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Wilson embezzled funds from the Philippines government and fled to Canada. When caught, lawsuits were filed against him by two surety companies that had bonded him. One company paid half of what he owed. Wilson had transferred the embezzled funds to Terrell for legal services, but the funds were still in the court-appointed depositary's possession. Terrell claimed ownership based on the transfer, but not actual delivery. The court ruled that ownership requires delivery under Civil Code articles 609 and 1095. Neither Terrell nor the surety company had preferential claim to the funds, as their credits were unprivileged under Civil Code articles 1922-1925. The funds must be paid out proportionally to the two creditors.
Исходное описание:
March 15, 1907
THE FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM A. WILSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Wilson embezzled funds from the Philippines government and fled to Canada. When caught, lawsuits were filed against him by two surety companies that had bonded him. One company paid half of what he owed. Wilson had transferred the embezzled funds to Terrell for legal services, but the funds were still in the court-appointed depositary's possession. Terrell claimed ownership based on the transfer, but not actual delivery. The court ruled that ownership requires delivery under Civil Code articles 609 and 1095. Neither Terrell nor the surety company had preferential claim to the funds, as their credits were unprivileged under Civil Code articles 1922-1925. The funds must be paid out proportionally to the two creditors.
Wilson embezzled funds from the Philippines government and fled to Canada. When caught, lawsuits were filed against him by two surety companies that had bonded him. One company paid half of what he owed. Wilson had transferred the embezzled funds to Terrell for legal services, but the funds were still in the court-appointed depositary's possession. Terrell claimed ownership based on the transfer, but not actual delivery. The court ruled that ownership requires delivery under Civil Code articles 609 and 1095. Neither Terrell nor the surety company had preferential claim to the funds, as their credits were unprivileged under Civil Code articles 1922-1925. The funds must be paid out proportionally to the two creditors.
THE FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WILLIAM A. WILSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Facts:
Wilson, is a disbursing officer in the Philippines, he took money, sureties, and funds, then fled to Canada. When he was caught, several lawsuits were filed against him intercorrelating each complaint. The American Company of New York became sureties on the official bond of Wilson for the sum of USD 15,000. Wilson defaulted USD 8,931.80, so the surety companies paid half from each of them to the Government. His funds were placed in a depositary named by the court to take care of the money. A little earlier before the complaint was filled, Wilson transferred the funds to Terrell, in payment of his debt for the professional services already rendered. Since the funds were under the possession of the Treasurer entrusted with the depository, the transfer could not have been made since, , it would have been necessary that the delivery of the funds had been made directly Terrell, which fact has not been proved at any time. But Terrell never claimed that the delivery was ever made, he only claims that the ownership thereof should be derived to him, not thru the fact of delivery but thru the very fact of the transfer and of his subsequent notification to Treasurer Baranagan, although, it is very clear that such notification does not constitute, in any manner, the fact of delivery as established by articles 1462, 1463, and 1464 of the Civil Code, all of which cover, in full this subject-matter. Issue: Should Terrell and The Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, claim ownership of the funds in accordance to Art 609 of the Civil Code? Decision: ." In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." And as the logical application of this disposition article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right." (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to him." In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue for a contract. With this, it can therefore be concluded that: "The transfer of the ownership in the contract of such transfer, does not produce the effect by the fact of the mere consent, but is acquired by tradition and in the due observance of general precepts." Therefore, by reason of the non- delivery Terrell did not acquire the ownership of the property transferred to him by Wilson. The court therefore finds that neither of the two creditors should enjoy preference with regard to the other. Preference is determined by the nature of the credit in some cases and by the priority of date in others. The first, when it deals with privileged credits, which different kinds of privileged credits are enumerated in articles 1922, 1923, and 1924 of the Civil Code; and the second, when such credits are without special privilege, but are set forth in a public document or a final judgment. (Par. 3, article 1924.) In neither of these two classes do we find the credit of the appellant or that of the appellee. The credit of the appellee is only shown in a private document, and the right, or credit, of the appellant is that derived by reason of the payment made by appellant to the Government as a surety on the bond of Wilson, and nothing more than this appears in the allegations and admissions of the parties during the trial of the case. It does not appear by the bill of exceptions in this case that any document was ever presented in justification of such payment. Neither does the decision refer to any document as showing, as proven, said payment. These two credits not coming under any of the articles herein cited, the same pertain to a general class, and therefore do not enjoy any preference, in accordance with provisions of article 1925 of the Civil Code. This being so, the two creditors should be paid of pro rata from the funds in question and without consideration of the dates. (Rule 3, of article 1929.)
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., Petitioner, Philippine Realty Corporation, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation and Standard Realty CORPORATION, Respondents