Iosif Cristian

SEAA - BA
8811 2014




Contents
Chapter 1. Running Crisis .............................................................................................................................. 3
Chapter 2. Preparation Before the Impact ................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 3. After the Impact .......................................................................................................................... 5
Chapter 4. Communication with Audiences Involved................................................................................... 6
Chapter 5. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 9


















Chapter 1. Running Crisis

Hurricane Katrina was the deadliest and most destructive Atlantic tropical cyclone of
the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season. It was the costliest natural disaster, as well as one of the
five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the United States. Katrina was the seventh most
intense Atlantic hurricane ever, part of the 2005 season that included three of the six most
intense Atlantic hurricanes ever (along with #1 Wilma and #4 Rita). At least 1,833 people died in
the hurricane and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest U.S. hurricane since the 1928
Okeechobee hurricane; total property damage was estimated at $81 billion (2005 USD), nearly
triple the damage brought by Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on August 23, 2005 and crossed
southern Florida as a moderate Category 1 hurricane, causing some deaths and flooding there
before strengthening rapidly in the Gulf of Mexico. The hurricane strengthened to
a Category 5 hurricane over the warm Gulf water, but weakened before making its second
landfall as a Category 3 hurricane on the morning of Monday, August 29 in southeast Louisiana.
It caused severe destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas, much of it due to
the storm surge.
The most significant number of deaths occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, which
flooded as the levee system catastrophically failed, in many cases hours after the storm had
moved inland. Eventually 80% of the city and large tracts of neighboring parishes became
flooded, and the floodwaters lingered for weeks. However, the worst property damage occurred
in coastal areas, such as all Mississippi beachfront towns, which were flooded over 90% in
hours, as boats and casino barges rammed buildings, pushing cars and houses inland, with waters
reaching 612 miles (1019 km) from the beach.
The hurricane surge protection failures in New Orleans are considered the worst civil
engineering disaster in U.S. history and prompted a lawsuit against the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE), the designers and builders of the levee system as mandated by the Flood
Control Act of 1965. Responsibility for the failures and flooding was laid squarely on the Army
Corps in January 2008 by Judge Stanwood Duval, U.S. District Court, but the federal agency
could not be held financially liable because of sovereign immunity in the Flood Control Act of
1928. There was also an investigation of the responses from federal, state and local governments,
resulting in the resignation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
director Michael D. Brown, and of New Orleans Police Department (NOPD)
Superintendent Eddie Compass.
Several agencies including the United States Coast Guard (USCG), National Hurricane
Center (NHC), and National Weather Service (NWS) were commended for their actions. They
provided accurate hurricane weather tracking forecasts with sufficient lead time.
Chapter 2. Preparation Before the Impact

On the morning of Friday, August 26, at 10 am CDT (1500 UTC), Katrina had
strengthened to a Category 3 storm in the Gulf of Mexico. Later that afternoon, the NHC realized
that Katrina had yet to make the turn toward the Florida Panhandle and ended up revising the
predicted track of the storm from the panhandle to the Mississippi coast. The NHC issued a
hurricane watch for southeastern Louisiana, including the New Orleans area at 10 am CDT
Saturday, August 27. That afternoon the NHC extended the watch to cover the Mississippi and
Alabama coastlines as well as the Louisiana coast to Intracoastal City.
The United States Coast Guard began prepositioning resources in a ring around the
expected impact zone and activated more than 400 reservists. On August 27, it moved its
personnel out of the New Orleans region prior to the mandatory evacuation. Aircrews from the
Aviation Training Center, in Mobile, staged rescue aircraft from Texas to Florida. All aircraft
were returning towards the Gulf of Mexico by the afternoon of August 29. Air crews, many of
whom lost their homes during the hurricane, began a round-the-clock rescue effort in New
Orleans, and along the Mississippi and Alabama coastlines.
President of the United States George W. Bush declared a state of emergency in selected
regions of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi on Saturday, the 27th, two days before the
hurricane made landfall. That same evening, the NHC upgraded the storm alert status from
hurricane watch to hurricane warning over the stretch of coastline between Morgan City,
Louisiana to the Alabama-Florida border, 12 hours after the watch alert had been issued, and also
issued a tropical storm warning for the westernmost Florida Panhandle.
On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke with Governor Blanco to encourage her to
order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. Voluntary and mandatory evacuations were issued
for large areas of southeast Louisiana as well as coastal Mississippi and Alabama. About 1.2 million
residents of the Gulf Coast were covered under a voluntary or mandatory evacuation order.
Chapter 3. After the Impact

Within the United States and as delineated in the National Response Plan, disaster response
and planning is first and foremost a local government responsibility. When local government
exhausts its resources, it then requests specific additional resources from the county level. The
request process proceeds similarly from the county to the state to the federal government as
additional resource needs are identified. Many of the problems that arose developed from
inadequate planning and back-up communication systems at various levels.
Of the 60,000 people stranded in New Orleans, the Coast Guard rescued more than
33,500. Congress recognized the Coast Guard's response with an official entry in the
Congressional Record, and the Armed Service was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
The United States Northern Command established Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina based
out of Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to act as the military's on-scene response on Sunday, August
28, with US Army Lieutenant General Russel L. Honor as commander. Approximately 58,000
National Guard personnel were activated to deal with the storm's aftermath, with troops coming
from all 50 states. The Department of Defense also activated volunteer members of the Civil Air
Patrol.
Early in September, Congress authorized a total of $62.3 billion in aid for
victims. Additionally, President Bush enlisted the help of former presidents Bill
Clinton and George H.W. Bush to raise additional voluntary contributions, much as they did
after the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami.
FEMA provided housing assistance (rental assistance, trailers, etc.) to more than 700,000
applicantsfamilies and individuals. However, only one-fifth of the trailers requested in Orleans
Parish were supplied, resulting in an enormous housing shortage in the city of New Orleans. To
provide for additional housing, FEMA has also paid for the hotel costs of 12,000 individuals and
families displaced by Katrina through February 7, 2006, when a final deadline was set for the
end of hotel cost coverage. After this deadline, evacuees were still eligible to receive federal
assistance, which could be used towards either apartment rent, additional hotel stays, or fixing
their ruined homes, although FEMA no longer paid for hotels directly. As of March 30, 2010,
there were still 260 families living in FEMA-provided trailers in Louisiana and Mississippi.
Two weeks after the storm, more than half of the states were involved in providing
shelter for evacuees. By four weeks after the storm, evacuees had been registered in all 50 states
and in 18,700 zip codeshalf of the nation's residential postal zones. Most evacuees had stayed
within 250 miles (400 km), but 240,000 households went to Houston and other cities over 250
miles (400 km) away and another 60,000 households went over 750 miles (1,200 km) away.
Chapter 4. Communication with Audiences Involved

Many representatives of the news media reporting on the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina became directly involved in the unfolding events, instead of simply reporting. Due to the
loss of most means of communication, such as land-based and cellular telephone systems, field
reporters in many cases became conduits for information between victims and authorities.
Several reporters for various news agencies located groups of stranded victims, and
reported their location via satellite uplink. Authorities, who monitored the network news
broadcasts, would then attempt to coordinate rescue efforts based on the news reports. This was
best illustrated when Shepard Smith and Geraldo Rivera of Fox News, among others, reported
thousands of people stranded at the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. Rivera tearfully
pleaded for authorities to either send help or let the people leave. Geraldo Rivera went so far as
to compare the convention center to Willowbrook State School.
According to the CNN segment, few transportation methods were provided for those who
either chose not to evacuate or were physically unable to do so due to disabilities or had no
available means of travelling. Plus, the state did not issue an official evacuation decree until 19
hours prior to the estimated arrival of the hurricane. Due to the late request for support from
response teams, local resources were unable to be used as a substitute because the majority of
transportation vehicles were inaccessible because of flooding.
The role of AM radio was of importance to the hundreds of thousands of persons with no
other ties to news. AM radio provided emergency information regarding access to assistance for
hurricane victims. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina, radio station WWL-AM (New Orleans)
was one of the few area radio stations in the area remaining on the air. The 870 kHz frequency
has a clear channel high power designation and the on-going nighttime broadcasts continued to
be available up to 500 miles (800 km) away. Announcers continued to broadcast from
improvised studio facilities after the storm damaged their main studios.
As the U.S. military and rescue services regained control over the city, there were
restrictions on the activity of the media.
On September 9, Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honor, the military leader of the relief effort,
announced that reporters would have "zero access" to efforts to recover bodies in New
Orleans. Journalist Brian Williams also reported that in the process of blocking journalists,
police even went so far as to threaten reporters with a weapon. However, at refugee centers such
as the Houston Astrodome, press activity was extensive. Immediately following the government
decision, CNN filed a lawsuit and obtained a temporary restraining order against the federal ban.
The next day, spokesperson Col. Christian E. de Graff announced that the government would no
longer attempt to ban media access to the victim recovery efforts.
Numerous social networking sites were used to spread awareness and raise funds to
support the Katrina Relief Effort. On Facebook, a site creator promised to donate $1 for every set
of 100 people that joined the group. The outcome of this site was not only to increase visibility
of the crisis, but also served as a medium for other assistance groups to advertise and victims to
express their gratitude. The particular Facebook group mentioned didnt have a posting with an
update on how the fundraising effort was going and the site creator could not be reached for a
total either.
Thank you to everyone who supports or has supported the Hurricane Katrina recovery.
I'm a survivor and if it were not for all the wonderful volunteers, we would be in even worse
shape than we still are. It's been over two and a half years since the storm and there is still so
very much to do, said Sherri Joubert of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This comment was left on the
wall of the mentioned Facebook group.
In 2004, FEMA developed and funded a Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane
Planning Project to create an action plan for the area in the event of a hurricane. The purpose of
the organization was to bring all levels of government and the American Red cross [together] to
identify, analyze, and address the overwhelming operational complexities that would be involved
in responding to a catastrophic hurricane striking southeast Louisiana. More than 300
representatives from all levels of government were involved.
On December 10, 2005 press release from FEMA highlighted two employees who had
created a donation collection effort that assisted with allocating contributions to designations
that were in critical need of the aid (FEMA). In regard, to community interactions FEMA
disseminated messages, updates, and application policies on a regular basis. Communication
method complications, such as towers being damaged, did make the disbursement of such
information difficult.
According to an article published in The Washington Post on Sept. 9, 2005, Director
Brown was stripped of his role and replaced by Vice Adm. Thad W. Allen of the Coast Guard.
The continued negative publicity and accusations by the public of mismanagement were
identified as they key factors for Browns demotion. At a press conference, Mr. Chertoff clearly
expressed that the change in management was of his own accord and Director Brown would
retain his position of being the director of the agency, but not the primary federal official
residing over the recovery effort. Director Brown eventually resigned from FEMA because of the
heavy media pressure.
As a middle-man of sorts between FEMA and the state of emergency response efforts,
Andrew Thomas was responsible for communicating emergency response plans, evacuation
information, and assistance program details to the citizens of the affected areas. Thomas had
direct interaction with the housing situation for affected victims in regards to trailers supplied by
FEMA. By April 2008, he said that the amount of people using government supplied trailers had
decreased from 23,280 in Orleans Parish down to 7,282. Thomas also discussed that the goal
of FEMA was to have all of the families who were living in trailers, relocated into permanent
homes by June. We will work with each of these families, one-on-one, to help them return to
their homes," said Thomas.
Chapter 5. Conclusions

The impact of the physical devastation caused by the hurricane was predicted by various
meteorologists. So, methods of handling the effects, especially the spread of inhabitable land,
shouldve been better prepared. An earlier evacuation time couldve assisted with this in addition
to, publicly provided transportation to safety.
There were 9,000 confirmed casualties however, there are almost 200 bodies that have
yet to be identified and claimed at the Victim Identification Center in Carville, Louisiana. Plus,
2,096 people were still listed as missing from the Gulf Coast region on February 17, 2006.
Additional tests should also be conducted to ensure the chain of communication is
efficient and flows appropriately. A key factor to the breakdown of governmental control of the
situation was noted to be a lack of competent leadership with clear plans. Officials should run
through this procedure as many times as necessary to identify and remove any problems.
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report includes a multitude
of specified area for amelioration and restructuring within FEMA as a result of issues
experienced during the management of Katrina. After reviewing all of the Federal suggestions
there are three areas I would recommend improvement within to ensure that FEMA appropriately
handles such disasters in the future: pre-disaster planning, overall communication, and aftermath
conflict resolution.