facts: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcias office. Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed
charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the
tape recording. Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done
without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the
conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed
because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law). The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.

Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent of all those
involved?
What was construed: The word any in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a
conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in the conversation.
This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties, Sen. Tanada said
during the deliberations. The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.


SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-8888.November 29,
1957

FACTS: The plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans for which it paid the foreignexchange tax. Claiming
exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the CentralBank that had exacted payment; and in its
amended complaint it included the Treasurer of thePhilippines. The suit was filed in the Manila Court of First Instance,
wherein defendants submittedin due time a motion to dismiss on the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of
actionbecause cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and second, it was a suit against the Governmentwithout the latter's
consent. . The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the motion, anddismissed the case by his order of November 19,
1954. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign
exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
HELD:

Cocoa beans cannot be considered as chocolate for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by
Republic Act No. 601 as amended. SEC. 2 of Republic Act No. 601 as amended provides that "the tax collected or foreign
exchange used for the payment of costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of
rice, flour, soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup ... shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore ,
upon satisfactory proof of actual importation . . ."The courts regard "chocolate" as, "Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted
cacao beans without the abstraction of the butter and always contains sugar and added cacao butter. Chocolate is a cocoa
bean roasted, cracked, shelled, crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains no sugar, and is in general use in
families. Sweetened chocolate is manufactured in the same way but the paste is mixed with sugar, and is used by
confectioners in making chocolate confections. In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict
construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in
the above section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product;
the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.


DAR VS DECS (wala)

PEOPLE vs ABANO
FACTS: Eugenia Abano guilty of the crimes of parricide and murder, and Eliseo and Teofilo, both surnamed Cabana, of two
murders. Two death penalties were imposed on each of the accused.
Eugenia Tolero Abano and Agripino Abano were married in 1948. 1 At the time of the commission of the crimes. they had
been separated for three years. Eugenia, who was then 57 years old, stayed in the conjugal home in Cumbado, Balamban,
Cebu with two of their children, one of whom was mentally incapacitated. To support her dependents, Eugenia worked as
copra-maker earning eight pesos a day.

Agripino, 55 years old, lived with another woman, 50-year old widow Bienvenida Cumad, at the Abanos' hut some 400
meters away from the conjugal home. Only a bridge separated the Abanos' conjugal home from the hut which was actually
located in Tunga, Cantuod, Balamban, Cebu.


HELD: The Court sympathizes with the most pitiful plight of Eugenia Abano. How she must have suffered during the three
years that her husband lived with his paramour. The wound in her heart, occasioned by the separation, never had a chance
to heal, but was kept raw and bleeding by the brazen and cruel behavior of her husband maintaining a love nest so near the
abandoned wife. Four hundred meters in an urban area may seem a long distance, but not so in a rural community where
the next-door neighbor may be housed at an even greater distance. It is indeed in cases like this, that the bounden duty of
the court to apply the law becomes a painful task and the maxim "dura lex, sed lex" makes its full impact felt. In view of the
exceptional circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the Court recommends executive clemency for accused-appellant
Eugenia Abano.


Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]
15AUG
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts
of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after
their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his
acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to
any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal. The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the
ground that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact
that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was probably guilty. Petitioner brought
this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners contention has no merit.
RATIO:
Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his
innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily
mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his conviction was due to
an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other
hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of
the accused.


CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein
appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was
executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance
taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when
Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should
apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having
exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving
sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.


Solid Homes vs. Tan
SOLID HOMES vs. TAN 465 SCRA 570 (Art. 1169)
Facts: On April 7,1980, Solid Homes sold to spouses Uy a subdivision lot and thereafter spouses Uy sold the same lot to
spouses Tan.
From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only to find out the sad state of development thereat.
There was no infrastructure & utility system of water. Worse, squatters occupy their lot & its surrounding areas. On Dec.
18,1995, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility system & clear the area of squatters by the end
of January 1996.
Having received no reply from petitioner, Respondent filed with the housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a
complaint for specific performance which rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: WON Respondents right to bring the instant case against petitioner has already prescribed? NO WON in the event
respondents opt to rescind the contract, should petitioner pay them the price they paid for the lot plus interest or the
current market value thereof? CURRENT MARKET VALUE.
HELD: Petitioner argued that the 10 yrs prescriptive period should be reckoned from April 7, 1980 when they sold the lot to
spouses Uy or at the latest on February 1985. The SC disagree because it is from the time an act is performed or an
omission incurred which is violative of plaintiffs right, that signals the accrual of a case of action.
Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the date the cause of action accrued. And a cause of
action arises when that which should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done. In law,
a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)an obligation on the part on the defendant to respect such right; and (3)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
In this case, it was only on Dec. 18, 1995 when respondent made a written demand upon petitioner to construct which are
unquestionably in the nature of an obligation to do.
Under Art. 1169, party who is under obligation to do something incurs delay only from the time the obligee demands either
judicially or extra judicially for the fulfillment of obligation.
In this case, respondent made their written demand upon petitioner to perform what is incumbent upon it only on Dec.18,
1995, it was only from that date when 10 yrs prescriptive period commenced to run.
Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market value, otherwise, respondent would enrich
themselves at the expense of the lot owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value.

Indeed, there would be unjust enrichment if respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven are made to pay only the
purchase price plus interest. It is definite that the value of the subject property already escalated after almost two decades
from the time the petitioner paid for it. Equity and justice dictate that the injured party should be paid the market value of
the lot, otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven would enrich themselves at the expense of herein lot
owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value. Surely, such a situation should not be countenanced for to
do so would be contrary to reason and therefore, unconscionable. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic
adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law.


US VS TORIBIO
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because
his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He
was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law
mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use,
within the meaning ofthe constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and
restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacitcondition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.



COMENDADOR VS DE VILLA
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation ofArticles of War (AW) 67
(Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted
where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before
the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of
the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail
guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the
court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing
court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail
does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations
which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the
chance to continue their plot in overthrowing thegovernment. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the
petitioners was reversed.


Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75 PHIL 131

FACTS: Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the
proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation. It is based on the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating
and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines. Furthermore, it was contended that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct
republic in the absence of enabling law.
ISSUES: Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government.
Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces.
HELD: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a
de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political
in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.
All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and valid before and remained as
such even after the occupied territory had come again into the power of true and original sovereign.

Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and continue the proceedings.


Chua v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service as of the date of separation Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the
benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however,
denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:

The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the
Supreme Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class
of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The court applied the doctrine of
necessary implication in deciding this case.


People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo
Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised ElectionCode. A preliminary investigation conducted by
said court resulted in the finding of a probable causethat the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter,
the trial started upon defendantsplea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
justice of thepeace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purviewof Section 54. A second
motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs.
Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace isexcluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. Acting on various motions andpleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of theruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue:
Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code
Held:

Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislativeenumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judgeincludes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justiceof the peace, and even jurors,
it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did notexclude the justice of the peace from its operation.
In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of
the Revised AdministrativeCode, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge,
includingtherein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of AgrarianRelations,
judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal
order entered by the trial court and remanded the case fortrial on the merits