1

ASIC COMPLAINT

Manipulative Trading Trends Associated with a Sample of
Thirty-Two ASX 200 Companies
October 2013



DISCLAIMER: All information presented as research has been sourced from broker trading
records and registry records. While the author considers the data to be accurate and free
from transcription errors, no guarantees can be given on conclusions and/or commentary
provided. Interested readers are encouraged to do their own Due Diligence and to make
up their own minds in regard to the causes of any trends present in trading data.
Copyright 2014
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any
form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical
methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations
embodied in critical reviews and referral to the website www.scribd.com/asx_trading_issues. For
permission requests, email the publisher, addressed Attention: Permissions Coordinator, at
asx.trading.issues@gmail.com

ASX TRADING ISSUES BLOG
EMAIL: asx.trading.issues@gmail.com
WEB ADDRESS: www.scribd.com/asx_trading_issues

2

OVERVIEW
A detailed analysis of algorithmic trading based on empirical broker data associated with thirty-two ASX
200 companies has shown that groups of brokers are able to trade selectively between themselves in
support of the setting and maintenance of artificial pricing levels. Much of the activity qualifies as being
illegal and requires proper investigation.
Price discovery appears to have become just a reflection of the trading agendas of sophisticated investors
rather than a reflection of company value based on the natural forces of supply and demand.
Pricing agendas are imposed automatically by machines that selectively distribute multitudes of small
algorithmic orders between brokers who are effectively colluding with their trading.
Algorithms have been shown to have the ability to distribute trades between designated sellers and
preferred buyers, thus enabling control over the market to be achieved. The activity is manipulative.
The description wolf pack is an apt description of how brokers co-operate in implementing pricing
agendas. Targeted stocks are swamped and controlled by algorithmic trades back and forth between
groups of brokers where the pack is rearranged from one day to the next with different brokers
assuming prominence.
The overwhelming trend in broker trading data across all stocks reviewed, is that on any particular day,
there will be a prominent broker (or small group) distributing trades that force prices lower (i.e.,
Downtick trades). There will also be another prominent broker (or small group) who are on the other
side of Downtick trades as buyers. The activity is highly dubious as the brokers who are prominent in
forcing lower prices do so based on relatively minor selling volumes, and the brokers who pick up large
numbers of Downtick trades as purchasers, do so with relatively minor buying volumes. The situation
is completely at odds with how fair markets are meant to work where dominant sellers by volume
ought to be associated with the largest number of Downtick transactions, and the dominant buyers by
volume ought to be the ones expected to pick up the largest numbers of cheaper Downtick trades.
It is no coincidence that two groups actively support lower prices as sellers and buyers of Downtick
trades, and nor is it a coincidence that other groups are able to dispose of and purchase large tranches
of shares, generally with reduced numbers of Downticks, but at prices set beneficially for them by
others.
The pivotal issue in assessing the reasonableness of trading is that genuine sellers seek to dispose of
their shares at the best possible prices, not through the forcing of large numbers of price falls. As such,
a good deal of the trading taking place can only be described in terms of illegal, manipulative activity.

A case in point is revealed in the charts that follow in relation to trading in Beach Energy on October 2,
2013. The charts compare both the selling profiles of brokers and the buying profiles of brokers.

To clarify, the selling profile of a broker is simply a comparison of the Downtick Sell Trades recorded by
a broker (i.e., DT %) to their market share in relation to all selling (i.e., Sells %).
The terms are defined as:
Downtick (DT): A transaction that results in a fall in the share price
DT % = The number of Downtick trades achieved, expressed as a percentage of all DT trades.
Sells % = The selling volume of a broker expressed as a percentage of all daily selling.

Similarly, the buying profile of a broker is simply a comparison of the Downtick Buy Trades recorded by
a broker (i.e. DT %) with their market share in relation to all buying (i.e., Buys %).
Essentially, the Selling Profile of a broker is the chart pattern when DT % is compared to Sells %
and the Buying Profile of a broker is the chart pattern when DT % is compared to Buys %

3

BEACH ENERGY DAILY TRADING October 2, 2013










The charts encapsulate the dubious trading activity that is evident across all trading reviewed for the 32
ASX companies. The brokers highlighted as a selling group above, accounted for 84% of all share price falls
but with a very small amount of selling between them. The buying profiles circled are also highly dubious,
where brokers with only a small buying presence have been successful in picking up large numbers of
cheaper Downtick transactions. DMGs selling and CITIs buying is anomalous for different reasons, as
large volumes of selling and buying have occurred with minimal impact to prices.
The 96 sets of charts in Section 1.5 are all similar to the example above, to varying degrees, and clearly
demonstrate the ability of algorithms to distribute trades between designated sellers and preferred
buyers. The patterns make it entirely possible for short sales to be applied without impact to prices, for
prices to be taken lower by strategic selling & buying, and for short sales to be covered again without price
impact. If so, then the data may be demonstrating how the ASX is being systematically rorted by the large
institutions and hedge funds who ply their trade via dubious algorithmic trading programs combined with
collusive short selling based trading agendas.
The situation may help to explain how $72 billion was stripped from the market through short selling back
in 2011/2012 <Short sellers ring up $72bn profit over 18 months> and why the ASX has been held back
since the GFC while US markets have forged ahead despite the Australian economy being in a much
healthier state. International interests may well be scalping the ASX and targeting retail and pension funds
in the process, and with recent reports such as <US hedge funds are lining up Australian banks> the
process looks as though it is set to continue.
The research data certainly demonstrates that ASX trading is far removed from representing fair price
discovery through the natural forces of supply and demand between genuine buyers and genuine sellers. A
fair market would reflect buying and selling profiles that are much more in balance for the majority of
trading taking place than is the case for the 32 companies reviewed.
The trading issues identified are clearly systemic in scope and have enormous implications for market
integrity. An effective regulatory response is urgently needed because as it stands, investors dealing on
the ASX are unknowingly dealing with a market that is very substantially compromised.





% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



BROKER SELLING PROFILES
BROKER BUYING PROFILES
Highly Dubious
Selling Profiles
Highly Dubious
Selling Profile
Highly Dubious
Buying Profiles
Highly Dubious
Buying Profile
4



CONTENTS


1.1 THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY RESEARCH Pg. 5

1.2 DUBIOUS TRADING TRENDS IDENTIFIED Pg. 7
1.2.1 High Levels of DTs Sells Small levels of Selling Pg. 8
1.2.2 Low Levels of DTs Sells High levels of Selling Pg. 10
1.2.3 High Levels of DTs Buys Small levels of Buying Pg. 11
1.2.4 Low Levels of DTs Buys High levels of Buying Pg. 12
1.2.5 Examples of Manipulative Trading Trends Overlooked by the Regulator Pg. 13
1.2.6 Further Examples Pg. 15

1.3 A REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL BROKER TRADING PROFILES Pg. 16
1.3.1 Low Levels of Selling Resulting in Lower Prices Pg. 17
1.3.2 Significant Levels of Selling Tending to Avoid Lower Prices Pg. 19
1.3.3 Low Levels of Buying able to capture DT Trades Pg. 22
1.3.4 Significant Levels of Buying Missing Out on DT Trades Pg. 27

1.4 ANALYSIS OF BROKER TRENDS IDENTIFIED ACROSS ALL ASX TRADING Pg. 23
1.4.1 Introduction Pg. 24
1.4.2 Combined Broker Selling Profile Averages Pg. 25
1.4.3 Control Over Pricing Levels through Low Volumes of Sales Pg. 26
1.4.4 Combined Broker Buying Profile Averages Pg. 28

1.5 THE DAILY CHARTS OF THIRTY-TWO ASX 200 COMPANIES - October 2013 Pg. 30




5

1.1 THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY RESEARCH
A snapshot of trading issues impacting a significant sample of thirty-two ASX 200 companies, has been
obtained by assessing trading on 3 separate days throughout October 2013.
Broker trading data has been summarized for each company on October 1, October 15 and October 31, to
provide:
a comparison of Downticks recorded by each brokers as a seller, and a comparison of the overall
level of selling supplied by each broker to the market; and,
a comparison of Downtick trades picked up by each broker as buyers, with the overall level of
buying supplied by each broker to the market.

The companies reviewed in relation to October 2013 trading are listed in the table below.
NEWCREST MINING NCM Section 1.5.1 Pg. 31
WHITEHAVEN COAL WHC Section 1.5.2 Pg. 32
ECHO ENTERTAINMENT EGP Section 1.5.3 Pg. 33
SIRIUS RESOURCES SIR Section 1.5.4 Pg. 34
FORTESCUE MINING FMG Section 1.5.5 Pg. 35
ILUKA RESOURCES ILU Section 1.5.6 Pg. 36
JB HIFI JBH Section 1.5.7 Pg. 37
KAROOM GAS KAR Section 1.5.8 Pg. 38
COCHLEAR LIMITED COH Section 1.5.9 Pg. 39
MYER MYR Section 1.5.10 Pg. 40
FAIRFAX MEDIA FXJ Section 1.5.11 Pg. 41
WESTERN AREAS LIMITED WSA Section 1.5.12 Pg. 42
LEIGHTON MINING LEI Section 1.5.13 Pg. 43
CST LIMITED CSR Section 1.5.14 Pg. 44
GRAINCORP GNC Section 1.5.15 Pg. 45
CSL LIMITED CSL Section 1.5.16 Pg. 46
SANTOS LIMITED STO Section 1.5.17 Pg. 47
BEACH ENERGY BPT Section 1.5.18 Pg. 48
RESOLUTE RESOURCES RSG Section 1.5.19 Pg. 49
ST BARBARA LIMITED SBM Section 1.5.20 Pg. 50
KINGSGATE CONSOLIDATED KCN Section 1.5.21 Pg. 51
WOODSIDE PETROLEUM WPL Section 1.5.22 Pg. 52
HARVEY NORMAN HVN Section 1.5.23 Pg. 53
PAN AUSTRALIA PNA Section 1.5.24 Pg. 54
PALADIN PDN Section 1.5.25 Pg. 55
PACIFIC Brands LIMITED PBG Section 1.5.26 Pg. 56
LINC ENERGY LNC Section 1.5.27 Pg. 57
SANDFIRE RESOURCES SFR Section 1.5.28 Pg. 58
OZ MINERALS OZL Section 1.5.29 Pg. 59
SILVER LAKE RESOURCES SLR Section 1.5.30 Pg. 60
LYNAS CORPORATION LYC Section 1.5.31 Pg. 61
CuDECO LIMITED CDU Section 1.5.32 Pg. 62

The research undertaken reveals trading abnormalities in all 32 companies reviewed. The anomalies are
the result of highly dubious interactions between automated trading algorithms and are readily observable
in the daily charts provided in Section 1.5
Importantly, aberrant trading trends are not able to be explained in terms of legitimate market activity
based on assumptions such as:
6

o all buying and selling is genuine;
o trading is fair where natural forces of supply and demand provide true price discovery;
o trading is transparent; and
o trading represents random, independent transactions, between entities who respect all trading
guidelines.
Aberrant trends are, however, able to be explained in terms of non-genuine buying and selling, and wide
scale collusion through the preferential dealings of algorithms. The ability for algorithms to choose who
they deal with, and where shares flow back and forward between colluding entities, provides opportunities
for influencing pricing outcomes while retaining ownership over shares. Accordingly, such non-genuine
trading can only be regarded in terms of share price manipulation issues, where trading activity results in
the establishment and maintenance of artificial pricing levels.
The relationship between non-genuine trading and share price manipulation was addressed in a recent
decision by the Australian High Court <LINK> in stating that genuine sellers are motivated by trying to
achieve the best possible returns from their selling. The fact that such a common sense statement was
offered in a joint statement by seven High Court judges is perhaps testimony to the confusion that has
descended over trading through the advent of trading algorithms.
The clarification in regard to genuine selling is critical because the research spanning thirty-two ASX200
companies shows that the selling by particular brokers is almost always designed to lower prices as much
as possible, and is not structured to achieve the best possible return from sales.
The lowering of prices is achieved by broker algorithms being tuned so as to generate large numbers of
small trades that result in a fall in the share price (i.e., large numbers of Downtick transactions). Often the
large numbers of small trades represent comparatively minor volumes of shares overall, yet the style of
selling creates maximum price impact.
An important outcome of research into a large number of ASX stocks is that CuDeco trading is seen to
represent just the tip of an extremely large iceberg when it comes to share price manipulation issues.
Moreover, there are other companies that have been impacted by highly dubious trading practices to a
greater extent than CuDeco.
Manipulative trading is implemented through settings applied to trading algorithms and by distributing
buying and selling across multiple brokers. It often results in minimal change to beneficial ownership as
research into CuDeco has shown. The practice has led to a market environment that is heavily compromised
and far removed from what it is held up to be.

Section 1.3


Research into trading data strongly suggests that the ASX is not the fair, transparent market place
advertised by ASIC in all of their official guidance and all investors need to be fully aware of the situation.

7

Section 1.2
DUBIOUS TRADING TRENDS IDENTIFIED

The trading data charts for the thirty-two ASX200 companies provided in Section 1.5 all represent concerns
that are related to share price manipulation and market integrity issues.

The concerns include:
o trading that is able to achieve unfair control over prices,
o the creation and maintenance of artificial prices, and,
o collusion by entities operating buying and selling algorithms through multiple brokers.

The various charting trends that flag market integrity concerns have been categorized as follows:

1.2.1 Reduced selling volumes associated with large numbers of Downticks
1.2.2 Strong levels of selling that has tended to avoid Downticks in price
1.2.3 Low levels of buying that attracts large numbers of Downtick trades
1.2.4 Strong levels of buying that has tended to miss out on Downtick purchases

The types of trading identified assist in highlighting systemic issues that are impacting stocks across the
entire ASX.

The issues are observable as anomalous trading trends not adequately explained from assumptions that
the market represents fair exchanges between genuine buyers and genuine sellers. Fair markets would
result in much more correlation between broker buying and selling profiles and the number of Downtick
transactions they were associated with, particularly in data taken over extended periods of time.

Importantly, some brokers have been shown to operate in particular ways over extended periods of time,
irrespective of the stocks actually traded. The trading patterns result from the settings chosen for
proprietary algorithms where for example some brokers almost always trade so as to cause lower prices.
That style of trading suggests they are being used as agents to implement trading agendas with entities
taking the other side of trades through other brokers.



8

1.2.1 TRADING WHERE SMALL VOLUMES OF SELLING HAS RESULTED IN LARGE NUMBERS OF PRICE FALLS
The 50 most anomalous trades across all companies reviewed throughout October are summarized below.
The selling has resulted in large numbers of downward price movements and clearly hasnt been motivated
by attempting to receive the best possible returns for shares sold. If properly assessed and brought before
the courts there is every chance that brokers deliberately selling in a manner to negatively impact prices
would be ruled as being manipulative.
It is reasonable that on any given day a desperate seller needing to exit a position could heavily (and
legitimately) impact prices. However the selling identified by research is for particular brokers to engage in
selling that almost always causes price falls irrespective of which stock they are trading in, and the patterns
are repeated continuously from one day to the next. The large numbers of price falls that accompany small
selling volumes come about through the purposeful tuning of algorithms to generate large numbers of
small Downtick trades through transactions with affiliate trading partners or through broker crossings
In the chart that follows, the leading 25 most anomalous trades amongst the 32 companies reviewed are
identified by both the day they occurred and by the broker responsible.



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Company & Day
Brokers
ANOMALOUS SELLING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downtick Sales (DT%) versus Overall Selling (Sells%)
DT Sales %
All Selling %

Leading 25 Anomalous Profiles
9

The next 25 most anomalous broker selling profiles were as follows.




Leading Brokers:



Of the 50 anomalous broker selling profiles, some companies featured more than others suggesting that
they were targeted more heavily.
Featuring 4 times were EGP and SBM
Featuring 3 times were: BPT, CSR, FMG, LYC, PBG,PDN, RSG, and SLR
Featuring 2 times were: KAR, OZL, and WSA
Featuring once were : CDU and 11 others.

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Of the 50 most anomalous trades Merrill Lynch accounted for 26%, while the other leading brokers
were Deutsche Bank (14%), Credit Suisse (12%), JP Morgan (12%), Macquarie (10%) and Instinet (8%).
ANOMALOUS SELLING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Sales (DT%) versus Overall Selling (Sells%)
DT Sales (DT %)
All Selling (Sells %)

Brokers
Company and Day
10

1.2.2 TRADING WHERE LARGE VOLUMES OF SELLING HAS TENDED TO AVOID DOWNTICKS IN PRICE
The 50 most anomalous daily broker selling profiles (i.e., where large volumes of selling, resulted in small
numbers of DT transactions) for trading across the 32 companies during Oct 2013 are provided below. The
daily selling profiles are shown for brokers along with the companies and the particular trading day involved.






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ANOMALOUS SELLING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Sales (DT%) versus Overall Selling (Sells %)
DT Sales (DT %)
All Selling (Sells %)

ANOMALOUS SELLING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Sales (DT%) versus Overall Selling (Sells %)
DT Sales (DT %)
All Selling (Sells %)


Brokers
Company and Day
Leading 25 Anomalous Profiles

Brokers
Company and Day
Next 25
Large volumes of selling associated with only small numbers
of Downticks is also counter-intuitive to what would be
expected from normal trading in a genuine market.
11

1.2.3 TRADING WHERE SMALL VOLUMES OF BUYING HAS CAPTURED IN LARGE NUMBERS OF DT BUYS
The charts show the leading 50 buyers of anomalous Downtick trades across all trading for the 32
companies reviewed throughout October ( i.e. large numbers of Downtick purchases achieved from
relatively minor volumes of buying). The success in being able to buy cheaper Downtick trades points to
collusion (through algorithms) between the buying brokers and the brokers responsible for Downtick sell
trades.



The next 25 most anomalous broker profiles.

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ANOMALOUS BUYING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Buys (DT%) versus Overall Buying (Buys %)

ANOMALOUS BUYING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Buys (DT%) versus Overall Buying (Buys %)
The Leading 25 Profiles
DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

Next 25
Brokers
Company and Day
Brokers
Company and Day
Buying profiles featuring large
numbers of cheaper Downtick
purchases from small volumes of
buying are statistically implausible
and suggest collusive trading
through the use of algorithms.
12

1.2.4 TRADING WHERE LARGE VOLUMES OF BUYING HAS TENDED TO MISS OUT ON DOWNTICK PURCHASES
The charts blow show the leading 50 buyers of anomalous broker buying profiles, where surprisingly, small
numbers of Downtick purchases were associated with strong levels of buying. The lack of success in
capturing cheaper DT trades can only be explained in terms of broker collusion in exchanging
comparatively large volumes of shares while generally not impacting pricing levels. Certainly prices have
avoided the fluctuations normally associated with the forces of supply and demand where genuine large
buyers try to pay as little as possible and genuine large sellers try to achieve the highest possible prices.





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DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)


ANOMALOUS BUYING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Buys (DT%) versus Overall Buying (Buys %)

ANOMALOUS BUYING PROFILES ACROSS ALL TRADING: Downticks Buys (DT%) versus Overall Buying (Buys %)
DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

The Leading 25 Profiles
Next 25 Profiles
Brokers
Company and Day
Brokers
Company and Day
Buying profiles featuring large
volumes of buying that has missed
out on cheaper Downtick
purchases again presents as
statistically implausible. The
patterns do not reflect genuine
supply and demand.
13

1.2.5 MANIPULATIVE SELLING TRENDS OVERLOOKED BY THE REGULATOR
Of the four trading patterns resulting from interactions between broker trading algorithms, one stands out
as being overtly manipulative and easily detected. The remainder are highly dubious as well but much
more difficult to assess without extensive audits. Trading patterns where large numbers of price falls are
associated with small volumes of selling (i.e., as per Section 1.2.1) simply cannot be explained in terms
other than share price manipulation.

While the regulator has claimed there is no evidence of wrongdoing in ASIC Complaints 2013-1, 2013-2 and
2013-3 it has been prepared to overlook significant Downtick issues in the selling down of practically all
CuDeco announcements <Refer ASIC Complaint 2013-1 Pg 110> as well as severe Downtick anomalies such
as the following:






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UBS Securities - Nov 2010 Downtick Selling Profile versus All Selling Profile (Re: CDU)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




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Deutsche Bank - Dec 2010 Downtick Selling Profile versus All Selling Profile (Re: CDU)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-2
Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-2
14





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Morgan Stanley (January through May 2013) Downtick Selling Profile versus All Selling Profile (Re: CDU)
UBS Securities (January through May 2013) Downtick Selling Profile versus All Selling Profile (Re: CDU)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-3
Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-3
15

1.2.6 FURTHER TRENDS
ASIC Complaint 2013-4 also referred to broker trading anomalies such as the ones reproduced below. The
charts coincide with the period that Morgan Stanley sold down the substantial shareholding that the M&G
Group held in CuDeco Limted.














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Credit Suisse (Jun12 to August 21, 2013) Downtick Selling Profile versus All Selling Profile (Re: CDU)

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-4
(The 25 most anomalous trading profiles are featured)



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JP MORGAN (JPM) Downtick Sell Profile versus All Selling Profile

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



June 18 to Aug 21, 2013
Trading referred to in
ASIC Complaint 2013-4
Given that both the ASX Board and ASIC would be well aware of the impact of trading algorithms on the market, it
follows that manipulative trading practices are being tacitly sanctioned by those authorised to operate and regulate the
financial markets.
16

Section 1.3

A REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL BROKER TRADING PROFILES

The previous section identified distinctive anomalous trading profiles of brokers in trading across thirty-
two ASX 200 companies throughout October 2013.
While particular brokers tended to trade in ways that resulted in highly dubious trading profiles from time
to time, there was a tendency for the brokers to change their selling profiles (i.e. adjust their algorithms),
and to rotate their involvements in particular stocks, from one day to the next. The changes and rotations
camouflaged broker activity so that over time, no single broker stood out as being overly prominent.
The key in terms of identifying manipulative influences is to be able to locate the clients of brokers who are
responsible for the manipulative trading profiles of brokers. Audits are required in order to achieve that. Of
particular interest is whether or not the same trading entities are simply choosing different brokers from
one day to the next in order to force dubious trading agendas on the market.
The following section summarizes the buying and selling profiles of leading brokers across all trading
recorded for October, irrespective of the stocks actually traded. Charting the results clearly demonstrates a
tendency by some brokers to trade, more often than not, in one of the following ways:
Type A Profile: Brokers who are actively involved in forcing lower prices as sellers with large
numbers of Downtick trades achieved from minimal selling volumes.
Type B Profile: Brokers who are actively involved in facilitating lower prices as buyers through the
purchasing of large numbers of cheaper Downtick trades despite small buying
volumes.
Type C Profile: Brokers who are actively involved in buying and selling large volumes of shares
without significantly impacting pricing levels given the numbers of shares traded.
The various broker styles identified in research data and listed above just happen to equate to what is
needed for short selling to successfully take place. The process can be described as:
1. Short sales need to be placed at optimum/ high prices without price impact. i.e., Type C trades
2. Prices then need to be taken lower without the loss of holdings. i.e., Type A & B trades
3. Short covering purchases need to be made, again without impacting prices i.e., Type C trades
Short selling that is not able to be successfully covered on the same day would obviously lead to an
increase in open short positions where borrowed stock is used to ensure that settlements take place.
While the trends evident in trading data provide a nice fit with what is required for short selling to be
successfully implemented, all trading styles referred to are non-genuine, require extensive collusion
between brokers through their algorithms, and they result in artificial prices. In short, share price
manipulation is commonplace and the market is heavily compromised through the fine tuning of HFT
trading algorithms that enable unfair control over the market.

17

1.3.1 SUMMARY OF BROKER TRADING PROFILES 1 Selling that has tended to result in lower prices
The following charts combine the broker selling profiles of particular brokers across all of their selling in
companies reviewed in October. The daily profiles have been arranged left to right to show the trades that
have led to lower prices from minimal volumes of selling (described as Profile A), compared to the trades
where selling has taken place with less impact on pricing levels (described as Profile C). Most of the charts
featured show a tendency towards Type A profiles.





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35%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
CREDIT SUISSE (CSUI) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



INSTINET (INST) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
JP MORGAN (JPM) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



A strong bias towards Profile A
(selling that has lowered prices)
A strong bias towards Profile A
(selling that has lowered prices)
A strong bias towards Profile A
(selling that has lowered prices)
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
18






0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
MACQUARIE (MACQ) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



MERRILL LYNCH (MERL) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
UBS SECURITIES (UBS) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



MACQs selling alternated
between Profile A and Profile C
throughout October
A strong bias towards Profile A
(selling that has lowered prices)
A substantial bias towards
Profile A (i.e., selling that
has lowered prices)
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type A
Profiles
19

1.3.2 SUMMARY OF BROKER TRADING PROFILES 2 Selling that has tended to avoid lower prices
The charts featured below show a tendency towards Type C profiles where selling has generally not been
associated with the levels of Downtick trades expected from significant volumes of selling put through the
market.




0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
CITIGROUP GLOBAL (CITI) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



DEUTSCHE BANK (DMG) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
GOLDMAN SACHS (GS) Broker Selling Profiles Across All Trading

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



A strong bias towards Profile C
occurred in the majority of
trading throughout October
Type A
Profiles
Type A
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
20

1.3.3 SUMMARY OF BROKER TRADING PROFILES 3 Buying that has supported Downtick Trades
The charts featured below show a tendency towards Type B profiles where low volumes of buying has
generally been able to pick up large numbers of cheaper Downtick trades.






0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
VIRTU FINANCIAL (VIRT) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
MERRILL LYNCH (MERL) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
INSTINET (INST) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

Type B
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
21






0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
GETCO AUSTRALIA (GETCO) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
CREDIT SUISSE (CSUI) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

Type B
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
22

1.3.4 SUMMARY OF BROKER TRADING PROFILES 4 Buying that has tended to avoid higher prices
The charts featured below show a tendency towards Type C profiles where high volumes of buying has
tended to miss out on cheaper Downtick trades. The profiles are in contrast to the brokers in the previous
section who tended to secure DT purchases from comparatively low volumes of buying.







0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
CITI GROUP GLOBAL (CITI) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
DEUTSCHE BANK (DMG) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
GOLDMAN SACHS (GS) Broker Buying Profiles Across All Trading
DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

DT Buys (DT %)
All Buying (Buys %)

Type C
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
Type C
Profiles
Type B
Profiles
23


Section 1.4

ANALYSIS OF BROKER TRENDS
IDENTIFIED ACROSS ALL ASX TRADING

24

1.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Individual broker trading data for the 32 companies sampled has been combined to provide average
profiles as sellers, and average profiles as buyers, across all stocks. Combining the data has provided an
opportunity for identifying the trading characteristics of particular brokers.
In regard to selling, select groups of brokers have emerged which have tended to:
o drive prices down through implementing large numbers of Downticks compared to their
volumes of selling in the market generally, or,
o sell significant volumes of stock but are able to avoid Downticks to a certain extent.
On the buying side, brokers have also tended to adopt particular buying profiles such as
o having the ability to pick up large numbers of Downtick purchases, despite comparatively minor
buying volumes, and
o buying large volumes of stock but somehow missing out on cheaper Downtick purchases.
There are of course exceptions, with many smaller brokers having negligible impact in the market, and in
particular stocks, prominent brokers have tended to rotate their buying and selling involvements from one
day to the next.
A major theme across all trading, however, is that brokers with small amounts of selling have substantially
impacted prices, and brokers with large amounts of selling have minimally impacted prices. It is not how
markets are meant to work. The results flowing from algorithmic interactions reflect that of a rigged
market where the true forces of supply and demand are being circumvented in an endless push to set up,
and then to consummate, successful short selling trades.
Importantly, in a fair market based on genuine buying and selling, brokers with small amounts of buying
shouldnt be successful in picking up large numbers of cheaper Downtick transactions. Also, brokers with
strong buying profiles shouldnt be tending to miss out on cheaper Downtick purchases. Yet those trends
are repeated in all trading data. The situation is completely counter-intuitive to that expected from fair and
genuine trading.
The following section attempts to identify some of the buying and selling characteristics of the more
prominent brokers where certain brokers have tended to adopted specific trading roles that are likely to be
in pursuit of shared trading agendas. Some brokers are consistently able to impact prices with small amounts
of selling that result in large numbers of Downtick trades, while others assist this group with small amounts
of buying that tends to pick up large numbers of the DT trades. In turn, other groups of brokers are generally
able to put large volumes of buying and selling through the market without impacting prices. The distinctive
trading characteristics come about through the various settings able to be supplied to broker algorithms.
When the activities of brokers are combined, perhaps as required by an exclusive club or group of
sophisticated investors, the combined efforts of brokers are effectively able to control the market. Such
control by influential, sophisticated investors comes about at the expense of those whose investments are
managed (and lent out for short selling). It is also at the expense of all smaller, retail investors. It is the
lending of other peoples shares to facilitate reductions in share prices that sits at the core of integrity
issues, and while short selling is legal, the share price manipulation that accompanies the practice, and
which has resulted in widespread trading anomalies, is not. Yet price rigging is going unaddressed.
25

1.4.2 COMBINED BROKER SELLING PROFILES
The trading characteristics of brokers as sellers across all trading taking place has been gauged by:
averaging all Downtick profiles of brokers for every stock traded on all days reviewed, and
averaging all selling profiles of brokers recorded for each stock across all days reviewed.
The following chart summarizes the results associated with the 32 companies sampled.

The selling of brokers across all stocks is characterized by 3 different trading profiles as highlighted below.



0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%

Proportion of DT Sales (Average DT %)

Proportion of All Selling (Average Sells %)

The Trading Profiles of 62 Brokers
Individual Broker Downtick Profiles versus Overall Selling Profiles
The Trading Profiles of 62 Brokers who sold
stock
Downtick Profiles versus Selling Profiles
Broker Downtick
Profiles exceed their
Selling Profiles
Broker Selling
Profiles exceed their
Downtick Profiles
Downtick Profiles matching Selling
Profiles and generally representing
low levels of activity.

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
C
S
U
I
M
E
R
L
J
P
M
I
N
S
T
U
B
S
C
I
M
B
I
T
G
M
S
D
W
B
T
I
G
T
I
M
R
M
A
C
Q

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
A
B
N
A
E
U
R
O
H
A
R
T
S
O
S
L
E
T
R
D
B
B
Y
S
U
S
Q
G
S
C
O
M
M
R
B
S
M
V
I
R
T
R
B
C
C
I
T
I
D
M
G

(Average DT %)

(Average Sells %)

Non-genuine selling
that generally appears
motivated towards
driving prices lower
Selling that tends to
be able to avoid
Downticks in price
3
2
1
26

The trends are quite extraordinary as even allowing for the averaging out that has occurred, with brokers
active on some days and not on others, definite profiles have emerged that are seemingly independent of
the stocks actually traded. The trends are characterized by:
One group of brokers being associated with significantly more Downtick transactions than what
their reduced selling profiles would suggest;
Another group of brokers tending to avoid Downticks despite strong selling presences in the market.
The fact that the distinctive trends have emerged suggests a highly co-ordinated approach to trading.
Firstly, particular brokers have generally traded in a manner that has resulted in lower prices. Secondly,
other brokers have been influential in putting substantial volumes of sales through the market while
tending to minimize the impact of their selling on share prices (i.e., fewer Downtick trades compared to
their levels of selling).
The trends may be explaining a somewhat contrived approach to short selling where some brokers are
designated short sellers and placing trades to best advantage (i.e., without price falls), while other brokers
are then actively involved in working prices lower. If so, then short selling is seen to be highly dubious as
the second group of brokers are acting in a contrived and highly manipulative/illegal manner. Also, the
placing of high levels of short sales to willing buyers may also be pointing to high levels of collusion as well,
particularly as heavy selling without impact to the share price is counterintuitive to what would be
expected from genuine buyers and genuine sellers operating in a fair market.

1.4.3 CONTROL OVER PRICING LEVELS THROUGH LOW VOLUMES OF SALES
To gauge the impact of selling that has tended to lower share prices, the 3 most anomalous selling profiles
for each day of trading in each stock have been identified and then totalled. (The trading days were Oct 1,
Oct 15 and Oct 31). Combining the 3 results for each day show the extent of Downticks achieved, and the
low volumes of selling supplied to the market that has been instrumental in forcing prices lower.
The results for each day have then been averaged to provide an overall snapshot of trading.
The calculation for Beach Energy (BPT) is summarized below:
Day Broker % DTs %Sells %Sells - %DTs
Oct 1 MACQ 30.9% 7.7% -23.20%
Oct 1 CSUI 20.3% 11.4% -8.90%
Oct 1 UBS 7.4% 1.7% -5.70%

Total 58.6% 20.8%


Oct 15 MERL 25.2% 0.3% -24.90%
Oct 15 JPM 14.8% 0.6% -14.20%
Oct 15 MSDW 23.0% 16.3% -6.70%

Total 63.0% 17.2%


Oct 31 DMG 39.7% 6.3% -33.40%
Oct 31 CSUI 18.0% 1.1% -16.90%
Oct 31 UBS 6.4% 1.3% -5.10%

64.1% 8.7%


3 Day Average 61.9% 15.6%


The 3 brokers who featured as the most
highly anomalous traders on Oct 1,
achieved 58.6% of all Downticks in price
with just 20.8% of all selling
On Oct 31, 3 brokers representing
just 8.7% of all the selling, forced
64.1% of all Downticks in Price
Over the 3 days reviewed, on average,
15.6% of all selling accounted for 61.9%
of all Downticks
The calculation %Sells - %DTs provides a measure of
anomalous selling that has the effect of lowering prices.
27

ANOMALOUS TRADING contd
The results for all companies in trading throughout October were as follows.
Oct 1, Oct 15 & Oct 31
Company Avg. DT % Avg. % Sells
BPT 61.9% 15.6%
CDU 57.0% 9.6%
COH 46.8% 22.7%
CSL 30.6% 11.2%
CSR 68.1% 24.0%
EGP 65.9% 21.1%
FMG 50.6% 18.2%
FXJ 63.6% 23.7%
GNC 49.9% 29.2%
HVN 49.0% 18.1%
ILU 66.5% 17.1%
JBH 65.2% 8.9%
KAR 61.8% 26.4%
KCN 57.6% 20.1%
LEI 39.0% 14.8%
LNC 43.1% 12.0%
MYR 56.1% 25.4%
NCM 46.5% 16.2%
OZL 51.9% 16.2%
PBG 85.8% 40.2%
PDN 57.8% 13.8%
PNA 45.9% 14.7%
RSG 67.4% 17.7%
SBM 74.5% 9.5%
SFR 64.3% 35.9%
SIR 64.8% 30.2%
SLR 57.4% 24.0%
STO 31.1% 15.0%
WHC 62.1% 26.6%
WPL 47.0% 21.8%
WSA 53.4% 18.9%
AVERAGES 56.2% 20%


The data clearly indicates the manipulative capability of algorithms which impact trading on a daily basis in
stocks right across the ASX. It makes official clarifications that attempt to normalize and sanitize the use of
algorithms extremely dubious. The following response by the regulator to shareholder concerns is a case in
point.


SELLING PROFILES

The data clearly reveals the manipulative
influence of broker algorithms when tuned to
generate large numbers of Downticks.
Santa Barbara (SBM) for example showed
74.5% of all Downticks in price arising from just
9.5% of the selling taking place across the 3
days reviewed.
Cudeco (CDU) saw 57% of all Downticks
resulting from just 9.6% of the selling taking
place while JB Hi FI (JBH) saw 65.2% of all
Downticks being generatd from just 8.9% of the
selling.
The data demonstrates the enomous
springboard effect that can be achieved
through the tuning of algorithms to facilitate
the setting and maintenance of artificial prices.
Also, brokers dont have to be associated with
anomalous levels of Downticks in terms of
manipulationg prices such as for example the
impact of UBS selling in Harvey Norman on Oct
15 with 54.5% of all Downticks corresponding
to 52.7% of all their selling. Algorithmic issues
aside, UBS was extremely influential on Oct 15
as a seller of HVN stock.

One fifth of all
selling was
responsible for
more than 50% of
all Downticks
<Quote> It is important to note that the small value transactions are largely the result with algorithmic
trading which often break down larger orders to minimise market impact by trading a large number of
small orders throughout the day. While the transactions can appear unusual when looked at in isolation,
they are not necessarily indicative of market manipulation.
28

1.4.4 COMBINED BROKER BUYING PROFILES
The trading characteristics of brokers as buyers across all trading taking place has also been gauged by:
averaging all Downtick buying profiles (% DT Buys) for every stock traded on all days reviewed, and
averaging all buying market shares (% Buys) recorded for each stock across all days reviewed.
The following chart summarizes the results associated with the 32 companies sampled.


Similar to the trends identified with broker selling, the buying profiles of brokers across all stocks are also
characterized by 3 distinctive trading profiles. They are highlighted below.





0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Downtick Profiles versus Selling Profiles
The Trading Profiles of 58 Brokers
Downtick Buys % versus Buying Profiles
Downtick buying
profiles in excess of
buying generally
Buying levels higher
than the levels of
Downtick purchases

Matching DT buying profiles and
overall buying profiles, characterized
by low levels of activity.

Proportion of DT Buys (Average DT %)

Proportion of All Buying (Average Buys %)

The Trading Profiles of 58 Brokers who purchased stock
Exceptions

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%

0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Strong buying that has
tended to miss out on
Downtick purchases
Low levels of buying that has
been successful in picking up
cheaper Downtick purchases
1
2
3
29

Again the trends are quite extraordinary as definitive buying profiles have also emerged that are seemingly
independent of the stocks actually traded and despite the fact that broker involvements fluctuate
continuously from one day to the next. The trends that have emerged are characterized by:
One group of brokers being associated with significantly more Downtick buying transactions than
what their reduced buying profiles would suggest,
Another group of brokers tending to miss out on Downtick purchases despite strong buying profiles.
The fact that brokers identify with distinctive buying trends irrespective of the stocks purchased further
suggests a highly co-ordinated/strategic/team orientated approach to trading. Such co-operation between
brokers or brokers being used to run different styled trading algorithms strongly identifies with an ability to
gain control over the market. It also identifies with share price manipulation.
Clearly, some brokers have been purchasers of stock in a manner that would have facilitated lower prices
by being the active buyers of Downtick trades. It would appear that other brokers who deal in large
volumes of stock can then take advantage of the lower prices that have been set up for them.
Again, the contrasting behaviours of the two groups make no logical sense when viewed from a
perspective of genuine buying and selling in a fair market. Logically, a strong buyer ought to be the one
who gains access to cheaper Downtick trades and brokers with lesser buying profiles ought to be the ones
who miss out on Downtick purchases. Yet the reverse has occurred.
Importantly, the trading profiles as buyers actually support the manipulative selling taking place by the
brokers who were responsible for large numbers of Downtick sales. The support represents high levels of
collusion and share price manipulation issues as trading agendas are implemented. Trading agendas are
achieved through HFT algorithms having the ability to preferentially allocate trades.
Based on the sample of 32 companies, algorithms are seen to be an integral part of how prices are being
unfairly controlled in stocks right across the ASX. The unfairness issues have been extensively spelt out
concerning CuDeco trading in several ASIC complaints however it would appear that similar stories are
being repeated over and over.
The fact that artificial prices can be so readily set and maintained in daily trading represents a strong
contradiction to claims that the Australian Stock exchange functions with integrity. It also raises questions
about an apparent failure by regulators and by the ASX to deliver on promises and to provide the sort of
trading environment suggested by official statements from these organizations.
<Quote> In supervising markets, our core objective is the promotion of investor confidence through fair and
efficient markets. This requires a market infrastructure that is robust, where the trading, clearing and
settlement of transactions is orderly and efficient, and where market misconduct is minimised. <LINK>






Algorithms represent a very large part of the problem both in active trading and during auctions, but also
contributing to compromised markets are systemic issues that allow:
o wide scale abuses of short selling;
o systems of trading that avoid price discovery (i.e., Dark Pools) and opaque Off market adjustments; and
o a system of trading, settlements and securities lending that takes place virtually opaque to the market
for the vast majority of transactions that occur, and which prevents entities being made accountable for
any unfair impact their trading has on the market.
All issues have been brought to attention in complaints forwarded to the regulator concerning CuDeco
30


Section 1.5

DAILY CHARTS OF THIRTY-TWO ASX 200 COMPANIES
DURING OCTOBER 2013


Daily charts for the trading taking place in the following companies on October 1, October 15 and October
31 are provided in the following section.

NEWCREST MINING NCM Section 1.5.1 Pg. 31
WHITEHAVEN COAL WHC Section 1.5.2 Pg. 32
ECHO ENTERTAINMENT EGP Section 1.5.3 Pg. 33
SIRIUS RESOURCES SIR Section 1.5.4 Pg. 34
FORTESCUE MINING FMG Section 1.5.5 Pg. 35
ILUKA RESOURCES ILU Section 1.5.6 Pg. 36
JB HIFI JBH Section 1.5.7 Pg. 37
KAROOM GAS KAR Section 1.5.8 Pg. 38
COCHLEAR LIMITED COH Section 1.5.9 Pg. 39
MYER MYR Section 1.5.10 Pg. 40
FAIRFAX MEDIA FXJ Section 1.5.11 Pg. 41
WESTERN AREAS LIMITED WSA Section 1.5.12 Pg. 42
LEIGHTON MINING LEI Section 1.5.13 Pg. 43
CST LIMITED CSR Section 1.5.14 Pg. 44
GRAINCORP GNC Section 1.5.15 Pg. 45
CSL LIMITED CSL Section 1.5.16 Pg. 46
SANTOS LIMITED STO Section 1.5.17 Pg. 47
BEACH ENERGY BPT Section 1.5.18 Pg. 48
RESOLUTE RESOURCES RSG Section 1.5.19 Pg. 49
ST BARBARA LIMITED SBM Section 1.5.20 Pg. 50
KINGSGATE CONSOLIDATED KCN Section 1.5.21 Pg. 51
WOODSIDE PETROLEUM WPL Section 1.5.22 Pg. 52
HARVEY NORMAN HVN Section 1.5.23 Pg. 53
PAN AUSTRALIA PNA Section 1.5.24 Pg. 54
PALADIN PDN Section 1.5.25 Pg. 55
PACIFIC Brands LIMITED PBG Section 1.5.26 Pg. 56
LINC ENERGY LNC Section 1.5.27 Pg. 57
SANDFIRE RESOURCES SFR Section 1.5.28 Pg. 58
OZ MINERALS OZL Section 1.5.29 Pg. 59
SILVER LAKE RESOURCES SLR Section 1.5.30 Pg. 60
LYNAS CORPORATION LYC Section 1.5.31 Pg. 61
CuDECO LIMITED CDU Section 1.5.32 Pg. 62

The trends identified as being manipulative and potentially illegal if properly investigated, as well as the
trends identified as being highly dubious and also requiring proper investigation, are all abundantly
evident.

31

1.5.1 NEWCREST MINING (NCM) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
NCM Oct 1 Downtick Involvement as Sellers

NCM Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
NCM Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

NCM Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

NCM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

NCM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
32

1.5.2 WHITEHAVEN COAL (WHC) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
WHC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WHC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
WHC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WHC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

WHC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WHC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
33

1.5.3 ECHO ENTERTAINMENT (EGP) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
EGP Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

EGP Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
EGP Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

EGP Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

EGP Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

EGP Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
34

1.5.4 SIRIUS RESOURCES (SIR) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
SIR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SIR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
SIR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SIR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

SIR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SIR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
35

1.5. 5 FORTESCUE METALS (FMG) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
FMG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FMG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
FMG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FMG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

FMG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FMG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
36

1.5.6 ILUKA RESOURCES (ILU) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
ILU Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

ILU Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
ILU Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

ILU Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

ILU Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

ILU Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
37

1.5.7 JB HIFI (JBH) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
JBH Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

JBH Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
JBH Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

JBH Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

JBH Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

JBH Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
38

1.5.8 KAROON GAS (KAR) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
KAR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KAR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
KAR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KAR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

KAR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KAR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
39

1.5.9 COCHLEAR Limited (COH) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
COH Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

COH Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
COH Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

COH Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

COH Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

COH Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



40

1.5.10 MYER (MYR) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
MYR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

MYR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
MYR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

MYR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

MYR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

MYR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
41

1.5.11 FAIFAX MEDIA (FXJ) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
FXJ Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FXJ Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
FXJ Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FXJ Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

FXJ Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

FXJ Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous

% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



42

1.5.12 WESTERN AREAS (WSA) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
WSA Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WSA Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
WSA Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WSA Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

WSA Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WSA Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
43

1.5.13 LEIGHTON MINING (LEI) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
LEI Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LEI Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
LEI Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LEI Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

LEI Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LEI Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



44

1.5.14 CSR LIMITED (CSR) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
CSR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
CSR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

CSR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
45

1.5.15 GRAINCORP (GNC) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
GNC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

GNC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
GNC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

GNC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

GNC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

GNC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Dubious level of
selling
46

1.5.16 CSL LIMTED (CSL) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
CSL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
CSL Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSL Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

CSL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CSL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
47

1.5.17 SANTOS LTD (STO) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
STO Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

STO Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
STO Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

STO Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

STO Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

STO Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
48

1.5.18 BEACH ENERGY (BPT) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%




0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
BPT Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

BPT Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
BPT Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

BPT Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

BPT Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

BPT Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
49

1.5.19 RESOLUTE RESOURCES (RSG) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
RSG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

RSG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
RSG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

RSG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

RSG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

RSG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
50

1.5.20 SANTA BARBARA LIMTED (SBM) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
SBM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SBM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
SBM Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SBM Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

SBM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SBM Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
51

1.5.21 KINGSGATE CONSOLIODATED (KCN) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
KCN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KCN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
KCN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KCN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

KCN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

KCN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
52

1.5.22 WOODSIDE PETROLEUM (WPL) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
WPL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WPL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
WPL Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WPL Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

WPL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

WPL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalou
s
53

1.5.23 HARVEY NORMAN (HVN) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
HVN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

HVN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
HVN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

HVN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

HVN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

HVN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
c
v

Anomalous
Anomalous
54

1.5.24 PAN AUSTRALIA LTD (PNA) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
PNA Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PNA Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
PNA Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PNA Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

PNA Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PNA Oct 31 Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
55

1.5.25 PALADIN ENERGY (PDN) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
PDN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PDN Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling




0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
PDN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PDN Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

PDN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PDN Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
56

1.5.26 PACIFIC BRANDS (PBG) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
PBG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PBG Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
PBG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PBG Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

PBG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

PBG Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
57

1.5.27 LINC ENERGY (LNC) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
LNC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LNC Oct 1 - Downtick - DT Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
LNC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LNC Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as
Buyers

LNC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LNC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
58

1.5.28 SANDFIRE RESOURCES (SFR) - October 2013 Charts





























Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
SFR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SFR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
SFR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SFR Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as
Buyers

SFR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SFR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
59

1.5.29 OZ MINERALS (OZL) - October 2013 Charts





























0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
Anomalous

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
OZL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

OZL Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



Highly
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%

0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
OZL Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

OZL Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as
Buyers

OZL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

OZL Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous

% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



60

1.5.30 SILVER LAKE RESOURCES(SLR) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
SLR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SLR Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
SLR Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SLR Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as
Buyers

SLR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

SLR Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
61

1.5.31 LYNAS CORPORATION (LYC) - October 2013 Charts





























0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
LYC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LYC Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying



% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
LYC Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LYC Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as Buyers

LYC Oct 31- Downtick Involvement as Sellers

LYC Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
62

1.5.32 CUDECO LIMITED (CDU) - October 2013 Charts






























0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
CDU Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CDU Oct 1 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers


% of DTs as Buyers

% of All Buying




% of DTs as Sellers

% of All Selling



Highly Anomalous

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%

0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
CDU Oct 15 - Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CDU Oct 15 - Downtick - DT Involvement as
Buyers

CDU Oct 31- Downtick Involvement as Sellers

CDU Oct 31 - Downtick Involvement as Buyers

Highly Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous
Anomalous Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly
Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Highly Anomalous
Anomalous