KUNG BAKIT DAPAT BALITA ANG KAGAT NG DIKYA

Richard R. Gappi - Bulatlat.com

Sinipsip ng dikya
Ang makinis na kutis
Ng bidang artista.
At ito ang ulo ng balita.
Samatalang, sa Hacienda Luisita,
May sumisipsip din ng dugo
Sa mga yayat na dibdib
At butuhang palad at hita.
Naibalita ba eto khit
Sa talampakan
Ng brodkast pahayagan?
May tinitingnan, may tinititigan
Ang mga mata ng ulat
At inilalakong katotohanan
Ng mga nangyayari
Sa ating lipunan.
Dahil totoo ang
Kapu-kapuso
Kappa-kapatid
Kapami-kapamilya

















INTRODUCTION:
All throughout history we see how important land is to people. There have been wars
over land, people have argued over land, stolen land, reclaimed land, earned land and
made their homes on land. Needless to say, land is the one thing that people pride
themselves on having and nowadays people still consider land to be a commodity
pertaining to their wealth and well being. If you have land, then you obviously have
money, and those people can get more out of life. With land you can do so many things,
even make more money. Land can be used to build houses, offices, sports stadiums,
airports, and more. If you have a house, then renting this out or building a separate
flatlet on your land can ensure that you get a monthly income. Land can also be used for
development and if you own a portion of land you can make quite a nice profit from
selling it to an investor or developer.

HISTORY: CASE DIGEST OF THE 3 CASES PROMULGATED
BY THE SUPREME COURT

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.
No. 171101, July 5, 2011

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera)
sold Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda,
to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and controlled by the Jose
Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a
dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of
Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale, with the condition that the lots
comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at
cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting
such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act. Tadeco however did not comply
with this condition.


On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against
Tadeco, et al., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco
alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar lands of which
the hacienda consisted are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations(PD 27-
rice and corn). The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender
Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom, Tadeco appealed to the CA.

On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino,
the Office of the Solicitor General moved to withdraw the governments case against
Tadeco, et al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the PARCs approval of Tadecos
proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229 (Sec10)
and later RA 6657(Sec31), Tadeco had the option of availing stock distribution as an
alternative modality to actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988,
Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate
stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to HLI the
agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of
Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.


On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of
Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock
Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989, the SDOA was formally entered into
by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary
Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was
eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on
October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive
shares in HLI.
As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a)
production-sharing equivalent to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of
the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash dividends or incentive bonus; and (b)
distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to family-
beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable "irrespective of
whether [HLI] makes money or not," implying that the benefits do not partake the nature
of dividends, as the term is ordinarily understood under corporation law. (5,117 out of
5315 = shares; 132 = land distribution


Prior to approval, DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago proposed that the SDP be
revised, along the following lines:
1. That over the implementation period of the [SDP], [Tadeco]/HLI shall ensure that there
will be no dilution in the shares of stocks of individual [FWBs];
2. That a safeguard shall be provided by [Tadeco]/HLI against the dilution of the
percentage shareholdings of the [FWBs], i.e., that the 33% shareholdings of the [FWBs]
will be maintained at any given time
November 21, 1989 - the PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issued Resolution
No. 89-12-2, approving the SDP of Tadeco/HLI.


From 1989 to 2005, HLI claimed to have extended the following benefits to the FWBs:
(a) 3 billion pesos (P3,000,000,000) worth of salaries, wages and fringe benefits
(b) 59 million shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs;
(c) 150 million pesos (P150,000,000) representing 3% of the gross produce;
(d) 37.5 million pesos (P37,500,000) representing 3% from the sale of 500 hectares of
converted agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita;
(e) 240-square meter homelots distributed for free;
(f) 2.4 million pesos (P2,400,000) representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares at 80
million pesos (P80,000,000) for the SCTEX;
(g) Social service benefits, such as but not limited to free
hospitalization/medical/maternity services, old age/death benefits and no interest bearing
salary/educational loans and rice sugar accounts.
Two separate groups subsequently contested this claim of HLI. (the petitions/protets)


CONVERSION PROPER
On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the
hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR
approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to payment of three percent (3%)
of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.
On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks
of Centennary Holdings, Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to
the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial
complex. From this area was carved out 2 parcels(180 has and 4 has), for which 2
separate titles were issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels
to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in payment of LIPCOs
PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC(dacion en pago). LIPCOs titles were
cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.
The other 200 has was transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate
transactions in 1997 and 1998, both uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million
each.
Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda
Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares
Tadeco ceded to HLI.


Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter
part of 2003. The first was filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group),
praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation. The second
petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of
the lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng
Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to
attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After
investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations
under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP, AND RECOMMENDED. On
December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01,
recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject lands
be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme
of the CARP.
From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding,
HLI also filed a petition before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the
DARs hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP even before PARC could rule or even
read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLIs motion for
reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.

II. THE ISSUES
(1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLIs SDP?
(2) [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
(3) Is the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in
revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARPs compulsory acquisition
and distribution scheme?]
(4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and
LIPCO acquired by purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC
resolution? [Did the PARC gravely abuse its discretion when it included LIPCOs and
RCBCs respective properties that once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP
compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage?]




III. THE RULING
HLI: PARC has no authority to revoke the SDP; it has the power to disapprove, but not to
recall its previous approval of the SDP. It is the court which has jurisdiction and authority
to order the revocation or rescission of the PARC-approved SDP

(1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLIs SDP under the doctrine of
necessary implication.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan
for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner
HLIs posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved.
It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not
explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or
authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary
implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as
that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of
express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate
owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan. To
deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP,
because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner
with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-
compliance with it.

HLI: the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead of to RA
6657, in determining their rights, obligations and remedies. The Code should be the
applicable law on the disposition of the agricultural land of HLI.
SC: NO! the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodying the
SDP are primarily governed by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that HLI was
precisely created in order to comply with RA 6657, which the OSG aptly described as the
"mother law" of the SDOA and the SDP. It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to shield itself from
the coverage of CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under
the guise of being a corporate entity.

(2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to
pass upon the constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one
of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.]
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a
small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality
of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of
Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its members
received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4,
2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were
sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by
petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps
in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as
represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the constitutionality of the
provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA,
raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November
21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too
late in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from
the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which
the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional
issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence
of numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged
unconstitutional legal provision.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis
mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. If some other
grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a
law, such recourse is favored.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA
(to which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the
alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its
revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the
fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional and
statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without
plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into
the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid,
but rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA
6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the stock distribution
component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: [T]hat
after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer
to sell and compulsory acquisition. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock
distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is no longer an available option under
existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be a moot issue.
(3) YES, the revocation of the HLIs SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely
abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP and placing the hacienda
under CARPs compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.]
The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of
HLIs stock distribution violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each
original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the
hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock
transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.
In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock
distribution, We find that it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA
states:
3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall
arrange with the FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY
[FWBs] on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth
(1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY that are
presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire block of
118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD
PARTY.
[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the
time of the approval of the SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined
earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI shares. The original FWBs got less
than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the acquisition and
distribution of the HLI shares were based on man days or number of days worked by
the FWB in a years time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37
days in a fiscal year before he or she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37
days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at year end. The number of HLI
shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed to
work in one year. Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs,
such that, as indicated in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the
Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as of said date stood at 10,502. All these
farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out of the
118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital
stock of HLI. Clearly, the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32
shares was diluted as a result of the use of man days and the hiring of additional
farmworkers.
Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-
year timeframe for HLI-to-FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec.
11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for the implementation of the approved
stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate landowner of
the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the
shares of stock in the names of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and
transfer books and must be submitted to the SEC within sixty (60) days from
implementation.
To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the
three-month threshold. Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably
evade compliance with agrarian reform by simply deferring to absurd limits the
implementation of the stock distribution scheme. the reason underpinning the 30-year
accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to
the qualified beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.
Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be
upheld [because of violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA
6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue rules and regulations, substantive
or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and
effect of law and must be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking
the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989
approving the HLIs SDP is nullified and voided.

(4) YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that
RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase should be excluded from the coverage
of the assailed PARC resolution.
[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good
faith, namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser
pays a full and fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she
has notice of the claim of another.
It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are purchasers in good faith for value
entitled to the benefits arising from such status.
First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial
land, there was no notice of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary,
or that any other person has a right to or interest in such property. In fact, at the time
LIPCO acquired said parcels of land, only the following annotations appeared on the TCT
in the name of Centennary: the Secretarys Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the
Secretarys Certificate in favor of Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from
agricultural to industrial and residential use.
The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda
Luisita, only the following general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed
of Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial estate; the Secretarys Certificate in
favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of RCBC to
guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.
To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to
CARP coverage by means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was
annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the
honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial
purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all,
Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows conversion and disposition of agricultural lands
previously covered by CARP land acquisition after the lapse of five (5) years from its
award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. Moreover, DAR notified all the
affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them the opportunity to comment
or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary processes,
granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary
jurisdiction under Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and executory after none of
the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO
purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous
registered owners could legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously
subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO acted in good faith in acquiring the
subject lots.
And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value.
Undeniably, LIPCO acquired 300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of
PhP750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1998. On the other hand, in a
Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of
Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of
PhP431,695,732.10.
In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both
RCBC and LIPCO cannot be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of
Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial lands and are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP.
The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it placed
LIPCOs and RCBCs property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under
the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage.
[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be
done in the aftermath of its disposition of the above-enumerated issues:
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution
Nos. 2005-32-01 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain operative
facts that had occurred in the interim. Pertinently, the operative fact doctrine realizes
that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by extension, no longer
without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This
is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or
juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a
statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.
While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are
upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the
fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which became the
basis of the SDP approved by PARC per its Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21,
1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received from HLI salaries and
cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross
produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare
converted land and the 80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling
118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On August 6, 20l0, HLI and private
respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the FWBs the option
of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of
fact, most FWBs indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and
circumstances tend to indicate that some, if not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to
continue as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to their own discretion.]


The dissents in the July 5, 2011 decision
The dissents of the minority justices were on the other fine points of the decision.
Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused to declare Sec. 31 of RA
6657 unconstitutional. The provision grants to corporate landowners the option to give
qualified FWBs the right to own capital stock of the corporation in lieu of actual land
distribution. The Chief Justice was of the view that by allowing the distribution of capital
stock, and not land, as compliance with agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657
contravenes Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, which, he argued, requires that the
law implementing the agrarian reform program should employ [actual] land redistribution
mechanism. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the corporate landowner remains to be
the owner of the agricultural land. Qualified beneficiaries are given ownership only of
shares of stock, not [of] the lands they till. He concluded that since an unconstitutional
provision cannot be the basis of a constitutional act, the SDP of petitioner HLI based on
Section 31 of RA 6657 is also unconstitutional.
Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Coronas position that Sec. 31 of RA
6657 is unconstitutional. He however agreed with the majority that the FWBs be given the
option to remain as shareholders of HLI. He also joined Justice Brions proposal that that
the reckoning date for purposes of just compensation should be May 11, 1989, when the
SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering
that more than 10 years have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can
validly dispose of their due shares, may do so, in favor of LBP or other qualified
beneficiaries. The 10-year period need not be counted from the issuance of the
Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award CLOA) because, under the
SDOA, shares, not land, were to be awarded and distributed.
Justice Brions dissent centered on the consequences of the revocation of HLIs
SDP/SDOA. He argued that that the operative fact doctrine only applies in considering the
effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute or a rule issued by the Executive
Department that is accorded the status of a statute. The SDOA/SDP is neither a statute
nor an executive issuance but a contract between the FWBs and the landowners; hence,
the operative fact doctrine is not applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a
statute or an executive issuance. When a contract is contrary to law, it is deemed void ab
initio. It produces no legal effects whatsoever. Thus, Justice Brion questioned the option
given by the majority to the FWBs to remain as stockholders in an almost-bankrupt
corporation like HLI. He argued that the nullity of HLIs SDP/SDOA goes into its very
existence, and the parties to it must generally revert to their respective situations prior to
its execution. Restitution, he said, is therefore in order. With the SDP being void, the
FWBs should return everything they are proven to have received pursuant to the terms of
the SDOA/SDP. Justice Brion then proposed that all aspects of the implementation of the
mandatory CARP coverage be determined by the DAR by starting with a clean slate from
[May 11,] 1989, the point in time when the compulsory CARP coverage should start, and
proceeding to adjust the relations of the parties with due regard to the events that
intervened [thereafter]. He also held that the time of the taking (when the computation of
just compensation shall be reckoned) shall be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was
executed by Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs.
Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority modified the questioned PARC
Resolutions (i.e., no immediate land distribution, give first the original qualified FWBs the
option to either remain as stockholders of HLI or choose actual land distribution) and the
applicability of the operative fact doctrine. She would instead order the DAR to forthwith
determine the area of Hacienda Luisita that must be covered by the compulsory coverage
and monitor the land distribution to the qualified FWBs.


Erroneous interpretation of the Courts decision
The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition of
HLI and to AFFIRM the PARC resolutions. This is contrary to media reports that the Court
voted 6-4 to dismiss the HLI petition. The five (not four) minority justices (Chief
Justice Corona, and Justices Brion, Villarama, Mendoza, and Sereno) only partially
dissented

of six (Justice Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, and Perez).
Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the deliberations and in the voting, while Justice
Diosdado Peralta was on official leave. The 14th and 15th seats in the Court were earlier
vacated by the retirements of Justices Eduardo Antonio Nachura (June 13, 2011) and
Conchita Carpio-Morales (June 19, 2011).
Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme Court administrator and
spokesperson, Atty. Midas Marquez. In a press conference called after the promulgation
of the Courts decision, Marquez initially used the term referendum in explaining the
High Courts ruling. This created confusion among the parties and the interested public
since a referendum implies that the FWBs will have to vote on a common mode by
which to pursue their claims over Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries
of condemnation by the misinformed farmers and the various peoples organizations and
militant groups supportive of their cause.
Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press briefing. But since by then the
parties had already filed their respective motions for reconsideration, he called upon
everyone to just wait for the final resolution of the motion[s], which is forthcoming
anyway. The resolution of the consolidated motions for reconsideration came relatively
early on November 22, 2011, or less than five months from the promulgation of the
decision.


G.R. No. 171101 November 22, 2011
(1) Motion for Clarification and Partial Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by
petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI);
- it is not proper to distribute the proceeds of the conversion sale to the FWBs the
proceeds of the sale belong to the corporation for having sold its asset, and the
distribution would be considered dissolution of HLI
- the actual taking is NOT November 21, 1989, but should be reckoned from finality of the
Decision of this Court, or at the very least, the reckoning period may be tacked to January
2, 2006, the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the DAR
(2) Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated July 20, 2011 filed by PARC and DAR
- Doctrine of Operative fact does not apply because no law was declared void.
(3) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2011 filed by AMBALA
- RA 6657 is unconstitutional
- "operative fact doctrine" does not apply. the option given to the farmers to remain as
stockholders of HLI is equivalent to an option for HLI to retain land in direct violation of
the CARL, the SDP having been revoked. It should not apply if it would result to inequity
- CA erred in holding that improving the economic status of FWBs is not among the legal
obligations of HLI under the SDP and an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10
- CA erred in holding that LIPCO and RCBC were purchasers for value
(4) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by respondent-intervenor
Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM);
- same with AMBALA
- issue of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case which must be decided upon
(5) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 2011 filed by private respondents Noel
Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (Supervisory Group) and
Windsor Andaya (collectively referred to as "Mallari, et al."); and
(6) Motion for Reconsideration dated July 22, 2011 filed by private respondents Rene
Galang and

ISSUES:
(1) applicability of the operative fact doctrine;
(2) constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988;
(3) coverage of compulsory acquisition;
(4) just compensation;
(5) sale to third parties;
(6) the violations of HLI; and
(7) control over agricultural lands (revocation of SDP)
OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE (not much related)
Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 an executive actwas declared
invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.
it should be recognized that SC, in its July 5, 2011 Decision, affirmed the revocation of
Resolution No. 89-12-2 and ruled for the compulsory coverage of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita in view of HLIs violation of the SDP and DAO 10. By applying the
doctrine, this Court merely gave the qualified FWBs the option to remain as stockholders
of HLI and ruled that they will retain the homelots and other benefits which they received
from HLI by virtue of the SDP.
The application of the doctrine is favorable to the FWBs because not only were the FWBs
allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution
scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to
remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
(Upheld previous ruling)
FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis
mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case.
COVERAGE OF COMPULSORY ACQUISITION
FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum
area to be covered to 4,915.75 hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be
covered is 6,443 hectares, which is the agricultural land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and
previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco).
We cannot subscribe to this view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the
propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural
land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75
has. of agricultural land.
DAR, however, contends that the declaration of the area to be awarded to each FWB is
too restrictive. It stresses that in agricultural landholdings like Hacienda Luisita, there are
roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-
owned by farmworkers, and this may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size
that may be awarded per FWB. DAR also argues that the July 5, 2011 Decision does not
give it any leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the
number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.
The argument is meritorious. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural
lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each
qualified FWB will be awarded.
500 HECTARES
RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by
means of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the
back of the titles of the lots they acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the
subject lots were validly converted to commercial or industrial purposes and for which
said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them.
PROCEEDS OF SALE
Considering that the 500-hectare converted land, as well as the 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot,
should have been included in the compulsory coverage were it not for their conversion
and valid transfers, then it is only but proper that the price received for the sale of these
lots should be given to the qualified FWBs. In effect, the proceeds from the sale shall take
the place of the lots.
JUST COMPENSATION - TAKING
In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just compensation for the
remaining agricultural land that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the
FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the "taking" is November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.
Mallari, et al. argued that the valuation of the land cannot be based on November 21,
1989. Instead, they aver that the date of "taking" for valuation purposes is a factual issue
best left to the determination of the trial courts.
AMBALA alleged that HLI should no longer be paid just compensation for the agricultural
land that will be distributed to the FWBs, since the RTC already rendered a decision
ordering "the Cojuangcos to transfer the control of Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, which will distribute the land to small farmers after compensating the
landowners P3.988 million." In the event, however, that this Court will rule that HLI is
indeed entitled to compensation, AMBALA contended that it should be pegged at forty
thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) per hectare, since this was the same value that Tadeco
declared in 1989 to make sure that the farmers will not own the majority of its stocks.
SC: the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP
in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. Further, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the FWBs.
SALE TO THIRD PARTIES
There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita were placed under
CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, then the 10-year period
prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, and,
consequently, the qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands with
respect to their land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they
have fully paid for the lands or not.
The proposition is erroneous. If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary,
the right to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to
any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such
transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith, the
land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the availability of the
land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in
one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of
improvements he has made on the land.
Without a doubt, under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred
or conveyed after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation
patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or
CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year
prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance
of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.
if We maintain the position that the qualified FWBs should be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita, then all efforts at
agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory by this Court, since, at the end of the day,
these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under
CARP.
CONTROL OVER AGRICULTURAL LANDS
SC realized that the FWBs will never have control over these agricultural lands for as long
as they remain as stockholders of HLI.
bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be
operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the
FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will
no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.
In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and
homelots80 received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or
return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011 Decision, "the benefits x x
x were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other
fringe benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining
agreement with Tadeco."
One last point, the HLI land shall be distributed only to the 6,296 original FWBs. The
remaining 4,206 FWBs are not entitled to any portion of the HLI land, because the rights
to said land were vested only in the 6,296 original FWBs pursuant to Sec. 22 of RA 6657.
With these, PARC/DARs, AMBALAs, and FARMs Motions GRANTED.
The order giving option to the FWBs to choose whether or not to stay as shareholders
was thereby recalled.

G.R. No. 171101 April 24, 2012
Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November
22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI)
and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by
private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. and Windsor Andaya (collectively referred to as "Mallari, et al.").
Basically, the issues raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. boil down to the following: (1)
determination of the date of "taking"; (2) propriety of the revocation of the option on
the part of the original FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI; (3) propriety of
distributing to the qualified FWBs the proceeds from the sale of the converted land
and of the 80.51-hectare Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX ) land; and (4) just
compensation for the homelots given to the FWBs.
PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
HLI contends that since the SDP is a modality which the agrarian reform law gives
the landowner as alternative to compulsory coverage, then the FWBs cannot be
considered as owners and possessors of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita at
the time the SDP was approved by PARC. It further claims that the approval of the
SDP is not akin to a Notice of Coverage in compulsory coverage situations because
stock distribution option and compulsory acquisition are two (2) different modalities
with independent and separate rules and mechanisms. Concomitantly, HLI maintains
that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be
considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural
lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its
failure to perform certain obligations under the SDP.
UPHELD PREVIOUS DECISION: taking was effected on November 21, 1989
What is notable, however, is that the divestment by Tadeco of the agricultural lands
of Hacienda Luisita and the giving of the shares of stock for free is nothing but an
enticement or incentive for the FWBs to agree with the stock distribution option
scheme and not further push for land distribution. And the stubborn fact is that the
"man days" scheme of HLI impelled the FWBs to work in the hacienda in exchange
for such shares of stock.
When the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were transferred by Tadeco to HLI in
order to comply with CARP through the stock distribution option scheme, sealed with
the imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21,
1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed of the afore-mentioned attributes of
ownership. Notably, Tadeco and HLI are two different entities with separate and
distinct legal personalities. Ownership by one cannot be considered as ownership by
the other.
Corollarily, it is the official act by the government, that is, the PARCs approval of the
SDP, which should be considered as the reckoning point for the "taking" of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita. Although the transfer of ownership over the
agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs approval, it is this Courts consistent
view that these lands officially became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. And as We
have mentioned in Our November 22, 2011 Resolution, such approval is akin to a
notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
FWBS ENTITLED TO PROCEEDS OF SALE
HLI reiterates its claim over the proceeds of the sales of the 500 hectares and 80.51
hectares of the land as corporate owner and argues that the return of said proceeds
to the FWBs is unfair and violative of the Corporation Code.
This claim is bereft of merit.
UPHELD PREVIOUS RULING - were it not for the approval of the SDP by PARC, these
large parcels of land would have been distributed and ownership transferred to the
FWBs, subject to payment of just compensation, given that, as of 1989, the subject
4,915 hectares of Hacienda Luisita were already covered by CARP.
HOMELOTS
In the present recourse, HLI also harps on the fact that since the homelots given to
the FWBs do not form part of the 4,915.75 hectares covered by the SDP, then the
value of these homelots should, with the revocation of the SDP, be paid to Tadeco as
the landowner.
We disagree. As We have explained in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, the distribution of
homelots is required under RA 6657 only for corporations or business associations
owning or operating farms which opted for land distribution. This is provided under
Sec. 30 of RA 6657.
Since none of the provisions made reference to corporations which opted for stock
distribution under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, then it is apparent that said corporations are
not obliged to provide for homelots. Nonetheless, HLI undertook to "subdivide and
allocate for free and without charge among the qualified family-beneficiaries x x x
residential or homelots of not more than 240 sq. m. each, with each family
beneficiary being assured of receiving and owning a homelot in the barrio or
barangay where it actually resides." In fact, HLI was able to distribute homelots to
some if not all of the FWBs.
Thus, in our November 22, 2011 Resolution, We declared that the homelots already
received by the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or to return
them. However, since the SDP was already revoked with finality, the Court directs
the government through the DAR to pay HLI the just compensation for said homelots
in consonance with Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution that the taking of
land for use in the agrarian reform program is "subject to the payment of just
compensation."
To recapitulate, the Court voted on the following issues in this manner:
1) In determining the date of "taking," the Court voted 8-6 to maintain the ruling
fixing November 21, 1989 as the date of "taking," the value of the affected lands to
be determined by the LBP and the DAR;
2) On the propriety of the revocation of the option of the FWBs to remain as HLI
stockholders, the Court, by unanimous vote, agreed to reiterate its ruling in its
November 22, 2011 Resolution that the option granted to the FWBs stays revoked;
3) On the propriety of returning to the FWBs the proceeds of the sale of the 500-
hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare SCTEX land, the Court unanimously
voted to maintain its ruling to order the payment of the proceeds of the sale of the
said land to the FWBs less the 3% share, taxes and expenses specified in the fallo of
the November 22, 2011 Resolution;
4) On the payment of just compensation for the homelots to HLI, the Court, by
unanimous vote, resolved to amend its July 5, 2011 Decision and November 22, 2011
Resolution by ordering the government, through the DAR, to pay to HLI the just
compensation for the homelots thus distributed to the FWBS.

the government, through DAR, is ordered to pay Hacienda Luisita, Inc. the just
compensation for the 240-square meter homelots distributed to the FWBs.

















DISCUSSION:

The final order of the Supreme Court over the Hacienda Luisita dated April 24, 2014
With G.R.No. 171101 was thought to be an indication that the decades old land
disputes would be over. Even the fourth SONA, His Excellency Benigno Aquino did
mentioned that farmers would be given their titles as early as September of 2013.
But up to this date, not a single land was distributed to the tenants (farmworkers-
benficiaries) not even to have the titles in their possessions.
So, what really transpired in Hacienda Lusita? ...a must read..
The Truth about Hacienda Luisi ta and the Cojuangco-Aquino Family (in
Simple English)
In the Philippines and abroad, the name Aquino is linked with democracy and justice.
Ninoy Aquinos death led to the end of the Marcos dictatorship. After the fall of
Marcos, Cory Cojuangco-Aquino was to be the new hope of the country, a leader
who truly cared for the people.

Unfortunately, this picture is not entirely correct.

The Cojuangco-Aquino family has been running an estate of 6,453 hectares,
Hacienda Luisita, since they bought it in 1958. Jose Cojuangco Sr., Corys father,
received large loans to buy the hacienda, on the condition that it would be
distributed to the farmers by 1967.

Now, 43 years later, the land has still not been distributed. There has never been any
valid reason why this was not done and many people have been killed for demanding
justice.

This article tells the story of Hacienda Luisita and shows the darker side of Cory, her
son Noynoy and the rest of the Cojuangco-Aquino family.



NOTE:


This is a summary of a series of well-researched articles by Stephanie Dychiu,
published on GMANews.TV Special Reports. The goal of this article is to make the
truth available to busy people and to the general public, including people with a basic
knowledge of English.

If you have the time, please also read the original articles on GMANews.TV. The links
are at the end of this article.



THE SPIRIT OF LAND REFORM


When Spain colonized the Philippines, it claimed its lands and forced the natives to
work and pay taxes to Spanish landlords.

Land reform is about giving back the stolen lands to the farmers, whose ancestors
had been tilling the land for centuries.



HACIENDA LUISITAS EARLY YEARS


The land that is now Hacienda Luisita was awarded by the Spanish government to a
Spanish company called Tabacalera in 1882. Tabacalera built a sugar mill in the
hacienda in 1927.

In 1958, Tabacalera sold the hacienda and its sugar mill to the Cojuangco family.



LOANS AND CONDITIONS


To be able to buy the hacienda and its sugar mill, Jose Cojuangco Sr., Cory Aquinos
father, applied for a loan from the GSIS and from a New York bank.

The GSIS loan was approved on the condition that the hacienda would be distributed
among its tenants.

The other loan was granted because the Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP)
deposited part of the countrys international reserves with the New York bank. BSP
did this on the condition that the land would be distributed to the farmers by 1967.



LAND NOT DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS


1967 passed with no distribution taking place. The government asked the Cojuangcos
several times to distribute the land. Each time, the Cojuangcos response was: They
could not distribute the land because there were no tenants on the hacienda.

In 1980, the Marcos government filed a case against the Cojuangcos. Five years
later, the Manila Regional Trial Court ordered the Cojuangcos to sell Hacienda Luisita
to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform so that it could be distributed to the farmers.

The Cojuangcos appealed against the courts decision.




CORYS PROMISE


During Corys election campaign, she and her family promised that if she became
president, the hacienda would be distributed to the farmers.

Cory said, Land-to-the-tiller must become a reality, instead of an empty slogan.
You will probably ask me: Will I also apply it to my familys Hacienda Luisita? My
answer is yes.


CORY COMES TO POWER


In February 1986, Cory became president and Salvador Doy Laurel became prime
minister.

A month later, Cory abolished the 1973 Constitution, the Parliament and Laurels
position as Prime Minister, and took over the law-making branch of the government.



THE MENDIOLA MASSACRE


Almost a year after Cory became president, the hacienda had still not been
distributed to the farmers.

Because of this, thousands of frustrated farmers went to Malacaang in January 1987
to demand land distribution. The police fired on the protesters, killing 13 and injuring
51.




CORYS LAND REFORM LAW


In May 1988, Cory dismissed the 1980 Marcos government case against the
Cojuangcos.

A month later, Cory signed her land reform law.

The law included an option, which allowed land owners to give farmers partial
ownership of a company instead of distributing the land. In other words, the farmers
would receive shares of stock instead of land.



SHARES INSTEAD OF LAND


The Cojuangcos used the option to distribute shares instead of land. They said it was
impractical to divide the haciendas 4,916 hectares of agricultural land among 6,296
farmers, as each farmer would receive only 0.78 hectares.

But according to a National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) study, the
farmers could still earn more with 0.78 hectares of land each than with shares. And if
dividing the land was impractical, the farmers had the option of forming a
cooperative.



COMPANY FORMED BEFORE VOTE


In 1989, Luisitas farmers were asked to choose between shares and land. More than
90% voted for shares.

But as early as August 1988, the Cojuangcos had already created the company that
they would use to avoid actual land distribution. This aroused suspicion that the
stock distribution option had already been decided before it was voted on.



UNFAIR DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES


Hacienda Luisita Inc., the company created by the Cojuangcos, was 33% owned by
the farmers and 67% owned by the Cojuangcos. The division was based on the
capital the two groups put into the company.

4,916 hectares of land, which was valued at P197 million, or P40,000 per hectare,
was considered the farmers capital.

Non-land assets, which were valued at P394 million, were considered the Cojuangcos
capital.

(P197 million is 33% of the total capital, while P394 million is 67% of the total
capital.)

67% ownership meant that the Cojuangcos would still have full control of the
company.

The problem is, there is something wrong with those numbers. Many things that
were included in the Cojuangcos capital should have been included in the farmers
capital. The most important of these things were:

1. Crops valued at P103 million.

2. Part of the land worth P28 million, which was transferred from Hacienda Luisita
Inc. to its sugar mill.

3. 121 hectares of residential land, which was valued at P60 million, or P500,000
per hectare. (The year before, this was valued at only P55,000 per hectare.)

4. 266 hectares of land improvements, which were valued at P58 million, or
P219,000 per hectare. (The year before, these were valued at only P21,000 per
hectare.)

If the above items had been counted as farmers capital, the company would have
been 75% owned by the farmers and 25% owned by the Cojuangcos.



30-YEAR WAITING PERIOD


To make things worse, the 33% ownership would not be given to the farmers in
1989. Instead, it would be given over a period of 30 years. The farmers would
receive only 1/30 of their shares at the end of each year.

Also, the distribution of shares would be based on the number of days the farmers
worked. This means that if a farmer quits or was fired, he or she would stop
receiving shares. If the number of working days was reduced, the number of shares
distributed for that year would also be reduced.

This arrangement was illegal. According to the law, the shares should be distributed
within 60 days of the implementation of the stock distribution option.



MASTER PLAN TO CONVERT LAND


In 1998, the Cojuangcos developed a master plan to convert the haciendas
agricultural land into commercial, industrial and residential lands. The farmers began
to fear for their jobs.



FARMERS PETITION


In 2003, the farmers wage went down to P9.50 per day after deductions. Working
days went down to 1 per week.

The farmers filed a petition to cancel the stock distribution option and stop land
conversion. They also asked for a wage increase and an increase in working days.
But the Cojuangcos said no.

In October 2004, the Cojuangcos fired 327 farm workers, including union officers.




FARMERS GO ON STRIKE


On November 6, 2004, the union of farm workers (United Luisita Workers Union or
ULWU) launched a picket and blocked Gate 1 of the sugar mill.

They were joined by the union of sugar mill workers (Central Azucarera de Tarlac
Labor Union or CATLU), who blocked Gate 2 of the sugar mill.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) were called in. The police used tear gas, batons
and water cannons but they were unable to stop the strike.

Four days after the strike started, the strikers were ordered by the government to
leave within five days, or else they would be removed by force.

The strikers did not leave. They called for help. People from the barrios around
Luisita, including priests, barangay officials and children, came to protect them.

On November 15, the PNP returned with around 400 policemen. But they were still
unable to stop the strike.



THE LUISITA MASSACRE


The next day, 700 policemen, 17 trucks of soldiers in full battle gear, at least 5
snipers, 2 tanks equipped with heavy weapons, a large tractor and 4 fire trucks with
water cannons came to Luisita. The military and the police attacked the protesters
with tear gas and water mixed with chemicals from the fire trucks. The protesters
fought back by shooting the fire trucks and tanks with slingshots.

Then, gunshots were heard. The military and the police fired on the men, women
and children as they ran for their lives. Some protesters were beaten and dragged
into army trucks. Some were shot while running, crouching or lying down.

1,000 rounds of ammunition were used by the military and the police during the
shooting. Seven protesters were killed and at least 121 were injured. Of the 121
injured, 32 suffered gunshot wounds, 11 were children and teenagers, and 4 were
over 60 years old.



NOYNOY DEFENDS MILITARY AND POLICE ACTION


The day after the massacre, Noynoy Aquino said the strike was illegal. He defended
the military and the polices dispersal of the protesters. He said the military and the
police were attacked by sniper fire coming from a neighboring barangay. He said the
riot was started by outsiders.

On the same day, Noynoy said the protesters fired first. He said when the police tried
to break the barricade using an armored personnel carrier, they were fired upon by
the protesters.

Noynoy also told some congressmen not to investigate what had happened as it
could worsen the situation.

Noynoys statements were proven false by the strikers and the group Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), which investigated the situation.



UNIONS OFFICE DESTROYED


Days after the massacre, the unions office was destroyed by soldiers.

"Nung balikan namin ang opisina namin, wala na lahat. Ultimo ang computer na
gamit namin, giba-giba na. Yung mga file, lahat, wala na kaming inabutan. (When
we went back to our office, everything was gone. Even the computer we were using
was totally destroyed. Our files, everything, we were not able to save anything),"
said Lito Bais, a leader of the United Luisita Workers Union.



NOYNOYS ESCORTS TAGGED IN SHOOTING


On January 5, 2005, farm workers George Loveland and Ernesto Ramos were shot.
Both survived, but suffered serious gunshot wounds to the chest and stomach.

In his testimony, Loveland said the shooters were plain-clothes security men who
were with Noynoy three days before the shooting. The words used by Loveland to
describe the men were: mga bata ni Noynoy Aquino, mga private army ni
Congressman (Noynoy), and parang security guard, parang bodyguard.

The day before the shooting, Loveland was told by one of the shooters that the farm
workers should agree to the construction of a road.

Noynoy declined to be interviewed about the incident and did not answer the
questions that were sent to him.



NOYNOYS SUPERHIGHWAY


In his testimony, Loveland said that on January 2, 2005, Noynoy talked to the farm
workers about the superhighway.

Loveland: Sinasabi niya po yung hinihingi daw po niyang pabor yung sa
superhighway na hinihingi niya (He was talking about a favor for the superhighway
that he was asking for)
Sen. Osmea: Ano tungkol sa superhighway? (What about the superhighway?)
Loveland: Project niya daw po, sir (He said it was his project )
Sen. Osmea: Ano ang hiningi ni Congressman Aquino? (What did Congressman
Aquino ask for?)
Loveland: Yung ipatupad, sir, yung kuwan expressway, sir. (To let it happen, sir, the
expressway, sir.)

Loveland was referring to the Luisita interchange of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac
Expressway (SCTEx).

The farmers protested against the construction of the road because it would lead to
the loss of a large area of the haciendas agricultural land.




SCTEX INVESTIGATION


In November 2009, an investigation into the SCTEx project was launched.

Cavite Rep. Crispin Remulla said Noynoy lobbied for the Luisita interchange. Remulla
also raised the following issues:

1. The government paid Hacienda Luisita Inc. P83 million for the right-of-way for 83
hectares of land (P100 per square meter). Remulla said this was overpriced because
the land was worth only P6 to P8 per square meter.

2. The government paid the cost of building the road, which was P170 million.
Normally, companies that want to connect a highway to their private properties
should pay the government. For example, the cost of building the Mamplasan, Asia
Brewery, Greenfield and Southwoods exits on the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX)
were paid by these companies.

Most importantly, the farmers were against the road construction from the start. And
even though the farmers were the rightful owners of the land, they did not receive
the payment of P83 million, or even 33% of it.

According to Noynoy, 97% of the P83 million was used to pay off debts. The farmers
were not aware of these debts.

Noynoy also denied he had anything to do with the project. He said the issue was
being used to tarnish his reputation because he was the leading presidential
candidate.

But Lovelands testimony was recorded in 2005several years before Noynoy
announced that he would run for president.



MURDERS AFTER THE LUISITA MASSACRE


After the Luisita Massacre, the following supporters of Luisita farmers were killed.

- Marcelino Beltran, a retired army officer turned peasant leader who was about to
testify at the Senate and at the Congress.

- Abel Ladera, Tarlac City councilor, engineer and former sugar mill worker who grew
up in the hacienda. Ladera had been actively supporting the farmers and had called
for a review of Luisitas issues.

- Father William Tadena, an Aglipayan priest who had mobilized his parish to donate
rice and groceries regularly to the workers at the picket line.

- Tatang Ben Concepcion, a 67-year-old peasant leader of Anakpawis in Pampanga.

- Flor Collantes, the secretary-general of Bayan Muna in Tarlac.

- Ric Ramos, the president of the union of the sugar mill workers. Before Ramos was
killed, the Cojuangcos had been claiming that there was no money to pay the
workers wages and benefits. Ramos asked the Department of Labor and Employent
(DOLE) to inspect the Cojuangcos warehouse. They found out that it was full of
sugar. The DOLE confiscated and sold the sugar and gave the proceeds to the
workers.

- Tirso Cruz, a union leader. Cruz had been leading protests against the construction
of the Luisita tollway of the SCTEx.

- Father Alberto Ramento, Supreme Bishop of the Aglipayan Church, who had been
helping the farm workers.




"HELLO GARCI" AND LUISITA


Under pressure from public outrage over the Luisita massacre, the Arroyo
administration formed Task Force Stock Distribution on November 25, 2004 to study
the causes of the workers strike. The task force was later renamed Task Force
Luisita.

While the Task Forces investigation was ongoing, Hello Garci hit the country.



CORY AND NOYNOY DEFEND GLORIA


In June 2005, tapes of wiretapped phone conversations between President Gloria
Arroyo and Comelec official Virgilio Garcillano surfaced. This led to accusations that
Arroyo cheated during the 2004 presidential elections.

Even after Arroyo delivered her famous I am sorry speech on TV on June 27, 2005,
Cory defended Arroyo, saying: I am glad the President has broken her silence. Her
admission of judgment lapses leading to improper conduct on her part is a truly
welcome development. Tonight the President has made a strong beginning and I
hope she will continue in the direction of better and more responsive governance.

Noynoy said President Arroyo should be praised for admitting her mistake. He said
her televised apology was a good start for her administration.

The next day, Cory said Arroyo should not be ousted through unconstitutional
means.



NOYNOY VOTES AGAINST PLAYING GARCI TAPES


At the fifth Congressional hearing on the Garci issue on June 30, 2005, three days
after Arroyos I am sorry speech, Noynoy voted against playing the Hello Garci
tapes.

Anakpawis Rep. Rafael Mariano said Noynoy protected Arroyo because she helped
the Cojuangco-Aquinos during the November 2004 strike in Luisita.



CORY AND NOYNOY DROP GLORIA


But on July 8, 2005, just a little over a week after Noynoy voted not to play the Garci
tapes and Cory praised Arroyo for her I am sorry speech, the Aquinos dropped their
support for Arroyo.

"I ask the President to spare our country and herself and make the supreme
sacrifice of resigning," Cory said.

The day before, Cory met with President Arroyo in Malacaang. There were rumors
of a shouting match, which Cory denied.

From then on, Cory and Noynoy actively joined the calls for Arroyo to either resign or
be impeached.



LUISITAWHY THE AQUINOS AND ARROYO BECAME ENEMIES?


Some Luisita farm workers believe the Aquinos abrupt withdrawal of support for
Arroyo had something to do with the hacienda.

The Aquinos broke ties with Arroyo in July 2005, the same month Task Force Luisita
submitted the findings and recommendations of its investigation. This formed the
basis for the governments decision a few months later to cancel Luisitas stock
distribution option (SDO) and order the distribution of the hacienda to the farmers.



GOVERNMENT ORDERS LUISITA DISTRIBUTION


In December 2005, the government ordered Luisitas SDO to be cancelled.

But the Cojuangco-Aquinos would not give up the land without a fight. They obtained
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) from the Supreme Court in 2006, which
prevented the government from cancelling the SDO and distributing the land. This
TRO has been in force for more than three years now.



SDO NOW ILLEGAL


The stock distribution option was abolished in the new land reform law of 2009. But
Hacienda Luisita has still not been distributed to the farmers.




NOYNOYS CAMPAIGN


On February 5, 2010, Noynoy said Hacienda Luisitas problem could not be solved
easily even if he became president. He said the reason was that the government
could not intervene because the hacienda was a private corporation.

Four days later, when Noynoy launched his election campaign, he said he would
distribute the hacienda to the farmers by June 2014.

Cory made a similar promise to distribute Hacienda Luisita when she was running for
president, but she broke her promise.

Danilo Ramos of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) said, Why wait for
2014 when they can relinquish their immoral and unlawful control of Hacienda Luisita
anytime today, tomorrow or next week?



BANK LOANS


Noynoy said the reason why the land could not be distributed sooner was the
haciendas debts. Certain portions of the hacienda had been mortgaged by the
Cojuangcos when losses were suffered by the company.

One of the lawyers of the farmers said the farmers were not aware of these loans
and did not benefit from them. Therefore, it was unfair to force them to shoulder the
burden of these debts.




A MATTER OF SINCERITY


Anakpawis Rep. Rafael Mariano said that if the Cojuangco-Aquino family were sincere
about distributing the land, they should immediately cancel the petition they filed in
2006, which prevented and continues to prevent the distribution of the hacienda to
the farmers.



STILL NO JUSTICE FOR MASSACRE AND MURDER VICTIMS


To this day, the victims of the Mendiola Massacre, Luisita Massacre and Luisita-
related murders have not received justice.



GMANEWS.TV SPECIAL REPORTS


Hacienda Luisitas past haunts Noynoys future
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/181877/hacienda-luisitas-past-haunts-noynoys-future

Corys land reform legacy to test Noynoys political will
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/182195/corys-land-reform-legacy-to-test-noynoys-
political-will

How a workers strike became the Luisita Massacre
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/182515/how-a-workers-strike-became-the-luisita-
massacre

After Luisita massacre, more killings linked to protest
http://www.gmanews.tv/story/183662/after-luisita-massacre-more-killings-linked-to-
protest



PHOTO SOURCES


http://www.gmanews.tv/story/181877/hacienda-luisitas-past-haunts-noynoys-future
http://www.chrispforr.net/row2/chrisphil3/luisita/luisita.htm
http://www.bulatlat.com/main/2005/11/13/a-year-after-hacienda-luisita-massacre-
justice-still-elusive/
http://mymill.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/the-mode-of-production-debate-in-the-
philippines/
http://www.rommelfuntelar.com/blog/2010/01/in-memory-of-mendiola-massacre/


Please feel free to spread or republish this article.

As Early as February 7, 2014, there were reports that Conjuancos claimed paying
471.5m as compensation for the land turnover to the farmworkers beneficiaries. But
to the dismay of the tenants, the Tarlac Development Corporation. Owned by the
clan, as reported by some newspaper, are now claiming their chosen parts of the
land. Even close friends of the Cojuancos are brandishing land agreements to kick
out farmers from the land they have been tilling.
Countless of protest were made by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid (AMBALA)
sa Hasyenda Luisita and acoording to Unyon ng Manggagawa sa Agrikultura (UMA)
farmers were enticed into land agreements or aryendo system and is being
implemented by closed allies of the Cojuancos in order to get hold of the lands.
A network to monitor the distribution of the lands of FWBS was launched in order to
publicized any Agreements and Action to transpired. UMA and AMBALA are working
hand in hand to aims to II 1-5.
The five decades of Land disputes was has never come to its ends. While it was
declared by the Courts; Trial Courts during Marcos Administration and now SC in this
Aquino Administration. Yet the Conjuanco evade the distribution of the land to the
FWBs with the intervention of DAR. Complaints were filed before the high Courts,
allegedly the size of the land were reduced, DAR did not include Carge tracts of land
in the distribution.
While the nation welcomed the decision of the Supreme Court ordering the actual
land distribution of Hacienda Luisita, the SC decision presents several problems and
challenges for farmers and advocates of land reform. The decision highlights the
limitations and problems with governments land reform program CARPER.
1. The SC decision ordered the compensation of the owners of Hacienda Luisita.
By owners, we mean the Cojuangco-Aquino family. They will be
compensated for the 4 335 hectares that will be distributed to the farmers. If
each hectare is valued at 1 000 000 the Cojuangcos will receive P4.3 billion.
The government will advance a certain amount, and the farmers will have to
pay the entire amount through an amortization scheme. No less than
President Benigno Aquino III stressed the importance of just compensation
for the landowners. He also invoked CARPER as the basics for this just
compensation. What is unjust in this scheme is that the vast estate was
unjustly acquired by the Cojuangcos through a government loan from the
GSIS and Central Bank. Public funds were used to acquire the estate with
condition that land through their sweat and blood, working on the estate for
several decades without receiving any of the supposed fruits of their labor.
Over the years, the Cojuangcos got richer and the farm workers were mired
deeper in destitution. There is therefore nothing just in paying the Cojuangcos
P4.335 billion which will come from public funds and the pockets of the long-
exploited farm workers. The farmers demand that the land be distributed for
free.
2. The SC decision did not rule that the Stock Distribution Option scheme was
unconstitutional. Only Chief Justice Renato Corona supported the junking og
the SDO. It would have been a landmark victory for thousands of other
farmers nationwide if the SDO itself, this loophole in the agrarian reform
program of the first Aquino regime, was altogether junked. The SDO has been
abused by big landlords who wanted to evade land reform and actual land
distribution. Instead of actual land distribution, farmers are swindled through
shares of stock.
3. The SC decision exempted the 500 hectare land purchased by RCBC. This
controversial because RCBC knew that the land in question was the subject of
an agrarian dispute, yet it entered into a transaction with Luisita management
to acquire the land. They claimed that they were innocent purchases but
facts will reveal that RCBC, Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (a subsidiary of
HLI) and Centenary Holding hand interlocking directors or officials. There is
also the land conversion order which reclassified this supposedly agricultural
land. The HLI management of course earned a hefty sum from this sale.
4. The SC decision exempted more than 1 000 hectares of land from the
coverage of land reform. Farmers and their lawyers have challenged the basis
of this exemption and have pushed that land reform cover at least 6 443
hectares.
5. The P1.3 billion payment by management to the farmers from the earnings of
land sale (RCBS, SCTEX) will still be subjected to a lot of accounting wizardry.
This amount can still go down if HLI shows that it spent the money for
legitimate corporate expenses and taxes.
This is not a victory for CARPER. Quite the opposite, what happens in the next few
months will show that CARPER will make genuine land reform even more difficult,
nay impossible.
It is now the collective struggle of the farmers which will ensure that their legal
victory (land distribution) will truly be beneficial for all farmer beneficiaries.