Notes on Pettits The Consequentialist Perspective

Task:
Overview of consequentialism
Overview of its alternatives
Show why consequentialism is both attractive and compelling

Five sections:
1. Assumptions in moral psychology that ought to be accepted by
consequentialists and non-consequentialists.
2. The question of rightness.
3. Different approaches to answering this question.
4. Consequentialist answer: the right option is that which produces the goods,
that which promotes expected, neutral value.
5. Defended against standard objections to consequentialism.


1. A moral psychology for consequentialists and non-consequentialists.

Critics of consequentialism think:
It is fundamentally misrepresenting the moral psychology of agents.
It makes prescriptions as if human agents were of a different character from that
which is revealed in our everyday experience of ourselves.
It is incapable of intellectually surviving exposure to the real thing.

Three broad psychological assumptions that non-consequentialists emphasize, and that we
should all endorse.

i) Non-atomism: peoples projects often essentially involve particular individuals

People often act because of other people.
e.g. Mary. Help her not because of the value of helping friends, but because you care for
her.
Motivation is not drawn from the desire the satisfy projects.

Love, loyalty and fidelity may not be the sum total of moral excellence, but they are
certainly a part of it. (is this virtue theory talk?)

ii) Non-moralism: peoples primitive motivations are often non-moralistic in character

Motivation to care for a friend deriving from moralistic concerns and the value of friendship
means one ceases to conform to the profile of a friend. (failure to treat a person as an end
in themselves?)
Stocker is known for arguing that acting out of friendship is not acting for the promotion of
friendship.

Abstract and moralistic categories may be invoked to explain or justify continuing with
those commitments, but while we have brute projects and desires they should not be
thought of as the actual motivators of the agent.

Non-moralism recognises and accepts as very desirable the fact that people are committed
to certain projects and desires.

I see no reason to reject motivational particularism.

iii) Non-actuarialism: People do not often make their decisions in a calculative way

Opponents of consequentialism (especially Bernard Williams) stress human beings are non-
actuarial in character, and a non-moralistic species.
People are, on the whole, not a rationalistic of calculative species.
To realise many of the things they cherish, it is essential they do not calculate
rationalistically about what they should do.
Two illustrative points:
First. People value the virtue of spontaneity.
Second. many human relationships are built upon the common
belief that each will treat the other in a manner that is
incompatible with rationalistic calculation.

affection requires unthinking consideration (p.10)

Critics of consequentialism assume consequentialism recommends or assumes people to be
actuarialist in character, in order to be moral.
As such, they believe this undermines the theory. (Williams; Bradley)

consequentialists have almost always resisted this charge
e.g. Sidgwick and Smart.
Austin It was never contended or contended by a sound, orthodox utilitarian, that the lover
should kiss his mistress with an eye to a common weal (1832)

Pettit happy to assume humans are non-actuarial and a moral doctrine which requires a
sustained actuarial posture would be more or less outlandish.


2. The Question of Rightness

Assume the above 3 psychological descriptions as true, and assume their alteration both
unfeasible and undesirable.
They should be allowed to remain under any moral theory.

People often do and must justify their actions.
What makes actions right or wrong? (that we exemplify typical psychology cant answer this)

The need for a participant moral theory

Differing moral theories must hold a common idea of what right means in order to
compare their ideas of what the right should be.

judgements of rightness are beliefs.



The likely shape of that theory

Lists widely shared beliefs about rightness, e.g. right implies ought; right is the better option;
common values; some values are stronger; right option is justifiable or unobjectionable; etc.
(list of 15 things).


..
..

The Nature of Rightness

A property must have a descriptive character.
.
The property of rightness is that descriptive property though we have no prospect of
giving its descriptive specification which makes an option imperative for the agent, which
makes any similar option imperative for any similar agent, which is instantiated in virtue of
such and such values, which serves to make an option unobjectionable, to attract agents
who are not weak of will, to connect reliably with virtue, and so on.

The method of resolving the question of rightness

Metaethics and normative ethics are inextricably connected with one another.
Reflective equilibrium.
Adjusting general principles, presumptions, judgements, alternately.