French military ofcers and the mapping of West Africa: the case of Captain

Brosselard-Faidherbe
Isabelle Surun
Universit Lille Nord de France, UDL 3, CNRS UMR 8529 IRHiS, F-59653 Villeneuve dAscq, France
Abstract
Through the study of projects conceived to shape colonial space, this article aims to reconsider the motives and means of French colonial expansion in West
Africa in the 1880s and 1890s. The Plan Faidherbe, designed by the Governor of Senegal in the 1860s, outlined a plan for eastward development, including
a road and rail link between the Senegal and the Niger Rivers (and beyond, between Algeria and Sudan). The implementation of these routes of penetration
called for a number of military-led topographic missions. The study of these missions and of the maps that were produced at the time reveal how such
projects and their implementation were mediated by both cartographic and eld practices. The case of Captain Henry Brosselard (1855e93), General
Faidherbes son-in-law, is an interesting example because of the diversity of the missions he led and the extent of territory which he traversed and mapped.
This case also shows how, in the course of a career, an ofcer could assume several different functions and come to conceive the process of building colonial
territory from different perspectives. This paper questions a common view of the military as having a purely strategic vision of space as a eld of conquest,
a view which reserves a more development-oriented outlook for civil administrators and the business community. Indeed, Brosselards varied career
somewhat blurs the conventional divide between civilians and soldiers, requiring us to reconsider accepted ways of categorising colonial actors.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: French colonial expansion; French Sudan; Niger; Cartography; Colonial ofcers; Planning; Development
In the 1880s and 1890s, at a time of French expansion, West Africa
was still in the process of being conquered and dominated, and it
was not yet considered a properly and well-dened territory.
Rather, in the context of the scramble for Africa, West Africa was
effectively represented as an empty space yet to be developed. In
the minds of the French eld ofcers busy implementing large-
scale strategic projects, it was a eld of experimentation and
a territory still in gestation. Some of these projects, in particular the
means of inland penetration through such means as the construc-
tion of telegraph lines, roads, railways and fortied outposts, have
already been the subject of a number of studies.
1
Historians have
thus far paid only limited attention to the cartographic work
accompanying this expansion. Yet maps are the graphic expressions
of such projects and the essential supports to their design. As
mediating devices operating between the space of the project and
the space of the terrain, they build and enable the intellectual
appropriation of the areas covered and their effective trans-
formation into planned spaces.
2
A simultaneous analysis of the
cartographic and discursive work of the ofcers involved in the
movement of expansion and conquest of French West Africa allows
a reconsideration of the processes of territorial development in the
colonies.
This paper reconsiders the motives and means of French colonial
expansion in West Africa at the end of the nineteenth century.
E-mail address: isabelle.surun@wanadoo.fr
1
Kanya-Forstner has analysed the stages of French military conquest and the process by which decisions were taken: see A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the
Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism, Cambridge, 1969. The project of expansion towards Upper-Senegal and the construction of a line of forts have been
studied by A. Bathily, La conqute franaise du Haut Fleuve (Sngal), 1818e1887, Bulletin de lInstitut Fondamental dAfrique Noire (1972) and by T.M. Bah, Les forts franais
et le contrle de lespace dans le Haut-SngaleNiger, in: Le sol, la parole, lcrit. Mlanges en hommage Raymond Mauny, Vol. 2, Paris, 1981, 977e985. Many works have
explored the question of railways as a means for colonisation: see M. Lakroum, Chemin de fer et rseaux daffaires en Afrique occidentale: le Dakar-Niger, 1883e1960, Doctorat
dEtat, Universit de Paris 7, 1987; H. dAlmeida-Topor, Ch. Chanson-Jabeur and M. Lakroum (Eds), Les Transports en Afrique, XIXeeXXe sicles, Paris, 1992; R. Khumbi, Le Rail
en A. O. F. (1880e1940), Lavnement du chemin de fer et son rle dans la mise en valeur des colonies franaises dAfrique occidentale, Thse de doctorat, Universit Paris 4,
1994; M. Maclane, Railways and development imperialism in French West Africa before 1914, Proceedings of the Western Society for French History 18 (1991) 505e514.
2
C. Jacob, La carte comme mediation, in: LEmpire des cartes: approche thorique de la cartographie travers lhistoire, Paris, 1992, 41e54; J.B. Harley, Maps, knowledge and
power, in: D. Cosgrove and S. Daniels (Eds), The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments, Cambridge, 1988,
227e312; J.B. Harley, Deconstructing the map, in: T. Barnes and J. Duncan (Eds), Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape, London, 1992,
231e247.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Historical Geography
j ournal homepage: www. el sevi er. com/ l ocat e/ j hg
0305-7488/$ e see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jhg.2011.02.024
Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177
lutar
Designed by the Governor of Senegal in the 1860s, the Plan Faidherbe
outlined a plan for eastward development, including a road and rail
link between the Senegal and the Niger Rivers (and beyond, between
Algeria and Sudan). The rst section of the paper examines the
motives for and context of French expansion, notably in military and
commercial terms, and the conceptions of space they reected. The
remainder of the paper focusses on the case of Captain Henry Bros-
selard (1855e93), General Faidherbes son-in-law, who led a number
of missions and mapped a large expanse of terrain. This case also
shows how, in the course of a career, an ofcer could assume several
different functions. Indeed, Brosselards variedcareer somewhat blurs
the conventional divide betweencivilians andsoldiers, requiring us to
reconsider accepted ways of categorising colonial actors.
Expansion in French West Africa: between military and
civilian rule
In the current literature on colonial expansion in West Africa, it is
common to nd a distinction between two forms of colonial
culture, each represented by distinct kinds of actor and institution.
On this interpretation, there were, on the one hand, the military
authorities, and on the other, a civil administration. The military
were bent exclusively on the continuing expansion of Frances
overseas possessions and on restoring the image of the French
Army, somewhat tarnished by the defeat of 1870 and the loss of
Alsace-Lorraine. In contrast, the civil administration, backed by
politicians and businessmen, formed a colonial lobby solely inter-
ested in exploiting the resources these territories represented. It is
usually assumed that the rst group developed a strategic approach
and had a broad view of the areas to conquer; and that the second
had a purely utilitarian and economic conception of space, viewing
territory on the basis of its potential for intensive and rational
development. The two principal organisations that supported the
Parti Colonial in Parliament have been distinguished in this way.
The Comit de lAfrique franaise, founded in 1890, is thus said to
have supported the more political imperialism of the military;
while the Union coloniale franaise, founded in 1893, was said to be
closer to the liberal ideas of the economic and business elite.
3
According to Alice Conklin, a signicant shift took place in the
colonial policy of France in the 1890s, which resulted in an admin-
istrative reorganization of the conquered territories. With the
creation in 1895 of the federation of Afrique occidentale Franaise
(AOF), she argues, military authority was handed over to civilian
authority. This was headed by a Governor General who answered
directly to the civilian authority of the Ministre des Colonies, himself
freed the year before from the control of the Ministre de la Marine.
In the particular context of the Dreyfus affair, there was growing
distrust of the army which was increasingly considered as badly
controlled. It is said that this helped discredit the policy of expan-
sion in favor of a policy of development advocated by the economic
forces within the colonial lobby, the victory of which appeared
obvious in 1902 with the appointment of an engineer fromthe Ecole
Polytechnique Ernest Roume, the candidate of the Union Coloniale, as
Governor General of AOF.
4
In fact this process was already well
underway by the early 1890s: as early as 1892, it had become
commonplace to assert in colonial circles that, especially in West
Africa, an era of exploitation should nowreplace the era of conquest.
5
There are several objections to this reading of events, which,
although not unqualied, deserves to be rather more nuanced. First
of all, the transfer of power was not as radical as this account
implies. The well-orchestrated rivalry between the civilian and
military authorities in the early 1890s should not obscure the fact
that the military continued to exercise substantial power on the
front-line of conquest, which continued to advance until after 1900
in the region of Lake Chad. What is more, certain territories on both
sides of the Sahara remained under military rule even until the
1930s, forming a coherent region that has been subject to in-depth
study by Jacques Frmeaux.
6
These objections, however, mainly
concern the intensity of the process and its chronology.
Asecond, more epistemological objection, concerns the categories
of actors mobilized in this account. To deconstruct the notions of
civilizing mission and development, Conklin has analysed the
discourse and the orders of a group of high-ranking Republican
administrators, the governor generals of AOF: directly responsible to
the colonial minister in Paris, yet strategically located in what the
French deemed their most barbaric territory of all e sub-Saharan
Africa e the ofce of the governor general in Dakar provides an ideal
window onto the Third Republics mission civilisatrice and its conse-
quences.
7
Conklin therefore focusses on the highest levels of the
colonys civil administrationetothe exclusionof all others eand this
has the effect of making the governor generals look as if they were the
sole proponents of the idea. For his part, Frmeaux proposed, as part
of an inquiry into the doctrines and experiences of the army in the
colonies, to take interest in the military territories so as to locate
there, in the leadership styles and relationships, particular forms of
government revealing two distinct tonalities in the North and in the
South of the Sahara. Frmeauxs study of the doctrines underlying
local administrative practices highlighted a specic type: this very
special category of ofcer-administrators.
8
Without seeking to
oversimplify the arguments of these two authors, both have
contributedtothe constructionof a somewhat dualistic conceptionof
colonial action as either the work of civilian administrators or of
military personnel.
In this paper, I propose to reconsider this conception of an irre-
ducible divide between civilian and military administration by
examining how colonial space was actually conceived in the process
of mapping. An analysis of the discursive and cartographic materials
produced by some ofcers involved in the conquest of AOF reveals
how some of the military were able to take part in the many chal-
lenges inherent to colonial expansion, and did indeed take into
account economic as well as strategic considerations, at a number of
different scales.
Plans, maps and scales
Colonial projects were at their most spectacular when they
encompassed large areas. It was in this context that the strategic
dimension of map making appeared at its most obvious. Indeed,
lines were traced across the West African subcontinent, and even
across the entire continent, with the objective of joining together
3
S. Persell, French Colonial Lobby, 1889e1938, Stanford, 1983, 17, 20e22, 27, quoted by A. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West
Africa, 1895e1930, Stanford, 1997, 266 n5.
4
Conklin, A Mission to Civilize (note 3), 33e35 and 41e42.
5
Conklin, A Mission to Civilize (note 3), 266 n7, after C.M. Andrew, Thophile Delcass and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: A Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy,
1898e1905, London, 1968. As Conklin explains, the term exploitation here is used in the French sense, which does not carry the pejorative connotations it does in English.
In French, exploitation can best be translated as development.
6
J. Frmeaux, LAfrique lombre des pes, 1830e1930, 2 Vols, Paris, 1993e1995.
7
Conklin, A Mission to Civilize (note 3), 5.
8
Frmeaux, LAfrique lombre des pes (note 6), Vol. 1, introduction.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 168
determinado
manchado
already conquered territories. Here were the broad outlines of the
project commonly referred to by historians as the Plan Faidherbe.
Formulated as early as the Second Empire, the idea of
a connection between the colonies of Senegal and Algeria, thanks to
a concerted movement through the Sahara and Sudan towards
Timbuktu, was increasingly deemed necessary.
9
The proposal was
actively supported by the governors of Senegal, such as Brire de
LIsle, who believed in the drive towards the Niger and swore by
the go ahead motto of the Americans.
10
This was also the case
amongst the Senior Commanders of the Upper River, including
Borgnis-Desbordes, Boilve, Combes, Frey, Archinard and Gallieni,
who were stationed upstream and saw themselves as the worthy
successors of Faidherbes project in the period 1880e93.
11
By that
time, Faidherbe himself had been made a life-long Senator of the
Republic and his advice was frequently requested by the Ministre
de la Marine et des Colonies: he followed the progress of these
proposals closely, and worried much about the setbacks and delays
caused by parliamentary opposition and lack of funds. Between
1881 and 1889, he even gave a series of lectures in his home town to
the Socit de Gographie de Lille, pointing out, time after time, the
outlines of his plan and commenting on the stages of its imple-
mentation.
12
The maps he used to support his presentations clearly
showed the magnitude of his grand plan, which has been
summarized by Kanya-Forstner in terms of a Senegambian
Triangle (Fig. 1).
13
In order to connect the upper parts of the Senegal to the
Niger,
14
and to make this the major axis of further westwards
penetration, Faidherbe called for the building of a main road,
telegraph lines and a railway track, defended by a line of fortied
strongholds, between Kayes and Bamako. The purpose of the plan
was to allow two access routes to the Niger, one from the west
through the SenegaleNiger major axis, and one from the south
through the Southern Rivers, by securing for France possession of
the coastline between Saint-Louis on the River Senegal and Sierra
Leone. The coastal side of the triangle raised the problems of the
British presence in the Gambia and of the Portuguese in Guinea,
issues which were nally settled only in the late 1880s through
a series of bilateral agreements on borders, determining the
colonial enclaves. It was also during this period that the interest of
the colonial authorities e and of the sous-secrtaire dEtat aux
Colonies, Mr. Etienne in particular e shifted southwards. Indeed,
slow progress in Sudan, combined with the new opportunities for
building links towards the south discovered by Louis-Gustave
Binger, showed the third side of the triangle as perhaps the more
likely axis of penetration.
Nonetheless, for such projects to become reality, a substantial
number of enquiries in the eld by ofcer-surveyors and military
engineers and extensive mapping were required. The possible
routes for a road or a railway had to be discussed at a more regional
level. Gallienis rst mission in Sudan (1879e81) and the topo-
graphic survey led by Major Derrien to explore French Sudan and
study the route of a railway linking the Senegal to the Niger
(1880e1) are just two examples of such endeavors.
15
The carto-
graphic material produced by these missions sometimes included
very accurate topographic detail, and sometimes opened further
vistas on selected sites, through enlargements placed in the
margins of the map. This was the case in Gallienis Voyage au
Soudan franais, which was accompanied by maps of varying scale.
There were general 1:7 000 000 maps, reconnaissance itineraries
drawn by Captain Pitri and Captain Vallire at a scale of 1:800 000
but also eld surveys at 1:120 000 and 1:40 000. The larger scale
was used to describe a river fork or crossing, or the oor of a valley
where a road was intended, or a hilltop suitable for the building of
a fort. It is at this scale, which revealed the irregularities of the
terrain, that the choices made at the time can be better understood.
Borgnis-Desbordes, Commander of the Upper River, analyzing the
work reported by Gallieni, criticized the latters propositions con-
cerning the location of the forts of Fangalla and Kita. In both cases,
he wrote that Gallieni obeyed the classic military doctrine, which
called for control of high places and the installation of strongholds
in dominant positions. Borgnis-Desbordes was more concerned
with logistical issues, such as easy access to water, which required
forts to be located in the valleys.
16
Martine Cuttier has analysed this
episode as revealing two contrasting conceptions of space,
reecting two distinct military cultures: that of the marsouins
(French marine infantry), like Gallieni, and that of the bigors
(French marine artillery), like Borgnis-Desbordes. Cuttier has
remarked that these coincide with different military training
schools, since the marsouins had been educated at the Ofcer
School of Saint-Cyr, while the bigors were graduates of the Ecole
Polytechnique.
17
Saint-Cyr trained the military ofcers intended for
the infantry or cavalry and provided a more classical military
education, while the prestigious Ecole Polytechnique provided
a complete engineer training of high scientic level and allowed
military as well as civilian careers. When they chose to undertake
a career in the army, engineers from the Ecole Polytechnique were
assigned to artillery or to military engineering.
However, far from locking these ofcers into immutable
conceptions of colonial space and its administration, this distinc-
tion between two different military cultures underwent constant
redenition, reecting changes in institutional positions and social
networks. This was the case, for example, in the crisis that divided
the colonial ofcers of the late 1880s when the Government
reconsidered the priorities of France in West Africa. Gallieni, who
had been trained at Saint-Cyr, supported the redeployment
towards the South advocated by Etienne: he spoke of develop-
ment and believed in a better return on investment. Meanwhile,
Archinard, trained at the Ecole Polytechnique, was the leader of the
Sudanese ofcers, who staunchly defended westward military
expansion. Blurring the strict boundary between the two cate-
gories of actors, both of them claimed to have been inspired by
Faidherbe.
9
L.L.C. Faidherbe, LAvenir du Sahara et du Soudan, Paris, 1863.
10
J.-S. Gallieni, Voyage au Soudan franais (Haut-Niger et pays de Sgou), 1879e1881, Paris, 1885, 1, a hommage to General Brire de LIsle.
11
Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (note 1), 43e44.
12
L. Faidherbe, Le Soudan Franais: chemin de fer de Mdine au Niger, Lille, 1881; L. Faidherbe, Le Soudan Franais: chemin de fer de Mdine au Niger, Deuxime partie, Lille,
1883; L. Faidherbe, Le Soudan Franais: chemin de fer de Mdine au Niger, Troisime partie, Lille, 1885; L. Faidherbe, Le Soudan Franais: pntration au Niger, Quatrime partie,
Lille, 1886; Capitaine H. Brosselard, Le Soudan Franais: pntration au Niger, Cinquime partie, Lille, 1887; Capitaine J. Ancelle, Le Soudan Franais, Sixime partie, Lille, 1888.
13
Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (note 1), 43e44, 52, 101, 152, 155.
14
As the colony of Niger didnt exist at this time, the Niger always refers to the River. The SenegaleNiger connection thus means a junction between the upper parts of
these two rivers and was situated in the new colony of French Sudan, which corresponds to present Mali.
15
Gallieni, Voyage au Soudan franais (note 10). Upper-Senegal (1880e1 campaign), map charted under the supervision of Commander Derrien, 6 sheets, 1:100 000, 1882.
16
Lieutenant-Colonel Borgnis-Desbordes, Pntration au Soudan, Revue maritime et coloniale, 72 (1882) 156; Lettres de Borgnis-Desbordes Brire de LIsle, Senegal
National Archives, 1 D 58, quoted by Martine Cuttier, Portrait du colonialisme triomphant. Louis Archinard, 1850e1932, Paris, 2006, 194e195.
17
Martine Cuttier, Portrait du colonialisme triomphant (note 16), 193e196.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 169
The military ofcer as eld observer: the case of
Brosselard-Faidherbe
Although the French military ofcers sent to Africa were given the
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the methods of topo-
graphical survey during their training years at Saint-Cyr or at the
Ecole Polytechnique or later at the Ecole de Guerre,
18
they were not all
skilled cartographers. Indeed, some seemto have balked at the idea
of surveying. In their eagerness to show their bravery in battle,
topography was considered as paperwork unworthy of their mili-
tary valor, imposed upon them to keep them busy during the rainy
season.
19
In a letter to his parents, the young Lieutenant Charles
Mangin told of his mission to survey the area of Kita, with a little
geography and a few reports to write out.
20
He complained of the
poverty of his duties as a surveyor: Maybe I will be allowed to
reconnoitre an area that has been placed on the maps by intelli-
gence, thats all I can hope for. Its thoroughly tiresome, dont you
think? Before yesterday, I took the bearings of an as yet uncharted
path. Nothing important at all, really.
21
In fact, there was very little
left to explore in an area already criss-crossed with charted
itineraries.
Captain Henry Brosselard, however, was pleased to be portrayed
in the attire of the eld cartographer (Fig. 2). Holding a pencil in his
right hand, sitting on a collapsible chair in his nest uniform,
wearing the medal of the Lgion dHonneur that he had been awar-
ded in 1882 and a cap on his head, Brosselard sits in front of a table
laden with an unnished map, compasses and a notebook (perhaps
his travel diary), a trunk and a satchel full of documents at his feet.
His colonial helmet and kit bag hang froma tent pole suggesting the
proximity of the eld he was apparently in the process of charting.
During the initial period of scientic exploration, the gure of the
eld explorer and the ofce-bound geographer had remained
distinct. Brosselards portrait, however, drew on both these icono-
graphic registers familiar to the readers of tales of exploration, thus
contributing to the emergence of a new gure: that of the ofcer-
topographer. The ofcer-topographer inheritedboththeadventurous
traits of the explorer and the scientic rigor of the academic geog-
rapher. It also found its place withinthe genre of the military portrait,
which was blooming in the popular illustrated press between 1890
and 1914. The gure of the ofcer of marine troops in African terri-
tory, portrayed by Brosselard, also extended the culture of explora-
tion to military culture.
22
While he was indeed posing for this
Fig. 1. The Senegambian Triangle. Drawn on a map from L. Faidherbe, Le Soudan Franais: chemin de fer de Mdine au Niger, Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille 4 (1885) 96.
The proposed SenegaleNiger railroad, marked in red, is visible online. Source: Bibliothque Universitaire Centrale, Universit de Lille 3.
18
The Ecole de Guerre provided special training to high-ranking ofcers.
19
A. Loro, La vie quotidienne des ofciers de linfanterie de marine pendant la conqute de la colonie du Soudan franais (1890e1900), Paris, 2008, 27e28.
20
C. Mangin, Letter to his father, Kayes, 1 January 1890, in: Lettres du Soudan, Paris, 1930, 58.
21
C. Mangin, Letter to his parents, Koukoudiana (Massif de Kita), 13 or 14 February 1890, in: Lettres du Soudan, Paris, 1930, 61.
22
F. Driver, Geography Militant: Cultures of Exploration and Empire, Oxford, 2001; I. Surun, Les gures de lexplorateur dans la presse du XIXe sicle, Le Temps des Mdias 8
(2007) 57e74. Michael Heffernan comes to the same conclusion in his commentary of a montage of maps and images celebrating the exploration of the Casamance River by
Brosselard published in LIllustration, September 6, 1890: This single page indicates how three different forms of media representation could be juxtaposed to reinforce the
association between exploration, military heroics, and imperial expansion. See M. Heffernan, The cartography of the Fourth Estate: mapping the new imperialism in British
and French newspapers, 1875e1925, in: J. Ackerman (Ed.), The Imperial Map, Chicago, 2009, 273e274.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 170
portrait, Brosselard was a cartographer of recognized expertise, who
had accumulated much valuable experience throughout his career.
23
In the footsteps of Faidherbe
Henry Brosselard was born in 1855, the son of a university professor.
From 1875 to 1877, he studied at St. Cyrs military college. From
February to June 1880, he was sent to Algeria as a lieutenant in the
rst mission of Lieutenant-Colonel Flatters. Responsible for charting
the route of a projected Trans-Saharan railway, he collaborated in
tracing of a 1:200 000 scale map. In 1880e1, he helped prepare the
construction of a railway line linking the River Senegal to the River
Niger while on a topographical exploration mission in French Sudan
under the orders of Major Derrien. Following this, Brosselard was
commissioned to the staff of the expeditionary force sent to crush an
insurrection in Algeria, in the region of Oran (1881e3) and to draw,
withthe CaptaindeLaCroixdeCastries, the 1:400 000and1:200 000
scale maps of South Oran. He was promoted lieutenant in 1882 and
was called to rst join the staff of General Campenon, the Minister of
War, then that of Admiral Aube, the Minister of the Navy. He thus
spent several years in ofces in Paris before returning to West Africa
where, in 1886, heading an Inquiry Committee, he participated in the
expedition commanded by Colonel Frey against the insurrection of
Mahmadou Lamine. Crossing the region of Futa Toro ealso known as
the Senegalese Futa e on his way back from this mission and in
charge of a small troop of soldiers, Brosselard drew up a 1:400 000
map of the area. Promoted to captain, he was then charged with two
important missions, which also led to signicant cartographic works.
Fig. 2. The French Military Ofcer as Cartographer: Portrait of Captain Brosselard-Faidherbe. Engraving by Adrien Marie, frontispiece in H. Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance
et Mellacore. Pntration au Soudan (Paris, 1892). Source: Bibliothque de Recherches Africaines, Universit de Paris 1.
23
The obituary written in the Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille described him as a distinguished writer, skillful explorer and cartographer of several regions of
Africa. The author was saddenened by the too short career of this intrepid ofcer and learned geographer who e in 1893 e had died at the age of 38. Bulletin de la Socit de
Gographie de Lille (1892e3) 211e212. See also the entry on Brosselard in the Dictionnaire de Biographie Franaise, 6 (1954) 432e433.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 171
In1887, hewas appointedas Government Commissioner to represent
France inthe bi-national Border Committee ofcially determining the
divide between Portuguese Guinea and French surrounding posses-
sions. He also formally took possession of the Ziguinchor outpost in
Casamance, following the Franco-Portuguese agreement of 1886.
Finally, in 1891, he led a mission charting the route of a railway track
connecting the Upper Niger River to the Atlantic from the mouth of
the River Mellacoree along the border between French Guinea and
Sierra Leone, a mission which led him to prepare a 1:50 000 scale
map of the area.
24
Brosselards record of service conrms the extent of the territory
covered by the young captain during his short career. It also shows e
through the lens of just one particular life e the diversity of orders
issued by all the departments involved in French expansion in Africa
to the ofcers of the various army corps: the Army of Africa, which
answered to the Minister of War, for everything related to Algeria
and the Saharan expansion from the north; and the Marines, who
reported to the Minister of the Navy for all operations concerning
West Africa. Three of the missions in which Brosselard took part
were intended to study possible routes for the construction of pro-
jected railway lines: the Trans-Sahara, the SenegaleNiger and the
GuineaeNiger. This he spoke of as he summed up his career in 1891:
I have, in the course of my eventful colonial life, had the triple
advantage of studying the three projected lines of penetra-
tion for reaching the Niger. In 1879e80, I was in the Sahara
with Lieutenant-Colonel Flatters, in 1880e81, in Sudan with
the Derrien mission and Lieutenant-Colonel Desbordes, and
nally, in 1890e91, I was in charge of the study of a means of
penetration from Mellacoree to the Niger.
25
Brosselard thus clearly saw his activity as a cartographer as an
extension of the Plan Faidherbe; namely, as part of the strategic
aims developed in terms of lines of penetration and materialized
by a set of railway links across the north-western subcontinent of
Africa. Brosselard was obviously not the only ofcer to consider this
space in the same light as Faidherbe had before him, but the
inuence of the latter took, in this case, a more particular signi-
cance and near lial resonance. For in 1883 Brosselard had married
Mathilde the daughter of General Faidherbe, and had taken the
name of Brosselard-Faidherbe, in tribute to his father-in-law upon
the latters death in 1889. During Faidherbes lifetime, Brosselard
had also been closely associated with his father-in-laws work. After
four lectures on Sudan to the Socit de Gographie de Lille,
Faidherbe, too old for the presentation, left the fth one to his son-
in-law, whom he recommended to Paul Crpy, the societys
president, in these terms:
Since the readers of the Bulletin of the Socit de Gographie de
Lille are good enough to nd interest in the affairs of Senegal,
I wish to inform them, as in previous years, of continuing
developments. However, as time is now of the essence, and
I cannot do this myself, I leave it to my son-in-law, Captain
Brosselard, who e as you know e is fully competent in all
matters concerning Africa, which he has already penetrated
from several sides, and on which he has published a consider-
able amount of work.
26
Another indication of Brosselards inclusion within the social
network woven by his father-in-law is his presence in 1885 as
a member of staff of the Minister of the Navy, who was no other
than Admiral Aube-Faidherbes brother-in-law.
During his career, Brosselard was on several occasions to intersect
with the lines of Faidherbes project and was asked to deploy his
energy in all those places that Faidherbe had pinpointed as crucial
for the interests of French expansion in Africa. His participation in
the topographic survey mission led by Derrien gave him the
opportunity of studying, inthe eld, the means of effectively creating
a railway link between Kayes and Bamako, which was the center-
piece of Faidherbes master plan. Again, when mapping the Futa Toro
and the River Casamance, Brosselard stood on the fringes of the
colony of Senegal such as Faidherbe sawit. His map of the Fouta Toro
presented, in its margins, very detailed hydrographic sketches of all
the difcult passages of the river, extending and specifying the
mapping done in the 1850s and 1860s under the orders of Faidherbe.
The attention paid to navigation on the River Senegal shows that
beyond local interest for the development of the colony, the
waterway held a strategic function as Faidherbes main axis of
penetration, which it indeed was at the dawn of the 1880s. The need
to control navigation on the River Senegal had become even more
imperative now that it had become the sole means of transporting
the material and men needed to build the railway and the only
possible supply route of the troops stationed upstream. Brosselard,
however, apparently dissatised withthe purely descriptive function
of maps, drew on his map of the area, next to the existing telegraph
line, the route of a road yet to be built between Matamand Bakel and
a stretch of canal between two arms of the river, which he believed
would be useful for future irrigation and the agricultural develop-
ment of a large island. Like Faidherbe, though in a more modest way,
Brosselard used maps to support the future organization of space,
making them prospective instruments too. Writing of his experience
in Casamance, he was proud to take possession of Ziguinchor, which
he saw as a new showpiece to match his father-in-laws Senegal:
On May 18, 1888, I came to take possession of this little
Portuguese town that had been returned to France on
agreement with Portugal. [.] At the western end stood the
agstaff on which oated only a few days before the Portu-
guese colours. [.] The occupation of Zighinchor by France
settled the issue of the possession of the River Casamance,
which de facto became a French river.
27
What is more, Brosselard added an epistemological dimension
to this political act. Indeed, his text drew a new divide within local
geographical space, almost erasing the political boundaries of the
British and Portuguese enclaves. It revived an older nomenclature
which extended the lands of Senegal and its dependencies to the
Southern Rivers by suggesting a new name that made the newly
annexed River Casamance, and also the Gambia, a geographical if
not a political dependency of Senegal:
The River Casamance is one of a group, which includes the
Saloum, the Gambia and the Casamance. In contrast to the
group of French rivers situated between Guinea and Sierra
Leone which are, strictly speaking, the Southern Rivers of
Senegal, one might call the rst group in the north of Guinea,
the Northern Rivers of Senegal.
28
During his mission to determine the border, Brosselard was led
to consider the problems caused by the new partition to some of
24
Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille (1891e2) 64, with reference to the report published in the Journal Ofciel.
25
Capitaine Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore. Pntration au Soudan, Paris, 1891, 83.
26
Brosselard, Le Soudan Franais (note 12), 5.
27
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 16e17.
28
Capitaine H. Brosselard, La Guine portugaise et les possessions franaises voisines, Lille, 1889, 60 [emphasis in original].
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 172
the indigenous populations, whose territories had been split
between two European sovereignties, or transferred from one to
another, in contravention of earlier agreements. He thus proposed
to reconsider the territories of the chiefdoms, by mobilising
historical and ethnographic knowledge that identied types, and
relied on the ethnographic eldwork carried out by Faidherbe
concerning the peoples of Senegal.
29
Finally, the last two missions conducted by Brosselard strength-
ened the two less obvious sides of the Senegambian Triangle: the
SenegaleSouthern Rivers and the Southern RiverseSudan axes. In
the report of the bi-national Border Committee, Brosselard dwelt at
length on the disastrous state in which he claimed to have found the
business establishments in the Portuguese territory, blaming this
decline to a policy of excessive customs duties, which he claimed had
frightenedaway business contractors. Everything hewrote presented
the Portuguese enclave as a ripe fruit, ready to fall. He explicitly
suggested that the Portuguese government should rid itself of this
burden that was too heavy for its budget, despite the constitutional
charter of the Portuguese Kingdom prohibiting the alienation of any
part of its territory. He also entertained the hope that the French
possessions would in the near future form a contiguous string of
territories, from the River Senegal to the River Mellacoree, though
this was far fromobvious at the time.
30
Such reasoning assumed that
the Gambianenclave wouldeventually disappear. Infact, there was at
the time the project of a Franco-British agreement concerning the
sale of Ivory Coast in exchange for Gambia, which had received
the support of gures such as Etienne, Gallieni and Faidherbe.
31
The
French ministries and embassies entertained this idea because the
Gambian enclave had long been a thorn in the side of French colo-
nists. It represented a potential means for the British to advance into
western Sudan and thwart Frances aims of creating a junction
between the Rivers of the South and Sudan and of ensuring
a protectorate over the Futa Jallon. However, by the time of Brosse-
lards last mission, the stakes had changed and Louis-Gustave
Bingers exploration mission of 1888 between Niger and the hinter-
lands of Ivory Coast revealed the promise of a possible junction
between Sudan and the Ivory Coast, convincing Etienne, Gallieni and
even Faidherbe to drop any idea of an exchange. The Franco-British
Agreement of 1889, which nally set the borders between Sierra
Leone and French Guinea, bore witness to the new orientation of
French interests further South.
32
It guaranteed future French access
from the River Niger to the River Mellacoree between the moun-
tainous region of Fouta Jallon and the northern border of Sierra
Leone.
33
It was thus precisely in this intermediate space that Bros-
selard was to seek, in 1891, a possible route for a railway track.
34
In the report he issued at the end of this mission, the parallel
between his work and that of Faidherbe becomes all the more
obvious.
35
Just as Faidherbe had done when he had proposed
a railway junction between Upper-Senegal and Niger Rivers, Bros-
selard backed up his project with precise gures. Showing a genuine
understanding of business practices in West Africa, he calculated the
amount of cotton, peanuts, coffee, cola nuts and other commodities
already produced in the Niger basin and already transiting south-
bound through native channels, in order to determine the tonnage to
be transported on the proposed railway track. He also calculated the
prot that a private company building and operating the line could
expect, by determining the necessary initial infrastructure invest-
ments, the rate of progress of construction and the potential prots
according to ongoing transportation fees.
36
He even drewon his map
the demarcation line of the commercial area onwhich the inuence
of the new railway would be felt, provided that there were indeed
businesses and a eet of boats established on the River Niger
(Fig. 3).
37
To these different forms of expertise that bore the mark of
empirical investigation and data collection, Brosselard added that
of the eld cartographer, which enabled him to argue that his
project suited the nature of the terrain, giving it a legitimacy that
would have been lacking in a purely prospective study:
The mission has brought back a rich geographical harvest.
The country traversed being so far unknown or incorrectly
charted, topographical studies were performed with rigorous
method all along the expedition. We have thus reported
a 1:50 000 scale map, representing no less than 20 000 km
2
,
revealing in the most complete manner our present knowl-
edge of the land and of the countries that lie between the
Atlantic Ocean and Upper Niger.
38
Similarly, in the popular book based on his work (entitled
Casamance et Mellacore), Brosselard published a plate reproducing
an outline of the route, showing the extent of his topographic
skills.
39
Such markers of his scientic abilities and the credit he was
given for having published a report in the Journal Ofciel allowed
him to convincingly defend his project:
We report with certainty that France has the monopoly on the
possible construction, in reasonable economic conditions, of
a railway line of 312 to 320 kilometers in length, connecting
the Niger and our possessions in Sudan to the Atlantic coast.
This is the solution to the great economic problem of Sudan.
40
By situating his project for a railway track within the broader
context of thewholeWest Africansubcontinent, thesynthetic maphe
presented in his book took into account all the different possible
routes toSudan. AndbyincludingthewholeNiger Basinunder French
inuence within the limit of the area of commercial inuence of his
projected railway, he effectively excluded the SenegaleNiger line
from his scheme of territorial organization. His work also rehearsed
29
Lon Faidherbe, Populations noires des bassins du Sngal et du Haut-Niger, Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie (maiejuin 1856).
30
Brosselard, La Guine portugaise et les possessions franaises voisines (note 28), 55e58.
31
Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (note 1), 155.
32
Frmeaux, LAfrique lombre des pes (note 6), Vol. 1, 54.
33
Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (note 1), 156.
34
Brosselard himself underlined the importance of this agreement, which evacuated Britains claims on the regions of Fouta Jallon with which Britain entertained very
active commercial relations, thus dening the framework of Frances action in the area: Over the last few years, thanks to the foresight of our leaders, the foundations of
favourable borders have been convened between France and Great Britain; and, though the divide has not yet been made effective, we now clearly know within which limits
we can now operate (Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 81).
35
As Faidherbe before him, Brosselard was not satised with the report given to the Minister and published in the Journal Ofciel. He spread his opinion by giving
conferences to the geographical societies of Paris and Lille and aimed at a larger public by publishing small illustrated books. Casamance et Mellacore was thus distributed by
the Librairie Illustre and Journal des Voyages.
36
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 91e99.
37
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 89, 99e104.
38
Excerpt from the Brosselard-Faidherbe report published in the Journal Ofciel, and republished in the Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille (note 24).
39
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 85.
40
Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille (note 24).
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 173
the arguments which had led him to recommend dropping the
SenegaleNiger project: the heavy investments required for
the constructionof bridges over theBang andthe Bakhoy Rivers; the
length of the river course between Saint-Louis du Senegal and Kayes,
the rst station of the proposed line; the inaccessibility of the River
Senegal to ships over 2000 tons; the dangers presented by the
passage of rapids and the impact on freight costs of the extra insur-
ance premiums; the concentration of activity on the river between
July and September, the only season during which the River Senegal
was navigable; the lack of sufcient numbers of native porters for
transfers during these crucial three months; the need to store in
Kayes all the goods arrived at the Niger at other times of the year; the
necessarybuildingof hugewarehouses; theriskof rottingperishables
stored over the winter months; the nally excessive travel times.
41
In
the light of such a catalogue of obstacles, Brosselard had no difculty
at all inpresentinghis lineas far cheaper andquicker. He showedthat,
contrary to expectations before his survey mission, the River Niger
was navigable inits upper part andthe nearest junctionpoint was not
very far from the coast. The River Mellacoree therefore seemed the
easiest maritime outlet for the products of the Niger Basin.
Moreover, the construction of the SenegaleNiger railway line
was experiencing serious delays and was also attracting continuous
objection in the Chamber of Deputies, where it was increasingly
considered as a means for the military to obtain an increased
budget. By the time Brosselard had nished his survey and written
his report, the construction of the line had been suspended and was
virtually buried.
42
The fact that Brosselard supported his own
project rather than that initiated by Faidherbe could, of course, be
regarded as a form of betrayal. Faidherbe, however, was already
aware of the necessary southward shift in the development of
French colonial space in West Africa; and Brosselard had no choice
than to take this shift into account and implement Under Secretary
Etiennes development strategy.
In the event, the GuineaeNiger railway was nally built along
a different route, more in line with the new conguration of the
territory following the colonial occupation of Futa Jallon in 1896.
43
However, despite the fate of Brosselards scheme, or perhaps
because of it, his project remains a good indicator of the way French
military ofcers conceived and mapped colonial space.
A conversion to colonial development?
From his survey missions in Casamance, Brosselard brought back
the necessary details to draw a map, of which he produced several
Fig. 3. Map of the Rivers of West Africa, also showing Brosselards projected route for a new railway between the Mellacourie River and Upper Niger, from H. Brosselard-Faidherbe,
Casamance et Mellacore. Pntration au Soudan, 89. Source: Bibliothque de Recherches Africaines, Universit de Paris 1.
41
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 84e86.
42
The construction of the 555 km KayeseBamako line, begun in 1881, only covered 4 km in the rst year: it was suspended between 1884 and 1886, reached the 94 km
mark in 1887 and Bafoulab in 1888. Only two years after the 1889 decision of building a line all the way to Niger, a parliamentary commission issued an unfavourable report
concerning the pursuit of the matter. Bamako was thus only reached in 1904. See Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan (note 1), 106e110, 115e117, 142, 144e146,
172e173, 177, 250.
43
I. Barry, Le Fuuta-Jaloo face la colonisation. Conqute et mise en place de ladministration en Guine (1880e1920), Paris, 1997, 255e260; J. Manglotte, Le chemin de fer de
Conakry au Niger (1890e1914), Revue franaise dhistoire dOutre-Mer 55 (1968) 37e105.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 174
versions.
44
The 1:400 000 map placed Casamance within a wider
space between the Gambia and Portuguese Guinea, and seemed
destined mainly to present its location and borders. The 1:200 000
version seems to have had very different objectives that went far
beyond the sole charting of borders. Indeed, the very title refers to
the sous-secrtaire dEtat aux Colonies, Eugne Etienne, as the
personwho commissioned the eld study that led to the drawing of
the map. However, the map itself was published by the Compagnie
Commerciale et Agricole de la Casamance (CCAC). This short-lived
company e it was only in business between 1889 and 1894 e was
the rst French company to obtain, in 1890, a timber concession in
the colonial territory. The concession itself was similar to those
given to the British companies, such as the Royal Niger Company or
the South African Company, or to those of the Congo Free State.
45
The maps key, which contains a list of the local produce
(oranges, palm, palm oil, and rubber), reveals a focus on the
resources the company proposed to process. On the right bank of
the river, Brosselard drew the boundaries of the zone of colonisa-
tion given by concession, although the activity of the company had
in no way developed that far. Moreover, the place-names indicated
the prospective function Brosselard assigned yet again to his
mapping activity: these were a series of names inspired by the
surnames of people associated with the company, such as Roth-
ville, Crpy-ville, Cousin-ville, Warenhorst-ville and even a Brosse-
lard-ville near Ziguinchor (Fig. 4). Thus Jules Roth, for example, was
born in Alsace-Lorraine but had settled in the area fteen years
earlier.
46
Warenhorst, a business school graduate, had been given
the job of compiling an inventory of the agricultural resources of
the region during the survey mission led by Brosselard in 1890. He
was also the author of the photographs used for the engravings
illustrating Casamance and Mellacoree. Albert Cousin, a busi-
nessman linked to the textile industry of northern France and to
Belgian investors with stakes in the Congo Free State, was the
lynchpin of the CCAC and had led negotiations for the timber
concession. Like Brosselard, he was one of its founding share-
holders. As for Paul Crpy e the President of the Societ de
Gographie de Lille and the representative of the Northern textile
industry e he became one of the members of the companys board
of directors in 1891.
47
Apart fromRoth-ville, which is mentioned in Brosselards work as
a small colony,
48
noneof these place-names onhis mapever marked
any effective settlement. It seems that their sole purpose was to
honour the directors of the companyandto offer a graphic expression
of purely virtual colonial domination. It would be a commonplace to
interpret such a map, following the work of Harley and others, as
a Eurocentric and imperial projection, in which blank surfaces are
lled with the names of alleged settlers rather than having any
indigenous meaning. It is sufcient however to note the rhetorical
nature of all maps ealsounderscoredby Harley
49
eandof the variety
of imperialism which used maps as a tool of anticipation for
a settlement that actually never became effective. More interesting
for my purpose here is the fact that a military ofcer took part in this
process of placename-making, which seems quite unusual at this
stage. For many explorers e including military men e have paid
Fig. 4. Colonial Toponymy onBrosselards Map of Casamance, fromCarte de la Casamance et de la rgion nord de la Guine portugaise, Compagnie commerciale et agricole de la Casamance,
1890, 1:200 000, sheet for Carabane. Source: Gallica website, Bibliothque Nationale de France, http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b7759080s.rBrosselard-Faidherbe.langFR.
44
Map of Casamance, of British Gambia and of the Northern region of Portuguese Guinea, charted by Capitain Brosselard-Faidherbe, following his 1888 and 1890 surveys,
with the collaboration of lieutenants Clerc and De Crousnilhon, 1:400 000, published in the Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de Lille (note 23), 208; Map of Casamance and
of the Northern region of Portuguese Guinea, charted by Capitain Brosselard-Faidherbe, following his 1888 and 1890 surveys and the maritime charts of this region, on the
order of M. Etienne, Sous-Secrtaire dEtat aux Colonies, 1:200 000, 2 sheets, available online on the Gallica website of the Bibliothque Nationale de France: http://gallica.bnf.fr/
ark:/12148/btv1b7759080s.rBrosselard-Faidherbe.langFR.
45
R. Pasquier, La Compagnie commerciale et agricole de la Casamance: Prlude au rgime concessionnaire du Congo?, in: Etudes africaines offertes Henri Brunschwig, Paris,
1982, 189e207.
46
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 23.
47
Pasquier, La Compagnie commerciale et agricole de la Casamance (note 45), 193e196.
48
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 23.
49
Harley, Maps, knowledge and power (note 2).
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 175
tribute to their countrys glory by baptising places with the names of
their kings, queens or presidents; and many have contributed to their
own posterity by using their own names as toponyms. But much
more rare are examples, in the history of the conquest, of an army
ofcer playing such a role on behalf of a commercial company.
Indeed, Brosselard used his cartographical skills acquired at Saint-Cyr
and in ofcial military missions in order to produce a map designed
for a commercial purpose. Certainly, his map of Casamance and his
authorship of Casamance et Mellacoree cannot be understood inde-
pendently of his connections with the CCAC. Brosselards work was
published at a time when the company was looking for new share-
holders to expand its activities. It was clearly part of an advertising
campaign extolling the economic potential of the region, the com-
panys achievements and its future prospects.
50
Just as prospective were the two maps of Ziguinchor drawn by
Brosselard in 1889 at a scale of 1:5 000. These were named
Ziguinchor, present situation and Draft for the development of
Zinguinchor (Fig. 5) and they demonstrate the precocity of Bros-
selards desire to develop the region.
51
The changes he proposed
mostly concerned the wharf area: the native dwellings were erased
fromthe map and replaced by jetties and extended storage space to
cater for the expected inux of goods. Brosselard also planned to
make use of the fallowelds designated as state property in order
to connect the axis linking the area of shipping activity to the city
per se. Around the Silia fountain (or spring) and enclosing a large
square were to stand a church and the buildings of the Catholic
mission. The city was planned on an orthogonal pattern and was
supposed to continue into territory reclaimed from the forest and
described as communal property. The native village of Boucote
was still allowed to exist in the new plan, but it was completely
rearranged in a grid pattern around the spring. Only the congu-
ration of the paddy elds was in fact respected, though they were
now given the appearance of clearly dened lots. The curved
network of roads and of lines was replaced by straight lines. The
new spatial organization sought to be rationally organized and
blatantly exposed its civilizing mission through nave marks such
as: boats and piers for trade, a small defensive building or tower
for the army, a agged outpost for the administration, and a cross
marking the spot for a Catholic church. In fact, only the magnetic
north axis of the map and the accuracy of the scale on the rst map
are true to the language of topographical expertise. As for the rest,
Brosselard did not bother with science: this publication was for the
general public and needed to be semantically simple in order to
best express the colonial project.
Fig. 5. Ziguinchor: Present Situation and Future Plan, from H. Brosselard-Faidherbe, La Guine portugaise et les possessions franaises voisines, Bulletin de la Socit de Gographie de
Lille 11 (1889), 404 and 12 (1889), 18. Source: Bibliothque de lEcole Normale Suprieure de Paris.
50
R. Pasquier has also pointed out the illustrated supplement of the Novembre 1891 issue of Le Temps and Warenhorsts book, La Casamance, published in 1891 (Pasquier, La
Compagnie commerciale et agricole de la Casamance (note 45), 198). There was also a note concerning Une compagnie franaise dans les Rivires du Sud published by the
Socit de Gographie de Lille, probably with the support of Paul Crpy, in his Bulletin (1891e2: 288e289). This clearly spoke of the activities of several members of the Society
in the companys affairs. The following year, the Bulletin published several letters by E. Bonvalet, Correspondent for the company in the Southern Rivers (1892) 5e9, 77e83,
131e134, 234e239.
51
Brosselard, La Guine portugaise et les possessions franaises voisines (note 28), 28, 69.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 176
As far as Brosselard was concerned, the convergence of the
military and civilian versions of the colonial project was the result
of a genuine conversion of mindset. He described the process in the
pages of Casamance et Mellacore, his last book:
Mine is not a story lled with thrilling adventures. In fact, over
the twelve years I have travelled through Africa, sometimes in
the Sahara, sometimes in Sudan, sometimes even in the heart
of the wildest regions and most impenetrable forests of the
coast, I have never had the opportunity of witnessing the
scenes of horror too readily described by other travellers. .. I
was eager then to walk in the footsteps of my heroic ancestors
but neither the Tuareg (.) nor the Bedouin (.) nor the fever
(.) nor the backwaters (.) nor the half-savage tribes (.) nor
Samorys armies (.) were capable of lling a heart eager for
adventure, with the food it so ardently needed. Therefore,
under the pressure of my growing scepticism, my imagination
set my heart in search of different emotions, focusing it on the
contemplation of the beauties of African nature. The analytical
examination of this magnicent spectacle soon revealed to me
the charms I hadpreviously paidonly furtive attentiontoat the
time of my rst strides as an Explorer. In the contemplation of
nature, my judgment opened itself wider to the ideas of
progress..
.In the interval, I have undertaken many studies, on the
Sahara, onthe course of the River Senegal andonthe regions of
the Southern Rivers; and I committed myself gradually to the
considerationof economic issues, for I amsure that these are in
no way separate from the study of colonial questions. The
experience I have acquired over these twelve years, at the cost
of severe fatigue and, unfortunately, to the detriment of my
health, has greatly upset my ideas as an enthusiastic young
ofcer. Putting aside all colonial chauvinism, I amthus content
today, when I speak of Africa, of producing only facts and
gures.
52
From youthful dreams of adventure to a mature economic ratio-
nale, Brosselards narrative represented a whole transitional genera-
tion. Like others of his day, he had been nourished on tales of
exploration, and had believed his adolescent dreams of conquest
couldbe satisedbyembracing a militarycareer. But incommonwith
many of his peers, he had also come to adopt the language of devel-
opment and of commercial progress in the service of colonialism.
Conclusion: mapping projects
This account of the itinerary of a young colonial ofcer e at rst
closely associated withthe legacy of Faidherbe and then converted to
the values of colonial development e reects the gap between
a project and its implementation. Most of Brosselards career was
devoted to studying the possibilities offered by terrain, at a medium
and large scale (in the cartographic sense)
53
of projects dened in
broader terms by his father-in-law, which were to become the ofcial
policy of French penetration into West Africa. During his missions, he
was required to negotiate, in the eld, the means of circumventing or
overcoming topographic obstacles and to implement linear infra-
structures that were to shape the landscape of colonial space. In such
a career, the map represented the means of intellectually grasping
this space as a pre-requisite for development at all of these scales
concurrently. At a small scale, the map broadly highlighted the
strategic directions of expansion. At a medium scale, it helped
formulate hypotheses, by allowing the comparison of different
possibilities. At a high level of denition the map became the means
of testing the possibilities of inscribing projects within specic areas.
Mediating between an imagined space, a concrete specic space and
its projected transformation, the map could e sequentially or
simultaneously e have a descriptive function and a prospective
function. It could present the results of technical operations under-
taken in the eld and use these to authenticate a match between the
image and its referent. It could equally transform a blank piece of
paper into an area of experiment. All the projects concerning the
colonial development of space, whether they were nally accom-
plished or not, gave birth to a series of cartographic productions that
can only be understood by articulating these scales of vision.
The local or small scale was used to set the guidelines of the
colonial project and appears today to have been generated by
a military culture of conquest and extensive expansion. But it also
enabled economic development, since it included the construction
of transport infrastructure providing both military logistics and the
means for trade, implying a view of medium scale too. A colonial
conquest by military ofcers, determined by an expansive view of
space cannot be opposed to a culture of economic development
dened by an intensive use of space, the two being closely inter-
twined. It may however be suggested that Brosselards conversion
to the economic development of colonial territory proceeded
largely from the experience he had acquired while drawing the
medium and large-scale maps he was ordered to produce for the
realization of colonial infrastructure projects. His extensive expe-
rience in cartographic practice, combined with his knowledge of
territories already occupied by colonial trade e in Casamance and
in the Southern Rivers area eand his networks of sociability woven
in the metropolis, may account for some of the distinctiveness of
his cartographic work. Brosselard was to some degree not repre-
sentative of the colonial ofcers of his generation, whose careers
depended more on their purely military activity. The contrast was
especially marked with the members of Archinards clique, those
known as the Sudanese who were on the routes to Timbuktu and
Chad. But Brosselard was by no means the only ofcer to be sent on
topographical rather than military missions or to publish his views
on French colonial policy in a format accessible to the general
public.
Finally, the contextual analysis of Brosselards map of the River
Casamance presented in this paper shows howagents with different
colonial backgrounds could associate in joint ventures and occa-
sionally share the same vision of colonial space. Military ofcers
involved in colonial expansion adopted simultaneously e or
successively edifferent tactical, strategic or developmental postures,
which were expressed at different scales, depending on the circum-
stances. Brosselards case highlights the extent of porosity between
cultures of space and between types of projects in the building of
French colonial territory in Africa.
Acknowledgments
A former version of this paper was presented at the 14th interna-
tional Conference of Historical Geographers, Kyoto, August 2009,
thanks to support from the ANR program Geo&Co, directed by
Hlne Blais and Florence Deprest. Stephan Kraisowits translated
the rst draft. Thanks to the reviewers of the Journal of Historical
Geography for their comments, and to Marc Berthon and Alondra
Topete for help in editing the images. The author also warmly
thanks Felix Driver for his helpful suggestions, for his work on the
translation and on the gures at the nal stages.
52
Brosselard-Faidherbe, Casamance et Mellacore (note 25), 1e2, 83.
53
The word scale here refers to the cartographic sense of the term, small scale encompassing a large space and large scale a small one.
I. Surun / Journal of Historical Geography 37 (2011) 167e177 177