XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY

WITTGENSTEIN
What Does the Wittgensteinian
Inexpressible Express?
By Jaakko Hintikka
1. A New (mis)Interpretation of Wittgenstein?
I
N HI S TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS, WI TTGENSTEI N EXPOUNDS AN I MPRES-
si ve l ogi co-phi l osophi cal theory about l anguage and about i ts rel ati ons
to thi nki ng and to real i ty. On the face of thi ngs, the Tractatus can be
under stood and studi ed as such a l ogi co-semanti cal tr eati se. But
Wi ttgenstei ns work has a pri ma faci e unexpected endi ng. I n the penul ti mate
secti on of hi s book Wi ttgenstei n wri tes:
My proposi ti ons are el uci datory i n thi s way: he who understands them eventual l y
recogni zes them as sensel ess [unsinnig], when he has cl i mbed out through them,
on them, over them
He must surmount these proposi ti ons; then he sees the worl d ri ghtl y. (Tractatus
6.54)
These statements must be taken seri ousl y and therefore must be i nterpreted
as l i teral l y as possi bl e. They have neverthel ess been experi enced by some
phi l osophers as posi ng a major i nterpretati onal probl em. For i f Wi ttgenstei ns
words are taken l i teral l y, we seem to have a major probl em i n our hands. I f
what Wi ttgenstei n sai d before proposi ti on 6.54 i s l i teral l y nonsense, we ap-
parentl y cannot understand hi s book at face val ue. And, as was poi nted out,
thi s face val ue i s that of a treati se i n l ogi cal semanti cs. Hence pri mari l y a
di fferent i nterpretati on has to be gi ven to the enti re workor so i t has been
cl ai med. What then i s the Wi ttgenstei nean i nexpressi bl ewhi ch compri ses
apparentl y the bul k of hi s booksupposed to convey to us? Perhaps the en-
ti re Tractatus has to be understood as a seri es of el uci dati ons that ul ti matel y
serve to i nsi nuate to a recepti ve reader certai n metaphysi cal and ethi cal i n-
si ghts.
Thi s, i n a nutshel l , i s the starti ng-poi nt of the i nterpretati on that has
been sel f-consci ousl y cal l ed The New Wi ttgenstei n. Unfortunatel y, thi s i s
Jaakko Hintikka is Professor of Philosophy at Boston University. He is known
for his work on game-theoretical semantics and independence-friendly logic and
as one of the builders of theories of distributive normal forms, infinitely deep
languages, semantics of modalities, and inductive generalization. He has also
offered new interpretations of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Peirce, and
Wittgenstein.
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
10
Jaakko Hintikka
based on a radi cal mi sunderstandi ng of the probl em si tuati on that the au-
thor of the Tractatus was faci ng. Thi s mi sunderstandi ng i s both hi stori cal
and systemati c.
2. A Doubly Resolute Reading of the Tractatus
WH AT, TH EN , I S TH E CORRECT REA DI N G OF WI TTGEN STEI N S CON FESSI ON OF
Unsinnigkeit? And where do the not-so-new New Wi ttgenstei neans go wrong?
Of course Wi ttgenstei ns statements have to be taken l i teral l y, or as the New
Wi ttgenstei neans boastful l y prefer to say, resol utel y. But thei r i nference
from Wi ttgenstei ns statement that asserts the (i n some sense) nonsensi cal
nature of hi s theori es i n the Tractatus to the i dea that he must there mean
somethi ng el se i s nave, not to say si mpl e-mi nded. The New Wi ttgenstei neans
are not aski ng what the cri teri a are accordi ng to whi ch the Tractari an theses
ar e nonsense. Yet the answer i s embar r assi ngl y obv i ou s. They ar e
Wi ttgenstei ns own cri teri a. And these Wi ttgenstei n expounds i n hi s book.
Accordi ng to them, meani ngful di scourse i s restri cted to truth-functi ons of
el ementary proposi ti ons about the worl d. What i s excl uded?
Many thi ngs, of course. Some i nterpreters mi ght thi nk i n the fi rst
pl ace of metaphysi cal statements. I ndeed, Wi ttgenstei ns own statements
show that i n the Tractatus he saw hi msel f as an opponent of metaphysi cs. I n
hi s i mportant l etter to Schl i ck on August 8, 1932 (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983,
pp. 254-255) he decl ares hi msel f to be a cri ti c of metaphysi cs i n the Tractatus:
And perhaps I do not have to tel l you that my cri ti ci sm of metaphysi cs i s al so ai med
at the metaphysi cs of our physi ci sts and not onl y at that of professi onal phi l oso-
phers!
But i f so, Wi ttgenstei n cannot be i nterpreted as tryi ng to i ntroduce a meta-
physi cal vi si on through the back door of showi ng. However resol utel y
we i nterpret the Tractatus, we cannot take i t to put forward metaphysi cal
vi ews, however i ndi rectl y.
What i s most conspi cuousl y excl uded accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei n are
al l statements about l anguage,or more accuratel y, about the meani ngs of the
expressi ons of our l anguagethat i s, al l proposi ti ons about how our l an-
guage i s rel ated to the worl d and the l ogi cal rel ati ons based on these l an-
guage-worl d rel ati ons. I wi l l cal l these meani ng rel ati ons semanti cal even
though thi s term may be hi stori cal l y i naccurate (compare secti on 6). The i n-
expressi bl e thus i ncl udes, among other thi ngs, rul es of i nference (5.132), truth
(i n the form of Freges The True 4.442), l ogi cal forms (4.12), tautol ogi ci ty
(5.1362), and above al l the l i mi ts of l anguage (preface, paragraphs 3-4). Thi s
i nexpressi bi l i ty of semanti cal and l ogi cal rel ati ons accordi ng to the Tractatus
was one of the mai n aspects of Wi ttgenstei ns book that worri ed i ts readers
i n the Vi enna Ci rcl e (see for exampl e Khl er 1991, p.136).
Now the cruci al theses of the Tractatus, for i nstance hi s statements
about the pi cture theory, concern preci sel y l anguage-worl d rel ati ons. Hence
what Wi ttgenstei n i s sayi ng i n 6.54 i s nothi ng more and nothi ng l ess than a
si mpl e corol l ary to the mai n doctri nes of the bul k of the Tractatus. For a trul y
percepti ve reader, proposi ti on 6.54 does not come as a surpri se, for i t fol -
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
11
What Does the Wittgensteinean Inexpressible Express?
l ows i n the most l i teral sense from what he had sai d earl i er i n the book. I n
other words, what statements l i ke 6.54 add up to i s not that i n the bul k of the
Tractatus Wi ttgenstei n i s expressi ng somethi ng di fferent from the l ogi co-
semanti cal theory that he seems to be expoundi ng. What Wi ttgenstei n i s as-
sumi ng i s that semanti cs i sl i teral l yi nexpressi bl e, and that for thi s rea-
son hi s attempt to express i t i s stricto sensu nonsensi cal . Thus, there i s no
contradi cti on i n mai ntai ni ng both that Wi ttgenstei ns statements i n 6.54 have
to be understood l i teral l y and that what he had put forward earl i er i n the
book i s a l ogi co-semanti cal theory.
And one can assert more than that. What 6.54 shows i s not that the
Tractatus cannot be read as a l ogi co-semanti cal treati se. On the contrary,
Wi ttgenstei ns words i n 6.54 cannot be understood unl ess the thrust of hi s
work i s taken to be l ogi cal and semanti cal i n nature. Readi ng Wi ttgenstei n
i n thi s way i s to understand hi m much more l i teral l y (resol utel y?) than the
New Wi ttgenstei neans do. Wi ttgenstei n i s not sayi ng that the message of the
Tractatus i s somethi ng di fferent from a semanti cal and l ogi cal theory because
i t i s l i teral l y taken as nonsense. He i s sayi ng that what i s sai d i n the book i s
nonsense because i t i s a semanti cal and l ogi cal theory.
Thus, we can safel y take the l ogi cal and semanti cal vi ews of the
Tractatus i n the Austi ni an sense i n whi ch these doctri nes mean what they
say. For what Wi ttgenstei n di savows i n 6.54 i s not what he expounds i n hi s
book, but the l i teral expressi bi l i ty of hi s own doctri nes. The Tractatus i s an
exerci se i n l ogi cal semanti cs, but i t does i ts job by means of showi ng rather
than sayi ng. And, accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei n, that very unsayabi l i ty i s a con-
sequence of hi s l ogi co-semanti cal theory.
A word on termi nol ogy may be i n order here. When the New
Wi ttgenstei neans cal l thei r readi ng of 6.54 resol ute, they are i ndul gi ng
i n rhetori cal tri ckery. Wi ttgenstei ns book i s wri tten i n German, and on a
pri ma faci e readi ng we have to understand thei r meani ng i n the same way
as any German text. When Wi ttgenstei n then says that the bul k of the Tractatus
i s nonsense, the questi on i s not whether we shoul d take hi s works reso-
l utel y or not, but what there i s i n Wi ttgenstei ns subject matter that makes
i t nonsense accordi ng to hi s own vi ews. And the answer to thi s questi on i s
gi ven l oud and cl ear by Wi ttgenstei ns own words. I f one wants to speak of
resol uteness here, i t i s best shown by taki ng the mai n content of Wi ttgenstei ns
book at i ts obv i ousl y i ntended normal meani ng. We hav e to l i sten to
Wi ttgenstei n as the l ogi ci an that he tol d Mal col m that he was i n wri ti ng
the Tractatus. Such a readi ng i s not onl y resol ute. I t i s doubl y resol ute. I t
not onl y takes Wi ttgenstei ns concl udi ng words i n the Tractatus l i teral l yi t
takes the enti re book l i teral l y.
I n a systemati c perspecti ve there neverthel ess seems to remai n a prob-
l em i f one mai ntai ns that semanti cs i s i nexpressi bl e whi l e at the same ti me
one puts forward l ogi co-semanti cal vi ews. I have hi ghl i ghted thi s probl em
on earl i er occasi ons by speaki ng of semanti ci sts wi thout semanti cs. But
the probl em i s Wi ttgenstei ns, not hi s i nterpreters. There i s pl enty of evi -
dence (some of i t revi ewed bel ow) that Wi ttgenstei n bel i eved i n the i neffa-
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
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Jaakko Hintikka
bi l i ty of semanti cs. From thi s i t does not fol l ow that an i nterpreter has to do
the same i n order to understand hi m.
3. Wittgenstein as a Member of the Ineffability Tradition
I N ANY CASE, I T WOULD HAVE BEEN VI RTUALLY PREDI CTABLE THAT A THI NKER I N
Wi ttgenstei ns hi stori cal si tuati on shoul d have thought that semanti cs i s i n-
effabl e. I n a l ong-range perspecti ve, there i s a trend or tradi ti on i n l ogi cal
theory that mai ntai ns thi s i neffabi l i ty. The vi ew i ts members represent i s
vari ousl y cal l ed l ogi c as l anguage (van Hei jenoort), l anguage as uni ver-
sal medi um (Hi nti kka, Gadamer), the l i ngua uni versal i s vi ew (Lei bni z,
Frege), and a uni versal i st vi ew of l ogi c and l anguage (Hi nti kka). Thi s tradi -
ti on i s di scussed i n Hi nti kka 1997.
The uni versal i st v i ew owes nothi ng to any my sti cal el ement i n
Wi ttgenstei ns thi nki ng, any more than i t i s grounded on mysti ci sm i n Frege
or Qui ne. I t i s an el ement of a perfectl y sober vi ew of l anguage and i ts rel a-
ti on to real i ty. There i s a strand i n Wi ttgenstei ns thought that can perhaps
be cal l ed mysti cal , but thi s mysti ci sm i s nei ther the reason for the i neffabi l -
i ty doctri ne nor a corol l ary to i t. The cl osest connecti on between the two i s
that the i neffabi l i ty vi ew opened the possi bi l i ty of a certai n ki nd of mysti cal
stance.
I n di fferent ways and for di fferent reasons, Wi ttgenstei ns two mai n
background fi gures, Frege and Russel l , both entertai ned a vari ant of the i n-
effabi l i ty vi ew. I t shoul d therefore be no surpri se that Wi ttgenstei n, too,
shoul d have done so. What makes the di fference between hi m and hi s pre-
decessors and what makes hi s statements so stri ki ng i s the bol dness of hi s
thi nki ng and of hi s ways of expressi ng hi msel f. (The same bol dness i s mani -
fested i n other vi ews of attempted el i mi nati on of i denti ty and hi s thesi s of
the tautol ogi cal character of l ogi cal truths.) Frege and Russel l had noted
some of the parti cul ar probl ems i nto whi ch the i neffabi l i ty vi ew l eads i n
speci al cases, such as the i ndefi nabi l i ty of truth of si mpl e objects (Russel l ).
For another i nstance, when Frege ran i nto the expressi bi l i ty probl em i n ex-
pl ai ni ng the semanti cal basi s of hi s formal system, he si mpl y appeal ed to hi s
readers antecedent understandi ng of what he meant. But nei ther of these
two earl i er thi nkers had the temeri ty to rai se the questi on of the expressi bi l i ty
of the enti re enterpri se that woul d l ater be cal l ed l ogi cal semanti cs. What
di sti ngui shes Wi ttgenstei ns atti tude toward the i neffabi l i ty of semanti cs from
that of hi s predecessors i s thus not hi s mysti ci sm, but hi s chutzpa.
One thi ng that thi s resul t i mpl i es i s that i t i s futi l e to try to under-
stand Wi ttgenstei ns radi cal i neffabi l i ty vi ew by compari ng i t wi th the ti mi d
attempts of hi s predecessors to cope wi th parti cul ar consequences of the same
vi ew. (What Frege was doi ng i n hi s comments on the concept of horse i s not
a concept how or on how he coul d onl y el uci date hi s basi c concepts but not
defi ne them i s a rearguard acti on, not a frontal assaul t on the probl em he
bequeathed to Wi ttgenstei n.)
How i ntegral l y Wi ttgenstei n was a member of the uni versal i st tra-
di ti on i s perhaps best i l l ustrated by poi nti ng out that a smal l -scal e versi on
of the i neffabi l i ty vi ew was expressed l oud and cl ear by Russel l . I n hi s Theory
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
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What Does the Wittgensteinean Inexpressible Express?
of Knowledge, he mai ntai ns, among other thi ngs, the i ndefi nabi l i ty of the ob-
jects of acquai ntance, whi ch i ncl ude l ogi cal forms and the i nexpressi bi l i ty
of thei r exi stence.
Later, the i neffabi l i ty of semanti cs was mai ntai ned by members of
the Vi enna Ci rcl e, admi ttedl y i n some casesespeci al l y by Carnapmore
as a methodol ogi cal maxi m than as a stri ct l i mi tati on on theoreti cal seman-
ti cs. There was i n fact a term among them for that semanti cal sel f-censor-
shi p . I t was cal l ed the for mal mod e of sp eech (formale Redewise) as
di sti ngui shed from the materi al mode of speech (inhaltiche Redeweise). I t i s
to be noted, though, that some other members of the Vi enna Ci rcl e, espe-
ci al l y Neurath, di d bel i eve i n the i mpossi bi l i ty of l ogi cal semanti cs.
These uncertai nti es i n the atti tude of the Vi enna Ci rcl e toward l ogi -
cal semanti cs are refl ected al so on the termi nol ogi cal l evel . The contrast be-
tween what was meant by syntax and by semanti cs was much l ess sharp
than what i t became l ater. For i nstance, i n spi te of i ts ti tl e, Carnaps Logical
Syntax of Language contai ns concepts and arguments that we woul d now cal l
semanti cal . I ndeed, at one ti me he thought of cal l i ng i t Semantik but was
deterred from doi ng so by the negati ve atti tude of hi s fel l ow members of the
Ci rcl e to semanti cs i n our sense. What i s even more rel evant to the saga of
Wi ttgenstei n i s that al l theori zi ng about l anguage-worl d rel ati ons was con-
si dered metaphysi cal by several members of the Vi enna Ci rcl e.
4. A Resolute Misreading of Wittgenstein
PERHAPS THE BEST WAY OF BRI NGI NG OUT WI TTGENSTEI NS OWN I NTENDED I NTERPRETA-
ti on of 6.54 i s to begi n wi th what New Wi ttgenstei neans have to say about
hi s vi ews. For thi s purpose, l et us exami ne the al l eged pri ze speci men of
thei r evi dence that James Conant has repeatedl y fl aunted. He cl ai ms (2000,
p.175) that
Wi ttgenstei n says of Carnap that he fai l ed to understand the passage [i n questi on,
namel y Tractatus 6.54], and therefore fai l ed to understand the fundamental con-
cepti on of the whol e book.
Unfortunatel y for Conant, what Wi ttgenstei n says i n the passage i n ques-
ti on i s preci sel y the contrary to what Conant cl ai ms. Conant i s quoti ng
Wi ttgenstei n out of context. The rel evant context (i n a wi de sense of the word)
i s the correspondence Wi ttgenstei n had i n 1932 wi th Schl i ck. Thi s correspon-
dence i s di scussed i n my 1993 paper Ludwi gs Appl e Tree. I t was uni nten-
ti onal l y prompted by the offpri nt of Carnaps paper on physi cal i sti c l anguage
as the uni versal l anguage of sci ence that i ts author sent to Wi ttgenstei n.
Wi ttgenstei n read i t and fl ew i nto a rage. Why? What had Carnap done
wrong? Contrary to what commentators mi ght l ead you to expect, i t was not
because Wi ttgenstei n di sagreed wi th Carnap or because Carnap had fai l ed
to understand hi m, but because Carnap was (accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei n) pl a-
gi ari zi ng hi m. Wel l , not l i teral l y pl agi ari zi ng, for Wi ttgenstei n had not pub-
l i shed anythi ng about the rel evant new i deas of hi s. (As I have shown, to-
gether wi th Merri l l Hi nti kka [Hi nti kka and Hi nti kka 1986], these new i deas
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
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Jaakko Hintikka
i ncl uded promi nentl y the pri macy of physi cal i sti c l anguage.) But Carnap
was usi ng hi s i deas wi thout permi ssi on and wi thout acknowl edgement,
Wi ttgenstei n averred, so that when he hi msel f ul ti matel y got around to pub-
l i shi ng hi s i deas, peopl e woul d bel i eve that he i s pl agi ari zi ng Carnap or at
best offeri ng reheated versi ons of Carnaps i deas.
Schl i ck tr i ed to act as a peacemaker. He i nfor med Car nap of
Wi ttgenstei ns charges. Carnap responded by sayi ng that he had not heard
Wi ttgenstei n expoundi ng the rel evant new i deas of hi s and that there was
nothi ng i n the Tractatus about physi cal i sm. When Wi ttgenstei n heard thi s,
he was not paci fi ed but on the contrary got even angri er. He began to accuse
Carnap of al so pl agi ari zi ng the Tractatus. He l i sted a number of expl i ci t i deas
that Carnap al l egedl y got from the Tractatus but whi ch Carnap was usi ng
wi thout any acknowl edgment. One of them was, accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei n,
the excl usi ve preference of the formal mode of speech. As Wi ttgenstei n put
i t i n hi s l etter to Schl i ck dated on August 8, 1932 (Ranchetti and Nedo 1983,
pp. 254-255):
You know very wel l yoursel f that Carnap i s not taki ng any step beyond me when
he i s i n favor of the formal and agai nst the materi al mode of speech [inhaltliche
Redeweise]; and I cannot i magi ne that [he] has mi sunderstood the l ast few proposi -
ti ons of the Tractatusand hence the basi c i dea [Grundgedanke] of the enti re book
so compl etel y [as not to real i ze i t hi msel f].
The el l i psi s that I have restored i s obvi ous i n context. Wi ttgenstei n must have
assumed that Carnap had understood hi s poi nt i n order to be abl e to accuse
hi m of pl agi ar i sm. As i n the other case of al l eged pl agi ar i sm, w hat
Wi ttgenstei n i s cl ai mi ng here i s not that Carnap had mi sunderstood the l ast
few proposi ti ons of the Tractatus. He i s sayi ng, i nsul ti ngl y, that even the poor
pedestri an Carnap coul d not have mi sunderstood them. Apparentl y, Conant
accompl i shed what even Carnap was not, accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei n, capabl e
of doi ng. What Wi ttgenstei n i s sayi ng i n the quoted passage i s that the i dea
of a formal mode of speech i s part and parcel of what i s stated i n the l ast few
proposi ti ons of the Tractatus. Now, the Carnapi an emphasi s on the formale
Redeweise i s but a way of emphasi zi ng the i nexpressi bi l i ty of semanti cs.
Thus, i t i s not onl y the case that the quoted passage fai l s to show
that Carnap mi sunderstood Wi ttgenstei ns message i n the Tractatus. Thi s
passage offers concl usi ve evi dence to the effect that Conants overal l i nter-
pretati on i s wrong i n that the Wi ttgenstei ni an doctri ne of nonsense i s but a
vari ant of the vi ew of the i neffabi l i ty of semanti cs.
For us, though not for Wi ttgenstei n, what the nonsensi cal propo-
si ti ons of the Tractatus present i s a Lehre, that i s, a theory. But i t i s i n effect a
theory of meani ng, and al l such theori es are accordi ng to Wi ttgenstei ns l i ghts
i mpossi bl e to express i n l anguage.
The poverty of the evi dence that the New Wi ttgenstei neans are pre-
senti ng for thei r i nterpretati on coul d be i l l ustrated by other exampl es. I t
makes i t di ffi cul t to di scuss thei r vi ews i n a seri ous schol arl y manner. Per-
haps the most conci se schol arl y verdi ct on the new Wi ttgenstei n i ndustry
can therefore be adapted from Oscar Wi l de, who characteri zed a foxhunt as
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
15
What Does the Wittgensteinean Inexpressible Express?
the unspeakabl e pursui ng the uneatabl e. Here, we are wi tnessi ng the un-
speakabl e pursui ng the unspeakabl e.
5. Carnaps Irresolute Misunderstanding of Wittgenstein
I T TURNS OUT THAT CARNAP DI D MI SUNDERSTAND WI TTGENSTEI NS CLOSI NG REMARKS
i n the Tractatus, but i n a way that does not hel p Conant i n the l east. I n Carnaps
copy of Wi ttgenstei ns l etter to Schl i ck ci ted above, he puts a questi on mark
next to the quoted sentence. I t i s not hard to understand Carnaps puzzl e-
ment. Because of the confusi on of sy ntax and semanti cs, Carnap took
Wi ttgenstei n to say i n the Tractatus that we cannot even speak of the syntax
of our l anguage. I n other words, he took Wi ttgenstei n to deny i n the Tractatus
al l sel f-referenti al use of l anguage, not just to deny semanti c sel f-reference.
Thi s i s l i kel y to be mi staken. Among other mi ssed cl ues, Carnap was obl i vi -
ous to the fact that i t was Wi ttgenstei n that brought to promi nence the i dea
of a l ogi cal syntax of l anguage. Because of thi s mi sunderstandi ng, Carnap
thought that he was goi ng beyond the Tractatus when he began to use meth-
ods by means of whi ch we can speak of the purel y formal (syntacti cal ) fea-
tures of l anguage. These means were i n the fi rst pl ace those devel oped by
Hi l bert i n hi s metamathemati cs and made more expl i ci t by Gdel i n hi s tech-
ni que of Gdel numberi ng. Carnaps hope i ni ti al l y was to use such syntacti -
cal methods to devi se a uni versal l anguage of sci ence i n whi ch one coul d
al so theori ze about that l anguage i tsel f. The Logical Syntax of Language was
the best he coul d do to real i ze thi s dream, and he was forced to recogni ze
the l i mi tati ons of hi s project onl y by the resul ts of Gdel and Tarski . Carnaps
preference of the formal mode of speech was l ess an echo of the Tractatus
than a l esson he had l earned from Hi l bert and Tarski .
However, thi s does not make any di fference to the i nterpretati on of
Wi ttgenstei ns words i n hi s l etter to Schl i ck, whi ch i ncontroverti bl y l i nk hi s
concepti on of the unsayabl e and the i nexpressi bi l i ty of semanti cs. I f any-
thi ng, they show that thi s l i nk was so obvi ous to his mi nd that he coul d not
hel p projecti ng i t to Carnap, too.
6. There is No Fundamental Difference Between Logical
and Metaphysical Readings of the Tractatus
WI TTGENSTEI N I NTERPRETATI ON HAS ALSO BEEN AFFLI CTED BY A MI SUNDERSTANDI NG THAT
i s si mi l ar to the Vi enna Ci rcl es bel i ef that al l semanti cs i s i nevi tabl y meta-
physi cal . Some commentators seem to thi nk that a l ogi cal i nterpretati on
of the Tractatus cannot have anythi ng to do wi th metaphysi cs, i n the sense of
havi ng to do wi th the real i ty our l anguage can be used to speak of. Thi s ki nd
of vi ew i s based on a radi cal mi sunderstandi ng of what l ogi c and l ogi cal
semanti cs are about. Logi c does not deal onl y wi th the properti es of l i ngui s-
ti c expressi ons or wi th thei r rel ati onshi ps to each other, such as i nferenti al
rel ati ons. Everythi ng i n l ogi c i s ul ti matel y based on the ways i n whi ch our
l anguage, promi nentl y i nvol vi ng l ogi cal constants, i s connected wi th real -
i ty, ways whi ch enabl e l anguage to represent that real i ty. I doubt that i t i s
appropri ate to cal l al l di scourse about real i ty (even i n the context of l ogi cal
theory) metaphysi cal . But i f we al l ow such usage, we end up sayi ng that
THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY XI 2003
16
Jaakko Hintikka
l ogi c and al l semanti cs are i nextri cabl y i nvol ved wi th metaphysi cs. For i n-
stance, any l anguage i mposes certai n condi ti ons on the ki nd of real i ty i t can
be used to descri be.
Hence, any attempt to make an i nformati ve di sti ncti on between l ogi -
cal and metaphysi cal i nterpretati ons of the Tractatus i s mi staken or at l east
mi sl eadi ng. Exampl es can be found apl enty to i l l ustrate thi s fact.
Agai n, a tel l i ng exampl e i s more el oquent here than a hundred ci ta-
ti ons. An i mportant and vi vi d exampl e of thi s i nterwovenness of l ogi c and
metaphysi cs i s offered by Wi ttgenstei ns concepti on of l ogi c i n the Tractatus.
Accordi ng to a common vi ew, l ogi c deal s wi th the most general features of
the worl d. For the author of the Tractatus, l ogi c deal s wi th the most parti cu-
l ar features of real i ty. Thi s i s because l ogi c deal s wi th l ogi cal forms and be-
cause al l these l ogi cal forms are composed of the l ogi cal forms of si mpl e
objects. These forms do not enjoy i ndependent exi stence apart from the ob-
jects whose l ogi cal forms they are. And the si mpl e objects are of course the
most parti cul ar enti ti es that there can be. Al l states of affai rs are combi na-
ti ons of such si mpl e objects.
But such a vi ew makes sense onl y on the metaphysi cal assumpti on
that the real i ty ( worl d ) of whi ch Wi ttgenstei n speaks i s, objecti vel y speak-
i ng, consti tuted from si mpl e objectssi mpl e i n the sense of not bei ng fur-
ther anal yzabl e but not si mpl e i n the sense of not havi ng a structure.
Another metaphysi cal assumpti on that has to be recogni zed i s that
the si mpl e objects postul ated i n the Tractatus are not restri cted to parti cul ars
but i ncl ude properti es and rel ati ons. The contrary used to be mai ntai ned by
the l i kes of Anscombe (1959) and Copi (1958), but the publ i cati on of
Wi ttgenstei ns Notebooks 1914-16 and Lee (1980) put an end to thi s mi si nter-
pretati on.
7. Ethics and Semantics Are One
ADMI TTEDLY, WI TTGENSTEI NS VI EWS ON THE UNSAYABLE ARE CONNECTED WI TH HI S ETHI -
cal stance. But the connecti on i s di fferent from what i t i s typi cal l y taken to
be and does not gai nsay the connecti on between semanti cs and i neffabi l i ty.
As I have suggested, Wi ttgenstei ns l eadi ng i dea was the same as Karl Krauss.
For both of them, the test case of ethi cal authenti ci ty was the authenti ci ty of
l anguage. Here, for Wi ttgenstei n, the i nexpressi bl e i nternal boundari es of
l anguage that excl ude what cannot be sai d do not have onl y an i ntel l ectual
si gni fi cance. They have al so an ethi cal si gni fi cance. They mark the l i mi ts of
honest, unaffected di scourse.
Thi s i s what Wi ttgenstei n means when he cal l s ethi cs transcen-
dental , that i s, somethi ng that deal s wi th the l i mi ts of l anguage, rather
than tr anscend ent, that i s, w hat l i es bey ond those l i mi ts. Thus, the
semanti cal theor y of the Tractatus ser v es i pso facto ethi cal pur poses.
Wi ttgenstei n say s that ethi cs and aestheti cs are one (6.421), whi ch i s
not much more than an echo of G. E. Moore. He coul d hav e sai d more
poi gnantl y, ethi cs and semanti cs are one. They are both i nexpressi bl e
for the same reason. As I have asked el sewhere, i snt the Tractatus at
bottom nothi ng more than a sermon on the text, Let what y ou say be
XI 2003 THE HARVARD REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY
17
What Does the Wittgensteinean Inexpressible Express?
si mpl y y es and no; any thi ng more than thi s comes from ev i l (Mat-
thew 5.37)? I snt thi s bi bl i cal i njuncti on echoed by Tractatus 4.023: A propo-
si ti on must determi ne the real i ty so that one onl y need to say y es or
no? Fai thful , presupposi ti onl ess representati on of real i ty i s not onl y
an ai m of posi ti v i sti c phi l osophers. I t was al so a sel f-i mposed ethi cal
r equ i r ement of the Ru ssi an r eal i sti c w r i ter s and ar ti sts w hom
Wi ttgenstei n admi red.
Bibliography
Wi ttgenstei ns mai n works are referred to i n thei r standard edi ti on and hi s Nachlass i s re-
ferred to accordi ng to von Wri ghts (1982) catal ogue.
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Co., 1959). (Second ed., 1963).
Carnap, Rudol f. The Logical Syntax of Language (London: Routl edge & Kegan Paul , 1937).
(German ori gi nal , 1934).
Conant, James. El uci dati on and Nonsense i n Frege and Earl y Wi ttgenstei n, i n The New
Wittgenstein, eds. Al i ce Grary and Rupert Read (London: Routl edge, 2000), 174-217.
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145-165.
De Pel l egri n, Enzo. A Machi ne Metaphor i n Wi ttgenstei ns Earl y Logi cal Wri ti ngs (forth-
comi ng).
Hi nti kka, Merri l l , and Jaakko Hi nti kka. Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basi l Bl ackwel l ,
1986).
Hi nti kka, Jaakko. Lingua Universalis vs Calculus Ratiocinator: An Ultimate Presupposition of
Twentieth-Century Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kl uwer Academi c, 1997).
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und die Folgen, ed. Paul Kruntorad (Vi enna: Hl der-Pi chl er-Tempsky, 1991), 127-158.
Lee, Desmond (ed.). Wittgensteins Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32 (1980).
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(Frankfurt am Mai n: Suhrkamp, 1983).
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C. Kl agge and Al fred Nordmann (I ndi anapol i s: Hackett, 1993), 36-44.
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