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The Carmen Farina Nobody Knows


and the cold Regents cheating and cover-up case that haunts
her, the Department of Education, and the Special
Commissioner of Investigation of the New York City School
District
By Philip Nobile

I ntroduction
New Schools Chancellor Carmen Farina was up to her neck
in a Regents cheating and cover-up scandal at the Cobble
Hill School of Americas Studies when she was Region 8
Superintendent in Brooklyn in 2004. Farina was questioned by
two separate agenciesthe DOEs in-house Office of Special
Investigations (OSI) and the independent Office of the Special
Commissioner of Investigation for the New York City School District
(SCI), a unit of the Department of Investigation (DOI).
She did not emerge entirely clean. In 2005, after a yearlong inquiry the
OSI investigator substantiated tampering by Cobble Hills Assistant
State Education Law 225: NY Code - Section 225: A person who shall: 9-a.
Knowingly and willfully make an unauthorized and false alteration or
representation of any grade, credit, honor, award or standing in the
permanent record or transcript of any student with respect to a school or
college under the supervision of the regents, the commissioner, or the university
of the state of New York.
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Principal Humanities Theresa Capra and cover-up by both Principal
Lennel George and Local Instructional Superintendent (LIS) Kathy
Pelles. The investigator later testified that Farina was dishonorable
and lied about a cover-up in the Superintendents office. In 2007, SCI
strongly dissented. Their unprecedented two-year review of OSIs
inquiry found no cheating or cover-up by anybody including Farina. The
investigator took it on the chin for arriv[ing] at a number of conclusions
which were not supported by the evidence.
So who was right about the Cobble Hill affair and Farinas role in it
the OSI investigator or the Special Commissioner? The integrity of two
agencies was at stake. One of them screwed up badly, possibly
corruptly. Then UFT President Randi Weingarten expressed her
vexation in a letter to the City Council in April 2008:
It is a serious matter when the two public agencies charges with
investigating allegations of wrongdoing in the Department of
Education come to conclusions about the same situation that are not
just different, but completely contradictory. There is simply no way
to reconcile the two reports--if we accept the conclusions in one
report, the other report is clearly wrong. Such a contradiction raises
doubts about the finding of the two agencies, and puts into question
the confidence the public has in the results of their investigations.
The public needs to know that whatever went so wrong in the
investigation of at least one of these agencies is identified and
corrected.
And now that Farina is Schools Chancellor the public also needs to
whether she is worthy of the citys and Mayor de Blasios trust.
This cold Regents case has an amazing but true twist. Farinas OSI
interrogator was Lou Scarcella, the muscular ex-NYPD homicide
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detective currently accused of railroading countless murder suspects in
Brooklyn. Although renowned in police circles for extracting
confessions, he could not inveigle one out of Farina under the peculiar
circumstances of their encounter. Still, her answers did not ring true. Her
amnesia regarding what she knew and when she knew it seemed too
precise.
Nevertheless, Scarcella tracked the cover-up right to Farinas door in the
person of LIS Pelles, her office mate at Region 8 headquarters on
Livingston Street. Pelles admitted concealing the cheating allegations
from investigators and, purportedly, from Farina and her successor
Superintendent, Marcia Lyles. Scarcella felt that Pelless tale of a total
office blackout was improbable. Why would a LIS ever withhold such
red hot information? He was sure that she duly informed her superiors of
the tribulation at Cobble Hill and that like Pelles they kept investigators
in the dark in violation of Mayoral Executive Order 16, SCIs Reporting
Obligations, and DOE procedures. As much as he preferred to nail the
big fishes, the buck stopped with Pelles in his report. Apparently, there
was scant enthusiasm at the top of the DOE for playing hardball with
these VIPs, especially since Farina had recently ascended to Tweed
where she sat at the right hand of Klein as Deputy Chancellor for
Teaching and Learning.
I
OSIs smoking guns
It is tempting to discard with prejudice Scarcellas
judgment on Cobble Hill. But in fairness he is owed the courtesy of a
credibility check, which SCI purported to do. As the original
whistleblower in the case, and for it is worth, I can vouch for Scarcella
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conclusions as far as they went because they were based on my leads,
profiling, and document drop. Among the most incriminating evidence
in Scarcellas files were:
an indiscreet email to me from AP Capra premeditating the
tampering: Lets try to focus on getting these kids a 65. In a pinch
they can get points from writing any old garbage down, you are going to
love grading time.
all too transparent, real time emails to me from teacher Elliot
Cohen, Capras then boyfriend now husband, describing the crimes in
her grading room as obscene, dishing the whole thing is a sham, and
admitting I did a favor for 2 of my favorite students, and trust me it
was ridiculous.
three detailed confessions from untenured Capra protgs
implicating her:
Mr. Leardi said Ms. Capra gave him examinations that were graded in
the 50s. Mr. Leardi said that when he asked Ms. Capra if it was all right
to change grades from failing to passing, Mr. Leardi said that she said,
Yes. Mr. Leardi said that she blessed the changing of failing grades
in the 50s to passing. Mr. Leardi said that he agreed to do it because he
wanted to help the students who failed, and wanted to please Ms.
Capra.
Mr. Colon said that in 2003, after the standard process of scoring
essays was completed, Ms. Capra gave him a stack of papers that were
failures. Mr. Colon said that Ms. Capra asked him to go back and
rescore the failures. Mr. Colon said that he passed these
examinations. Mr. Colon said that deep down inside he knew this was
wrong. Mr. Colon said, I cheated. Mr. Colon said that he did this
because he wanted to be part of the team.
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Mr. Cohen said that Ms. Capra engaged in the same practice that he and
Mr. Colon engaged in and she also knew it was the wrong thing to do.
Mr. Cohen said that Ms. Capra gave the graders failed tests and knew
that they cheated. Mr. Cohen said, She was our supervisor, she knew
everything we did. Capra knew he was coming to OSI and said to him,
Tell the truth. This investigator asked Mr. Cohen why Ms. Capra
did this. He said, To look good.
three eyewitness statements from teachers in the grading room
further entangling Capra:
Mr. [Ken] Kaufman said that during the correction sessions in June
2003, Ms. Capra gave him a stack of tests that were failures and told him
to pass them.
Mr. [Terry] Swords said that he remembers Ms. Capra saying, See if
you could find some points. Mr. Swords said that Ms. Capra handed out
tests and said, These tests need three points. Mr. Swords said that Ms.
Capra asked the graders to find points on examinations (essays) that
were already marked in the low 60s.
Mr. Nobile said that he specifically remembered that Ms. Capra took a
stack of failing examinations and handed them to Mr. Colon for
scrubbing. ... Mr. Nobile said [the tampering] was done under Ms.
Capras direction and approval.
a coup de grce letter from Steven Katz, Chief of the Bureau of
Assessment of the New York State Education Department (NYSED)
dated April 6, 2004:
Please review the attached copies of documents we received from Mr.
Philip Nobile, a social studies teacher at Cobble Hill School for
American Studies. You will note that Mr. Nobile alleges that an
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Assistant Principal at Cobble Hill School for American Studies, Ms.
Capra, directed several nontenured teachers to revise student scores on
those two [Regents] examinations upward to over the 65 score point
(passing).
In our judgment, the aggregation of scores assigned in the 65 -69 range
[97] as compared to the 60-64 range [7] for students of the Cobble Hill
School of American Studies on both [Social Studies] Regents
examinations, goes beyond any dispersion, magnitude or directionality
that is likely to be attributable to chance.
Showing consciousness of guilt, Capra quickly skipped town without
speaking to Scarcella or demanding an audit that could conceivably
prove her innocence. She was subsequently fired from an AP job on
Long Island for concealing her suspension from the DOE. So much for
the cheating charge and Capras poor character.
As for cover-up by the Principal and LIS, the evidence was even more
unassailable and involved obstruction as well:
Principal Georges violation of city law:
Mayoral Executive Order 16 stipulates that Every officer and employee
of the City have the affirmative obligation to report, directly and without
undue delay, to the Commissioner or an Inspector General any and all
information concerning conduct which they know or should reasonably
know to involve corrupt or other criminal activity .
SCIs Reporting Obligations contains similar language: Every officer
and employee of the City School District of the City of New York, the
Chancellor, the PEP and all other officers have the affirmative
obligation to report, directly and without undue delay, to the Special
Commissioner of Investigation, any and all information concerning
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conduct which they know or should reasonably know to involve corrupt
or other criminal activity .
Fact--George disclosed nothing to SCI of my repeated oral and written
allegations of Regents crimes between May 2003 and May 2004. When
Scarcella paid his first visit to Cobble Hill, George buried the NYSED
package and the Capra/Cohen emails: Mr. Nobile said that George is
involved in a cover-up. In this investigators [sic] first meeting with Mr.
George, he did not give this investigator all the documentation with
regard to this investigation.
LIS Pelless violation of city law: Fact--Not only did Pelles fail to
call the cops like George, she clammed up in the Superintendents office
before and after Farina left for Tweed, or so she said to Scarcella. Her
defense for interring my complaint was laughable: On one hand, she
said she would inform OSCI if she received allegations [of cheating]. On
the other hand she admitted that she did not inform investigators of Mr.
Nobiles allegations because she only had conversations with Mr.
George about them.

Pelless and Georges obstruction:
Mayoral Executive Order 16 also outlaws any investigation concerning
corrupt or other criminal activity or conflicts of interest without the
prior approval of the Commissioner or an Inspector General.

SCIs Reporting Obligations carries a warning against hampering
investigations: Interference with or obstruction of the Special
Commissioners investigations or other functions shall constitute cause
for removal from office or employment, or other appropriate penalty.

Acting without authorization from investigators and allegedly without
Farinas knowledge, Pelles nonchalantly okayed an illicit in-house
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inquiry: I did not investigate. I allowed Mr. George to investigate. I
was at the school after February 25, 2004. Mr. George told me that a
teacher told him about Regents cheating. I dont remember what I did. It
was not addressed to me. He said he would investigate. I said good luck,
investigate. I did not tell the state. I did not ask for anything in
writing. There was no report.
Predictably, Georges simulated, paperless detective work unearthed
neither tampering nor cover-up. Set up as a false accuser, I made an end
run to the State Education Department that in turn cast overwhelming
statistical doubt on Capras Regents grades, and thereupon pressed
Superintendent Lyles to arrange a genuine inquest into my allegations.

II
A Leak to the New York Times
Scarcellas 30-page report, crammed with verbatim
interview notes from all the players, was dated May 25, 2005. Despite
slamdunk evidence hooking Capra, George and Pelles, there was no rush
to discipline. Kleins DOE had a notorious soft spot for prodigals in
management. Weeks went by, but nothing happened. Scarcella and I
feared the stall was just more cover-up. Maybe nothing would have
happened if somebody had not leaked a copy of his suppressed report to
the New York Times in late June, somebody probably inside OSI, maybe
Scarcella himself, though he always denied it to me.
David Herszenhorn, the Times education reporter, started calling Farina.
He wanted to know why the Principal was still in place. She had no good
answers. Before you could say Mayoral Executive Order 16, George was
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unceremoniously summoned to Lyles office on the morning on June 27,
preventing him from attending the schools graduation. Lyles was cold-
blooded. He was removed the following day and doomed to a
termination hearing. In contrast, though guilty of the same offenses and
theoretically held to a higher standard, Pelles escaped with only a
written reprimand from the DOE stating that she did not adequately
advise the principal, Lennel George to follow established DOE policy
and report the allegations to OSCI and/or OSI.
Was Pelless soft landing less a punishment than a reward for taking a
bullet for her Superintendents, that is, for maintaining beyond all logic
that she shielded Farina and later Lyles from news of alleged crimes in a
school they supervised, led by a principal Farina had personally
appointed, just as she was transitioning to Tweed to replace Diane Lam
who was fired in a conflict of interest mess? As implausible as Pelless
version seemed, consider the beneficial effect: what Farina and Lyles
were not told, they could not be accused of covering up. Pelles was their
alibi, but did it have legs? Read on.

III
An arbitrator shifts the Zeitgeist
OSI Case # 04-2907 did not die a natural death. It
sprang back to life as SCI Case #2005-2006 soon after the Times broke
the Cobble Hill story on July 1. (Principal Hid Fraud on Tests In
Brooklyn, Officials Say). A confidential source channeling Scarcellas
frustration told SCI that the cover-up extended to higher ranking
officials including then Region 8 Superintendent Marcia Lyles and then
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Deputy Chancellor for Teaching and Learning Carmen Farina. This tip
set off a 23-month, no expense spared review of OSIs substantiations.
On June 26, 2007, Special Commissioner of Investigation Richard
Condon sent a scorching 67-page report with 233 footnotes to Schools
Chancellor Joel Klein roasting OSI on all sides. What I say is that the
investigation showed no credible evidence that there was cheating. And
certainly no evidence that this principal covered up evidence that there
was cheating, Condon declared in the Times. (New Report Clears
School of Cheating, June 27, 2007)
Klein embraced SCIs verdict that exonerated the previously guilty
Capra and Pelles as well as the suspected Farina and Lyles. As for
George, a funny thing transpired at his 2006 proceeding. He was
acquitted of cover-up even though Arbitrator Barbara Deinhardt
arguably determined otherwise when she wrote: it appears that at the
time that Nobile brought up some question about Regents grading in the
Spring of 2003, George was busy and distracted and essentially told
Nobile that he didnt have time to talk to him. George may well have
assumed that this was just one more in this series of complaints by
Nobile and brushed it off in his preoccupation with other matte[r]s.
Give me a break. My early verbal warning was the professional
equivalent of a bomb threat. What could be more important to a first
year principal than news of criminal activities in his building? In
addition to absolving George for his brushoff in 2003, Deinhardt
overlooked his subsequent bad acts in 2004, that is, covering up
NYSEDs game changing letter, my memos on Capras cheating ring,
and the incriminating emails. N.B. George did not testify that he was
busy and distracted. Contradicting Deinhardts state of mind invention,
he swore that our conversation never happened.
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Nevertheless, Deinhardts non-acquittal acquittal shifted the Zeitgeist.
Klein cleaned house at OSI even before Condon released his report that
stung Director Theresa Europe and her Deputy Tom Hyland for
completely fail[ing] in their oversight of Scarcella and Scarcella for
being biased from the onset and act[ing] as an agent of the
complainant. Europe was demoted, Hyland fired, and Scarcella forced
to resign. Despite portraying me as the Moriarity of Cobble Hill with
600-plus mentions, mostly unflattering, Condon did not charge me with
misconduct or recommend any penalty, not even a letter to my file for
slinging mud at immaculate educators. Although Klein treated his own
people like roadkill, he sheathed his wrath with me, the scoundrel who
mistook himself for a whistleblower. Wonder why.

IV
SCIs review of OSIs smoking guns
It is counterintuitive to suppose that Condons
sleuths headed by Special Counsel Eileen Daly would crank out a
brazenly bogus report that, in effect, whitewashed the Cobble Hill
crimes, exculpated wrongdoers, and heaped all the blame on the OSI trio
and me, though strangely had no comment on the four teachers who
corroborated me. Why would an outfit established to root out corruption
in city schools corrupt itself by throwing a Regents case? Rather than
speculate on the politics behind SCIs revisionism, it would more
productive to examine their forensics, in particular, their take on
Scarcellas rack of smoking guns catalogued above. Only then can the
public realistically deduce, a` la Weingarten, which agency botched the
case and Farinas part in it.
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Invoking the reasonable person standard, SCI did not have a
snowballs chance in Tahiti of subverting OSIs substantiations
unless they argued that multiple eyewitness, both friends and foes of
Capra, were not credible, that damaging documents were not covered up,
that NYSEDs analysis did not count, that emails did not mean what
they literally said, and that George and Pelles did not break all the rules
around reporting corrupt and criminal conduct. Or if these arguments
were lacking, they would have to play it cute as below:
Capras points for garbage email: SCI downgraded this ur-text
to a footnote and somehow failed to gain comment from Capra on its
meaning during two interviews, only three words of which were quoted.
She described her relationship with Cohen circa October 2005 as
personal and tumultuous, which was probably a reference to their
broken engagement in the wake of Scarcellas report. If she was
questioned about the accusations of her teachers, NYSEDs letter, her
reckless disregard for an audit, and her subsequent masquerade on Long
Island, matters central to the caseher answers were missing from
SCIs report.
Cohens obscene crimes emails: originally, Cohen told
Scarcella that they referred to cheating. But he recanted at Georges
hearing in 2006 after marrying Capra. SCI accepted his testimony that
the overgenerous Regents scoring rubric, never cited in his emails,
was obscene and caused the scoring crimes. But no attempt was
made to reconcile Cohens novel claim with opposite statements by five
other teachers including me. All of us affirmed that the tampering
occurred after the exams were graded according to the rubric. Cohen
emphasized this same point over and over in his pre-marital confession
to Scarcella. One example: Mr. Cohen said that he gave points above
the rubric scale which constituted cheating. (emphasis added)
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There was a dum-dum bullet inside this smoking gunmy kickoff email
to Cohen. On the evening of June 19, 2002, we chatted on the phone
about our virgin experience with Regents grading earlier that day. Both
of us were surprised by the casual tampering that went on. After hanging
up, I made a final point via email: Hector [Colon] should go to work for
Enron after what he did today. Good thing [then UFT Chapter Leader]
Terry [Swords] wasnt in room. We picked up the cheating thread the
next day. I wrote: Last night you said there was a lot of hanky-panky in
Global corrections. I only noticed the scrubbing at the end on a few
cases like [Student A]. Did I miss something? Cohens answer was not:
I dont get the Enron reference and what do you mean hanky-panky? I
dont know what youre talking about. Instead he went with the flow:
The whole thing is a sham. Their essays were terrible all around and
received points when they should have gotten ZERO. Nothing about
rubrics.
Husband Cohen can blow smoke around his meaning, but mine was
unequivocal: there was cheating in June 2002. At the time, I was in my
APs good graces and buddies with Cohen. He and I sat on the
committee that interviewed her for appointment as Assistant Principal.
If only our department were filled with teachers like you, hard-working
and sincere, my job would be cake. I really mean that, she e-mailed me
on June, 11, 2002, a week before Regents. In this super clubby
atmosphere why would I whip up a mean, make-believe Enronesque
scene reflecting terribly on my friendly AP with her boyfriend
already?
three confessions: Two of the three personal admissions of tampering
were left standing without challenge.
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SCI did not speak to Leardi or comment on his three-peat of guilt to
George (email), the Superintendents office (hand delivered letter), and
Scarcella (interview).
Colon actually reaffirmed his confession: During the interview
conducted under oath in the presence of his attorney at the SCI office,
Hector Colon admitted that he cheated in scoring Regents exams. I
did change tests I shouldnt have. I mean I didnt follow the rules. If
there was no cheating, Colon perjured himself, copping to a crime he did
not commit. Why would an innocent teacher do that? Usually,
statements against interest are deemed persuasive. `Since Condon
claimed that there was no credible evidence of cheating, Colons
stubborn, all too believable outpouring had to be discredited. Instead, it
was reinforced. Trashing their own report as well as their boss, the SCI
author(s) confirmed Colons credibility in two separate passages in order
to save Capra:
He repeatedly testified that Capra gave him a pile of exams and told
him to take care of them or take care of it with no further
instructions. Colon conceded that Capra never told him to cheat,
never told him to find points that were not there, and never told him
to get the students to pass. Despite the absence of such an
instruction from Capra, Colon concluded that she meant that he
needed to give points to pass the students and he did just that.
Colon attempted to assert that she [directed teachers to cheat], but
in the end, he admitted that he changed scores of his own accord.
First, the reasonable person would understand Capras cryptic order to
take care of already graded exams to mean only one thing(wink,
wink) tampering. The Information Booklet for Scoring Regents
Examinations in Global History and Geography and United States
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History and Government neither requires nor recommends nor even
mentions, and therefore could not be construed to permit, re-reading
exams close to passing. Only math and science Regents mandate re-
reading when the score falls between 60 and 64.
Second, lets get real. How likely is it that of his own accord an
untenured teacher would risk his career by changing grades in full view
of his AP and without the AP catching on? N.B. SCI provided no
alternative interpretation for take care of and apparently did not ask
Capra about it.
Certainly, the most powerful flesh and blood evidence against Capr a
came from her grading and bed partner. Cohen lavished Scarcella with
her motive, means, and opportunity. His description of an illicit after-
hours huddle was a precious detail: Mr. Cohen said that he was in Ms.
Capras office after the official marking session ended. Mr. Cohen said
that Ms. Capra gave him a stack of papers that had already been graded
to official grading standards and failed. Mr. Cohen said Ms. Capra said
to him, re-check these. Mr. Cohen said that Ms. Capra implied he was
to cheat. He even estimated the number of defiled exams: Mr. Cohen
said that approximately thirty failing papers had been changed
Yet not a syllable of Cohens case-clinching OSI confession appeared in
SCIs report. Instead Condons people canonized his subsequent post-
marital testimony generously spread over three pages: Cohen reported
that Scarcella coerced, bullied, and threatened [him] into believing that
[he] had done something wrong. Cohen asserted that he would have
done anything to get out of the room and be away from his threats.
There were two problems with this sob story. First, if Scarcella
bulldozed him into a false confession, how come it closely mimicked the
same facts, language, and anecdotes of the other eyewitnesses? For
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instance, Leardi told Scarcella about an exchange with Cohen regarding
a bad kid: Elliot Cohen grabbed [an exam booklet] from [Leardi] and
said, This is a bad kid. He does not pass. Sure enough, Cohen recalled
the same dialogue: Mr. Cohen said that Mr. Leardi gave him a failing
test paper and asked him if it was all right to pass the student. Mr. Cohen
said that he said, No, that is a bad kid, he does not pass
Second, SCI neglected to confirm Scarcellas enhanced interrogation
with the third person in the room--Arthur Solomon, Cohens UFT
advocate. It never happened, Solomon insisted. I would have stopped
Scarcella if he had acted as badly as Cohen testified. Thats my job.
And who is more crediblea UFT rep with no reason to lie or a new
husband with every reason to deny past statements inimical to his bride?
Lastly, if Cohen is to be believed, he was a fabulist of genius, instantly
adlibbing in a panicked state a comprehensive account of fictitious
crimes orchestrated by his inamorata that coincidentally matched the
statements of his colleagues.

This has been hell for me, Capra told the Times. In a heartbeat
someone can accuse you of something falsely. Like the man she
married, I suppose.

three eyewitness statements: SCI ignored two of the three
eyewitnessesneither Kaufman, a former Navy pilot, nor Swords, a
former chapter leader and member of the Principals cabinet, were
interviewed. Thus their OSI statements confirming cheating remained
inviolate.
As for me, despite major huffing and puffing about my motive, timing,
zeal, undisguised contempt for Capra, and tight association with
Scarcella, SCI produced no evidence backing Deinhardts theory that I
cooked up the cheating story to checkmate Capras plan to rate me out of
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the system at the end of my upcoming probation in June 2004. If I
wanted to save my job, making an easily disproved false complaint was
not very bright. A swift audit of the exams that were still in the building
could have instantly exposed my perfidy. Showing consciousness of
moral certainty, I proposed an audit to George in two early memos and
later to Klein and Condon through my former City Councilman David
Yassky. I also appealed to Katzs superior, former NYSED Assistant
Commissioner Jean Stevens. None agreed to this no-brainer. As a last
resort, I asked Weingarten to contact Regents Chancellor Merryl Tisch.
Merryl and I talkedshe said she would look into it, Weingarten
emailed me on July 29, 2009. That was the last I heard.
A thought experiment: an examination of evidence X will prove or
disprove a criminal accusation. The accuser suggests, argues, begs for an
examination of evidence X. But the accused never demand an
examination that would possible prove their innocence, if indeed they
were innocent. Whom to believethe accuser who says, Look at X,
please, or the accused who say in effect, Please, dont look? You
dont have to be King Solomon to decide who is more credible.
Further, SCI found no contradictions or inconsistencies in my OSI
statements, memos to George, interview with the Attorney Generals
Office, and voluminous emails and faxes to myriad city and state
officials. Every comma of my story stood up. Neither Capra nor George
nor Pelles said a word about me in SCIs report. Even their sympathizers
could not come up with anything unsavory in my three-year history at
Cobble Hill.
Yes, I loathed the ground Capra walked on, but so did others.
Coincidentally, on the same day that I gave George my first cheating
memo (Jan. 26, 2004), two members of his cabinetspecial ed
coordinator Judith Alexander and Swords, then running the 9
th
grade
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Ramp Up program--met with George to protest her brand of leadership.
In a memo to the ad hoc School Improvement Committee Alexander
wrote: We kept hammering the same point back to himthat if he
doesnt take a visible stand against Capra he is guilty by association and
is losing the trust of his staff along with their respect. If Capra keeps
terrorizing staff, then he has not kept his word. Without a hint of irony
Cohen cracked to SCI that Scarcella and I were in bed together. I
much prefer his earlier testimonial telling Scarcella that I was a
muckraker, which was a compliment coming from a U.S. history
teacher.
Nonetheless, I acknowledge a hiccup in my hearing testimony. Unable
to poke holes in my story, Georges sneering counsel badgered me about
my peer relationship with Scarcella. (I had published investigative
pieces in the Times, New York, Esquire, Village Voice, the Weekly
Standard and New York Review of Books.) Flailing about for something
to twist into suspicion, she alighted on phone calls, as if that had
anything to do with anything. SCI highlighted the exchange: Nobile
admitted speaking with Scarcella more than once by telephone. He said
maybe they spoke more than 10 times, but he answered, I dont recall
when asked whether it was more than 20 times. What the hearing
transcript could not convey was my level of derision. Fed up with the
counsels strategic misdirection, I substituted sarcasm for sincerity. You
had to be there. The Javerts of SCI did not rest until they counted the
exact number of calls and gratuitously footnoted them: An analysis of
Nobiles telephone records revealed 114 calls to Scarcellas telephones
between May 2004 and July 2006. An analysis of Scarcellas telephone
records revealed 121 calls to Nobiles residence between July 2004 and
July 2006. Notice the padding: Scarcellas inquiry was completed in
May 2005, but calls were counted for more than a year later.
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While on the subject of my bromance with Scarcella, a blinding
obsession of both Deinhardt and Condon, I say all the better. Their claim
that my extraordinary assistance tainted the results was unsupported and
oblivious to context. After all, whom was Scarcella going to trust, me
who turned over the incriminating documents or George and Lyles who
covered them up? Some whistleblowers come with just allegations like
the confidential source who wagged SCI, and some like me come
locked and loadede.g., the aforementioned docs, multiple
eyewitnesses, confessed wrongdoers, NYSED statistics, and topped off
by a villain who fled the scene of the crime without looking back.
Reproaching Scarcella for maximal brainstorming with me showed lack
of imagination. I drew a roadmap based on my inside knowledge and
Scarcella, on his first cheating case, doggedly drove the investigation as
far and as high as he could. Even if I had ghosted his report, as SCI slyly
implied, that would not change the facts on the ground. To this day,
Mr. Nobile was correct about everything, Scarcella insisted in the
Times. (June 27, 2007) After two years of negative research SCI did not
prove otherwise.
So what was up with all the phoners? Investigator-to-investigator, we
had a lot to talk about. In short, we were transfixed by the corruption
that spread like flesh eating bacteria from Cobble Hill to the Region 8
Superintendents office to Tweed and crossed over to SCI, not to
mention the burlesque of the George hearing.
Principal Georges cover-up and internal investigation: SCI
neither interviewed George nor quoted his hearing testimony nor
commented on his fake in-house probe that even Pelles knocked as
crappy and Deinhardt as not as aggressive as it should have been.
Worst of all, SCI neglected to point out Georges uncontested double
violation of Mayoral Executive Order 16 and SCIs Reporting
20

Obligations. Rather, he was exonerated via the Eichmann defense: We
agree with the hearing officer that Lennel George did not engage in a
cover-up. He conducted an investigation at the direction of his
supervisor.
LIS Pelless coverup and internal investigation: SCIs paltry 137-
word interview with Pelles, the highest ranking administrator nabbed in
the cover-up, came down to a single inadequate sentence:
Pelles acknowledged that she told George to conduct an
investigation into the complaint of Regents cheating at Cobble Hill
and that she did not report the allegations to Lyles or Farina.
The first clause confirmed that Pelles broke city law banning freelance
corruption investigations and flouted the obstruction clause in SCIs
Reporting Obligations. The second clause omitted the far more
important and legally consequential failure to report the allegations to
SCI, which Pelles admitted to Scarcella and which SCI deleted from the
record! This exclusion of evidence that ran afoul of SCIs own
Reporting Obligations is evidence of corruption. With the same
breathtaking non sequitur pardoning the Principal, SCI exonerated the
LIS: Pelles was not involved in a cover-up. She directed George to
investigate Nobiles complaint.
V
Testing Farinas Credibility
The passages on Farina and Lyles in OSIs report were disturbingly
inconclusive. With a nod from Scarcella I expressed my misgivings to
Chief Counsel Michael Best who oversaw the DOEs Legal Services
Department including OSI. In a July 11, 2005 email I lobbied for an
expanded investigation because the two ladies, when their memories
21

were working, gave nonsensical answers to Mr. Scarcella's extremely
limited questions. If not, I promised to appeal to SCI (little did I know
then) Best did me the favor of forwarding my skeptical message to
SCI which had already been tipped off to a high level cover-up by a
confidential source. Scarcella and I were not alone in smelling a rodent.

Scarcellas interrogation of Farina
Farinas appointment at OSI in November 2004 had the appearance of
preferential treatment owing to the sudden participation of Deputy
Director Hyland. Previously, Scarcella had interviewed witnesses
without supervision. But a Deputy Chancellor was a very big wheel, a
Superintendent, too. Somebody upstairs was looking after them.
Scarcella said that Hyland censored his list of questions, which I helped
devise, and cramped his style. But even Farinas prophylactic responses
left a lousy impression when her memory failed again and again and
again:
This investigator asked M. Farina when she first became aware of
the cheating at Cobble Hill. She said, I dont think it was when I
was Superintendent. I dont remember. She was asked if she had
any discussions with Superintendent Lyles about the Cobble Hill
situation prior to mid-April 2004. She said, I dont remember. She
was asked if she discussed Mr. Georges removal from Cobble Hill
with Superintendent Lyles. She said, We discussed it, not specifics,
just general background, I cant remember. She added, I didnt
know the tests [under investigation] were Regents. I thought it was
something between Mr. George and an A.P. with inflated grades.
She said that she had never heard of the complainant, Mr. Nobile.
(emphasis added)
22

Was Farina that spacey? Quite the opposite. A beloved and at times
feared administrator, [Farina] seemed to know everybody in the nation's
largest school system and has an uncanny ability to recall students from
decades ago, Herszenhorn observed in the Times on the occasion of her
premature departure from Tweed. (Top School Aide Becomes the
Latest to Step Down, April 27, 2006) Why would this razor sharp,
hard driving executive fall into a fugue state when asked about dramatic
turning points in a scandal synchronized with her elevation to Tweed?
Herewith a credibility check denied to Scarcella and ducked, as we shall
see, by SCI:
On not recalling when she learned of my allegations, that is, whether
during or after her Superintendents tenure in Region 8.
It is unlikely that Farina did not remember when she was informed about
Cobble Hill, especially when the question was refined to pre or post
arriving at Tweed. First, if the news arrived while she was still in
Brooklyn, would she not have notified investigators asap? After all, she
told Scarcella that standard operating procedure in her office required
reporting tampering allegations to O.S.C.I. and the state. Since she
made no such report, she could not have known about Cobble Hill when
she was Superintendent unless she was lying. Second, the last thing
she needed as she started up at Tweed was a criminal cloud over a
school she supervised. If Pelles had spared the bad tidings during this
sensitive tender transitional moment, Farina could not possibly forget
because she would have slipped into Tweed without nasty a Regents
mess gnawing at her heels.
On not recalling whether Lyles, her successor in Region 8, spoke to
her about Cobble Hill before mid-April, that is, before the state stepped
in.
23

If Farina said, Yes, I remember that Lyles gave me a heads up in that
time period, she would have wrapped Lyles and herself in a cover-up
because neither contacted SCI. A No could have caught her in lie, if
contrary evidence emerged. I dont remember was an easy dodge. In
her first couple of weeks at Tweed, that is, from mid-March to mid-April
2004, news about Regents cheating at Cobble Hill would have landed
like a ton of bricks and lodged in her head, unforgettably.
On not discussing the specifics but just general background with
Lyles regarding Scarcellas request to expel George from Cobble Hill
pending completion of his probe.
Flashback to September 1, 2004, the day Scarcella made his request.
Lyles was in a major pickle. There was an escalating crisis at Cobble
Hill. It began the previous January with the first of my three
whistlelblowing memos and soon swelled with Capras and Cohens
emails, NYSEDs ominous letter, the annulment of Social Studies
Regents grading at Cobble Hill, OSIs sweeping investigation, multiple
confessions and detrimental witness statements, Capras suspension and
swift resignation, and now Scarcella wanted George out, too. What to
do? Lyles reached out to Farina at Tweed. George was her baby. She
installed him and effusively praised his leadership in a letter the previous
September:
I want to thank you for the wonderful visit I had to Cobble Hill
High School. In walking around the school and visiting classrooms,
it is evident that everyone has worked hard to make major
improvements at Cobble Hill. It is a tribute to your leadership and
to the strength of your staff that the school has come so far so
quickly.
24

I cant wait to start sending visitors to see your school and to
support the work, as well as to recruit students to your school.
Allegedly, for the last five months, April through August, Lyles has kept
all the Cobble Hill developments off Farinas plate. But now, in
September, with Scarcella on the prowl, she finally called her former
and current boss. Georges fate was in Farinas hands. Yanking him
would be a harsh blow. Not only would he suffer humiliation, she would
be embarrassed, too, just as she was taking charge of the Chancellors
education reforms.
Naturally, Farina would be curious, personally and professionally. What
had George done? Did Scarcella have the goods? Should she stand up
for him or dump him? What was best for the school? For the students?
For the DOE? She waited for Lyless explanation. What brought George
to this awful place? She needed all the facts in order to deal fairly and
smartly with the situation. But Lyles offered no specifics and she did
not ask for any?
That is how Lyles remembered the phone call, too. Scarcellas
handwritten notes read verbatim: On Sept 1, 2004, after this
investigator requested Mr. Georges removalI [i.e., Lyles] called Ms.
Farina. She knew there was an investigationwe did not talkjust the
merits of his removal of Mr. George. (underline in original).
But the story still did not add up: a Superintendent and a Deputy
Chancellor deliberate firing a principal during the first week of school
but NEVER address the reasons why. Lyles knows but wont tell. Farina
knows not, but wont ask. Inconceivable. Or inconceivable
mismanagement. And capping off Farinas far-fetched response, was an
added: I dont remember. Why add that exclamation? It seemed as if
25

she were overcompensating, distancing herself from any connection with
the Cobble Hill case, even at the expense of telling such a whopper.
On thinking that the Cobble Hill investigation involved inflated course
grades, not Regents scores.
More baloney. Squabbles between principals and APs about course
grades are not the stuff of OSI concern. But it was the sort of dumb thing
people say when embellishing a prior prevarication.

Where did Scarcellas interrogatory leave Farinas credibility? Applying
the reasonable person standard, in a galaxy faraway. Strategic memory
loss, aka pinpoint amnesia, is a red flag. She blanked on three questions
at the heart of the alleged high level cover-up. Alone with Farina,
Scarcella might have tied her in knots, but not with Hyland standing
guard. Consequently, OSI rendered a no-decision on Farina,
substantiating neither guilt nor innocence. Same for Lyles.

SCIs interrogation of Farina
Fifteen months later in February 2007 Farina had her rendezvous with
SCI. This was the agencys chance to follow up Scarcellas questions,
and hers to refresh her recollection. In the long interim she had time to
check her records to discern what she knew and when she knew it and
how allegations of Regents cheating hit a roadblock in her office.
Condons team was professionally and ethically bound to look diligently
at the possibility that Kleins now retired Deputy, whose duty it was to
guarantee the bona fides of the citys Regents scores, had been a lying
cheat herself. Although Farina was the paramount person of interest in
26

SCIs review, her interview was compressed into 140 words with no
quotes from the transcripts. Whatever she swore was summed up in two
vastly uninformative sentences:
Farinas testimony was consistent with the facts in the Scarcella
report. She denied any knowledge of the complaint about cheating
at Cobble Hill.

SCIs Interrogation of Lyles
SCIs 305-word interview with Lyles was similarly constrictedno
questions or answers, no effort to drill down into the cover-up in the
Superintendents office. When Condon concluded that Lyles was above
reproach he contradicted his own report that stated slickly but
unequivocally on page three: The Region did not refer the NYSED
letter to this office. Lyles told Scarcella that the standard operating
procedure in the Superintendents office regarding an allegation of
Regents tampering was to report it to O.S.C.I. and the state. So she
knew the right thing to do, and chose the wrong thing. Her non-
compliance was incontestable evidence of cover-up that SCI discounted.
VI
Lyles and Pelles lied to the state
If there is a sliver of doubt that the Region 8 Superintendents office was
a snakes nest of cover-up, consider a May 10, 2004 letter drafted and
signed by Pelles and addressed to Katz in Albany. Herewith the first two
paragraphs:
27

I am responding on behalf of our Regional Superintendent Dr.
Marcia Lyles, to your correspondence of April 6 and May 7.
Shortly after returning from our April vacation (around April 14)
we received your original letter asking for an inquiry into
allegations concerning the scoring of Global History and U.S.
History Regents examinations for June 2003 at Cobble Hill High
School. We immediately forwarded your letter to the Office of the
Special Commissioner of Investigations for the New York City School
District. (emphasis added)
According to Condon this forwarding claim was a fabrication. In reality,
we (Lyles/Pelles) buried the states letter in the Superintendents
office precisely because we did not want SCI or OSI getting wind of it
along with attached memos on Capras unscrupulous m.o.
Consequently, when Scarcella landed at Cobble Hill, he had no idea that
Katz and I were already on the case and that Katz had demanded that the
DOE via Lyles undertake an inquiry into the allegations that were
presented to us. So what brought him to the school in the first place?
The plot thickens. There was a second whistleblower, Leardi, the West
Pointer. Although he initially denied the tampering to George, his
conscience soon kicked in with Scarcella: Mr. Leardi said that he is
coming forward because Ms. Capra is treating Mr. Nobile very unfairly
and is spending too much time giving him Unsatisfactory ratings. On
April 4, Leardi hand delivered his own jaccuse to Lyless office:
During the June 2003 Regents I did in fact see Theresa Capra
personally change grades that were in the 50s to passing and
sometimes even bumped up to the 70s. I could not swear that these
were not legitimate but the climate was one of desperation. The
other teachers, including myself, were asked to review grades in the
28

60s (all of these changes were only on the Essays)[.] Theresa
personally took grades in the 50s and 60s and revamped them. In
some cases, for children not to her liking, she did not bump up the
grades.
Three days later, Leardi emailed George: Yes, I did tell you an opposite
story earlier and will own up to that. Like I explained I felt intimidated
and did not want to rock the boat. I am telling you the truth. I have
nothing to gain and everything to lose from doing this.
Thus in the month of April 2004 Lyles possessed two incriminating
letters--Leardis of the 4
th
and NYSEDs of the 6th. She was obliged to
report both on to SCI, but she sent only Leardis. Why the distinction?
Obviously, the states critique opened a can of worms, but potentially
Leardis lament was a get-out-of-jail card. At the time, he had two
strikes against him. Not only was he on mental health leave for bipolar
manic depressive disorder, but he also admitted to a past emotional
infatuation for the young and pretty AP.
In the beginning, Lyless gambit worked. When Scarcella read Leardis
complaint, passed down the chain from SCI, he thought it was a loser.
Without more than a formerly lovesick teacher with mental issues, there
was nothing to go on. SCI noted Scarcellas early skepticism: During
his testimony at the George proceeding, Scarcella stated that he was
leaning and, quite frankly, hoping that this case was unsubstantiated
However, Nobile caused him to restart his investigation.
Not exactly. I told Scarcella that he was being duped by the
Superintendent and the Principal who fobbed off Leardi as the lone and
deluded informer. Actually, it was NYSEDs letter and the lagniappe of
the Capra/Cohen emails, which I disclosed, that revived Scarcellas
29

interest. If this was act[ing] as an agent of the complainant, as SCI
overcharged, then all investigators who follow evidentiary trails
proffered by whistleblowers act the same way.
VI I
The audit that never was
The greatest wound to SCIs integrity, the dead
giveaway that the agency turned rogue on Cobble Hill, was their
reckless disregard for an audit, the DNA in any tampering case. At least
Scarcella made an attempt, which SCI confirmed with Lori Mei of the
DOEs Division of Assessment and Accountability: According to Mei,
in May 2004, Scarcella asked that the Cobble Hill exams be rescored,
but he later told her not to do so. As best Mei could recall, Scarcella said
that he had enough evidence and did not need to look at the exams.
Scarcella had a different memory: At SCI, Scarcella testified that Mei
told him that she did not have the resources to re-score the exams.
Apparently, neither put their assertions in writing contemporaneously,
leaving their conflict unresolved.
Anyhow, if Scarcella said that he had enough evidence, he was right.
His documentation was off the charts, credible enough to sway layers of
DOE lawyers to do the almost unthinkable, that is, charge and prosecute
a principal for covering up Regents cheating. George went to his hearing
without a peep about an audit that could conceivably redeem him and
expose me and the other teachers as the worst persons in the world for
framing our upright AP.
30

If an audit was a luxury for Scarcella, it was essential for Condon
because he went out on a limb claiming no credible evidence of
cheating. His team had two years to inspect the booklets and score
sheets for signs of tampering, particularly erasures. Incomprehensibly,
they tuned out my repeated pleas for an audit and treated the disputed
exams like nuclear waste. Even crazier, Condon quoted one of Meis test
experts saying that to assess an allegation of grade tampering properly,
rescoring is critical.
If SCI had followed their own witnesss advice, they would have seen
what I sawerasures on 51 of the 97 passes between 65 and 69. In an
undated memo to Scarcella I identified each tampered exam and noted
the mode of manipulation.
In one instance, I spied multiple erasures on a Global History test whose
final grade was raised from 52 to 67. The initials on the booklet were
Capras. How did she do that? By inflating the ratings on two essays by
2 points each on a 0 to 5 scale. She changed one essay originally rated 3
to a 5, and a second originally rated 2 to a 4, and by raising two
document based questions (DBQs) by 1 point on a 0 to 2 scale. Because
essay scores are weighted a 1 or 2 point uplift counts for a multiple of
points sufficient to reach or exceed the passing score of 65.
In sum, Condon dared to say that there was no credible evidence of
grade inflation without checking for grade inflation! This was the
equivalent of a medical examiner finding no credible evidence of
poisoning in a suspected homicide without benefit of an autopsy. To
draw the analogy nearer to Cobble Hill, the medical examiner was aware
that three people had confessed to poisoning the victim and three others
claimed to have been in the room when it happened.

31

VIII
The rest of the story
During a second interview with SCI in July 2006, Scarcella told them
something omitted from his report--Farina was a liar, and Lyles, too, by
implication.
Mr. Noble, in my opinion, was the most honorable man involved in
this investigation and everyone else I interviewed were [sic]
dishonorableup to Carmen Farina. Scarcella did not elaborate on
Farinas role, but later testified that Nobile was out for justice,
meaning that there was a cover up here and Scarcella believed
that Scarcella was lied to by people in the Board of Education,
including Carmen Farina. Scarcella also said: I believe that Mr.
Nobile believes that this cover up went right to the Chancellors
Office, Tweed Courthouse.
Scarcellas belated burst of candor clashed with SCIs theory of the case
that Scarcella and I were the bad guys. But if Farina lied, then there
really was a high level cover-up and Scarcella was not a tattooed
sleazeball who for reasons SCI never explored connived with an
avenging teacher to take out an AP, P, LIS, Superintendent and Deputy
Chancellor. Now SCI had him just where they wanted himunder oath,
on perjury watch, and making the sensational claim that the Deputy
Chancellor was involved in a crime. His credibility was on the line. Two
immediate questions arose--what did Farina lie about and why wasnt
that in his report? Either the questions were not posed or SCI did not
approve the answers because the author(s) merely noted that Scarcella
did not elaborate on Farinas role. That was it, seven utterly
unenlightening words on a central issue in the case. Had Condons
32

squad honestly sought the truth about Farinas credibility, their report
would have read something like: Scarcella refused to elaborate on
Farinas role despite our repeated attempts to get him to talk. In the
end, SCI let Scarcellas condemnation of the Deputy Chancellor stand
without counter or comment. The same bizarre passivity obtained when
SCI interviewed Europe and Hyland. Despite Deinhardts decision,
Europe reaffirmed Capras cheating and Georges cover-up; Hyland
testified that George and Pelles lied. And again, no follow-ups, as if
SCI was in the tank.
After Scarcellas resignation in February 2007, he finally confided the
rest of the story, that is, why he wound up allowing Farina and Lyles to
walk. There was a meeting in a conference room with Europe and Best
to discuss a draft of his report. They loved it, he explained. Best said
I did a great job. He said, I know Farina lied but I cant go after her.
Shes a Deputy Chancellor. Lyles, a future Deputy Chancellor herself,
was also off limits.
I believe Scarcellas reluctant outing of Best and Europe, but should
anybody else? Where is the evidence that these lawyers betrayed
professional ethics by running interference for Farina and Lyles?
Ultimately, did their allegiance bend toward the DOE or the truth?
Circumstantial evidence favors Scarcellas account of this eventful
meeting and, consequently, upholds a high level cover-up. First, the
timing: in light of the Lam scandal it would have been a public relations
catastrophe for Klein if two of his hand-picked Deputy Chancellors for
Teaching and Learning went down in flames one after the other. Second,
Scarcellas interviews with Farina and Lyles were warped by the
exceptional presence of Europes Deputy Hyland. Third, Scarcellas
uncharacteristically indecisive write-ups of Farina and Lyles were at
33

complete odds with his incisive SCI testimony, suggesting that his OSI
report was sanitized. Finally, there was Europes revealing May 18,
2004 email to Pelles, Lyles and Mei on the subject of my complaint that
Capra and George, in reprisal for my whistleblowing, planned to
discontinue me on the grounds of five straight unsatisfactory
observations: Are you looking into whether Mr. George intends on
firing Nobile. Timing would really be bad for us as it would look like a
straight case of retaliation. Please let me know. Bad for us? This
phrasing showed where Europes fealty lay.
N.B. On May 25 George signed my death warrant, checking
the Unsatisfactory box on eleven of the fifteen key performance
measures on my Annual Professional Performance Review. But on June
14 he changed my rating from a career-ending U to a tenure-granting S.
SCI explained the astonishing turnaround in an unsourced footnote:
Lyles determined that there was not enough documentation in Nobiles
file to support Georges end of the year unsatisfactory rating of Nobile.
Rubbish. Five U observations in four months was more than enough
documentation to discontinue me. Lyles determination otherwise
implied that retaliation was Georges real motive, his only motive. But
any confirmation of Georges revenge would contradict SCIs theory
that I was the avenger.

IX
A truth commission starting with Farina
We have reached the Q.E.D. stage of this article.
The Gentlemens Agreement between Condon and Klein to squelch
OSIs report and cover up for Farina and Lyles validated Steven Levitts

34

dictum in Freakonomics that teacher cheating is rarely looked for,
hardly ever detected, and just about never punished.
Politically speaking, there was no advantage to kayo the Regents crime
spree. Fair or foul, the higher the pass rate the greater the graduation rate
on which rested Mayor Bloombergs and Kleins claim to education
fame. And they were not alone in profiting from the fruits of inflation.
Everybody in the system looks better when scores rise by any means
necessary, which is why nobody of prominence in the Regents, NYSED,
the DOE, and the UFT shouted out against affirmative cheating. Under
Klein the DOE ended erasure analysis and averted their eyes from
suspicious patterns like Cobble Hills. In this kingdom of the blind even
the watchdogs declined to bark. Norm Scott, the I. F. Stone of ed
bloggers and a former teacher, admitted that he would never whistle
blow -- figure it's like baseball players on steroids -- if everyone does it
everything balances out. Well, I guess I don't have problems with
grading generously and would think that if a kid was close to a 65 I
would think about what I am doing to that kid by giving say a 64.
The effects of this massive flim-flam were ugly: educators became
cynics and low grade lawbreakers, graduation stats were falsified, the
true extent of the achievement gap was camouflaged, and thousands of
failing students, mostly black and brown, were granted unearned
diplomas with all the baggage that can carry over a lifetime.
Thanks to shaming by the Wall Street Journal, the corroded old days of
Regents rigging are over. In 2011, based on research by three economics
professors, the Journal reported that changing Regents grades was
business as usual in New York City. (Students Regents Test Scores
Bulge at 65, February 2). The economists found that the rates of test
manipulation in NYC were roughly twice as high as those in the entire
state. We estimate that [in 2009] roughly 6 to 10 percent of NYC
35

students who scored above the passing threshold for a Regents Diploma
actually had scores below the state requirement. Klein, recently
resigned, declined comment on this dagger to his reputation. His
successor Dennis Walcott was loudly silent, too.
Seven years earlier, the New York Post published a wake-up story
headlined Teachers Cheat: Inflating Regents Scores To Pass Kids
(January 26, 2004):
Some of the citys public high schools have a dirty little secret: Theyre
inflating Regents exam scores to give more students a passing grade.
Educators even have a name for the unwritten rule: scrubbing.
Im sorry if its shocking for laymen to hear. Scrubbing is something we do
to help kids to get their asses out of school, a Manhattan English teacher said
unapologetically.
In a next day follow-up headlined Klein Vows To End Test
Scrubbing, the Chancellor declared: There better not be any fudging
on the Regents numbers. I'm certainly prepared to enforce [the rules
against cheating] . . . If people are trying once again to take shortcuts,
we've got to put an end to that." Apparently, these words of warning
were his first and last on the taboo topic. As a result, the cheating
continued to be universally tolerated until the Journals devastating
expos embarrassed the Regents into beefing up test security. Intramural
grading is now prohibitedteachers can no longer scrub their own
students exams. Instead, all Regents are shipped off to central locations
for scoring by random teachers. Still, the culture of cheating remains
wide and deep and adaptable. Any teacher will tell you.
Soon, Condon will face an Inspector General of the DOI who awaits my
250-page corruption complaint regarding his what-me-audit? Review:
Points for Garbage: How Special Commissioner of Investigation for the
36

New York City School District Richard Condon in league with Schools
Chancellor Joel Klein subverted an open and shut criminal case of
Regents tampering, obstruction, and cover-up. With homage to Mary
McCarthy, there is little risk in concluding that every word in SCIs
report is a lie, including 'and' and 'the.'
Farina and Lyles are not the first superintendents of urban school
systems to be hit with cheating scandals. Beverly Hall was indicted in
Atlanta, Michelle Rhee was accused though never charged in
Washington. But Farina and Lyles, now Superintendent in Jersey City,
would be the first to gain promotions afterward, and is that such a good
idea? In this era of gun-to-the-head accountability in which careers live
and die by pass rates, cheating will continue to prosper one way or
another. On my weekly rotations as an Absent Teacher in Reserve in
Brooklyn high schools I frequently hear about pass quotas in the 70 to
80 percent range, and if they are unmet, things happen to teachers. One
told me that her principal called her in after second marking period to
say, I want twenty more students to pass your history classes and,
inevitably, twenty more did. Another told me that non-compliance led to
the loss of lunch period. Is anybody, including Farina, checking on the
inordinate fondness for 65s in course grades? Is the Archbishop of
Cantebury Catholic?
Where to go from here? Administrator and teacher cheating is so
entrenched, watchdogs so out to lunch, and Tweed so apathetic that
only a Truth Commission, as proposed by UFT President Michael
Mulgrew, can hope to unclothe the sordid history of Regents tampering
and prevent cheating binges in the future. Ideally, the Chancellor would
be the lead-off witness.
37

X
Ten questions for Carmen Farina
1 Lets talk about Cobble Hill, which goes to your credibility and
competence. You told Scarcella that you couldnt remember whether you
were informed of the cheating allegations when you were Superintendent
of Region 8. Since you made no report to investigators, it follows that
you did not have a clue when you were Superintendent. Otherwise, you
would have contacted investigators, isnt that right? So why would you
say you couldnt remember?
2 Regarding Scarcellas demand to remove George in September 2004,
you told Scarcella that you did not discuss specifics with Lyles just
general background. I cant remember. Can you remember why you
didnt insist on specifics? After all, you appointed George, supervised
him, lauded him, owned him. Werent you curious to know what your
Principal was accused of? How else could you advise Lyles? Wasnt it
professionally irresponsible to deliberate Georges fate with your eyes
closed? Finally, do you remember why you allowed George to remain
on the job?
3 Last January the New York Times attributed your rise in the DOE
to a hands-on and blunt management style. It appears you were
anything but on the Cobble Hill case. You told Scarcella that you never
asked Pelles why she covered up the cheating allegations from you, as
well as Lyles and SCI. You said, I was at Tweed. I was not her
superior. Yet you were her superiors superior. As Deputy Chancellor
for Teaching and Learning, werent you every teachers and every
administrators superior? Pelles was your hire in Brooklyn and she
38

disgraced your office on your watch. Why so hands-off on such a crucial
matter? Where was your blunt management style?
4 You also told Scarcella that you didnt know that the tests [under
investigation] were Regents. I thought it was something between Mr.
George and an A.P. with inflated grades. Thats sounds farfetched.
Who could have given you such wrong information? In your four
decades with the DOE, have you ever heard of another instance of OSIs
investigating a quarrel between a principal and AP regarding inflated
school grades? Anyhow, did you follow-up after you were told that that
school grades were the issue? If not, why not?
5 Regarding discipline, Pelles received a letter in her file for cover-up,
but George got a 3020-a for the same misconduct. Why the disparate
treatment when he was following her orders? As Deputy Chancellor in
2005 when Scarcellas report was released, you were in a position to
recommend, if not assure, equal treatment, at least to avoid the
appearance of favoritism that flowed from Pelless slap on the wrist. Did
you happen to recommend termination for Pelles? If not, why not? Why
George and not her? At least he reported up the chain, which Pelles said
she did not.
6 What about Lyless role in the cover-up? According to SCI, she
suppressed NYSEDs damaging letter containing Nobiles allegations by
failing to forward it to SCI. Presumably, she did not forward it to you,
either, because you thought it was something between Mr. George and
an A.P. with inflated grades. Why didnt you discipline Lyles for
violating DOE procedures? If Pelles was reprimanded because she did
not adequately advise George, shouldnt you have disciplined Lyles for
not adequately advising you, her superior?
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7 Since the disputed Cobble Hill Regents exams have never been
officially rescored, if you remain Chancellor, will you call for an audit?
And if it meshes with the six Cobble Hill eyewitnesses, the states
assessment, the Capra/Cohen emails, and ultimately OSIs
substantiation, will you place Capra, now an associate professor at
Mercer County Community College in New Jersey, back on the DOEs
ineligible list? Will you likewise appropriately discipline George, still a
principal, and Pelles, now a network leader?
8 During your time in the DOE to what extent were you aware of the
dirty little secret of Regents tampering that went by the term of
scrubbing? As Superintendent and Deputy Chancellor, what did you
do to protect the integrity of Regents grades? Would you agree with
Steven Levitts saying that teacher cheating is rarely looked for, hardly
ever detected, and just about never punished.
9 The reigning dirty little secret involves school grades. Principals
are known to set pass quotas for teachers which is certainly illegal, not
to mention unethical. How will you stop this corrosive practice akin to
Regents cheatingwrite a memo to principals, invite teachers to blow
the whistle, identify schools with 65 bulges and check for cheating, all of
the above?
10 Granted your willfully ignorant oversight in the Cobble Hill case,
how can the city and the Mayor rely on you to run an honest DOE that
will no longer cheat mostly minority students of authentic educations?



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