RobertoPedroso

15April2013
BritishEmpiricism
Humeon'Is'and'Ought':ADefenseofMacIntyre
InBookIIIofATreatiseonHumanNature
1
,Humechastisesmoralistsforattemptingto
derive'Ought'propositionsfrom'Is'propositionswithoutexplaininghowsuchadeductionispossible.
2

Heencouragesthereadertobeawareofthisproblem,andremarksthatmanymoraltheorieswould
dissolveifweweretotakethisproblemseriously.Theproblemisofmeritbecauseitcastsdoubtonthe
validityof'Ought'propositions.Humehimselfwantstoarguethatmoralpropositionsareneither
rationallydeduciblenormattersoffact,butinsteadareimpassionedlocutionsthatexpressasentimentin
relationtoanaction.
3
Byproblematizingtherelationshipbetweenfactualassertionsandmoral
propositions,hedealsablowhiscontemporarymoralintuitionists.Morerecently,philosopherslike
AlisdairMacIntyrehavesoughttointerpretthisimportantpassage.
4
MacIntyrehasastakeinthe
argumentinsofarasthevirtueethicsheespousesisbuiltonakindofnaturalisticteleology,which
necessarilymustaddresstheIsOughtproblem.
5
MacIntyre'sessay,Humeon'Is'and'Ought',takesthe'standardinterpretation'ofthis
passagetobetheassertionthatnosetofnonmoralpremisescanentailamoralconclusion.
6
Heargues
thatHumecouldnothavemeanttoargueanysuchthing.Rather,hebelievesHumewassimplyurging
cautionabouthowpreciselyonetransitionsfromfactualpropositionstomoralpropositions.
Humecanbeinterpretedasmakingoneoftwoarguments.TheWeakArgumentsaysthatthere
canbearelationshipbetween'Is'and'Ought'propositions,butthatitcannotbeoneofstrictentailment
becausethepropositionsexpressentirelydifferentrelations.TheStrongArgumentsaysthatthereisan
unbridgeabledividebetweenthetwokindsofproposition.MacIntyretakestheStrongArgumenttobe
thestandardreadingoftheIsOughtpassage.HeclaimsthatsuchareadingwouldmakeHume
needlesslyinconsistent.He,itwillbeseen,assumestheWeakArgumentwithoutgivingitmuch
attention.CommentatorslikeR.F.Atkinson
7
andW.D.Hudson
8
havecriticizedMacIntyre'sreadingfor
beingconceptuallyconfused,andtheyleaveopenthepossibilitythatHumeisadvocatingforthe
strongerposition.IintenttoaddresstheircriticismsandaffirmthatitwouldneedlesslyrenderHume
inconsistenttoaccusehimofmakingtheStrongArgument.
Generally,MacIntyrecanbeseenasmakingtwoargumentsforwhytheStrongArgument
wouldmakeHumeinconsistent:(1)Hume'srelianceonanthropologicalandsociologicalremarksinhis
moralargumentwouldceasetomakesenseand(2)Hume'sownaccountofjusticeattemptsto
transitionfroman'Is'propositiontoan'Ought'proposition.Forthesakeofbrevity,Iwillfocuson(2),
whichMacIntyrespendsmoretimedeveloping.IfMacIntyreiscorrectinbelievingthatHume'saccount
ofjusticecreatesmoralpropositionssomehowfrommattersoffact,thananyattempttoattributethe
StrongArgumenttoHumewouldbeincoherent.
Whenthereforemenhavehadexperienceenoughtoobserve,thatwhatevermaybetheconsequenceof
anysingleactofjustice,perform'dbyasingleperson,yetthewholesystemofactions,concurr'dinby
thewholesociety,isinfinitelyadvantageoustothewhole,andtoeverypartitisnotlongbeforejustice
andpropertytakeplace.
9

Humefindsjusticewheresocietyisorganizedsuchthatrulesaretailoredtothebenefitofthewhole
community.Thissenseofjusticedoesnotdependonapriorimoralprinciples,butrathertakesthereto
becommunityintereststhatareatoddswithindividualselfinterest.Hemakesthepragmaticargument
thatindividualsreadilygiveupsomeoftheseinterestssothattheymightsecurethelargeradvantages
offeredbyastablesociety.Sohesaysthatjusticeestablishesitselfbyakindofconventionor
agreementthatis,byasenseofinterest.
10
MacIntyremakestheobservationthatthisargument
appearstoderivejusticefromfactualpropositions.Asamatteroffact,membersofsocietyhavetaken
ituponthemselvestocreaterulessothatallofsocietymightbenefitfromthepeaceandcivilitythose
rulesoffer.Humesublimatesthisfactintoamoralprincipleaboutrulefollowing.Howdoeshedothis?
AccordingtoMacIntyre:
Thatis,thenotionof"ought"isforHumeonlyexplicableintermsofthenotionofaconsensusof
interest.Tosaythatweoughttodosomethingistoaffirmthatthereisacommonlyacceptedruleand
theexistenceofsucharulepresupposesaconsensusofopinionastowhereourcommoninterestslie.
11

IfMacIntyre'sreadingiscorrect,Humehasinsomewaycreatedamoralprinciplefromasetoffacts,
andwouldbeperformativelycontradictinghimselfifhesimultaneouslyassentedtotheStrongArgument.
Onthispoint,Hudsonoffers3objections.
First,herejectsMacIntyre'sinterpretationof'ought'inHumeonthebasisthat,whilethereisa
connectionbetween'ought'propositionsandsocialrules,thereisnotarelationofidentitybetween
them.
12
ButHumehasarguedthatmoralscanonlybegroundedinpassions,fortheinactivecharacterof
reasonandfactscouldnotstirustoutterapprobationsordisapprobations.
13
Ifmorals,then,areakind
ofsentiment,thenwouldnotasociallyacceptedrulebetheultimateexpressionofamoralsentiment?If
asocietyhasaruleagainstwilfulmurder,isitnotbecausethatactisseenasmorallyobjectionable?And
ifitismorallyobjectionable,itissopreciselybecauseitisdiametricallyopposedtoageneralinterest.
Thusaruleagainstmurderemergesbecausemembersofsocietyhaveacollectiveinterestinnotbeing
murdered.ItseemsthatMacIntyre'sreadinghereismoreconsistentthanHudson.
Second,Hudsonarguesthatthemerefactofarulebeingcommonlyaccepteddoesnot
necessitatethattheruleisinourcommoninterest.
14
Arewemorallyobligedtofollowarulethatleaves
usworseoff?Thedoctrineofcivildisobediencesuggestsotherwise.Thisisadifficultissue,butthis
argumentisamoralobjectionratherthananobjectiontoMacIntyre'sreadingofHume.Kant,for
example,famouslyarguedinPerpetualPeacethatapparentlyunjustlawsoughttobeobeyeditwould
notbeimpossibleforHumetohavemadethesameclaim.
15
Furthermore,itisdifficulttoimaginea
societyknowinglyinstitutingarulethatsubvertsitsinterests.Humeisinterestedinsociallyconstituted
rules,notunjustlawsenforcedbyadictator.
Third,Hudsontakesissuewiththeclaimthatobligationislogicallydependentonthecommon
interest.
16
Hearguesthattheparticularmoraljudgement...is,onthisinterpretation,logicallydependent
onastatementoffactinconjunctionwithageneralmoralprinciple(250).Thiswouldbetray
MacIntyre'sclaimbecausesuchaconsequencewouldrenderHumecompatiblewiththeStrong
Argument.HudsonisrighttoaskwhatexactlyMacIntyremeansbylogicallydependent,but
MacIntyrespecificallydeniesthathemeanslogicalentailment.Theuseoflogicaldependencewas
meanttoconveyakindofrelationbetweenthe'ought'andthecommoninterestMacIntyrestates
elsewherethatthisisarelationofwanting.
ToclarifyhisunderstandingofHume's'ought',MacIntyrecontrastsHume'smoraltheorywith
Mill'sutilitarianism.
17
Millpresentstheutilityprincipleasthesuprememoralprinciple,whichwouldbe
morallywrongtodeny,butwhichitmakessensetodeny.Bymakessensetodeny,hemeansthat
youcanrefutethatthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberiswhatweoughttopursue.For
Hume,however,weoughttofollowthecommoninterestistautological:thecommoninterestisbound
inextricablytotheterm'ought'.WhereMillismakinganethicalargumentaboutwhatweoughttodo,
Humeismakingametaethicalargumentaboutwhatitmeanstosaythatweoughttodosomething.
ThusHudson'sreplythatHumeandMillarenodifferentinsofarasbothwouldlosetheirjustificationif
thefactsweredifferentmissesthepointaltogether.
18
Humeusestheterm'ought'coextensivelywiththe
commoninterest,andhenceobjectingtothenotionthatweoughttofollowthecommoninterestisto
argueagainstatautology.
IfHumemakesanargumentthatrequirestransitioningfrom'Is'propositionsto'Ought'
propositions,thenhowisthistransitionpossible?Aswasmentionedpreviously,MacIntyreassentsto
theWeakArgumenttoreiterate,an'Is'propositioncannotformallyentailan'Ought'proposition,
preciselybecausetheyexpresstwodistinctrelations.Ifsuchatransitionshouldbepossible,theremust
existarelationbetweenthepropositionsofacharacterdistinctandweakerthanentailment.Hence
MacIntyreargues:mytransitioningfrom'is'to'ought'ismadeinthisinferencebythenotionof
'wanting'.
19
Thisishistoricallyvalidated,hesays,intheworkofAristotle,whoofferspracticalmoral
argumentsintermsofeudaimonia.
20
Indeed,MacIntyremakestheclaimelsewherethatmoralnotions
areunintelligiblewithoutthenotionofwanting,desires,etc.
21
Hudsononceagainintervenes,agreeingthatmoraljudgementsaremadeinthecontextof
'wants','needs'and'desires',butmaintainingnonethelessthatitdoesnotfollowthathewas,orthought
hewas,deducingoughtfromis.
22
Heusestheexampleofafootballgame:whileyoumightbe
motivatedbypassions,noamountofdesirewillchangetherulesofthesport,forthetwoarelogically
distinct.Thisobjection,however,isentirelyunfaithfultoHume.IgnoringtheIs/Oughtdistinctionforthe
moment,Humeexplicitlyarguesthatmoraljudgementsareinformedonlybypassions:sinceviceand
virtuearenotdiscoverablemerelybyreason,orthecomparisonofideas,itmustbebymeansofsome
impressionorsentimenttheyoccasion.
23
Hecrystallizesthispointbyattributingmoraldistinctions
directlytopleasure:anaction,orsentiment,orcharacterisvirtuousorvicious...becauseitsview
causesapleasureoruneasinessofaparticularkind....
24
Hudsonisfreetoarguethatmoraljudgements
arelogicallydistinctfromthesentimentsorimpressionswehaveaboutthem,butonecouldnever
attributesuchaviewtoHume.Thefootballanalogyfailsintrinsicallyinthatitsrulesaregroundedinthe
tensionitcreatesbetweenopponentstherewouldnotbefansoffootballiftherulesdidnotdoso.
Analogously,Humearguesnotonlythattherecouldnotbemoralruleswithoutpassions,butthatthese
passionsaretheveryseatofnormativeforce.
HavingdemonstratedthedeficiencyofHudson'scriticisms,itshouldstandthatMacIntyrehas
paintedHumeashavingpresentedatheoryofjusticethatbridgesIsandOughtbywayofthis
categoryofbridgenotions.Thequestionthenbecomeswhetherwesimplyputdownourpensand
denounceHume'smoraltheoryforinconsistency,orwhetherwecansalvageHumebyreinterpretingthe
Is/Oughtpassage.Unsurprisingly,MacIntyrechoosesthelattercourseofaction.
Atminimum,HumebelievesthegapbetweenIsandOughtisdifficulttoovercome.He
accusespreviouswritersofignoringthisgap,andurgeshisreaderstobeskepticalaboutthesekindsof
arguments.Yet,afterissuingthatwarning,heimmediatelyprecedestomakeexactlysuchanargument.
InMacIntyre'sview,heurgesrestraintbecausethisisadifficultbutnotimpossibletransition.When
Humesaysitseemsaltogetherinconceivable,howthisnewrelationcanbeadeductionfromothers,
whichareentirelydifferentfromit
25
,MacIntyrecallsithyperbole.Wehaveallbeenbroughtupto
believeinHume'sironysothroughly,hewrites,thatitmayoccasionallybenecessarytoremind
ourselvesthatHumeneednotnecessarilymeanmoreorotherthanhesays.
26
Atkinsonrespondswith
skepticismaboutHume'sintenttobeironic,butwithoutstatingreasons.
27
MacIntyre'sviewisconsistent
withboththefactthatHumeisconcludingasectionandthegeneraltoneofthepassage(vulgar
systems,asauthorsdonotcommonlyusethisprecaution).
28
Evenifonedoesnotbuyintotheironicreading,MacIntyrepointsoutthatthe'entailment'
argumentisreadintothepassagebycontemporaryreaders.Whilemodernreadersmightidentify
'deduction'with'entailment',MacIntyreconcludesthatHumewouldnotmeantitthiswaybasedonthe
scarcityofhisuseoftheterm.
29
Atkinson'sskepticismappearsonceagain,andhearguesthatthis
readingdoesnotexcludethepossibilityofHumemakingtheStrongArgumentincontradistinction.
30

Thisistosay,evenifwediscardthe'entailment'readingasanachronous,hecouldstillbemakingthe
semanticallydistinctclaimthatmoraljudgementsarenotlogicallydependentonfacts.Thisargumentis
weak,however,becauseitonlyleavesopenthepossibilitythatHumewishedtomakesuchaclaim.If
oneeliminatesthe'entailment'reading,onelosesanytextualbasisforattributingtheStrongArgumentto
Hume.Bytheprincipleofcharity,then,oneoughttoattributetoHumewhateverviewmostconsistently
fitswithhiswork.GiventhestrengthofMacIntyre'sevidencethatHumemakesalegitimatetransition
fromIstoOughtinthejusticeargument,thedebateaboutHume'spositionontheIs/Oughtproblem
sidesinfavorofMacIntyre.
Thusithasbeendemonstratedthat:(1)Hume'stheoryofjusticemakesatransitionfrom'Is'
propositionsto'Ought'propositions(2)Hisaccountoftheroleofpassionslegitimizethistransitionand
(3)itisplausibletoreadtheIs/OughtpassageasnotassentingtotheStrongArgument.Onthisbasis,I
findMacIntyre'sreadingofHumepersuasive.HumedidnotintendtoposetheIs/Oughtproblemasa
fallacytobeavoided,butratherasaconceptualdifficultythathasbeeninadequatelytreatedbyhis
contemporaries.Hemakesthecasethatanydiscussionofmoraljudgementmustaddressthe
metaethicalquestionofwhatconstitutesamoralobligationandhowwetranscendthegapbetween
nonmoralandmoralsubstance.

1Hume, David,L.A.SelbyBigge,andP.H.Nidditch.ATreatiseofHuman Nature.

Oxford:Clarendon,1978.

2Ibid., 469470

3Ibid., 470,471

4MacIntyre, A.C."Humeon"Is"and"Ought""The PhilosophicalReview68.4(1959):45168.

5MacIntyre, AlasdairC.AfterVirtue:AStudyinMoralTheory.Notre Dame,IN:Universityof

NotreDame,1984.

6Ibid., 452

7Atkinson, R.F."Humeon"Is"and"Ought":AReplyto Mr.MacIntyre."ThePhilosophical

Review70.2(1961): 23138.

8Hudson, W.D."HumeonIsandOught."ThePhilosophical Quarterly14.56(1964):

24652.

9Hume, op.cit498

10Loc. cit.

11MacIntyre 1959,op.cit.457

12Hudson, op.cit.249

13Hume, op.cit.457

14Hudson, op.cit.249

15Kant, Immanuel.PerpetualPeace,.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1939.

16Hudson, op.cit.249

17MacIntyre 1959,op.cit.458459

18Hudson, op.cit.250

19MacIntyre 1959,op.cit.463

20Loc. cit.

21Loc. cit.

22Hudson, op.cit.251

23Hume, op.cit.470

24Hume, op.cit.471

25Hume, op.cit.469470

26MacIntyre 1959,op.cit.460

27Atkinson, op.cit.235

28MacIntyre 1959,loc.cit.

29Loc. cit.

30Atkinson, loc.cit.