1. Layague v.

De Ulgasan, 109 Phil 945 CLETO

Facts:

On July 29, 1949, Fortunato Layague and Santiago Rombo filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental an
action for declaratory relief against Concepcion Perez de Ulgasan, the judicial administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Alipia Perez, praying that the sale of certain real property under administration
by the heirs of the deceased Alipia Perez made in 1946 be declared legal and valid.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that prior to the sales sought to be declared valid, the real
estate was partitioned by the heirs among themselves and by virtue of such partition, the heirs took
possession of their respective shares.
The defendant claimed that the extrajudicial partition, as well as the sales made by the alleged heirs of
Alipia Perez, was null and void. As counterclaim, she prayed that plaintiffs be sentenced to pay the
estate of the deceased for the coconut fruits gathered from the lands.
Plaintiffs were "during the year 1947-48 up to September 1949" in possession of two-thirds portion of
the land under administration proceedings by virtue of the deeds of sale executed by the heirs; that
during that period, Fortunato Layague gathered 40,000 coconuts which yielded about 8,000 kilos of
copra, while Santiago Rombo gathered 12,000 coconuts which he converted into 2,400 kilos of copra;
and that both of them sold the copra, the price thereof being P55.00 per hundred piculs at the time.
The land in question was in custodia legis when the heirs sold their interest therein in 1946. Intestate
proceedings of the late Alipia Perez were instituted in 1936 and has not yet been closed or terminated.
The trial court ruled that the sales were valid, and did not order the plaintiffs to pay the estate for the
value of the coconuts they gathered during the crop years 1947-1948.

Issue:

W/N the trial judge erred in not rendering judgment with respect to the defendants counterclaim for the
value of the fruits gathered by plaintiffs during the crop year 1947-48. No.

Held:

Under section 3, Rule 85, of the Rules of Court, the executor or administrator shall have the right to
take possession of the real or personal properly of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of debts and expenses of administration. Where there are no debts, however, to be paid, there
is no reason for the executor or administrator taking possession of the estate, which should pass to the
heirs.
The sale made by the heirs of their right, interest or participation in the lands under administration in
favor of the plaintiffs-appellees having been declared valid and there being not even an intimation that
the estate is indebted, the payment for the value of the fruits gathered by the plaintiffs-appellees as
purchasers to the defendant administratrix is not necessary and might even prove to be cumbersome.
In any event, the quantity of the fruits gathered by appellees is known and determinable in value.
Conceding that the proceeds they received from the fruits of the estate belong to the estate, the court in
the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over them and could, if necessary, compel said appellees to
deliver to the administratrix of the estate the necessary portion of said proceeds for the payment of any
claim against the estate.
In this connection, we note that the estate of the deceased has been under administration proceedings
for quite an unreasonably long time. This is patently against the policy of the Rules of Court to close up
the estate as promptly and economically as possible.
As was once held by this Court, "All courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate
within twelve months from the time they are presented, and may refuse to allow any compensation to
executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher
measures."


2. Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, 9 SCRA 113 FERNANDEZ
Doctrine: It is clear from the facts of this case that is was deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the
relationship of the parties, as advanced by petitioner and the oppositors-appellees, to be able to appoint an administrator in
accordance with the order preference established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court

Facts: Ngo the hua claims to be the wife of chung liu, filed a petition to be appointed administratrix of the estate of
aforementioned deceased.

Her petition was opposed Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Sio Pek and Chung Ka Bio, all claiming to
be children of the deceased Chung Liu by his first wife, Tan Hua

The low court found that Ngo The Hua and the deceased were validly divorced by the aforementioned Taipei District
Court, and that Chung Kiat Hua, Lily Chung Cho, Bonifacio Chung Siong Pek and Chung Kiat Bio are children of the
deceased. So it issued the order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of Chung Liu.
Issue: WON appointment valid? Yes

Held: It is clear from the facts of this case that is was deemed necessary by the lower court to determine the relationship of
the parties, as advanced by petitioner and the oppositors-appellees, to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance
with the order preference established in Section 5, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. Said section provides that letters of
administration shall be granted to the surviving spouse the next of kin, or to any principal creditor, in this order.
Oppositors-appellees denied petitioner Ngo The Hua's claim that she is the surviving spouses of Chung Liu, and petitioner
likewise denied the oppositors-appellees' claim that they are children of the deceased. Since these applicants were asking
for the letter of administration on the theory that they are preferred according to Section 5 Rule 79 because of their
relationship to the deceased Chu Liu, the lower court necessarily had to pass first on the truth of their respective claims of
relationship to be able to appoint an administrator in accordance with the aforementioned order of preference.
3. Guidote v. BPI, 67 Phil 391 FORTES

Vicenta C. Vda de Guidote v. Bank of PI (1939)

Doctrine: In lieu of the bond, the court may properly require a deposit of a certain amount with the clerk of
court. Or the court may provide that the distribution is subject to the right of creditors whose claims have not yet
been paid.

Facts:
Proceeding is for the settlement of the intestate estate of Valentin Guidote
The administratrix submitted a project of partition, however, she declared them subject to the mortgage
which the decedent executed in favor of the Rufinos
All the properties were subjected to the lien except for the Antipolo property
BPI filed an opposition to the project of partition on the ground that the decedent have unpaid credit
amounting to P20K
The Court gave the administratrix 3 options in order for the BPI loan to be paid and for the project of
partition to be approved:
1. Sell the unencumbered Antipolo property to pay for indebtedness to BPI
2. Convey the Antipolo lot to BPI
3. Subject all properties to the liens of the mortgage to the Rufinos and loan payable to BPI
The Court further held that it would approve the project of partition subject to the liens of the Rufinos
and BPI should the loan to BPI remains unpaid within 30 days.

Issue: WON the CFI erred in holding that the project of partition will be approved in 30 days subject to the
liens of the Rufinos and BPI NO!

Held: In affirming the decision of the CFI, the Court held that the estate cannot be partitioned as the heirs
admitted that the credits to the Rufinos and BPI are unpaid, unless they file a bond to secure the payments of
the said debts and other debts still unpaid.

The lower court did not err in holding that if the bank's credit is not paid within thirty days, it would approve the
project of partition, the properties to be adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased being subject, however, to the
mortgage of the Rufinos and to the credit of the bank.

4. Dolores C. Vda. De Gil v. Agustin Cancio, 14 SCRA 796 ITARALDE

DOCTRINE: There is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the
property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the the probate court. It is
therefore, error for the court to sat that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.

FACTS: Subject matter is the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil Sr. In his will, he instituted his widow Isabel as
his exclusive heir on the condition that in case Isabel dies, estate will be inherited by their adopted son Carlos
Gil Jr. Upon admission to probate of the will, Isabel was appointed administratrix of the estate. Among the
properties of the estate were 2 parcels of land with a house on it located at Guagua, Pampanga. During the
Japanese occupation, Isabel and Carlos Jr.obtained a loan with Agustin Cancio and they agreed to transfer the
title of the mentioned properties after the same had been finally adjudicated to both or either of the two heirs.
Carlos Jr died and Isabel then filed a motion to execute the deed of transfer of the subject lots. a copy of the
motion was also sent to Dolores, the widow of Carlos Jr as guardians of the minor children of Carlos Jr. Judge
approved the motion on condition that original deed of transfer should be submitted to the court for approval.
Isabel subsequently died without executing the deed of transfer. So Dolores was the one who executed and
motioned the court for its approval. Court then requested for the payment of the estate and inheritance tax
before passing upon the motion. Dolores did nothing.

Agustin Cancio after lapse of several years filed a motion in the probate proceedings reiterating former petition
of the co-administratrix for the approval of the deed of sale. Surprisingly, Dolores opposed the motion on the
ground that Isabel and Carlos Jr agreed with Cancio without authority of the court, that the properites subject of
the sale had never been finally adjudicated to the heirs, so the deed of sale should only be considered as
equitable mortgage. the court denied Cancios motion and set aside previous order which requires submission
of the deed of sale for approval of the court on the theory that since properties were sold was personal in
character, said obligation should be threshed out in a separate action.

ISSUE: WON Isabel and Carlos Jr has authority to sell the properties when it was not yet finally adjudicated to
them.

HELD: it should be borne in mind that under the provision of Art. 1430 of the CC the widow and children of the
deceased are entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the estate pending liquidation of estate and
until their shares have been delivered to them. SC recognized this as reason for the prospective heirs to have
borrowed money from Cancio, in order that they may have means to support themselves in the interregnum
since the estate was then unproductive. Since the situation happened during the japanese occupation, the
lower court did not hesitate on giving Isabel the authority to execute the deed of sale with Cancio. An heir can
sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which
comes under the jurisdiction of the the probate court. It is therefore, error for the court to sat that this matter
should be threshed out in a separate action.


5. Wenceslao v. Calimon, 46 Phil 906 KUNG
Facts:
This is a case of a legal redemption sanctioned by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
to the effect that the defendant should resell to the plaintiffs a four-fifth part of a parcel
of land situated in the barrio of Baluarte, municipality of Bulacan, described in the
complaint.

Issues:
Three principal questions are raised by the appellant in his brief, the first relating to the
period of nine days for the redemption the second to the price of the repurchase, and
the third to the capacity of the redeemers.

Ruling:
As to the first point, even supposing the nine days fixed by article 1524 of the Civil Code to
have expired, which is not the case, the provision applicable here is that contained in
article 1067, as the matter concerns heirs and an inheritance not yet distributed,
according to the stipulation of facts. But even considering article 1524 to be applicable,
the fact is that the plaintiffs are minors and have no legal guardian. The period fixed in
said article could not have run against them. Contra non valentem agere non currit
prscriptio. This principle is recognized in our substantive law and is expressly
enshrined by sections 42 and 45 of our Code of Civil Procedure. itc@a1f

With regard to the price, the evidence and circumstances of the case sufficiently show that
the defendant did not pay but P7,700 and a note for P5,000, the effectiveness of which
depends upon the said defendant's taking possession of the land.

The evidence does not establish that this action was brought on behalf of Anselmo Hilario.
The admission of the affidavit Exhibit A does not constitute any error. Those who have
signed it have testified in court against what they had stated in said document (section
343, Code of Civil Procedure).

It is not obstacle to the upholding of the right of redemption that the redeemers have no
money to make the redemption. The lack of finds may render such a right
inefficacious, but does not affect its existence. The plaintiffs cannot exercise such right
unless they reimburse the purchaser with the purchase price paid by him (article 1067,
Civil Code).

As to the offer to redeem made by Urbano Wenceslao on behalf of his children the herein
plaintiffs, we think it is valid. He is the natural guardian of his children whom he
represented in court and out of court. Such an offer was not an act of administration of
property but of representation of his children in their rights.

We find in the proceeding no sufficient ground for altering the judgment appealed from;
wherefore the same is hereby affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.


6. Saturnino v. Paulino, 97 Phil 50 YAP

Facts: Jaime Paulino died and was survived by his children Timoteo , Macario and Feliza, and a grandson - Quirico
Saturnino, son of his deceased daughter Antonia. The subject of this petition is the Laoag Property left by the
decedent. Feliza sold the property to spouses Maxima and Juana, and Nemesio and Donata, for P1,200.00.

The sale was made without the knowledge of Quirino who, being desirous of exercising his right of subrogation as co-
heir of the vendor, offered to the vendees to return then and there to them, in actual case, 4/5 of the purchase price of
said property,

Quirino instituted an action against the defendants, depositing with the Clerk of said Court the amount by way of
reimbursement. Defendants answered that all their inheritance from the decedent had been divided in accordance
with Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the last verbal wish of the decedent before his death, giving the
Laoag Lot to Feliza as her exclusive and only share, and leaving other heirs to divide all the agricultural lands among
themselves, which division was duly effected.

Meanwhile, Quirino filed for the probate of the will and testament of the decedent. The will was allowed and provided
that the property in dispute be distributed, share and share alike among the heirs.

Respondents alleged that petitioner has no legal capacity to sue, because the property in litigation therei n is part of
the estate which is the subject matter of Case No. 37, in which an administrator was appointed but no adjudication
had, as yet, been made.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed the decision on the basis that pending partition, none of
the heirs can allege to have inherited any portion of the residue or claim any right of legal redemption as co-heir.

Issue: WON petitioner can exercise his right of redemption as a co-heir before partition.

Ruling: Yes.
Pending "partition, adjudication or assignment to the heirs" of a deceased estator, their "right of inheritance" is not
merely" in the nature of hope," for "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death". One of those rights is that of redemption under Article 1067. What is more, this right of redemption may be
exercised only before partition, for said provision declares explicitly:

If either of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of his co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the purchase price, provided it be done within the
period of one month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof.

First, if the property is sold by the heir to whom it was adjudicated, the other heirs are not entitled to redeem the
property, for, as regards, the same, they are neither co-heirs nor co-owners. Second, the heirs to whom the property
was adjudicated pro-indiviso are, thereafter, no longer co-heirs, but merely co-owners. Consequently, neither may
assert the right of redemption conferred to co-heirs, although, in proper cases, they may redeem as co-owners, under
Article 1522 of the Civil Code.

7. Castro v. Castro, 97 Phil 705 AQUINO
8. Plan v. IAC, 135 SCRA 270 BISNAR
Facts:
In the intestate proceeding for the settlement of Regino Bautistas estate, his administratrix, his widow,
Florencia Topacio, filed a motion for authority to sell 2 lots of the theater on it to Amorante Plan
(Petitioner) to pay for the estates debts.
The motion indicated that all the heirs had been informed through Milagros Bautista, on of
Reginos 7 children.
Motion for authority to sell was granted.
Federico Bautista, one of the heirs, opposed the sale, claiming that the sale should be annulled
because the heirs were not notified.
There was no movement in his case so it was archived.
Instead of reviving his opposition, he filed a separate action to annul the sale.
3 times it was dismissed on the ground that Federicos remedy should be in the intestate
proceedings.
When he appealed to the CA, the sale was annulled.
Hence, the appeal by plan.

Issue: Whether Federico could nullify in a separate action, instead of in the intestate proceeding for his
deceased fathers estate, the sale of 2 conjugal lots and the theater?

Ruling: Federicos remedy is in the intestate proceedings where his petition opposing the sale had been
pending.
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to sale of
hereditary rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as
to which there is no legal redemption.
In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate
court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution
sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a
deceased person.



9. Garcia v. Calaliman, 172 SCRA 201 CLETO

Garcia v. Calaliman
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

On February 11, 1946, one Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On his
death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of
his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled,
Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale.
The heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia,
Consolacion Garcia, Remedios Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled,
Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale.
Heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners herein, filed against the spouses
Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo, private respondents an action for legal redemption of the 3/4
portion of the parcel of land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was sold
by their co-heirs to the defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners took all the necessary steps to effectuate their exercise of the right of legal
redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

Yes. Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by the
redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all
uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive.
The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code
does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of
redemption


XVI. 16
th
week (effects of partition; rescission and nullity of partition)

Study: Civil Code, articles 1091-1105

Read:

1. Garcia v. Tolentino, 25 Phil 102 FERNANDEZ
Facts: Eulalia Flores died intestate

Eulalia Flores had five children, two of whom survived her: Irene Tolentino and Bonifacio Tolentino.

Plaintiff is Irene Tolentino and Defendant is Bonifacio Tolentino

Irene Tolentino, testified that Bonifacio administered their mother's estate and gathered the crops, and then "took
such of the lands as he liked best, and those that were left were divided among us;" that the lands he kept
were of greater value; that he took such lion's share because he was the eldest, and they consented
because they respected him. Witness was asked whether she was present when Eulalia Flores' property
was divided, and she replied that she was.

it is very evident that a division was made of the property that belonged to Eulalia Flores and that what the real
plaintiffs seek, through special intestate proceedings, is a rescission of the division made, because in it
they received property of less value than that which the defendant's predecessor in interest had awarded
to himself, whereby they claim to have been injured. The action prosecuted is really a rescissory one of
division, and not an action for partition of inheritance.
Issue: WON the there should be rescission of partition? No
Held: In order that an action for rescission of partition made may lie, the lesion must exceed the fourth part of the
value of the property awarded and the action must be brought within four years counting from the time
the division was made. (Civil Code, arts. 1074 and 1076.)

2. Gemora v. Yap Tico, 52 Phil 616 FORTES

Jose Gemora v. F.M. Yap Tico & Co. (1928)

Facts:
Catalina De la Cruz is the widow of Susano Gemora
Catalina De la Cruz owed F.M. Yap Tico a large sum of money
During the settlement of the estate of the decedent Susano Gemora, the whole estate was adjudicated
to the children of Catalina and Susano
Catalina did not claim any portion of the estate
But F.M. Yap Tico filed an MR praying that one-half of the property be adjudicated to its debtor,
Catalina as her share in the conjugal partnership
MR was denied by the Court
Yap Tico then sued Catalina for collection, the Court declared Catalina in default
One-half of the property earlier adjudicated entirely to Catalinas children was attached by the court and
sold at a public auction to satisfy Catalinas debt to Yap Tico
Antonio Quiana is the highest bidder and was awarded the property

Issue: WON the children are the owners of the whole of the estates property for having been adjudicated to
them in the intestate proceedings of their deceased father Susano Gemora? - NO

Held: The Court annulled the adjudication to the children of of the estate in the intestate
proceedings.
Adjudication to the heirs is void, for, according to the evidence of record, the same was procured by
fraud
The children in conjunction with their mother Catalina de la Cruz, have plotted a number of acts
tending, to defraud the latters creditors.
Catalina de la Cruz already owed Yap Tico & Co., Ltd., a considerable sum of money when the property
was adjudicated to her children
Catalina did not appeal the order, or even moving for its consideration, notwithstanding that she
was the owner of one-half of it;
and in the cadastral proceeding also, she neither claimed said half, nor appealed from the
judgment adjudicating it to her children
while all the time her debt to Yap Tico & Co., Ltd., subsisted.
The way in which the property was divided among the plaintiffs, and the omission, better said, with the
consent of Catalina de la Cruz, practically left her creditors, and especially Yap Tico & Co., Ltd., without
any means of protecting their rights."
Catalina and her heirs were then ordered to issue documents transferring ownership of the property to
Quiana.

3. De Vera v. Galauran, 67 Phil 213 ITARALDE

DOCTRINE: Unless there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to
the ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as
such. Id the deceased turns our to have debts, the creditors or the heirs of themselves may initiate a
special proceeding. IF the heirs are minors, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for them.

FACTS: Arsenio de Vera and Isabel Domingo mortgaged their property to Cleotilde Galauran, as
security for their loan. But Galauran illegally made them sign a deed which they believed to be of
mortgage but turned out to be a pacto de retro sale. Since Isabel died ahead, Arsenio filed for the
annulment of the deed of sale acting for himself and as guardian ad litem for the six minor heirs-
children of Isabel. Galauran filed for a demurrer alleging that the plaintiffs have no cause of action, for
they have not yet been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. Demurrer was sustained.

ISSUE: WON minor children has cause of action?

HELD: See Doctrine.In the complaint it is asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the minor
plaintiffs. This should have been granted. case was remanded to lower court for further proceedings.

4. Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil 100 KUNG
(As we all knew, the original text just includes the syllabus. Hence, I just copied it here)

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF DECEDENTS HEIRS BY HIS SECOND
MARRIAGE; RIGHT OF SAID HEIRS TO RECOVER ONE-HALF OF DECEDENTS ESTATE. In the intestate
proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the latter knowingly concealed the fact that said
deceased left a second wife with whom he had two children, namely, herein appellees. Held: That the
trial court, in a subsequent action brought by appellees to recover their legal participations in the
deceaseds estate, correctly declared said appellees coowners of the estate in question to the extent of
one-half thereof, with right to its possession.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD DISTINGUISHED FROM REOPENING OF
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. There is no merit in appellants claim that the intestate proceedings could
no longer be reopened after the expiration of the two-year period fixed in sections 597 and 598 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It suffices to state that this is an action by the heirs of the deceased by his
second marriage whose dominion over their share in the inheritance was automatically and by operation
of law vested in them upon the death of said deceased, subject only to the lien of the latters creditors,
for the purpose of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud, which action may be brought within four
years after the discovery of the fraud, in accordance with section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.


5. Vda. De Lopez v. Lopez, 35 SCRA 80 YAP

Facts:
Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased Emilio filed with the lower court a project of
partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. The project of partition
was approved and and the intestate proceeding was declared "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." 17
days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, represented by their mother, Lolita, filed a motion to reopen the
proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of the deceased. The motion
was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered
terminated and the estate had been distributed and the title thereto had become vested in the distributees.
Lower Court denied the petition.

Issue: WON the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was too late.

Ruling: No
The fact that appellants' motion to reopen, as well as the petition attached thereto, is based on their claim that
they are illegitimate children of the deceased. On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased
and hence entitled to share in his estate. Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial
administratrix and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby.

A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in intestate proceedings)
does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or
particle to the interest which the petitioner had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a
conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true
right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive
character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may
still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real
property of the deceased may be situated.

The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not
become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary actions.
And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party
concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the
order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on time.


6. Constantino v. CA, 264 SCRA 59 AQUINO
7. Jakosalem v. Rafols, 73 Phil 628 BISNAR
Facts:
Juan Melgar was the owner of a land.
When he died, judicial administration of his estate commenced.
Susana Melgar, his daughter, sold the land with a right to repurchase to Pedro Cui, with the condition
that during the period for redemption, she would continue to be in possession of the property.
Partition of the estate took place and the land was adjudicated to Susana.
Susana then again sold of the land to Nicolas Rafols (Respondent).
Cui filed an action to recover the said of the land.
Pending the case, he donated the land to Generosa Teves De Jakosalem (Petitioner).
The lower court ruled in favor of Rafols, ruling that Susan could not have sold the land to Cui because
at that time, it was still under judicial administration.

Issue: Who is entitled to the land?

Ruling: Sale to Cui is valid.
Possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the
instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted.
Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left
with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being
thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided.
Every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such
assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted him in the partition upon
the dissolution of the community.
Sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as to the
portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father
Juan Melgar and upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana
Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

8. Tomias v. Tomias, 89 Phil 216 CLETO

Facts:

Eustaquio Tomias died intestate in 1920, leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita, Monica, Bernabela,
Toribia (alleged to be known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias.
He was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof by his 7 children.
Two of these, however, later died, Leon in 1931 and Josefa in 1944.
It is claimed that the latter was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who
had married twice, was survived by 4 children Conrado, Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas the
first two, by the first marriage, and the other two by the second marriage.
It is claimed that he also had a natural son named Filemon Tomias.
On January 19, 1948, Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the deceased
Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the
deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a complaint with the CFI of Occidental Negros against their aunts,
alleging that their deceased grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of 15 parcels of
land in Occidental Negros of total and that since the death of Leon Tomias, the defendants had
continued in possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among the heirs and to give
plaintiffs their share of the products.
Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting.
For refusing to join as plaintiffs, Dolores Tomias and Anicetas Tomias (the other two legitimate children
of Leon Tomias) were included as defendants.
The court rendered its decision, declaring plaintiffs and defendants owners in common of the 15 parcels
of land described in the complaint, together with the improvements thereon, in the proportion of one-
seventh each to Josefa, Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, all surnamed Tomias, and
one-twenty-eighth to each of the 4 legitimate children of the deceased Leon Tomias, namely, Conrado
Tomias, Magdalena Tomias, Dolores Tomias, and Anicetas Tomias.
The above decision became final in due time.
But some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural son of
Leon Tomias, sought to annul it on the ground (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case
because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the deceased
Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit, and (2) that not all of the heirs were
represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been
made a party therein.
When denied, defendants asked for a reconsideration, alleging that Toribia Tomias, one of the children
of the deceased Eustaquio Tomias, had not been served with summons and implementing the
allegation with the affidavit of Toribia Tomias to the effect that she had neither received a copy of the
complaint in the partition case.
The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding (1) that Filemon Tomias was not an
indispensable party to the action in the absence of a judicial decree declaring him to be an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Leon Tomias, and (2) that Toribia Tomias appears to have
been included as one of the defendants in the partition case under the name of Enrica Tomias, she
being known by this name in the locality where she lives and among members of her family.

Issue:

W/N the judgment in the partition case should be voided on the allegation that some of the parcels of land
partitioned were the property of Toribia Tomias, and Filemon Tomias, as an alleged natural son, who were not
made party to the original suit.

Held:

No.

There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the
inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same
person. There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.
The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias
does not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in a
separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latters share in the
inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.


9. Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 FERNANDEZ

Doctrine: The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property.

Facts: Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945;

On May 6, 1948, Defendants executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de
Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs.

Defendants has transferred certificates of title of the parcel of lands to their name.

Plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when
the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of
deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action
for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the
period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by
respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the
present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.

Issue: WON petitioners action has prescribed? Yes

Held: Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute
of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs
of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the
petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners
have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 1wph1.t
Although, there are some decisions to the contrary, it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance
of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations.
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in
the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery
is deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of
extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.
10. Rebecca Viado Non v. CA, 325 SCRA 652 FORTES

Rebecca Viado Non v. CA, Alicia Viado (2000)

Doctrine: where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but
the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her

Facts:
Case of sister-in-law vs. sister-in-law
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado acquired several properties, among them is the house and lot in La
Loma, QC
Julian and Virginia had 4 children:
Nilo, Leah, Rebecca (petitioner) and Delia (afflicted with mental retardation)
Nilo is married to Alicia
Julian and Virginia died 3 years apart. Their 2 children, Nilo and Leah followed.
The heirs lived harmoniously in the La Loma property until Rebecca petitioned the Court to partition the
property distributing the shares of the heirs
The Trial Court ruled that the widow and children of Nilo are now the lawful owners of the property on
the strength of:
Deed of Donation executed by their father, Julian of his share in the property to Nilo
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement wherein their father Julian, deceased sister Leah and
petitioner Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share
of the property inherited from Virginia Viado
Rebecca alleged that her signature was fraudulently procured as Nilo led her to believe that the
document is for the mere administration of the estate of their late mother
Rebecca added that the Extrajudicial Settlement should be annulled as her other sister, Delia was
preterited.

Issues:
1. WON the Extrajudicial Settlement should be annulled as Delia was preteried? NO
2. Who is the rightful owner of the La Loma property? sister-in-law Alicia, wife of Nilo

Held:
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement should not be annulled, but the heir of Nilo should pay in cash the
preterited sister, Delia her share in the property
This is in accordance to our law on succession.
Also the petitioner did not present any evidence on how and in what manner the fraud, coercion, undue
influence allegedly committed by her brother Nilo happened.
All she presented were self-serving allegations
The petitioner, Rebecca is a schoolteacher, it is difficult to believe that she could have misunderstood
the tenor of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement


11. Legasto v. Versoza, 54 Phil 766 ITARALDE

DOCTRINES: Partition made by a testator inter vivos in pursuance of a will which has been disallowed
is null and void.
Gift of realty made in a public document is null and void when the deed fails to show
acceptance or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not
given to the donor or not noted in the deed of gift and in the separate acceptance.

FACTS: subject estatewas that of deceased
12. Romero v. Villamor, 102 Phil 641 KUNG

FACTS:
- Mariano Villamor and Eustaquia Leopoldo were husband and wife. Both died intestate. The
last known residence at the time of their death is in Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental. They had
five children: Calixta Villamor (now deceased and mother of Doroteo, Matias, Victor, and
Wilijado, surnamed Romero): and Pedro, Hilaria, Aniceta and Eusebia, also surnamed Villamor.

- It appears from the record that on January 23, 1949, the estate of said couple was partitioned
extrajudicially inter vivos by the widower Mariano Villamor among the four surviving children of
said spouses and their grandchildren (children of Calixta represented by their father Luciano
Romero).

- The children of Luciano Romero and Calixta Villamor opposed to said partition, and
questioning the validity of the partition as well as the authority of their father to represent them
because he had not been judicially appointed as their administrator, they asked their uncle and
aunts to cause the institution of an intestate proceeding but they refused.

- Doroteo Romero instituted special proceedings praying in the petition that letters of
administration of the estate of the deceased couple be issued to him, and that in the meantime,
the petitioner or any other person that the Court may deem capable, be appointed as special
administrator.

- The petition for the opening of these intestate proceedings was objected to by Pedro, Aniceta
and Eusebia Villlamor, who moved for the dismissal of the petition, on the ground that the
properties had been already partitioned since 1949. The Court, by order, designated Doroteo
Romero to check, on all the produce of the property lasted or mentioned in the so-called
extrajudicial partition dated January 23, 1941.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether widower Mariano Romero has the authority to liquidate his wifes estate? No.
2. Whether the extrajudicial partition inter vivos made on January 23, 1949 by Mariano Romero
is valid? No.

RATIO:
1. The power of the widower under the Civil Code of 1889, to liquidate the conjugal partnership
upon his wife's demise had disappeared as of 24 November 1924 with the passage of Act 3176
of the Philippine Legislature, now embodied in rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court. Clearly
therefore, the respondents had the right to commence intestate proceedings for the distribution
of their grandmother's estate, since the latter was not validly partitioned.

2. The validity of any such distribution rests upon the prior making of a valid testament, with all
the formalities prescribed by law, the partition inter vivos being but the execution thereof. Since
Mariano Villamor died intestate, the partition inter vivos of his estate is void and no effect.

It is true that when Mariano Villamor died, the new Civil Code was already in effect, and that its
Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate
by act inter vivos; but the validity of any such partition must be determined as of the date was
executed or accomplished, not the date when the author dies.

13. Gatmaitan v. Medina, 109 Phil 108 YAP
Facts:
Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking his appointment as administrator of the property of his wife,
Veronica Medina, who died intestate.

The court appointed Gatmaitan as administrator and Medina (one of the two sisters of the decedent) co-
administrator of the estate. Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory of undivided half of the conjugal partnership
properties. An opposition to the admission of said inventory was registered by the oppositors (sisters) on the
ground that the same did not represent the true list, and, particularly, that a parcel 22 hectares of land, more or
less, was left out.

The heirs of the deceased, filed a "Motion for Partial Partition and Distribution,". The court ordered that the
sisters be given an advance payment of P1,000.00, and they, as well as the other heirs 25 cavans of palay
each for their subsistence, to be included in the final distribution of the residue of the estate. This was opposed
by Gatmaitan on the ground that the sums ordered are not warranted by the circumstances obtaining.

Issue: WON the motion for partial partition and distribution should not be granted.

Ruling: Yes
A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings
should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances
of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious courts should guard with
utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately
protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.

Firstly , the partial distribution was prematurely ordered by the lower court. It appears that at the time the
questioned order was rendered, the amended inventory filed by the administrator was not yet even accepted.
Moreover, it seems that notices for the presentation of claims by possible creditors of the estate had not yet
been published.

Second, and more important, no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial distribution
ordered by it. It should be noted, furthermore, that the bond required by the Rules is not solely for the protection
of the heirs then appearing, but also for the benefit of creditors and subsequent claimants who have not agreed
to the advances.

Lastly, appellees urged that this appeal was prematurely taken in that appellant has not as yet formally objected
to the proffered bond as mentioned in an alleged order of the court. It should be noted, furthermore, that the
bond required by the Rules is not solely for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also for the benefit of
creditors and subsequent claimants who have not agreed to the advances.


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