Moral Responsibility in Business

The term moral responsibility has two distinct meanings: first, moral duty or moral obligation (andivier
had a moral responsibility not to lie.; second, one person is to blame for something ( andivier was
morally responsible for the deaths of five pilots who crashed when trying to land the A7D airplane
A person is morally responsible for an in!ury or a wrong on three conditions: the person caused or
helped cause it, or failed to prevent it when he could and should have; the person did so "nowing what he or
she was doing; the person did so of his # her own will.
The absence of any of these three elements would eliminate a person responsibility for an in!ury and
so would fully e$cusea person from any blame for that in!ury. That is e$actly the way asbestos
manufacturers tried to defend themselves when accused of forcing their employees to wor" in a ha%ardous
environment.
ASBESTOS AND LUNG DISEASES
&everal manufacturers of asbestos were recently held responsible for the lung diseases suffered by
some of their wor"ers. The !udgment based in part on the finding that the manufacturers had a special
duty (a duty they were assigned by their position to warn their wor"ers of the "nown dangers of
wor"ing with asbestos. 'et they "nowingly failed to perform this duty, and the lung diseases were a
foreseen in!ury that they could have prevented had they acted as they had a duty to act.
(n their defence, the asbestos manufacturers argued that: The lung in!uries suffered by their
wor"ers were not caused by wor"ing with asbestos, but by smo"ing. They did not "now that
conditions in their plants would cause lung cancer in their wor"ers. They were not free to prevent
the in!uries because they had tried to get their wor"ers to wear protective mas"s, but the wor"ers
refused and so they were in!ured, because of circumstances the manufacturers could not control.
(f any of these claims were true, then the manufacturers could not be morally responsible for
the lung diseases of their wor"ers.
The first re)uirement for moral responsibility is a real connection between the agent action and that
action conse)uences: the person must either cause the in!ury or else must fail to prevent it when she
could and should have done so. (n many cases, it is easy to determine whether a person actions
ausedan in!ury or wrong. (n such cases, we spea" of commissions. *evertheless, it is not so easy when a
party does not cause an in!ury but merely fails to prevent it. (n such cases, we spea" of omissions.
NIKE AND CHILD LABOUR
*i"e is a household name when it comes to sports apparel and e)uipment. (t has wor"ed hard to
burnish its image, especially by garnering endorsements from big names in the sports world, such
as +ichael ,ordan. -ut in .//0 its silver image began to tarnish. (t "new it was in trouble when
an article on child labour in 1a"istan appeared in 2ife maga%ine with a picture of a .34year4old
boy sewing a *i"e soccer ball in a factory, and activists started showing up in front of *i"e
outlets holding posters with the boy5s picture on it. Although child labour is illegal in 1a"istan, the
law is not enforced and child labour is widespread. The factory in )uestion was not run by *i"e,
but by a subcontractor or supplier. *onetheless, *i"e was held responsible by many, especially in
the 6& and 7anada. 8ne immediate result was a 9-oycott *i"e: movement, which has continued
to monitor and report on *i"e5s actions.
*or was the report from 1a"istan an isolated incident for *i"e. Also in .//0, 7-&5s
;< =ours reported on wor"ing conditions in >ietnam, featuring *i"e and the abuses of wor"ers
who made some of *i"e5s products. &ince .//0, *i"e has been charged by critics with engaging in
a variety of unethical employment practices in countries that e$ercise little or no control over the
conditions of labour or whose governments are corrupt and can be bought off. ?or *i"e had and
continues to have a reputation for producing its products in less developed countries, "nown for
the cheapest labour and the la$est law enforcement, including 7hina, >iet *am, -angladesh and
(ndonesia. At *i"e5s invitation, the >iet *am 2abour @atch conducted a si$4month investigation
and its report details discrepancies between what *i"e told American customers and what the
group itself uncovered. 8ne significant item in the report is the statement that non4*i"e shoe
factories the group visited in >ietnam had better wor"ing conditions and paid higher wages.
(n .//<, *i"e pledged to ma"e sure its factories adhered to acceptable labour practices and
agreed to let labour and human rights groups inspect its facilities. 'et its critics continued to trac"
the company. (n 3AAA, >ictoria (nternational Development Bducation Association (>(DBA in
7anada published a boo" of facts about *i"e, which noted among other things that *i"e, which
paid its <A,AAA (ndonesian factory wor"ers ten cents an hour, could double their wages at a cost of
less than C3A,AAA,AAA D the amount that *i"e paid +ichael ,ordan for promoting its products. (t
paid C3AA million to sponsor the -ra%ilian soccer team. >(DBA also claimed that the cost of
ma"ing one pair of *i"e running shoes was appro$imately CE.AA, although they retail for more
than C.AA and for as much as C.</. The figures by themselves, of course, do not present the
whole picture. =owever, at least on the surface they suggest e$ploitation of labour and a terrible
disparity between manufacturing and advertising e$penditures.
(n 3AA., *i"e5s 7B8, 1hilip Fnight, claimed that the company5s policy with respect to the
employment of child labour was 9the highest in the world: .< for footwear manufacturing, .0 for
apparel and e)uipment.: *onetheless, he ac"nowledged that there were instances in which the
company used contract factories abroad, where the policies had been violated. @ith respect to the
company5s violations in 7ambodia, violations reported by the --7, +r. Fnight cited the fact that
evidence of age could buy there for as little as CE and that, following the charge, the company re4
e$amined all employee records there. The reply did not satisfy critics.
i
The athletic shoe company has been the centre of a controversy over its responsibility for the mistreatment
of the wor"ers who ma"e its shoes. *i"e does not actually manufacture any of the athletic shoes it sells.
(nstead, *i"e designs its shoes in &eattle, and then pays companies in developing countries (7hina,
(ndonesia, (ndia, etc. to ma"e the shoes according to these designs. These foreign supplier companies have
directly mistreated and e$ploited their wor"ers.
*i"e has claimed that it is not morally responsible for this mistreatment, because the supplier
companies caused the in!uries of their employees. Thus, *i"e itself did not cause the in!uries. 7ritics have
responded that although it is true that *i"e did not directly cause the in!uries, *i"e could have prevented
those in!uries by forcing its suppliers to treat their wor"ers humanely. (f it is true that *i"e had the power
to prevent the in!uries, and should have done so, then *i"e met the first condition for moral responsibility.
=owever, if *i"e was truly powerless to prevent these in!uries if *i"e had no control over the actions of its
suppliers then it did not meet the first condition.
1eople are morally responsible for an in!ury when they failed to prevent it, only if they hould
haveprevented it. 1eople cannot hold morally responsible for all the in!uries they "now about and fail to
prevent. Bach of us is not morally responsible for failing to save all the members of all the starving groups
in the world that we learn about by reading the newspapers, even if we could have saved some of them. (f
we were morally responsible for all these deaths, then we would all be murderers many times over and this
seems wrong.
A person is responsible for failing to prevent an in!ury only when, for some reason, the person had an
obligation to prevent that particular in!ury. &uch an obligation generally re)uires some sort of special
relationship to the in!ury or the in!ured party. ?or e$ample, if ( "now ( am the only person near enough to
save a drowning child, and ( can do so easily, then my special physical relationship to the child creates in
me an obligation to save the child and so ( am morally responsible for the child death if ( fail to prevent
it. 8r if ( am a police officer on duty and see a crime that ( can easily prevent, then, because it is my !ob to
prevent such crimes, ( have a specific obligation to prevent this crime and am morally responsible if ( fail
to do so. Bmployers li"ewise have a special obligation to prevent wor" in!uries on their employees and so
are morally responsible for any foreseen wor" in!uries they could have prevented.
The second re)uirement for moral responsibility is concerned with the agent knowledge of the
relevant aspects in a situation. The person must "now what she is doing. (f a person is ignorant of the fact
that her actions will in!ure someone else, then she cannot be morally responsible for that in!ury.
A person may be ignorant of either the relevant facts the relevant moral standards. ( may be sure that
bribery is wrong (a moral standard, but may not reali%e that in tipping a customs official ( was actually
bribing him into cancelling certain import fees (a fact. (n contrast, ( may be genuinely ignorant that bribing
government officials is wrong (a moral standard, although ( "now that in tipping the customs official ( am
bribing him into reducing the fees ( owe (a fact. (gnorance, however, does not always e$cuse a person.
8ne e$ception occurs when a person deliberately stays ignorant of a certain matter to escape
responsibility. (f *i"e managers told their suppliers that they did not want to "now what was going on in
their factories, they would still be morally responsible for whatever mistreatment went on that they could
have prevented. A second e$ception occurs a person negligently fails to ta"e ade)uate steps to get
information about a matter that has its own importance. A manager in an asbestos company, who has
reason to suspect that asbestos may be dangerous, but who, out of la%iness, fails to gather information on
the matter, cannot plead ignorance as an e$cuse.
The third re)uirement for moral responsibility: The person must act of his own free will. &omeone acts
of his own free will when the person acts deliberately or purposefully and his actions are not the result of
some uncontrollable mental impulse or e$ternal force.
A person is not morally responsible if he causes in!ury because he lac"ed the power, s"ill, opportunity,
or resources to prevent his actions from resulting in in!ury. *or is a person morally responsible when
physically forced to inflict an in!ury on someone else. The same when the agent is physically restraint from
doing something to prevent the in!ury, nor when a person mind is psychologically impaired in a way that
prevents her from controlling her actions. An employee may in!ure a fellow wor"er when a machine he
thought he "new how to operate suddenly veers out of his control. A manager wor"ing under e$tremely
stressful circumstances may be so tense that one day he is overcome by rage at a subordinate and genuinely
is unable to control his actions toward the subordinate. An engineer who is part of a larger operating
committee may be unable to prevent the other committee members from ma"ing a decision that the engineer
feels will result in in!ury to other parties. An assembly4line wor"er with an undiagnosed malady may suffer
muscle spasms that cause the assembly line to malfunction in a way that inflicts physical in!uries on other
wor"ers.
(n all of these cases, the person is not morally responsible for the wrong or the in!ury, because the
person did not choose the action deliberately or purposefully, but was forced to inflict the in!ury by a
mental impairment or some uncontrollable e$ternal forces.
@e can distinguish three types of mitigating factors that can lessen a person moral responsibility.
?irst, we should consider circumstances that minimi%e, but do not completely remove a person
involvement in an act that caused or brought about an in!ury. This "ind of circumstance affects the degree
to which the person actually caused or helped to cause the in!ury. An engineer may be aware of the unsafe
features in somebody else design, but passively stand by without doing anything about it because Ghat
not my !ob (n general, the less one actual actions contribute to the outcome of an act, the less one is
morally responsible for that outcome.
7ertain circumstances leave a person uncertain, but not altogether unsure about a variety of matters
(facts, moral standards, seriousness of the wrongdoing. etc.. This "ind of circumstance affects the person
knowledge. An office wor"er who is as"ed to carry proprietary information to a competitor might feel
fairly sure that doing so is wrong, yet may also have some genuine uncertainty about how serious the
matter is.
?inally, there are circumstances that ma"e it difficult but not impossible for the person to avoid doing
it. This "ind of circumstance affects the person free will. &ometimes, middle managers meet intense
pressure or threats by their superiors to reach unrealistic production targets or to "eep certain health
information secret from wor"ers or the public, although it is clearly unethical to do so. (f the pressures on
managers are great enough, then their responsibility correspondingly diminishes.
The e$tent to which these three mitigating circumstances can diminish a person responsibility for a
wrongful in!ury depends on the seriousness of the wrong. (f my employer threatens to fire me unless ( sell a
used product that ( "now will "ill someone, it would be wrong for me to obey him, even though loss of a
!ob will impose heavy costs on me.
.. The ?uller company sells adhesive products, which are made and distributed in 7entral America.
(n =onduras, Hesistol has a big mar"et share and it is used by the street children as a drug, to get them
high. (n a short time, the use of Hesistol as an illegal drug became a very serious problem, and childrenIs
advocateIs launched serious criticisms against ?uller. Are these criticisms !ustifiedJ @hat should ?uller
have done in order to avoid the inade)uate use of HesistolJ (Actually, the company tried some solutions.
@hat other parties are responsibleJ
3. *i"e is a well4"nown clothing and e)uipment brand. (n .//0, the good image of the company
was affected, when the Life maga%ine published an article about child labour in 1a"istan, and a photo of a
.34year old boy wor"ing at a sewing machine in order to ma"e a *i"e football ball in a factory in 1a"istan.
Afterwards, acitvists urge consumers to boycott *i"e. 7hild labour was illegal in 1a"istan, but the
regulation was only seldom enforced. The factory where the factory was ta"en was not owed by *i"e itself,
but by a independent local subcontractor. Kiven that the factory was not owed by *i"e, is the company
responsible for the subcontractorIs practicesJ @hat other parties are responsibleJ
L. At the end of ./7As and at the beginning of ./<As, *estlwas sub!ect to one of the well "nown
boycotts in the business world. 8ne of the reasons is that formula must normally be mi$ed with water,
which is often contaminated in poor countries, leading to disease in vulnerable infants. (s *estlresponsible
for the inade)uate use of the formula in these countriesJ @hat should the company doJ
;. (n ./<As ,ohns4+anville provided asbestos4based industrial products. (n spite of its )ualities,
asbestos is a very dangerous material for the human health, but this fact was not "nown in that period.
+any of thesee products were used in the shipyard industry and many wor"ers had their health affected
because of their e$posure to asbestos. Kiven the fact that the harmful effects of asbestos were not "nown, is
,ohns4+anville responsible for wor"ersI serious diseases caused by the e$posure to asbestosJ
E. (n .//3, a woman sued +cDonalds for the fact that the coffee cup bought from a +cDonald
fast4food resstaurant and spilled by the woman caused her serious burns. (s +cDonalds responsible for the
accidentJ Do you consider that the company should have been legally punishedJ @hat should have
+cDonalds doneJ
i
De George, Richard T., Busi ness Ethics, Sixth edi ti on, Upper Saddl e Ri ver, New Jersey,
Pearson-Prentice all, !""#, pp. $%#-$%&