While Aristotle mentions truth () in his discussion of virtue in the

Nicomachean Ethics, the kind of truth that is discussed seems to encompass only the
truth of propositions about oneself. For Aristotle, the virtue of truthfulness, as with
all others, exists as a mean between the extremes, being in this case the excess of
boastfulness and the deficiency of self-deprecation. In this respect, the virtuous
person speaks truthfully about his or her strengths when they really do exist,
resisting the urge to exaggerate, while remaining silent about those which do not.
The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things that
bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than
he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what
he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who
calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word,
owning to what he has, and neither more nor less. (Nicomachean
Ethics, Book 4 Ch. 7)

Being in reference specifically to an agents own character and achievements, there
is ambiguity with regards to Aristotles view on the ethical status of the truthfulness
of propositions as a whole. While it is clear that Aristotle views truthfulness to be in
general morally preferable to falsehood, claiming that falsehood is in itself mean
and culpable, and truth noble and worthy of praise (Ibid.), this claim is left
unsupported with regards to the general proposition. There seems to be nothing
embedded in Aristotles theory of virtue ethics by which we can judge the moral
weight of a general lie.
It is clear that it is far easier to make this judgment from the perspective of
other ethical theories. To the Kantian deontologist, the action of willingly uttering a
false proposition is morally reprehensible because it lies in direct contradiction to
an objective and universal ethical imperative. To the Utilitarian ethicist, lying is
permitted when doing so brings about the most happiness, and prohibited when it
does not. It is also clear why we have less of an easy time determining the moral
status of a lie from within a system of virtue ethics; for within such a system, the
fundamental concept is character, while in our other cases, it is right action. In the
two examples outlined above, we have an action which is judged relative to either a
maxim or to the effects which it directly causes. But to Aristotle and other virtue
ethicists, actions must be interpreted in terms of an agents character, or not at all.
And so, in order to capture the ethical status of the lying not in regards to ones own
traits and successes, it appears necessary to define a new virtue, omitted by
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, or at least, to redefine the virtue of truthfulness
found there in order to include the more general case.
If we are going to institute a new Aristotelian virtue, we must first designate
a spectrum between two extremes, by which our virtue can exist as the ideal mean
of human character. While Aristotle already has a virtue which is designated
truthfulness, we have already outlined why this is not exactly what we are looking
for. The first question which we must answer then is this; does the person who is
virtuous in regards to truth-telling tell the truth all the time? Is it contrary to virtue
to lie in even the most extreme cases? We have mentioned that in the Kantian
deontology, it is always immoral to tell a lie. There does not seem to be such a strong
imperative to this extreme when considering the case through virtue ethics. In fact,
it is a fundamental principle of Aristotelian ethics that virtue lies between the two
extremes. And so, it appears that it is not going to be as straightforward as saying
that it is virtuous to have every statement one utters be the truth. We can then say
that constant, blunt truthfulness lies in the excess of the virtue which we are trying
to define, while a person who is wholly deficient in it will be a pathological liar. We
do in fact want the virtue to lie far closer to the excess then the deficiency; we want
it to be virtuous for most of ones propositions to be true, but for an agent not be
morally bound to speak true statements in the most extreme cases where the is no
identifiable good which comes to the situation or to the agents character besides
speaking the truth. We can then designate this new virtue as a sense of practical
honesty. This of course implies that there is a time to tell the truth, and therefore
that there is a time to lie. This is a controversial claim. Many systems have moral
maxims which state the contrary, namely that it is never morally permissible to tell a
lie. To refute such claims, one would need to refute Kants whole metaphysical
grounding for his deontological system; thousands of pages have been written to
such an end, and it is far outside of the scope of this paper to even begin to attempt
such a feat. Instead, I will argue using the skeleton of Aristotles virtue ethics to
argue why implementing such a virtue might be useful in achieving eudaimonia.
One can think of a great many situations where the natural instinct is to lie,
or when it seems much ore convenient to omit the truth. But we wish to specify of
concept of practical honesty as narrowly as possible, as we mish to maximize the
truthfulness of propositions without forcing the truth in those few situations in
which in need not be uttered, as it would cause far more harm than good. It seems
like we are here engaging in Utilitarian calculus instead of specifying virtue, but this
does not really turn out to be problematic. All virtues, at their initial conception, are
defined because of the good that occurs when people embody them. It is certainly
preferable for people to tell the truth, if not to fulfill deontological maxims, then
because it benefits communication and human interactions and makes us all better
people. And so, we can tell the truth insofar as this condition is upheld, while
withholding the truth only when doing so avoids negative consequences and when
these positive benefits of truthfulness appear negligible in respect to the harm
which it could do. This then will be our virtue of practical honesty in action. Giving
specific examples of when we might abstain from truth-telling will help to elucidate
this controversial concept which we have asserted, that of the existence of virtuous
honesty. Consider one of the most orthodox philosophical thought experiments,
originally posted as an objection to Kant. We speak, of course, of the murderer at
the door. Suppose a known murderer comes to your residence and requires about
the whereabouts of your friend, who is just inside. Is it morally permissible to lie to
this murderer? It seems prudent to avoid telling the truth in this sense; if we assume
that lying will indeed save your friends life, it seems quite right to lie. We note that
Kant has a fully developed argument as to why one should not lie, but neglect to
address this here. In account with Aristotles virtue ethics, this seems totally
reasonable. A balanced, virtuous person might do such a thing; it would require the
correct amount of wisdom, and courage, in order to evade the murderer in this way.
And so, we can claim that in this case, we obtain the required mean of truth-telling
in this case by withholding the truth.
There are indeed less extreme cases in which one might appear virtuous in
omitting the truth. Suppose that a friend or lover, after crying heavily, asks you self-
consciously how they look, when in fact you think they look more hideous than they
ever have before. Outside of any universal or metaphysical arguments about the
immorality of lying, what reasons can one think of to justify telling the truth in this
case? It appears that even in this less serious case, it might be virtuous to lie to your
sad acquaintance. We uphold that in most cases, it is still virtuous to tell the truth.
And so, we have outlined a relatively new Aristotelian virtue, that of practical
honesty, by describing a mean of truth-telling between the two extremes, being the
blunt and harmful statement of the truth, and the constant telling of lies. We have
shown a few cases where this virtue in action might lead to a more harmonious life,
helping the agent to reach eudaimonia, when other ethical systems calls for telling
the truth in situations where the outcome is bad. This account generalizes Aristotles
existing character virtue of truthfulness, which pertains only to statements about
the agent. This strengthens his overall project.