TORRES vs.

GONZALES 152 SCRA 272 (1987)

FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts), and was sentenced to an
aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1 day. These convictions were affirmed by
the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the
manner prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. On March
22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived
of his rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was
arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner files this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.

HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested
and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. (Lakas Atenista
Transcription

BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ (January 21, 1949)

FACTS: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested,
the case was proceeded against Jimenez, upon which the CFI of Zamboanga sentenced him to life imprisonment. Before the period
for perfecting an appeal has expired, defendant Jimemeze became aware of Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946. The
Proclamation granted amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
Provided, it is in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, which was
committed from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually
committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerilla Amnesty
Commission presided by the respondents herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended,
did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commssion, presided by the respondents, issued an order, returning the
cases of the petitioners to the CFI of Zamboanga. However, the commission did not decide whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have
admitted having committed the offense as Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the victim, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty

RULING: YES, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The theory of the respondents is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character or an amnesty. Amnesty must
be distinguished from pardon:
1. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty is granted by Proclamation of the Chief Execuitve with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
2. Pardons is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be
guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
3. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is,
it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or
the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit
from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition must admit having committed the criminal act or
offense with which he is charged and allege the amnest as a defense. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct ot say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession
and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commission entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense, with which he is charged, the Commissions, if necessary or requested by the interested party, should conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses for botht he complainants and the accused.
Whether or not the defendant has admitted the commission of the offense, he can invoke the benefit of
amnesty. It is because there is no law, which makes such admission or confession not admissible as evidence
against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty Commissino finds that the offense not come within the
terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.